by Lieutenant Colonel Brian Gellman

Making predictions is hard, especially about the future. production. ADP 2-0 further states that the following attri-
—Yogi Berra butes enable an analyst to effectively provide staff support
Professional baseball player
and intelligence analysis: critical thinking, embracing ambi-
Introduction guity, and collaboration.2 The purpose of this article is to
The intelligence profession exists in a complicated, complex provide military intelligence leaders with ideas on how they
environment. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) can foster an analytical environment that enables these at-
describes a strategic environment with the reemergence tributes by reflecting on—
of long-term, strategic competition with revisionist powers Ê How we make decisions and judgments.
such as China and Russia, as well as rogue regimes in Iran
and North Korea. The NDS also describes a security environ- Ê How we evaluate arguments and evidence.
ment affected by rapid technological advancements and the Ê How we can benefit from collaboration and diversity of
changing character of war. Among the many NDS solutions, thought, as they can result in innovative analysis.
the Department of Defense is accelerating modernization Intelligence Analysis
programs, specifically in the realm of artificial intelligence Critical thinking. Critical thinking is essential to analysis. Using
and machine learning. All of this may seem unprecedented, critical thinking, which is disciplined and self-reflective, pro-
but it is not. vides more holistic, logical, ethical, and unbiased analysis and
conclusions. Applying critical thinking ensures analysts fully ac-
In post-World War II and the early days of the Cold War, count for the elements of thought, and standards of thought,
a nascent U.S. intelligence community faced a similar un- and the traits of a critical thinker.
certain world, and like today, it had access to emerging Embracing ambiguity. Well-trained analysts are critical due to
forms of collection and data management. Sherman Kent, the nature of changing threats and operational environments.
who is commonly credited with professionalizing the U.S. They must embrace ambiguity, and recognize and mitigate
their own or others’ biases, challenging their assumptions, and
intelligence community, described this period of U.S. his- continually learn during analysis.
tory in his 1949 book Strategic Intelligence for American Collaboration. Commanders, intelligence and other staffs, and
World Policy. When reflecting on his book 15 years later, intelligence analysts collaborate. They actively share and ques-
Kent noted that no matter how complicated or complex the tion information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand
environment and no matter how sophisticated the means situations and produce intelligence. Collaboration is essential
to analysis; it ensures analysts work together to effectively and
of collecting and storing data, there will never be a replace- efficiently achieve a common goal. Often analytical collabora-
ment for the thoughtful analyst.1 tion is enabled by [Department of Defense] DOD intelligence
capabilities.
Artificial intelligence and machine learning will change
—ADP 2-0, Intelligence3
the intelligence profession in the same way satellite surveil-
lance and computers changed the intelligence profession
for Kent, but they will not replace the need for a thought-
Thinking about Thinking, aka #metacognition
ful analyst. Kent recognized that employing new technol- It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought
without accepting it.
ogies in the early Cold War required innovative, adaptive, ­­ —Aristotle
and critical thinking problem solvers to enable intelligence Just as we can train a Soldier to fire a weapon, we can
analysis in the new environment. The same holds true for train a Soldier to think critically. When you train a Solider
today’s intelligence analysts. to shoot, you divide the task into increments. It starts with
ADP 2-0, Intelligence, defines intelligence analysis as the good body positioning, stance, and grip. Once the Solider
process by which collected information is evaluated and in- has a good firing position, the next step is learning sight pic-
tegrated with existing information to facilitate intelligence ture, breath control, and aiming. Finally, the trigger squeeze

April–June 2020 7
completes the primary task; however, many other tasks negatively affect their credibility. In truth, it is the opposite.
complement shooting, including immediate action drills, re- Disclosing what you don’t know is a sign of maturity and
medial actions, and weapons maintenance. wisdom.
