DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

WEEK 2: Barbara Geddes, What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Introduction: The Third Wave of Democratization
Barbara Geddes' article provides a synthesis of democratization research from the late 20th century,
analyzing 85 authoritarian regime transitions since 1974, identified as the start of Huntington's
“Third Wave” of democratization. Geddes aims to identify patterns in these transitions and propose a
theoretical framework for understanding why some authoritarian regimes collapse and why others
persist.
Key Findings on Democratization Trends
 30 authoritarian regimes transitioned into stable democracies.
 9 transitions led to short-lived democracies before reverting to authoritarianism.
 8 cases had elections and leadership changes but remained politically unstable or
undemocratic.
 4 transitions led to warlordism.
 34 resulted in new authoritarian regimes.
 Some transitions led to state break-ups (e.g., the Soviet Union).
Despite the number of regime transitions, Geddes critiques the lack of a universal theory explaining
democratization and proposes that different authoritarian regime types break down in distinct
ways.
1. Traditional Theories of Democratization: Strengths and Weaknesses
Geddes reviews existing theories and their empirical support:
1.1 Modernization Theory
 Hypothesis: Economic development leads to democracy.
 Empirical Evidence: There is a strong correlation between democracy and higher economic
development.
 Key Studies Supporting It:
o Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979), Burkhart & Lewis-Beck (1994) confirm that
wealthier nations are more democratic.
o Przeworski & Limongi (1997) found that while economic development does not
always trigger democratization, democracies are more likely to survive in
wealthier countries.
 Geddes' Interpretation: Economic development reduces the likelihood of authoritarian
reversions but does not fully explain transitions.
1.2 Economic Crises and Regime Breakdown
 Hypothesis: Economic downturns increase the likelihood of democratization.
 Empirical Support: Studies confirm that economic crises destabilize authoritarian regimes
and trigger transitions.
  Key Studies:
o Przeworski & Limongi (1997): Low economic growth correlates with transitions.

o Haggard & Kaufman (1995): Economic crises weaken authoritarian coalitions.

 Geddes' View: While economic crises make transitions more likely, they do not determine
whether the transition will be democratic or authoritarian.
1.3 Elite Divisions as a Catalyst for Democratization
 O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986): Regime splits are the first step toward democratization.
 Evidence: Internal elite divisions explain transitions in Latin America and Southern
Europe.
 Challenge: African and post-Soviet democratizations occurred due to popular uprisings,
not elite divisions (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997).
 Geddes' Argument: Regime splits matter, but they are not a universal cause of
democratization.
1.4 Elite Pacts and Their Role in Transition
 Burton et al. (1992), Karl (1990): Democratic transitions succeed when elites agree on
power-sharing.
 Geddes' Critique: Pacts are rare in real-world transitions and mostly seen in Latin America
and Europe.
2. A New Model: How Different Authoritarian Regimes Break Down
Geddes argues that not all authoritarian regimes collapse the same way. She categorizes regimes
into three types and examines how each collapses.
2.1 Military Regimes
 Definition: The ruling elite consists of military officers.
 Characteristics:
o Power is collectively shared among officers.

o Most fragile type of authoritarianism.

o Average lifespan: 9 years.

 How They Break Down:

o When officers disagree, they tend to return to the barracks rather than risk the
disunity of the military.
o Transitions are often negotiated (e.g., Chile 1990, Brazil 1985).

 Transition Outcomes:
o 31% become stable democracies.

o 43% become unstable democracies.

o The rest revert to authoritarian rule.

2.2 Single-Party Regimes
 Definition: One political party monopolizes power.
 Characteristics:
o Most resilient authoritarian type.

o Average lifespan: 23 years.

 How They Break Down:

o Usually due to external shocks (economic crisis, war, collapse of external support).

o Example: The Soviet collapse led to the breakdown of many communist regimes.

 Transition Outcomes:
o 50% survive transitions and continue as dominant parties (e.g., China, Vietnam).

o Transitions are slower and more controlled than in military regimes.

2.3 Personalist Regimes

 Definition: Power is concentrated in a single leader rather than an institution (e.g., Saddam
Hussein, Mobutu Sese Seko).
 Characteristics:
o Leaders purge rivals and rule through loyalty networks.

o Average lifespan: 15 years.

 How They Break Down:

o More vulnerable to coups, revolts, or the leader’s death.

o When the leader falls, the entire regime collapses.

 Transition Outcomes:
o 16% transition to democracy.

o 49% transition to new authoritarian rule.

3. What Factors Affect Democratization?

3.1 Economic Performance
 Military regimes are highly vulnerable to economic crises.
 Personalist regimes are somewhat resilient because they maintain loyalty through patronage.
 Single-party regimes are highly resilient and can survive severe crises.
3.2 International Influence
 Soviet Union’s collapse weakened many single-party regimes.
 IMF-imposed economic reforms reduced patronage networks in personalist regimes, leading
to instability.
3.3 Popular Mobilization vs. Elite Transitions
 In Latin America, democratization was elite-led.
 In Eastern Europe and Africa, mass protests triggered transitions.
 Military regimes are more likely to transition peacefully, while personalist regimes are
overthrown violently.

4. Conclusion: What Have We Learned After 20 Years?

 Democracy is more likely in wealthier countries.
 Economic crises increase transitions but do not determine their outcome.
 Military regimes collapse due to elite splits and often democratize.
 Single-party regimes are the most durable and require external shocks to collapse.
 Personalist regimes collapse violently, and democratization is rare.
 Elite pacts and negotiated transitions occur mainly in military regimes.
Key Takeaways
Different authoritarian regimes break down differently—there is no one-size-fits-all explanation.
Democratization is more likely in military regimes than in personalist ones.
Economic crises weaken authoritarian regimes, but their effects depend on the regime type.
Elite pacts and controlled transitions happen mostly in military regimes.

