The Reinvention of Diplomacy
Are international negotiations becoming more democratic?
By Lora Anne Viola
Diplomacy is the quintessential tool of modern statecraft. It is the means,
short of force, through which foreign policy is negotiated and executed. But
what happens to diplomacy when the state whose craft it practices is no lon-
ger at the center of international relations? Processes of supranationalization
and transnationalization are relocating powers that once unambiguously
rested with the modern state to new types of political actors, such as su-
pranational bodies, private entrepreneurs, and NGOs. What does this trans-
formation of the state imply for the process by which international politics is
Lora Viola received a BA in political practiced?
science and economics from Co-
lumbia University, and an MA in in- Modern European diplomacy begins with the invention of the permanent re-
ternational relations and a PhD in sident ambassador in Renaissance Italy and the rise of the sovereign state.
political science from the University Three characteristics of the permanent resident ambassador enabled the sys-
of Chicago. She has been a mem- tematization of diplomatic relations in Europe.
ber of the WZB research unit
„Transnational Conflicts and Inter- First, the ambassador is the first official dedicated by the sovereign for the
national Institutions“ since 2006, sole purpose of representing that sovereign in its relations with foreign
where she studies institutional powers. This is in contrast to envoys which in the Middle Ages had an un-
change. She has taught seminars specialized role, carrying out all types of transactions on behalf of various
on international negotiation at the principals of different standing; any actor – private citizens, companies, cities
University of Chicago and at the – with enough power or money could send and receive envoys. Second, unlike
Free University of Berlin. envoys who were sent abroad to deliver specific messages and then return as
[Foto: Mike Minehan] speedily as possible, the new ambassadors were to provide permanent contact
between two sovereigns. In contrast to the ad hoc nature of the earlier envoys,
viola@wzb.eu this facilitated the establishment of stable continuous relations. Third, the
ambassador was to establish a residence on foreign soil, known as the chan-
cery. Residency allowed ambassadors to become local experts in the domestic
and foreign policies of a particular land. By the 17th century the elements that
we recognize today as modern diplomacy were already in place and remained
virtually unchanged until the early 20th century.
Democracy and the „New Diplomacy“
Many scholars consider the 19th century to have been the golden age of di-
plomacy. Indeed, popular images of elegant dinner parties and smoky back-
rooms where well-bred diplomats negotiate over the fate of international af-
fairs can be traced to this period. But this style of diplomacy and the role of
the career diplomat were to be criticized as decadent and devious in the wake
of World War One. For many contemporaries, the devastation of WWI was a
failure of diplomacy. Some critics directly blamed diplomacy for the war, ar-
guing that behind-the-scenes deal-making enabled risky policies such as secret
alliances which favored war. Others indirectly blamed diplomacy, arguing
that it had failed to prevent the war because it was inept and poorly organi-
zed; the elite diplomatic corps was based on class rather than on talent, was
out of touch with the needs of the people, and unfamiliar with the new tech-
nologies of the age.
Woodrow Wilson, proposing that the old diplomatic system be revised, called
for “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no
private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall pro-
ceed always frankly and in the public view.” At the heart of the Wilsonian vi-
sion for a “new diplomacy” was the democratic conviction that the public
was driven by reason to prefer peace and, if allowed to influence politics,
would oppose war. Thus, in response to the perceived failure of ambassado-
rial diplomacy, the new diplomacy was to be exposed to the tempering effects
of public scrutiny.
22 WZB-Mitteilungen Heft 121 September 2008
Liberalism built this new machinery of international cooperation in the form
of the League of Nations. The League was an attempt to transplant democ-
racy from the national to the international context and, although it was not
the first multilateral conference, it was the first universal attempt to address
political problems on the basis of democratic rationalism. This institution, as
well as its successor the United Nations, was meant to constrain aggressive fo-
reign policy, to subject states to legal constraints, and to make it impossible
for a few elite men to determine the fate of many. Although it did not fully re-
place the old ambassadorial system, the diplomatic center of gravity was
shifting away from the embassies of capital cities to these new universal in-
stitutions.
But the liberal democrats, whose utopianism historian E. H. Carr bitterly cri-
tiqued, would have to wait more than another half century for their ideals to
come close to realization. The League failed catastrophically and its rein-
carnation, the United Nations, became paralyzed by the Cold War. Only after
the end of the Cold War and the unfreezing of the UN did another trans-
formation take place which opened the door for democratic diplomacy.