When we train Soldiers to shoot, we don’t hand them the Paradoxically, admitting knowledge deficits may be easier
weapon and say, “Go shoot!” We divide the task into sub- for junior analysts than for senior (mature) analysts. Junior
tasks, train each subtask separately, and then put them all analysts may feel more open to admitting ignorance of a
together. We have to take the same reductionist approach topic, whereas senior analysts may fear the loss of credibil-
when we train Soldiers on how to think critically. We cannot ity with their leadership and will “fake it until they make it.”
hand the Solider a laptop and say, “Go think critically!” We This is a selfish and counterproductive approach. As lead-
have to divide the experience into smaller chunks. ers, we have to encourage our Soldiers not to be afraid to
admit when they do not know something. We must also
According to the American Philosophical Association,
lead by example and humbly admit our own limitations and
“critical thinking is the process of purposeful, self-regula-
knowledge deficits. This approach will better enable a criti-
tory judgement. This process gives reasoned consideration
cal-thinking environment.
to the evidence, context, conceptualizations, methods, and
criteria.”4 In other words, critical thinkers consider the prob- Preconceptions are another pitfall the thoughtful analyst
lem holistically. Critical thinkers are aware of their approach must be aware of because we all have them. In fact, the
to making judgments and the things that may influence and more experience we have, the more preconceptions we
hinder those judgments. have. As an old boss used to tell me, “We are all victims of
our experiences, and now you are all victims of mine.” This
leader was keenly aware that our experiences inform our
judgment, for good or for bad, and he was warning us that
his preconceptions would be a driving force in our organi-
zation. There is nothing wrong with having preconceptions
as a critical thinker; however, we must be actively aware of
how they influence our judgment.
Finally, an analyst must be aware of his or her biases.
Biases are implicit shortcuts that our brain takes to solve
problems and make judgments. Our cognitive faculties will
take the path of least resistance to come to a conclusion.
Critical thinkers must first understand themselves
This is perhaps the hardest metacognition task because
The first subtask in critical thinking is metacognition, which “implicit” means we may not be aware we are doing it. In
is thinking about thinking. When first learning how to shoot, order to understand how we make decisions or judgments,
the new Solider has to think about shooting. Shooting only we have to understand how our brain works.
becomes automatic through deliberate practice and repeti- Richards Heuer, a career analyst at the Central Intelligence
tion. New shooters have to think about their positioning, Agency, wrote a book in 1999 titled Psychology of Intel-
their target, their point of aim, and their breathing. When ligence Analysis. In his book, he describes how we perceive
learning how to think critically, the new analyst must think things and how our memory works. He further explains how
about thinking. It works the same way. Critical thinking must these cognitive processes lead to biases in how we evaluate
also be trained through deliberate practice and repetition. evidence, how we estimate probabilities, and how we per-
Only with practice can thoughtful analysts become aware of ceive cause and effect. Additionally, he states that our view-
their limitations, preconceptions, and biases. ing of events in hindsight can actually reinforce our faulty
We have to start by knowing our limitations. Critical think- reasoning. Heuer also suggests strategies and analytical
ers must be self-reflective, making an honest self-appraisal frameworks to mitigate the effects of our own biases on
of what they do and do not know. In the intelligence field, our reasoning. The book’s introduction includes a sum-
what we know is often dwarfed by what we do not know, mary of Heuer’s central ideas with regard to the cognitive
so one would think it is easy to be humble. However, admit- challenges intelligence analysts face: “The mind is poorly
ting you don’t know something requires letting go of your ‘wired’ to deal effectively with both inherent uncertainty
pride and ego. Analysts may be concerned that admitting a (the natural fog surrounding complex, indeterminate intel-
knowledge deficit is admitting a weakness and that it may ligence issues) and induced uncertainty (the man-made fog

8 Military Intelligence
fabricated by denial and deception operations).”5 Heuer For example, an imagery product depicts a tank at a known
believes that making the analyst aware of how the brain location on a map at a specific time. The tank is a T-72 and
works, of the heuristic tools and shortcuts that our cognitive is in a defensive position. This is what the analyst can see.
faculties use, will result in an analyst being less likely to fall What they think is their assessment of what they believe
prey to distorted and subjective reasoning. Every thoughtful is happening that they can’t see. They think that there are
analyst should read Heuer’s book, which is available online.6 more tanks and that these tanks are in a defense. The idea
that there are more tanks is not an observable fact; it is an
Evidence Evaluation, aka #beliefsvsfacts assertion. They assume the adversary is following their doc-
The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity has its own trine, and by doctrine, the adversary does not defend with
reason for existing.
