TMD DISCUSSION PAPER NO.

41

Trade Liberalization and Complementary Domestic Policies:

A Rural-Urban General Equilibrium Analysis of Morocco

Hans Löfgren
Moataz El-Said
Sherman Robinson
International Food Policy Research Institute

Trade and Macroeconomics Division

International Food Policy Research Institute
2033 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006, U.S.A.

April 1999

TMD Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and are circulated prior to a
full peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment. It is expected that most Discussion Papers
will eventually be published in some other form, and that their content may also be revised.
 Trade Liberalization and Complementary Domestic Policies:
A Rural-Urban General Equilibrium Analysis of Morocco

by

Hans Löfgren
Moataz El-Said
and
Sherman Robinson

International Food Policy Research Institute

Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

May 19, 1999

Revised version of paper presented at Expert Meeting on "The Dynamics of

New Regionalism in MENA: Integration, Euro-Med Partnership Agreements
and After," organized by the Economic Research Forum, the OECD
Development Center, and the World Bank, held in Cairo, February 6-7, 1999.
 ABSTRACT

In this study, a dynamically recursive general equilibrium model of Morocco is used to

examine alternative trade and domestic policy scenarios involving the implementation of the EU
Association Agreement for the period 1998-2012. The model has a detailed treatment of the
agricultural and rural economy in Morocco. The results for the trade liberalization scenarios
indicate that tariff unification has small aggregate effects whereas the removal of non-tariff
barriers has strong positive aggregate effects: factor incomes and household welfare expand
considerably more rapidly than for the base. However, trade liberalization disfavors the rural poor,
especially in rainfed areas. We simulate the introduction of complementary domestic policies with
a non-distorting transfer program that fully compensates the owners of rainfed resources and skill
upgrading for the rural labor force. The results indicate that, if combined with at least one of these
complementary domestic policies, trade liberalization can lead to a win-win outcome: the welfare
of all household groups increases significantly more rapidly than if status-quo policies are
followed.
 Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

MODEL STRUCTURE AND DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Model disaggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Production activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
System constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Database and solution approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4. SIMULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

5. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

TABLES AND FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1. INTRODUCTION

Morocco is about to start implementing an Association Agreement with the European

Union (AAEU) at the same time as the country adjusts its trade policies to conform to WTO
rules. A major policy question facing Morocco’s policy makers is whether and to what extent they
should pursue additional unilateral trade liberalization. The aggregate impact of a carefully
formulated program of trade liberalization is likely to be positive. However, like other major
changes in economic policy, it may have very different effects on different segments of the
population. Given that Morocco’s agriculture currently enjoys substantial protection, additional
broad-based trade liberalization is likely to have a detrimental impact on rural households,
including the bulk of the poor population. This means that policy makers may consider the
introduction of complementary domestic policies that compensate those who lose from changes in
trade policies. In the absence of such policies, the political feasibility of significant agricultural
tariff cuts is questionable.
In this study, a dynamically recursive general equilibrium model of Morocco is used as a
laboratory for analyzing alternative policy scenarios for the period 1998-2012. In order to focus
on agriculture and issues of poverty, the model distinguishes explicitly between rural and urban
activities and households. It has a relatively detailed treatment of agricultural and other rural
production, the labor market (disaggregated into skilled and unskilled), and households
(disaggregated into four types: rural poor, rural non-poor, urban poor, urban non-poor).
The basic simulation scenario assumes gradual implementation of the EU partnership
without additional bilateral changes in trade policies. The first set of simulations investigates the
impact of alternative scenarios for unilateral trade liberalization. In the second set of simulations,
we simulate the impact of a maximum unilateral trade liberalization scenario in combination with
two alternative domestic policy changes, increased rural education (enhancing the skills of the
rural labor force), and a non-distorting program for cash compensation to owners of resources
used in rainfed agriculture. In addition to economic indicators, the analysis of the different
scenarios uses indicators of political feasibility based on the distributional results. Given the likely

1
uneven impact on different population groups, decisions about trade liberalization are informed
not only by their economic consequences, but also by the political power of different groups.
Section 2 provides a brief background on the Moroccan economy and economic policy,
with a focus on trade policy, agriculture, and rural areas. In Section 3, the CGE model and its
database are presented; Section 4 is devoted to simulations while Section 5 summarizes the results
and discusses policy implications. The Appendices of the paper include a mathematical statement
of the static module of the model as well as additional background data.

2
2. BACKGROUND

Table 2.1. summarizes the sectoral structure of the national economy.1 In terms of the
economy as a whole, agriculture provides somewhat less than 20% of GDP but around 45% of
total employment, attesting to its relatively high labor-intensity. Rural households derives most of
their income from agriculture as 77% of rural labor is employed in agriculture. The service sectors
(including the government administration) is the major employer in urban areas. If defined
narrowly, Morocco's agriculture plays a relatively limited role in the country's relatively diversified
foreign trade, accounting for around 8% of exports and 6% of imports; however, if agroindustrial
trade is included, the shares are considerably higher. The most important agricultural exports are
fish, fruits and vegetables. Wheat and sugar are the major agricultural imports (Royaume du
Maroc, 1997; EIU, 1997, pp. 54-55).

