EKONOMIA I PRAWO.

ECONOMICS AND LAW

Volume 22, Issue 1, March 2023
p-ISSN 1898-2255, e-ISSN 2392-1625
www.economicsandlaw.pl
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
received 28.09.2022; revised 23.02.2023; accepted 31.03.2023
Citation: Moszyński, M. (2023). Global order and its enemies. Ekonomia i Prawo. Economics and Law,
22(1), 127–142.
https://doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2023.007.

Global order and its enemies

MICHAŁ MOSZYŃSKI
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management,
Department of Economics, ul. Gagarina 13A, 87-100 Toruń, Poland
 moszyn@umk.pl
orcid.org/0000-0003-1197-8744

Abstract
Motivation: A series of crises have demonstrated the low resilience of the global economy
to shocks and triggered a discussion about the possible end of globalisation understood as
the unrestrained growth of mutual trade and business ties on a global scale. The emerg-
ing tendencies to shorten supply chains and block trade as well as calls for an active
and strategic trade policy are contributing to the decay of the liberal global order built after
World War II. The potential disintegration of the world economy into antagonised blocs
and the conflict between the Western model of liberal democracy and autocratic regimes
should be considered particularly dangerous. The above phenomena deserve the utmost
attention, and the desire to understand them has provided inspiration for taking up this
topic.
Aim: This study aims to define and interpret the concept of global order in both eco-
nomic and political dimensions. In this context, two interrelated questions are addressed.
The first one is about the character of the global order after World War II and the second
one concerns the causes and consequences of its decay.
Results: The emerging disintegrative tendencies in the global economy and the anarchisa-
tion of international economic relations constitute a negative-sum game. Globalisation has
allowed most countries in the world to achieve significant gains in wealth. The benefits
that it provides to consumers are too great to be consciously abandoned in favour of an
autarkic economic model. Capitalism seems to be able to operate under very different
political regimes, hence — with all the differences between political models at the national
level — it creates an effective platform for cooperation on the global stage. Nevertheless,
the end of the “peace dividend” indicates that effectively preventing the danger of armed
conflict by means of economic and military deterrence will be an important part of the fu-
ture world order.

© 2023 Nicolaus Copernicus University. All rights reserved. cbyd

 EKONOMIA I PRAWO. ECONOMICS AND LAW, 22(1), 127–142

Keywords: global order; institutions; globalisation; economic integration; capitalism

JEL: B52; F02; P10; P48

1. Introduction
The main scientific goal of the study is to define and interpret the concept
of global order in the economic and political dimensions. The paper is divided
into seven sections. The literature review in section 2 justifies undertaking
a reflection on global order in both economic and political terms and encour-
ages attempts to understand its nature, evolution and prospects. The research
methods are briefly described in the section 3. To achieve the paper’s objective,
the subject is decomposed into two interrelated problem questions. The first
question is about the nature of the post-World War II global order (section 4),
while the second question concerns the causes of the decay of that order and its
possible consequences (sections 5 and 6). The entire discussion is followed by
conclusions (section 7).

2. Literature review: a diagnosis of the crisis state of the world

In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the triumph of economic
and political liberalism made it possible to formulate the famous “end-of-his-
tory” thesis (Fukuyama, 1992), and President Bush (1990) expressed hope for
a “new world order” in which “the nations of the world, East and West, North
and South, can prosper and live in harmony”, where “the rule of law supplants
the rule of the jungle” and where nations “recognize the shared responsibility
for freedom and justice”. The link between the political and economic spheres
was imagined as a deterministic sequence that involved forcing political lib-
eralisation through economic liberalisation under conditions of globalisation
(“change through trade”). It was hoped that the iron law of progress would
operate and that Western-style global modernisation would gain momentum as
incomes rose and the middle class became stronger. The opening up of China
and its export-led growth strategy, the transformation of Russia in the first half
of the 1990s and the political and economic integration of the countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe into Western structures all fitted into this pattern.
However, the great expectations that the world would embark on a path
of geopolitical convergence have turned out to be vain as the competition be-
tween liberalism and autocracies has returned, and nation-states continue to be
a source of nationalisms. Kagan (2008) figuratively described these phenomena
as “the return of history and the end of dreams”. The US–China antagonisms
and especially the war in Ukraine are reminiscent of the “clashes of civilisa-
tions” referred to in Huntington’s (1993) thesis.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, negative social, political and eco-
nomic developments have been increasing in the liberal democracies of the West.
According to Freedom House (2021), political rights and civil liberties around

