IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN

&

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN

TUESDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2019 / 12TH BHADRA, 1941

WA.No.846 OF 2019

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 40046/2017(R) DATED 08.01.2019

OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA

APPELLANTS/ PETITIONERS:

1 JOHN.K.ILLIKKADAN, AGED 57 YEARS, S/O. KURUVILA,

SELECTION GRADE DISTRICT JUDGE, PATHANAMTHITTA,
RESIDING AT SOPANAM, VETTIPURAM, PATHANAMTHITTA.

2 K.P INDIRA, AGED 57 YEARS, W/O. GOPINANTH,

SELECTION GRADE DISTRICT JUDGE , PALAKKAD,
RESIDING AT DISTRICT JUDGES BUNGLOW,
NO XVII/18, THAREKKAD, PALAKKAD-1.

BY ADVS.
SRI.T.C.GOVINDA SWAMY
SMT.KALA T.GOPI

RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS:

1 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF KERALA,
STATE SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695 001.

2 THE REGISTRAR GENERAL,

HIGH COURT OF KERALA, KOCHI 682 031.

3 SRI.K. BABU,
DISTRICT JUDGE AND THE REGISTRAR,
SUBORDINATE JUDICIARY,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, KOCHI 682 031.

4 SRI. KAUSER EDAPPAGATH,

DISTRICT JUDGE, NIA COURT,
4475, BANERJI ROAD, KALOOR, KOCHI 682 017.
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 2 -
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5 SRI. A. BADHARUDEEN,
DISTRICT JUDGE,
COURT COMPLEX, MANJERI, MALAPPURAM 676 121.

6 SRI. C. JAYACHANDRAN,
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE,
DISTRICT COURT, KOTTAYAM 686 004.

7 THE REGISTRAR (SUBORDINATE JUDICIALRY),

HIGH COURT OF KERALA, KOCHI 682 031.

8 BALAKRISHNAN K.K,
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE/
MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,
TIRUR, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN 676 101.

9 THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA,

KOCHI 682 031,
REPRESENTED BY THE REGISTRAR GENERAL.

R1 BY SPL.GOVT. PLEADER SRI.N.MANOJ KUMAR (B/O)

R2, R7, R9 BY ADV. SRI.ELVIN PETER P.J.
R3-R4 BY ADV. SRI.O.V.RADHAKRISHNAN (SR.)
R3-R4 BY ADV. SMT.K.RADHAMANI AMMA
R5 BY ADV. SRI.K.C.ELDHO
R6 BY ADV. SMT.LAKSHMI RAMADAS

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24-07-2019,

ALONG WITH WA.730/2019, WA.731/2019, THE COURT ON 03-09-2019
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN

&

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN

TUESDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2019 / 2ND SRAVANA, 1941

WA.No.730 OF 2019

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 40043/2017(R) DATED 08.01.2019

OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA

APPELLANT/ PETITIONER:

MOHAMMED VASEEM, AGED 59 YEARS,

FORMERLY FIRST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, THRISSUR,
PRESENTLY WORKING AS DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
THODUPUZHA.

BY ADVS.
SRI.S.P.ARAVINDAKSHAN PILLAY
SMT.N.SANTHA
SRI.V.VARGHESE
SRI.PETER JOSE CHRISTO
SRI.S.A.ANAND

RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS:

1 HIGH COURT OF KERALA,

REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL,
HIGH COURT OF BUILDINGS,
ERNAKULAM KOCHI - 682 031.

2 REGISTRAR GENERAL,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM, KOCHI - 682 031.

3 REGISTRAR (SUBORDIANTE JUDICIARY),

HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM, KOCHI - 582 031.
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 4 -
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4 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
HOME DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN-695 001.

5 C. JAYACHANDRAN,
SECOND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE,
KOTTAYAM, PIN - 686 002.

R1-R3 BY ADV. SRI.ELVIN PETER P.J.

R4 BY SPL.GOVT.PLEADER SRI.N.MANOJ KUMAR (B/O)
R5 BY ADV. SRI.P.RAVINDRAN (SR.),
R5 BY ADV. SRI.REJI GEORGE,
R5 BY ADV. SRI.SREEDHAR RAVINDRAN.

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24-07-2019,

ALONG WITH WA.846/2019, WA.731/2019, THE COURT ON 03-09-2019
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN

&

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN

TUESDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2019 / 2ND SRAVANA, 1941

WA.No.731 OF 2019

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 40069/2017(R) DATED 08-01-2019

OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA

APPELLANT/ PETITIONER:

SOPHY THOMAS, AGED 56 YEARS,

MAC TRIBUNAL, ALAPPUZHA,
PERMANENTLY RESIDING AT THANNIKOTTIL HOUSE
(PRANNOY VILLA), MARKET ROAD,
THRIPUNITHURA, ERNAKULAM 682 301,
PRESENTLY PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
THRISSUR

BY ADVS.
SRI.BECHU KURIAN THOMAS (SR.)
SRI.ENOCH DAVID SIMON JOEL
SRI.LEO LUKOSE

RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS:

1 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS,
GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695 001.

2 THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA,

ERNAKULAM 682 031,
REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL.
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 6 -
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3 C.JAYACHANDRAN,
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE,
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TRIAL OF SURYANELLI CASES,
KOTTAYAM 686 001.
PRESENTLY PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
KOTTAYAM

R1 BY SPL.GOVT. PLEADER SRI.N.MANOJ KUMAR(B/O)

R2 BY ADV. SRI.ELVIN PETER P.J.
R3 BY ADV. SRI.P.RAVINDRAN (SR.)
R3 BY ADV. SRI.REJI GEORGE

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24-07-2019,

ALONG WITH WA.846/2019, WA.730/2019, THE COURT ON 03-09-2019
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 7 -
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“C.R.”
K. Vinod Chandran & Anil K. Narendran, JJ.
---------------------------------------------
W.A.Nos.846/2019, 730/2019 & 731/2019
---------------------------------------------

Dated, this the 3rd day of September, 2019

JUDGMENT
Vinod Chandran, J.

The essential comity ideally required within a common

service, identified as a designated cadre comprised of both

"direct recruits" and "by-transfer appointees/promotees";

is often disturbed by inter se disputes of seniority, which

the Courts have been resolving. Here, we find one of such

disputes in the Higher Judicial Service of the State. There

is no dearth of precedents, of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

and the High Courts; which however has to be applied on the

basis of the specific service rules. In the present case,

there are two aspects to be decided, which essentially

arise from the claim of the direct recruits that they

should be assigned to the specific number of vacancies set

apart for that category de hors any promotions made from

by-transfer appointees, in excess of the category assigned

for such promotions or by-transfer appointments, as is the

description in the Special Rules.

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 8 -
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2. The direct-recruits place heavy reliance on the

decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Haneefa P.K. &

Others v. State of Kerala & Others, reported in 2012 (4)

KHC 510, which resolved an identical dispute, between the

by-transfer appointees and direct recruits, who were last

recruited before the present direct recruits. They claim

seniority over the persons appointed by-transfer after the

notification for their recruitment was issued; which

by-transfer appointments were also 'subject to the claim of

the direct recruits'. This is the first aspect. The second

aspect to be decided arise as to the consequence of one of

the direct recruits having been appointed later, by virtue

of a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, which

interfered with the select list as drawn up by the High

Court. Three persons originally selected were sent out of

service and the successful writ petitioner was accommodated

along with three others, who were allowed to be continued.

He claims seniority at par with the three appointed

earlier and also as per the re-drawn select list, which

places him above one of the three. We refer to the parties

by their names.

3. The three, who were originally recruited;

Sri.K.Babu, Sri.Kauser Edappagath and Sri.A.Badharudeen,

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 9 -
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appointed on 21.05.2009; were given seniority in accordance

with their date of appointment. When a draft seniority list

was published, the three direct recruits filed objections,

pointing out that they were entitled to seniority over

some, who have been appointed by-transfer, for reason of

the by-transfer appointments being in excess of the quota

allotted for such category of promotions. Their claims were

allowed by the Administrative Committee (herein after A.C),

which was challenged by two of the officers who are

prejudicially affected by such assignment of seniority

above them; Sri.John K. Illikkadan and Smt.K.P.Indira. The

new direct recruit, Sri.C.Jayachandran who was recruited

later, by virtue of a decision of this Court directing

recasting of the select list, claims seniority along with

the three others who were recruited and appointed earlier

to him. Jayachandran seeks seniority on the basis of the

select list re-cast by the High Court. Amongst the three

recruited and appointed earlier, Badharudeen lost his place

in the select list by reason of Jayachandran being assigned

a position above him for reason of merit. On Jayachandran

claiming seniority along with the other three it prejudices

the claims of Sri. Mohammed Vaseem & Smt. Sophy Thomas who

were appointed, by-transfer before Jayachandran joined

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 10 -
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service. The claims raised by the direct recruits were

considered by the A.C on separate representations filed by

them for reassignment of seniority.

4. We first heard the issue raised by all the

direct recruits for seniority above the persons appointed

prior to them on the ground of their right to be adjusted

in the posts existing within the cadre available to

direct recruits. This is on the ground that the

by-transfer appointments were made in excess of the quota

available to the officers of the subordinate judiciary.

Sri.T.C.Govindaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the

appellants in W.A.No.846 of 2019 first assailed the manner

in which the A.C re-assigned seniority of the direct

recruits, above by-transfer appointees. It was contended

that the A.C passed the order at Exhibit P1 without

assigning any reasons for reassignment of a seniority,

which results in the date of first appointment of the

direct recruits as also by-transfer appointees being

altered from that decided by the Full Court. It was on the

Full Courts recommendation, the Governor had issued

appointment orders. Exhibit P1 is cursory and non-speaking.

Reliance is placed on MRDA Officers Association Kedarnath

Rao Ghorpade v. Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 11 -
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Authority and Another [(2005) SCC 235] to argue that even

administrative orders require clear reasons to be shown

especially when it causes prejudice to a person or group of

persons.

5. It is also argued that the notice received by

the appellants as produced at Exhibit P5 also did not spell

out the reasons for a hearing or the prima facie decision

arrived at by the High Court so as to convene a hearing of

the direct recruits and by-transfer promotees. Exhibit P5

merely referred to a seniority dispute and specified the

time and date of hearing as also forwarded the objections

to the seniority list as submitted by the direct recruits.

A Special Committee of three judges was first convened,

which, however, did not hold a hearing. But a

recommendation admittedly was given by the Special

Committee to the A.C. The A.C then found that a hearing was

not afforded to the affected parties and constituted yet

another Special Committee of three Judges. That Special

Committee, heard the affected officers and is said to have

given their recommendations to the A.C. The recommendations

of both the Special Committees were never furnished to the

affected officers. It is understood from Exhibit P2, in

which is recorded the Minutes of the A.C meeting, that,

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 12 -
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both the Special Committees recommended for rejection of

objections of the direct recruits, for reason of a break

down of quota. The A.C neither thought it fit to supply a

copy of the decision to the affected officers; nor did it

hold a separate hearing before they decided to differ from

the recommendations of the Special Committee. These

admitted facts show a clear violation of principles of

natural justice. The A.C also ought not to have interfered

with the date of appointments as decided by the Full Court

or the date of the appointment orders issued by the

Governor; in accordance with the decision of the Full

Court. The power invoked by the Governor being under

Article 233 of the Constitution.

6. It is further argued that the status of the

appellants, by-transfer appointees, on their taking charge

as District Judges by virtue of the orders passed under

Article 233 cannot be said to be ad hoc, fortuitous or a

stop gap appointment. There is absolutely no suggestion in

the appointment orders of the appellants, produced at

Exhibits P3 and P4, that they have been appointed only as

an ad hoc measure. The only reservation in the appointment

orders is that it would be without any prejudice to the

claim of the candidates to be directly recruited from the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 13 -
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Bar as provided under Rule 2(b) of the Kerala State Higher

Judicial Service Rules, 1961. This does not necessarily

indicate a valid claim being available to the direct

recruits; which would arise for decision when a seniority

dispute is raised on valid grounds.

