November 2014

Working paper 407

Financial regulation in Kenya:

Balancing inclusive growth with financial stability
Francis M. Mwega

This case study investigates the potential tradeoffs between regulations and
stability of Kenya’s financial sector and their implications for inclusive growth.
This is done in the context of six areas: (i) size and growth of the financial sector
relative to LICs and MICs; (ii) implications of a mixture of local banks (some of
which have spread to neighbouring countries), foreign banks and development
finance institutions; (iii) evolution and macroeconomic implications of financial
innovations and inclusion; (iv) cost and access to credit, especially to SMEs; (e)
prudential regulations; and (f) management of capital flows in the context of
large current account deficits, mainly financed by short-term net capital inflows
such that their easy reversibility could potentially generate a currency crisis.

Shaping policy for development odi.org

Acknowledgements

This paper is an output of the Grant "Financial regulation in low-income countries:

Balancing inclusive growth with financial stability" funded by the DFID-ESRC
Growth Research Programme (DEGRP). ODI gratefully acknowledges the support
of DFID/ESRC in the production of this study. The views presented are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI or DFID/ESRC.
Table of contents

Acknowledgements ii

List of figures and tables ii

1 Introduction 1

2 Size and growth of the financial sector 2

2.1 The financial sector in Kenya’s Vision 2030 2
2.2 Financial Sector and economic performance 5

3 The roles of foreign banks, state-state owned banks and DFIs in Kenya 9
3.1 Foreign and state-owned commercial banks 9
3.2 Challenges of Regulating Kenya banks in other countries 12
3.3 3.4: Development Finance Institutions 13

4 Financial inclusion in Kenya 15

4.1 Trends and patterns of financial inclusion 15
4.2 Is regulation of M-PESA and other mobile money platforms adequate? 17
4.3 Financial inclusion (innovations) and macroeconomic stability in Kenya 18

5 Access and cost of credit in Kenya 19

5.1 Introduction 19
5.2 Banks lending to SMEs in Kenya 20
5.3 Cost of credit and interest rate spreads in Kenya 21

6 Prudential regulations in Kenya 27

7 Management of capital flows in Kenya 30

7.1 Evolution of current account deficit and net capital inflows in Kenya 30
7.2 ODA Flows 32
7.3 FDI Flows 33
7.4 Capital account regulation to avoid future currency or banking crises 34

8 Summary and conclusions 36

References 42

Financial regulation in Kenya: i

List of figures and tables

Figures
Figure 1: M2 as % of GDP in Kenya versus LICs and MICs 6
Figure 2: Domestic credit to the private sector as % of GDP in Kenya versus LICs
and MICs 6
Figure 3: Domestic credit to the private sector (DCP) and nominal GDP in Kenya,
2005:12 – 2013:12 7
Figure 4: Quarterly Growth in Financial Intermediation and GDP in Kenya, 2001Q1-
2013Q3 7
Figure 5: The money multiplier and income velocity in Kenya, December 2005 to
December 2013 18
Figure 6: The interest rates spread in Kenya (ex post lending minus deposit rate) 23
Figure 7: The interest rates spread in Kenya (ex post lending rates minus the 91
days TBR) 23
Figure 8: The Performance of the banking Sector, 2002-2012 24
Figure 9: Spreads in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries 25
Figure 10: Selected prudential and financial stability indicators for the banking
sector 2011 - 2013 28
Figure 11: 12-months cumulative current account deficit as % of GDP, December
2005-November 2013 30
Figure 12: Net capital flows to Kenya, US$ million, December 2005-November
2013 31
Figure 13: Foreign Currency advances and deposits in Kenya, January 2007 –
December 2013 35

Tables
Table 1: Ganger-causality between quarterly growth in financial intermediation
(QGFI) and growth in GDP (QGGDP) 8
Table 2: The performance of commercial banks in Kenya by ownership 10
Table 3: Simulated cost of banking services to SMES 12
Table 4: Financial inclusion and exclusion in Kenya, % 15
Table 5: Overall Use of financial services, % 16
Table 6: Financial inclusion in Kenya by gender 16
Table 7: Financial inclusion in Kenya by location 17
Table 8: Comparative Analysis of Commercial Banks’ Ex Post Spreads in Kenya
and Selected Countries (%) 23
Table 9: Ex post Spread Decomposition in Kenya, % 26
Table 10: Net Foreign Purchases as % Share of Equity Turnover in Kenya, January
2009-December 2013 31
Table 11: Net ODA to Kenya, 2002-2011 32
Table 12: Public Debt Sustainability in Kenya 32
Table 13: Net FDI inflows to Kenya, 2002-2011 33

Financial regulation in Kenya: ii

1 Introduction 1

In the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC), many countries are prioritizing
stability by strengthening financial regulation. Although important, this might be at
the expense of inclusive growth, especially in poor countries. Without effective
regulation, financial systems can become unstable, triggering crises that can
devastate the real economy as evidenced by the recent GFC that began in 2007
(Spratt 2013). Given the primary purpose of finance is to facilitate productive
economic activity, the aim of regulation is to maintain financial stability and to
promote economic growth. This is a delicate balancing act, as too great a focus on
stability could stifle growth, while a dash for growth is likely to sow the seeds of
future crises.

There are two different ways that regulation could impact on growth and stability
(Spratt 2013). The first is by influencing the day-to-day behaviour of financial
market actors so that financial regulation has direct effects, for example, on how
much a bank chooses to lend to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The second
is by influencing how the financial system evolves structurally, thereby creating
indirect effects. The diversity of the banking system, for example, will influence the
pattern of lending by sectors.

This case study investigates the potential tradeoff between regulation and stability
in Kenya, a small open economy which is highly vulnerable to domestic and
external shocks, but with a lightly regulated financial system and a fairly open
capital account. The study adopts an empirical approach, entailing quantitative
work and focused policy analysis. The specific objectives of the Kenya case study
are therefore to identify and analyze (i) key national risks to financial stability as
well as obstacles or gaps in financial sector for funding inclusive growth; (ii)
domestic regulatory measures that have been implemented, future options to
support financial stability and the advantages and problems of different
mechanisms for such regulation, given the country characteristics (e.g. weak
institutions, governance and law enforcement, and information problems); and (iii)
the management of capital account to support financial stability prior, during and
after the recent global financial crisis.

To make the research manageable, the study mainly focuses on the banking sector,
although capital markets, pension funds and other financial institutions may
facilitate more long term finance if banks do not provide sufficiently. The Terms of
Reference for the research project identify a number of issues that require
investigation. The paper is therefore organized around these issues. Section 2
analyzes the size and growth of the financial sector and its linkages to economic
performance; Section 3 investigates the role of foreign banks, state-owned banks
and development finance institutions (DFIs); Section 4 examines the evolution of
financial inclusion in the country; Section 5 discusses access and cost of credit;
Section 6 explains prudential regulations; while Section 7 analyzes the management
of capital flows in the country. The paper is concluded in Section 8.

1
This draws on the study’s Terms of Reference.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 1

2 Size and growth of the
financial sector

2.1 The financial sector in Kenya’s Vision 2030

The starting point of the study is an analysis of the features and vision of
development of the country in the medium term for example as articulated in Kenya
Vision 2030 and the Medium Term Plans (MTPs), given the country’s main
opportunities (such as the recent discovery of commercially viable oil deposits and
of rare minerals in the country) and challenges (such as continued lack of access
and high cost of credit, especially for SMEs).

Kenya Vision 2030 is the country’s development blueprint which was launched in
2008 (Kenya 2007). It aims to transform Kenya into a “newly industrializing,
middle-income country providing a high quality life to its citizens by the year
2030”. Its overarching objective is to make Kenya a “globally competitive and
prosperous nation with a high quality of life by 2030”. The Vision is based on
three “pillars”: the economic, the social and the political. The economic pillar aims
to improve the country’s prosperity through an ambitious economic development
programme that would achieve an inclusive average GDP growth rate of at least
10% per annum over a period of 25 years. The social pillar seeks to build “a just
and cohesive society with social equity in a clean and secure environment”. The
political pillar aims to realize “a democratic political system founded on issue-
based politics that respects the rule of law, and protects the rights and freedoms of
every individual in Kenyan society”. These three pillars are anchored on
macroeconomic stability; continuity in governance reforms; enhanced equity and
wealth creation opportunities for the poor; and investment in infrastructure; energy;
science, technology and innovation; land reforms; human resources development;
security; and public sector reforms.

The Vision identifies financial services as one of six sectors that are the key drivers
of the economy. The others are tourism; agriculture and livestock; wholesale and
retail trade; manufacturing; and business process outsourcing as well as other IT
enabled services. Subsequently, oil and mineral resources sector was added in the
second MTP after the discovery of commercially viable oil deposits and of rare
minerals in the country in 2012. The Vision aims to create “a vibrant and globally
competitive financial sector that will create jobs and also promote high levels of
savings to finance Kenya’s overall investment needs”. It envisages a dynamic
financial sector comprised of banks, the capital market, insurance, pensions,
development finance and financial co-operatives (SACCOs). The Vision therefore
aims to revamp Kenya’s fairly diversified financial sector which currently includes
the following institutions:

 The capital market, with the stock market the 5th largest by market
capitalization in Africa after South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria and
Morocco.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 2

  38 insurance companies.
 5 Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) that provide medium and
long-term finance.
 1 mortgage company.
 7 representative offices of foreign banks.
 101 foreign exchange bureaus, first licensed in January 1995.
 A Post Office Savings Bank, supported by 890 post offices spread
throughout the country.
 About 2700 Savings and Credit Co-operative Organizations
(SACCOs) in both rural and urban areas.
 2 credit reference bureau.
 9 deposit-taking microfinance institutions, and so on.

The envisaged policy actions and targets of the financial sector under Vision 2030
include:

 Raise savings rates from 17% to 30% of GDP. This would be

achieved, for example, by increasing bank deposits from 44% to 80%
of GDP and by lowering borrowing costs. With an average loans
deposits ratio of 76% (over 1978-2012), this implies an increase in the
bank loans from 33% to 61% of GDP. These targets indicate what the
Vision envisages as the desirable scale of banking sector to achieve
middle income status.
 Enhance financial inclusion by decreasing the share of population
without access to finance by about 20%.
 Increase stock market capitalisation from 50% to 90% of GDP.
 Source foreign savings for investment by up to 10% of GDP from
foreign direct investments (FDI), overseas development assistance
(ODA) and sovereign bonds.
 Undertake reforms of the banking sector to facilitate the
transformation of the large number of small banks in Kenya to few
larger and stronger ones.
 Introduce credit reference bureau.
 Streamline informal finance, SACCOs and microfinance institutions.
 Deepen financial markets by raising institutional capital through
pension fund reforms and expanding bond and equity markets.
 Introduce legal and institutional reforms that would enhance
transparency in all transactions, build trust and make enforcement of
justice more efficient.
 Create a critical mass of skills in financial management.
The Kenya Vision 2030 was to be implemented in successive five-year Medium-
Term Plans, with the first MTP covering the period 2008 – 2012 (recently
completed), and the current second MTP covering the period 2013-2017 (Kenya
2013).

The flagship projects and policies that were to be implemented during the First
MTP (2008-2012) included (i) transformation of the banking sector to bring in
fewer stronger, larger scale banks; (ii) development and execution of a
comprehensive model for pension reform; (iii) pursuance of a comprehensive
remittances strategy; (iv) formulation of a policy for the issuing of benchmark
sovereign bonds; and (v) implementation of legal and institutional reforms required
for a regional financial centre.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 3

According to the Second MTP (2013-2017), some of these projects and policies
have not been implemented at all or have been implemented only partially. The
MTP attributes this to a number of factors which include (i) the post-election
violence of 2007/2008; (ii) adverse weather impacting the agricultural sector and
the economy; and (iii) the GFC of 2007/08 and the subsequent worldwide
economic slowdown.