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the world had been improving for about three and a half decades from the mid-
1970s onwards. However, this trend then reversed and indicators deteriorated
for a decade and a half until 2021, which has been aptly described by Diamond
(2015) as a “democratic recession” and more bluntly by Przeworski (2019)
as a “crisis of democracy”. In several countries, democratically elected lead-
ers have attacked liberal institutions, mainly the courts, non-partisan bureau-
cracies, independent media and other bodies that help limit executive power
in a system of checks and balances, and their governments have been increas-
ingly adopting authoritarian tactics. Poland, for example, fell by as many as 48
places in the World Press Freedom Index between 2015 and 2022 (Reporters
Without Borders, 2022). As stated in the International IDEA (2021, p. VII) re-
port, “more than a quarter of the world’s population now live in democratically
backsliding countries. Together with those living in outright non-democratic
regimes, they make up more than two-thirds of the world’s population.” This
democratic backsliding has often enjoyed significant popular support, something
that Appelbaum (2020) has referred to as the “Seductive Lure of Authoritari-
anism”, and Scheiring (2020), using Hungary as an example, as “The Retreat
of Liberal Democracy”. The COVID-19 pandemic has compounded existing
negative trends such as the increasingly technocratic approach to managing
society in Western democracies and the tendency in many nonconsolidated
democracies or authoritarian regimes to resort to coercion (Economist Intel-
ligence Unit, 2022, p. 3). Today’s crisis of liberalism is reminiscent of similar
breakdowns of this current of thought in past history, as addressed, for ex-
ample, by Lippmann (1937) or by the ordoliberal Röpke (1942); it also brings
to mind the well-known attempt to defend Western liberal values in the post-
World War II era made by Popper (1945).
In the field of economics, the accumulation of negative phenomena that have
shaken the European and, more broadly, the world economy since the global
financial crisis (2008+) is substantial: the eurozone crisis (2009–2010),
the migration crisis (2015), the referendum on the UK’s EU membership (2016)
and Brexit, and the COVID-19 pandemic (2020+). The aforementioned shocks
have fuelled a discussion about the end of globalisation, or at least its slowdown.
Taking the dynamics of world trade (which clearly exceeded the growth rate
of world GDP after World War II) as the most general measure of globalisa-
tion, it is fair to note that world trade collapsed during periods of crises but
then quickly recovered. Since 2012, however, there has been a marked de-
cline in the growth rate of trade. According to IMF (2022, pp. 137, 166) data,
the average growth rate of world trade for the 2004–2013 period was 5.4 per
cent, but for the 2014–2023 period, it was only 3.0 per cent. The correspond-
ing figures for world real GDP are 4.1% and 3.0%. Direct investment halved
over the 2016–2019 period (United Nations, 2022, p. 210), and in early 2022,
just when it seemed to be starting to recover from the shock of the pandemic,
the international business environment changed dramatically with Russia’s
attack on Ukraine. Jens Stoltenberg (NATO, 2022) described Russia’s war