7. As far as the appellants, John Illikkadan &

Indira, are concerned, they took charge in accordance with

Exhibit P3 dated 29.05.2007 and Exhibit P4 dated 16.05.2008

respectively on 06.07.2007 and 30.05.2008. Their probation

was declared respectively on 19.08.2009 and 21.06.2010;

their period of probation commencing from their date of

first appointment. The decision in Baleshwar Dass and

Others v. State of U.P. and Others [(1980) 4 SCC 226] is

relied to contend that there is a clear distinction insofar

as a person who is appointed to hold a temporary post and

one who is appointed substantively to that temporary post.

The learned Counsel would categorize the cadre strength of

96, as affirmed by the High Court in the counter affidavit,

to be a magic number which has absolutely no relation to

the posts available to be filled up by District Judges.

There are many number of positions of a regular and

permanent nature available ex-cadre, like the post of

Registrars in the High Court; and also temporary posts

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 14 -
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available, the like of which is the Fast Track Courts, to

which promotions were made from the Subordinate Judiciary.

Reference is made to Exhibits R2(f) decision of the A.C as

distinguished from R2(g) decisions to contend that in the

case of John Illikkadan there is no mention of an ad hoc

promotion being granted. Even Indira was posted, continued

and probation declared from the joining date.

8. Yet another contention taken by the appellants

in W.A.No.846 of 2019 is on Rule 6 of the The Kerala State

Higher Judicial Services Special Rules, 1961 (referred to

as "Special Rules", for brevity) [Exhibit P17] which is

applicable to the appointment of the appellants herein. In

fact, the amended Rules, as was the case in the pre-amended

Rule, refers to seniority being determined with reference

to the date of the order of first appointment to the

category of District and Sessions Judges. The seniority as

per the Rules has to be determined in accordance with the

date of first appointment in which case the appellants are

to be assigned seniority above the direct recruits. Haneefa

P.K. (supra) is sought to be distinguished specifically on

the ground that there, three persons promoted, were

reverted to accommodate the direct recruits. There, a list

of 15 officers from the Subordinate Judiciary were

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 15 -
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identified for promotion "as and when vacancies arise". Ten

from among these were promoted, out of which three were

reverted to accommodate the direct recruits. There is no

such contingency arising in the case of the appellants who

were included in a list of persons, whose date of

appointment was long before the actual recruitment of the

direct recruits. It is also contended that the A.C did not

have the power to re-assign a seniority determined by the

date of first appointment as per the Special Rules, which

was made by the Governor under Article 233, in consultation

with the High Court. This would not fall within the ambit

of the delegated powers of the A.C is the compelling

argument.

9. Sri.Bechu Kurian Thomas, learned Senior

Counsel, appears for the appellant, Sophy Thomas, in

W.A.No.731 of 2019, who admittedly is junior to the direct

recruits appointed in 2009. The grievance of the appellant

is against the seniority assigned to Jayachandran, who was

appointed later, but pursuant to the very selection process

in which the other 3 were appointed, by virtue of a

decision of this Court. He has been granted seniority above

the appellant, though the appellant was appointed to the

Higher Judiciary earlier. The appellant took charge on

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 16 -
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04.08.2010 in accordance with Exhibit P5 appointment order

dated 02.07.2010, while the 3rd respondent took charge on

24.02.2011 in accordance with Exhibit P4 appointment order

dated 22.12.2010. The learned Senior Counsel specifically

drew attention to the Explanatory Note in Exhibit P4, which

speaks of the decision of the Full Court to continue in

service, with effect from 21.05.2009, the 3 direct recruits

who were appointed on that date. The 3 rd respondent,

however, was appointed with effect from the date on which

he assumes charge, which was on 24.02.2011. The appellant's

probation was declared on 04.08.2012 by Exhibit P6 and the

3rd respondent's probation was declared only on 01.03.2013.

The appellant was also accommodated in the category of

Selection Grade District Judge on 04.08.2015 while the 3 rd

respondent was so accommodated in that category only on

24.02.2016.

10. The learned Senior Counsel invites us to Rule

2 and the specific words employed therein "to be filled up

or reserved to be filled up", which is also noticed by the

Full Bench in Haneefa P.K. (supra). When there was a

specific provision available for reserving the vacancies to

be filled up from a particular category and the same having

not been done, there is no cause for the High Court to

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 17 -
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address a claim of seniority on a day prior to the date of

appointment. Even as per the Full Bench decision, there is

no rota system available in the Higher Judicial Service and

there could be no date assigned for the purpose of

seniority on the basis of the date on which the vacancy

arises. The amendment brought in to Rule 6 is specifically

pointed out. Prior to 2008 the Higher Judicial Service

consisted of two categories, being (i) Selection Grade

District and Sessions Judges; and (ii) District and

Sessions Judges (including Additional District & Sessions

Judges). The amended regulations had three such categories

ie: (i) Supertime Scale; (ii) Selection Grade; and (iii)

District and Sessions Judge. The method of appointment and

the percentage of vacancies earmarked for each category of

officers in the Subordinate Judiciary also underwent a

change. Rule 2(c) provided for appointment to the category

of District and Sessions Judge from the Subordinate

Judges/CJMs at 50% and by-transfer appointments by a

limited competitive examination of persons having not less

than five years service in the cadre of Subordinate

Judge/CJM at 25% and 25% by direct recruitment. It is the

compelling argument of the learned Senior Counsel that as

the appellant is now informed, no appointments have been

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 18 -
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made by way of competitive examination from the Subordinate

Judiciary and that itself would show that there is a

complete break down of quota. As a matter of fact the

Subordinate Judges/CJMs get promoted as District Judges

within the five year period. Reliance is placed on the

Explanatory Note in Exhibit P4 appointment order of the 3 rd

respondent to emphasize conscious decision taken by the

Full Court, which finds specific expression and

articulation in the order of the Governor which cannot be

varied by the A.C.

11. Sri.Bechu Kurian Thomas specifically refers to

the writ petition filed by the 3rd respondent [W.P.(C)

No.16206 of 2010] against the selection of direct recruits

to the cadre of District Judges carried out in the year

2009, which is produced at Exhibit P3. In addition to

seeking setting aside of Exhibit P11 list of qualified

candidates and Exhibit P12 select list produced therein,

the 3rd respondent sought the select list to be re-cast in

the order of merit including only those candidates who had

secured the qualifying marks in the written examination

without any moderation/grace marks. These reliefs were

allowed by the Court, by virtue of which decision the 3 rd

respondent was appointed. The 3rd respondent, in fact, had

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 19 -
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as relief No.(iv) sought for appointment with effect from

30.03.2009, which is the date of original appointment of

the other direct recruits, being respondents 9 to 12 in the

said list. The said relief obviously was not granted and,

hence, there is res judicata insofar as the 3rd respondent

now raising such a plea. Even under Article 226 of the

Constitution, the principle of res judicata has application

and for this purpose reference is made to the decision of a

Division Bench of this Court reported in Jayachandran v.

High Court of Kerala [2010 (4) KLT 49].

12. Exhibit P4 is the appointment order of the 3rd

respondent, which is dated 22.12.2010, which was not

challenged. Reference is also made to the counter affidavit

of the 3rd respondent, wherein the 3rd respondent admits to

have approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2017 with a

writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for the

purpose of re-assignment of his date of appointment. This

was rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, finding that he

has to approach the High Court first. No writ petition has

been filed before the High Court. It is also submitted that

the claim raised by the 3rd respondent is hit by delay.

Exhibit P4 appointment order is on 22.12.2010 and the 3rd

respondent took charge on 24.02.2011. He filed a

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 20 -
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representation for re-assignment of seniority before the

High Court on 11.04.2012, Exhibit R3(h). He slept over the

matter and again filed a second representation dated

18.09.2014 [Exhibit R3(i). There is gross delay insofar as

the claim raised and that too only by unrepresented

memorials submitted before the High Court on the

administrative side and no proper challenge was made

judicially. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

P.S.Gopinathan v. State of Kerala [(2008) 7 SCC 70] is

relied on to bring home the contention of delay.

13. Sri.S.P.Aravindakshan Pillay, learned Counsel

appearing for the appellant in W.A.No.730 of 2019,

Sri.Mohammed Vaseem, specifically refers to Exhibit P1

appointment order of the appellant dated 02.07.2010. At the

time of appointment of the appellant, it is pointed out

that the six direct recruits who were appointed as per the

original select list were already occupying their

positions. There can be no claim raised of the appointment

of the appellant to be in a post in the cadre; which is

actually due to a direct recruit. The appointment order at

Exhibit P1 also only referred to pending writ petitions,

subject to the result of which alone there was a rider

insofar as the appellant being provisionally appointed. The

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 21 -
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writ petitions referred to were disposed of by Exhibit P2.

The challenge also was to the selection of direct recruits

and the learned Single Judge followed a Division Bench

decision, which found that there could be no prescription

of minimum age and no successful candidate could be avoided

from consideration for reason only of prescription of

minimum age; which was not available in the original

notification. Sri.S.P.Aravindakshan Pillay specifically

argues that without an order under Article 233; on the

recommendation made by the High Court, there cannot be any

alteration made to the date of appointment or the date of

first appointment, which power is exclusively conferred on

the Governor under Article 233. Even if the decision of the

A.C was communicated to the Governor, it would be

insufficient insofar as the Full Court having not taken the

decision; which is imperative. Any reference to the High

Court is a reference to the Full Court of the High Court.

It is pointed out that at the time of appointment of the 5 th

respondent in this appeal [3rd respondent in W.A.No.731 of

2019], there was no want of vacancy and out of the six

direct recruits appointed in the year 2009, three were

terminated from service and it was when all the six

occupied their posts that the appellants in these two

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 22 -
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appeals were promoted. The nature of vacancy within the

cadre, whether it be that allotted to the direct recruits

or the promotees, is irrelevant and there could be a

reassignment of seniority only when there is a dearth of

vacancy to accommodate the direct recruits. When the

method of appointment to any service is both by direct

recruitment and by-transfer, Rule 5 of Part II of KS&SSR

provides that while a direct recruit can only be appointed

to a substantive vacancy in the permanent cadre, a promotee

or by-transfer appointee can be recruited to any vacancy.

The A.C has failed to take note of the proviso to Rule 27

of Part II KS&SSR, which speaks of the determination of

seniority where the method of appointment to a post is by

promotion, by-transfer or by direct recruitment in a fixed

ratio or percentage.

14. The learned Senior Counsel

Sri.O.V.Radhakrishnan appears for respondents 3 and 4 in

W.A.No.846 of 2019, Babu and Kauser. The learned Senior

Counsel first refers to Exhibit R2(b) the notification for

direct recruitment dated 16.04.2007 and Exhibit R2(c), the

original select list dated 30.03.2009. The notification was

issued also on the basis of a decision taken by the Full

Court in its meeting held on 29.08.2006, wherein it was

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 23 -
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decided to call for applications to fill up six vacancies

available in the cadre of District Judges to be recruited

by direct recruits from the Bar and also by promotion of

Sub Judges/CJMs, as evidenced from Exhibit R2(f). Exhibits

P3 and P4 orders, by which the two appellants were

promoted, are referred to specifically to point out that

they were so promoted subject to the claim of the

candidates recruited direct from the Bar as provided under

Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules, 1961. The counter affidavit

of the High Court at paragraphs 11 to 15 is read over to

urge that the cadre strength was 96, in which there was not

sufficient number of direct recruits while the number of

promotees together in the temporary posts, far exceeded

their quota. The appointments made as per Exhibits P3 and

P4 are stated to be ad hoc in the counter affidavit; to the

Fast Track Courts, which were made permanent only by

Exhibit R2(i) in the year 2012. The vacancies within the

cadre, out of 25% vacancy only 18 were occupied by direct

recruits and six remaining vacancies were occupied by

promotees which can only be on ad hoc basis. Rule 2(1) of

Part I KS&SSR is pointed out to contend that appointment to

a service is only when the appointee discharges for the

first time the duties of a post borne on the cadre of such

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 24 -
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service. The by-transfer appointments made of the

appellants were not to the vacancies available for

by-transfer appointments within the cadre and the ad hoc

appointment cannot enure to their benefit in determining

the seniority. The tenor of Exhibits P3 and P4 appointments

makes it clear that the appellants were obliged to give way

to direct recruits when they are appointed. Specific

reference is made to the last paragraph of the Full Court

Resolution, produced at Exhibit R2(g). Reliance is placed

on State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi [(1978) 2 SCC

102] to support the A.C's decision. It is also submitted

that despite producing the minutes of the A.C, no specific

challenge is made to it or a relief sought to set aside the

same. Exhibit P1 challenged in the writ petition is a

consequent decision taken by the A.C as per the minutes at

Exhibit P2. Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan

Sindhi [(2010) 1 SCC 234] is relied on. Amarjeet Singh v.