State transformation and its consequences
The end of the Cold War and the spread of globalization created un-
precedented forms of interdependence in the international system and en-
abled new actors to enter international politics. These processes have led to a
transformation of the state characterized by the weakening or relocation of
traditional pillars of state power, such as the monopoly on force and the mo-
nopoly on legal regulation. The end of the Cold War allowed supranational
and transnational actors to take on increasing responsibility for global gover-
nance which was once the exclusive burden of states. Now states operate in-
creasingly in partnership with supranational bodies, private entrepreneurs,
and civil society actors to regulate global public goods. This transformation
in the role of the state has been accompanied by a change in the nature of di-
plomacy as well. The content of diplomacy has become more complex; the
context of diplomatic action is no longer concentrated in the embassies of
Moscow or D.C., but in Kyoto, Seattle, and Doha; and while ambassadors are
still appointed to capital embassies, a growing field of diverse actors from ci-
vil society is participating in diplomacy.
During the Cold War, most negotiations were dominated by the relationship
between the two superpowers, but in the last two decades a larger number of
Summary
states have demanded an independent voice in global governance. At the same
time, rapid globalization meant that a larger range of problems could only be Diplomacy is the quintessential tool
solved by multilateral cooperation. Trade, the environment, and global of modern statecraft. But what
health, for example, have become sites of increased global governance acti- happens to diplomacy when the
vity with a large number of stakeholders addressing challenging substantive state is no longer at the center of
problems. This combination of increased multilateralism and issue multi- international relations? The trans-
plication raised the complexity of diplomatic negotiations. In the 1960s, for formation in the role of the state
example, the GATT Kennedy Round saw 62 countries participate in three- has been accompanied by a change
year-long trade negotiations. In contrast, the latest Doha Round of the WTO in the nature of diplomacy as well.
trade talks included more than double that number of country participants The content of diplomacy has be-
negotiating over seven years and producing tens of millions of pages of docu- come more complex, the context of
mentation. diplomatic action is no longer con-
centrated in capital embassies, and
A parallel change is the increasing number of non-governmental actors enga- a growing field of diverse actors
ged in diplomacy. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is one of from civil society is participating in
the most important avenues through which NGOs gain formal access to the diplomacy. The diplomacy of the
international diplomatic apparatus. In 1946, 41 NGOs were granted consul- 21st century seems to be growing
tative status by ECOSOC, by 1992 this number rose to over 700, and today beyond the state. But there are rea-
more than 3,000 organizations have consultative status. NGOs are also in- sons to worry that the combination
creasingly accredited to participate as observers in conferences, summits, and of partial institutional openness
ministerial negotiations. In 1996, for example, the WTO for the first time al- and civil engagement is not ne-
lowed NGOs to attend a ministerial conference. 108 NGOs representing en- cessarily making diplomacy more
vironmental, development, consumer, business, and farm interests were pre- democratic.
sent. Over subsequent years the number of NGOs attending ministerial confe-
WZB-Mitteilungen Heft 121 September 2008 23
rences rose dramatically, reaching 812 at the 2005 Hong Kong conference
and over 750 at the 2008 Geneva conference. Furthermore, hundreds of
NGOs have established working relations with particular departments, pro-
grams, or specialized agencies of the UN. Finally, even NGOs without formal
access to diplomacy can apply for association with the UN Department of
Public Information (DPI) which offers them a regular means of disseminating
information to member states.
NGO diplomatic activity ranges from serving as advisers on government de-
legations, to accreditation as official observers, to lobbying, to mobilizing
public opinion, to information servicing. And while NGOs typically do not
have a formal voice in negotiations, they are nevertheless re-shaping how di-
plomacy is done. Although diplomacy grew out of the state, the diplomacy of
the 21st century seems to be growing beyond the state.