<<Table 2.1>>

Since the early 1980s, Morocco has gradually reformed its economy in the direction of
trade liberalization and increased reliance on market forces and the private sector. Morocco's
macroeconomic management has since the mid-1980s been more successful than in most other
countries in the Middle East and North Africa according to key indicators such as rate and
volatility of inflation, level of the budget deficit, and stability of the real exchange rate (Page and
Underwood, 1997, pp. 104-105). In the trade area, the level and dispersion of tariffs have both
been reduced while quantitative restrictions (QRs) have been eliminated (Alonso-Gamo et al., p.
24; IMF 1997, p. 7). Compared to most structural-adjustment-oriented countries, Morocco was
successful in combining positive growth with rapid restoration of internal and external balance
(Karshenas, pp. 47-48). Nevertheless, compared to the 1970s, economic growth decelerated in
the 1980s and even more so during the period 1990-96. In spite of far-reaching trade reforms,
Morocco still has significant trade barriers with a high degree of dispersion of protection rates

1
Appendix Table A.1.2 includes additional information on structural change in Morocco's
economy, 1970-1996.

3
across sectors. Table 2.2 shows 1994 data for tariff and non-tariff barriers that are used for the
model-based analysis of this paper. Non-tariff barriers are defined broadly to include all domestic
price deviations that cannot be accounted for by import duties. As shown, the agricultural trade
regime was, as of the mid-1990s, particularly distorted, especially for cereals and animal products.

<<Table 2.2>>

For Morocco’s policymakers, rural development remains a key challenge. According to

data from the early 1990s, rural per-capita consumption is around half of the urban level. While
rural areas house less than 50% of the population, they account for 70% of the poor. As shown in
Table 2.3, rural areas are also strongly disfavored according to other indicators such as access to
electricity and safe water, literacy, and school enrollment, with the female population standing out
as particularly disadvantaged. Low educational achievement is reflected in a labor force that for
the most part is "unskilled" (in the sense that most jobs require no formal education). The skill gap
is a major source of inequality between rural and urban areas; on average skilled workers earn 6-7
times the wage of unskilled workers (Karshenas, 1994). Relatively unfavorable rural conditions
have led to rapid rural-urban migration, which provides an important outlet for the rural labor
force (absorbing the bulk of its natural growth), but exacerbates urban unemployment and puts
downward pressure on urban wages. The rural economy is dominated by agriculture which
represents close to 80% of total employment and may account for some 60% of total rural
value-added. While agricultural GDP is highly variable, since the early 1980s the sector has
arrested an earlier secular decline in its share of the economy. The agricultural sector is
characterized by considerable heterogeneity, perhaps most importantly between relatively
prosperous irrigated zones (17% of the cultivated area in the early 1990s) and disfavored rainfed
zones that, inter alia, suffer from frequent but irregular droughts. Moreover, the rainfed areas
differ greatly in terms of average annual rainfall.

<<Table 2.3>>

4
 Given the high degree of agricultural protection, the challenge of rural development is
intertwined with trade policy. Currently, Morocco is in the process of implementing its
Association Agreement with the EU and its GATT/WTO commitments in the Uruguay Round.
The EU is the major trading partner of the countries in the Middle East - North Africa (MENA)
region, receiving 25% of the region’s total exports and providing 44% of regional imports (ERF,
1998, p. 64). For Morocco, EU export and import shares are even higher, in 1994 at 64% and
57%, respectively (Royaume du Maroc, 1997, p. 572). Since 1994, the EU has sought the
conclusion of association agreements with most non-EU Mediterranean countries. The
agreements include the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) covering the EU and each non-
EU partner. In line with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, the FTAs are to be implemented
gradually over transitional periods lasting a maximum of twelve years.2
In 1996, Morocco signed such an agreement with the EU. For industrial imports from the
EU, Morocco is committed to a gradual elimination of tariff rates, and the abolishment of any
quantitative restrictions, taxes, and other measures that have the same effect as tariffs. In return,
Morocco will receive aid for education and infrastructure projects over a period of five years
(Oneworld, 1995). With few exceptions, Morocco’s non-agricultural exports will continue to
enjoy unrestrained, duty-free access to the EU. In spite of a slightly improved access, Morocco’s
agricultural exports to the EU remain strictly regulated, with limited scope for expansion.
As a member of the WTO, Morocco is committed to respecting the rules of GATT/WTO.
On the basis of the agreement of the Uruguay Round, Morocco is replacing non-tariff measures
with ordinary tariffs (tariffication). For all agricultural commodities, Morocco is committed to
maximum tariffs defined by the bounds it submitted, and the 24% reduction in those bounds in
equal annual decrements over a period of ten years. The tariff bounds are of no economic

2
According to Articles I and XXIV of the GATT, the establishment of Free Trade Areas and
Customs Unions are permitted as long as they are based on the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
principle and meet the following four conditions: a. all trade is covered by the agreement; b. tariff
rates imposed on imports from a third country after forming the FTA are not on the whole higher
or more restrictive than those before the FTA formation; c. the transition period to free trade does
not exceed 12 years; and d. the contracting parties are promptly notified of the arrangement itself,
as well as modifications or enlargement to it (ERF, 1998, p. 65).

5
significance since no change is required as the submitted bounds are well above the actual applied
rates, which is typical of developing countries. In practice, for a significant period of time neither
the GATT/WTO or the AAEU will oblige Morocco to reduce significantly the high agricultural
protection that is a major source of inefficient resource allocation.
Currently, trade and rural development are two major and interrelated issues in Morocco’s
economic policy debate. In the trade area, the debate revolves around the impact of the
implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU and of Morocco’s GATT/WTO
commitments in the Uruguay Round. Another major concern is whether Morocco should pursue
further general import liberalization, covering agricultural imports irrespective of source and
industrial imports from regions beyond the EU. Broad unilateral import liberalization may have a
positive impact on aggregate economic performance. However, given the high degree of
agricultural protection, the impact of broad-based trade liberalization on rural welfare is a
particular concern. Liberalization may also give rise to transitional costs as labor is reallocated
between different sectors.
Moroccan policy makers are well aware of the link between rural welfare and agricultural
crop prices — in March 1998, in the very first decree he signed, Morocco's new prime minister
Youssoufi imposed a sharp increase in tariff rates on imported wheat to counteract a recent
drastic fall in world prices (EIU, 1998, p. 20). In fact, it may be more appropriate to consider
agricultural trade liberalization in the context of complementary policies that compensate
vulnerable rural households. As an example of policies that can be pursued in the short run,
Mexico introduced an income transfer program (PROCAMPO) where farmers were compensated
for reduced protection of agricultural markets. By making payments proportional to assessments
of past earnings in agriculture, the program aimed at being non-distortionary in terms of current
production decisions (World Bank, 1997c). In Morocco, baseline payment levels could be
established on the basis of data from the 1997 agricultural census. It should be easier to
administer than direct payments based on the current cropping pattern. Over a longer time
horizon, options include support for an educational system that enhances the skills of the rural
labor force and the development of infrastructure that facilitates the development of rural
non-agricultural activities.