—Albert Einstein
a single tank. Based on these assumptions, assessing that
more tanks are in the area is a good assertion because it is
Acknowledging limitations and awareness of our own per- supported with factual evidence about how we know the
sonal preconceptions and biases is important in self-assess- enemy fights. Next, the analyst describes what they won-
ment. After an analyst looks within, the next step in critical der, or what they don’t know. They wonder not only where
thinking is recognizing the difference between assertions the other tanks are, but also where their lines of communi-
and evidence. An assertion is a statement of a belief. We cations are. Where is their maintenance area? Will they stay
make assertions when we provide intelligence estimates or in the defense, or will they transition to the offense? When
assessments. To strengthen an assessment, analysts must we wonder, we are expanding to the second and third levels
view their assessment as making an argument. A good ar- of the problem we are observing by asking questions. This
gument provides evidence in the form of observable, verifi- exercise takes analysts through a deliberate thought pro-
able facts or sound reasoning to support the assertion. Too cess that separates what they see (observable facts) from
often, analysts will support their assertion with other asser- what they think (assertions or assessments) and takes them
tions without realizing it because they don’t think in terms to the next level of critical thinking by wondering what else
of assertions and evidence­­—beliefs versus facts. they need to know.
During mission analysis, it is sometimes necessary to make Ambiguity is Ambiguous aka #itscomplicated
assumptions for planning. An assumption is a belief based I wanted a perfect ending. Now I’ve learned, the hard way, that some
on a valid fact. In intelligence analysis, we also have to make poems don’t rhyme, and some stories don’t have a clear beginning,
assumptions. We assume the enemy is following their doc- middle, and end. Life is about not knowing, having to change, taking
the moment and making the best of it, without knowing what’s going
trine, we assume the enemy is seeing the same battlefield
to happen next. Delicious Ambiguity.
that we are, and we assume the enemy defines victory in ―Gilda Radner
the same way we do. Are these valid assumptions? Do we Comedian and actress
treat them like beliefs or facts? Thoughtful analysts must
When defining the role of intelligence, a common re-
be aware that assumptions are beliefs and must identify
sponse is “to reduce uncertainty.” Ambiguity leads to un-
them as part of the assessment. They must constantly chal- certainty, and uncertainty can result in discomfort. We can
lenge the assumptions until proven as facts. An argument never truly eliminate uncertainty; we can only hope to re-
based on assumptions can lead to a false sense of certainty. duce it. Even after an event occurs, we still cannot eliminate
Clearly identifying assumptions provides greater transpar- all uncertainties that surround the event. To be successful,
ency about what analysts know versus what they think they analysts must be comfortable with an ambiguous environ-
know. ment in which uncertainty is high. The thoughtful analyst
GEN Colin Powell said to his briefers, “Tell me what you accepts the “delicious ambiguity.”
know. Tell me what you don’t know. Then you are allowed Reducing uncertainty through thoughtful analysis is dif-
to tell me what you think.” A good drill that leaders can use ficult because intelligence has both complicated and com-
to meet GEN Powell’s briefing requirements—reinforce the plex problems. For the purpose of this article, a complicated
difference between beliefs, facts, and assumptions and en- problem has a relatively small number of possible outcomes
courage creative thinking—is called “See, Think, Wonder.” and can be solved given multiple perspectives and the right
In this drill, analysts are provided an intelligence product, data. A complicated problem can be compared to advanced
or even a piece of artwork, and are asked to describe what mathematics, where given sufficient data and an understand-
they see, what it makes them think about, and what it ing of the math, an answer can be determined through finite
makes them wonder.7 direct-causal (linear) relationships. How an enemy defense

April–June 2020 9
is set up and when they will transition to the offense is ductionist approaches, dividing the problem into smaller
complicated and requires knowledge about the enemy, the parts that add up to an understanding of the whole. At the
terrain, the operational environment, and the leaders’ de- conclusion of a complicated problem, we often learn the
cision-making process. However, a single truth is out there answer, even if in hindsight. For example, predictive analy-
waiting for the analyst to discover it, if given sufficient data. sis on improvised explosive device emplacement locations,
In most cases, the analyst will be able to narrow it down to high-value target locations, or a tank division’s defensive
a couple of high probability courses of action. posture is a complicated problem that can be divided into
parts to explain the whole. With enough data, the analyst
can build predictive templates to a high degree of accuracy
leaving only a finite amount of information requirements to
confirm or deny the templates. For complicated problems,
analytical models such as intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) or operational environment can be used as
an analytical framework to reduce uncertainty.
