KNOWLEDGE AND ITS DEFINITION

Introduction

The question “What is knowledge?” forms the foundation of epistemology, the philosophical
study of knowledge. To understand what knowledge is, one must delve into its types, the
requirements it entails (such as truth and belief), the distinction between knowing and merely
getting it right, the difficulties in defining it (the problem of the criterion), and the classic account
known as "Justified True Belief." Each of these aspects plays a critical role in the contemporary
debates around the nature and value of knowledge.

1. Types of Knowledge
Great! Here’s the expanded and detailed version of Unit 1: Knowledge and Its Definition,
beginning with Topic 1. I’ll deliver it in sections, each rich with subtopics, examples, and
conceptual depth.

UNIT 1: KNOWLEDGE AND ITS

DEFINITION

1. Types of Knowledge
To define knowledge properly, we must begin by recognizing its various forms. Though the
English term "knowledge" seems singular, it points to different kinds of cognitive and practical
grasp. Philosophers usually distinguish knowledge into three primary types:

1.1 Propositional Knowledge (“knowledge-that”)

This is the central concern of epistemology. It refers to knowledge that a proposition is true.

Examples:
 ●​ "I know that Delhi is the capital of India."
●​ "I know that water boils at 100°C at sea level."
●​ "I know that 2 + 2 = 4."

Key features:

●​ It involves truth-evaluable statements.

●​ It is expressed in declarative sentences.
●​ It can be true or false.

This is the type of knowledge we test in exams, evaluate in scientific inquiry, and debate in
philosophy. It is also the kind of knowledge most susceptible to questions about justification,
truth, and belief.

1.2 Ability Knowledge (“know-how”)

This is practical or skill-based knowledge.

Examples:

●​ "I know how to ride a bicycle."

●​ "I know how to cook pasta."
●​ "I know how to swim."

Key differences from propositional knowledge:

●​ It often doesn’t require propositional articulation.

●​ It is learned through experience and repetition.
●​ You can have ability knowledge without being able to explain it (e.g., a person who can
ride a cycle may not know the physics behind balance).

1.3 Acquaintance Knowledge

This refers to personal familiarity or direct experience.

Examples:

●​ "I know my friend Priya."

●​ "I know the city of Lucknow very well."
●​ "I know the taste of mango."

It often comes through perception and interaction, rather than inference or logical reasoning.
1.4 Why Epistemology Focuses on Propositional Knowledge

Although all three types are meaningful, epistemology focuses primarily on propositional
knowledge because:

●​ It can be clearly analyzed in terms of truth, belief, and justification.

●​ It can be shared, debated, and argued.
●​ It is central to scientific, mathematical, and philosophical knowledge.

Understanding the nature of propositional knowledge allows philosophers to explore the

criteria of knowing, the nature of truth, and the limits of belief.

2. Truth and Belief

To analyze what knowledge is, we must first recognize the building blocks that most
philosophers agree are necessary conditions: truth and belief. However, while both are
crucial, they are not sufficient for knowledge on their own. This section unpacks their nature,
interrelation, and limitations.

2.1 The Necessity of Truth

A belief can only qualify as knowledge if it is true. One cannot know something that is false.

Example:

●​ "I know that the Earth is flat" — this cannot be knowledge because the proposition is
false, even if someone strongly believes it.

Truth is non-negotiable in epistemology. A false belief may be confidently held, widely

accepted, and even emotionally compelling—but it does not become knowledge.

Philosophical Clarification:

●​ Truth is usually regarded as correspondence to reality—a belief is true if it accurately

reflects how things actually are.
●​ Some philosophers have proposed alternate theories of truth (like coherence or
pragmatic theories), but correspondence theory remains dominant in discussions of
knowledge.

2.2 The Nature of Belief

Belief is a mental state—a subjective commitment to the truth of a proposition.