First, diplomats were traditionally viewed as experts offering their countries
specialized knowledge about a region or topic. But today the expertise ne-
cessary to handle complex negotiations is increasingly provided by other ac-
tors, especially NGOs. NGOs can often provide states and their negotiators
with the local knowledge and compiled information that was once the job of
the diplomat. Second, NGOs are creating new forms of governance by taking
on watch-dog roles before, during, and after policy negotiations. When
NGOs receive accreditation to participate as observers in a negotiating
round’s formal plenary meetings, for example, they usually have the oppor-
tunity to address government delegates on the record. They are also entitled
to information on the proceedings of the negotiations, which they can then
publicize and criticize. In this way, NGOs can put diplomats under a new de-
gree of public scrutiny and pressure. Third, NGOs and celebrity diplomats
such as Bono are able to mobilize public opinion and raise awareness, thereby
allowing civil society to influence the foreign policy agenda.
New actors, new forms of communication
The transformation of the state has led many commentators to wonder if the
state as we know it is withering away. We could ask the same about di-
plomacy: do these latest reinventions spell the end of diplomacy as we know
it? The answer is certainly yes; the old ambassadorial diplomacy is no longer
the main tool of statecraft. At the same time, political communication among
states and between states and citizens has never been so important to interna-
tional politics as it is today. This political communication is happening in a
variety of new settings – intergovernmental institutions, multilateral confe-
rences, ministerial rounds – and with a range of new actors from government
and civil society. But the older forms of diplomacy are not simply being sub-
stituted by new forms; traditional diplomatic methods are merging with and
working side by side with new methods and actors. So it seems that the old di-
plomacy has found a way to integrate the new diplomacy.
But is this combination a solomonian solution or a devil’s bargain? Propo-
nents of democracy presume that any improvement in transparency and civil
society engagement always advances the public good. But there are at least
two reasons to be sceptical. First, public scrutiny changes the way negotiators
act, and this might not always be beneficial. Second, in a world of only partial
public access, the general public good risks being trampled by special inter-
ests.
Recent research has shown that in private negotiations diplomats tend to be
more flexible, open for creative solutions, and more likely to entertain hypo-
thetical solutions to a negotiation problem. For these reasons, negotiation
done out of the public view increases the likelihood of an agreement being
reached. The negative effect of closed negotiations, of course, is that it makes
public influence on the course of the proceedings impossible and limits poli-
tical accountability to the outcome phase. This is exactly where opening up to
civil society can play a helpful role.
24 WZB-Mitteilungen Heft 121 September 2008
But while public influence can be positive, it can also negatively alter the na-
ture of negotiation. Research has also shown that public scrutiny creates in-
centives for government negotiators to posture, take uncompromising posi-
tions, and to avoid entertaining trade-offs perceived as politically risky. This
is because government negotiators fear appearing weak and act more conser-
vatively in order to forestall public criticism. This negotiating stance, in turn,
makes reaching agreement less likely.
Putting negotiators under public pressure certainly is not a problem if the out-
comes – even failure to reach agreement – reflect sensitivity to the general
will. The problem arises when such outcomes instead reflect sensitivity to spe-
cialized interests at the expense of overall social welfare improvement. All too
often NGOs in a position to influence international diplomacy do not repre-
sent a broad public base but rather a small but highly mobilized special inter-
est. Moreover, NGOs are themselves not democratically accountable beyond
their base, and sometimes not even within their base. Many NGOs which
claim to represent the interests of the South, for example, are in fact run and
organized in the North. The potential problem here is that negotiators who
represent governments are constrained by groups that have no broad public
mandate.
In order for public activism in diplomacy to contribute to general social wel-
fare, mechanisms need to be in place which foster fair representation and
broad legitimacy. By opening up to only some NGOs, and even then only par-
tially, international diplomacy is sidestepping the deeper question of the de-
mocratic accountability of global governance. This is particularly pro-
blematic given the far-reaching nature of contemporary international negotia-
tions. The next stage of the transformation debate needs to consider how to
best design democratic access to diplomatic institutions in order to improve
social welfare. True democratic legitimacy will most likely entail a deep re-
form of international institutions.
References
Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan 2001 (1939),
291 p.
Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking, “Governments, Non-governmental Organisations and the
Re-calibration of Diplomacy”, in: Global Society, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2000, pp. 361-376
Keith Hamilton, Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, Routledge 2000, 288 p.
Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, New York: Dover Publications 1988 (1955), 284 p.
David Stasavage, “Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International
Bargaining”, in: International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 4, 2004, pp. 667-704
WZB-Mitteilungen Heft 121 September 2008 25