Reducing uncertainty in a complex problem is less likely to
allow for templates because it usually represents a nonlin-
ear system for which reductionist approaches will not work.
In a complex problem, what we know is often insignificant
compared to what we don’t know, and even after a com-
plex event occurs, we may still not understand the true na-
ture of what happened and why. An example of a complex
problem is the Arab Spring. How did protests in one Arab
Complicated vs Complex Problem Solving country spread to another, then another, and then another?
On the other hand, in a complex problem, too many vari- Social media? Wheat crop failures? Globalization? Climate
ables exist, both dependent and independent, for the ana- change? Authoritarian regimes? The complex answer is
lyst to consider every single possibility. Complex problems probably yes and no to each of these questions. Each likely
tend to be nonlinear, and the problem cannot be reduced had a role, but no single factor could have caused the Arab
into smaller parts to understand the whole. Consider eco- Spring. Will there be another similar Arab Spring event, and
logical and biological systems as examples. It was not easy if so, what are the indicators? To reduce uncertainty for this
for Hawaiian sugar farmers to predict that introducing mon- kind of complex problem, you have to consider your ana-
gooses into the local ecosystem to control rats would re- lytical approach, build a team of diverse thinkers, and fre-
sult in endangering local bird and turtle populations (while quently reevaluate your estimate.
failing to control the rats). Or a physician attempting to Approaching a complex problem is much more difficult
diagnose a headache may be able to eliminate the most se- for analysts, especially in the Army because we do not
rious causes, such as a brain tumor, but never learn the true have a lot of doctrine that helps us to do this. IPB can serve
cause because too many unique variables exist, such as en- as a starting point for discussion, but ultimately it isn’t
vironment, genetics, nutrition, pharmacology, allergies, and suitable for handling complex problems. Heuer provides a
psychology. In this complex system, the actions the physi- description of the analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH),
cian takes might have unintended consequences that make offering analysts another tool that may be more suitable for
the condition worse. The “cure” might be worse than the complex environments. ACH is better equipped to handle
disease. This is also true in intelligence, when an intelli- complex situations in which there is a wide range of possi-
gence-driven activity inadvertently creates the conditions ble outcomes and variables. No perfect model exists, hence
the intelligence was intended to assess or avoid. the difficulty. Leaders should research and try out differ-
The thoughtful analyst must recognize the difference be- ent analytical models on complex problems until they find
tween complicated problems and complex problems be- something that works best for the specific problem set and
cause solving them requires a different approach and may the organization. Don’t be afraid to try multiple methods;
result in different levels of uncertainty. In complicated anything that gets the group thinking in new ways has value.
problems, what we know is often more than what we don’t In addition to considering analytical tools, as part of the
know. It is a linear system whereby the analyst can use re- self-assessment, the analyst should recognize requirements

10 Military Intelligence
for expertise that does not reside on the team. Because of If that evidence proves false, does it change the entire as-
the nature of complex environments and the vast number sessment?” For enduring problems, these questions should
of variables involved, leaders will likely have to include ad- be asked regularly (weekly, monthly, and yearly) at which
ditional subject matter experts to provide new perspectives time a team of analysts reviews estimates and reevaluates
on relationships in the complex problem. (Collaboration is all evidence presented during that period to ensure the
discussed further in a later section.) estimate is still valid. It is especially important to review
Finally, we have to be keenly aware that the estimate can evidence that was previously discounted to ensure the evi-
and should change. When problems drag on, when they dence wasn’t discounted out of bias toward the preferred
seem to move from complicated to complex, we sometimes estimate. Allowing an estimate to change over time may be
attempt to simplify the problem. We tend to use two falla- hard for an analyst because the intelligence consumer may
cious models in these situations. The most common model see this as flip-flopping or being inconsistent. However, the
is based on the assumption of linear progression. We have thoughtful analyst has to overcome these pressures.
data points that result in a straight line, like a stock that Collaborative Innovation aka
starts at $5, in 6 months is $10, and in 12 months is $15. A
#thinkoutsidethebox
linear progression assumes that the stock will be $20 in 18
If you haven’t read hundreds of books, you are functionally illiterate,
months. However, if you are a stock investor, I hope you are and you will be incompetent because your personal experiences alone
not investing solely based on this method. This is a fallacy aren’t broad enough to sustain you.