Devi Ratan [(2010) 1 SCC 417] is also relied on to buttress

the argument that having accepted Exhibits P3 and P4, the

appellants are estopped from challenging the same. State of

Maharashtra v. Anita [(2016) 8 SCC 293] is also relied

upon. Rule 18 of Part II KS&SSR is pointed out to contend

that the declaration of probation would not enure to the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 25 -
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benefit of the appellants for the purpose of determination

of seniority especially since the Rule provides that such

declaration of probation would be subject to determination

of seniority. C.K.Antony v. B.Muraleedharan [(1998) 6 SCC

530] is relied on to advance the said contention.

15. Sri.P.Ravindran, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the sole party respondent in W.A.Nos.730 of

2019 and 731 of 2019 who is also a respondent in the other

appeals asserts, that the appointment of Jayachandran was

delayed not because of any fault of his. The said

respondent was first excluded from consideration on the

ground of minimum age, which was not a condition in the

notification, which was challenged successfully before this

Court. Later, in the course of the said proceedings, it

came out from the counter affidavit of the High Court

itself that grace marks were awarded to all candidates who

appeared for written examination before viva voce. The

respondent had raised a further challenge before this

Court, which was allowed in Jayachandran (supra). The

operative portion of the said judgment is specifically

pointed out to contend that the direction was to re-cast

the select list. It was not an appointment to be made

subsequent to the judgment and when a selection list is

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 26 -
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re-cast on the basis of the decision of this Court,

necessarily seniority would have to be assigned from the

date of initial appointment of the other three persons

recruited earlier and there should also be made adjustments

in the seniority as among the direct recruits. The Division

Bench had specifically directed consideration from the 7

candidates, seen from Exhibit R3(e) produced along with the

counter in W.A.No.l731 of 2019. Only the candidates at

serial Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 were appointed ie: Babu, Kauser,

Jayachandran and Badharudeen, in that order of merit and

seniority. Jayachandran had the 3rd place in the merit list

of candidates above the 5th place obtained by Badharudeen,

who was adjusted in the quota available for Muslims. Hence,

though Badharudeen was appointed in 2009, in assigning

seniority; Jayachandran has to be given seniority above the

less meritorious candidate. The argument is further taken

that the seniority of the respondent again has to be

assigned, as assigned to the 3 candidates in the specific

posts available to direct recruits from amongst the cadre

strength.

16. On the arguments addressed as to delay in

making a representation and not having challenged the

date of first appointment judicially, it is pointed out

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 27 -
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that there was never such an argument raised before the

learned Single Judge nor was there any pleadings to that

effect. The learned Single Judge having affirmed the

decision of the A.C, it does not call for an interference

in an appeal, since there is nothing patently wrong or

palpably illegal in the decision of the learned Single

Judge. Without conceding to the aspect of delay, the

decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.S.Deodhar v.

State of Maharashtra [AIR 1974 SC 259] is pointed out to

argue that a person need not be non-suited on the bare

ground of delay when there is a satisfactory explanation

for the same. If the respondent, who was a member of the

Higher Judicial Service, subordinate to the High Court,

waited for a decision from the administrative side of the

High Court without asserting his claim before a Court of

law, he cannot be faulted; nor can it stand against a valid

claim being permitted. Unless there is a patent wrong

committed by the learned Single Judge, there cannot be any

interference in an appeal, asserts the Senior Counsel.

17. Sri.Elvin Peter appearing for the High Court

would seek to sustain the order of the Administrative

Committee. In the course of hearing, we had a doubt as to

the fixation of the cadre, which has to be done by the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 28 -
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Government as per Rule 2(18) of Part I KS&SSR. As per the

Rules, “the permanent cadre of each service, class,

category and grade shall be determined by the State

Government”. We, hence, directed the Registry to place

before us the order of fixation of cadre. We see from the

additional affidavit filed by the Registry that fixation of

cadre has not been carried out by the Government at the

relevant time. By an additional affidavit G.O.(MS)

No.107/2015/Home dated 29.05.2015 [Annexure R2(g) in

W.A.No.846 of 2019] is placed before us. This is the first

time that the Government determines the cadre in the Higher

Judicial Service of the State as evident from the following

extract from the said document:

“The Administrative Committee of the High Court

comprising of the Hon'ble Chief Justice and Senior
most Hon'ble Judges of High Court have been fixing
the cadre strength of Kerala State Higher Judicial
Service i.e., District Judges in the State. The
present cadre strength has been fixed by the
Committee at 99, in its meeting held on
09.12.2010”.

Hence, obviously the cadre has not been fixed by the

Government as is necessitated by the KS&SSR, at the time

when the notification for the subject recruitment was made

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 29 -
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and the appointments carried out after a due selection, or

at any time before 2015. We raised a query especially since

the brunt of the arguments were on the cadre fixed at 96

exclusively of the permanent posts available. However, the

doubts raised by us are of no consequence especially

looking at the Special Rules.

18. The Special Rules have undergone amendments

twice after the instant direct recruitment. The Special

Rules as existing prior to 2008, the amended Rules in 2008

and 2017 are produced as Exhibits P17, P18 and P19 in W.P.

(C) No.40046 of 2017 [W.A.No.846 of 2019]. As argued by

Sri.Elvin Peter, the number of posts in category (2),

District & Sessions Judges, to be filled or reserved to be

filled up by direct recruitment shall be 1/3rd of the

permanent posts in categories (1) and (2) taken together.

Cadre hence, is not significant and the quota has to be

applied to the permanent posts. Here, we deal with the

contention of the appellants that in 2008, prior to the

appointment of the direct recruits, there was an amendment

brought out, as evident from Exhibit P18, which creates

three categories and reduces the quota for direct recruits

to 25% of the cadre strength of posts as distinguished from

the earlier quota of 1/3rd of permanent posts in the two

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 30 -
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categories as per the unamended Rules. It was the argument

that the cadre strength has to be taken insofar as the

amended Rules at Exhibit P18 having come into force. In the

context of there being no fixation of cadre by the

Government, there should be found no quota available for

the direct recruits.

19. We are unable to countenance the said

argument, though it has to be observed that even after

Exhibit P18 Special Rules came into force there was no

fixation of cadre by the Government as is required under

the KS&SSR. However, for the subject appeals, we are of the

opinion that the quota has to be found from Exhibit P17,

the unamended Rules, which applied at the time of

notification. The notification for direct recruitment was

on 16.04.2007 and the selection process went through a

series of litigation and eventually the select list was

published on 30.03.2009. The decision to make appointments

by direct recruitment which led to the notification, was

taken by the Full Court on 29.08.2006. In such

circumstance, the direct recruits in the subject selection

are appointed to the quota of 1/3 rd of the permanent posts

in categories (1) & (2) taken together, as spoken of in the

Special Rules which stood unamended prior to 2008.

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 31 -
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20. Before proceeding further with the facts, we

have now to look at the binding precedent of a Full Bench

in Haneefa P.K.(supra). Haneefa P.K. dealt with a similar

inter se seniority dispute in the Higher Judicial Service

pursuant to a direct recruitment made in 2001, of 8

candidates from the Bar, selected in accordance with the

Special Rules, to the 1/3rd of the permanent posts in

categories (1) & (2) taken together. On facts, it has to be

noticed that the writ petitioners therein, the by-transfer

appointees, five in number, are available at serial Nos.40,

41, 42, 43 and 45 of Exhibit P6 seniority list produced in

W.P.(C) No.40046 of 2017 [W.A.No.846 of 2019]. While they

were continuing in the post of Sub Judges/CJMs, the High

Court recommended the approval of a panel of 15 from the

said cadre, for appointment by-transfer, as District &

Sessions Judges in the Higher Judicial Service. The

Governor approved the panel for appointment, as and when

vacancies arise, as per notification dated 16.02.2001

[Exhibit P1 therein]. The notification specifically

provided that the approval of the panel of Sub Judges/CJMs

is without prejudice to the claims of the candidates to be

recruited from the Bar as provided in Rule 2(b) of the

Special Rules.
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 32 -
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21. The by-transfer appointees therein were at

serial Nos.8, 10, 11, 13 and 15 [respectively at serial

Nos.40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 in Exhibit P6 seniority list of

W.A. 846/19]. Those at serial Nos.8,9 and 10 were promoted

and posted as District Judges; Serial No.8 on 07.06.2001

and No.10 on 04.09.2001 respectively as Motor Accidents

Claims Tribunal, Ottappalam and Labour Court, Kollam. We do

not refer to serial No.9 since he did not dispute the

seniority issue. The direct recruits were appointed by

order dated 29.10.2001 and the High Court issued the

posting orders on 26.11.2001. Finding dearth of vacancies

in the permanent posts, serial Nos.8, 9 and 10 were

reverted and posted as Sub Judges. They (8&9) claimed

independently for seniority as per their original

appointment and posting orders, both prior to the

appointment of the direct recruits. The persons at serial

Nos.11, 13 and 15 though not posted as District Judges

prior to the appointment of direct recruits, claimed their

seniority from the date of notification issued by the

Government (order of the Governor under Article 233) on

16.02.2001. The Full Bench found the direct recruits to be

entitled to seniority above the petitioners de hors the

fact that serial Nos.8, 9 and 10 from the panel approved by

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 33 -
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the Governor, were posted to the post of District Judges

prior to the appointment of the direct recruits.

22. The panel of 15 was approved and orders issued

under Article 233, by the Governor on 16.02.2001, while the

notification for direct recruitment was long prior on

28.10.2000. Here we have to pertinently observe that the

seniority of the other persons (from the 15), promoted from

the cadre of Sub Judges/CJMs, who were at Serial Nos.1 to

7, were not disturbed, since they were appointed to the

posts prior to the appointment of direct recruits. We

observe this because if the contention of the direct

recruits is sustained, even as the High Court is now wont

to argue, then the entire panel, even those appointed

before the appointment of the direct recruits, should have

been assigned seniority below the direct recruits; since

the vacancies in the permanent posts were available

before the panel of Sub Judges/CJMs were recommended.

We also notice that the persons at serial Nos.4,6 & 7 in

the panel of 15 in the order dated 16.02.2001 were posted

and joined duty respectively on 07.03.2001, 30.03.2001 &

16.04.2001. They were assigned seniority above the direct

recruits at positions 29 to 31 and the 8 direct recruits at

32 to 39. At the outset we observe so, to emphasize that

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 34 -
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the facts are quite distinct in the subject case and there

was no instance of reversion to make appointment of direct

recruits, in the year 2009.

23. The Full Bench considered the claim of the

persons borne in the category of Sub Judges/CJMs who were

not posted as District Judges prior to the appointment of

the direct recruits and when posted, reversion having been

effected of two, (actually 3, one of whom did not challenge

the seniority), who were so posted prior to the appointment

of direct recruits. This was also on account of there being

no sufficient vacancies available in the permanent posts in

categories (1) & (2) of the Special Rules, taken together.