6
 In this paper, we use a rural-urban CGE model of Morocco to explore the impact of
different scenarios for trade reforms and complementary policies on the rural economy, the labor
market, and the rural poor. For each scenario, we will also assess political feasibility, using
various aggregate indicators.

3. MODEL STRUCTURE AND DATA

We will here present the rural-urban CGE model and its data sources.3 The current model,
which draws on existing economywide models of Morocco, is distinguished by an explicit
separation of activities and households into rural and urban. The disaggregation aims at
identifying the rural poor, as well as the factors and activities from which they earn their incomes.
Hence, the model has a detailed treatment of aspects that are most closely linked to the rural
economy and the welfare of the rural poor, including agricultural and other rural activities, and
rural factors of production. Although the treatment of urban production is more aggregated, the
model also permits an analysis of the impact on the urban poor of policies and exogenous shocks.
Moreover, the resulting economywide perspective permits us to avoid the fallacy of viewing the
rural economy as an isolated island. This is important since the rural and urban economies and the
welfare of their households are interdependent, with numerous linkages in the markets for
commodities and factors.

Model disaggregation

Table 3.1. displays the disaggregation of activities, factors, and institutions. Among the 45
activities, 38 are rural and 7 urban. Most rural sectors are part of crop or livestock agriculture.
The non-agricultural sectors of the economy (disaggregated into the major types of industrial and
service sectors) are classified as rural or urban.

3
This presentation uses no mathematics. Table A.1.1 includes a mathematical model statement.

7
 <<Table 3.1>>

All activities use capital and labor. Agricultural activities demand additional factors:
livestock makes use of pasture-fallow land; crop activities rely on rainfed land; irrigated crop
activities also use water. Outside agriculture, the labor force of each activity includes both skilled
and unskilled labor whereas for all agricultural activities, except fishing and forestry, the labor
force is made up of a separate category of (unskilled) agricultural labor. In crop and livestock
agriculture, most activities produce multiple commodities and most commodities are produced by
two activities, one in rainfed and one in irrigated areas. Fodder byproducts are produced by most
crop activities. Livestock activities produce meat and milk (disaggregated by animal type) and, for
the cow activities, manure. Multiple-output activities produce their commodities in fixed physical
proportions.
Outside crop and livestock agriculture, each activity produces only one commodity. Given
that service commodities tend to have location-specific characteristics, rural and urban service
activities are viewed as producing distinct commodities. For industrial and agricultural
commodities, markets are treated as integrated across regions (irrigated and rainfed agricultural
zones or rural and urban regions) and with international trade.
The model includes four household types, disaggregated by region (rural and urban) and
income level (poor and non-poor). The other institutions consist of the government and the rest of
the world, divided into the European Union (EU) and non-EU in the area of goods trade. The rest
of the world is thus disaggregated given that one purpose of the analysis is to understand the
impact on rural development from Morocco’s partnership agreement with the EU.

Production activities

Producers are assumed to maximize profits given their technology and the prices of inputs
and outputs. As shown in Figure 3.1, the technology of the production activities is specified as a
Leontief function of aggregate value-added and an aggregate intermediate input. Value-added is
produced by a CES function of primary factors, and a Leontief function of intermediate input use.

8
In order to permit technique change in response to significant price changes for inputs, the
intermediate coefficients are flexible inside agriculture but fixed for other sectors. For irrigated
crop agriculture, an aggregate land-water factor is among the arguments in the CES function.
This aggregate factor is produced by a set of alternative factor-aggregation activities based on
Leontief technology that specifies substitution possibilities between the land and water along a
linearized CES isoquant. This Leontief representation is preferred to a continuous CES function
to allow for the possibility of water or land being in excess supply, with a corresponding price of
zero for the non-scarce factor. The income of each factor is allocated to domestic institutions
(households and government) in fixed shares, after adjustments for factor payments to and from
the rest of the world (both of which are fixed in foreign currency).

<<Figure 3.1>>

Institutions

In the base year, both rural and urban households receive the bulk of their incomes from
factor earnings in their respective regions. Compared to the non-poor, the poor in both regions
depend more heavily on labor incomes in general and unskilled labor incomes in particular (See
Table A.1.3 for 1994 income shares derived from the SAM.). In addition to factor income,
households receive transfers from the government (the transfer received by each household is a
fixed GDP share) and the rest of the world (fixed in foreign currency). Total household income is
used to pay direct taxes, save and consume. Direct taxes and savings are fixed shares of
household income. Consumption demand is determined by the linear expenditure system (LES).
Besides factor incomes, government revenue consists of taxes — direct taxes from
households, indirect taxes from domestic activities, domestic sales taxes, and import tariffs (with
different rates applying to EU and non-EU goods' imports). All taxes are ad valorem. Apart from
the above-mentioned transfers to households, the government uses its income to buy a fixed
quantity of consumption goods, transfers to the rest of the world (fixed in foreign currency), and

9
consumer subsidies (a fixed share of the consumption value for manufactured goods, representing
food items).
The rest of the world interacts with Morocco through commodity trade and the above-
mentioned transfers (which add to or deduct from the incomes of factors and domestic
institutions).