WEEK 3: (1) Jennifer Gandhi & Ellen Lust-Okar, Elections Under Authoritarianism
This article explores why authoritarian regimes hold elections, how voters, candidates, and
incumbents behave in these elections, and whether elections in authoritarian contexts contribute to
democratization. The authors argue that traditional democratic election theories are inadequate for
explaining the role of elections in non-democratic regimes. They advocate for a more nuanced
approach that considers the diversity of authoritarian elections and their unique political dynamics.
1. Introduction: Why Study Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?
 Elections in authoritarian regimes are often seen as monolithic and rare, yet empirical
evidence shows that many autocratic regimes regularly hold elections.
 Many 18th- and 19th-century European and Latin American autocracies held elections
long before democratization.
 Elections in authoritarian regimes vary widely:
o Some are rubber-stamp elections (where results are predetermined).

o Others allow for some degree of competition and political debate.

 Past research has primarily focused on elections as a pathway to democratization, but this
view oversimplifies the function of elections in different types of authoritarian regimes.
2. The Role of Elections in Authoritarian Regimes
2.1 Why Do Dictators Hold Elections?
Scholars offer several explanations for why autocrats hold elections:
1. Co-optation of Elites
o Elections serve as a power-sharing mechanism among ruling elites.

o They allow dictators to distribute resources and government positions fairly among
elite supporters.
o Ensures that elites remain loyal to the regime, as their political and economic
survival depends on it.
2. Dividing and Weakening the Opposition
o Elections provide limited political participation for opposition groups, reducing their
incentives to revolt.
o Opposition parties that participate are often co-opted into the regime and forced to
play by its rules.
o Creates a "divide-and-rule" effect, making opposition coordination harder.

3. Enhancing Legitimacy
o Holding elections allows dictators to present themselves as legitimate rulers to both
domestic and international audiences.
o International organizations and foreign donors often expect multiparty elections,
so elections can help secure aid and investment.
4. Information Gathering and Control
o Elections provide dictators with valuable information about opposition strongholds
and public grievances.
o The regime can then target these areas for repression or patronage.

2.2 Differences Between Types of Authoritarian Elections

Authoritarian elections differ based on:
 Level of government: Some are national presidential elections, others are local.
 Degree of electoral freedom: Some are tightly controlled, while others allow real opposition
participation.
 Institutional power of elected bodies: Some parliaments have real policy-making authority,
while others are purely symbolic.
Scholars have categorized authoritarian regimes into:
 Electoral authoritarian regimes (Schedler, 2006) – where elections exist but do not lead to
democratic change.
 Hybrid or competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky & Way, 2002) – where elections
allow for limited opposition success but do not threaten regime survival.
3. Electoral Behavior in Authoritarian Regimes
The authors examine how voters, candidates, and incumbents behave in authoritarian elections.
3.1 Voter Behavior
 Voter turnout is often high, despite the lack of real competition.
 Why do voters participate?
1. Patronage & Clientelism: Many voters expect material benefits (jobs, government
services) in exchange for their votes.
2. Fear & Coercion: Some regimes pressure or intimidate voters to participate.
3. Symbolic Reasons: Some voters see elections as an opportunity to express their
discontent, even if they cannot remove the regime.
4. Local Interests: In some cases (e.g., China), voters use elections to elect local
officials who can influence their daily lives.
 Demographics of Voter Behavior:
o Rural voters are more likely to support the regime because they are dependent on
state resources.
o Urban, middle-class voters are more likely to oppose the regime.

o Opposition supporters tend to be highly ideological and willing to risk voting for
challengers.
3.2 Candidate Behavior
 Most candidates running in authoritarian elections seek access to state resources rather than
actual political change.
 Incumbent-backed candidates usually have significant advantages, including state funding,
media control, and institutional support.
 Opposition candidates face a dilemma:
o If they run, they legitimize the regime.

o If they boycott, they risk being politically irrelevant.

 High turnover in legislatures:

o Many authoritarian regimes rotate legislators frequently to prevent them from
gaining independent power bases.
o Example: Mexico's PRI regime used term limits to prevent political elites from
challenging the ruling party.
3.3 Incumbent Behavior
 Incumbents use several strategies to manipulate elections:
1. Ballot-box stuffing and vote-buying.
2. Media control to suppress opposition voices.
 3. Redistricting and gerrymandering to ensure pro-regime victories.
4. Legal restrictions on opposition parties and candidates.
5. Election monitoring manipulation – ensuring that international observers see
elections as "credible" even when fraud occurs.
 Types of electoral fraud:
o Some regimes inflate their vote totals to create a sense of overwhelming support.

o Others allow some opposition success to create a façade of legitimacy.

4. Elections and Democratization

4.1 Do Elections Lead to Democratization?
 Elections can accelerate democratization when:
o Opposition forms strong coalitions and challenges the regime.

o Election fraud triggers mass protests ("color revolutions" in Ukraine, Georgia, etc.).

o International pressure forces incumbents to hold fairer elections.

 Elections can also strengthen authoritarian rule when:

o The opposition is divided or co-opted.

o Incumbents manipulate the rules to maintain power.

o Voter dependency on patronage ensures continued support for the ruling party.