As a result:

 Gross national savings as percent of GDP actually decreased from

15.4% in 2007/08 to 10.4% in 2011/12, well below the First MTP set
target of 24.4%.
 Total investments as a percentage of GDP rose marginally to 21.9% in
2012/2013 compared to 20.1% in 2010/2011 against a set target of 30-
32%.
 Credit extended to the private sector amounted to 36.8% of GDP in
2012 compared to 28.3% in 2007.
Nevertheless, the Second MTP identifies some of the following key achievements
under the First MTP:

 Increased efficiency of financial services that directly supports

improved credit access by reducing transaction costs. A number of
interventions, including in the payments system, capital markets
infrastructure and credit referencing contributed to efficiency gains
during the period.
 Introduction of credit reference bureau. The Banking (Credit
Reference Bureau) Regulations, 2008, were first rolled out in July
2010 and by December 2013, the two licensed credit referenced
bureaus (Credit Reference Bureau Africa Limited and Metropol Credit
Reference Bureau Limited) had received a total of 3.5 million credit
requests from banks, more than 53,000 requests from individual
customers and 12,851 customer inquiries prompted by adverse actions
by institutions. Revised regulations allowing for sharing of positive
and negative credit information by banks and deposit-taking
microfinance institutions were gazetted in January 20142.
 Implementation of policies to enhance the stability of the financial
system. Attention has been focused on the deposit-taking institutions,
which account for the largest proportion of the assets in the system.
Oversight of insurance, pension and other investment funds had also
been strengthened with all the regulators adopting a risk-based
approach to the supervision of institutions/entities under their
regulation3.

2
According to the CBK, Credit Reference Bureaus (CRBs) complement the central role played by banks and other
financial institutions in extending financial services within an economy. CRBs help lenders make faster and more
accurate credit decisions. They collect, manage and disseminate customer information to lenders within a provided
regulatory framework. Credit histories not only provide necessary input for credit underwriting, but also allow
borrowers to take their credit history from one financial institution to another, thereby making lending markets
more competitive and, in the end, more affordable. CRBs assist in making credit accessible to more people, and
enabling lenders and businesses reduce risk and fraud. Sharing of information between financial institutions in
respect of customer credit behaviour, therefore, has a positive economic impact.
3
Other achievements were (i) progress towards the formation of the Nairobi International Financial Centre
(NIFC); and (ii) the enactment of the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism Act
(AML/CFT Act) in 2009.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 4

2.2 Financial Sector and economic performance

A lot of work has been done on the relationship between the size of the financial
sector and economic performance. Many studies find a close linkage between
financial deepening, productivity and economic growth. It is for example estimated
that policies that would raise the M2/GDP ratio by 10% would increase the long-
term per capita growth rate by 0.2–0.4% points (Easterly and Levine 1997, Ndulu
and O’Connell 2008). According to Levine (1997), there are five functions of the
financial system through which it enhances economic growth: reducing risk;
allocating resources; monitoring managers and exerting corporate controls;
mobilizing savings; and facilitating exchange of goods and services. The impact of
these factors on growth depends, among others, on the level of financial
intermediation; the efficiency of financial intermediation; and the composition of
financial intermediation. In the simple AK model, the financial sector promotes the
growth of the economy by raising the saving rate; the marginal productivity of
capital, and the proportion of savings that is channeled to investment. However,
while low income countries need to increase the size of their financial sectors, there
are limits to this (Spratt 2013). Beyond a certain level, estimated at around 80-
100% of private credit to GDP, financial sector development becomes negative for
economic growth, both through heightened financial instability and the
misallocation of financial resources. The same applies to a too rapid growth of
private sector credit which might lead to output volatility and adverse growth
effects (Griffith-Jones with Ewa Karwowski 2013).

Kenya has a well developed financial system for a country of its income level
(Beck and Fuchs 2004). Kenya’s level of financial development is not too far off
from the predicted level in a global cross-country model (Allen et al. 2012).
Christensen (2010) classifies Kenya as a frontier market economy whose financial
market is advanced, but not to the same extent as emerging markets e.g. S. Africa,
given that its M3/GDP ratio was about 34% compared to an average of 63% for
emerging market economies in 2008-10 although these indicators have improved
over time. It is therefore unlikely the size of the Kenya’s financial sector is beyond
the threshold to negatively impact on economic growth. Griffith-Jones and
Karwowski (2013) also show that credit expansion in Kenya has been relatively
modest in the last decade (at 19.5% over 2000-10) compared to other selected SSA
countries (for example Angola 1545.5%, Malawi 215.6%, Mali 286.7%, Niger
174.4%, Nigeria 173.0%, Sao Tome and Principe 709.8%, Sierra Leone 384.2%,
Sudan 505.6%, Tanzania 274.4 and Uganda 152.8%).

Two measures of the depth and coverage of financial systems is the M2/GDP and
private credit/ GDP ratios. As seen in Figure 1, while the M2/GDP ratio in Kenya
closely tracks that of low-income countries (LICs), it is far below that of middle-
income countries (MICs), with a clear divergence over time. Between 1980 and
2011, their respective ratios increased from 29.9% to 49.9% for Kenya, 16.8% to
47.2% for LICs and 32.2% to 101.6% for MICs. Figure 2 also shows a similar
pattern with respect to credit to the private sector GDP ratio, with the Kenya ratio
tending to decline from the early 1990s. Between 1980 and 2011, their respective
ratios increased from 29.5% to 37.4% for Kenya, 10.5% to 29.9% for LICs and
31.3% to 76.1% for MICs.

With the country aspiring to MIC status by 2030, it apparently has a long way to go
in building its financial sector. In its monetary programming, the CBK endeavours
to keep the path of private sector credit growth rate close to the projected nominal
GDP path. As seen in Figure 3, domestic credit to the private sector (DCP) closely
tracked the nominal GDP over 2005-2009, with acceleration in 2010-2011, which
was broadly reversed in 2012, with another acceleration in the second half of 2013.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 5

Private sector credit growth picked-up during the first half of 2013 in response to
the gradual easing of the monetary policy stance, pick-up in economic activity and,
improved investor confidence in the economy after the March 2013 elections. The
CBK reduced the Central Bank Rate (CBR) from 9.50% to 8.50% in May 2013 and
retained it at this level in the rest of 2013. Consequently, the annual growth in the
overall private sector credit rose from 12.69% in June 2013 to 21% in December
2013, above the projected growth path of 16.2% in the year to December 2013.

Figure 1: M2 as % of GDP in Kenya versus LICs and MICs

120

100

80

60

40

20

0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

KEN LICs MICs

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

Figure 2: Domestic credit to the private sector as % of GDP in

Kenya versus LICs and MICs

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

KEN LICs MICs

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

Financial regulation in Kenya: 6

Figure 3: Domestic credit to the private sector (DCP) and
nominal GDP in Kenya, 2005:12 – 2013:12

1,600 4,500

1,400 4,000

1,200 3,500

1,000 3,000

800 2,500

600 2,000

400 1,500

200 1,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

DCP NGDP

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) provides quarterly GDP and
growth data since 2000. Figure 4 shows four-period moving average growth rates in
financial intermediation and GDP in Kenya over 2001Q1-2013Q3. There is clearly
some correlation (0.24) between the two series during the study period, with the
moving average quarterly GDP growth rate generally less volatile than growth in
financial intermediation (standard deviation of 0.660 versus 1.465, respectively).
Granger causality tests show significant causality from financial intermediation to
growth at 3 and 4 lags at the 5% level, with the other lags non-significant (Table 1),
supporting Kenya Vision 2030 designation of the financial sector as one of the
drivers of growth in Kenya, at least in the short-run4. On an annual basis, the
financial sector growth has consistently outpaced the real GDP growth since 2009.

Figure 4: Quarterly Growth in Financial Intermediation and GDP

in Kenya, 2001Q1-2013Q3

-1

-2

-3

-4
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Quarterly growth in Financial Intermediation

Quarterly growth in GDP

Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (www.knbs.go.ke)

4
In contrast, the KNBS reports growth data on a quarter-on-quarter basis to remove the seasonal effects. By
ignoring the intermediate values, none of the Granger causality tests are significant, although there is more
correlation in the two series (0.28).

Financial regulation in Kenya: 7

Table 1: Ganger-causality between quarterly growth in financial
intermediation (QGFI) and growth in GDP (QGGDP)

3 lags 4 lags

F-Statistic Prob. F-Statistic Prob.

QGGDP does not Granger Cause QGFI 0.867 0.466 1.426 0.244

QGFI does not Granger Cause QGGDP 2.809 0.050 2.751 0.042

In Kenya, the Second MTP identifies the following emerging issues and challenges:
(i) inadequate access to finance for SMEs; (ii) high bank lending rates and wide
interest rate spreads; (iii) high level of exclusion from financial services; and (iv)
low insurance penetration and pension coverage. We address the first three
challenges later in the paper.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 8

3 The roles of foreign
banks, state-state owned
banks and DFIs in Kenya

3.1 Foreign and state-owned commercial banks

According to the framework papers for the project (Spratt 2013, Griffith-Jones with
Ewa Karwowski 2013), opinion on the merits of foreign banks and state-owned
banks has shifted considerably since the 2007-8 GFC. Foreign banks can have both
positive and negative effects. While they can bring valuable skills, technology and
capital, they can also bring risks. Evidence from the recent financial crisis shows
that countries where foreign banks dominate the market could suffer negative
lending shocks, as turmoil in the home markets cause parent banks to withdraw
capital from the developing countries where they operate. They can have negative
impacts, particularly by bypassing the supply of credit to the less lucrative sections
of the country. Critics of foreign bank participation therefore argue that foreign
banks may have an overall negative effect on financial deepening and inclusion
(Beck 2013). Distance constraints and informational disadvantages may prevent
foreign banks from lending to SMEs. The competitive advantage of foreign banks
can result in domestic banks being crowded out of the market and foreign banks
focusing on the top-end of the market, thus leaving SMEs and poorer households
without access to financial services. Specifically, the greater reliance of foreign
banks on hard information about borrowers as opposed to soft information can have
negative repercussions for riskier borrowers if foreign banks crowd-out domestic
banks. The existing empirical literature has not provided unambiguous findings on
the repercussions of foreign banks for financial development and inclusion and
neither has the African experience (Beck 2013).

Similarly, there has been a change in the negative perception of state-owned

commercial banks, with the some studies finding that these banks performed a
valuable counter-cyclical role in some countries; while others find them to be
associated with higher rates of economic growth (Spratt 2013). The challenge
therefore is to design and regulate them so that they can successfully fulfill their
development mandate, while avoiding the well-documented failures of the past.

Kenya currently (in December 2013) has 43 banks, with 1,313 branches and 34,064
employees, accounting for about two thirds of the financial system’s assets. In
terms of shareholding, the Central Bank identifies 14 banks with foreign
ownership, accounting for 32.2% of net assets in 2012. The Central Bank also
identifies 6 banks with state ownership accounting for 24.8.2% of net assets in
2012, with the government having majority ownership in three of these, which
account for 4.2% of net total assets (Consolidated Bank; Development Bank of
Kenya; and the National Bank of Kenya) 5. The remaining 23 are local private

5
The other three banks are CFC Stanbic, Housing Finance; and Kenya Commercial Bank.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 9

banks, accounting for 43.0% of the banking sector’s net assets. Hence Kenya’s
banking system is dominated by local private banks and foreign banks.

We therefore study the relative performance of the 14 foreign banks and the 6
banks with state ownership versus the local private banks in the country.
Specifically, this section addresses the following research issues:

 How well have foreign banks and banks with state ownership
performed, for example, in terms of financial indicators, such as
ROAs, NPLs, etc, but also in terms of economic indicators, such as
providing access to credit to SMEs, as well as other parts of the private
sector?
 What are the key challenges of regulating Kenya banks in other
countries? Foreign banks in Kenya are treated symmetrically with the
other banks in the country.
Oloo (2013) proposes a number of indicators to identify the different strengths and
weaknesses of Kenyan banks and provides data on individual banks, which we
aggregate into the various ownership components, weighted by the value of assets
in 2012. These include the rates of return on assets and capital; cost of funds,
efficiency ratio and the ratio of non-performing loans (see Table 2).

Table 2: The performance of commercial banks in Kenya by

ownership

Foreign banks Banks with state- Banks with majority state Local private All banks
ownership ownership banks

Return on assets, %6
2009 3.6 2.8 3.7 3.8 3.6
2010 4.7 3.7 4.2 4.8 4.6
2011 4.7 4.1 3.1 4.8 4.7
2012 5.2 4.1 1.4 4.8 4.9
Return on capital, %7
2009 36.7 30.0 27.2 30.3 32.3
2010 46.1 23.4 30.8 46.6 40.7
2011 50.6 44.9 27.6 50.4 49.1
2012 51.9 38.0 12.7 50.9 48.0
8
Average cost of funds, %
2009 3.0 2.7 3.5 4.0 3.4
2010 2.2 2.1 2.9 3.4 2.7
2011 2.5 2.3 3.8 3.8 3.0
2012 4.9 5.3 7.6 7.0 6.0

6
Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of profits before tax to average total assets (at beginning and end of the year).
A higher ratio is desirable.
7
Return on capital (ROC) is measured as the return to the average core capital (at the beginning and end of the
year). A higher ratio is desirable.

