* Traversing Philosophical Boundaries FOURTH EDITION MAX O. HALLMAN Merced College Y 302 >. WADSWORTH #08 CENGAGE Learning” ngapore + Spain «United Kingdom « United States ‘rustle « Brad « Japan «Korea + MThe Ethics of Care VIRGINIA HELD. Virginia Held is a Distinguished Professor in the City University of New York Graduate School. After receiving her B.A. in Philosophy and English from B: College, Held entered the philosophy graduate program at Columbia University from which she eared her Ph.D. in 1968. Held was appointed Associate Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York in 1973, and over the years she has held many positions at the university. She has also held visiting professorships at several universities, including the University of California, Los Angeles. ‘Outside the classroom, Held was a staff member of the magazine The Reporter for more than a decade, and she has served on the editorial board of several philosophical journals. In addition, she has been active in a number of philosoph- ical organizations, including the Society for Women in Philosophy and the Amer ican Philosophical Association. In 2001-2002, she held the office of President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Held has also presented talks, often focusing on issues of feminism and social justice, at a large number of conferences and workshops.VIRGINIA HELD: THE ETHICS OF CARE includ S Morality Teanstming Ca ee Justifying Social Action (1984), Feminist Porn, Plt, and Gt ace 4 PH (92), and Te Es Cn In the following selection from The Ethics of Care, Held explains the major while contrasting the é ese ane ors Pringpal ssumpdion of the adn have been dominant in Wester a ism, and Aristotelian virtue ethics—that eee ‘m philosophy. Unlike these eatlier theories, the ethics of care focuses on the moral values implicit in the caring relationship that exists between individuals. It values emotion, while rejecting the emphasis on abstract reasoning and universalistic rules found in the dominant theories. As with feminist thought in general, the ethics of care also insists on reevaluating the traditional separation of private life from public life, thereby a significance of the relationships that exist between interconnected persons within the family and other social groups. Finally, the ethics of care begins with a different conception of persons—the “conception of persons as relational, rather than as the self-sufficient independent individuals of the dominant moral theories.” Having explained the common features of the ethics of care, Held contrasts the ethic of care with the ethic of justice. Unlike certain earlier proponents of the ethics of care who seem to have suggested that these two ethics were mutually exclusive, Held argues that both of these ethics deal with something of great moral importance, and thus that they must be integrated if we are to have a satisfactory moral theory. This integntion, however, cannot take the form of incorporating one of these ethics into the other as some have suggested. Indeed, 1e ethics of care to one of the dominant in ition to those who would attach the ethics o| lo Seer Held claims that, “Care is tice ne it under the ethic of justice, c ea ea can be care without justice e. There robably the most deeply fundamental valu there hs hissoically been litte justice in the family, but care and life have gone rg as te eee without care, however, for without care without it, be no justice : i to respe ild we ‘ve and there would be no persons 70 el woud serv cludes with a brief discussion of the social and political im- fiat as Ping. an ethics of care Eckd emnphaszes tot these implications ane Ee canta es - era ain ofthe family or of penonal relations, co what certainly not limited to here as opposed to the “pub- tsitional moral theories have labeled ie peas ethic of care would allow us to lic” sphere, Indeed, Held claims hat TPE priorities, For when we careflly Seevallate many, 08,005 fn iv aionsofehe ethics of care, we will realize that examine the social and political imp! esmioye rcturing of so “s radical ethic calling for a profound resuctonns ling the moral 423IN THE PAST FEW DECADES, THE ETHICS OF CARE HAS developed as a promising alternative to the domi- nant moral approaches that have been invoked dur- ing the previous two centuries. It has given rise to an extensive body of literature and has affected ‘many moral inquiries in many areas. It is changing, the ways moral problems are often interpreted and changing what many think the recommended ap- proaches to moral issues ought to be. With interest in normative perspectives expand- ing everywhere—from the outlines of egalitarian families and workplaces, to the moral responsibilities of parents and citizens, to the ethical evaluations of governmental and foreign policies—the ethics of care offers hope for rethinking in more fruitful ways how we