4.2 Case Studies:

 Mexico’s PRI regime (1929–2000): Allowed some competition but manipulated the system to
stay in power until economic crisis and electoral reforms led to democratic transition.
 China: Uses local elections to improve governance but retains strict control at the national
level.
 Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco: Allow limited opposition participation to avoid full democratic
transitions.
5. Conclusion
 Authoritarian elections serve multiple functions: maintaining elite loyalty, controlling
opposition, and signaling legitimacy.
 Democratic election theories are insufficient for explaining these processes.
 Future research should focus on how different types of authoritarian elections operate and
their long-term political effects.
Key Takeaways
Elections in authoritarian regimes are not just symbolic—they help regimes survive.
Voters, candidates, and elites all have strategic reasons for participating.
Some elections can spark democratization, but most are designed to stabilize autocratic rule.
(2) Marc Morje Howard & Philip G. Roessler, Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitice
Authoritarian Regimes
1. Introduction: Competitive Authoritarianism and Liberalizing Elections
The article examines competitive authoritarian regimes, which blend democratic electoral
competition with authoritarian rule. These regimes:
 Hold regular, competitive elections between the government and the opposition.
 Incumbents often rely on coercion, intimidation, and electoral manipulation to remain in
power.
 However, some elections result in "liberalizing electoral outcomes" (LEOs), where
opposition victories or procedural reforms reduce authoritarian practices.
The study seeks to explain why and how some elections in competitive authoritarian regimes lead to
greater liberalization, even if they do not immediately establish full democracy.

2. The Concept of Competitive Authoritarianism

 Levitsky & Way (2002) describe competitive authoritarianism as a hybrid system where:
o Elections are not fully free and fair, but they are not entirely meaningless either.

o Governments manipulate elections using media control, repression, patronage, and

fraud, yet the opposition still has some real chance of winning.
o Examples: Zimbabwe, Malaysia, Russia under Putin, Mexico before
democratization.
Regime Typology
The authors categorize political regimes based on their electoral processes:
 Liberal Democracy → Free, fair, and contested elections.
 Electoral Democracy → Free but somewhat flawed elections.
 Competitive Authoritarianism → Contested elections but with heavy manipulation.
 Hegemonic Authoritarianism → Elections occur, but the opposition is completely
disadvantaged.
 Closed Authoritarianism → No competitive elections (e.g., Saudi Arabia, China).
Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from hegemonic regimes in that:
 Opposition candidates are legally allowed to compete.
 Elections are unfair but uncertain—surprise opposition victories can happen.

3. What Are Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes (LEOs)?

A Liberalizing Electoral Outcome (LEO) occurs when an election leads to significant political
liberalization, even if full democracy does not emerge. This can happen through:
 Opposition victories, leading to a shift in power.
 More free and fair elections compared to previous ones.
 Expansion of civil liberties and political rights.
Examples of LEOs:
 Ghana (1996 & 2000) → Opposition gained strength, leading to improved electoral fairness.
 Peru (2000 & 2001) → Fujimori’s fall followed by greater democratic openness.
 Indonesia (1999) → End of Suharto’s rule, leading to freer elections.
 Kenya (2002) → Opposition coalition victory, ending Moi’s long rule.
LEOs do not always lead to full democracy but can create momentum for further reforms.

4. Factors Influencing LEOs

The authors test different hypotheses to understand what causes LEOs. They focus on three key
factors:
4.1 Opposition Coalitions
 Hypothesis: Opposition coalitions increase the likelihood of a LEO.
 Why?
o Authoritarian incumbents exploit opposition divisions to stay in power.

o A united opposition prevents the ruling party from using “divide-and-rule”

strategies.
o Broad-based coalitions make fraud and repression riskier for incumbents.

o Coalitions mobilize voters and increase electoral participation.

 Empirical Evidence:
o In Serbia (2000), a united opposition defeated Milosevic.

o In Kenya (2002), the opposition coalition NARC ended KANU’s rule.

4.2 Opposition Mobilization (Protests & Civil Society)

 Hypothesis: High levels of anti-government protests increase the likelihood of a LEO.
 Why?
o Mass mobilization signals public dissatisfaction and weakens the regime’s
legitimacy.
o Protests pressure incumbents into allowing fairer elections.

o Mobilization deters election fraud by increasing scrutiny.

  Empirical Evidence:
o In Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, protests overturned fraudulent elections.

o In Indonesia (1998), student movements played a key role in Suharto’s fall.

4.3 Incumbent Turnover

 Hypothesis: If an authoritarian incumbent steps down before an election, a LEO is more
likely.
 Why?
o Succession struggles within the ruling party weaken regime stability.

o New candidates lack the same level of coercive control.

o Patronage networks may collapse, reducing the ruling party’s ability to manipulate
elections.
 Empirical Evidence:
o In Croatia (2000), after Tudjman’s death, opposition won.

o In Kenya (2002), Moi’s exit led to an opposition victory.

5. Testing the Hypotheses: Statistical Analysis

The authors analyze 50 competitive authoritarian elections from 1990-2002.
Their logistic regression model finds:
✅ Opposition coalitions are the strongest predictor of LEOs.
✅ Protests (mobilization) also significantly increase LEO likelihood.
✅ Incumbent turnover matters, but not as much as opposition unity.
❌ Economic crises, foreign aid, and international pressure have weak effects.
❌ Structural factors like parliamentary vs. presidential systems are not significant.
Figure 1: Key Determinants of LEOs

Factor Effects on LEOs

Opposition Coalition Strong Positive ✅
Protest Movements Positive ✅
Incumbent Moderate Positive✅
Economic Crisis Weak ❌
Foreign Aid & Investment Weak ❌
Political Institutions (Parliament vs. President) Insignificant ❌

Main Conclusion: LEOs depend more on strategic opposition actions than on structural factors.
6. Case Study: Kenya’s 2002 Election
The authors use Kenya (2002) as an ideal case of a LEO.
Kenya’s Political Context:
 1992 & 1997 Elections: President Moi used ethnic violence and fraud to win.
  2002 Election: Moi was constitutionally barred from running.
 The opposition formed a strong coalition (NARC).
 Outcome:
o Opposition candidate Mwai Kibaki won with 62%.

o Electoral process was freer and fairer.

o Kenya shifted toward greater political openness.