Example:

●​ If you say, “I believe that it will rain tomorrow,” you’re expressing confidence in the
proposition "It will rain tomorrow."

For a person to know something, they must believe it. This condition might seem trivial, but it’s
logically essential.

You cannot know what you don’t believe.

●​ Saying “I know that the train leaves at 6, but I don’t believe it” is incoherent.
●​ If you assert a fact but doubt or deny it internally, your state is not one of knowing.

Degrees of Belief:

Belief can vary in certainty:

●​ Tentative belief: "I believe it might snow."

●​ Strong belief: "I firmly believe this medicine works."

But for knowledge, the strength of belief is less important than whether it's justified and true.

2.3 Truth + Belief: Why They’re Not Enough

So far, we’ve identified two necessary conditions for knowledge:

1.​ Belief — a psychological commitment to a proposition.

2.​ Truth — objective correspondence with reality.

But are these two conditions sufficient?

No—and this is one of the most important discoveries in modern epistemology.

Case Study: The Lucky Guess

Imagine you’re taking a multiple-choice quiz:

●​ You don’t know the answer to question 10.

●​ You randomly guess "C"—and it happens to be correct.

You believed "C" was right. It was true.

But your belief was not based on good reasons. It was pure luck.
Conclusion: You had a true belief, but not knowledge.

This brings us to the idea that knowledge must be:

●​ True
●​ Believed
●​ And also justified

In other words, your belief must be formed on good grounds, evidence, or reliable methods.

Recap: Why Truth and Belief Are Necessary But Not Sufficient
Component Description Necessary? Sufficient?

Truth Proposition must Yes No

match reality

Belief Mental commitment Yes No

to the proposition

To truly claim knowledge, we need something more—a way to rule out mere lucky guesses.
That something is typically understood as justification, which will be discussed more deeply in
Unit 2.

3. Knowing vs. Merely Getting It Right

One of the most important distinctions in epistemology is between genuinely knowing a fact
and merely being right by accident. This section explains why true belief is not enough for
knowledge, and introduces the concepts of epistemic luck and epistemic credit.

3.1 The Role of Luck in Belief

A person may hold a belief that turns out to be true, but only by chance, not due to any reliable
reasoning or evidence.

Classic Example: The Lucky Exam Guess

●​ A student guesses the answer to a difficult question on an exam.

●​ The guess turns out to be correct.
●​ The belief was true, and the student believed it.
 ●​ But clearly, the student did not know the answer.

This kind of belief is accidentally true. We would not give the student epistemic credit for
knowing, only for being lucky.

3.2 The Concept of Epistemic Credit

To truly know something, your belief must not only be true but must also result from a
competent and reliable process. This process should be:

●​ Rational
●​ Evidence-based
●​ Not dependent on coincidence

This leads us to the idea of epistemic credit:

You deserve epistemic credit when your belief is true for the right reasons.

Analogy:​
An expert archer hits the bullseye through skill. A beginner hits it once by accident. Both hit the
target, but only one deserves credit.

So too with belief:

●​ The person who believes something based on good reasoning has knowledge.
●​ The person who guesses correctly does not.

3.3 Epistemic vs. Moral Luck

To sharpen our understanding, let’s compare epistemic luck with moral luck:

●​ In moral luck, a person may be judged differently based on the consequences of their
actions—even if they had the same intentions.
●​ In epistemic luck, a person’s belief turns out to be true due to factors beyond their
cognitive control, like coincidence or chance.

Epistemologists aim to eliminate or minimize the influence of luck in defining knowledge.

This is why justification becomes so central: it’s a way of showing that the belief was reliably
formed, not randomly correct.
Summary: Why Knowing Requires More Than Truth and Belief
Component Gets It Right? Counts as Why/Why Not?
Knowledge?

Lucky Guess Yes No Truth arrived at by

accident

Reasoned Belief Yes Yes Truth achieved

through justification

Thus, the distinction between knowing and merely getting it right is central to
epistemology—it motivates the need for an additional condition beyond truth and belief:
justification, which will be treated fully in Unit 2.