The Full Bench categorically found that there is a specific

quota available to the direct recruits as per the Special

Rules, negativing the argument that what was provided was

only a maximum of posts to which the direct recruits could

be appointed. We bow to the declaration and think it

apposite that the provision be extracted here under:

“Method of appointment- (a) Appointment to

category (1) shall be made by the High Court by
promotion from category (2).
(b) Appointment to category (2) shall be made
by transfer from the category (1) Subordinate
Judges/C.J.Ms. of the Kerala Judicial Service or
by direct r4ecruitment from the Bar, provided
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 35 -
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that the number of posts in category (2) to be

filled up or reserved to be filled up by direct
recruitment shall be one-third of the permanent
posts in categories (1) and (2) taken together.
(c) ...”.
(underlining by us for emphasis)

24. The Full Bench placed heavy reliance on the

decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in O.P.Singla v.

Union of India [(1984) 4 SCC 450], wherein the Special

Rules applicable to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service was

considered; to reverse a Division Bench judgment of this

Court, the reference from which was considered by the Full

Bench. The Rules applicable to the Delhi Higher Judicial

Service provided recruitment by promotion and by direct

recruitment from the Bar. In the Delhi rules there existed

a proviso that not more than 1/3rd of the substantive posts

in the service shall be held by direct recruits. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court, analyzing the Rules, upheld the

contention of the promotees that the language is more

consistent with the contention that the proviso merely

prescribes a ceiling for direct recruits. This was found to

be quite different from a usual quota provision, which does

not use negative language; but provides a mere quota in the

substantive post to be filled by direct recruitment. The

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 36 -
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Hon'ble Supreme Court then found, that the matter does not

rest with the proviso. Though the rule does not prescribe a

quota for direct recruits, reading the integral scheme of

recruitment as a whole and specifically noticing the rota

as provided for the purpose of seniority under Rule 8(2),

it was found to be a specific quota earmarked for direct

recruits. Hence, when direct recruitment is made, the

seniority of direct recruits vis-a-vis promotees ought to

be determined in the order of vacancies based on the quota

of vacancies as provided in Rule 8(2) adjusting each in

their rotation vacancy. But however, in that case

considering the fact that the promotees were continued for

long in their officiating capacity a equitable principle

was evolved to determine the inter-se seniority; which is

not relevant for us. Here, we have to emphasize that there

is no rota available in the Kerala State Higher Judicial

Service Rules. The Full Bench held so in Para 48: “We have

already interpreted Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules that it

is intended to operate as a quota for direct

recruitment.”(sic) There is also no quota for by-transfer

appointments, which in no uncertain terms demonstrate that

there is no ratio applicable as per the Special Rules read

with the KS&SSR. Our decision turns on this crucial aspect

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 37 -
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of existence of quota only in the case of the direct

recruits and that too confined to the permanent posts in

category (1) & (2) of the Special Rules taken together and

the absence of a rota and a ratio.

25. Here we have to notice a few decisions as cited

by the respondents on the inter-se seniority disputes. C.K.

Antony (supra) was a case in which there was a ratio

prescribed of 3:2 between direct recruits and by-transfer

promotees and the latter were appointed on an ad hoc basis.

It was held that though they were regularized in the posts

to which they were appointed, at the time of regularization

the direct recruits were undergoing training and were

available for appointment. In the instant case there is no

ratio, as we found and the appointment was not ad hoc and

were to substantive vacancies, though temporary, which were

indefinitely continued and later made permanent as we will

demonstrate a little later.(1993) 3 SCC 371 State of W.B.

Vs. Aghore Nath Dey and (2006) 6 SCC 558 K.Madalaimuthu Vs.

State of T.N are cases where appointments were made to

temporary posts for specified periods without recourse to

the procedure delineated in the recruitment rules. (2008) 2

KLT 533(SC) Prasad Kurien Vs. Augustin is applicable only

to the extent of its declaration that the ratio or

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 38 -
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percentage prescribed has to be applied to the cadre

strength and not to the vacancies. This has been applied in

the instant recruitment, albeit to the permanent posts,

which is the prescription in the Special Rules. There

though the prescription was for every fourth vacancy to a

direct recruit, it was held to be a ratio of 3:1,

applicable to the total cadre strength. (2012) 13 SCC 340

Union of India Vs. N.R. Parmar looked at the quota-rota

principle and directed the inter-se seniority between the

promotees and direct recruits to be inter-spaced in the

rotational turns, even though the direct recruitment of the

very same recruitment year got delayed.(2016 11 SCC 656

[Venkata Prasad Vs. High Court of A.P] was a case in which

the relevant rules provided for ad hoc appointment, which

appointee would not be regarded as a member of the

permanent cadre as per the rules itself; by virtue of which

alone the subordinate officers were promoted to the post of

District & Sessions Judges in Fast Track Courts. These

decisions, cited at the Bar, have no application in the

adjudication of the instant dispute.

26. On a reading of the provision as extracted

herein above, the Full Bench of this Court found that in

the Special Rules applicable, to the higher judicial

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 39 -
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service of the State, what is provided is not a maximum and

is a definite quota as interpreted from the words employed

in the provision. The word “or” had to be read as “and” and

the mandate was available insofar as the words employed

being “shall be one-third”. It was held that the number of

posts in category (2) to be filled up and reserved to be

filled by direct recruitment shall be 1/3rd of the permanent

posts in categories (1) & (2) taken together. There can,

hence, be no deviation from the principle laid down by the

Full Bench of this Court; nor do we have a different

opinion. It is very clear that there is a definite quota

available to the direct recruits, which is 1/3 rd of the

permanent posts in categories (1) & (2) taken together. As

on the date of notification or even the decision of the

Full Court, the available permanent posts in the categories

(1) & (2) were 96, which is an admitted fact. Out of this

96, 1/3rd was available to the direct recruits. But,

however, we notice that the resolution taken by the A.C was

to fill up 25% of the vacancies, which obviously was by

reason of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in All

India Judge's Association Vs. Union of India [(2002) 4 SCC

247]. We pause here to take note that the quota available

in the Higher Judicial Service had undergone changes by

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 40 -
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reason of the subsequent amendments. For the subject

appointments, the Special Rules as it existed prior to 2008

was applicable, which provided for a quota of 1/3rd of the

permanent vacancies. We see from the resolutions placed

before us of the A.C, constituted at various points,

wherein decisions were taken to appoint direct recruits in

the Higher Judicial Service, that the quota as understood

by the A.C was 25%. Presumably this could have been by

reason of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in All India Judge's Association.

27. Noticing the constant discontentment among the

members of the Higher Judicial Service in regard to their

seniority in service, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in All

India Judge's Association case prescribed a quota for

promotion at 50% by following the principle

“merit-cum-seniority” and 25% strictly on merit by limited

departmental competitive examination and 25% by direct

recruitment. It was held:

“We direct the High Courts to suitably amend and

promulgate seniority rules on the basis of the
roster principle as approved by this Court in
R.K.Sabharwal case [(1995) 2 SCC 745] as early as
possible. We hope that as a result thereof there
would be no further dispute in the fixation of
seniority. It is obvious that this system can
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 41 -
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only apply prospectively except where under the

relevant rules seniority is to be determined on
the basis of quota and rotational system. The
existing relative seniority of the members of the
Higher Judicial Service has to be protected but
the roster has to be evolved for the future.
Appropriate rules and methods will be adopted by
the High Courts and approved by the States,
wherever necessary by 31-3-2003”.

We notice that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had specifically

directed the High Courts to amend the rules and also held

that the same can only apply prospectively except where,

under the relevant rules seniority has to be determined on

the basis of quota and rotational system. The Rules have

been amended only in the year 2008 and then in the year

2017. This does not affect the adjudication of the present

case at all, since the Special Rules as existing at the

time of selection of the respondents, direct recruits,

there was no rotational system available. The appellants

have a contention that since only 25% of the vacancies were

filled up, there should be found a break down of quota,

since already many promotees were occupying the posts

available to the direct recruits and this continued for a

quite long period. We need not go into the issue of a quota

break down as we would presently demonstrate.

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 42 -
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28. In this context, we have to notice the admitted

fact that two Special Committees were appointed, in the

instant case, by the A.C for making recommendations as to

the inter se seniority dispute. Both the said Committees

found against the direct recruits and held that there is a

quota break down. The recommendations of the Committees,

however, were not supplied to the affected persons and this

is one defect they pointed out insofar as the decision of

the A.C, which went contrary to the recommendation. The

by-transfer appointees also have a contention that in the

context of the A.C having found against the recommendation,

necessarily a further hearing should have been afforded.

29. We would first deal with the appellants'

contention regarding break down of quota. The Committee of

Judges appointed by the A.C though comprises of Judges of

this Court; were only aiding or assisting the A.C in coming

to a decision on the administrative side. At the hearing as

afforded, the Committee so appointed would have definitely

taken note of the rival contentions raised and it would

have found a place in their recommendations. If, the A.C

has the power to decide on the issue; which is one of the

grounds of challenge; which we assume for now but will

comprehensively deal with later, we are of the definite

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 43 -
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opinion that there need be no further hearing carried out.

Hence, there was also no necessity of the recommendation of

the Committee of Judges being furnished to the affected

parties. When we commenced hearing of the matter, we

noticed that the learned Single Judge had gone into the

recommendations of the Committee and we specifically told

the learned Counsel that if we feel that the

recommendations of the Committee have to be looked into, we

would first furnish it to them and hear arguments based on

that. However, in the context of our finding on the role of

the Special Committee, we are of the opinion that there is

absolutely no necessity to furnish the recommendations of

the Committee; which as implied is only a recommendation,

not binding and capable of regulating the decision of the

A.C on the administrative side. We also did not feel

compelled to look into such recommendations; and hence felt

no requirement to furnish the same to the parties to the

lis. On the question of quota break down as argued on the

basis of only 25% direct recruitment having been made

as against 1/3rd of the permanent posts provided in

the Special Rules, we cannot countenance the ground

since that alone would not lead to a finding of total break

down of quota. The mere fact that some of the permanent

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 44 -
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posts, in which direct recruitment was to be made,

by-transfer appointees continued would not result in total

break down of quota.

30. Going back to the Full Bench decision in

Haneefa P.K. (supra), it was specifically noticed in

paragraph 22 that the Special Rules do not contain any rota

provision. It was held on an examination of Rule 2(b) of

the Special Rules that the latter part of the Rules insofar

as the direct recruits are concerned, by the language

employed, provides a positive and mandatory quota of 1/3 rd

of the permanent posts in the two categories as seen from

the Special Rules. We also pertinently notice that the

declaration of the Full Bench is only to that end and

cannot be taken further to find a specific quota prescribed

for the by-transfer appointments and it is so stated in

paragraph 62 that “once separate quotas are prescribed for

direct recruitment and for appointment by transfer from the

subordinate judiciary, the ratio prescribed in the rules

should be maintained against the cadre strength”. Here, we

have to notice that the Full Bench has not found a ratio at

all and the decision only leads to a quota being made

mandatory for direct recruitment in the permanent posts in

category (1) & (2) taken together.

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 45 -
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31. Here, we have to take a slight deviation on the

distinct facts available in the present case. Herein the

decision of the A.C to take steps for direct recruitment of

District Judges was taken on 29.08.2006 [Exhibit R2(f)]

[The documents referred to in this paragraph are as

produced in W.P.(C) No.40046 of 2017]. The notification

inviting applications for appointment as District Judges

was dated 16.04.2007 [Exhibit R2(a)]. The appointment of

John Illikkadan was by order dated 29.05.2007 [Exhibit P3]

and Indira by order dated 16.05.2008 [Exhibit P4]. They

joined the post on 06.07.2007 and 30.05.2008 respectively.