8
The ability of a bank to acquire external funding cheaply to boost its investments is a critical measure. There are
two main sources of funds for the bank: (a) deposits from customers; and (b) borrowed funds. This ratio therefore
is a measure of how cheaply, or expensively these funds have been acquired: it reflects the ease with which a bank
is able to secure such funds. A lower rate is desirable.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 10

 Efficiency ratio, %9
2009 53.1 66.4 64.4 58.8 60.0
2010 47.1 61.4 58.0 51.6 53.6
2011 45.8 56.8 63.1 51.6 52.0
2012 50.7 57.0 74.8 52.0 53.9
10
Non-performing loans to advances ratio, %
2009 4.5 9.7 10.1 6.4 6.7
2010 3.6 6.4 6.6 5.1 5.0
2011 2.7 4.4 6.5 3.7 3.6
2012 2.4 5.2 8.8 3.6 3.7
The foreign banks have done as well as local private banks with both having an
average rate of return on assets of 4.6% over 2009-2012, ahead of banks with state
ownership (3.7%) and state-owned banks (3.1%). The poor performance of the
latter is attributed to poor legacy in the past of poor governance and massive
interference by the state in their management.

The same pattern is repeated in the other indicators. Foreign banks have on average
done slightly better on the rate of return on core capital (46.3%) over 2009-2012
when compared to local private banks (44.6%), ahead of banks with state
ownership (34.1% and 24.6%, respectively). They also have the lowest cost of
funds (index of 3.2%) together with banks with state ownership (index of 3.1% and
4.5%, respectively) and local private banks (index 4.6%). Foreign banks are also
the most efficient (with an average score of 49.1%) slightly ahead of local private
banks (score of 53.5%), with banks with state ownership the least efficient (scores
of 60.4% and 65.1%, respectively). Finally, foreign banks have the least non-
performing loans ratio (average 3.3% over 2009-2012), followed by local private
banks (4.7%) and banks with state ownership (6.4% and 8.0%, respectively).

It is therefore apparent that foreign banks largely behave like local private banks,
except that they have cheaper sources of finance due to their reputation capital.
They are also very diverse so that it is difficult to generalize their behavior. They
include for example (i) the traditional multinational banks from Europe and USA
(Barclays, Citibank, Habib A.Z. Zurich and Standard)11; (ii) banks from Asia and
the Middle East (Bank of Baroda, Bank of India, Gulf African Bank, Habib Bank
and Diamond Trust Bank, the last two from Pakistan and owned by the Aga Khan
Fund for Economic Development); (iii) pan-African banks (Bank of Africa, United
Bank of Africa; and Ecobank); and (iv) Islamic banks (First Community Bank
licensed in 2007 with some shareholding from Tanzania and Gulf African Bank
licensed in 2008). K-Rep Bank was incorporated as a commercial bank in 1999,
from microfinance NGO and has largely maintained the microfinance banking
model.

According to World Bank (2013), most foreign banks have dedicated units serving
SMEs. There are however a few exceptions such as Citibank and, to a less extent,
Standard that focus on corporate and high-end clients, and hence do not lend to
SMEs. Oloo (2013) simulates the cost of provision of banking services to SMEs
from customers’ perspective. In the first scenario, he considers a small business

9
The efficiency ratio is measured by taking the total operating expenses, which include the bank’s overheads and
weighting them against the total operating income. A lower ratio is desirable.
10
Non-performing loans is the single most important threat that a bank can face. To assess its magnitude, it is
weighted against the total portfolio of all loans and advances that the bank has extended. A high ratio is a reflection
of imprudent lending practice and poor credit management. A low ratio is therefore desirable.

11
Barclays and Standard have been in the country for more than 90 years.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 11

firm, with a turnover of about US$ 60,000 (at the exchange rate on Ksh 84.5 per US
dollar in 2012). He assumes the annual cost of opening and maintaining a business
current account to require 6 50-leaf cheque books, 48 customer withdraws, 48
bankers cheques, 24 standing orders, charges for 600 transactions and 12 ledger
fees. In the second scenario, he considers a medium-sized business enterprise with
a turnover of about US $ 6 million per year. He assumes the annual cost of opening
and maintaining a business current account requires 12 50-leaf cheque books, 96
customers withdraws, 96 bankers cheques, 96 standing orders, charges for 6,000
transactions and 12 ledger fees.

He derives the following total costs of operating the accounts by type of bank
ownership. The results show that local private banks have the lowest costs to
SMEs, followed by foreign banks and then banks with state ownership.

Table 3: Simulated cost of banking services to SMES

Small firm, US$ Medium-sized firm, US$

Foreign banks 795.5 1751.0

Banks with state ownership 825.3 1902.0

Banks with majority state ownership 800.6 1835.5

Local private banks 733.0 1667.7

3.2 Challenges of Regulating Kenya banks in other countries

In Kenya, some banks have expanded their branch networks in the region. By
December 2012, Kenyan banks had established 282 branches in neighbouring
countries (Uganda 125, Tanzania 70, Rwanda 51, Burundi 5, and South Sudan 31).
Such banks pose an increasing challenge for regulators across Africa (Beck 2013).
Financial integration implies that the negative externality costs of bank failure go
beyond national borders that are not taken into account by national regulators and
supervisors. Close cooperation that can help internalize these cross-border
externalities, although the institutional extent of such cooperation should be a
function of the strength of externalities but also the heterogeneity of countries’
legal and regulatory frameworks.

Central banks in Eastern African countries have, for example, signed a

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to facilitate information sharing and
supervisory co-operation for regional banking groups. The CBK has developed and
implemented a consolidated supervision program for the effective oversight of
banking groups. As part of efforts aimed at implementing consolidated supervision,
it launched Prudential Guidelines on Consolidated Supervision and convened two
Supervisory College meetings in 2012 and 2013 bringing together all Central
Banks of the East African countries where Kenyan banks currently have operations.
The introduction of guidelines on Country and Transfer Risk, Risk-based
Supervision and Consolidated Supervision is timely given the increasing cross
border risks faced by the Kenyan banks as they expand regionally” 12. The East
African Central Banks are also currently working to harmonise their banking sector
supervisory rules and practices as a prerequisite for the envisaged East African
Monetary Union (EAMU). The recently established Committee of African Bank
12
Interview with CBK Governor in Oloo (2013).

Financial regulation in Kenya: 12

Supervisors as part of the African Association of Central Banks can give this
cooperation further impetus, by enabling informal exchange of information and
experiences and networking possibilities (Beck 2013).

Two issues appear critical in this increasing regulatory cooperation (Beck 2013).
First, based on the experience of European countries, there should be a focus on
proper preparation for resolution. Non-binding MOUs and Colleges of Supervisors
limited to information exchange are of limited use in times of bank failure. Second,
it is important not to ignore development benefits of foreign banks when
considering them as potential source of fragility. Financial stability is not an
objective in itself, but rather a necessary condition for sustainable financial
deepening, with the main goals of economic development and poverty alleviation.

3.3 3.4: Development Finance Institutions13

It has long known that commercial banks will under-supply long-term finance, and
under-serve key sectors, such as agriculture or small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), and that these ‘market failures’ are more acute in LICs (Spratt 2013).
Although DFIs are an obvious solution, they were widely seen as inefficient,
ineffective and corrupt so that the ‘cure’ was thought worse than the ‘disease’. This
perception has shifted significantly since the recent financial crisis, where some
countries with significant DFIs saw them fill the gap left by the commercial banks.
The success of DFIs in countries as diverse as Brazil, South Africa and Germany
has shown it is possible to avoid many pitfalls.

Is there a need for a greater role for DFIs in Kenya, to cover gaps in financing in
key sectors, essential for inclusive growth, as in Asia (Hosono 2013)? What are
experiences of DFIs in Kenya? How can good DFIs be expanded /created, taking
into account issues of incentives and governance?

There is no doubt that DFIs in Kenya could play a significant role in the financial
sector by providing long-term finance (CBK 2013). Targeted interventions for
specific sectors or groups like SMEs, youth, women, and so on would best be
served by DFIs. This is recognized under Vision 2030, where DFIs are expected to
contribute towards enhanced financial access and investment goals. For DFIs to
play this role and fulfill market expectations, they require enhanced capacity with
clear ground rules and enhanced finance allocation. In Kenya, DFIs are under the
purview of the National Treasury. But the sector remains small. The five existing
DFIs account for less that 1% of the assets of the banking sector and had lent only
Ksh.6.8 billion (approximately USD80.73 million) as of June 2012 when compared
to Ksh 1,224.11 billion (approximately USD 14.53 billion) of credit to the private
sector from the county’s banking sector (CBK 2013). Hence these DFIs supplied
only about 0.56% of the banking sector credit to the private sector.

According to CBK (2013), some Kenyan DFIs converted to commercial banks in

the1990s (e.g. DFCK to DBK Ltd) in order to mobilize deposits. But the journey
was not smooth due to their inability to comply with the prudential. As a result,
they experienced high non-performing loans and high concentration risk due to
dependence on a few borrowers. The DFIs-turned-banks non-compliance with the
prudential requirements could have mainly been driven by the conflict of their
primary mandate of long term lending and the banking regulatory framework which
is applicable to all banks irrespective of their circumstances. They were therefore
unsuccessful in mobilizing long term local deposits to match their assets profile.

13
The five existing DFIs service industry and commerce (IDB Capital, Kenya Industrial Estates and Industrial and
Commercial Development Corporation); agriculture (Agricultural Finance Corporation); and tourism (Kenya
Tourist Development Corporation).

Financial regulation in Kenya: 13

The failure of DFIs to customize their policies and practices towards commercial
bank orientation was compounded by weak corporate governance structures arising
from operating for a long period without prudential guidelines.

According to a Presidential Task Force on Parastatals Reform (2013), the role of

DFIs has atrophied since the mid-1980s which the Task Force attributes to DFIs
inability to respond successfully to the change to a liberal policy regime in the
1980s and 1990s; narrow credit focus and limited sources of financing from donors
and government; as well as poor governance in part due to state interference,
coupled with ineffective management and low staff morale. The Task Force
therefore advocates consolidating DFIs under a Kenya Development Bank (KDB)
with sufficient scale, scope and resources to place a catalytic role in Kenya’s
economic development by providing long-term finance and other financial and
advisory, investment and advisory services. CBK (2013) as well calls for
introduction of prudential regulation and supervision consistent with their mandate
(for example the AADFI standards of the Association of African DFIs) as done in
several countries including Tanzania, Nigeria, China, Swaziland and Korea which
already regulate and supervise DFIs. As a result, Kenya would only customize the
regulatory and supervisory frameworks to local circumstances. An effective
regulatory and supervisory framework should adequately address the potential risks
faced by DFIs by tailoring them to suit their unique features, especially the tradeoff
between the focus on economic development orientation and long term structure of
assets. Regulation and supervision must also continuously evolve to keep pace with
innovations.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 14

4 Financial inclusion in
Kenya

4.1 Trends and patterns of financial inclusion

The envisaged targets of the financial sector under Vision 2030 included enhancing
financial inclusion by decreasing the share of population without access to financial
services by about 20%. Financial inclusion in Kenya has been monitored through
financial access surveys of which three so far have been conducted: in 2006, 2009
and 2013. These surveys reveal that Kenya’s financial inclusion landscape has
undergone considerable change. The proportion of the adult population using
different forms of formal financial services has increased from 27.4% in 2006, to
41.3% in 2009 and stood at 66.7% in 2013, amongst the highest in Africa
(Table 4)14. In addition, the proportion of those accessing informal financial
services has declined substantially from 33.3% in 2006 to 27.2% in 2009 and to
only 7.8% in 201315. Overall, the proportion of the adult population totally excluded
from financial services has declined from 39.3% in 2006 to 31.4% in 2009 and to
25.4% in 2013. With a decline of 35% between 2006 and 2013, this has
substantially exceeded Vision 2030’s expectations.