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against Ukraine as a “game-changer” for the global order. The economic effects
of the war extend beyond the region of conflict to create a triple crisis involving
fuel, food and financial issues. The war has exacerbated supply-side problems
related to the length of supply chains, as already outlined during the pandemic,
and Europe’s dependence on Russian energy and rising commodity prices have
accelerated inflationary pressures. Rising interest rates have threatened to un-
dermine the sustainability of the public finances of indebted economies and sti-
fle economic activity in the manner of the stagflation of the 1970s.
All of this is compounded by environmental challenges that make one won-
der about the feasibility of sustaining the uninterrupted economic growth pur-
sued in the past (the concept of degrowth) and by demographic problems, not
only in developed countries but also in developing countries such as China.
This synthetic diagnosis of the current condition of the world makes it possi-
ble to speak of disorder, a state of a certain solstice or even a kind of interregnum:
a time when — as the Italian historian Antonio Gramsci vividly described —
the old order has already died and the new order cannot yet be born (Przeworski,
2019, p. 1; Streeck, 2016, p. 36). Kleer (2021, p. 34) sees these perturbations as
a transition from one civilisation to the next, in this case from an industrial one
to an informational one. Or perhaps there is simply a transition from one form
of liberal order to another, with a new geopolitical configuration? Beck (2016,
pp. XI–XII) concluded that the “metamorphosis of the world” is of such a pro-
found nature that it cannot be compared to any previous “change in society”.
The famous question raised a century ago by the German philosopher Oswald
Spengler as to whether we are facing a “Decline of the West” can be echoed.
In his view, civilisation represents the final stage of the duration of a particular
culture. In this case, he meant the end of Western (European) culture.
Such processes in statu nascendi are not easy to interpret, and it is often
only ex post, in a historical perspective, that they can be properly understood
and classified.

3. Methods
The research is based primarily on a critical study of literature in the areas
of political economy and institutional economics as well as social theory, with
elements of history and political science. The analysis conducted in the text
on the basis of these approaches is qualitative in nature, with occasional phe-
nomena illustrated by macroeconomic data.

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4. Global order after World War II

4.1. Global order: a liberal order?

As Kissinger (2014, p. 2) noted, “our age is insistently, at times almost desper-
ately, in pursuit of a concept of world order.” In his view, the closest to this
idea are the principles of the Peace of Westphalia, ending the Thirty Years’ War
in 1648, on which the cooperation of modern sovereign states has been based.
They include national independence, sovereign statehood, national interest
and non-interference. The contemporary, now global Westphalian system —
which is also called the world community — has striven to curtail the anarchical
nature of the world (Kissinger, 2014, p. 3). The main principle of respecting
the integrity of states has been violated by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine,
which means a return to the rule of the law of the stronger.
Global order can be defined as an international arrangement of norms, laws
and institutions that regulate the mutual relations of states. As one of its possible
variations, a global liberal order consists of a set of rules and structures designed
to promote democracy and human rights, encourage free trade and diminish
war by fostering the pursuit of mutual gain and giving weaker countries a voice
(Tierney, 2021, p. 116). The post-World War II global economic order, built by
the US and its partners, brought unquestionable prosperity, stability and pre-
dictability for more than seven decades. It made possible the reconstruction
and integration of Europe, the Japanese and Asian economic miracle and Chi-
na’s long-term economic growth. Until the oil crisis of the 1970s, there had
been no major global crisis, with armed conflicts being local in nature. The in-
stitutional backbone was provided by the organisations established in 1944, that
is the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and in 1947, that is
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later WTO), whose task was to fa-
cilitate international economic cooperation. On the international security side,
the institutional architecture was complemented by NATO, founded in 1947. It
is worth noting here that this order was largely constructed, not of spontaneous
origin. The order was liberal in nature, although not in a pure form, as US pol-
icy often deviated from its stated ideals. In general, however, it was character-
ised by economic openness, reduction of tariff barriers, presence of multilateral
institutions, security cooperation and promotion of democracy. As Kissinger
(2014, p. 1) remarked, for most of the post-war period, the community of na-
tions reflected the American consensus: “an inexorably expanding cooperative
order of states observing common rules and norms”.
This order can be placed on a long trajectory of liberal modernisation, started
by the Enlightenment and dynamised by the Industrial Revolution. The devel-
opment of the West seemed to exhibit the logic of the iron law of progress,
driven not only by science, discovery, innovation, reason and technology but
also by appropriate institutions and policies. Economists searched for the right