because conditions drive the movement of the stock up, —GEN James Mattis
Retired U.S. Marine Corps and former Secretary of Defense
and without knowing these conditions, you are investing
on an observed trend and hope, not on an understanding Think outside the box. I can’t stand that cliché. Thinking
of the trend. Despite this clear example of a poor invest- outside your “box” is not possible because your “box” is
ing strategy, we see analysts who assume a linear progres- your mindset. Your mindset is a result of your training, edu-
sion without understanding the underlying conditions. If cation, and experiences. Constraining the size of your “box”
you don’t understand the conditions, then your estimate is are internal and external factors that include biases, knowl-
only a guess based on a straight line and nothing else. Hope edge deficits, preconceptions, and stifling work environ-
is a method, but not the preferred one for the thoughtful ments. Answers that lie beyond your mindset are beyond
analyst. your reach. You need growth or help to get there.
Another fallacious model we use, especially in extended When people suggest you should think outside the box,
deployments or persistent problem sets, is incremental they are looking for creativity. They are asking someone to
analysis. Beware the dangers of incremental analysis and create new connections, take innovative approaches, re-
confirmation bias. In the incremental analysis trap, we be- evaluate existing data from different perspectives, or in-
gin with an estimate and each day look for evidence (re- troduce new data that is seemingly unrelated. How can we
porting) to support that estimate. This commonly occurs
when we produce daily intelligence summaries. We tend to
focus more on data that confirms our theories, and we dis-
count or explain away evidence that refutes our estimate.
As Heuer observes, “New data received incrementally can
be fit easily into an analyst’s previous image. This percep-
tual bias is reinforced by organizational pressures favoring
consistent interpretation; once the analyst is committed in
writing, both the analyst and the organization have a vested
interest in maintaining the original assessment.”8
To avoid incremental analysis, analysts must be able to
think critically about their own assessment, and leaders
must be willing to accept a morphing estimate. Applying
what they know about their own limitations, their precon-
ceived notions, and their biases, thoughtful analysts ask
out loud, “What if I am wrong? What piece of evidence
that I used to construct my assessment is most vulnerable? Thought Boxes

April–June 2020 11
do this? How can we enable analysts to solve problems to time for an internet search on the artist to stimulate further
which the answer lies outside their mindset? The answer thoughts and write down additional thoughts, categorized
is to help them grow the size of their box and to add more as what you think, or assess, and what you wonder, or don’t
boxes. know. Highlight these new thoughts stimulated by your re-
This is not as difficult as it sounds. Your mindset is a result search. Ask someone else to do the exercise, but do not col-
of internal growth (training, education, and experiences) laborate yet. Work on it independently. When complete,
constrained by your internal and external constraints. In the compare your table, your coworker’s table, and my table,
long term, we have to be lifetime learners, constantly striv- shown in Figure 2 (on the next page). Then write down any-
ing to expand our mindset though training, education, and thing new that you think or wonder about after collaborat-
experiences. We can do this through reading (self-educa- ing with others and highlight these new ideas.
tion), accepting new experiences (assignments outside our After comparing your notes to Figure 2, did you see any-
comfort zone), and always striving to learn about new tech- thing you didn’t observe or think about? Did that stimulate
nologies. We can also accomplish this by being aware of the new thoughts? When you include a second or a third analyst
biases and preconceptions constraining our growth. in the exercise, each potentially seeing different observable
facts, and very likely thinking and wondering in different di-
In the short term, to solve the wicked problem of the day,
rections, the analysts will be able to make connections and
we can identify our knowledge deficits and research the
ask questions they may not have developed on their own.
problem. When this research isn’t sufficient, or if our limita-
tions in the form of internal biases or culture constrain our Exercise 2: Brainstorming to Creativity. After using the See,
thinking, it is time to bring in another mindset to help us. Think, Wonder exercise to examine the artwork, you should
We need more boxes. have developed questions that require answers. Intelligence
analysis often requires analysts to think creatively and with
Exercise 1: See, Think, Wonder Applied. Try this example imagination to develop theories to explain what they see
using a work of art. The picture in Figure 1 is of a display of and what they think. Brainstorming is an excellent tool for
art from the Chinese dissident Ai Weiwei. drawing out a variety of creative answers to a problem.