ought to guide our lives. Te has the potential of being based on the truly universal experience of care. Every human being has been eared for as a child or would not be alive. Understanding the values involved in care, and how its standards reject violence and domination, are possible with the ethics of care. It need not invoke religious beliefs that carry divisive baggage. It does not rely on dubious claims about universal norms of reason to which we must give priority in all questions of morality. Instead, it develops, on the basis of experience, reflection on it and discourse concerning it, an understanding of the most basic and most comprehensive values... By now, the ethics of care has moved far be- yond its original formulations, and any attempt to evaluate it should consider much more than the one or two early works so frequently cited, It has been developed as a moral theory relevant not only rom The Eis of Cae: Personal, Polis, and Go misono Oxides Pes Se to the so-called private realms of family and friend- ship but to medical practice, law, political lie, the organization war, and. intemational relations. The ethics of care is sometimes seen as a poten- tial moral theory to be substituted for such domi- | nant moral theories as Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, ‘or Aristotelian virtue ethics. It is sometimes seen asa form of virtue ethics. It is almost always developed as emphasizing neglected moral considerations of east as much importance as the considerations cen- tral to. moralites of justice and rights or of utility and preference satisfaction. And many who conti ute to the understanding of the ethies of care seek to integrate the moral considerations, such a jus tice, which other moral theories have clarified, St isfactorily with those of care, though they offen «¢ the need to reconceptualize these considerations of society, FEATURES OF THE ETHICS OF CARE Some advocates of the ethics of care resist geneT izing this approach into something that can be fied into the form of a moral theory. They see it ®* mosaic of insights and value the way itis sensitive | contextual nuance and particular narratives: a than making the abstract and universil claims more familiar moral theories. Still, I think one a discern among various versions of the a number of major features. 5 First, the central focus of the ethics of “ the compelling moral salience of attending © # meeting the needs of the particular other ol by Vinge Hd Capright 2006 by Oxf Unicity Ps. Repel bywhom we take responsibility. Caring for one’s child, for instance, may well and defensibly be at the forefront of a person's moral concems, The ethics of care recognizes that human beings ate de pendent for many years of their lives, cha the moral Shim of those dependent on us for the care they need is pressing, and that there are highly important ‘oral aspects in developing the relations of caring that enable human beings to live and progress. All persons need care for at least their early years. Pro- spects for human progress and flourishing hinge fundamentally on the care that those needing it re- ceive, and the ethics of care stresses the moral force of the responsibility to respond to the needs of the dependent. Many persons will become ill and de- pendent for some periods of their later lives, includ ing in frail old age, and some who are permanently disabled will need care the whole of their lives. Moralities built on the image of the independent, autonomous, rational individual largely overlook: the realy of human dependence and the morality for which it calls, The ethics of care attends to this central concem of human life and delineates the moral values involved. It refuses to relegate care toa realm “outside morality.” How caring for par~ ticular others should be reconciled with the claims of, for instance, universal justice is an_issue that needs to be addressed. But the ethics of care starts With the moral claims of particular others, for in stance, of one’s child, whose claims can be compel- ling regardless of universal principles. Second, in the epistemological proces of rying to understand what morality would recommend and what it would be morally best for us €0 do and to be, the ethics of care values emotion rather than rejects it, Not all emotion is valued, of course wt in contrast with the dominant rationalist a Prouces, such emotions as sympathy. empathy aa and responsiveness are seen as the kind jaotil emotions that need to be cultivated, not "ly to help in the implementation of the dictates \in what morality. ‘component of the people exon but to better ascerta Sominends. Even anger may mad ation that should be felt when tribytl wajustly or inhumanely. and it may co" eto (rather than interfere with) an appropriate VIRGINIA HELD: THE ETHICS OF CARE Aas interpretation of the moral wrong. This is not t0 say that raw emotion can be a guide