System constraints

System constraints, or “closure rules” are those constraints that have to be satisfied by the
economic system, but which are not considered in the decisions of any micro agent (Robinson
1989, pp. 907-908). They consist of the markets for commodities and factors as well as a set of
macro aggregates.

Commodity markets

Commodities are supplied by domestic production activities and by imports. On the other
side of the market, we find domestic demand and exports. Imperfect substitutability is assumed
for commodities from different sources (different domestic activities, different import regions, or
the outside world versus domestic producers). Commodities delivered to different destinations
(domestic market vs. aggregated export market or different export markets) are imperfectly
transformable.
Figure 3.2. summarizes the commodity flows that underlie the market for a commodity
that is produced by two activities and is traded in both directions, both with the EU and the rest of
the outside world. A separate price is associated with each commodity flow (box).

<<Figure 3.2>>

In the bottom left, production from the two activities combine to form aggregate output
that, in turn, is transformed to domestic sales and aggregate exports. In the next stage, the latter

10
are further transformed into exports to the EU and the rest of the world. On the domestic supply
side, imports from the EU and the rest of the world generate aggregate imports that, together
with domestic sales, are aggregated to give the domestic composite commodity supply. On the
other side of the composite commodity market, demand is made up of household and government
consumption, investment, and intermediate input use. The above Figure is simplified for
commodities that enter international trade in a less complete fashion (or not at all for non-traded
commodities) and/or are supplied by a single domestic activity. Moreover, for imported service
commodities, the first step in the aggregation is eliminated since imports are not disaggregated by
source.
The functional forms for transformation and aggregation are, respectively, Constant-
Elasticity-of-Substitution (CES) and Constant-Elasticity-of-Transformation (CET) functions. At
each stage, the shares of commodities from different sources or to different destinations are
sensitive to relative prices. These assumptions embodied in these functions — imperfect
substitutability and transformability — grant the domestic price system a certain degree of
independence from international prices and dampen responses of imports, exports and domestic
sales to price changes.
Each box can be viewed as representing a market that, although linked to other markets,
has a separate market-clearing mechanism. With the partial exception of export and import
markets, each price performs the role of clearing the market — the quantities supplied and
demanded are, respectively, positively and inversely related to the price. For imports, the supply
side clears the market: it is assumed that Morocco is a small-country facing infinitely elastic
supplies at exogenous world prices.
For most exports, it is similarly assumed that Morocco is a small country facing infinitely
elastic demands at an exogenous world price: in this setting, the demand side clears the market.
The only exception is for agricultural exports to the EU. A dual-regime formulation is used
according to which an increase in Morocco’s supply price will give rise to reduced exports along
a constant-elasticity demand curve. However, a decrease in the Moroccan price will not give rise
to a corresponding increase in demand. The EU will purchase the base-year quantity at the

11
(lower) price, in the process capturing the rent produced by the constraint. As a result, the EU
pays exactly the price needed to induce Morocco to export the fixed quantities.

Factor markets

Given the medium- to long-run perspective of the current analysis, the dynamic model
version assumes that each factor is mobile across the activities that use it. A market-clearing price
generates demand-supply balance in the context of full resource utilization. The only exception
applies to land and water in irrigated agriculture where the model allows for the fact that
flexibility in technique choice may not be sufficient to assure that both factors always are fully
utilized. Hence, for each factor, two regimes are possible: full employment with a market-clearing
price or unemployment with the utilization level as the clearing variable. Given that the sectoral
production function always demands the land-water aggregate, at most one of the two factors is
unemployed at any given point in time.

Macro constraints

These constraints determine the manner in which balance is achieved for the macro
aggregates associated with the accounts for the government, the rest of the world, and savings-
investment. Government savings — the difference between the government’s current revenues
and current spending — is a fixed share of GDP. Proportional adjustments in the rate of value-
added tax (uniform across all sectors) assure that the government savings target is met. Foreign
savings are fixed. A flexible real exchange rate (measuring the ratio between prices of traded
commodities and domestic outputs sold domestically) clears the balance of the rest of the world.
As noted earlier, for each household category, savings is a fixed share of its disposable income.
Hence, none of the three types of savings — government, household, and foreign — is free to
equilibrate aggregate savings-investment balance. Hence, the model has a savings-driven
determination of investment: aggregate investment (for gross fixed capital formation) varies
endogenously to achieve savings-investment equilibrium.

12
The Dynamic Module

The within-period, static model is solved for 1994 (the base year for the database) and
1998 (to update the model to the base year for the model-based analysis), and every two years
thereafter until 2012. Between the static-model solutions, selected parameters are updated in the
dynamic (between-period) module, either using lagged endogenous variables (from solutions in
previous periods) or exogenous trends. The aggregate capital stock is updated endogenously on
the basis of previous investment and depreciation, interpolating for the inter-period years. Total
population, supplies of skilled and unskilled labor, foreign savings, institutional payments to and
from the rest of the world, and total factor productivity by activity are all updated exogenously.