The appointment of six direct recruits as District Judges

was by Exhibit R2(b) dated 30.03.2009. We would refer to

the dates with respect to the other cases a little later,

since if the claim of Jayachandran, for seniority along

with those appointed on 30.03.2009 is allowed, he also

would be deemed to have been appointed on 30.03.2009 and

the benefit of notional seniority available to direct

recruits would enure to him also.

32. Evidently from the dates noticed herein above,

the decision to make direct recruitment was taken even

before the two promotees joined the post of District Judge.

The appointment orders also specifically indicated that the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 46 -
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promotions would be subject to the claim of the direct

recruits. Much has been made out, of the said reservation,

in affirming the claim of direct recruits in the

appointment orders of promotees. We do not think that the

reservation made, in any manner indicated that the direct

recruits are senior to the promotees. It only indicated

that, if they are found to be senior, then the promotees

would not have any claim based on their date of

appointment. There is also a ground urged that the

promotees having not challenged their appointment orders

cannot claim seniority as against the direct recruits. A

decision was also placed reliance upon to canvass the

position. In Anita (supra) the Government took a policy

decision to make contractual appointments and those

recruited had executed agreements specifying the nature of

their appointment. They cannot raise any claim of

permanency was the finding. Here the appointment orders

merely made the appointments subject to the claim of direct

recruits and unless the latter have a valid claim it cannot

be pressed against the promotees, since if there is no

valid claim the condition would not be of any consequence.

33. It is also very pertinent that in the present

instance there was no reversion effected and there were

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 47 -
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available vacancies in the permanent posts of District

Judges for accommodating all the direct recruits. In fact,

six of them were originally appointed, out of which three

lost their positions by reason of the judgment of this

Court in a case filed by Jayachandran. Only one joined

additionally, in the recast select list thus bringing the

total direct recruits to four. It is pertinent that even

when six joined, originally, in 2009, there was no

reversion of any by-transfer appointee.

34. We have to recall, at the risk of reiteration,

the bare minimum facts in the earlier direct recruitment

which resulted in the Full Bench judgment in Haneefa P.K.

(supra). There, the decision of the A.C and the

notification for direct recruitment came, as in the present

case, before the promotion made by-transfer. The

by-transfer appointees were included in a panel and the

Governor under Article 233, issued appointment order by

G.O. dated 16.02.2001. There were 15 persons in the list

and they were posted in the post of District Judge as and

when vacancies arose. The notification for appointment of

direct recruits was made by G.O. dated 29.10.2001, of 8

direct recruits. Before the direct recruits were appointed,

10 persons from the panel as per the G.O. dated 16.02.2001

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 48 -
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were posted as District Judges, of which serial Nos.8, 9

and 10 were reverted to accommodate the direct recruits.

Those who were reverted, along with the persons in serial

Nos.11 and 13, were the writ petitioners before the Full

Bench, challenging the seniority given to the direct

recruits above the promotees. Here, we have to point out

that the contention of the direct recruits was also only

that they are senior to the person at serial No.8 of the

panel as per G.O. dated 16.02.2001. We say this because the

notification for appointment of direct recruits was prior

to the G.O. dated 16.02.2001, the panel of Sub Judges/CJMs.

Necessarily there would have been a claim of seniority

raised above all the 15 persons in the panel, if the

arguments addressed now were addressed then. The High Court

even at that stage did not have such a ground and on a

representation made by the direct recruits, assigned them

seniority only as against the promotees who were appointed

and posted, but reverted and those not posted from the

panel. The contention of the by-transfer promotees was that

their order under Article 233 dated 16.02.2001 being prior

to the appointment order of the direct recruits dated

29.10.2001, they ought to have been given seniority above

the direct recruits, which was negatived by the Full Bench.

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 49 -
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As noticed above the by-transfer appointees in the very

same panel, upto Serial No.7 were assigned seniority above

the direct recruits and they continued as seniors even

after the direct recruits were appointed. They were

appointed and posted as District Judges before the direct

recruits joined service.

35. In this context the decision of one of us [Anil

K.Narendran,J.] in Sunilkumar V.S. v. State of Kerala &

Others [2016 (2) KHC SN 40] assumes significance. We have

to also observe that at that stage and in every previous

litigation on this aspect, the different Benches, proceeded

on the basis that there was a cadre determined by the

Government as is provided in the KS&SSR. We have seen that

there was no cadre determined at the time when the subject

selections were initiated. However that does not efface the

sheen of the decisions rendered nor does it loose the

lustre it has as a binding precedent since the quota was

not on the cadre. We specifically extract paragraphs 30

and 31 of the said decision:

“30. Rule 12(4) of Part I KSR defines 'cadre'

to mean the strength of a service or part of a
service sanctioned as a separate unit. Rule 2(18)
of Part I KS&SSR provides that, the permanent cadre
of each service, class, category and grade shall be
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 50 -
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determined by the State Government. Rule 5 of Part

II KS&SSR deals with method of recruitment. As per
Rule 5, where the normal method of recruitment to
any service, class or category is neither solely by
direct recruitment nor solely by transfer but is
both by direct recruitment and by transfer, (a) the
proportion or order in which the Special Rules
concerned may require vacancies to be filled by
persons recruited direct and by those recruited by
transfer shall be applicable only to substantive
vacancies in the permanent cadre; (b) a person
shall be recruited direct only against a
substantive vacancy in such permanent cadre, and
only if the vacancy is one which should be filled
by a direct recruit under the Special Rules
referred to in clause (a); and (c) recruitment to
all other vacancies shall be made by transfer.
31. Note 1 to Rule 5 of Part II KS&SSR
provides that, all permanent vacancies and
temporary vacancies except those of short duration
shall be treated as substantive vacancies. Note 2
to Rule 5 provides further that, the vacancies on
account of leave and deputation with a duration of
less than six months shall be treated as vacancies
of short duration, provided, such vacancies with a
duration of three months to six months should not
be treated as vacancies of short duration, if the
vacancies are likely to last long or new vacancies
are likely to arise. Note 3 to Rule 5, added as per
SRO No.194/93 published in Kerala Gazette on
2.2.1993, mandates that, whenever a ratio or
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 51 -
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percentage is fixed for different methods of

recruitment/appointment to a post the number of
vacancies to be filled up by candidates from each
method shall be decided by applying the fixed ratio
or percentage to the cadre strength of the post to
which the recruitment/ transfer is made and not to
the vacancies existing at that time".

The above decision has been upheld by a Division Bench by

common judgment dated 10.02.2017 in W.A. No. 1986 of 2015

and connected cases. There the specific contention for the

writ petitioners was that there should be more vacancies to

which direct recruitment is resorted, since the categories

as spoken of in the Special Rules includes all the posts,

totalling about 146. The Division Bench noticed Section

2(c)(iii) as available in the Special Rules, as amended in

2008 (Ext.P18 in W.A. 846 of 2017). It was held so:

“17. Apparently Rule 2(c)(iii) cannot be read

in isolation. The words “post in the category” has
to be read along with Rule 5 of KS&SSR, in which
event there is no ambiguity in the Rules as the 25%
posts have to be in the permanent cadre or on the
basis of the cadre strength of the posts.”

36. Obviously the reference to cadre was without

realising that there was no cadre determined at that time.

But that is of little significance since Rule 5(b) of the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 52 -
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KS&SSR makes it abundantly clear that direct recruitment

can only be to a substantive vacancy in the permanent

cadre; while Rule 5(c) provides for recruitment to all

other vacancies by transfer. Note (1) also provides that

“All permanent vacancies and temporary vacancies except

those of short duration, shall be treated as substantive

vacancies” (sic). What emanates from the above extracts,

both from the decisions of the Single and Division Bench,

read with the provisions of the Special Rules and the

KS&SSR, is that the quota prescribed for direct recruits is

to be 1/3rd of the permanent posts available in category (1)

& (2) of the Special Rules. Admittedly there are many

temporary vacancies available, which, though called

“temporary”, are not for a specific period or for “short

duration”. In this context, we have to notice that there

were a number of Fast Track Courts in which there were

District Judges appointed, which Courts continued without

break, till they were made permanent in the year 2012. Rule

5 of Part II KS&SSR, provides that all permanent and

temporary vacancies, except those of short duration, shall

be treated as substantive vacancies. However, there can be

no appointments made of direct recruits unless other than

to permanent vacancies. This leads to a corollary that

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 53 -
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temporary vacancies, not of a short duration, being a

substantive vacancy, the same can be filled up only from

the Subordinate Judiciary, that too with by-transfer

promotions.

37. In Balehwar Dass(supra) the distinction was held

to be one, holding a post in a substantive capacity for an

indefinite period of a long duration in contradistinction

to one who holds it for a definite or temporary period,

subject to confirmation in a regular post. Here, the

appellants were admittedly appointed on probation, but

their probation was declared within the two year period as

available in the KS&SSR. They have also continued in the

post, which definitely raises a presumption that the

appointment was made to a substantive vacancy, that too in

accordance with the Rules after carrying out a due

selection procedure delineated in the Rules. Those persons

so appointed to substantive vacancies though categorized as

a temporary one, but not of a short duration, continued

thereat and their probation was declared from the date of

their initial appointment. They are persons who were

appointed to the post of District Judges prior to the

appointment of direct recruits and there being no

circumstance of a reversion having been effected for

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 54 -
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accommodating the direct recruits, necessarily the

by-transfer appointees get seniority over the direct

recruits. They, obviously were not appointed to the quota

ear marked for the direct recruits and all of the direct

recruits were appointed without reversion of any

by-transfer appointees. The by-transfer appointees were

continued in their posts, substantive ones and we

pertinently reiterate that the Special Rules applicable do

not provide a rota nor even a ratio and confines to a

quota to the direct recruits that too restricted to the

permanent posts.

38. Here we garner support from (1990) 2 SCC 715

Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association

Vs. State of Maharashtra, as was extracted by the Full

Bench.

"(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post

according to rule, his seniority has to be
counted from the date of his appointment and
not according to the date of his confirmation.

The corollary of the above rule is that where the

initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according
to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the
officiation in such post cannot be taken into
account for considering the seniority".

In the Full Bench case the three by-transfer appointees who

were posted as District Judges were continuing in the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 55 -
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vacancy reserved for the direct recruits. This is why they

were reverted from the posts, which were permanent posts

and earmarked to the quota of direct recruits. However the

mere fact that none of the direct recruits, in this

recruitment were accommodated by reversion of a by-transfer

appointee demonstrates that the vacancies in the quota

against the permanent vacancy of 96 was remaining vacant as

on the date of the appointment of direct recruits.

39. The inter-se seniority in the Delhi Higher

Judicial Service, decided in O.P. Singlas case again came

up for consideration in (2000) 8 SCC 25 Rudra Kumar Sain

Vs. Union Of India; then by a Constitution Bench. We

extract the following observation which is relevant to our

case too.

"11. ... In fact, in Singla case, the Court

on being confronted with a peculiar situation,
had given the direction as to in what way, it
will be equitable for all concerned to determine
the inter se seniority, but notwithstanding the
same, the High Court appears to have stuck to
the idea of the principles engrafted in Rule
8(2) of the Rules and then decided the question
of seniority on the basis of number of posts,
available in the service. While doing so, the
High Court obviously missed the findings of this
Court that under the scheme of the Rules,
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 56 -
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“service” is a narrower body than the cadre and

every temporary post, which carries the same
designation as that of any of the posts in the
Schedule is a cadre post, whether such post is
comprised in the “service” or not. ..."

We are quite conscious of the fact that the peculiar

situation, of the promotees having been continued for long

years in that case, and there arising a breakdown of the

“quota-rota” rule for reason of which an equitable

principle for determining inter-se seniority was evolved

therein; is not available here. But still the underlined

portion is applicable as the rules stand here too, ie: the

Special Rules read with KS&SSR.