to morality; feel~ ings need to be reflected on and educated. But from the care penpective, moral inquiries that rely on eason and rationakistic deductions or calculations are seen as deficient. The emotions that are typically considered and «din rationalistic moral theories are the ego~ re istic feelings that undermine universal moral norms the favoritism that interferes with impartiality, and igeful impulses for which mo- rality is to provide restraints, The ethics of care, in contrast, typically appreciates the emotions and lational capabilities that enable morally concemed persons in actual interpersonal contexts to under- stand what would be best. Since even the helpful emotions can often become misguided or worse— as when excessive empathy with others leads t0 a wrongfil degree of sel-denial or when benevolent \tion— the aggressive and ve concem crosses over into controlling domi awe need an ethics of care, not just care itself. The various aspects and expressions of care and caring, relations need to be subjected to moral scrutiny and evaluated, not just observed and described. Third, the ethics of care rejects the view of the dominant moral theories that the more abstract the reasoning about a moral problem the better, because the more likely to avoid bias and arbitrariness, and the more nearly to achieve impartiality. The ethics ts rather than removes itself from the claims of particular others with whom we share ac tual relationships. It calls nto question the universal istic and abstract rules of the dominant theories When the latter consider such actual relations as be aveen a parent and child, ifthey say anything about them at all they may see them as permitted and fulevating them a preference that a person tay have. Or they may recognize a universal obligation forall parents to care for their children. Bu they do pt permit actual relations ever C0 take priority over the requirements of impartiality. As Brion Berry ex- presses this view, there canbe univer rues permit ne people co favor their frends in certain contexts, such as deciding tow! fs, but the latter partiality is morally accept tiniversal rules have already so judged i! The ethies of care respe hhom to give holiday Ie only because426 CHAPTER 4: ETHICS cof care, in contrast, is skeptical of such abstraction id rekance on universal rules and questions the pri- given to them, To most advocates ofthe ethies fofcare, the compelling moral claim of the particular other may be valid even when it conflicts with the requirement usually made by moral theories that moral judgments be universalizable, and this is of fondamental moral importance.” Hence the poten- tial conflict between care and justice, friendship and impartiality, loyalty and universality. To others, however, there need be no conflict ifuniversal judg- ‘ments come to incorporate appropriately the norms of care previously disregarded. Annette Baier considers how a feminist ap- proach to morality differs from a Kantian one and Kant's claim that women are incapable of being, fully moral because of their reliance on emotion rather than reason, She writes, “Where Kant con~ cludes “so much the worse for women,’ we can conclude ‘so much the worse for the male fixation on the special skill of drafting legislation, for the bureaucratic mentality of rule worship, and for the male exaggeration of the importance of indepen- dence over mutual interdependence.””* ‘Margaret Walker contrasts what she sees. as feminist “moral understanding” with what has tra- ditionally been thought of as moral “knowledge.” She sees the moral understanding she advocates as involving “attention, contextual and narrative ap~ preciation, and communication in the event of moral deliberation.” This alternative moral episte- mology holds that “the adequacy of moral under- standing decreases as its form approaches generality through abstraction."* The ethics of care may seek to limit the appli- cability of universal rules to certain domains where they are more appropriate, like the domain of law, and resist their extension to other domains. Such ani ority rules may simply be inappropriate in, for instance, the contexts of family and friendship, yet relations in these domains should certainly be evaluated, not merely described, hence morality should not be limited to abstract rules. We should be able to give moral guidance conceming actual relations that ate trusting, considerate, and caring, and con- cerning those that are not. Dominant moral theories tend to. int moral problems as if they were conflicts bese egoistic individual interests on the one hand, ae universal moral principles on the other, The ey. tremes of “selfish individual” and “humanity” are recognized, but what lies between these is often overlooked. The ethics of care, in contrat, focuses especially on the area between these extremes Those who conscientiously care for others are