Table 4: Financial inclusion and exclusion in Kenya, %

2006 2009 2013

Formal 27.4 41.3 66.7

Informal 33.3 27.2 7.8

Excluded 39.3 31.4 25.4

Source: Financial Sector Deepening Kenya (2013)

The last half decade has therefore seen a massive increase in access to financial
services in the country. Deposit accounts have, for example, increased from about 2
million to 18 million while loan accounts have increased from 1 to 3 million since
200716. This is reflected in Table 5 which shows a substantial increase in the use of
bank services, from 13.5% in 2006, to 17.1% in 2009 and to 29.2% in 2013.
However, the most dramatic increase is usage of mobile money services from
virtually 0% in 2006 to 28.4% in 2009 to 61.6% in 2013. The rapid growth of

14
Formal financial institutions are defined broadly to include commercial banks, deposit-taking microfinance
institutions (DTMs), foreign exchange bureau, capital markets, insurance providers, deposit-taking SACCOs
(DTSs), mobile phone financial service providers (MFSP), Postbank, NSSF, NHIF, credit-only MFIs, credit-only
SACCOS, hire purchase companies and the government.

15
The informal financial sector includes informal groups, shopkeepers and merchants, employers, and money
lenders who are all unregulated under structured law provisions.
16
Interview with the Governor, Central Bank of Kenya. EastAfrican, August 24-30, 2013.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 15

mobile money banking services shows its ability to overcome problems of physical
access and high relative costs (Spratt 2013). Mobile banking has introduced
alternative channels at financial service provision to conventional banking and has
provided clear, quick and convenient platforms to conduct a range of financial
transactions. The adoption of mobile money service M-PESA in 2007 far exceeded
expectations. Currently, the four mobile money services (M-PESA, Airtel Money,
YuCash and Orange Money) have close to 20 million customers, handling over
US$ 54.4 million worth of transactions per day. M-PESA however remains
dominant with 82% of market share, Airtel Money 15%, YuCash 2% and Orange
Money 1%.

Table 5: Overall Use of financial services, %

Usage of: 2006 2009 2013

Banks 13.5 17.1 29.2

SACCOs 13.5 9.3 9.1

Microfinance 1.8 3.5 3.5

institutions

Informal groups 39.1 29.5 27.7

Mobile money 0.0 28.4 61.6

financial services
Source: ibid.

Financial inclusion has varied with the socio-economic statues of the population.
According to FSDK (2013), financial exclusion in 2013 varied from 55.3% for the
poorest 20% of the population to 5.7% for the wealthiest 20% of the population. As
well, financial exclusion was highest for those without any education (60.7%) and
lowest for those with tertiary education (1.8%). Table 6 shows that women use of
formal financial services has lagged behind that of men, but the gap substantially
reduced between 2009 and 2013, while exclusive use of informal financial services
have declined for both men and women. Similarly, Table 7 show that rural areas
have lagged behind urban areas in access to financial services

Table 6: Financial inclusion in Kenya by gender

2006 2009 2013

Male Female Male Female Male Female

Formal 34.3 21.0 49.3 34.4 71.1 62.7

financial
institutions

Informal 27.0 39.2 19.8 33.9 4.7 10.8

Excluded 38.7 39.8 31.0 31.8 24.2 26.6

Source: ibid.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 16

Table 7: Financial inclusion in Kenya by location

2006 2009 2013

Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban

Formal 24.6 35.7 35.5 63.1 59.6 80

financial
institutions

Informal 37.0 22.2 30.0 16.8 9.8 4.4

Excluded 38.4 42.0 34.5 20.1 30.6 15.6

Source: ibid.

On use of financial services by business owners, 36.8% used banks; 4.2%

SACCOs, 7.8% microfinance institutions, 33.5% informal groups and 72.6%
mobile money financial services, exhibiting the same pattern as for the wider
population.

4.2 Is regulation of M-PESA and other mobile money platforms

adequate?

The success of M-PESA in Kenya is often used to argue for a light-touch approach,
where mobile banking was allowed to flourish (Spratt 2013). Possible systemic and
individual users’ risks seem to require careful evaluation, however. It is clearly
important to enable, rather than stifle, innovation but it is also clear that regulation
should be comprehensive in the longer term. How to strike the right balance here is
an important area of research.

In responding to this question, the CBK admits that the technology used to deliver
the mobile money services carries inherent threats, the main ones being operational
risk, financial fraud and money laundering 17. However, prior to the launch of
mobile banking services by the various companies, the CBK requires them to
provide a detailed risk assessment, outlining all potential risks and satisfactory
mitigating measures they have put in place. In the case of M-PESA, Safaricom
sought authorization from CBK to undertake the money transfer business. In
evaluating the proposal, the CBK considered the request on the basis of safety,
reliability and efficiency of the service. In addition, precautionary measures were
put in place to ensure that the service did not infringe upon the banking services
regulatory framework as provided for in the Banking Act. Following the enactment
of the National Payments System Act in 2011, the CBK now has the oversight
mandate of the National Payments System. All payment service providers including
mobile phone service providers offering money transfer services fall under the
CBK’s regulatory framework18.

The Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) has however complained that the Mobile
Network Operators (MNOs) offer services similar to those offered by banks, yet

17
Interview with the CBK Governor in Oloo (2013). This section draws on this interview.
18
According to the December 2013 Monetary Policy Statement, “The CBK will continue to support development
of new products and innovations towards enhancing financial access in order to encourage economic growth. In
this regard it will continue to propose suitable legislation aimed at ensuring that such innovations are regulated
accordingly to enhance market confidence. The Bank will also continue to monitor any new financial derivatives
and /or innovations in the market that could have adverse effects on market stability”.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 17

they are not subject to similar regulations19. KBA argues that there is a blurred line
between what constitutes taking deposits from customers as done by MNOs and
taking deposits for savings as done by banks. The e-float for example which is kept
in special accounts in banks by MNOs is not subject to banking regulations such as
subjecting them to deposit insurance, undermining the security of such deposits in
case of a bank failure or financial crisis. The response by MNOs is that the
possibility of such risks making a huge impact on clients is very rare as the e-float
is relatively small, and it is distributed across several banks.

4.3 Financial inclusion (innovations) and macroeconomic

stability in Kenya

Increased financial inclusion through financial innovations does not seem to have
compromised financial stability. First, the stock of e-money is backed 100% by
accounts held at commercial banks. The mobile money e-float is also a small
proportion of the other monetary aggregates in terms of size for it to matter much
for monetary policy. Weil et al. (2011) estimate the outstanding stock of M-PESA
e-float at 1.6% of M0 and 0.4% of M1.
Second, while there has been increased instability in monetary relationships post-
2007, reflected in a decline in the income velocity of circulation and an increase in
the money multiplier undermining the conduct of monetary policy which assumes
stable monetary relationships, stability seems to have been re-established since
2010. The instability was therefore a temporary phenomenon. Velocity which is the
ratio of nominal GDP to money supply (M3X) declined significantly from a
monthly average of 2.50 in 2006 to 2.09 in 2010 and stabilized at that level
thereafter. Similarly, the money multiplier increased from a monthly average of
5.49 in 2006 to 5.96 in 2010 and stabilized at that level. The demand for money
also shows stability post-2010 (Weil et al. 2011).

Figure 5: The money multiplier and income velocity in Kenya,

December 2005 to December 2013

7.6 2.6

7.2 2.5

6.8 2.4

6.4 2.3

6.0 2.2

5.6 2.1

5.2 2.0

4.8 1.9
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

MONEY MULTIPLIER INCOME VELOCITY

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

19
See the Daily Nation, January 26, 2014, ‘Banks revive battle with money service providers’

Financial regulation in Kenya: 18

5 Access and cost of
credit in Kenya

5.1 Introduction

This section looks at access to finance, where the key problem is how to provide
financial access that is both affordable and suited to the needs of poor people
(Spratt 2013). On this, the costs of providing basic banking services are often
prohibitive, and credit is either unavailable or too expensive. The reasons are well
understood: providing physical access in rural areas is inherently expensive, and
providing financial services for people with few financial resources entails high
relative costs; a lack of credit history and collateral is a key constraint on extending
credit, and small loan sizes also mean high transaction costs. Extending financial
access thus tends to be unattractive for banks in LICs. Although microfinance
institutions (MFIs) have partially filled this gap, their record is mixed.
Kenya’s financial sector has undergone reforms since the late 1980s aimed at
achieving (i) stability so as to ensure that banks and other financial institutions
taking deposits can safely handle the public’s savings and ensure that the chances
of a financial crisis are kept to a minimum; (ii) efficiency in the delivery of credit
and other financial services to ensure that the costs of services become increasingly
affordable and that the range and quality of services better caters to the needs of
both savers and investing businesses; and (iii) improved access to financial
services and products for a much larger number of Kenyan households (Nyaoma
2006). The country formally adopted financial sector forms in 1989, supported by a
$170 million World Bank adjustment credit. Financial reform proposals were first
incorporated in the 1986–90 structural adjustment program. The main features of
the program included: (i) interest rate liberalization which was achieved in July
1991; (ii) liberalization of the treasury bills market in November 1990 which was
accompanied by introduction of the treasury bonds of long-term maturities - one,
two and five-year maturities; (iii) setting up a Capital Markets Authority in 1989 to
oversee the development of the equities market; (iv) abolition of credit guidelines
in December 1993 (which were in existence since 1975 in favour of agriculture);
and (v) improving and rationalizing the operations and finances of the DFIs.

Financial sector reforms have undoubtedly strengthened Kenya’s banking sector in

the last decade or so, in terms of product offerings and service quality, stability and
profitability (Kamau 2009). Major indices show an improvement, including: (a) the
capital adequacy ratio; (b) rates of return on assets (ROA); (c) non-performing
loans; (d) growth and composition of credit to the private sector; and (e)
composition of banks assets and liabilities20.

20
Assets of the banking system in Kenya are dominated by loans and advances, government securities and cash
reserves at CBK. Kenya commercial banks hold minimal derivatives or asset-based securities in their portfolios.
They mainly hold risk-free government securities.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 19

5.2 Banks lending to SMEs in Kenya

The World Bank (2013) devotes itself to this issue. The report notes that although
retail banking has improved markedly in Kenya in the last decade, access to credit
for SMEs is still limited, with SMEs accounting for about 90% of all enterprises in
the country, according to the Kenya Private Sector Development Strategy 2006-10.
SMEs are provided with financial services by a range of institutions, including
banks, non-bank financial institutions, savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs),
and microfinance institutions. The report cites an analysis of firms that made it to
the 2013 Top 100 mid-sized companies’ survey that showed that the number of
SMEs that turned to lenders for credit lines and overdrafts increased to 67%
compared to 57% in 2012. Most of the surveyed entrepreneurs cited the high cost of
credit as the reason for cash flow challenges they face, leaving them with no
recourse but to dig deeper into their personal savings or turn to family friends to
raise funds for day to day operations.

The report notes there is some evidence that Kenyan banks are actually ahead of
their counterparts in Nigeria and South Africa in lending to SMEs. From field
surveys, about 17.4% of total bank lending goes to SMEs in Kenya, compared to
only 5% in Nigeria, and 8% in South Africa. Kenya’s ratio is comparable to that of
Rwanda, which is a smaller market with a relatively small presence of large-scale
firms (Aziz and Berg 2012). These numbers are supported by the innovations in the
banking sector that suggest a strong appetite for SME lending.

According to a survey reported in the World Bank (2013), involvement of Kenyan

banks in the SME segment is growing, both in terms of size and the diversity of
their approaches to the SME client relationship. This has been driven by
innovations specifically targeting this market. These innovations started through
microfinance-rooted institutions scaling up to becoming commercial banks and now
include innovations with lending models and technology in the retail banking
segment by other institutions, most notably Equity Bank. In addition, in Kenya
there are active markets for hire-purchase and invoice-discounting mainly provided
by banks to SMEs which deliver to government and larger enterprises with
reputable payment histories. Adoption of these instruments has facilitated entry by
some mid-sized Kenyan banks into the SME financing.
According to this survey, Kenyan banks tend to provide more working capital than
investment loans. Demand factors play a role with Kenyan firms citing working
capital shortages as the primary reason for approaching banks. The distribution of
loans may also reflect an assessment by banks that long-term loans are too risky.
According to the banks interviewed, on average it takes 190 days to recover bad
loans in Kenya, with a rate of recovery of about 80%; the cost is about 40% of the
amount of the loan. The situation seems somewhat better in Rwanda, where on
average it takes 135 days to recover loans, the rate of recovery is about 85%, and
the cost is about 10% of the loan. Nigerian banks operate in the most difficult
environment: on average they need 246 days to recover a loan and are able to
recover on 30% of the loan.
According to the World Bank (2013), most Kenyan banks have dedicated units
serving SMEs. At most institutions, however, the unit is a subunit of the retail
banking unit rather than a division. Products are largely standardized, although the
number of banks such as Equity Bank, Cooperative Bank and K-Rep Bank are
producing customized loan products for the SME sector. Some banks provide
training to their clients to improve their management skills and financial reporting.
Lending remains based on collateral. Risk management is increasingly automated,

Financial regulation in Kenya: 20

although domestically owned banks have not yet embraced the use of scoring and
risk-rating technologies on a large scale.