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“rules of the game” of economic life to ensure sustainable, balanced economic

growth, prosperity and a life of dignity. A study of the vast literature on the sub-
ject leads to the conclusion that an indispensable set of rules for a functional
economy must include private property, flexible prices and open markets. This
core of liberal thought cannot be ignored in the construction of a market-based
economic order and, in this sense, these constituents are universal — regardless
of time and place (Moszyński, 2015, p. 200).
In the political dimension, Fukuyama (2014) argues that “a well-functioning
political order must consist of the three sets of political institutions — state, law,
and accountability — in some kind of balance.” The fact that liberal democracy
meets these conditions does not automatically mean that it represents some kind
of political universalism, but rather reflects the cultural preferences of people
who live in Western liberal democracies. Of the nondemocratic alternatives,
China poses the most serious challenge to the idea that liberal democracy con-
stitutes a universal evolutionary model.

4.2. The universalism of capitalism

Reflections on global economic order are difficult to detach from the political di-
mension. Order is based on principles and values, yet these are not understood
in the same way everywhere. Wallerstein (2006, p. XV) points to the prob-
lem of the European universalism that the Western world adopts in relation
to the sphere of values when explaining its policies, especially towards “develop-
ing” countries. As he points out, “the concepts of human rights and democracy,
the superiority of Western civilization because it is based on universal values
and truths, and the inescapability of submission to the ‘market’ are all offered
to us as self-evident ideas. But they are not at all self-evident.” In fact, Waller-
stein (2006, p. XIV) argues, “the struggle between European universalism
and universal universalism is the central ideological struggle of the contemporary
world”. While accepting these arguments and acknowledging the separateness
of “world-systems” or “civilisations”, if only in the sense of Huntington (2006,
p. 40ff), it is nevertheless important to note — on a global level — their cooper-
ation in the economic field. After all, the Soviet Union traded with the West, just
as China, India and South America do today. It seems, therefore, that the lan-
guage of the market is more universal than that of politics, making it possible
to think of a global economic order that is not limited to democratic regimes
with market economies. As already indicated in section 4.1, the core of liberal
market economy principles is relatively narrow, but the variety of forms that
real-world economic models take proves that there is no one-size-fits-all kind
of capitalism that is best for a particular time and context. The example of China
demonstrates that hybrid models are possible, while Hungary, in a milder form,
demonstrates the feasibility of specific forms of non-liberal state capitalism.
These considerations make sense for capitalism controlled at the national
level by political power. However, completely different conditions are imposed

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by global capitalism, as is aptly demonstrated by the well-known trilemma

pointed out by Rodrik (2007, p. 200). His model describes the conflict between
globalisation, national sovereignty and democracy. Rodrik believes that deep
international economic integration (especially free movement of capital), an
independent nation-state and democracy are not simultaneously achievable.
The post-World War II world order, the Bretton Woods System, was a combina-
tion of the sovereign nation-state and democracy and was based on restrictions
on capital flows. The increasing globalisation since the 1990s has forced states
to introduce similar neoliberal measures and has resulted in the development
of an ideal type called the “golden straightjacket”. The third ideal type — a com-
bination of hyper-globalisation and democratic politics — implies a global de-
mocracy in which political control of the economy at the global level is possible.
The institutions of global governance still do not sufficiently fulfil this condition,
therefore a global political order is unlikely from the standpoint of this model.