40. The Constitution Bench also considered the

meaning of the terms “adhoc”, “fortuitous” and “stopgap”,

frequently used in service jurisprudence. Looking at the

dictionary meanings these terms were found to denote an

accident or occurrence by chance, which is unforeseen or to

tide over an emergent situation. It was held so:

"19. The meaning to be assigned to these terms

while interpreting provisions of a service rule
will depend on the provisions of that rule and the
context in and the purpose for which the
expressions are used. The meaning of any of these
terms in the context of computation of inter se
seniority of officers holding cadre post will
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 57 -
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depend on the facts and circumstances in which the

appointment came to be made. For that purpose it
will be necessary to look into the purpose for
which the post was created and the nature of the
appointment of the officer as stated in the
appointment order. If the appointment order itself
indicates that the post is created to meet a
particular temporary contingency and for a period
specified in the order, then the appointment to
such a post can be aptly described as “ad hoc” or
“stopgap”. If a post is created to meet a
situation which has suddenly arisen on account of
happening of some event of a temporary nature then
the appointment of such a post can aptly be
described as “fortuitous” in nature. If an
appointment is made to meet the contingency
arising on account of delay in completing the
process of regular recruitment to the post due to
any reason and it is not possible to leave the
post vacant till then, and to meet this
contingency an appointment is made then it can
appropriately be called as a “stopgap” arrangement
and appointment in the post as “ad hoc”
appointment. It is not possible to lay down any
strait-jacket formula nor give an exhaustive list
of circumstances and situation in which such an
appointment (ad hoc, fortuitous or stopgap) can be
made. As such, this discussion is not intended to
enumerate the circumstances or situations in which
appointments of officers can be said to come
within the scope of any of these terms. It is only
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 58 -
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to indicate how the matter should be approached

while dealing with the questions of inter se
seniority of officers in the cadre".

41. The appointments of the promotees, herein,

were not stopgap, fortuitous or adhoc as these terms are

understood by the Constitution Bench. Apposite in this

context would be reference to 1992 Supp(1) SCC 304 [A.N.

Sehgal Vs. Raja Ram Sheron] wherein the rules under

consideration, even according to the Court was a departure

from the normal service jurisprudence. There the rules were

framed heavily in favour of direct recruits, even

permitting their appointment to ex-cadre posts. Hence the

dictum laid down there cannot have any application here.

Reference however is relevant, to notice the normal rule as

found by the Supreme Court in para 8:

"8. ... We may make it clear at this juncture

that in normal service jurisprudence a direct
recruit would always be recruited and appointed
to a substantive vacancy and from the date he
starts discharging the duty attached to the post
he is a member of the service subject to his
successfully completing the probation and
declaration thereof at a later date and his
appointment relates back to the date of initial
appointment, subject to his being discharged
from service on failure to complete the
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 59 -
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probation within or extended period or

termination of the service according to rules.
Equally it is settled law that a promotee would
have initial officiating promotion to a
temporary vacancy or substantive vacancy and on
successful completion and declaration of the
probation, unless reverted to lower posts, he
awaits appointment to a substantive vacancy.
Only on appointment to a substantive vacancy he
becomes a member of the service. But
confirmation and appointment to a substantive
vacancy are always an inglorious uncertainty and
would take unduly long time. Therefore, the
confirmation or appointment to a substantive
capacity would not normally be a condition
precedent to reckon the continuous length of
service for the purpose of seniority. On the
facts of the case and the settled legal
position, at first blush the argument of Shri
P.P. Rao carried weight that the appellants
would get their seniority from the respective
dates of the initial promotion as Executive
Engineers. But we find that in the instant case
the rules have made departure from the normal
service jurisprudence as would appear from the
scheme under the rules".
(underlining by us for emphasis)

This inglorious uncertainty was removed inter alia when the

Fast Track Courts were made permanent. But all those

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 60 -
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appointed continued uninterruptedly, without break and were

borne in the higher judicial service and it does not affect

the seniority of appointments made by-transfer to

substantive vacancies in the cadre which comprises of both

permanent and temporary vacancies as per Rule 5 of the

KS&SSR. We have also been taken through the decision in

High Court of Kerala Vs. Mohandas P.K. [2017(3) KHC 703],

which considered two questions: (i) whether the cadre

includes temporary vacancies? and (ii) whether in

determining the cadre the Government has to numerically

determine the posts?. The decision is not relevant to

decide this case wherein the concept of cadre does not at

all arise, since the Special Rules provide for a quota on

the permanent posts; the number of which is clearly

discernible, which number was inadvertently taken as the

cadre in the various decisions.

42. On the above reasoning, we find it difficult

to accept the impugned decision of the A.C, as is seen from

the records. Here we have to notice that there is a

contention that Exhibit P2 Minutes of the A.C has not been

challenged before this Court. Bharat Amratlal Kothari

(supra) considered among others the question whether the

High Court was correct in granting compensation. There the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 61 -
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Police had seized vehicles and the animals carried in it on

charge of cruelty to the animals and the jurisdictional

Magistrate rejected the application for release of animals,

made by their owners. The animal owners moved the High

Court against the FIR registered but did not make any

specific prayer for compensation in which event the High

Courts order granting it, was found to be improper.

Amarjeet Singh (supra) was a case in which without

challenging the promotion, the consequential seniority list

was challenged. Here we do not see any such infirmity. The

writ petitioners were only issued with Exhibit P1 Official

Memorandum dated 26.10.2017, which also did not contain any

reasons as to how the direct recruits were given seniority

above the by-transfer appointees. The by-transfer

appointees sought for the reasons behind the order; upon

which Exhibit P2 was issued. The reasons in Exhibit P2 has

to be read into Exhibit P1 and the challenge to Exhibit P1

would suffice.

43. The issue as highlighted by the A.C in Exhibit

P2 is as to whether the direct recruits who commenced

service subsequent to the officers appointed by-transfer

are entitled to seniority above the promotees. Reliance was

placed on Haneefa P.K. (supra) and it was noticed that the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 62 -
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same was upheld in a Special Leave Petition by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court. The A.C found that the Full Bench had

considered whether those appointed in excess of the quota

are entitled to seniority from the date of their

appointment and it was held that such appointees will gain

seniority only from the date their appointments are

adjusted against the vacancies within the quota. Here, the

A.C erred insofar as there being no quota prescribed for

by-transfer appointees. As we noticed, the quota is only

for the direct recruits and that is confined to the

permanent posts in the cadre of District Judges. The Full

Bench judgment in Haneefa P.K. was elaborately quoted,

which we have distinguished herein above on the facts

available here of no reversion having been effected to

accommodate the subject direct recruits. The A.C then found

that the by-transfer appointees were appointed to the

vacancies in the direct recruitment quota; which is

patently erroneous, since there was no reversion effected

and all the six direct recruits so appointed on 30.03.2009

were appointed without disturbing any previous appointment

in the category. The A.C considering the issue of break

down of quota, found that the judgment in Haneefa P.K.

covers the issue as on 01.11.2012 and that there was no

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 63 -
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deliberate inaction or inertia on the part of the

Government [read 'High Court'] in making appointments

regularly to the post. Haneefa P.K., according to us,

considered the facts of the recruitment of District Judges

from the Bar, who were appointed in the year 2001 and the

declaration is insofar as there being a definite quota

available to the direct recruits in the relevant Special

Rules, as against the permanent posts. We do not find any

break down of quota rule but the Full Bench cannot be

relied on to automatically confer seniority on direct

recruits. All the same, the finding that by-transfer

appointments made were to quota available to the direct

recruit District Judges cannot be countenanced. There were

sufficient vacancies in the cadre to accommodate the

by-transfer appointees as also the direct recruits at the

time when the direct recruits came into service. This amply

demonstrates that there were enough permanent vacancies

available for accommodating the direct recruits and none

from the by-transfer appointees were occupying such

permanent posts. We, hence, do not find any reason to

uphold the decision of the A.C.

44. In this context, we also have to take note of

the contention that the A.C did not have the power to
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 64 -
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decide on the seniority dispute between by-transfer

appointees and direct recruits. Reliance placed by the High

Court is on the delegation of the powers made by the High

Court as produced at Exhibit R2(l) [Minutes of the Judges'

Meeting on 12.06.1986]. There can be no dispute raised on

the power to so delegate, for which decisions are legion

and we refer to just one. In Batuk Deo Pati Tripati (supra)

the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the power of the High

Court to frame rules for regulating the manner in which the

administrative control of the Subordinate Judiciary, vested

in it may be exercised; under Article 235. There the

question dealt with was the compulsory retirement of a

judicial officer, on the recommendation of the

Administrative Committee, without reference to the Full

Court. Therein the rules framed required the decision of

the A.C to be communicated to the individual judges who

could offer their comments and if no comment was offered

within the stipulated time there was deemed an assent. It

was found that though the Registry communicated the

decision of the A.C to the Judges, the communication was

after the recommendation was send to the State Government.

Even then the power exercised was found to be proper.

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 65 -
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45. The power under Article 235 was elaborated

as seen from the following extracts from paragraph 10,

14 & 18:

"10. ... The relevant part of Article 235 of the

Constitution provides that the control over District
Courts and courts subordinate thereto shall be vested
in the High Court. Since Article 216 provides that
every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and
such other Judges as the President may from time to
time deem it necessary to appoint, Article 235 has to
be construed to mean that the control over District
Courts and courts subordinate thereto is vested in
the entire body of Judges who together constitute the
High Court and not in the Chief Justice as
representing the High Court or an Administrative
Judge or a smaller body of Judges acting as an
Administrative Committee. But though the control over
subordinate courts is vested institutionally in the
High Courts by Article 235, it does not follow that
the High Courts have no power to prescribe the manner
in which that control may in practice be exercised.
In fact, the very circumstance that the power of
control, which comprehends matters of a wide-ranging
variety, vests in the entire body of Judges makes it
imperative that rules must be framed to make the
exercise of control feasible, convenient and
effective. The seeds of the jurisdiction to frame
rules regulating the manner in which the control over
subordinate courts is to be exercised are thus to be
found in the very nature of the power and in the fact
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 66 -
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that the power vests in the entire body of Judges.

The High Court has, therefore, the power under
Article 235 itself to frame rules for regulating the
manner in which the control vested in it may be
exercised. The power to do a thing necessarily
carries with it the power to regulate the manner in
which the thing may be done. It is an incident of the
power itself and indeed, without it, the exercise of
the power may in practice be fraught with
difficulties which will frustrate, rather than
further, the object of the power. It is undoubtedly
true that the rules framed for prescribing the manner
in which a power may be exercised have to be truly
regulatory in character. The reason is that under the
guise of framing rules, the essence of the power
cannot be permitted to be diluted. ...

xxx xxx xxx

14. ... The ideal which inspired the provision that

the control over District Courts and courts
subordinate thereto shall vest in the High Courts is
that those wings of the judiciary should be
independent of the executive. Tracing the history of
that concept, Hidayatullah, J., in State of West

Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Baghchi(1966) 1 SCR 771 has

highlighted the meaning and purpose of Article 235.
It is in order to effectuate that high purpose that
Article 235, as construed by this Court in various
decisions, requires that all matters relating to the
subordinate judiciary including compulsory retirement
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 67 -
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and disciplinary proceedings but excluding the

imposition of punishments falling within the scope of
Article 311 and the first appointments and promotions
should be dealt with and decided upon by the High
Courts in the exercise of the control vested in them.
xxx xxx xxx

18. ... We have pointed out above that the

amplitude of the power conferred by Article 235, the
imperative need that the High Courts must be enabled
to transact their administrative business more
conveniently and an awareness of the realities of the
situation, particularly of the practical difficulties
involved in a consideration by the whole court, even
by circulation, of every day-to-day matter pertaining
to control over the District and subordinate Courts,
lead to the conclusion that by rules framed under
Article 235 of the Constitution the High Courts ought
to be conceded the power to authorise an
Administrative Judge or an Administrative Committee
of Judges to act on behalf of the Court".
(underlining by us for emphasis)

46. The Supreme Court drew a distinction between

dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and compulsory

retirement to find that the latter power could be exercised

by the A.C. We provided the underlining above, to emphasize

that under the guise of framing rules the essence of the

power cannot be diluted and promotions and first

appointments are not matters that can be delegated.