Make a list of what you see, what you think, and what However, to be effective, the facilitator of the brainstorm-
you wonder. After writing down what you think, take the ing session must establish and enforce four rules:

Figure 1. Work of Art Example

12 Military Intelligence
 What I See What I Think What I Wonder should prompt, “Who?” Drilling
• Multiple urns from the Han • Research suggests that urn • The Han Chinese have majority down to this idea may result in
dynasty painted over. is from the Han dynasty. control of the People’s Republica long list: the U.S. Government,
• Ai Weiwei dropping an urn • The dropped urn was likely of China, so was this an attack on
Russian government, Russian
with an unconcerned look worth a lot of money. them? Was it perceived as such? mafia, Chinese mafia, Chinese
on his face. • This is likely a political • Is Ai Weiwei very wealthy? Or
statement against the Han does he have wealthy benefactors
dissidents, Uighurs, Free Tibet
Chinese-run government. who are financing his veiled protestors, Hong Kong protes-
political statements? If so, whotors, Anonymous, or aliens. The
are they? list of people, organizations, or
Figure 2. Author’s See, Think, Wonder Table governments that could sup-
Ê Do not allow criticisms or negative judgments. port this effort may account for 20 to 30 ideas alone.
Ê Arrange for a relaxed atmosphere. After a fixed period of time or when it is obvious the group
Ê Think quantity, not quality. has reached the point of diminishing returns and focus, then
and only then the group will evaluate the quality of their
Ê Add to or expand on the ideas of others.9
ideas. Some ideas may be dismissed right away after brain-
For this exercise, the question is, “How did Ai Weiwei ac- storming, such as financial support from extraterrestrials.
quire the urns he painted and destroyed?” Applying the rules Ideas that are more reasonable may be ranked in terms of
of brainstorming, encourage a group to provide at least 100 likelihood. The group will also divide the ideas into broader
possible solutions. That sounds like a ridiculous number;
categories to better organize the most likely answers. In this
however, it is very achievable. Use a whiteboard so that ev-
example, this exercise would stop here; however, in an in-
eryone can see each other’s ideas to build on. When an idea
telligence problem, the next step would be to establish a
is especially good, the facilitator should encourage the team
collection plan to help confirm or deny the most probable
to drill down on that idea and create additional variations.
theories.
For example, rich benefactors who intend to discredit the
Chinese government may support Ai Weiwei. The facilitator In these exercises, you expanded your own mindset by re-
searching the artist, by laying your box alongside the box of
Rules of Brainstorming10 a coworker, and by getting new ideas from the author that
1. No criticisms or negative judgments are allowed. These come you did not have before your collaboration. This exercise
later, after the session is finished. The basic idea is to obtain new is an overly simplistic demonstration of something you al-
ideas and not to rate them. The introduction of criticisms, judg- ready know—two heads are better than one. But are they?
ments and evaluations will stop the flow of creative ideas by
What happens if both analysts’ mindsets are essentially the
making individuals defensive and self-protective, and thus afraid
to introduce truly new and different ideas for fear of ridicule. same?
2. Arrange for a relaxed atmosphere. If the environment is noisy, To expand the collective box or mindset of a group, it is
crowded or full of distractions, concentration will be lost. Also, important to have diversity in thought. This does not mean
the positions and personalities of the participants are important. diversity in an equal opportunity context. This is not about
An autocratic supervisor could ruin a session if people are afraid
of appearing “silly” and thus do not speak up when they have ethnicity; this is about thinking differently. Two analysts
novel ideas. who are of different ethnicities but share the same train-
3. Think quantity, not quality. The point of brainstorming is to ing (for example, at Fort Huachuca, Arizona), same college
obtain large numbers of different types of ideas. Again, judg- education, and similar experiences (tactical military intelli-
ments come later when ideas which do not look promising can gence) may still have boxes that closely converge, leading
be filtered out. By concentrating on quantity, the subconscious is
to similar thought outcomes and groupthink. To achieve an
encouraged to continue making new connections and generating
more ideas. optimally diverse collective mindset, the leader should as-
4. Add to or expand the ideas of others. This is not an ego-build-
semble a group with sufficient diversity in experience, edu-
ing contest, but a group effort to solve a common problem. A cation, and training to give you the best opportunity to find
basic premise is that ideas from one person can trigger different that answer outside your box.