Database and solution approach

The model data is based on a disaggregated SAM (a 108x108 matrix) for 1994, to which
the model parameters are calibrated. The SAM was constructed on the basis of data from various
data sources, most importantly: (i) disaggregated agricultural information from the Moroccan
government, the World Bank, and the FAO, primarily for 1990/91;4 (ii) a disaggregated
economywide framework represented by Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) for 1990 and 1994,
an input-output table for 1990, as well as data on the 1994 policy regime — taxes, subsidies, and
non-tariff barriers (Bussolo and Roland-Holst, 1993; Roland-Holst, 1996a); (iii) 1994 macro and
trade data from Royaume du Maroc (1997), the RMSM data base (World Bank, 1997a), and
United Nations (1998); and (iv) disaggregated population, consumption, and labor force data
from Royaume du Maroc (1993, 1995, 1996, 1997), World Bank (1994, 1995, 1997a, 1997b),
International Monetary Fund (1997), and Karshenas (1994). It should be emphasized that in areas
where detailed information was lacking (for example regarding wage gaps across different

4
The Moroccan government sources include MAMVA (DPAE/Division des Statistiques and
DPV, AGER, DPA, and ORMVA), Ministère des Incitations à l’Economie (Direction de la
Statistique), Ministère des Finances, Ministère de l’Industrie, Ministère des Travaux Publics, and
Caisse de Compensation.

13
activities), some simplifying assumptions had to be imposed. In doing so, we were guided by the
underlying premise of the analysis: the impact of trade policy on the rural economy cannot be
properly assessed without a model structure that captures the salient characteristics that are
related to the urban-rural divide, including large skill and wage gaps, and differences in sectoral
structure.
Available information was brought together in one matrix, the disaggregation of which
parallels the disaggregation of the current model. Underlying the construction of such a SAM is
an attempt to make the best possible use of available scattered data. Inevitably imbalances appear
when data from different sources and years are integrated in one framework; a cross-entropy
method was used to generate a balanced model SAM that uses all the information contained in the
original data set (Thissen and Löfgren, 1998; Robinson et al, 1998). A macro version of the
model SAM — identical to the disaggregated SAM except for the aggregated depiction of
factors, household, activities, and commodities — is shown in Table 3.2. A variety of other
studies of Morocco were consulted for estimates of elasticities for the Armington, CET, CES
(production), LES (household consumption), and export-demand functions.5

<<Table 3.2>>

The current model is solved as a mixed-complementarity problem (MCP), consisting of a

set of simultaneous equations that are a mix of strict equalities and inequalities but without an
objective function. This approach, made feasible by the recent development of solvers, makes it

5
The consulted studies include Aloui et al,. 1989; de Janvry et al., 1992; Goldin and Roland-
Holst, 1995; Laraki, 1989, Mateus et al.,1988; Morrisson, 1991; and Rutherford et al., 1993. In
summary, the values used are: 1. Elasticity of substitution for CES value-added functions: 0.8 for
all activities except Public Administration (0.19); 2. Elasticity of substitution for CES
intermediate-input aggregation functions for agricultural activities: 0.5 for all activities except
vegetables (2.0); 3. CES (Armington) function elasticities for aggregation of imports from
different regions and of imports and domestic output: between 2 and 7 for all commodities with
the higher values for grains; 4. CET function elasticities for transformation of domestic output to
aggregate exports and domestic sales and of aggregate exports to exports disaggregated by
region: between 2 and 5 for all commodities; 5. Elasticities for constant-elasticity export demand
functions for agricultural exports to the EU and for service exports: -1.5. Household expenditure
elasticities were computed on the basis of Royaume du Maroc (1993).

14
possible to formulate a model that combines desired features of mathematical programming
models (in particular by permitting excess supplies of agricultural resources, such as water) while
allowing the full range of assumptions for consumer demand, government policies, and foreign
trade that appear in standard CGE models. The GAMS modeling software is used both to
generate the database and to implement the model. The model is solved with PATH, a solver for
mixed complementarity problems.6

4. SIMULATIONS

The simulations, based on the CGE model presented in the preceding section, explore the
impact of alternative scenarios for trade liberalization and the potential role of complementary
domestic policy changes. The first set of simulations are defined in Table 4.1.

<<Table 4.1>>

The results are summarized in Table 4.2. The simulation AAEU defines the status quo in
the sense that policy changes are limited to what Morocco unambiguously made a commitment to
implement in association with the EU. On the aggregate level, real GDP at factor cost grows at an
annual rate of 3.7%, a rate that changes very little across the simulations that are reported in this
paper.7 Growth is biased in favor of urban production and non-agricultural sectors, in part
because these do not depend on natural resources, the physical quantity of which cannot be
expanded easily. (In the model simulations, the quantities of agricultural resources — land, water,

6
For GAMS, see Brooke et al. (1988). Rutherford (1995) provides more information on PATH.
7
The simulated aggregate growth rate is in line with the expectations of the World Bank, both for
Morocco and the region at large (al-Hayat, December 16, 1998; RMSM database). Growth in
aggregate real GDP at factor cost (an index of real production) varies little across the different
simulations since supplies are exogenous for all factors except capital (for which supply growth is
endogenous but quite similar across the different simulations given similar levels of real
investment while utilization rates are permitted to vary only for irrigated resources.

15
and pasture-fallow areas are fixed at the 1994 level.) Changes in the allocation of labor between
agriculture, rural non-agriculture, and urban activities are minor.

<<Table 4.2>>

On average, real factor incomes grow at a similar pace to GDP, with the most rapid
growth for agricultural resources, both irrigated and rainfed. Household welfare grows at 2-3%
per year, both on the aggregate level and for the different household groups.8 Welfare growth is
slightly biased in favor of the poor and rural areas, a reflection of the fact that growth in factor
incomes is faster for agricultural resources and unskilled labor than for skilled labor and capital.9
Rapid growth in the rents of agricultural resources, including pastures, may lead to
overexploitation and environmental degradation. The result that resource incomes in irrigated
agriculture grow more rapidly than for other factors points to the growing importance of efficient
resource management in this area.
Imports and exports grow faster than GDP and incomes; the economy is gradually
becoming more open. The agricultural trade deficit grows as domestic production, hampered by
the limited resource supply, is unable to keep up with growing domestic demand. For industry,
export growth is more rapid than import growth; imports from EU grow rapidly while imports
from non-EU countries decline, i.e., the AAEU leads to trade diversion toward the partner
countries in the free-trading area. Compared to 1998, the real exchange rate appreciates. To