Key Lessons from Kenya’s Case

 Opposition unity was crucial.
 Incumbent’s exit created political uncertainty, benefiting the opposition.
 Mass mobilization pressured the government to hold fairer elections.
7. Conclusion: Why Do Some Elections Lead to Liberalization?
 LEOs happen when opposition forces successfully mobilize and unite.
 Authoritarian rulers do not always win, even in manipulated elections.
 Structural factors (economy, foreign aid, institutions) matter less than opposition strategy.
 Competitive authoritarian regimes are unstable and can “tip” toward democratization.
Policy Implications
✅ International actors should support opposition unity & civil society mobilization.
✅ Monitoring election fraud alone is insufficient—long-term opposition strengthening is key.
✅ Competitive authoritarian regimes are not permanent—strategic choices shape outcomes.
Final Takeaways
✔ Opposition coalitions & mobilization are the biggest drivers of liberalization.
✔ Incumbent turnover increases opposition chances but is not sufficient alone.
✔ Elections in authoritarian regimes can be moments of real change.

WEEK 4: Michael Lewin Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?

Introduction
Michael L. Ross examines whether oil wealth hinders democracy, a claim often made to explain the
lack of democracy in oil-rich states, particularly in the Middle East. The study tests the hypothesis that
resource wealth—specifically oil and minerals—makes states more authoritarian. Ross analyzes 113
countries from 1971 to 1997 using regression analysis to determine if oil-rich states democratize at a
slower rate than others.
Ross explores three main aspects:
1. Validity – Does oil wealth actually prevent democracy?
2. Generality – Does this effect apply only to the Middle East, or does it hold for oil-rich states
globally? Does mineral wealth have similar effects?
 3. Causal Mechanisms – If oil wealth hinders democracy, why does this happen?

Ross proposes three possible mechanisms through which oil wealth could hinder democracy:
1. The Rentier Effect – Governments with oil revenue can avoid taxing citizens, reducing
pressure for democratic accountability. They also use oil wealth for patronage and social
spending to reduce opposition.
2. The Repression Effect – Oil-rich states use their wealth to strengthen security forces, making
it easier to suppress dissent.
3. The Modernization Effect – Economic development through oil does not lead to social
modernization (education, urbanization, and occupational diversity), which are typically
associated with democratization.
Ross employs panel data regression analysis with a dataset of 113 countries (1971-1997). The key
independent variable is oil and mineral wealth, measured as the value of fuel-based and mineral
exports as a percentage of GDP. The dependent variable is democracy level, taken from the Polity
IV dataset.
Key control variables include:
 Income per capita
 Islamic population percentage (to account for potential religious or cultural effects)
 OECD membership (to distinguish wealthy democracies)
 Regional effects (Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa)
Findings
1. Oil Wealth Has a Strong Negative Effect on Democracy
o Higher oil exports correlate with lower democracy levels.

o The effect is strongest in poorer countries.

o Oil’s negative impact on democracy is not limited to the Middle East but applies
globally.
2. Mineral Wealth Also Hinders Democracy, But to a Lesser Extent
o Similar to oil, non-fuel minerals correlate with authoritarianism, though the effect is
slightly weaker.
3. Agricultural and Food Exports Do Not Have the Same Effect
o Unlike oil and minerals, food and agricultural exports do not correlate with
authoritarianism.
o This suggests that it is not just any export revenue but rather resource rents that
contribute to authoritarianism.
4. The Causal Mechanisms are Supported by Data
 o Rentier Effect: Oil-rich governments collect lower taxes and spend heavily on
patronage, reducing democratic pressures.
o Repression Effect: Oil wealth enables larger military budgets, which governments
use to suppress opposition.
o Modernization Effect: Oil wealth does not lead to the educational and occupational
diversity that fosters democracy.
5. Oil Has a Stronger Anti-Democratic Effect in Poorer Countries
o Oil wealth does not hinder democracy in already wealthy states (e.g., Norway).

o However, in poorer countries (e.g., Nigeria, Venezuela), oil wealth significantly

reduces the likelihood of democratization.
Implications & Contributions
 Challenges Economic Determinism: The study contradicts the idea that rising incomes
always lead to democracy.
 Supports the Resource Curse Theory: Strong empirical evidence suggests that oil wealth
contributes to authoritarianism.
 Beyond the Middle East: While often associated with Arab states, Ross shows that the anti-
democratic effects of oil wealth apply globally.
 Influences Policy Debates: Findings are relevant for international organizations promoting
democracy in resource-rich nations.
Conclusion
Ross provides strong statistical evidence that oil and mineral wealth make countries more
authoritarian, particularly in low-income states. The study reinforces the resource curse hypothesis,
suggesting that natural resource wealth can be politically harmful. Oil-rich governments rely on low
taxation, high government spending, repression, and a lack of modernization, which keeps them
authoritarian.
His findings have broad implications for understanding why many oil-rich states struggle with
democratization, offering a powerful critique of simplistic economic theories that assume rising
wealth will always lead to democracy.

WEEK 5: (1) Gandhi & Przeworski, Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Introduction
The central question of this study is: Why do some authoritarian rulers remain in power for decades,
while others fall soon after taking control? Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski argue that political
institutions—particularly partisan legislatures—play a crucial role in extending the tenure of
autocrats. By incorporating potential opposition groups into these institutions, autocrats provide
incentives for cooperation and reduce the threat of rebellion. The study analyzes all authoritarian
rulers from 1946 to 1996 using statistical methods to determine whether these institutions impact the
survival of dictators.
Key Arguments
1. The Role of Institutions in Autocratic Survival
 o Many scholars attribute the survival of autocrats to brute force, personal charisma,
or traditional legitimacy.
o However, repression alone is costly and sometimes ineffective (e.g., Pol Pot was
ousted despite his brutal rule).
o Autocrats create and use institutions strategically to co-opt potential opposition and
extend their rule.
2. Types of Threats to Autocrats
o Internal threats from within the ruling elite (e.g., military coups or political
betrayals).
o External threats from society at large (e.g., protests, opposition movements,
economic instability).
o To manage these threats, autocrats establish two types of institutions:

 Elite-controlling institutions (juntas, royal councils, ruling party

committees).
 Mass-co-opting institutions (partisan legislatures, controlled elections).
3. How Institutions Help Autocrats Stay in Power
o Legislatures as a Tool for Co-optation:

 By granting limited political representation to opposition groups,

legislatures provide a space for negotiation, reducing the incentive for
rebellion.
 Example: Jordan's King Hussein allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to
influence educational policy in exchange for political cooperation.
o Single-Party Systems as a Stability Mechanism:

 Authoritarian regimes with one dominant party (e.g., Communist Party in

the Soviet Union) tend to be more stable.
 The party absorbs potential challengers, preventing coups and political
fragmentation.