The report notes that banks prefer to engage with formal firms rather than with
informal or semi-informal firms. As part of the loan application, they require SMEs
to provide a variety of documents certifying their compliance with government
regulations and providing details about their finances. The most common
documents required include the registration certificate from the Business Registrar
(Attorney General’s Office); the Single Business Permit, obtained from the City
Councils: and sometimes the certificate of compliance from the Kenya Revenue
Authority. These filing requirements are quite onerous and often discourage SMEs
from seeking bank financing.

According to World Bank (2013), donors have been encouraging banks to engage
in SME financing, providing bank-specific lines of credit and partial credit
guarantees. Donors prefer this bank-specific approach to establishing schemes that
are open to all qualified institutions, although a more open approach would be
better suited to encouraging competition. In markets where SME financing is in its
infancy, schemes can augment banks’ willingness to push the frontier and
demonstrate that lending to SMEs can be a viable and profitable business line.
U5AID reportedly operates the largest credit guarantee scheme in Kenya, a US$70
million program. ARIZ, a risk-sharing program funded by the African
Development Bank, guarantees 50% of all loans in the portfolio. Other donors that
are encouraging lending to SMEs include the European Investment Bank, Proparco,
FMO, DEG, SIDA, KfW, Norlund, and the China Development Bank.

On policy, the report recommends that tapping the full growth and job-creating
potential of the SME sector will entail a move towards providing growth capital
and not just working capital. A growing number of private equity providers are
active in East Africa in general and in Kenya in particular. Most of them are not
interested in SMEs. A number of new entrants cite lack of information and
expertise as a deterrent to venturing into this market. Technical assistance could
help bridge the distance between the demand for and the supply of private equity.

Improving the listability of SMEs as well could increase their access to equity
finance. Kenyan SMEs have shown some interest in tapping equity financing to
grow, by turning to the growing number of private equity funds or by issuing shares
on the stock market. In fact, about 28% of firms surveyed in the Top 100 Mid-Sized
Companies said they were considering listing on the Nairobi exchange, which now
has a special segment, the Growth Enterprise Market Segment (GEMS) for SMEs.

5.3 Cost of credit and interest rate spreads in Kenya

One of the key criticisms of the Kenyan banking sector is that the cost of credit and
the interest rate spread remains high. This has raised concerns from government,
regulators and parliament, with the latter trying severally to introduce legislation to
control them. As seen in Figure 6, the interest rate spread was fairly stable,
although gradually increasing, between January 2005 and October 2011, averaging
9.56%. It jumped to a peak of 13.05% in December 2011 following a decision by
the Central Bank of Kenya to raise the policy Central Bank Rate (CBR) from 11%
to 16.5% in November 2011 and to 18% in December 2011 where it stayed until
June 2012. As a consequence, both deposit and lending rates rose sharply as the
CBK attempted to control inflation and stem currency depreciation. As seen in the
figure, the increase in the spread was because banks raised the lending rate more
than the deposit rate. The spread subsequently gradually decreased as the central

Financial regulation in Kenya: 21

bank has relaxed monetary policy, lowering the CBR from 18% to 9.5% during
January-April 2013 and to 8.50% since May 2013.

At an average of 10.02% over 2005-13, the interest rate spread has therefore
remained high despite improved economic conditions in the country. According to
the critics of commercial banks, there have been many developments that have
taken place in the country that should have significantly reduced the spread (Oloo
2013). These include (i) improvements in technology (ATMs, mobile phones, etc)
that have reduced the cost of doing business, and the need for human resource
requirements; (ii) agency banking, with 16,000 agents that are now available to
banks at nominal cost; and (iii) introduction of credit reference bureau to reduce
information asymmetries and risk. As well, the opening of Currency Centres across
the country has reduced costs associated with transporting cash for the banks.

The spread between the lending rate and the risk free 91-days Treasury bill rate is
also high and more volatile at an average of 7.43% over 2005-13 (Figure 7). This
spread can be taken as a measure of the risk premium faced by banks. It captures
perceived risk by lenders of borrowers’ ability to pay; as well as inefficiency in the
banking system. It has however declined since the mid-2011 denoting a decline in
the risk premium. The collapse of the 91-days TBR in 2005 was due to a reduction
of the required cash ratio from 10% to 6% in 2003 which injected a lot of liquidity
into the economy, drastically lowing interest rates.

Table 8 compares interest rate spreads in Kenya vis a vis a few selected comparator
countries over 2000-2012. The spreads are on average relatively higher in Kenya
than in Malaysia, Botswana, South Africa, Nigeria and Tanzania. They are only on
average higher in Uganda. The high spread in Kenya may reflect the comparably
higher lending by Kenyan banks to SMEs that are perceived to have a higher risk
premium.

Alongside high lending interest rates and wide spreads, the banking sector profits
have increased over time. Profits before tax increased from about US$ 70 million in
2002 to US$ 1,256 million in 2012, an average growth rate of 38.7%. The major
sources of income were interest on loans and advances (average of 49.6% of total
income during the period) which increased over time reflecting an increase in the
spread; and fees and commissions (14.6%), and government securities (19.8%)
which declined during the period (Figure 8). As also seen earlier in Table 2, the
banking sector experienced a general improvement in performance indices over
2009-2012, although there were some setbacks in 2012 with respect to the average
return in core capital, average cost of funds, the efficiency ratio and non-
performing loans ratio due to an adverse macroeconomic environment in late-2011.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 22

Figure 6: The interest rates spread in Kenya (ex post lending
minus deposit rate)

24

20

16

12

0
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13

LENDING_RATE
DEPOSIT_RATE
SPREAD

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Figure 7: The interest rates spread in Kenya (ex post lending

rates minus the 91 days TBR)

24

20

16

12

-4
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13

LENDING_RATE
TBR_91_DAYS
SPREAD2

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Table 8: Comparative Analysis of Commercial Banks’ Ex Post

Spreads in Kenya and Selected Countries (%)

Year Malaysia Botswana South Nigeria Kenya Tanzania Uganda

Africa

2000 4.31 6.06 5.30 9.58 14.24 14.19 13.08

2001 3.75 5.66 4.40 8.18 13.03 15.25 14.19

2002 3.32 5.75 4.98 8.10 12.97 13.11 13.53

2003 3.23 6.45 5.20 6.50 12.44 11.47 9.09

Financial regulation in Kenya: 23

2004 3.05 5.90 4.74 5.48 10.10 9.94 12.86

2005 2.95 6.48 4.58 7.42 7.80 10.52 10.85

2006 3.34 7.59 4.03 7.16 8.50 8.93 9.61

2007 3.24 7.60 4.01 6.65 8.18 7.39 9.84

2008 2.95 7.87 3.51 3.51 8.71 6.73 9.78

2009 3.00 6.29 3.17 5.07 8.84 7.06 11.20

2010 2.50 5.86 3.37 11.06 9.81 7.98 12.49

2011 2.00 5.85 3.33 10.32 9.42 8.18 8.81

2012 1.81 7.39 3.31 8.39 8.15 5.95 10.08

Average 3.04 6.52 4.15 7.49 10.17 9.75 11.19

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

The persistently high spreads and growing profitability of the industry have left it
open to repeated criticisms of collusive price-setting behaviour (World Bank 2013,
Oloo 2013). In the popular press and elsewhere, Kenyan banks have repeatedly
been portrayed as using their market power to extract high interest rates from
businesses, especially SMEs. The larger banks have been particularly subject to this
criticism, based on the perception that they use their reputational advantage to
charge higher rates on loans and advances, while not having to pay high interest
rates to attract deposits. This perception of high spreads at big banks is reinforced
by data showing them to be the most profitable segment of the industry. The
competition Commission has launched an investigation into the price-setting
behaviour of commercial banks, based largely on the concerns of consumers
regarding interest rate spreads.

Figure 8: The Performance of the banking Sector, 2002-2012

1,400 80

1,200 70

1,000 60

800 50

600 40

400 30

200 20

0 10
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12

PROFITS, US$M
INTEREST ON LOANS AS % OF INCOME
INTEREST ON GOV'T SECURITIES AS % OF INCOME
NET FEES & COMMISSIONS AS % of INCOME

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

There have been several studies of interest rate spreads in Kenya (Abdul et al.
2013, Were and Wambua 2013, World Bank 2013). The World Bank (2013)
provides a good summary of these studies, first noting that that, while no hard rules
prescribe the optimal interest spreads that correspond to specific market conditions,
market lending rates are typically a mark-up over the risk-free (government paper)
interest rate, the magnitude of the mark-up depending on a host of factors,

Financial regulation in Kenya: 24

including industry structure, tenor, overhead costs, and risk. Determining this mark-
up when information markets are incomplete is especially challenging.

According to the Kenya Bankers Association (Oloo 2013), interest rate spreads
reflect the macroeconomic, regulatory and institutional environment under which
banks operate such that the determinants of the spread are in four categories:
macroeconomic factors and the state of financial sector development; industry-
specific factors; and bank-specific factors. We discuss these factors below.
(a)Macroeconomic environment. The size of the spread will depend on the
macroeconomic environment and the country’s monetary policy stance. There is a
high correlation between the spread and the CBR. The Central Bank of Kenya, for
example, raised the benchmark interest rate by nearly 300% (from 6.25% to 18%)
in less than three months in late-2011. As a result, banks raised their lending and
deposit rates. After August 2012, when the central bank started to lower the policy
rate as inflation moderated, bank lending rates were not as responsive. Although
banks did eventually lower their lending rates, the interest rate spread remained
high. According to the Kenya Bankers Association (Oloo 2013), the banks best
interests are served when interest rates remain low and stable, arising from a stable
macroeconomic environment. Further, a low interest rate regime has a direct
relationship with the quality of the banks' loan books, with expectations that non-
performing loans will increase in a regime of high interest rates.

(b) Financial sector development. Cross-country studies show large interest

spreads are associated with low levels of financial sector development. In general,
spreads in East Asia and Pacific are lower than in Sub-Saharan Africa. And within
Sub-Saharan Africa, the most advanced market (South Africa) exhibits small
spread. As the financial sector grows, spreads narrow. The spreads in Low Income
Countries (LICs) averaged 11.4% compared to 7.4% in Middle Income Countries
(MICs) over 1990-2012 (Figure 9). Compared to the 1990s, spreads have also
declined in Kenya.

Figure 9: Spreads in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries

16

14

12

10

4
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12

LIC MIC

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator. Missing LIC spreads were extrapolated.

(c) Industry-specific factors especially overhead costs. Kenya banks justify the high
spreads as due to the difficult business environment they operate in (Oloo 2013).
The main argument is that dispute resolutions take too long and is costly; while
national infrastructure services (e.g. electricity) are expensive and unreliable. They
also cite the high cost of attracting, training and maintaining human resources.
Salaries and other forms of labour compensation make up a large part of their

Financial regulation in Kenya: 25

overhead, as the scarcity of skilled financial sector workers leads to high turnover
and compensation packages geared to retain scarce skills (World Bank 2013). Most
banks estimate that salaries make up 50% of their overhead cost despite the fact tact
that Kenya has a fairly well-developed pool of banking skills. Nevertheless, the
largest portion of spreads is explained by profits in recent times (Table 9).

Table 9: Ex post Spread Decomposition in Kenya, %

2009 2010 2011 2012

Profit 41.6 47.6 51.4 47.9

Bad loans provisions 7.9 8.6 3.6 4.3

Overhead costs 44.6 38.1 38.7 40.2

Reserves 5.9 5.7 6.3 7.7

Total 100 100 100 100

Source: World Bank (2013)

As seen in Table 9, overhead costs do play an important role in explaining the

spreads in recent years in Kenya. Overhead costs have actually been going up since
the macroeconomic disruptions in 2011. Given the large share of salaries in the
overhead costs of the banking sector, increasing the supply of skilled labor to this
sector should be a priority (World Bank 2013).