8
The welfare index is derived from the compensating variation (defined as the amount of money
which, if taken away from the household after a price and/or income change, would leave it just as
well of as before the change; i.e., what the household would be willing to pay for enjoying the
change). More specifically, the index was defined as the ratio between the simulated value of
household consumption and the consumption value that would have left household welfare at the
1994 level (simulated consumption value minus compensating variation). In Tables 4.2 and 4.4,
the household values in all columns except "1998" in Table 4.2 show the percentage annual
growth rate in the welfare index between 1998 and 2012. The 1998 column shows per-capita
consumption in 1998 (at 1994 prices).
9
Note that the household are classified on the basis of their 1994 characteristics (including
location, income level, and patterns of asset holdings). Labor that migrates between rural and
urban employment does not change its household affiliation.

16
maintain savings at a predetermined share of GDP in the face of reduced tariff rates and other
trends, the government collects value-added taxes at a level equivalent to 4.1% of GDP.
The other three simulations in the first set assume that Morocco implements policies that
reduce the extent of price distortions caused by trade policies. For the simulation TARIFF,
unification of all commodity tariffs except industrial imports from the EU at the 1994 average rate
reduces protection significantly for agriculture but has less impact on the industrial protection
rates facing suppliers from outside the EU. Accordingly, compared to the AAEU scenario,
agricultural imports expand (most strongly for commodities from the EU, including beef) while
growth in agricultural production and resource incomes slows. Growth decelerates for rural non-
agriculture which, more than the urban sector, is driven by demand from agricultural production
and rural households. The fact that the rural economy primarily relies on unskilled labor reduces
income growth for this category. Growth in the urban economy accelerates slightly, generating
higher incomes for capital and skilled labor as well as on the national aggregate factor level.
Aggregate household welfare is enhanced, due to a significant improvement for urban non-poor
households with small declines for other categories, an outcome that stems from the pattern of
change in factor incomes. In general, the repercussions of tariff unification, including efficiency
gains, are quite limited. This is not surprising since tariff unification takes place in a setting where
numerous other distortions are in place.
In the simulation TARIFF+NTB, non-tariff barriers, primarily affecting agriculture, are
gradually removed. The impact is much stronger than for tariff-unification alone and economic
openness is enhanced significantly. The driving force is reduced prices for demanders (both
consumers and producers) of agricultural commodities.
Factor incomes grow considerably more strongly for capital and skilled labor. In
agriculture, resource income growth declines, especially in the rainfed subsector. A growing part
of the labor force migrates away from agriculture to the urban and rural non-agricultural
activities. All households groups gain except the rural poor who are unaffected. Households that
rely more heavily on incomes from rainfed resources than the representative rural households in
the model would be likely to see their situation deteriorate under this scenario. Rapid agricultural
import expansion raises the trade deficit, as a result of which the real exchange rate depreciates,

17
further enhancing exports and dampening imports. Import growth engenders higher tariff
revenues, reducing revenue from the value-added replacement tax to 2.2% of GDP.
Unification of tariffs at 10% (industrial imports from the EU excluded; the simulation
TRADE-LIB), a significant cut, generates further exchange rate depreciation, increased openness,
reduced tariff revenues, increased government reliance on the value-added tax, and reduced
growth in agricultural resource incomes. Other effects are relatively minor. On the aggregate
level, factor incomes and household welfare stay virtually unchanged. There are minor cuts in
agricultural production and rural household welfare. The negative impact on agriculture and rural
well-being is driven by the fact that, for agriculture, reduced protection is transmitted more
strongly into lower domestic prices as imports are relatively highly substitutable with domestic
output.10
Figures 4.1 – 4.4 compare the evolution over time of welfare for each household group
under the last scenario (TRADE-LIB), which incorporates major trade liberalization, to the
AAEU scenario. The rural poor lose while all other households groups are better off under
liberalization in all periods. According to the compensating variation measure, by the year 2012,
aggregate gains under TRADE-LIB exceed those of AAEU by more than 5% of the GDP of the
AAEU simulation in the same year. Hence, there is scope for having the winners compensate the
losers in a way that assures that both groups are better off than for the AAEU run.
Figures 4.5 – 4.9 show the evolution of disaggregated factor incomes (indexed to 100 for
1998) for the same two simulations. The figures show that, at this level, the gains are highly
unevenly distributed. Households that do not have significant non-agricultural incomes would
tend to lose from the reforms during the time frame considered. However, as a longer time period
passes, the households are more able to develop strategies where they shift away from reliance on
agricultural income.
In the second set of simulations, we juxtapose the policy changes under TRADE-LIB with
complementary measures that aim at compensating rural, vulnerable losers. These actions may be

10
In an additional simulation, TRADE-LIB was rerun but without the gradual elimination of
tariffs on industrial imports from the EU. The results were very similar in most respects, including
welfare effects. The only major difference was that, as expected, the new simulation showed
higher tariff revenues and less reliance on the value-added tax.

18
considered worthwhile in their own right (since they aim at improving the welfare of rural poor)
and may also serve to mitigate political resistance to trade reforms. Table 4.3 describes the
content of the two simulations. For the first simulation (which aims at imitating Mexico’s
PROCAMPO program, cf. discussion in Section 2), part of the program cost covers
administration: out of every Dirham spent on the program, 70% is transferred to farmers while
30% is spent on administration.11 The skill enhancement program is motivated by the fact that, as
noted in Section 2, the skill gap between urban and rural areas is a major source of rural-urban
inequality. It assumed that the program can be achieved without economic loss by reallocating
educational expenditures, for example from urban-focused higher education that produces
graduates lacking skills in demand in the labor market. It should be noted that neither one of the
programs is narrowly targeted to poor households: they respectively benefit all owners of rainfed
resources and all rural households with unskilled labor.