The study uses statistical analysis of 139 countries under authoritarian rule from 1946 to 1996.
 It categorizes three types of authoritarian leaders:
o Monarchs (e.g., King Hassan II of Morocco).

o Military rulers (e.g., Augusto Pinochet of Chile).

o Civilian dictators (e.g., Fidel Castro of Cuba).

 The dependent variable: How long an autocrat remains in power.

 Key independent variables:
o Existence of legislatures and political parties.
 o Dependence on natural resource wealth (which reduces the need for cooperation).

o Threat level from the opposition (measured using past coups, opposition strength,
and international democratic pressures).

Key Findings
1. Legislatures Extend Autocratic Rule
o Authoritarian leaders who establish legislatures survive significantly longer than
those who rule without them.
o Single-party regimes last the longest, while military regimes are the most fragile.

2. Economic and Political Factors Matter

o Resource-rich dictatorships (e.g., oil-rich states like Saudi Arabia) rely less on
institutions since they can use wealth to buy loyalty.
o Autocrats facing strong opposition are more likely to institutionalize to manage
dissent.
3. Optimal Institutionalization is Key
o Dictators who under-institutionalize (ignore opposition demands) face short
tenures (average 3.3 years in power).
o Those who institutionalize properly (balance co-optation with control) stay in power
for an average of 8.4 years.
o Over-institutionalization (granting too many concessions) can also backfire but is
less risky than repression.
4. Types of Autocratic Survival Strategies
o Monarchs rely on family councils and personal networks for stability.

o Military dictators depend on juntas and face the highest risks of coups.

o Civilian dictators survive longest when they establish strong single-party rule (e.g.,
China, Cuba).
Implications & Contributions
 Reframes the "Brute Force" Perspective: The study challenges the belief that
authoritarian survival is solely about repression. Instead, institutions matter in stabilizing
authoritarian rule.
 Explains the Variation in Dictator Survival: Differences in institutions, economic
resources, and opposition strength explain why some autocrats last decades while others are
quickly overthrown.
 Policy Relevance: Understanding how autocrats use institutions strategically can help
policymakers predict regime stability and develop strategies for democratic transitions.
Conclusion
The study provides strong empirical evidence that authoritarian rulers use political institutions as
survival tools. By incorporating opposition forces into controlled legislative bodies and single-party
systems, dictators can neutralize threats and extend their rule. However, misjudging the level of
institutionalization needed can shorten their tenure. This research deepens our understanding of
authoritarian governance and provides insights into the dynamics of autocratic stability and
collapse.

(2) Milan W. Slovik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule

Introduction
Milan W. Svolik's book, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, explores the inner workings of
authoritarian regimes, focusing on how dictators maintain power and why some authoritarian
governments last longer than others. The study identifies two central problems that shape authoritarian
rule:
1. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing – Dictators rarely rule alone; they must share
power with elites (military leaders, party officials, etc.). However, since there is no
independent authority to enforce agreements among elites, power-sharing is inherently
unstable.
2. The Problem of Authoritarian Control – Dictators must also suppress or manage opposition
from the masses. They use repression (force, censorship) and co-optation (economic benefits,
political concessions) to maintain control.
Svolik argues that understanding how authoritarian rulers address these two problems is crucial for
explaining the stability and longevity of dictatorships.
The Two Core Problems of Dictatorship
1. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing
 Dictators do not have enough personal power to rule alone; they rely on a coalition of elites
(generals, party leaders, business elites).
 However, dictators often seek to centralize power over time, reducing the influence of their
allies.
 This creates tensions: Will the dictator honor power-sharing agreements, or will he betray
his allies to gain absolute power?
 Many dictatorships end due to elite defections or coups, as elite insiders often pose the
greatest threat.
2. The Problem of Authoritarian Control
 Dictators face mass opposition from citizens who are excluded from power.
 To manage this threat, they use:
o Repression (military force, police crackdowns, surveillance, censorship).

o Co-optation (distributing wealth, government jobs, controlled political participation).

 The balance between repression and co-optation determines whether the dictatorship
remains stable or collapses under popular unrest.
The Nature of Authoritarian Politics
Unlike democratic systems, where rules are enforced by independent institutions, authoritarian
politics operate in a lawless environment where:
1. Violence is a constant threat – Disputes between elites or between rulers and the masses
often end in violent purges, coups, or uprisings.
2. No independent institution can enforce agreements – Power is held by force, not by legal or
constitutional constraints.
3. Dictatorships vary in institutionalization – Some regimes (like China) develop stable
institutions that help manage elite power-sharing, while others (like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq)
revolve around a single leader's absolute authority.
Key Findings and Insights
1. Most Dictators are Overthrown by Insiders, Not Popular Uprisings
o Data from 1946–2008 shows that 68% of dictators were removed by a coup from
regime insiders (military, elites).
o Only 20% of dictators fell due to popular uprisings or democratic transitions.

