1. Pelaez vs. Auditor General, G.R. No.

L-23825, December 24, 1965

Facts: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders
Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.
Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has
been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power. Said Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the President of the Philippines by
executive order to define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality,
[township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political
division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.

Summary: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders (EOs) Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to
129 creating thirty-three (33) municipalities during the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. On November 10, 1964, petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as a taxpayer, instituted a special civil action,
for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General to restrain him, as well
as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in the
implementation of the said EOs and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said EOs are null and void, upon the ground that Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective on January 1, 1960
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Issue: 1) Whether or not the provision in question constitute an undue delegation of legislative power?

2) Whether or not the Executive Orders issued by the President creating municipalities constitutional?

Ruling: 1) Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. As the
Supreme Court of Washington has put it "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes." It
is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature —
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby delegate upon himself the power, not only to make the
law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end
sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the
last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:

... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require.

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may
require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of
the government may be transferred. At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case
at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said
Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. In Section 68, as above indicated, the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in
character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not
one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question.”

For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers,
state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should
be annexed to a particular municipality or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and
frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although
the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute or conferring upon courts the
authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon
petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in
such village or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be
incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain
determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is
allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the
village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to
enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" or creating a
Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or
operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been
complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing
the name of the same.

To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies
no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be
applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of
prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation,
correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or
prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the
country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus conferred is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually
unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that
"public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity
of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal
impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may
be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of
the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the
democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court
to uphold.

Accordingly, in delegating powers to administrative bodies, the legislature must ordinarily prescribe a
policy, standard, or rule for their guidance and must not vest them with an arbitrary and uncontrolled
discretion with regard thereto, and a statute which is deficient in this respect is invalid.

2) The Supreme Court held that the creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one
which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. Although the Executive has the power to fix
common boundary in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities,
the authority to create municipal corporations is strictly a legislative function.

Congress may delegate the power to fill in the details in the execution and enforcement of a law
provided that the said law must (1) be complete in itself and (2) fix a standard or limitation. However,
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these requirements for a valid delegation.
Hence, Executive Orders (EOs) issued by the President pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained
from passing in the audit any expenditures of public funds in implementation of the said EOs or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.
 2. Disomangcop vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 149848, November 25, 2004 (check last page)
3. Sogod v. Rosal, G.R. No. 38204, September 24, 1991 (read full text)

Facts: Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc, formerly a barrio of the
municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be composed of the barrios of Bontoc,
Divisoria, Onion, Pacu, Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and their corresponding
sitios. A boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc and the municipality
of Sogod with the latter claiming that the former exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios above-
mentioned but also over other ten (10) barrios allegedly belonging to Sogod.

The Provincial Board of Leyte then held a plebiscite among Pangi, Taa, Taa part of Sta. Cruz, Tuburan,
Lawgawan and their corresponding sitios to determine whether the people in these barrios would like to
remain with the municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc. Results showed in favor of Sogod.

Pres. Garcia then issued EO 368 which approved the recommendation of the provincial board of
Leyte, and reconstituted the barrios and sitios which shall compose the municipalities of Bontoc and
Sogod. The executive order also specified Granada Creek as the boundary line separating Bontoc and
Sogod. Later on, the President thru Executive Secretary Castillo, suspended the EO. Municipality of
Sogod filed for certiorari and prohibition with the CFI of Southern Leyte to enjoin the provincial board
and provincial governor from taking cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute between the two
municipalities and to enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercising territorial jurisdiction over the
barrios of Pangi, Taa, Casao, Sta. Cruz, Tuburan and Laogawan all allegedly belonging to the municipality
of Sogod but trial court dismissed it.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case?

Ruling: The respondent judge acted correctly in dismissing the cases for want of jurisdiction and in
allowing the provincial board to continue with the pending investigation and proceedings on the
boundary dispute.

At the time the civil actions were filed with the trial court by petitioner municipality in 1970, the
applicable laws necessary for the determination of the question of whether the trial court has the
authority to decide on the municipal boundary dispute is Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative
Code and Republic Act No. 3590 (Revised Barrio Charter).