<<Table 4.3>>

Selected results for the second simulation set are shown in Table 4.4. Figures 4.10-4.13
summarize the impact on household welfare. To facilitate comparisons, data for AAEU and
TRADE-LIB are repeated. Compared to TRADE-LIB, the TRANSFER simulation generates
gains for rural households, especially the poor, while the urban households lose. This result
reflects the fact that urban households own little rainfed resources while they, like the rural
households, suffer from declining factor incomes because of the value-added tax, which increases
in rough proportion to the value of the transfer — in 2012 it is close to 3.8% of GDP. Figure
4.14 shows the evolution of the transfer over time. It increases gradually during the
implementation of the reduction in border protection. After reaching a peak in 2004, it starts a
steady but slow decline. In other respects, the transfer has a limited impact. It primarily functions
as a device for income redistribution. As opposed to the TRADE-LIB scenario, the rural poor are

11
This charge is highly approximate — it is not clear what the cost of such a program would be in
Morocco, inter alia since it depends on the capacity of the existing administration to manage an
additional program. International experience suggests that 30% is a plausible figure for the
administrative cost share in well-managed public works programs (World Bank 1997c, p. 53).

19
now better off compared to the base scenario. However, relative to GDP, the total cost of the
transfer program is substantial, suggesting the need to target such programs more narrowly,
perhaps to rainfed regions with little rainfall.

<<Table 4.4>>

In the simulation SKILL-UPGRADE, we explore the impact of raising the skill level of
part of the unskilled rural labor force. In every year starting from 1999, the skilled rural labor
force is augmented by 5%, boosting its annual growth rate for the period 1998-2012 from 3.8%
to 7.7%. The rural unskilled labor force is reduced so as to leave unchanged the total labor force,
cutting its growth rate from 2.4% to 2.0%. Compared to the TRADE-LIB simulation, GDP
growth accelerates significantly for rural non-agricultural and urban activities, but not in
agriculture since this sector only uses unskilled labor. Incomes go up for all factors except skilled
labor, an indication that, in the face of supply shifts, demand for this labor type is inelastic.
Welfare is boosted strongly for all households except the urban non-poor, who initially depend
more heavily than others on skilled labor incomes. They see their wages decline without any
change in their endowment of skilled labor.
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show the results for two indicators of political support for the
scenarios TRADE-LIB, TRANSFER, and SKILL-UPGRADE compared to AAEU. According to
both indicators, total political support is a weighted average of the degree of approval or
disapproval of each household group. For each non-base simulation, the degree of political
approval or disapproval of each household group is measured, in each time period, by the
percentage deviation of its disposable income from income under AAEU in the same period. This
assumes that the population has a conception of what their conditions would have been like under
an alternative, status-quo scenario. Under “dirham power," the weight of each household
(indicating its political influence) is defined as its share, during each time period, in total
household income. Under “people power," the household weights are population shares (Dervis et

20
al., pp. 458-466; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1995, p. 24).12 According to both measures, all non-
AAEU scenarios are supported (since the support measures invariably have positive values) —
further liberalization would be supported compared to the status quo. Support is growing
significantly as long as the policy changes are implemented. SKILL-UPGRADE is most strongly
supported according two both measures since it on average leads to the strongest income
improvement. However, given its pro-poor character (the beneficiaries have larger population
shares than income shares), it scores higher for the people-power measure. Dirham power
supports TRADE-LIB more strongly than TRANSFER while people-power support for these two
scenarios is virtually identical, a reflection of the relative pro-poor character of the agricultural
transfer program. These summary measures provide a simplistic view of the determinants of
political support. Among other things, it is possible that household attitudes should be measured
at a more disaggregated level where the impact is considerably less even and most likely negative
for some groups (cf. the evolution of factor incomes shown in Figures 4.5 – 4.9). Nevertheless,
according to these measures, the pro-poor trade-domestic policy packages could have broad
support, in particular if votes in elections play a strong role in the determination of economic
policy.

5. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we use a rural-urban CGE model of Morocco to simulate the impact of
alternative scenarios for trade and domestic policies. In the base scenario, the AAEU is
implemented without other policy changes. For the period 1998-2012, real GDP at factor cost
grows at an annual rate slightly below 4%. Rural poor and urban poor households enjoy the most
rapid welfare increases, a reflection of the fact that the pattern of factor income growth is

12
In 1998, the people-power shares of the different households (in %) are as follows: urban poor
3.6, urban non-poor 47.5, rural poor 8.8, and rural non-poor 40.1. In the same year, the dirham-
power shares are urban poor 1.1, urban non-poor 66.2, rural poor 2.6, and rural non-poor
30.2. The shares do not change significantly over time.