not seeking primarily to further their own individual in- terests; their interests are intertwined with the per sons they cate for. Neither are they acting forthe sake of all others or humanity in general; they seek in- stead to preserve ot promote an actual human rls tion between themselves and particular others. Persons in caring relations are acting for self-and-other to- gether. Their characteristic stance is neither egoisic nor altruistic; these are the options in a conficuil situation, but the well-being of a caring relation in- volves the cooperative well-being of those in the relation and the well-being of the relation itselé In trying to overcome the attitudes and pro- blems of tribalism and religious intolerance, domi- nant moralities have tended to assimilate the domains of the family and friendship co the tibul or to a source of the unfair favoring of one’s own. Or they have seen the attachments people have it these areas as among the nonmoral private prefer ences people are permitted to pursue if rest by impartial moral norms. The ethics of care rec08-_ nizes the moral value and importance of relations ot family and friendship and the need for moral ge ance in these domains to understand how exst§ relations should often be changed and new ones de veloped. Having grasped the value of caring relation’ in such contexts as these more personal ones, cthies of cate then often examines social and polite arrangements in light of these values. In i ™ developed forms, the ethics of care asa feminist) ethic offers suggestions for the radical «ransformation society. It demands not just equality for wom’? existing structures of society but equal consider for the experience that reveals the values, impo tance, and moral significance, of caring: ig A fourth characteristic of the ethies of OF that, like much yy aes minist thought in» 4reconceptualizes traditional notions about the pub- ficand the private. The traditional view, built int the dominant moral theories, is thatthe household isa private sphere beyond politics into which gov- emment, based on consent, should not intrude. Feminists have shown how the greater social, poit- jal, economic, and cultural power of men has aructured this “private” sphere to the disadvantage of women and children, rendering them vulnerable to domestic violence without outside interference, often leaving women economically dependent on nen and subject €o a highly inequitable division of hhbor in the family. The law has not hesitated to intervene into women’s private decisions concern ing reproduction but has been highly reluctant to intrude on men’s exercise of coercive power within the “castles” of their homes. Dominant moral theories have seen “public” lif as relevant to morality while missing the moral significance of the “private” domains of family and fiiendship. Thus the dominant theories have as- sumed that morality should be sought for unrelated, independent, and mutually indifferent individuals sumed to be equal. They have posited an abstract, filly rational “agent as such” from which to con- seruct morality, while missing the moral issues that arise between interconnected persons in the con~ texts of fimily, fiiendship, and social groups. In the context of the family, itis typical for relations to be between persons with highly unequal power ‘who did not choose the ties and obligations in which they find themselves enmeshed. For in- stance, no child can choose her parents, yet she ‘may well have obligations to care for them. Rela- tions of this kind are standardly noncontracturl, and conceptualizing them as contractual would of ten undermine or at least obscure the trust 0” which their worth depends. The etic of care ad- ssc rather than neglees mom iste rng in ‘hts among the sequal and dependent rela- ‘ns tha are ofien laden with emotion and invol- Uunary, and then notices how ofien these attributes ‘rly not only to the household but in the wider Te as well. For instance, persons do not choose GH gender, racial, clas, ethnic, religious, | or cultural groups to be brought up ity Yet VIRGINIA HELD: THE ETHICS OF CARE a7 these sorts of ties may be important aspects of who they ae and how thee experiences so-enondint to monal understanding A fifth characteristic of the ethics of care is the conception of persons with which it begins... The ethics of care usually works with a conception of persons as relational, rather than as the self sufficient independent individuals of the dominant ‘moral theories. The dominant theories can be inter- preted as importing into moral theory a concept of the person developed primarily for liberal political 1g the person asa rational, nterested individual and economic theory, s autonomous agent, or a sel (On this view, society is made up of “independent, autonomous units who cooperate only when the terms of cooperation are such as to make it further the ends of each of