5. Reasons for the decay of global order

Referring back to the discussion in section 2, the crisis state of the world can be
interpreted as a certain qualitative change in the liberal world order, and perhaps
even as its decomposition. Opinions on this are divided, and therefore the re-
sponses to the causes of this state of affairs will also be inconclusive. To cover
the spectrum of discussion, let us cite the opinion of Deudney and Ikenberry
(2018, p. 16) that “it is too soon to write the obituary of liberalism as a the-
ory of international relations, liberal democracy as a system of government, or
the liberal order as the overarching framework for global politics.” For these
authors, the liberal vision of nation-states cooperating for security and pros-
perity is still valid, and the liberal world represents the “resilient order” that is
difficult to overturn. German sociologist Streeck (2016, p. 35), on the contrary,
is convinced of the failure of the globalist-neoliberal social project, which has
lost the advantages of the global system of the three golden decades after World
War II. Invoking Wallerstein, he sees the weakening position of the hegemon,
the USA — the “heart” of world capitalism and engine of its evolution — as
the source of systemic entropy. This is primarily about the decline of relative ad-
vantages, whether in economic, technological or demographic terms, in favour
of Asia. While the military power of the US is capable of destroying threats,
the causal capacity for the installation of pro-US and pro-capitalist regimes has
declined (vide: Iraq, Afghanistan).
Two main lines of response to the question of the sources of weakness
in global order can be proposed. The first one relates to the internal problems
of developed countries and is based on the thesis that the institutions of the post-
war economic order no longer ensure strong, sustainable and inclusive eco-
nomic growth. The second argument, articulated by developing countries, is
that governance structures do not reflect the actual distribution of economic

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power in the modern world, and are thus inherently unfair (Goodman,
2017, p. 5).
The loss of stability in the international order and the deterioration in its per-
formance can be interpreted as a loss of good institutional equilibrium. For Keen
(2022, p. 23), a well-known critic of neoclassical economics, the root of the cri-
sis state of the modern world is economists’ and politicians’ belief in a natural
mechanism that pushes the world towards disequilibrium rather than equilib-
rium. It was not equilibrium but accumulating imbalance that caused the collapse
of slavery, socialism and feudalism, and it is exactly the same with capitalism.
Comparing reforms in Russia and China, he notes that it is the Chinese who
have not succumbed to the religion of equilibrium and are introducing the re-
forms gradually, rationally and cautiously, which is why they have been hugely
successful.
Exploring the sources of the problems inherent in the developed countries
themselves, Fukuyama (2014) highlights that “the worship of procedure over
substance is a critical source of political decay in contemporary liberal democ-
racies.” The rigidity of institutions is responsible for the fact that when the cir-
cumstances change, “both law [formal institutions — MM] and procedural
accountability are used to defeat the substantive ends that they were originally
designed to serve.”
Zielonka (2018, p. x) goes back to the crisis of liberalism when explain-
ing Europe’s (and Western) multifaceted problems. In his view, liberal circles
“spend more time explaining the rise of populism than the fall of liberalism”.
The most frequent explanation of the liberals’ current distress is the neo-liberal
turn: classical liberalism and other more social streams of liberalism have been
captured and perverted by neo-liberalism.
Rodrik (2018) explains the crisis of liberal democracy and the proliferation
of populist movements by the friction between globalisation and democracy (see
section 4.2.). Globalisation exacerbates social tensions, in particular by wid-
ening inequalities and flushing out the social norms that have been the glue
of social cohesion. This creates fertile ground for nationalism, which politi-
cal leaders cynically exploit. The escalation of this phenomenon can be seen
in Russia, which has launched a nationalist war with the intention of destroying
the Ukrainian nation (Acemoglu, 2022, p. 64). Also, it is worth remembering
that wars have always had an outsized role in civilisational shifts (Kleer, 2021,
p. 35). From the standpoint of Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2019) well-known
book, it is legitimate to argue that there is a risk of moving beyond the “narrow
corridor to liberty” within which the state and the society control each other.
A strong state controls violence, enforces laws and provides public services,
whereas a strong, mobilised society is needed to control and shackle the strong
state. Totalitarian states outside this delicate balance represent an additional
destabilising force in the world order. The intentional actions of such states
and their authorities with massive economic, military and political power are
more likely to have a destructive impact on the world order than the actions