o This highlights that the biggest threat to dictators comes from within the regime,
not from mass protests.
2. Dictatorships Use Institutions to Manage Power
o Some authoritarian regimes create political institutions (legislatures, ruling parties,
juntas) to regulate power-sharing and control opposition.
o Example: China's Communist Party Politburo ensures power-sharing among elites,
preventing coups.
o However, in personalist dictatorships (like Stalin’s USSR or Qaddafi’s Libya),
institutions are weak, and power is concentrated in one leader.
3. Repression Can Backfire
o While military force can suppress dissent, it also empowers the military as a political
actor.
o If the military becomes too powerful, it may overthrow the dictator and install its
own leader (e.g., Egypt’s military ousting Mubarak in 2011).
o Dictators must balance relying on the military for repression while preventing it
from becoming a political threat.
4. Why Some Dictators Become "Personalist" Rulers
o Some dictators start as part of a coalition but gradually eliminate rivals to consolidate
absolute power.
o Example: Saddam Hussein purged the Ba'ath Party to ensure no one could
challenge his rule.
o Personalist dictatorships tend to be more brutal and unstable because they rely
entirely on the ruler’s personal power rather than institutions.
Implications
 Why Some Dictatorships Last Longer than Others
o Military dictatorships are often unstable because militaries are prone to internal
power struggles and coups.
o Single-party regimes (like China, Vietnam) are more stable because they create long-
term institutions that regulate elite competition.
o Resource-rich dictatorships (like Saudi Arabia) last longer because they use oil
wealth to buy loyalty and avoid power-sharing conflicts.
 Why Authoritarianism is Hard to Overcome
o Even when a dictator falls, authoritarian institutions often persist, making
transitions to democracy difficult.
o Example: Russia after the Soviet Union still maintained strong authoritarian
institutions despite elections.
Conclusion
 Authoritarian regimes are shaped by two main struggles:
1. Managing elite power-sharing (to avoid coups).
2. Controlling mass opposition (to prevent uprisings).
 The success or failure of dictatorships depends on how well they handle these problems.
 Some dictators institutionalize power-sharing to create stability (China), while others
consolidate personal power and become highly repressive but unstable (North Korea).
This framework helps explain why some dictatorships survive for decades while others collapse
quickly. The book applies this model to case studies and statistical data to provide a comprehensive
theory of authoritarian rule.

WEEK 6: Schmitter & Karl, What Democracy Is … and Is Not?

Introduction
Schmitter and Karl's article, What Democracy Is ... and Is Not, published in the Journal of Democracy
(1991), explores the definition and characteristics of democracy while also dispelling common
misconceptions. They argue that democracy is not a one-size-fits-all system but rather a flexible
framework shaped by historical, economic, and cultural contexts.
Their core argument is that democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held
accountable by citizens through competition and cooperation among elected representatives. The
article also clarifies that democracy does not automatically lead to economic efficiency, administrative
effectiveness, or even stability.
I. What Democracy Is
Schmitter and Karl define modern political democracy as a system in which rulers are accountable
to citizens through institutionalized competition and cooperation among elected representatives.
1. Key Elements of Democracy
Democracy consists of:
 Rulers – Those who make binding public decisions.
 Public Realm – The space where collective decisions are made.
 Citizens – The most fundamental component; democracy depends on the existence of citizens
with equal rights.
 Competition – A necessary condition, as democracy assumes conflicts of interest that require
competitive resolution.
 Elections – Essential but not sufficient. Holding elections alone does not guarantee
democracy.
 Majority Rule – A basic principle, but democracies often include protections for minorities.
 Cooperation – Democracy requires cooperation between individuals, political groups, and
institutions.
 Civil Society – Organizations and associations independent of the state help balance power
and promote democratic engagement.
2. Institutions That Make Democracy Work
Schmitter and Karl emphasize the procedural requirements for democracy:
 Elected officials must control government policy.
 Elections must be frequent and fair.
 All adults must have the right to vote and run for office.
 Citizens must have freedom of speech and access to alternative information sources.
 There must be freedom of association, allowing political parties and interest groups to form.
In addition to these basic conditions, they add two crucial requirements:
1. Elected officials must have real power (not be overridden by military or unelected bodies).
2. The country must be politically independent (not controlled by external forces).
II. What Democracy Is Not
Schmitter and Karl highlight common misconceptions about democracy:
1. Democracy is Not Just Elections
o "Electoralism" – The mistaken belief that just holding elections is enough for
democracy.
o Many regimes hold flawed elections to appear democratic while remaining
authoritarian (e.g., "competitive authoritarian" regimes).
2. Democracy Does Not Guarantee Economic Efficiency
o Democracies do not necessarily lead to higher economic growth, savings, or
investment than authoritarian regimes.
 o Economic progress depends on other factors, such as institutions, policies, and
external conditions.
3. Democracy Is Not Necessarily More Efficient Administratively
o Decision-making in democracies can be slow and complicated due to the need for
negotiation and consensus.
o Autocracies can sometimes make quick decisions, but these can also be disastrous
(e.g., economic mismanagement in command economies).
4. Democracy Is Not Always More Stable
o New democracies often experience political instability due to conflicts over
institutions and rules.
o Democracies involve constant disagreement as different groups compete for power
and influence.
5. Democracy Does Not Guarantee Free Markets
o Democracy does not automatically mean economic liberalization or capitalism.