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 68 -
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Resolving of seniority disputes is inextricably linked with

the first appointment, and promotion is dependent upon such

seniority at least when merit is equal.

47. We also look at whether there was an actual

delegation or not. In this context, we have to notice the

Minutes of the meeting on 01.07.1986, wherein Appendix 'A'

referred to the distribution of administrative work in the

High Court. The High Court, as has been fairly established,

is the Full Court. There are certain matters specifically

enumerated as the exclusive premise of the Full Court, of

which we specifically extract Clauses (3) and (4):

“(3) Final decision on Committee's recommendations

regarding direct recruitment of District Judges.
(4) Final decision on Committee's recommendations
in regard to promotions of judicial officers”.

Hence, the recommendation of the High Court to the Governor

for appointment to the post of District Judges, whether it

be by direct recruitment or promotion, has to be made by

the Full Court. The order of the Governor under Article 233

is on the basis of the said recommendation; which for all

purposes is the consultation as referred to in Article 233.

We would think that a seniority dispute, which is

intrinsically linked with the date of appointment and the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 69 -
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recommendation so made by the Full Court on which the

Governor acts under Article 233, would be a matter which

has to be considered by the Full Court itself.

48. The High Court, however, relies on the powers

delegated to the A.C, which comprises of the Chief Justice

and four senior-most Judges. The specific power referred to

is in item No.5, which is extracted herein below:

“II(5) Representation from judicial officers

regarding service problems”.

Though the issue of seniority can also be literally termed

as a service problem, we do not think that the intention

was to delegate such disputes to be decided by the A.C as a

mere service problem. Inter-se seniority disputes cannot be

trivialised and though a problem, in the literal sense, it

falls for determination based on the applicable rules and

the evident facts, tested on the established legal

principles; which require an assertion of a claim, hearing

of affected parties and commend a judicious adjudication.

Service problems would be many and varied and in every

cause when a grievance is raised by a Judicial Officer it

would be difficult for the Full Court to be convened; nor

is it necessary. This is the power specifically granted to

the A.C, but it cannot result in interference to the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 70 -
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recommendations of the Full Court made to the Governor

under Article 233. We would find the A.C, to be not

conferred with the power to so adjudicate a seniority

dispute and ideally the same should have been placed before

the Full Court. We have answered the said question which is

raised in the appeals, only for future guidance in such

matters, which, it would be inappropriate to leave

undecided. We have already held that the A.C's decision is

not legally sustainable; we also find the A.C to have no

jurisdiction to decide the issue.

49. The next question to be decided is whether

Jayachandran can claim seniority as on 30.03.2009 or even

prior to that date by reason of the quota in the Special

Rules. We have answered the latter question, against the

direct recruits who were actually appointed on 30.03.2009

and this would regulate even Jayachandran, who was

appointed much later. As to the facts which led to the

later appointment, suffice it to notice that it was

occasioned by reason of the Division Bench judgment of this

Court in Jayachandran [2010 (4) KLT 49]. The decision was

on 13.09.2010 and directed re-casting of the select list.

It has been argued by the by-transfer appointees that the

writ petitioner therein had specifically sought for

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 71 -
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seniority from the date on which the other direct recruits

as per the select list were appointed, which was not

permitted by the Division Bench. We are, however, inclined

to accept the contention raised by learned Senior Counsel

Sri.P.Ravindran that by directing re-casting of the select

list what was intended was that the persons who are newly

placed in the select list also should be given their due

seniority from the date of the initial appointment of the

others. We cannot find that, by not specifically referring

to the prayer and allowing it, there has been a rejection

of the said prayer made. We would think that the direction

to re-cast the select list is sufficient indication that

any person newly selected would have to be assigned the

seniority as on the date of the original selection. We also

notice that it was not by Jayachandran's fault that his

appointment was delayed.

50. Be that as it may, obviously what was directed

by the Division Bench, of recasting the select list was not

done and Jayachandran was appointed as District and

Sessions Judge from the date he assumes charge. We refer to

the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent in W.P.(C)

No.40046 of 2017. On re-casting the select list with the 7

candidates as referred to in Jayachandran (supra), Exhibit

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 72 -
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R2(c) indicates the position of Jayachandran to be at rank

No.3. Only four persons were selected, though seven

qualified; which was for reason of there being two reserved

vacancies, to fill up which, there were 'No Candidates

Available' [NCA]. As per the re-cast select list,

Jayachandran had 3rd rank; after Babu and Kauser, who were

earlier appointed; with Badharudeen, one of the earlier

appointees, being relegated to the 4 th position. Hence,

obviously the appointment should have also been in that

sequence with Jayachandran having the 3rd position among the

4 who were appointed directly. Jayachandran should have

been given notional seniority from the date of appointment

of the others though, he would not have any claim for pay

and allowances, for the period when he had not discharged

the duties in the post.

51. But, when the notification came under Article

233 of the Constitution, which is produced at Exhibit R2(d)

in W.P.(C) No.40069 of 2017, appointing Jayachandran from

the date he assumes charge, he joined without demur.

Jayachandran was hence appointed as on the date he assumes

charge by G.O. dated 22.12.2010. The other three were

allowed to continue from the date they joined. The

Explanatory Note to the G.O. dated 22.12.2010, as is

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 73 -
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evident from Exhibit R2(d) in W.P.(C).No.40046 of 2017,

also indicated that the proposal of the High Court was to

allow the three persons who were appointed as per G.O.

dated 30.03.2009 to continue in service with effect from

the date on which they assumed charge, being 30.03.2009 and

C.Jayachandran “as District and Sessions Judge in the

Kerala Higher Judicial Service with effect from the date on

which he assumes charge” (sic). Jayachandran who was

appointed from the date on which he assumed charge, took

charge on 24.02.2011. He could have filed a contempt or a

fresh writ petition; which was not done, raising a fair

presumption that he waived his right to notional seniority.

52. There is a ground taken by Senior Counsel

Sri.P.Ravindran that the aspect of delay was not at all

challenged by the appellants. We find the said submission

to be incorrect. In W.P.(C)No.40069/17, the appellant has

in Ground E, with specific reference to the date of joining

of the respondent urged that the appointment order provided

for his commencement of service from the date of joining

and urged that he had acquiesced to the order and waived

his right to challenge the same. W.P.(C)No.40043/17 by

Ground D contented that the 5th respondent cannot resurrect

his stale claim for seniority after having not objected to

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 74 -
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the date of his first appointment as indicated in the

appointment order pursuant to the Division Bench decision

of this Court. Citing the date of appointment as per the

order dated 22.10.2010, in Ground E it has also been urged

that the claim is hopelessly time barred.

53. Having taken charge on 24.02.2011, a

representation before the High Court was filed on

11.04.2012 [Exhibit R3(h)], after more than one year. No

consideration was made of the representation, in which

event, Jayachandran again filed a reminder to the earlier

representation on 18.09.2014; more than three and a half

years from his joining service and about two and a half

years from his first representation. All this while the

appellants, Mohammed Vaseem and Sophy Thomas continued as

seniors of Jayachandran, quite unaware of the

representations. It is also to be noticed that the 3rd

respondent had approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court with a

Writ Petition numbered as W.P.(Civil) No.857 of 2017 which

was withdrawn without prejudice to any other remedy on

22.09.2017. No other remedy was availed then.

54. In this context, we have to notice that

Jayachandran, slept over his rights and has allowed the

by-transfer appointees to continue with the seniority as

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 75 -
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assigned to them, which seniors also obtained further

promotions in the categories as seen from the amended

Special Rules. Here, we again refer to Exhibit P18 in

W.A.No.846 of 2019, where there is a different

categorization brought in by the amendment of the Special

Rules in the year 2008. The Higher Judicial Service as per

Exhibit P18 has three categories:

1. Super-time Scale District and Sessions Judge,

2. Selection Grade District and Sessions Judge,
3. District and Sessions Judge including
Additional District Judge.

The posts in category (1) is limited to 10% and that in

category (2) to 25% of the cadre strength of the posts in

all the three categories put together. Both the writ

petitioners Mohammed Vaseem and Sophy Thomas and

Jayachandran have been promoted as Selection Grade District

Judges. The former two, from an earlier date, which order

has not been challenged.

55. Two aspects stare at the face of Jayachandran,

insofar as the claim for seniority along with the three

direct recruit District Judges appointed as on 30.03.2009.

(i) He slept over his rights and rested contend with

unrepresented memorials, to which the High Court responded

very late; thus seriously interfering with the vested

rights of the promotees. (ii) The by-transfer appointees

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 76 -
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continued on the basis of their seniority and also obtained

further promotion in the cadre. As per the proceedings

issued by the High Court vide order dated 17.03.2017 the

further promotions given to the 3 officers are as under:

“18. Shri.Muhammed Vaseem, Additional District

Judge-I, Mavelikkara is promoted as Selection
Grade District Judge with effect from 10.08.2015
vice he completed five years in the category of
District Judge on 10.08.2015 and Smt.Annie John,
Selection Grade District Judge promoted as
Supertime Scale District Judge on 29.05.2015.
xxx xxx xxx
20. Smt.Sophy Thomas, MACT, Alappuzha is promoted
as Selection Grade District Judge with effect
from 04.08.2015 vice she completed five years in
the category of District Judge on 04.08.2015 and
the demise of Shri.E.B.Rajan, Selection Grade
District Judge on 10.06.2015.
xxx xxx xxx
25. Shri.C.Jayachandran, Enquiry Commissioner and
Special Judge/Additional District Judge-II,
Thrissur is promoted as Selection Grade District
Judge with effect from 24.02.2016 vice he
completed five years in the category of District
Judge and Shri.K.Dharmajan, Selection Grade
District Judge retired on 30.11.2015”.

The delay and the further promotions force us to reject the

prayer of Jayachandran. In this context, we refer to the

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 77 -
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decision of the Full Bench of this Court in M.P.Raghavan

Nair v. State Insurance Officer [1971 KLT 583].

56. In M.P.Raghavan Nair, the writ petitioner and

two respondents were appointed in the cadre of Lower

Division Clerks (LDC) as per the advice of the Public

Service Commission, the petitioner as senior to the other

two respondents being advised earlier. However, the

petitioner was the last in passing the obligatory test for

promotion; which resulted in his confirmation in the post

of LDC, being later to the respondents. He was thus, by

misconstruing the seniority rule, placed as junior to the

other two respondents in the post of LDC. The other two

persons were promoted to the post of UDC and only later the

petitioner was promoted to that cadre. A further promotion

to the post of Junior Superintendent also was in the same

fashion; the petitioner being placed the junior-most

among the three parties to the lis. We need refer to the

dates of promotion as Superintendents, which in the case

of 3rd respondent was on 13.03.1962, 4th respondent on

25.04.1962 and the petitioner on 02.07.1963. The petitioner

filed a representation before the Government on 04.08.1962

challenging the gradation list published in the Gazette of

10.10.1961, which placed the petitioner as the junior-most

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 78 -
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in the cadre of LDCs. He, however, did not challenge the

appointment of the respondents 3 and 4 to the

Superintendent’s category which was earlier to his

appointment. Even when the representation was submitted and

later a writ petition was filed by him against the

seniority fixed in the cadre of LDC, he was in the cadre of

UDC and the other two were already promoted as

Superintendents. The Full Bench found that, placing the

petitioner as junior-most for reason only of his having

passed the obligatory test later to the other two and his

confirmation being so delayed, was erroneous. But, however,

the Full Bench, by a majority, refused to consider his

claim for seniority since by the time he made a

representation to re-assign his seniority in the cadre of

LDCs, the other two had been promoted to the higher posts

earlier to him, which remained unchallenged.