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of other countries. While Russia has clearly defined itself as an enemy of this
order, China seems to be more cautious in this matter.
The general backdrop of the excesses in question is the accelerated, disruptive
technological change and increased complexity of the modern world. Humanity
today is creating a “(world) risk society” in which there are many human-in-
duced risks compounded by the process of modernisation (Beck, 1999). Since
we are unable to address these themes more extensively, we would like to quote
a brief description: “Chaos threatens side by side with unprecedented inter-
dependence: in the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the disintegration
of states, the impact of environmental depredations, the persistence of geno-
cidal practices, and the spread of new technologies threatening to drive conflict
beyond human control or comprehension. New methods of assessing and com-
municating information unite regions as never before and project events glob-
ally — but in a manner that inhibits reflection, demanding of leaders that they
register instantaneous reactions in a form expressible in slogans. Are we facing
a period in which forces beyond the restraints of any order determine the fu-
ture?” (Kissinger, 2014, p. 2).

6. Consequences and perspectives

The erosion of global order as outlined by the processes mentioned in section 2 is
conveniently described within the framework of the model developed by Brun-
nermeier (2021), who proposes to frame global order in two dimensions. The first
dimension concerns the organisation of interactions between countries, that is
whether they are established multilaterally or bilaterally, while the second di-
mension refers to the distinction between institution-based and outcome-based
order. International arrangements may qualify for different categories within
these two dimensions. For example, the multilateral Paris Agreement of 2015
is outcome-based (2-degree global warming), whereas the European Monetary
Union is multilateral and rule-based.
The post-World War II global order was mainly based on rules and interna-
tional organisations that provided a forum for coordinating and solving various
problems. The advantage of this type of global order is that it promotes pre-
dictability in a complex world and mitigates unfavourable behaviour like tariff
and currency wars. Larger countries have to abide by the same rules as smaller
ones, which limits their power. However, this type of order is less flexible, mak-
ing it more difficult to adapt to unexpected shocks. It may turn out that in a dy-
namically changing world, existing rules are not compatible with permanent
change (Brunnermeier, 2021).
Through the lens of this model, we can therefore witness a shift from multilat-
eral to bilateral order. A good example of this is Brexit, which has forced the UK
to negotiate its relations with the rest of the world on its own. In addition, there
is a shift from rule-based and institution-based order to outcome-based order,
which will result in a further decline in stability and predictability. In a simi-

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lar way, we can interpret the current situation as a transition from constructed
to spontaneous order with chaotic and ad-hoc government interventions.
The coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent Russian aggression against
Ukraine represent an important caesura for the global order. The earlier geo-
political constellation was described by a world of interdependence, with high
costs of possible conflicts. Thanks to peace and security, international trade was
guided by the principle of minimising production costs and stretching the global
value chain, while security of supply allowed for a just-in-time policy. In con-
trast, the new geopolitical constellation is characterised by a desire to maintain
the resilience of individual economies. The reorientation in the sphere of inter-
national trade involves greater consideration for the criterion of security of sup-
ply rather than cost reduction, with the just-in-time strategy being replaced by
a just-in-case strategy and autarkic behaviour becoming increasingly prevalent
in the production of strategic goods. It is worth noting at this point China’s
efforts to increase the scope of economic and technological self-sufficiency,
undertaken officially since 2015 under the “Made in China” strategy. The aim
of this ten-year plan of Chinese industrial policy is to develop domestic R&D
activities, take control of global supply chains, substitute foreign technologies
with domestic solutions and, ultimately, capture foreign markets for high-tech
products.
All of this increases the risk of regionalisation of the global economy and for-
mation of competing political and economic blocs in line with the “new sys-
temic competition” paradigm (Apolte, 2019). Within this model of competition,
liberal democracy is confronting an authoritarian, intolerant and neo-imperi-
alist social model, just as it did during the Cold War. Today’s despots freely
resort to an authoritarian-aggressive, religious or national-imperialist style. For
the West, this conflict means that it is necessary to reflect on the realm of values.
In a keynote speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos, NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg said that “freedom is more important than free trade”
and that the “protection of our values is more important than profit.” According
to him, an important lesson from Russia’s war against Ukraine is that the West
should not trade long-term security needs for short-term economic interests.
He stressed that the war demonstrates how economic relations with authori-
tarian regimes can create vulnerabilities in areas that include energy (NATO,
2022). In a similar vein, one might ask what price the West is willing to pay
to defend its values vis-à-vis the authoritarian China, although this debate is
yet to begin (Riecke, 2022, p. 16). The economic sanctions imposed on Russia,
ethically justified, are meant to cripple the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war
and impose clear economic and political costs on Russia’s political elite respon-
sible for the invasion. They are, however, a double-edged weapon, as the clo-
sure of economies, from an economic point of view, implies welfare losses for
the majority of the existing participants in the exchange. A similar logic can
be attributed to the US–China trade wars initiated under President Trump
in 2018. In economic terms, the emerging disintegrative tendencies in the global