o Many successful democracies have used state intervention and regulation in the
economy.
III. How Democracies Differ
There is no single model of democracy. Democracies vary based on factors such as:
 Consensus – Not all democracies have a broad national agreement on key issues.
 Participation – Some democracies have higher citizen involvement than others.
 Access – Not all citizens have the same ability to influence policies.
 Majority Rule vs. Minority Protections – Democracies must balance majority power with
rights for minorities.
 Presidential vs. Parliamentary Systems – Different democratic systems distribute power in
various ways.
Democracies can take different forms, including:
 Presidential vs. Parliamentary (e.g., U.S. vs. U.K.)
 Federal vs. Unitary (e.g., U.S. vs. France)
 Majoritarian vs. Consensus-Based (e.g., U.K. vs. Switzerland)
Each variation affects how democracy functions and what policies it produces.
IV. Conclusion
Schmitter and Karl conclude that democracy is a flexible and adaptable system, not a rigid set of
rules. It is defined by competition, cooperation, accountability, and citizen participation. However,
democracy does not automatically lead to economic prosperity, efficiency, or stability.
They caution against idealizing democracy and expecting it to solve all societal problems. Instead,
democracy should be seen as a continuous process of negotiation and adaptation, capable of self-
correction and reform.
Key Takeaways
 Democracy is more than just elections; it requires accountability, competition, and
participation.
 Democracies do not guarantee economic success, efficiency, or stability.
 There are multiple forms of democracy, shaped by history, culture, and institutions.
 Democracy is an evolving system that requires active engagement and institutional
adaptation.
This article provides a realistic and nuanced understanding of democracy, distinguishing it from
common myths and misconceptions. It remains an essential text for understanding modern
democratic governance.

WEEK 8: (1) Przeworski & Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts

Introduction
Przeworski and Limongi’s Modernization: Theories and Facts (1997) critically examines the long-
standing debate on whether economic development leads to democracy. Their primary aim is to
distinguish between two competing theories:
1. Endogenous Democratization Theory – Economic development causes democratization,
meaning that as countries grow richer, they transition to democracy.
2. Exogenous Democratization Theory – Democracies emerge randomly, but wealthier
democracies are more likely to survive once established.
The authors challenge the traditional modernization theory, famously proposed by Seymour Martin
Lipset (1959), which suggests that economic growth naturally fosters democracy. Instead, Przeworski
and Limongi argue that economic development sustains democracies rather than creating them.
Key Arguments
The article presents two core arguments:
1. Democracy does not emerge as a result of economic growth.
o Countries do not necessarily democratize as they become richer.

o There is no income threshold at which authoritarian regimes automatically fall.

2. Economic development makes existing democracies more stable.

o Once a country is democratic, its survival is strongly correlated with wealth.

o No democracy has ever collapsed at an income level above $6,000 per capita
(adjusted for purchasing power parity in 1985 USD).
Theoretical Background: Endogenous vs. Exogenous Democratization
The authors analyze two main explanations for the relationship between economic development and
democracy:
1. Endogenous Democratization (Traditional Modernization Theory)
 Economic development creates the social and economic conditions necessary for
democracy.
 Industrialization, education, urbanization, and a growing middle class lead to:
o More complex social structures

o Increased political awareness

o Stronger civil society

o Greater demands for political participation

 This theory suggests that once a country reaches a certain level of economic development,
democracy naturally emerges.
2. Exogenous Democratization (Przeworski & Limongi’s Argument)
 Democracies do not necessarily emerge because of economic growth.
 Instead, democratization happens randomly due to historical, political, or international
factors.
 However, once democracy is established, economic development makes it more likely to
survive.
 The probability of democratic survival increases significantly with higher income levels.
Empirical Findings
Przeworski and Limongi analyze data from 135 countries between 1950 and 1990, examining 224
regime transitions (101 democratic and 123 authoritarian).
1. Economic Growth Does Not Cause Democratization
 The data show no consistent pattern where economic growth leads to transitions from
dictatorship to democracy.
 Many authoritarian regimes persist even at high-income levels (e.g., Singapore, Gulf
monarchies).
 Democratization happens randomly, often due to external shocks, elite decisions, or
political crises.
2. Democracy Becomes More Stable as Countries Become Wealthier
 No democracy has ever collapsed in a country with a per capita income above $6,000
(1985 PPP USD).
 Democracies in poor countries (below $1,000 per capita) last an average of 8 years.
 Democracies in middle-income countries ($2,000–$6,000 per capita) last about 30 years.
 Democracies in wealthy countries (above $6,000 per capita) can be expected to last
indefinitely.
3. Economic Crises Are the Biggest Threat to Democracy
 Democracies are much more likely to collapse during economic downturns.
 Poor democracies (below $2,000 per capita) are extremely vulnerable to economic
recessions.
 In wealthy countries, economic crises do not lead to democratic collapse.
4. The Bell-Shaped Pattern of Dictatorships
 Dictatorships are very stable at low-income levels (below $1,000 per capita).
 As countries develop, dictatorships become less stable (more likely to transition).
 However, once a dictatorship reaches very high-income levels ($6,000+ per capita), it also
becomes more stable (e.g., Singapore, oil-rich states).
Critique of Traditional Modernization Theory
Przeworski and Limongi critique Lipset’s modernization theory by pointing out several flaws:
1. Misinterpretation of Correlation and Causation
o Just because wealthy countries are often democratic does not mean economic
growth causes democracy.
o The relationship could be due to historical coincidences or external influences.

2. Historical Exceptions
o Many authoritarian regimes remain stable despite economic development (e.g.,
China, Saudi Arabia, Singapore).
o Many poor countries transitioned to democracy without economic development.

3. Economic Growth and Political Stability

o The real effect of economic growth is in making democracies more durable, not in
creating them.

Policy Implications
1. Economic Growth Alone Does Not Guarantee Democratization
o International efforts to promote democracy should not rely solely on economic
development.
o Instead, democracy promotion should focus on political institutions, civil society,
and rule of law.
2. Wealthy Dictatorships Are Unlikely to Democratize
o High-income authoritarian regimes (e.g., China, Gulf monarchies) may remain
stable indefinitely.
o External pressure or internal elite decisions are more important factors for their
democratization.
 3. Democracies Need Economic Stability
o Economic crises are the biggest threat to young democracies.

o Poor democracies should prioritize economic stability to avoid democratic

breakdown.
Conclusion
Przeworski and Limongi challenge the traditional modernization theory by arguing that economic
growth does not cause democratization. Instead, democracy emerges randomly, but once
established, it is more likely to survive in wealthier countries. Their findings suggest that economic
development is crucial for sustaining democracy, but not necessarily for initiating it.
This article remains one of the most influential critiques of modernization theory, shaping modern
debates on democracy, economic development, and authoritarian persistence.