the parties,” in Brian Berry's words Or, if they are Kantians, they refrain from actions that they could not will to be universal laws to which all flly rational and autonomous individ ual agents could agree. What such views hold, in Michael Sandel’ enitique of them, is that “what se~ parates us is in some important sense prior to what Connects us—epistemologically prior as well as mor ally prior. We are distince individuals first and hen swe form relationships.”” In Martha Nussbaum’s lib- eral feminist morality, “the flourishing of human beings taken one by one is both analytically and normatively prior to the flourishis The ethics of care, in contrast, charac sees persons a8 relational and interdependent, mor- ally and epistemologicall. Every person stats out as child dependent on those providing us care, and ve remain interdependent with others in thor Sughly fandamental ways throughout our lives ‘That we can think and act as if we were indepen fork of social relations mak- of any group. fistically dent depends on a net ing it posible for us to do so. And our rel: pare of what constitute our identity, This fs ot 60 jot become autonomous; fenuinits say that we eann eve done much interesting work developing an mative conception of autonomy in plac dhe liberal individualist one, Feminists have much experience rejecting oF reconstituting relational tes ve, But it means that from the per~ that are oppresiv Specive of an ethics of cre, 1 construct morality as aleet of |428 CHAPTER 4: ETHICS if we were Robinson Crusoes, or to use Hobbes's image, mushrooms sprung from nowhere, is mis- leading." As Eva Kittay writes, this conception fos~ ters the illusion that society is composed of equal, and independent individuals who can choose to associate with one another or not. It obscures the very real facts of dependency for everyone when they are young, for most people at various periods in their lives when they are ill or old or infirm, for some who are disabled, and for all those engaged in unpaid “dependency work.”” And it obscures the innumerable ways persons and groups are interde- pendent in the modern world Not only does the liberal individualist concep- tion of the person foster a false picture of society and the persons in it, it is, from the perspective of the ethics of care, impoverished also as an ideal. The ethics of care values the ties we have with particular other persons and the actual relationships that partly constitute our identity. Although persons often may and should reshape their relations with ocher— distancing themselves from some persons and groups and developing or strengthening ties with other—the autonomy sought within the ethics of care is a capacity to reshape and cultivate new rela tions, not to ever more closely resemble the unen= cumbered abstract rational self of liberal political and moral theories. Those motivated by the ethics of care would seek to become more admirable re~ lational persons in better caring relations Even if the liberal ideal is meant only to instruct us on what would be rational in the terms of its ideal model, thinking of persons as the model presents them has effects that should not be welcomed. As Annette Baier writes, “Liberal morality, if unsupple- mented, may unfit people to be anything other than ‘what its justifying theories suppose them to be, who havé no interest in each others’ interests There is strong empirical evidence of how adopting, a theoretical model can lead to behavior that mirrors it. Various studies show that studying economics, with its “repeated and intensive exposure to a model whose unequivocal prediction” is that people will decide what to do on the basis of self-interest, leads economics students 6 be less cooperative and more inclined to free ride than other students.! The conception of the person ado} pted by the domin re nt moral theories provides monies 2 suitable’ for legal, polieal, and Sanaa tions between relative rangers, once adequate mg exist for them to form a politcal entity. The aie, of care is, instead, hospitable to the rehitedner persons. It sees many of our responsibilities me fi ed into but presented to us by the ase dents of our embeddediiess in timilil and socal historical contexts. Ie often calls on ui to take respon sibility, while liberal individualist morality totus fon how we should leave each other alone. The view of perions as embedded and encumbered ees fandamental to much feminist thinking about mo- rality and expecially to the ethics of can JUSTICE AND CARE Some conceptions of the ethics of care see it 3 contrasting with an ethic of justice in ways tht n. Carol G perspectives in in- suggest one must choose between th ligan’s suggestion of alterna terpreting and organizing the elements of a mor problem lent itself co this implication; she henel used the metaphor of the ambiguous figure of vase and the faces, from psychological research