ideas (some closely related and some not so closely related) in
other people. That is why this technique works better in a group, One potential solution is to bring in expertise from out-
as opposed to when used in isolation. side the intelligence section. We used to call this “reverse
—G. Venkatesh BOS [battlefield operating system].” (The battlefield oper-
“Follow Brainstorming Basics to Generate New Ideas” ating system was the equivalent to what we know today
as the warfighting functions.) We would ask logisticians to

April–June 2020 13
put on the red hat and develop adversary logistics plans for must train analysts to think critically, evaluate evidence,
the overall enemy course of action. The air defense offi- and expand their mindset by encouraging analysts to de-
cer would suggest the location of the adversary air defense construct how they think, “show their math,” and separate
units on the map to best match capabilities to terrain and evidence from assertions and facts from beliefs. Leaders
mission. As part of developing the enemy course of action, should establish diverse reading lists appropriate to their
reverse BOS brings diverse mindsets into a collaborative mission and schedule regular meetings to discuss and share
product. ideas. It is also important that leaders allow analysts to ex-
In multinational efforts, partner forces could also bring a plore different analytical models and demand constant re-
diverse way of thinking, especially when tackling the prob- evaluation of estimates. Finally, leaders must build teams
lem of cultural mirror imaging whereby our own culture of critical thinkers that have sufficient diversity of thought
constrains our mindset. As information security and legal while ensuring enough common ground to allow for the
requirements allow, analysts can invite members from in- communication of ideas.
dustry and other nonfederal entities. Of course, all good Endnotes
things should be in moderation. If their thinking is too diver- 1. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 2nd ed.
gent, it will not work because people will not be able to un- (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), xxiv.
derstand each other’s point of view. Even if their combined
2. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 2-0, Intelligence
boxes cover the answer, they may not be able to communi- (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 31 July 2019), 2-6.
cate with each other in a way that allows the team to find it.
In other words, diversity of thought is essential, but you can 3. Ibid.

have too much of it. The thoughtful analyst has to be aware 4. “Expert Consensus on Critical Thinking,” Insight Assessment, accessed
of when this becomes counterproductive. December 19, 2019, https://insightassessment.com/article/expert-consensus
-on-critical-thinking.
Conclusion
5. Jack Davis, introduction to Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards
A thoughtful analyst is a critical thinker who approaches J. Heuer, Jr. (Central Intelligence Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence,
a problem holistically. This analyst is aware of his or her 1999), xx, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/
own limitations, preconceptions, and biases and takes ac- csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-
tive steps to mitigate the vulnerabilities that constrain their analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf.
thoughts and cloud their judgments. The thoughtful analyst 6. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.
is aware of which evidence is a fact and which evidence is
7. Julie Carmean, “Teaching Critical Thinking through Art with the National
based on reasoning or assumptions, and is constantly chal-
Gallery of Art,” edX, accessed December 8, 2019, https://www.edx.org/
lenging those assumptions. The analyst must strive to grow
course/teaching-critical-thinking-through-art-with-the-na.
his or her mindset as a lifelong learner through new train-
ing, education, and experiences. This includes professional 8. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 16.
reading in intelligence and other disciplines because it ex- 9. G. Venkatesh, “Follow Brainstorming Basics to Generate New Ideas,”
pands the analyst’s mindset through diversity of thought. ISIXSIGMA, accessed December 8, 2019, https://www.isixsigma.com/tools-
templates/brainstorming/follow-brainstorming-basics-generate-new-ideas/.
Leaders have a responsibility to enable this growth and to
establish and maintain a collaborate environment. Leaders 10. Ibid.

LTC Brian Gellman is the senior intelligence officer, G-2, for the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. He has more than
16 years of military intelligence experience working primarily in support of special operations. His most recent deployment was as the J-2 of
the Special Operations Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Freedom during the Mosul counterattack in late 2016. LTC Gellman holds a master
of science in science and technology intelligence from National Intelligence University. He is an adjunct professor for National Intelligence
University at Fort Bragg, NC, and Angelo State University in San Angelo, TX.

14 Military Intelligence