57. The majority decision held that the principles

underlying the Limitation Act and provisions restraining

stale claims under the CPC, being principles of repose and

peace, are equally applicable to petitions under Article

226 of the Constitution. Quoting from A Court v Cross 130

English Reports 540 it was noticed “Long dormant claims

have often more of cruelty than of justice in them”. The

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 79 -
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respondents having continued in their promoted post as

senior to the petitioner without any challenge to their

promotions, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise his

claim and thus upset the promotions also. It was held:

“Seniority in the lower category is by no means the

same as promotion to the higher category the moment
a vacancy occurs in the latter, even if it be that
promotion is governed solely by the pre-determined
fact of seniority. Seniority, no doubt, furnishes a
title to promotion, not, it is true in this case, a
merely contingent title as would be the case, if
the rule for promotion were merit, seniority
counting only in cases where the merit of the
competing claimants is roughly equal. Nevertheless,
it is no more than a title. There would still have
to be the conferment of the promotion by the
appointing authority, and the promotion would no
more follow automatically from a declaration of
seniority than would possession from the hands of a
trespasser follow automatically from a decree
merely declaring title”.

58. A like situation arises in the present case

also. Sophy Thomas and Muhammed Vaseem were appointed

earlier to Jayachandran. It is pertinent that both the

appointment orders did not contain a condition that it is

subject to appointment of direct recruits. But, however, as

we earlier held, Jayachandran’s recruitment was not delayed

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 80 -
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because of his fault. He had valiantly fought for his

rights before this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court and

obtained a decision in his favour. In the normal course we

would have permitted him to be treated as appointed on the

date on which the other direct recruits in the very same

selection were appointed; but for the delay. Jayachandran’s

appointment order was on 22.12.2010 and he took charge on

24.02.2011. The appointment order, as earlier read,

specifically provided that his appointment would be from

the date on which he takes charge; which is in accordance

with Rule 6 of the Special Rules. Muhammed Vaseem, Sophy

Thomas and Jayachandran continued in service, the former

two as seniors to the latter.

59. As we found, when the Division Bench in favour

of Jayachandran directed re-casting of the select list,

necessarily he should have been appointed from the date on

which the others were appointed after selection; though

notionally. But, the order appointing Jayachandran

specifically said otherwise. He should have taken

appropriate proceedings to correct it, which he did not. He

acquiesced and slept over his rights and filed a

representation on 11.04.2012. The High Court did not act

upon it; nor did Jayachandran approach any Court with his
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 81 -
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grievance. Again in 2014 there was a further representation

made regarding his seniority in the category of District

and Sessions Judge. While so, the three were considered for

promotion to the vacancies of Selection Grade District

Judges and orders were issued on 17.03.2017, wherein, as

noticed above, Muhammed Vaseem was promoted in the vacancy

which arose on 29.05.2015, Sophy Thomas in the vacancy

which arose on 10.06.2015 and Jayachandran in the vacancy

which arose on 30.11.2015. Muhammed Vaseem and Sophy Thomas

were treated as seniors to Jayachandran. It was later to

that the A.C re-assigned the seniority by order dated

26.10.2017; which is impugned in the writ petitions.

60. As has been held by the Full Bench, promotion

would not automatically follow a declaration of seniority

just as possession from the hands of a trespasser would not

automatically follow from a decree of declaration of title.

The re-assignment of seniority in category (3) is

inconsequential insofar as their respective positions in

category (2), wherein the position of seniority of the

three District Judges remain unchallenged and is indelibly

etched in the category of Selection Grade District Judges.

61. We also notice the judgment in P.S.Gopinathan

v. State of Kerala [(2008) 7 SCC 70]. Therein, the appellant

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 82 -
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was appointed as District Judge on 14.01.1992 by order of

the Governor; following which a posting order was issued on

29.02.1992. Later to this, three directly recruited persons

were appointed as District Judges; two on 31.03.1992 and

one on 30.05.1992, the first two of whom took charge on

02.04.1992 and the other on 01.06.1992. In January, 1992,

the Civil Judicial Service and the Criminal Judicial

Service of the State were integrated and Service Rules,

1991 came into effect on 01.01.1992; based on which there

was a fresh panel of Sub Judges/Chief Judicial Magistrates

drawn up for promotion as District and Sessions Judges from

the integrated seniority list. One another Sub Judge placed

as senior to the appellant in the new panel of Sub

Judges/CJMs was approved by the Governor on 15.07.1992. The

High Court, then, treated the earlier appointments to be

temporary and the appellant was again included as serial

No.2 in the integrated panel which came out on 15.07.1992.

There was a further appointment order issued on 31.07.1992

posting the appellant again as District Judge. An Official

Memorandum was issued by the High Court on 29.09.1992

showing the appellant junior to the direct recruits as also

serial No.1 in the panel approved by the Governor on

15.07.1992. The appellant made a representation on

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 83 -
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28.10.1992 against the said seniority, within three months,

which was followed up with other representations as

reminders. The learned Judges declined the prayer of the

appellant for seniority relying on the law of equitable

estoppel by acquiescence, as has been clearly stated in

Willmott v. Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96. It was held that when a

fresh appointment order was issued on 15.07.1992 treating

the earlier appointment order on 14.01.1992 as temporary,

which was reiterated in the appellant’s 2nd posting order on

31.07.1992, the High Court had clearly committed a mistake.

The first appointment order and the posting order did not

have any such stipulation of the appointment or posting

being temporary in nature. But, even then it was held that

the appellant being aware of the same, did not object to it

and he acquiesced to being treated as a temporary District

Judge. Even though the representation was made three months

thereafter, it was found that he has slept over his right

of having been appointed permanently in the post of

District and Sessions Judge and he was rightly understood

by the High Court to have waived or abandoned his rights.

62. Learned Senior Counsel, undeterred, strenuously

argued for the delay to be ignored in view of the fact that

the respondent, was one who had been denied selection and
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 84 -
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achieved it only by fighting for his rightful claim; who is

also entitled to the fruits of the litigation to its full

extent. Reliance, to urge that that aspect, was placed on

R.S. Deodhar (supra). There the question was the promotion

of Mamalatdars, in the Aurangabad Division of the newly

created State Of Bombay, to the post of Deputy Collectors.

The issue also arose in the circumstance of the

reorganization of States, by which inter-alia some portions

of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad came to be included in

Bombay. The petitioners were Tahasildars in Hyderabad, who

were directly recruited to that post, with the next

promotion being to the post of Deputy Tahasildars. Those

coming from the other States also carried with them the

respective conditions of service, they were entitled to by

virtue of Section 115(7) of the States Reorganization Act,

1956. The preliminary objection raised was of delay, when

the divisional cadre of Mamalatdars was created in 1956, by

a Government resolution. The procedure for promotion was in

vogue for a number of years; at least from 1961, the Rules

having been given effect in 1959. The petitioners chose to

approach the Court with a petition under Article 32, only

in 1969. The controversy also revolved around the treatment

of Mamalatdars as a Divisional cadre as distinguished from

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 85 -
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a State Cadre. We first notice that the principles stated

were on the peculiar facts therein and with respect to the

delay in so far as invocation of Article 32.

63. The objection on delay was negatived despite

the observations of two former Chief Justices of India, in

two decisions of Constitutional Benches; on the peculiar

facts arising there. The observations were:

(i) In AIR 1970 SC 898 Tilokchand Motichand Vs. H.M.

Munshi Hidayatullah C.J stated so:

"The party claiming Fundamental Rights must move

the Court before other rights come into existence.
The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties
if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the
part of the person moving the Court. This
principle is well-recognised and has been applied
by Courts in England and America".

(ii) In AIR 1970 SC 470 [R.N. Bose Vs. Union of India]

Sikri.J (as he then was stated so:

"It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of

the rights which have accrued to them. Each person
ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that
his appointment and promotion effected a long time
ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a
number of years".
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 86 -
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The Court found in R.S. Deodhar (supra) that the promotions

were provisional and no rights crystallized on the

respondents. There was also the fact that the petitioners

who were from the Aurangabad Division were informed by the

Commissioner of that Division that the rules for

recruitment to the post of Deputy Collectors were not

unified, that they would be regulated by the rules of the

Ex-Hyderabad State and that the Rules of 1959 had no

application to them. Of course the State Government did not

subscribe to the view of the Commissioner, which however

came to be publicised in a writ petition filed before the

High Court of Bombay; which view was accepted by the Court.

It was on these compelling circumstances that the Court

refused to shut its doors on the sole ground of delay.

64. The dictum in P.S.Gopinathan and M.P.Raghavan

Nair (both supra) squarely applies in the present case and

the extracts from Tilokchand Motichand & R.N. Bose (both

supra) considering the facts arising herein, stands against

the respondent. There are also no compelling circumstances

as in R.S. Deodhar (supra), to offer succour to the

respondent and the said decision also cannot come to the

rescue to save the delay arising herein. Jayachandran quite

aware of the stipulation in the appointment order that it

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 87 -
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would only take effect from the date of his joining, joined

and never challenged it, accepting the seniority of those

persons appointed before him as per Rule 6 of the Special

Rules. A representation was first submitted to the High

Court, after more than one year on 11.04.2012. No attempt

was made to redress his grievance before this Court or at

least motivate the Registry of the High Court to take

action on his representation for more than four years. A

reminder was sent in the year 2014. The Hon’ble Supreme

Court has categorically held that unrepresented memorials

do not condone or save delay. The High Court, that too the

A.C, considered the representation in the year 2017, after

more than six years from his appointment and five years

from his representation; during which period the appellants

continued in their posts as established seniors of

Jayachandran and also was promoted to the higher category

of Selection Grade District Judges’ and asserted their

seniority in that category too, which, as has been noticed

herein above, has not been challenged at any time. We have

already held that inter-se seniority disputes cannot be

resolved by the A.C. The recommendation made by the Full

Court to appoint Jayachandran from the day he assumes

charge, however illegal or irregular it might be, cannot be

W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 88 -
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rectified by the A.C. It can only be done by the Full Court

or the Court exercising judicial functions; which

essentially is the power of the State as conceded to the

Courts. We, hence, are of the opinion that Jayachandran’s

claim is belated and has to be rejected. Our findings with

respect to the other aspects of the decision of the A.C,

would squarely apply in the case of Jayachandran also.

In the light of the findings above, we allow the

appeals and direct seniority to be assigned to the parties

to the lis from the date of their first appointment. We set

aside the impugned judgment, which upheld the decision of

the Administrative Committee. We direct the parties to bear

their respective costs.

Sd/-
K.VINOD CHANDRAN
JUDGE

Sd/-
ANIL K.NARENDRAN
JUDGE
Vku/-
W.A.No.846 of 2019 & - 89 -
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APPENDIX OF WA 846/2019
RESPONDENT'S/S ANNEXURES:

ANNEXURE R2(a) TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING DATED
29/09/1994.

ANNEXURE R2(b) TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE DATED 27/07/2000.

ANNEXURE R2(c) TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE SPECIAL

COMMITTEE DATED 12/07/2006.

ANNEXURE R2(d) TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE SPECIAL

COMMITTEE DATED 31/07/2006.

ANNEXURE R2(e) TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE DATED 09/12/2010.

ANNEXURE R2(f) TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE DATED 11/06/2013.

ANNEXURE R2(g) TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER GO(MS)

NO.107/2015/HOME DATED 29/05/2015.

ANNEXURE R2(h) TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON JUDGMENT DATED

21/08/2015 IN WPC NOS. 12732, 13521, 13445,
14780 AND 14957/2015.

ANNEXURE R2(i) TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER GO(MS) NO.226/2016

DATED 30/08/2016.

ANNEXURE R2(j) TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE DATED 24/10/2016.

ANNEXURE R2(k) TRUE COPY OF COMMON JUDGMENT DATED

22/05/2017.

ANNEXURE R2(l) TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMEWNT IN WRIT APPEAL

NOS.1224, 1245, 1246, 1348 AND 1349/2017.