(2) Boix & Stokes, Endogenous Democracy

Introduction
Boix and Stokes challenge the widely accepted argument put forth by Adam Przeworski and
Fernando Limongi, who claimed that economic development does not cause democratization but
only helps sustain democracies once they have been established. This perspective, known as the
exogenous democratization theory, argues that while rich countries are more likely to remain
democratic, economic growth does not increase the likelihood of transitioning from dictatorship to
democracy.
Boix and Stokes dispute this claim and argue that economic development does, in fact, lead to
democratization—a theory they refer to as endogenous democratization. They present theoretical
and empirical evidence to show that wealthier dictatorships are more likely to transition to democracy.
Key Arguments
1. Theoretical Debate: Endogenous vs. Exogenous Democratization
 Przeworski and Limongi's Exogenous Theory:
o Economic development makes existing democracies more stable, but it does not
necessarily trigger democratic transitions in dictatorships.
o Dictatorships can persist at high levels of income (e.g., Singapore, Gulf monarchies).

o Democratization is caused by historical events or elite decisions, not economic

growth.
 Boix and Stokes’ Endogenous Theory:
o Economic growth increases the probability of democratization by redistributing
power and reducing the incentives for elites to resist democracy.
o Wealthier countries have more educated populations, stronger civil societies, and
diversified economies, all of which promote democratization.
o Historical democratization waves (19th-20th centuries) were driven by economic
development, rising middle classes, and reduced economic inequality.
2. Empirical Evidence: Does Economic Growth Lead to Democracy?
Boix & Stokes’ Critique of Przeworski & Limongi's Methodology
Boix and Stokes argue that Przeworski and Limongi underestimated the impact of development on
democratization due to three key methodological flaws:
1. Data Restriction to Post-1950 Period
o By focusing only on countries after 1950, Przeworski & Limongi ignored earlier
waves of democratization in Europe and the Americas, which were strongly linked to
economic development.
o Extending the dataset back to the mid-19th century reveals a much stronger link
between development and democratization.
2. Misinterpretation of Income Levels
o Przeworski & Limongi claimed that income levels do not predict democratic
transitions because few high-income dictatorships democratized.
o Boix & Stokes counter that most wealthy countries had already democratized
before reaching high-income levels, leaving only a small number of cases to
observe.
3. Omitted Variable Bias
o Factors such as income equality, economic diversification, and external influences
(e.g., Cold War politics, oil wealth) were not properly accounted for in Przeworski &
Limongi’s model.
3. Alternative Data and Statistical Analysis
Boix and Stokes reanalyze global data on democratization from 1850 to 1990, addressing
Przeworski and Limongi’s methodological flaws. Their findings show:
 In the 19th and early 20th centuries, economic growth and democratization were closely
linked.
 Higher income per capita increased the probability of democratization, even after
controlling for external influences.
 The effect of development on democracy weakens only at very high-income levels, where
democratization has already occurred in most cases.
Key Statistical Findings
 Countries with higher per capita incomes were significantly more likely to transition to
democracy.
 The impact of economic growth was strongest in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
 In the post-1950 period, fewer authoritarian regimes democratized due to Cold War
influences and oil wealth, rather than because economic growth had no effect.
4. Additional Factors Influencing Democratization
Boix and Stokes refine their theory by incorporating additional economic and political factors that
influence democratization:
1. Economic Inequality
 High economic inequality increases the cost of democratization for elites, as they fear
redistributive policies under democracy.
 More equal societies are more likely to democratize, as elites feel less threatened by
majority rule.
 Example: Europe democratized gradually as wealth became more evenly distributed.
2. Capital Mobility and Economic Structure
 In economies dominated by landowners or oil wealth, elites resist democracy because their
wealth is immobile and easy to tax.
 In economies based on industrialization and human capital, elites are more open to
democracy because their wealth is mobile and harder to tax.
 Example: Oil-rich Gulf monarchies resist democratization, whereas industrialized
societies (Europe, East Asia) democratized faster.
3. Cold War & External Influences
 U.S. and Soviet Union interventions artificially sustained dictatorships, disrupting natural
democratization processes.
 After the Cold War, many former authoritarian states democratized, indicating that
external pressures had suppressed endogenous democratization.
Conclusion: Development Does Cause Democratization
Boix and Stokes refute Przeworski & Limongi’s claim that economic development does not lead
to democracy. Instead, they demonstrate that:
1. Historical democratization patterns strongly support endogenous democratization.
2. Economic development increases the probability of democratic transitions, especially in
low- and middle-income countries.
3. High-income dictatorships are rare because most countries democratize before reaching
very high levels of development.
4. Economic inequality and capital mobility shape the pace of democratization.
5. Cold War politics and resource wealth (e.g., oil) have temporarily distorted
democratization patterns.
Implications
 Economic development remains a key driver of democratization, despite variations based
on inequality, external pressures, and economic structure.
 Modernization theory still holds value, but it must be adapted to account for inequality,
political institutions, and global influences.
 Policy interventions promoting economic growth, education, and income equality can
facilitate democratization in authoritarian regimes.
Final Thoughts
Boix and Stokes present a compelling defense of endogenous democratization, showing that
economic development plays a fundamental role in the transition to democracy. By correcting
methodological flaws in earlier studies and incorporating historical evidence and broader economic
factors, they revive the classic modernization theory and offer a more nuanced explanation of why
democracies emerge and persist.