(d) Bank-specific factors: Market structure. Large banks have higher spreads than
medium-size and small banks. The difference can be attributed to differences in the
cost of raising capital. Small and poorly capitalized banks find it more difficult to
raise funds. They have to offer higher deposit rates to attract funds and compensate
for the perception that they are riskier than large, more liquid, better-capitalized
banks, which are perceived to be “too big to fail”. Consequently, big banks are able
to mobilize more deposits even at relatively low or near zero deposit rates while at
the same time attracting large loan applications despite charging higher rates
(World Bank 2013). In Kenya, the banking sector is characterized by an
oligopolistic structure and market segmentation, in which the largest four banks
control about two-fifths of the market, partly as a result of their reputation and
customer loyalty, hence the need for increased competition and breaking the market
dominance by a few players (Mwega 2011).

(e) Bank specific factors: Lending risk premium. The difference between market
lending rates and short-term T-bill rates (Figure 7) can be interpreted as the risk
premium, and reflect the market’s perception of risk. Over and above the actual risk
perception, where information gaps on credit history or market conditions and other
deficiencies in the financial infrastructure persist, banks are likely to price these
deficiencies through a higher risk premium (World Bank 2013).

Financial regulation in Kenya: 26

6 Prudential regulations
in Kenya

In 1988, the Basel Committee issued the Basel I Accord which assesses banks
capital adequacy requirements in the context of the credit risk they face and
advocates risk-based supervision. Basel I therefore emphasized a set of minimum
capital requirements for banks in order to address credit risk. In 2004, the
Committee issued the Basel II Accord which contained further recommendations
on banking laws and regulations. The Committee attempted to accomplish this by
setting up rigorous risk and capital management requirements designed to ensure
that a bank holds capital reserves appropriate to the risk the bank exposes itself to
through its lending and investment practices. The Accord was to be implemented
from 2007 by G10 countries, with more time given to developing countries, as they
were yet to satisfy the prerequisites for the new accord. Basel II has three pillars:
Pillar I on minimum capital requirements; Pillar II on the supervisory review
process; and Pillar III on market discipline. In December 2010, the Committee
announced proposals dubbed Basel III which are currently being reviewed for
regulatory and supervisory suitability to financial systems (Kasekende et al. 2011).
These proposals include the strengthening of capital adequacy and liquidity
requirements as well as countercyclical macroprudential measures.

The CBK continues to regulate banks mainly based on Basel I but was in the
process of formulating a policy position on Basel II implementation (KPMG 2012).
New guidelines that came into force in January 2013 contain some features of Basel
II and Basel III on capital adequacy requirements (Oloo 2013). Overall, Kenya has
endeavoured to implement the Basel accords for ensuring financial stability of the
country’s financial sector. The Kenyan banking system has continued to record
compliance with the minimum capital and liquidity prudential requirements. The
prudential and financial stability indicators have shown that the financial sector is
sound (Figure 10). All the banks have in the recent past met the four minimum
capital requirements with respect to the (i) Minimum core capital of Ksh 250
million which was raised to Ksh 1 billion over 2008-12; (ii) Core Capital/Total
Deposit Liabilities ratio (Minimum 8%); (iii) Core Capital / Total Risk Weighted
Assets ratio (Minimum 8%) and Total Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets
(Minimum 12%). In addition, the NPL/Assets ratio has decreased from a high of
22.6% in 2001 to a low of 4.3% in 2007, and of December 2013 averaged 5%, an
indication that the banking systems asset quality has generally improved over time.
As well, the ROA and ROE have generally shown an upward trend since 2002.

Based on the unaudited financial statements for 2012, almost all banks had met the
enhanced minimum core capital requirement of Ksh 1 billion, according to CBK21.
However, the final capital positions of the Kenyan banks will be determined once

21
Interview with CBK Governor in Oloo (2013).

Financial regulation in Kenya: 27

the audited financial statements are submitted at the end of March 2013. This is
however a minimum threshold and several banks already hold capital way above
the minimum of Ksh 1 billion. The key determinant of capital for an institution is
the needs of the market niche it serves.

One theory is that increased capital base is important for financial sector stability
and may lead to cost reduction from economies of scale which may lead to lower
lending rates. On the other hand, a further increase the capital requirement will
only create more concentration, making the banking sector more oligopolistic.
Gudmundsson et al. (2013) conclude that capital regulation improves the
competition, performance and financial stability of Kenyan banks22.
Implementation of the CBK’s capital requirements for banks to build their core
capital can therefore be expected to enhance financial sector stability and lead to
cost reduction from economies of scale and ultimately lowering lending rates.

Figure 10: Selected prudential and financial stability indicators

for the banking sector 2011 - 2013

Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 Statutory

Requirement

Core capital to Total Risk 18.0% 18.9% 19.5% 8.0%

Weighted Assets Ratio

Total Capital to Total Risk 21.0% 21.9% 23.2% 12.0%

Weighted Assets Ratio

Core capital/Deposits 15.6% 16.3% 17.3% 8.0%

Liquidity Ratio 37.0% 41.9% 38.6% 20.0%

Gross Non-Performing 4.4% 4.5% 5.0% N/A

loans to Gross Loans Ratio

Return on Assets (ROA) 3.4% 3.8% 3.6% NA

Return on Equity (ROE) 30.3% 34.2% 28.9% NA

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

CBK has focused more on microprudential regulation which relates to factors that
affect the stability of individual banks and less so on macroprudential regulation
which relates to factors which affect the stability of the financial system as a whole.
In the latter case, changes in the business cycles may influence the performance of
banks, hence the Basel III proposal for countercyclical capital changes to provide
the way forward for future macroprudential regulation, which should take into
account the growth of credit and leverage as well as the mismatch in the maturity of
assets and liabilities. Murinde (2012) however argues that review of
macroprudential regulations should encompass the broader aspects of financial

22
They estimate the Lerner index and the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic as measures of competition and relate them
to core capital. The panel estimates show the log of core capital is positive and significant while squared log of
core capital is negative and significant. This implies that an increase in core capital reduces competition up to a
point and then increases competition so that the benefits of increasing capital requirements on competitiveness are
realized once consolidation in the banking sector takes place. They then use return on equity to capture bank
performance and stability and the estimation results confirm a positive relationship supporting the evidence that
capital regulation improves the performance of banks and financial stability.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 28

services regulation, such as depositor protection or deposit insurance and the safety
of the payments system which have received attention from CBK.

The regulatory toolkit in Kenya has also relied substantially on other variables such
as structure of banking assets and liabilities such as restrictions on banks’ large loan
concentrations and foreign exchange exposure limits (Kasekende et al. 2011). As
well, according to KPMG (2012), Kenya has a highly skilled workforce and the
banking sector is able to secure banking staff with relevant training, and finance-
related profession certification. In addition, the country has returning citizens with
international professional experience to add to an already diverse talent pool.
Capacity for implementing different regulations and supervision, such as lack of
information and insufficient staff do not seem to be a major constraint. In a group
of 11 SSA countries, Gottschalk (2013) finds Kenya to have the second largest
number of supervisors (60), largest number of supervisors with more than ten years
of experience (30) and the largest percentage of supervisors with a postgraduate
degree (80), although the number of onsite supervisors by banks in the previous
five years was comparatively low at 1.

Among other regulatory issues, Kenya has increasingly moved into universal
banking reflected in increasing share of net commissions and fees in the banks' total
income. The country now has banks that own insurance companies, others have set
up insurance agencies to push forward their concept of bank-assurance; while
others own stock brokerage firms. Hence there have been increased synergies
between the banking, insurance and securities sectors with removal of regulatory
barriers between the different segments of the financial sector. This poses
regulatory challenges as different financial sector entities are subject to different
regulatory regimes. Given the convergence and consolidation of the financial
services, some players have called for the established of an overall services
regulatory authority, as in UK (Mutuku 2008, Presidential Task Force on Parastatal
Reforms in Kenya 2013).

According to the Central Bank, the convergence of financial services is a global

phenomenon, with among its key drivers being the customer demands for a “one
stop financial services super markets” and competition. This poses regulatory
challenges as different financial sector entities are subject to different regulatory
regimes. The Central Bank has adopted a consolidated supervision approach, which
requires information sharing and coordination amongst the various regulators in the
financial sector. This is consistent with Spratt (2013) who advocates for (i) a
unified approach to supervision, with the central bank playing a dominant role; and
(ii) a comprehensive approach that should utilize the already wider ‘tool-kit’
available to regulators.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 29

7 Management of capital
flows in Kenya

7.1 Evolution of current account deficit and net capital inflows in

Kenya

Kenya has in the last decade experienced a large increase in the current account
deficit (Figure 11). The current account recorded an average deficit of 1.75% of
GDP in 2006, generally widening over the subsequent years. By 2012, the deficit
had risen to an average of 10.6% of GDP. The deficit improved in 2013 from a
peak of 11.0% of GDP in January 2013 to 8.5% of GDP in November 2013. The
improvement in current account is attributed to normalisation of the import bill
after the large amount of imports of equipment for infrastructure development and
improvement in net receipts from services. As a result, the proportion of imports of
goods and services financed by exports of goods and services increased to 62.9% in
the first half of 2013 from an average of about 61.5% in the second half of 2012.
Nonetheless, imports of machinery and other equipment continued to account for a
higher proportion of the import bill at about 27.2%. These are essential for
enhancing future productive capacity of the economy.

The high current account deficit would not be a major problem if it was financed by
long-term capital inflows such as ODA and FDI. However the deficit is mainly
financed by short-term net capital inflows, except in a few episodes when net long-
term official flows dominate (Figure 12). Short-term capital flows have typically
accounted for more than 50% of total financial flows. The easy reversibility of
these inflows increases the risk of a ‘sudden stop’ as a shift in market sentiments
creates a flight away from domestic assets (O’Connell et al. 2010).This could lead
to depletion of reserves and sharp currency depreciations. While increased capital
inflows are accompanied by a possible resurgence of growth and a marked
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, they have been accompanied by
inflationary pressures, a real exchange rate appreciation and deterioration in the
current account deficit (Maasa 2013). In Kenya net capital inflows depreciate the
real exchange rate in the short-run and long-run (Mwega 2013).

The CBK has not in the past collected information on foreign participation in the
bonds market. However a Banking Circular No. 4 of 2013 was sent to all
commercial banks on December 17, 2013, asking them to be providing monthly
information on foreign investments in government securities. Table 10, on the other
hand, shows the net foreign purchases in Kenya’s NSE as percentage of equity
turnover over January 2009-December 2013. Net purchases averaged 14.7% of
equity turnover and were negative in only a few months: January 2009 (-13%),
May 2010 (-3%), April – June 2011 (-23% to -40%), December 2011 (-23%),
February 2013 (-27%) and December 2013 (-6%).

Figure 11: 12-months cumulative current account deficit as % of

GDP, December 2005-November 2013

Financial regulation in Kenya: 30

 0

-2

-4

-6

-8

-10

-12
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Figure 12: Net capital flows to Kenya, US$ million, December

2005-November 2013

1,000

800

600

400

200

-200
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

NET_SHORT_TERM
NET_LONG_TERM_OFFICIAL
NET_LONG_TERM_PRIVATE

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Table 10: Net Foreign Purchases as % Share of Equity Turnover

in Kenya, January 2009-December 2013

60

40

20

-20

-40

-60
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Financial regulation in Kenya: 31

7.2 ODA Flows

The other sources of finance are ODA and FDI23. Mwega (2010) analyses the
evolution of foreign aid to Kenya. Kenya is not a high aid-dependent economy. At
its peak in 1989-90, net ODA inflows averaged 14.6% of the gross domestic
income, declining to a low of 2.44% in 1999. There were thereafter increased net
aid inflows which rose from 3.0% of GNI in 2002 to 7.4% of GNI in 2011 (Table
11). This was as a result of government increased borrowing to finance
development projects on infrastructure as well as increased inflows of grants to
support the government efforts in social sectors and humanitarian responses to
droughts. The increase in foreign aid therefore reflected renewed donor confidence
in the government resolve for proper management of the economy and situating
adequate government measures against graft and corruption.