4. The Problem of the Criterion

This issue goes deeper than defining knowledge—it questions whether we can even begin the
project of defining it without already having examples of knowledge. This problem sits at the
foundation of epistemology and leads to a classic philosophical impasse.

4.1 The Circularity Dilemma

This problem arises when we ask two questions simultaneously:

1.​ What do we know?​

(Let’s identify examples of genuine knowledge.)​

2.​ How do we know it?​

(Let’s identify the criteria that make belief count as knowledge.)​

But here’s the dilemma:

●​ We cannot identify real knowledge without already knowing the correct criteria.
●​ We cannot formulate correct criteria unless we already have examples of genuine
knowledge.

This creates a circle—we need one to define the other, but both depend on each other. This is
what Chisholm called “The Problem of the Criterion.”
4.2 Methodism: Starting with Criteria

Methodism is the view that we should first identify the method or criterion for knowledge, and
then use it to decide what we actually know.

Key example: Descartes’ methodic doubt

●​ Descartes begins by doubting everything.

●​ He accepts only what is absolutely certain—“clear and distinct” ideas.
●​ Then, he builds his system of knowledge from these foundations.

Advantages:

●​ Systematic and logically tight.

●​ Avoids starting from assumptions.

Disadvantages:

●​ Highly skeptical: it may leave us with very little actual knowledge.

●​ Too demanding: very few beliefs can meet Cartesian standards of certainty.

4.3 Particularism: Starting with Clear Cases

Particularism is the opposite approach. It starts by identifying clear, intuitive examples of

knowledge and then builds a theory to explain what makes them count as knowledge.

Example (Chisholm):

●​ “I know I have hands.”

●​ “I know 2 + 2 = 4.”
●​ “I know I’m thinking right now.”

Then, the philosopher works backward: if these are cases of knowledge, what criteria must
they meet?

Advantages:

●​ Matches common-sense intuitions.

●​ Avoids extreme skepticism.

Disadvantages:

●​ May seem circular.

 ●​ Risks relying on unproven assumptions.

4.4 Responses and Philosophical Implications

There is no widely accepted solution to the Problem of the Criterion, but most epistemologists
today lean toward particularism, accepting that we can’t define knowledge in a vacuum.

The problem teaches us two things:

1.​ Epistemology is a web, not a linear chain.​

We cannot start from scratch and build knowledge upward like a house—we often
reason in a circular but coherent network.​

2.​ Philosophy must sometimes tolerate imperfection.​

Foundational definitions may remain elusive, but progress can still be made by
examining how knowledge behaves in various situations.​

Summary: The Criterion Crisis

Approach Starts With Strengths Weaknesses

Methodism Criterion Logical, systematic Too skeptical

Particularism Examples of Realistic, intuitive Circular,

knowledge assumption-based

The Problem of the Criterion reminds us that the project of defining knowledge is as complicated
as the concept of knowledge itself.

5. Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?

For centuries, philosophers believed they had captured the nature of knowledge through the
classical definition:

Knowledge = Justified True Belief (JTB)

However, in the 20th century, this view was famously challenged. In this section, we’ll explore:

●​ What JTB means

 ●​ Why it was considered adequate
●​ Gettier’s critique
●​ The ongoing search for a better theory of knowledge

5.1 The Classical JTB Model

According to the Justified True Belief model, a person knows a proposition p if and only if:

1.​ Belief: The person believes p

2.​ Truth: p is true
3.​ Justification: The person is justified in believing p

Each condition is necessary:

●​ You cannot know something you don’t believe.

●​ You cannot know something false.
●​ You cannot know something without good reason.

Example:

Let’s say Ravi believes that the capital of France is Paris.

●​ He believes it (Condition 1).

●​ It’s true (Condition 2).
●​ He learned it through school and verified it through maps (Condition 3).