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economy and the anarchisation of international economic relations constitute

a negative-sum game. Globalisation has allowed most countries in the world,
including major players in the geopolitical arena, to achieve significant gains
in wealth. The benefits it provides to consumers would be abandoned in fa-
vour of a more autarkic economic model. Economic actors are paying the price
in the form of global inflation and rising interest rates.
Nevertheless, the end of the “peace dividend” indicates that effectively pre-
venting the danger of armed conflict by means of economic and military deter-
rence will be an important part of the future world order. The more convincing
this deterrence is, the sooner mutual coexistence can be grounded on rules
and isolation of economic systems can be avoided (Grimm, 2022, p. 64).
The use of trade policy as a geopolitical tool is manifested in the intensifica-
tion of Western trade cooperation, such as the acceleration of the EU–Canada
Free Trade Agreement (CETA), whose entry into force has been blocked for
several years. Trade among like-minded people, based on values and a common
understanding of the law, is not only easier but also more sustainable in the end
(Münchrath, 2022, p. 15). Under the conditions of the new systemic competi-
tion, there is a retreat from the doctrine of “change through trade” and even its
modification to “trade through change”.
If the existing global order is flawed but shows adaptability and functionality,
and above all if there is no alternative to it, then reforms are the only sensible
course of action. These may include improving the operation of international
organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
for example improving the allocation of votes and positions of underrepresented
countries. Another course of action could be to update and strengthen key prin-
ciples of global economic order in a number of fields, including trade, invest-
ment and finance, or even to create them (Goodman, 2017, pp. 5–8).1
In which areas of world trade are global rules needed? A typical argument
from economists relates to the phenomenon of market failures, for example
unfavourable externalities such as beggar-thy-neighbour policies that lead
to overall welfare losses. A second reason for international coordination could
be the provision of a global public good, such as health or climate protection.
As argued by Gates (2022, pp. 42–52), maintaining a global monitoring centre
for the emergence of infectious disease threats under the auspices of the WHO
would cost $1 billion per year, a paltry sum compared to the trillions of dollars
in losses caused by a pandemic. The large number of beneficiaries, the prob-
lem of coordination and the phenomenon of free-riding make it difficult to set
up such a team. Meanwhile, this is one of the many fields of the world econ-
omy where desirable international policies are also in the interests of individual
countries. One can point to areas where global regulation has not emerged, even
1
It is difficult to discuss global governance reforms while leaving aside issues of eco-
nomic and political power. Where is the power and who is supposed to change the world?
It seems that public authorities will not become drivers of change because they do not keep
up with trends. This problem requires a separate analysis.