Table 11: Net ODA to Kenya, 2002-2011

Indicator Name 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Net ODA (% of GNI) 3.0 3.5 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.9 4.5 5.8 5.1 7.4

Net ODA (% of central government expense) 15.7 18.6 19.7 22.3 21.3 25.0 21.0 27.8 22.6 32.3

Net ODA (% of gross capital formation) 19.7 21.3 24.2 23.0 22.8 25.5 23.3 29.1 25.6 35.3

Net ODA per capita (current US$) 11.9 15.4 19.0 21.2 25.8 35.1 35.2 44.6 39.8 59.1

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

One reaction to aid volatility has been reluctance by the government to factor in
programme aid in the budget. The government has in the recent past excluded
donor budgetary support from its annual budget strategy and beefed measures for
local resource mobilization. Consequently, the country has substantially reduced
aid-dependence, with government revenues having increased dramatically after the
December 2002 elections. In the last two decades, tax revenues have increased
both as a proportion of GDP and absolutely in US dollars terms, with acceleration
since 2002. Tax revenue as a share of GDP increased from 17.3% in 2002 to 19.9%
in 2011. In absolute terms, tax revenues almost tripled from US$ 2.27 billion in
2002 to US$ 6.69 billion in 2011.

While there have been concerns about public debt in the country, various indicators
(Table 12) shows it is sustainable in the medium-term. The table shows the country
is on the threshold with respect to the PV of the public sector debt to GDP ratio
(40%) which increases from 39.3% in 2011 to 40.3% in 2012. However, it
gradually decreases to 38.7% by 2014, and to about 25% by 2030. Given Kenya’s
historically strong revenue performance, the country remains well within the other
two indicators.

Table 12: Public Debt Sustainability in Kenya

Indicator 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 2030

PV of public 38.5 39.3 40.3 39.9 38.7 37.9 34.70 25.6
sector debt
to GDP ratio
(40)
PV of public 156.5 154.2 156.1 151.5 145.6 147.8 140.4 106.1
sector debt

23
Remittances are already incorporated in the measurement of the current account deficit.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 32

to revenue
ratio (250)
Debt service 25.5 21.9 24.5 23.5 21.6 21.5 20.0 15.5
to revenue
ratio (30)
Source: World Bank – IMF (2011)

7.3 FDI Flows

FDI has played a small (but increasing important) role in the Kenyan economy. Net
FDI flows to Kenya have not only been highly volatile, they generally declined in
the 1980s and 1990s despite the economic reforms that took place and the progress
made in improving the business environment (Mwega and Ngugi, 2004). The
investment wave of the 1980s dwindles in the 1990s as the institutions that had
protected both the economy and body politic from arbitrary interventions were
eroded (Phillips et al. 2001). The performance of FDI has improved since the
1990s and averaged US$159.4 million in 2002-07. Net FDI increased to an average
of 0.68% of GDP in this period. The data however show that the good performance
was driven by a big jump of net FDI flows to the country in 2007. The jump was
due to new investments by mobile phone companies (involving mergers and
acquisitions of $3 million) and accelerated offshore borrowing by private
companies to finance electricity generation activities, which became necessary due
to a drought that prevailed that year. FDI inflows averaged 0.3-0.98% of GDP in
the country over 2008-2011. FDI inflows substantially declined in 2008 but
improved over 2009-11. FDI inflows increased from US$95.6 million in 2008 to
US$335.2 million in 2011. World Bank (2013) reports that Kenya received about
US$187.6 million in the year to June 2013, far below flows to Tanzania (US$
1,512.3 million) and Uganda (US$ 1,817.1 million), mainly to their gas and oil
industries24. The report urges the country to improve its business climate to attract
more FDI and promote economic growth. Esso (2010) for example finds a long-run
relationship between FDI and growth in Kenya, with a one-way causality from the
former to the latter. FDI is expected to scale up following the discovery of
commercially viable oil deposits and rare minerals in the country.

Table 13: Net FDI inflows to Kenya, 2002-2011

Indicator Name 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 0.21 0.55 0.29 0.11 0.23 2.68 0.31 0.38 0.55 0.98

FDI, net inflows, US$ million 27.6 81.7 46.1 21.2 50.7 729.0 95.6 116.3 178.1 335.2
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

In an empirical study, Mwega and Ngugi (2007) found the FDI ratio is mainly
determined by a few fundamentals (in this case, the trading partners growth rate,
terms of trade shocks; the external debt ratio and the quality of institutions). With
the first two variables exogenous, the result suggests that investment promotion in
Kenya requires actions such as reducing corruption (for example, changing
government away from corrupt awards to insiders); rebuilding institutions; and
enhancing the rule of law and order, with clear and transparent regulations,
uniformly enforced (Phillips et al. 2001). Reducing the external debt overhang
would also have a positive effect on FDI.

24
At an average exchange rate of Ksh 85.3 per dollar in the year to June 2013.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 33

7.4 Capital account regulation to avoid future currency or
banking crises

Management of the short-term capital flows in Kenya could be enhanced by some

non-radical interventions such as building reserves (for example to the six months
cover initially recommended by the East African Community) to guard against
reversals. Some countries have implemented more radical policies such as the
Tobin tax, asking such flows be in the country for a certain minimum period or
revert to a crawling peg regime that would contain and lead to better management
of both short-term capital flows and the exchange rate. According to O’Connell et
al. (2010), the CBK is not yet in a trilemma which postulates that a country that
operates an open capital account cannot peg the exchange rate and have an
independent monetary policy at the same time. Given a combination of imperfect
asset substitutability, prudential regulations and residual capital controls, CBK has
scope to target inflation while also exerting some influence over the path of the
nominal exchange rate in the short-run and perhaps for extended periods.

Besides monetary policy actions to neutralize the effects of the net capital on
domestic liquidity, the CBK therefore mainly relies mainly on foreign exchange
reserves to enhance the country’s capacity to absorb shocks that impact the foreign
exchange market. The statutory requirement is that the CBK endeavour to maintain
foreign reserves equivalent to four months’ import cover. The CBK does not
participate in the foreign exchange market to defend a particular value of the Kenya
shilling but may intervene to stabilize excess volatility in the exchange market.
Following the volatility in the exchange rate in 2011, the CBK introduced various
regulatory measures, through Prudential Guidelines of banks, to support the
stability of the exchange rate. These included:

 Limiting the tenor of swaps and Kenya Shilling borrowing where

offshore banks are involved to a tenor of not less than one year.
 Limiting the tenor of swaps between residents to not less than seven
days.
 Reduction of the foreign exchange exposure ratio of core capital from
20% to 10%.
 Requiring that local banks obtain supporting documents for all
transactions in the Nostro accounts of offshore banks.
 Suspension of the use of any Electronic Brokerage System by banks.

There are no explicit measures to regulate currency mismatches in lending to banks

and companies, except indirectly through foreign currency exposure limits. As seen
in Figure 13, while foreign currency advances and deposits have increased over
time, their ratio has been fairly stable over 2007-2013. Neither are there counter-
cyclical capital controls on inflows of short term capital flows to the country.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 34

Figure 13: Foreign Currency advances and deposits in Kenya,
January 2007 – December 2013

400

360

320

280

240

200

160

120

80

40
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

FORE IGN CURRE NCY A DV A NCE S , K S H B ILLION

FORE IGN CURRE NCY DE P OS ITS , K S H B ILLION
% S HA RE OF FORE IGN CURRE NCY A DV A NCE S TO DE P OS ITS

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Financial regulation in Kenya: 35

8 Summary and
conclusions

This case study investigates the potential tradeoff between regulation and stability
of Kenya’s financial sector, with a focus on the banking sector. The Terms of
Reference for the research project identify six issues below that require
investigation.

Section 2 is devoted to the size and growth of the financial sector. The paper first
analyses of the features and vision of development of the country as articulated in
Kenya Vision 2030 and the Medium Term Plans (MTPs). The Vision identifies
financial services as one of seven sectors that are the key drivers of the economy. It
envisages the creation of “a vibrant and globally competitive financial sector that
will create jobs and promote high levels of savings to finance Kenya’s overall
investment needs”.

Kenya’s M2/GDP and private credit/ GDP ratios closely track those of low-income
countries (LICs), but they are far below those of middle-income countries (MICs),
with a clear divergence over time. With the country aspiring to MIC status by 2030,
it apparently has a long way to go in building its financial sector. Granger causality
tests show significant causality from financial intermediation to growth at 3 and 4
lags at the 5% level, with the other lags non-significant, supporting Kenya Vision
2030 designation of the financial sector as one of the drivers of growth in Kenya, at
least in the short-run. On an annual basis, the financial sector growth has
consistently outpaced the real GDP growth since 2009.

Section 3 discusses the role of the foreign, state-owned commercial banks and DFIs
in the country. Kenya currently (in December 2013) has 43 banks, of which14
banks have foreign ownership, accounting for 32.2% of net assets in 2012. The
Central Bank also identifies 6 banks with state ownership accounting for 24.8.2%
of net assets in 2012, with the government having majority ownership in three of
these, which account for 4.2% of net total assets (Consolidated Bank; Development
Bank of Kenya; and the National Bank of Kenya). The remaining 23 are local
private banks, accounting for 43.0% of the banking sector’s net assets. Kenya’s
banking system is therefore dominated by local private banks and foreign banks.

The foreign banks have done as well as local private banks with both having an
average rate of return on assets of 4.6% over 2009-2012, ahead of banks with state
ownership (3.7%) and state-owned banks (3.1%). The poor performance of the
latter is attributed to poor legacy in the past of poor governance and massive
interference by the state in their management. The same pattern is repeated in the
other indicators. Foreign banks have on average done slightly better on the rate of
return on core capital (46.3%) over 2009-2012 when compared to local private
banks (44.6%), ahead of banks with state ownership (34.1% and 24.6%,
respectively). They also have the lowest cost of funds (index of 3.2%), followed by
banks with state ownership (index of 3.1% and 4.5%, respectively) and then local
private banks (index 4.6%). Foreign banks are also the most efficient (with an

Financial regulation in Kenya: 36

average score of 49.1%) slightly ahead of local private banks (score of 53.5%),
with banks with state ownership the least efficient (scores of 60.4% and 65.1%,
respectively). Finally, foreign banks have the least non-performing loans ratio
(average 3.3% over 2009-2012), followed by local private banks (4.7%) and banks
with state ownership (6.4% and 8.0%, respectively). It is therefore apparent that
foreign banks largely behave and perform like local private banks, except that they
have cheaper sources of finance due to their reputation capital. They are also quite
diverse so that it is difficult to generalize their behaviour.

According to World Bank (2013), most foreign banks have dedicated units serving
SMEs. There are however a few exceptions such as Citibank and, to a less extent,
Standard that focus on corporate and high-end clients, and hence do not lend to
SMEs. According to simulations from Oloo (2013) data, local private banks charge
the lowest costs to SMEs, followed by foreign banks and then banks with state
ownership.

In Kenya, some banks have expanded their branch networks in the region. Such
banks pose an increasing challenge for regulators across Africa (Beck 2013. Central
banks in Eastern African countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) to facilitate information sharing and supervisory co-operation for regional
banking groups. The CBK has developed and implemented a consolidated
supervision program for the effective oversight of banking groups. As part of
efforts aimed at implementing consolidated supervision, it launched Prudential
Guidelines on Consolidated Supervision and convened two Supervisory College
meetings in 2012 and 2013 bringing together all Central Banks of the East African
countries where Kenyan banks currently have operations. The East African Central
Banks are also currently working to harmonize their banking sector supervisory
rules and practices as a prerequisite for the envisaged East African Monetary Union
(EAMU). One issue that appear critical in this increasing regulatory cooperation,
based on the experience of European countries, is that there should be a focus on
proper preparation for resolution. Non-binding MOUs and Colleges of Supervisors
limited to information exchange are of limited use in times of bank failure.

In Kenya, DFIs play a small role in the economy. The five existing DFIs account
for less that 1% of the assets of the banking sector and supplied only about 0.56%
of the banking sector credit to the private sector. There however seems to be
consensus that DFIs could play a significant role by providing long-term finance
through targeted interventions for specific sectors or groups like SMEs, youth and
women (CBK 2013). This is recognized under Vision 2030, where DFIs are
expected to contribute towards enhanced financial access and investment goals. The
Task Force on Parastatals Reform (2013) advocates consolidating DFIs under a
Kenya Development Bank (KDB) with sufficient scale, scope and resources to
place a catalytic role in Kenya’s economic development by providing long-term
finance and other financial and advisory, investment and advisory services. CBK
(2013) as well calls for introduction of prudential regulation and supervision
consistent with their mandate as done in several countries including Tanzania,
Nigeria, China, Swaziland and Korea. As a result, Kenya would only customize the
regulatory and supervisory frameworks to local circumstances.