o” perception, to illustrate how one could see a prob- Jem as either a problem of justice or 2 problem of care, but not as both simultaneously." ‘An ethic of justice focuses on questions of fi ness, equality, individual rights, abstract princi and the consistent application of them. An eth care focuses on attentiveness, trust, responsivens and cultivating caning >" tions, Whereas an ethic of justice seeks a fair son between competing individual interests and va ssi ty a4 need, narrative nuanc ethic of eate sees the interests of carers and as importantly intertwined rather tha competing. Whereas justice protects eal freedom, cae fosters social bons and corer ‘These are very different emphases in hat wht tality should consider. Yet both deal wi *\ seems of great_moral importance. This ™ i, many to explore how they might be combine 2 satishetory morality, One can persuasive dl| ~ for instance, that justice is needed in such contexts of care as the family, to protect against violence and the unfair division of labor or treatment of children One can also persuasively argue that care is needed in such contexts of justice as the streets and the courts, Where persons should be treated humanely and in the way education and health and welfare should be dealt with as social responsibilities. The implication may be that justice and care should not be separated into different “ethics,” thac, in Sara Ruddick’s proposed approach, “justice is always seen in tandem with care.”"’, Almost no advocates of the ethics of care a willing to see it as a moral outlook less valuable than the dominant ethics of justice. To imagine that the concems of care can merely be added on to the dominant theories, as, for instance, Stephen Danvall suggests, is seen as unsatisfactory.'* Confin- ing the ethics of care to the private sphere while holding it unsuitable for public life, as Nel Noddings did at first and as many accounts of it suggest,'* is also to be rejected. But how care and justice are to be meshed without losing sight of their differing priori- ties is a task still being worked on, My own suggestions for integrating care and justice are to keep these concepts conceptually dis- tinct and to delineate the domains in which they should have priority. In the realm of law, for in- stance, justice and the assurance of rights should have priority, although the humane considerations of care should not be absent. In the realm of the family and among friends, priority should be given ‘6 expansive care, though the basic requirements of Justice surely should also be met, But these are the slearest cases; others will combine moral urgencies. Universal human rights (including social and eco- tomic ones as well as the political and civil) should Certainly be respected, but promoting care across continents may be a more promising way to achieve {is than mere rational cognition. When needs are ({sheate, justice may be a lesenet! requirement on quis! sponsibility for meeting needs. although rately excuses violations of rights. At the level OF what constitutes a society in the first place. a do- pain within which rights are to be assured and care vided, appeal must be made to something like VIRGINIA HELD: THE ETHICS OF CARE 429 the often weak but not negligible caring relat among persons that enable them to recognize cach other as members of the same society. Such rec nition must eventually be global; in the meantime the civil society, without which the liberal institu. tions of justice cannot function, presumes a back ground of some degree of caring relations rather individuals... Further: provide a more fruitful than of merely competin, more, considerations of ca basis than considerations of justi much about how society should be structured, for instance, how extensive or how restricted markets should be.... And in the course of protecting the rights that ought to be recognized, such as those co basic necessities, policies that express the caring of the community for all its members will be better policies than those that grudgingly, though fairy, issue an allotment to those deemed unfit. Care is probably the most deeply findamental value. There can be care without justice; there has hiscorically been litte justice in the family, but care and life have gone on without it. There can be no justice without care, however, for without care no child would survive and there would be no persons to respect, for deciding IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIETY for its Many advocates of the ethics of care at relevance in social and political and economic life. Sara Ruddick shows its implications for efforts ro, achieve peace." I argue that as we see the det cies of the contractual model of human. relations: within the household, we can see them also in the world beyond and begin to think about how society should be reorganized to be hospitable to rather than continuing