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though it has long been called for: the Tobin tax and regulation of tax havens,
regulation of anti-competitive behaviour, digital economy, climate change.
Guidance on how to organise future international order is given by Acemo-
glu (2022, p. 64):
– Trade agreements should not be dictated by multinationals that benefit
from artificially maintaining low wages and labour standards in developing
countries.
– Trade linkages based on the cost advantages of cheap, subsidised fossil fuels
should be rethought.
– Acceptance, or at least understanding, on the part of the West that it cannot
fully influence the political sphere of its trading partners. This does not mean
a lack of response to human rights violations, but the emphasis can be re-
directed from official government policy to the wider use of civil society or-
ganisations such as Amnesty International and Transparency International.
– The West must take steps to enhance its own security and ensure that au-
thoritarian and corrupt regimes do not influence its own policies.
– Western governments would gain credibility if they admitted the mistakes
in their policies during the colonial and Cold War periods towards develop-
ing countries.
These recommendations can be supplemented with a conclusion that the pol-
itics has to accept the reality of different values and complexity of the world. Al-
though many problems are interconnected, it is useful to separate controversial
issues where possible in order to avoid blocking other solutions. Furthermore, it
is worth recommending to avoid ideologising and to focus on practical solutions
to a given problem, taking into account the local point of view. The peculiarities
of problems in different regions of the world may be beyond the reach of global
and centralised institutions such as the World Bank, hence the call for a diverse
and variable composition of expert teams, an openness to innovation in the in-
ternational forum. In this regard, it would probably be appropriate to adopt
and accept a bottom-up approach rather than top-down rule-making and en-
forcement. Considering the regional and national context in relation to world
order, it is worth recalling the reflection of Röpke (1959, p. 20), which has not
lost its relevance: “The outlook is bad, however, if the nations strive for inter-
national order while at home they continue to pursue a policy contrary to what
is required for it.” This allows the recommendation to be made to strain efforts
in developed countries towards strengthening democracy and internationalism,
rather than closing economies and creating economic tensions between the US
and the EU.

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7. Conclusion
The above considerations indicate that global order is a capacious category that
cannot be easily operationalised and that a deeper understanding of it requires
interdisciplinary studies. The change in the geopolitical situation and the cri-
sis state of the world have spurred greater interest in the idea of global order,
whether in the political or the economic dimension. The interpretation of the cri-
sis phenomena justifies the conclusion that there is indeed a certain qualitative
change in the global order. One could also ask whether a world order has ac-
tually existed or whether it has rather been — in the liberal version — limited
to Western countries. Meanwhile, the relative power of the West is diminishing,
and the Eurocentric perspective is losing relevance. At the time of preparing
this text, a comprehensive answer to the question of what the future balance
of power in the world will look like is not yet possible. A world with overlapping
regional and interregional orders, able to cooperate and compete in different
spheres simultaneously, seems likely.
The discussions surrounding the notion of world order are a continuation
of the endless debate initiated by Kant around the question of whether it is pos-
sible for the international politics of states to be oriented towards peaceful co-
operation within the framework of international law. A more recent iteration
of this problem has been aptly described by Beck (2016) as “the question of how
nation-states develop cooperation within the context of state sovereignty with-
out losing their identity and finding answers to global challenges.” In the face
of the clash of civilisations, Kant’s question remains open. Perhaps the West,
pursuing Wallerstein’s postulate, should search more strongly for universal uni-
versalism in the realm of values and draw on the achievements of Oriental phi-
losophy? Such intellectual reinforcement could come from the Chinese concept
of tianxia, which offers an alternative vision to the current world order (Zhao,
2016). Fukuyama (2022, p. 154) argues that the principle of moderation, which
he derives from antiquity, can be taken as the basis of a liberal society. This has
already been argued by Röpke (1950) as Maß und Mitte. Given that this idea is
also attributed to Confucius, one can see a common denominator in the realm
of values.
From a Western perspective, which is apparently very difficult for us
to abandon mentally, it is justified to conclude that the liberal approach is prag-
matic: a given order exists because it works and solves problems, so relying
on democratic governments, market-based economic systems and international
institutions seems preferable to other alternatives when it comes to addressing
the present challenges. According to Fukuyama (2014), it is not inevitable that
history will end with the triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a decent
world order will be liberal. This is why it is worth facing up to its enemies.

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 Acknowledgements

Author contributions: author has given an approval to the final version of the article.
Funding: this research was fully funded by the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń.
Note: the results of this study were presented at the 5th Scientific Conference ‚Institutions:
theory and practice’ (15–16 September, 2022, Toruń, Poland).