Section 4 discusses financial inclusion in Kenya. Financial access surveys show

that Kenya’s financial inclusion landscape has undergone considerable change. The
proportion of the adult population using different forms of formal financial services
has increased from 27.4% in 2006, to 41.3% in 2009 and stood at 66.7% in 2013,
amongst the highest in Africa. Overall, the proportion of the adult population
totally excluded from financial services has declined from 39.3% in 2006 to 31.4%
in 2009 and to 25.4% in 2013.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 37

The massive increase in access to financial services in the country since 2006 is
mainly due to enhanced usage of mobile money services from virtually 0% in 2006
to 28.4% in 2009 to 61.6% in 2013, making Kenya a global leader in the use of
mobile phone platforms. Currently, the four mobile money services have close to
20 million customers, handling over US$ 54.4 million worth of transactions per
day. M-PESA however remains dominant with 82% of market share, Airtel Money
15%, YuCash 2% and Orange Money 1%.
Financial inclusion has varied with the socio-economic statues of the population.
According to FSDK (2013), financial exclusion in 2013 varied from 55.3% for the
poorest 20% of the population to 5.7% for the wealthiest 20% of the population. As
well, financial exclusion was highest for those without any education (60.7%) and
lowest for those with tertiary education (1.8%). Women use of formal financial
services has lagged behind that of men, but the gap substantially reduced between
2009 and 2013. As well, rural areas have lagged behind urban areas in access to
financial services

The success of M-PESA in Kenya is often used to argue for a light-touch approach,
where mobile banking was allowed to flourish (Spratt 2013). However, possible
systemic and individual users’ risks seem to require careful evaluation and
monitoring. The CBK acknowledges that the technology used to deliver the mobile
money services carries inherent threats, the main ones being operational risk,
financial fraud and money laundering. However, prior to the launch of mobile
banking services by the various companies, the CBK requires them to provide a
detailed risk assessment, outlining all potential risks and satisfactory mitigating
measures they have put in place. Precautionary measures have been put in place to
ensure that the services do not infringe upon the banking services regulatory
framework as provided for in the Banking Act. Following the enactment of the
National Payments System Act in 2011, the CBK now has the oversight mandate,
with all payment service providers including mobile phone service providers
offering money transfer services falling under the CBK’s regulatory framework.

Increased financial inclusion through financial innovations does not seem to have
compromised financial stability. First, the stock of e-money is backed 100% by
accounts held at commercial banks. The mobile money e-float is also a small
proportion of the other monetary aggregates in terms of size for it to matter much
for monetary policy. Weil et al. (2011) estimate the outstanding stock of M-PESA
e-float at 1.6% of M0 and 0.4% of M1. Second, while there has been increased
instability in monetary relationships post-2007, reflected in a decline in the income
velocity of circulation and an increase in the money multiplier, undermining the
conduct of monetary policy which assumes stable monetary relationships, stability
seems to have been re-established since 2010. The instability was therefore a
temporary phenomenon. The demand for money also shows stability post-2010
(Weil et al. 2011).

Section 5 is devoted to access and cost of credit in Kenya. Financial sector reforms
have undoubtedly strengthened Kenya’s banking sector in the last decade or so, in
terms of product offerings and service quality, stability and profitability (Kamau
2009). The World Bank (2013) devotes itself to an analysis of banks lending to
SMEs in Kenya. The report notes that although retail banking has improved
markedly in Kenya in the last decade, access to credit for SMEs is still limited.
Most of the surveyed SMEs cite the high cost of credit as the reason for cash flow
challenges they face, leaving them with no recourse but to dig deeper into their
personal savings or turn to family friends to raise funds for day to day operations.
The report notes there is some evidence that Kenyan banks are actually ahead of
their counterparts in Nigeria and South Africa in lending to SMEs. From field

Financial regulation in Kenya: 38

surveys, about 17.4% of total bank lending goes to SMEs in Kenya, compared to
only 5% in Nigeria, and 8% in South Africa. According to a survey reported in the
World Bank (2013), involvement of Kenyan banks in the SME segment is growing,
both in terms of size and the diversity of their approaches to the SME client
relationship, with the encouragement of donors who provide bank-specific lines of
credit and partial credit guarantees.. This has been driven by innovations
specifically targeting this market. According to this survey, Kenyan banks tend to
provide more working capital than investment loans.

On policy, the report recommends that tapping the full growth and job-creating
potential of the SME sector will entail a move towards providing growth capital
and not just working capital. Technical assistance could help bridge the distance
between the demand for and the supply of private equity while improving the
listability of SMEs on the special Growth Enterprise Market Segment (GEMS)
could increase their access to equity finance.

One of the key criticisms of the Kenyan banking sector is that the cost of credit and
the interest rate spread remains high (at an average of 10.02% over 2005-13). The
spreads are on average relatively higher in Kenya than in, for example, Malaysia,
Botswana, South Africa, Nigeria and Tanzania, but lower than in Uganda.
Alongside high lending interest rates and wide spreads, the banking sector profits
have increased over time. Profits before tax increased from about US$ 70 million in
2002 to US$ 1,256 million in 2012, an average growth rate of 38.7%, with income
from interest on loans and advances accounting for 49.6% of total income during
the period. The persistently high spreads and growing profitability of the industry
have left it open to repeated criticisms of collusive price-setting behaviour,
particularly for large banks (World Bank 2013, Oloo 2013). The Competition
Commission has launched an investigation into possible collusion price-setting
behaviour by commercial banks, while the National Treasury has set up a 15-
member committee to probe these spreads.

There have been several studies of interest rate spreads in Kenya (Abdul et al.
2013, Were and Wambua 2013, World Bank 2013), which postulate that interest
rate spreads reflect (i) macroeconomic factors; (ii) the state of financial sector
development; (iii) industry-specific factors; and (iv) bank-specific factors which
are discussed in the paper.
Kenya banks justify the high spreads as due to the difficult business environment
they operate in (Oloo 2013). The main argument is that dispute resolutions take too
long and are costly; while national infrastructure services (e.g. electricity) are
expensive and unreliable. They also cite the high cost of attracting, training and
maintaining human resources. Salaries and other forms of labour compensation
make up a large part of their overhead, as the scarcity of skilled financial sector
workers leads to high turnover and compensation packages geared to retain scarce
skills (World Bank 2013). Most banks estimate that salaries make up 50% of their
overhead cost despite the fact tact that Kenya has a fairly well-developed pool of
banking skills. Given the large share of salaries in the overhead costs of the banking
sector, increasing the supply of skilled labor to this sector should be a priority.
Nevertheless, the largest portion of spreads is explained by profits in recent times
(World Bank 2013).

Section 6 discusses prudential regulations in Kenya. The CBK continues to

regulate banks based mainly on Basel I but was in the process of formulating a
policy position on Basel II implementation (KPMG 2012). New guidelines that
came into force in January 2013 however contain some features of Basel II and
Basel III on capital adequacy requirements (Oloo 2013). Overall, Kenya has

Financial regulation in Kenya: 39

endeavoured to implement the Basel accords for ensuring financial stability of the
country’s financial sector. The Kenyan banking system has continued to record
compliance with the minimum capital and liquidity prudential requirements. All
the banks have in the recent past met the four minimum capital requirements with
respect to the (i) Minimum core capital of Ksh 250 million which was raised to Ksh
1 billion over 2008-12; (ii) Core Capital/Total Deposit Liabilities ratio (Minimum
8%); (iii) Core Capital / Total Risk Weighted Assets ratio (Minimum 8%) and
Total Capital/ Total Risk Weighted Assets (Minimum 12%). In addition, the
NPL/Assets ratio has decreased from a high of 22.6% in 2001 to a low of 4.3% in
2007, and of December 2013 averaged 5%, an indication that the banking systems
asset quality has generally improved over time. As well, the ROA and ROE have
generally shown an upward trend since 2002.
CBK has focused more on microprudential regulation which relates to factors that
affect the stability of individual banks and less so on macroprudential regulation
which relates to factors which affect the stability of the financial system as a whole.
Basel III therefore proposes for countercyclical capital changes to provide the way
forward for future macroprudential regulation, which should take into account the
growth of credit and leverage as well as the mismatch in the maturity of assets and
liabilities (Murinde 2012).

The regulatory toolkit in Kenya has also relied substantially on other variables such
as structure of banking assets and liabilities such as restrictions on banks’ large loan
concentrations and foreign exchange exposure limits (Kasekende et al. 2011). As
well, according to KPMG (2012), Kenya has a highly skilled workforce and the
banking sector is able to secure banking staff with relevant training, and finance-
related profession certification. In addition, the country has returning citizens with
international professional experience to add to an already diverse talent pool. In a
group of 11 SSA countries, Gottschalk (2013) finds Kenya to have the second
largest number of supervisors (60), largest number of supervisors with more than
ten years of experience (30); and the largest percentage of supervisors with a
postgraduate degree (80), although the number of onsite supervisors by banks in the
previous five years was comparatively low at 1.
Finally, Section 7 discusses the management of capital flows in Kenya .Kenya has
in the last decade experienced a large increase in the current account deficit. The
current account recorded an average deficit of 1.75% of GDP in 2006, generally
widening over the subsequent years. By 2012, the deficit had risen to an average of
10.6% of GDP. The deficit improved in 2013 from a peak of 11.0% of GDP in
January 2013 to 8.5% of GDP in November 2013. The high current account deficit
has mainly been financed by short-term net capital inflows, which have typically
accounted for more than 50% of total financial flows. The easy reversibility of
these inflows increases the risk of a ‘sudden stop’ as a shift in market sentiments
creates a flight away from domestic assets (O’Connell et al. 2010).This could lead
to depletion of reserves and sharp currency depreciations.

The CBK has not in the past collected information on foreign participation in the
bonds market. On the other hand, net purchases by foreigner in Kenya’s NSE
averaged 14.7% of equity turnover over 2005-2013 and were negative in only a few
episodes: January 2009 (-13%), May 2010 (-3%), April – June 2011 (-23% to -
40%), December 2011 (-23%), February 2013 (-27%) and December 2013 (-6%).

The other sources of finance are ODA and FDI which have only played a limited
role, given they are relatively small and highly volatile. The World Bank urges the
country to improve its business climate to attract more FDI and promote economic
growth. Esso (2010) for example finds a long-run relationship between FDI and

Financial regulation in Kenya: 40

growth in Kenya, with a one-way causality from the former to the latter. FDI is
expected to scale up following the discovery of commercially viable oil deposits
and rare minerals in the country. In an empirical study, Mwega and Ngugi (2007)
found the FDI ratio is mainly determined by a few fundamentals (in this case, the
trading partners growth rate, terms of trade shocks; the external debt ratio and the
quality of institutions). The result suggests that FDI promotion in Kenya requires
actions such as reducing corruption; rebuilding institutions; and enhancing the rule
of law and order, with clear and transparent regulations, uniformly enforced
(Phillips et al. 2001). Reducing the external debt overhang would also have a
positive effect on FDI.

While there have been concerns about public debt in the country, various indicators
shows it is sustainable in the medium-term. The country is on the threshold with
respect to the PV of the public sector debt to GDP ratio (40%) which increases
from 39.3% in 2011 to 40.3% in 2012. However, it gradually decreases to 38.7%
by 2014, and to about 25% by 2030. Given Kenya’s historically strong revenue
performance, the country remains well within the other two indicators (World Bank
– IMF 2011).
Management of the short-term capital flows in Kenya could be enhanced by some
non-radical interventions such as building reserves to guard against reversals. Some
countries have implemented more radical policies such as the Tobin tax, asking
such flows be in the country for a certain minimum period or revert to a crawling
peg regime that would contain and lead to better management of both short-term
capital flows and the exchange rate. According to O’Connell et al. (2010), the CBK
is not yet in a trilemma which postulates that a country that operates an open capital
account cannot peg the exchange rate and have an independent monetary policy at
the same time. Given a combination of imperfect asset substitutability, prudential
regulations and residual capital controls, CBK has scope to target inflation while
also exerting some influence over the path of the nominal exchange rate in the
short-run and perhaps for extended periods.

There are no explicit measures to regulate currency mismatches in lending to banks

and companies, except indirectly through foreign currency exposure limits. While
foreign currency advances and deposits have increased over time, their ratio has
been fairly stable over 2007-2013. Neither are there counter-cyclical capital
controls on inflows of short term capital This case study investigates the potential
tradeoff between regulation and stability of Kenya’s financial sector, with a focus
on the banking sector.

Financial regulation in Kenya: 41

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