The law vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities on the provincial board
pursuant to Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that that the authority to
hear and resolve municipal boundary disputes belongs to the provincial boards and not to the trial
courts. The decisions of the boards are then appealable to the Secretary of the Interior (now the Office
of the Executive Secretary). And, RA 3590 states that the provincial board was empowered under the
said law to determine and alter boundaries of municipalities and barrios.

4. Samson vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133076, September 22, 1999 (check last page)

Facts: Moises S. Samson is incumbent councilor of 1st district of QC. He challenged the
constitutionality of RA No. 8535 , creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City.
Samson argues that RA 8535 failed to conform to the LGC because:

o from the minutes of the public hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Local
Government, certifications as to income, population, and land area were NOT presented
to Congress during the deliberations

o The law contained no specification as to seat of government

o no certification attesting to the fact that the mother local government unit, Quezon City,
would not be adversely affected was submitted

o Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition of concerned barangays
calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches

Issue: W/N RA 8535 is constitutional? YES.

Ruling: Requirement as to certification on compliance with the income, population and land area is met

The bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of Representatives. Samson did
not present any proof that no certifications were submitted to the House Committee on Local
Government. The presumption of regularity stands.

Moreover, during the public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government, resource
persons from NSO, Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF), Land Management Bureau, DBM, and
officials of Quezon City were present.

The representative from the BLGF estimated the combined average annual income of the 13 barangays
for the years 1995 and 1996 to be around P26,952,128.26 (>than the 20M minimum requirement).

The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would comprise the
proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310 (> than the 150,000 required).

There is no need to consider the land area. Under the LGC, other than the income requirement, the
proposed city must have the requisite number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either
requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient.

The court also took judicial notice that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.

The official statements of the representatives could serve the same purpose contemplated by law
requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open session of either the
Senate or the House of Representatives give even greater solemnity than a certification submitted to
either chamber.

Moreover, Samson failed to show that, aside from the oral declarations during the public hearings, the
representatives present did not also submit written certifications. Samson did not present a copy of the
petition to prove that it was without the written certifications attached as required by law.

Samson failed to present any concrete evidence on the alleged adverse effect on Quezon City by the
creation of the City of Novaliches
QC Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., was present during the deliberations of the Senate Committee on Local
Government, and made no mention of anything concerning such adverse effects.

As chief executive of Quezon City, Mayor Mathay would be the first person to protest any development
that might prove detrimental to Quezon City. The fact that he did not raise any adverse issue during the
public hearings is indicative of the non-existence of such negative issues.

Also, in the plebiscite as contemplated on R.A. 8535, all persons concerned will have the opportunity to
raise those issues even before they vote

The omission of R.A. No. 8535 to provide for a seat of government is not fatal to its validity.

Under Section 12 of the LGC, which applies by virtue of Section 54 of R.A. No. 8535, the City of
Novaliches can still establish a seat of government after its creation. While Section 12 speaks of the site
of government centers, such site can very well also be the seat of government, “from where
governmental and corporate service shall be delivered.”

Failure to furnish copy to the QC Council will not render invalid R.A. No. 8535. The evident purpose of
this requirement is to inform the City Council of the move to create another city and to enable it to
formulate its comments and recommendations on said petition.

The Quezon City Council members are obviously aware of the petition since matter has been widely
publicized in the mass media. The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in not result in a
prohibited amendment of the Constitution. The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely
apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the
country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by petitioner.

5. Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695 (same)

Facts: The case involves a boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta in
the Philippines. The dispute arose when the City of Pasig passed ordinances creating two proposed
barangays, Karangalan and Napico. The Municipality of Cainta filed petitions with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) arguing that the proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its jurisdiction
and that the plebiscites for their creation should be suspended or cancelled until the boundary dispute is
resolved.

The COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite for the
creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until the boundary dispute is resolved.
However, the COMELEC ruled differently in the case of Barangay Napico, dismissing the petition as moot
since the plebiscite had already been held and the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified.