to marginalize it, We care, rather fan vee how not only does every domain of socieey eed transformation in light of the valves of care hhut so would the relations between such domains ifwe took care seriously, as care would move to the enter of our attention and become a primary con= cem of society. Instead of a society dominated by Conflict restrained by law and preoccupied with conomic gain, we might have a society that saw430 CHAPTER 4: ETHICS bs its most important task the flourishing of children and the development of caring relations, not only in personal contexts but among citizens and using, governmental institutions. We would see that i stead of abandoning culture to the dictates of the marketplace, we should make it posible for culture to develop in ways best able to enlighten and enrich, human life Instead of seeing the corporate sector, and mil- itary strength, and government and law as the most important segments of society deserving the highest levels of wealth and power, a caring society might see the tasks of bringing up children, educating its members, meeting the needs of all, achieving peace and treastring the environment, and doing these in the best ways possible to be that to which the great cst social efforts of all should be devoted. One can recognize that something comparable to legal con- straints and police enforcement, including at a global level, may always be necessary for special cases, but also that caring societies could greatly decrease the need for them. The social changes that a focus on care would require would be as profound as can be imagined. The ethics of care as it has developed is most certainly not limited to the sphere of family and personal relations, When its social and political im- plications are understood, it is a radical ethic calling for a profound restructuring of society. NOTES 1, See Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2. Itis often asserted that to count as moral, a judgment must be universaliable: If we hold it would be right (or wrong) for one person to do something, then we are committed to holding that 3 would be right (or wrong) for anyone similar in similar circumstances to do it. The su ‘moral ju fied variables and the ie 10 take care of Jane bec eae 7 use she is my child” isnot Ml parents ought to take care of their children” is, The former judg: a Uuniveralizable if it wi nt could be lerived from the latter, %. 10, H 4, . Sara Ruddick, “1 ay vacates oF the ethic o than as dependent on universal moral a no ju it might not be universalizable. e thi (ath fameny cece, ons Seopa a Margaret Urban Walker, “Moral Unders Alierisive‘Eelaemalogy|diea/tacken nat Tat Tay TAL Laced iy eras Onnd Unveity Bom, 1979.2 ee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 982, p. 166. Martha Nussbaum, Sew and Socal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 0, This image is in Hobbes's The Citizen: Pilot Rudiments Concerning Government and Seciey, B, Gert (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1972, p. 205. sa Feder Kittay, Love's Labor: Esays on Wines Equality, and Dependency (New York: Rowleis 1999). Baier, Moral Prejudices, p- 29. See Robert A. Frank, Thomas Gilovich, 194 Dennis T, Regan, “Does Studying Economie Inhibit Cooperation?” Journal af Economie Pew tives 7@) (Spring 1993): 159-171 and Ger Marwell and Ruth Ames, “Economists Free 1 Does Anyone Ele?: Experiments on the Pov of Public Goods, IV,” Journal of Public Ea 15(3) (June 1981): 295-310. i Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Payee Theory and Women’s Development (Camber Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 28 fg Orientation and Moral Development aud Metal Tory eds Eva Foie co 1987), 2 stice in Families 5S are: Essel Re Held (Bowe 1 ove Coe? Domination,” in Justice and C ninist Ethics, ed. Virginia Colo.; Westview Press, 1995), P- 2! Stephen Danwall, Philosophi al Ethics Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), cP: of Care.” r15, Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach 1o Ethis and Morat Education Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), JOHN HOSPERS: WHAT MEANS THIS FREEDOM? 431 16. Sara Ruddick, Matemal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Pease (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989). Questions for Thought its 2: Which of the first four features of an ethics of care do you find most ap- pealing? Which of them do you find least appealing? Is your conception of persons closer to that with which an ethics of care begins or to that of liberal individualism? Explain. Do you agree with Held that an ethic of care is as important, if not more important, than an ethic of justice? Why or why not? Can you think of additional ways in which adopting an ethics of care might transform the society in which you live? To what extent, if any, are your moral decisions influenced by caring?