Under JTB, Ravi knows this fact.

5.2 Gettier’s Challenge (1963)

In a short paper titled “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Edmund Gettier showed that JTB
is not sufficient for knowledge. He offered counterexamples—now known as Gettier
cases—that meet all three conditions but fail to qualify as knowledge.

Gettier Case 1: Smith and Jones

●​ Smith has strong evidence that Jones will get the job.
●​ He also sees Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
●​ He concludes: “The person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.”
●​ But unexpectedly, Smith gets the job—and he, too, has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith’s belief is:

 ●​ True (he gets the job and has 10 coins)
●​ Believed
●​ Justified

But the belief is true by coincidence, not because Smith’s reasoning was valid.

Conclusion: This is a case of JTB, but not knowledge. The belief was accidentally true.

5.3 The Structure of Gettier Cases

Gettier cases generally follow this pattern:

1.​ The agent forms a belief B based on good justification J.

2.​ Unknown to the agent, J is false or partially flawed.
3.​ However, B still turns out to be true, purely by luck.

This challenges the JTB account because:

●​ The person has done everything “right” epistemically.

●​ Yet we don’t attribute knowledge due to the role of luck.

5.4 Proposed Solutions and Theories

Philosophers have tried to repair or replace JTB by adding a fourth condition or altering the
nature of justification.

1. No False Lemmas

●​ Add a fourth condition: “The belief is not based on any false assumptions.”
●​ Problem: Some Gettier cases involve only true assumptions, but still result in
accidental truth.

2. Causal Theory (Goldman)

●​ The belief must be causally connected to the fact it represents.

●​ Problem: Abstract truths (e.g., mathematics) may not involve causal relations.

3. Reliabilism

●​ A belief counts as knowledge if it results from a reliable belief-forming process (e.g.,

perception, memory).
●​ Shifts focus from justification to truth-conduciveness.
●​ Critique: May allow for cases of truth without understanding.

4. Virtue Epistemology (Zagzebski, Sosa)

 ●​ Knowledge is a kind of intellectual achievement, the result of cognitive virtues like
careful reasoning, attention, and honesty.
●​ This approach emphasizes epistemic agency and skill, rather than just static
conditions.

Summary: The JTB Debate

Theory Core Idea Strengths Weaknesses

Justified True Belief Traditional definition Elegant, intuitive Fails in Gettier cases

No False Lemmas Justification must not Addresses some Doesn’t solve all
rest on falsity flaws cases

Causal Theory Belief must be Grounded in reality Fails for abstract

caused by the fact knowledge

Reliabilism Belief must arise from Practical, Ignores internal

reliable methods truth-focused justification

Virtue Epistemology Knowledge as a Connects knowledge May be hard to define

cognitive to epistemic agency virtues precisely
achievement

Final Reflection

The Gettier problem marks a turning point in modern epistemology. It showed that knowing is
not just about being right—it’s about being right in the right way.

Philosophers now realize:

●​ Justification must be strong enough to exclude luck.

●​ Knowledge involves more than a checklist—it requires understanding the structure,
context, and formation of belief.

Conclusion
Unit 1 of epistemology provides a foundational understanding of the complexities involved in
defining knowledge. We explored the different types of knowledge, highlighting the central role
of propositional knowledge. We examined the truth and belief requirements and found them to
be necessary but insufficient conditions for knowledge. The distinction between knowing and
merely getting it right underscores the importance of justification and the removal of luck.

The problem of the criterion challenges our methodological assumptions in epistemology,

forcing us to choose between methodism and particularism. Finally, the traditional view of
knowledge as Justified True Belief was shown to be inadequate in light of Gettier problems,
prompting modern epistemology to search for refined or entirely new definitions.

Thus, while defining knowledge may seem intuitive at first, it unfolds into a complex and
nuanced philosophical inquiry—one that continues to shape epistemological debates to this day.