Issue: Whether or not boundary dispute presents a prejudicial question that must be decided before the
plebiscites can be held?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the boundary dispute presents a prejudicial question that must be
decided before the plebiscites can be held. The Court emphasized the importance of properly identifying
the territorial jurisdiction of a barangay and the potential for ultra vires acts if the territorial jurisdiction
is not clearly defined.

Therefore, the Court held that the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in
abeyance until the boundary dispute is resolved, and the plebiscite for Barangay Napico should be
annulled and set aside. The plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be suspended until
the boundary dispute is resolved. The plebiscite for Barangay Napico should be annulled and set aside.

7. San Juaqin vs. Silva, G.R. No. L-19870, March 18, 1967.

Petitioner, Municipality of San Joaquin, seeks the reversal of a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo dismissing the former's petition for prohibition, contesting the legality of Executive Order No. 436
of the President of the Philippines, dated July 10, 1961, creating the municipality of Lawigan out of
twenty-one (21) barrios theretofore forming part of said municipality of San Joaquin. Respondents-
appellees are the persons appointed by the President as mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of Lawigan,
who are sought to be restrained from performing their functions as such, upon the ground that Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order is based, constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative powers, and, hence, unconstitutional. The lower court, however, held
otherwise. Hence, this appeal.

The issue herein has been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825,
promulgated on December 24, 1965, which upheld the theory of appellant herein, and rejected the view
taken in the appealed decision.

Wherefore, said decision is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered declaring the
aforementioned Executive Order No. 436 null and void ab initio, and directing herein respondents-
appellees to refrain from acting as officers of the municipality of Lawigan, with costs against them. It is
so ordered.

8. Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994

Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong
and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following:

(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in
the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into
two separate districts.

(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of
the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond
that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.

(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements.
(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section

Issue: Whether or not the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional?

Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative"
proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as
set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as
aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless
otherwise provided by law."

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which
pertains to itself. Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

9. Kapalong vs. Moya, G.R. No. L-41322, September 29, 1988

Facts: From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created respondent
Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight (8) barrios of petitioner.
For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of boundaries between the two municipalities was
brought, at the instance of private respondent, to the Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and
decide. However, it appears that no action was taken on the same. Private respondent then filed a
complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Davao, presided over by herein public respondent
Judge Felix L. Moya against the Municipality of Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary
dispute, recovery of collected taxes and damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 475.

Summary: President Carlos P. Garcia created (from portions of the Municipality of Kapalong) the
respondent Municipality of Santo Tomas and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight (8) barrios of
Kapalong. This conflict of boundaries between the two municipalities was brought to the Provincial
Board of Davao for it to consider and decide. BUT no action was taken.

The Municipality of Sto. Tomas then filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Davao,
presided over by herein public respondent Judge Felix L. Moya against the Municipality of Kapalong, for
settlement of the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of collected taxes and damages.

Petitioner contention: (invoking ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General) President has no power to create
municipalities thus there is no Municipality of Sto. Tomas corporate existence
Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists?

Ruling: Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law
may be patties in a civil action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power
to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it cannot be a party to any
civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings
would be pointless.

Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General (15 SCRA 569) is clear that
the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo Tomas to
speak of It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no corporate existence at all, and it must perforce
remain part and parcel of Kapalong. Based on this premise, it submits that respondent Judge should
have dismissed the case.

On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of boundary disputes is
administrative in nature and should originate in the political or administrative agencies of the
government, and not in the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on appropriate occasions
(Ibid., pp. 73-74).

Take note: Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only “entities authorized by
law may be patties in a civil action.” Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no
power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it cannot be a party to
any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case, since further
proceedings would be pointless.

10. Cawaling vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001

Facts: On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act
Creating the City of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of
Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted
a plebiscite on December 16, 2000 in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification. Consequently, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the
creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the
plebiscite alleging that the plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the
approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof and that Respondent COMELEC failed to observe
the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.

Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition for
prohibition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional,
contending that the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which
requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city and
that R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b)
abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

Consolidated into this case are the two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted
pursuant thereto.

Summary: Congress passed RA 8806 creating the city of Sorsogon by merging municipalities of Sorsogon
and Bacon. Petitioner Cawaling assailed this, stating that the LGC recognizes only two modes of creating
a city: 1) by converting a municipality into a city; or 2) by converting a cluster of barangays.

On August 16, 2000, President Estrada signed into law RA 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon
By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating
Funds Therefor." One of the provisions in said law include: SECTION 54. Plebiscite. — The City of
Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes
cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act.

The passage of the law was published in newspapers from August to SEPTEMBER 1, 2000.

A plesbiscite was conducted in the component municipalities by the COMELEC on DECEMBER 16, 2000.
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the
City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.

Subsequently, Petitioner Cawaling assailed the plebiscite as a nullity AND RA 8806 as unconstitutional.

His argument

NULL AND VOID PLEBISCITE

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the
approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive
information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite

UNCONSTITUTIONAL RA 8806

A. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that
only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city";

B. There is no compelling reason to create Sorsogon City

HELD: The provision cited by the Petitioner points only to some of the modes of creating a city. The LGC

and the Constitution recognizes DIVISION and MERGER as modes as well, provided only that the legal

requirements as provided in the LGC are met.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of
Sorsogon City is valid?

2) Whether or not the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information campaign on the proposed
Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code?

Ruling: 1) Yes. The plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon
City is valid.

Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806 which provides that the City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence
upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite
to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120)
days from its approval.

However, Section 65 of the Act states that it shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general and local circulation.

The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of general circulation.
Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of
Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000.

In addition, the last sentence of Section 10 of the Code provides that plebiscite shall be conducted by
the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of
the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. Quite plainly,
the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from
the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or
ordinance to fix "another date" for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the
date of the effectivity of the law.

Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read together with
Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as used and contemplated in
Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the
laws relating to the same subject should be read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or
repugnancy to established jurisprudence.

2) No. The COMELEC did not fail to conduct an extensive information campaign on the proposed
Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code.
No proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation. Consequently, the
Court sustains the presumption that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under
the law in conducting the plebiscite.

Take note:

THE LGC AND THE CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES MERGER AND DIVISION AS A MODE OF CREATION OF A
CITY

Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or
a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the
modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and
which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a
province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus,

Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:

"SECTION 8. Division and Merger. — Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply
with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation… (may requirements pa re. contiguous
area, land area, population etc.

Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing
local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall
comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

AS TO THE COMPELLING REASON TO CREATE SORSOGON CITY FROM BACON AND SORSOGON

This goes into the wisdom of the law which is something that we do not litigate.

AS TO THE ONE BILL, ON TITLE RULE

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities
of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the
merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the
title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the
incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the
public of fair information on this consequence.

AS TO THE PLEBSICITE
COMELEC pegged the period NOT FROM THE DATE OF APPROVAL of the law (Aug 16, 2000), but from
the date of COMPLETION OF THE PUBLICATION PERIOD (September 1, 2000). This is because the same
Act, RA 8806, states: SECTION 65. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least
two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation. From said date, the conduct of the plebiscite was
well within the 120 day period. SC agreed with the COMELEC, and added the ratio by citing Section 10 of
the LGC which provides:

"SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. — No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date…”

The court cited the Ruling in TANADA v ANGARA re. importance of publication for laws to take effect.

The SC said that to give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act
effective even before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred in Tañada.

AS TO THE LACK OF INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

No sufficient proof was provided on this issue. Hence, the SC used the presumption of regularity in favor
of COMELEC.

11. Mariano vs. COMELEC, March 7, 1995 (read last page)

Facts: Petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

For they contend that such law is enacted, so that Binay could be re-elected and run for as a city of
mayor, Binay was actually a 2nd term Municipal mayor of makati.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of every census.
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
450,000.

Held:

1. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of
Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise
the present territory of the municipality."

the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and
bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said
cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant
merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as
the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative
intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.

2. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated.
They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself.

3-A. in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. We ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be
made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed
by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.

B. We do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in
Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op
cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a
law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it
should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to such general subject."

C. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.