21
pro-poor: agricultural resource incomes grow most rapidly followed by unskilled labor, with
lower growth rates for skilled labor and capital.
The results for the trade policy simulations indicate that, in a world where policy
alternatives are second-best, tariff unification has a relatively limited impact on aggregate factor
incomes and household welfare. However, removal of non-tariff barriers (expressed in
tariff-equivalent form) has strong positive aggregate effects. Lowering of tariffs and removal of
non-tariff barriers lead to depreciation and major expansions in non-agricultural exports and
agricultural imports. Growth accelerates for non-agricultural sectors but slows down in
agriculture. Resources (labor and capital) move from agriculture to other parts of the economy.
Aggregate factor incomes and household welfare expand considerably more rapidly than for the
base.
However, trade liberalization reduces income growth for agricultural resources, especially
in rainfed areas. The owners of these resources tend to be a relatively poor part of the rural
population. On the household level, the trade liberalization scenarios disfavor the rural poor, who
represent 70% of all poor in Morocco.
Two domestic policy scenarios aim at addressing the relatively negative impact of trade
liberalization on the owners of rainfed resources and the rural poor. In one of the scenarios, we
introduce a non-distorting transfer program that fully compensates the owners of rainfed
resources for the losses they incur from trade liberalization compared to the base scenario. On the
household level, the result is a pro-rural development pattern, with poor and non-poor rural
households registering the strongest welfare improvements. Also the urban households are
significantly better off than under the base scenario. However, the tax burden on the government
is quite heavy (close to 3.8% in 2012), suggesting the need for targeting, perhaps by providing
transfers to rainfed farmers in low rainfall zones.
In the second domestic policy scenario, we upgrade the skills of the rural labor force,
approximately doubling the rate of growth for rural skilled labor (from a low base) and reducing
growth for rural unskilled labor. This leads to a significant growth expansion for GDP (driven by
non-agricultural expansion), aggregate factor incomes, and aggregate household welfare. In terms
of household welfare, the outcome is pro-rural and pro-poor: the two rural households record the

22
fastest growth, followed by the urban poor while the urban non-poor face a minor growth
deceleration. The overall conclusion from the model simulations of this paper is that, if combined
with complementary domestic policies, trade liberalization can lead to a win-win outcome: the
welfare of all household groups grows more rapidly than if status-quo policies are followed.

23
 REFERENCES

Aloui, Omar, Jean-Jacques Dethier, and Abderrahim Houmy (1989). “L’Impact de la Politique
d’ajustement sur les Secteurs des Cereales et de l’Elevage au Maroc.” Ministère de l’Agriculture
et de la Reforme Agraire, Department de la Plantification et des Affaires Economiques; et Banque
Mondiale, Division des Politiques Agricoles, Department de l’Agriculture et du Developpment
Rural.

Alonso-Gamo, Patricia, Susan Fennell, and Khaled Sakr (1997). “Adjusting to New Realities:
MENA, The Uruguay Round, and the EU-Mediterranean Initiative.” IMF Working Paper.
Washington, D.C.

Bussolo, Maurizio, and David Roland-Holst (1993). A Detailed Input-Output Table for Morocco,
1990. OECD Development Centre, Technical Paper No. 90, November.

de Janvry, A., and E. Sadoulet (1995). Quantitative Development Policy Analysis. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.

de Janvry, A., E. Sadoulet, and M. Fafchamps (1992). “Structural Adjustment and the Peasantry
in Morocco: A Computable Household Model,” European Review of Agricultural Economics,
vol. 19, pp. 427-453.

Dervis, K., J. De Melo, and S. Robinson (1982). General Equilibrium Models for Development
Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit). (1998) Morocco: Country Report. Second quarter.

EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit). (1997), Morocco: Country Profile 1997-98

Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey (1998). ERF Indicators:
Economic Trends in the MENA Region. Cairo, Egypt.

Goldin, Ian, and David Roland-Holst (1995) Economic Policies for Sustainable Resource Use in
Morocco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoekman, Bernard (1995). The World Trade Organization, the European Union, and the Arab
World: Trade Policy Priorities and Pitfalls. Policy Research Working Paper 1513, World Bank,
Washington, D.C.

International Monetary Fund (1997). Morocco - Selected Issues. Staff Country Report No. 97/6.
Washington, D.C.

24
Karshenas, Massoud (1994). "Structural Adjustment and Employment in the Middle East and
North Africa." Working Paper 9420. Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and
Turkey, Cairo, Egypt.

Laraki, Karim (1989). “Food Subsidy Programs: A Case Study of Price Reform in Morocco,”
LSMS Working Paper No. 50, World Bank.

Mateus, Abel, and others (1988). A Multisector Framework for Analysis of Stabilization and
Structural Adjustment Policies: The Case of Morocco. World Bank Discussion Paper 29, June.

Morrison, Christian (1991). Adjustment and Equity in Morocco. OECD:Development Centre

Studies.

Oneworld (1995). The EU and the Mediterranean <http://www.oneworld.org/aprodev/eumed

.html>. Accessed December 11, 1998.

Page, John, and John Underwood (1997). "Growth, the Maghreb, and Free Trade with the
European Union," pp. 98-126 in Galal, Ahmed, and Bernard Hoekman, eds. Regional Partners in
Global Markets: Limits and Possibilities of the Euro-Med Agreements. Centre for Economic
Policy Research, London, and Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Cairo.

Robinson, Sherman (1989). “Multisectoral Models.” In Chenery, H. and T. N. Srinivasan eds.

Handbook of Development Economics. North Holland, Volume 2.

Robinson, Sherman, Andrea Cattaneo, and Moataz El-Said. (1998). Estimating a Social
Accounting Matrix Using Cross Entropy Methods. Discussion Paper 33, Trade and
Macroeconomics Division, International Food Policy Research Institute.

Roland-Holst, David (1996a). SAMs for Morocco, 1990 and 1994 (in electronic form).

Royaume du Maroc (1993). Niveau de Vie des Menages 1990/91. Various volumes. Direction de
la Statistique. Rabat.

Royaume du Maroc (1995). Annuaire Statistique. Direction de la Statistique. Rabat.

Royaume du Maroc (1996). Les Indicateurs Sociaux. Direction de la Statistique. Rabat.

Royaume du Maroc. (1997). Annuaire Statistique. Direction de la Statistique. Rabat.

Rutherford, Thomas F., E.E. Rutström and David Tarr (1993). “Morocco’s Free Trade
Agreement with the European Community: A Quantitative Assessment,” Policy Research
Department, WPS 1173, The World Bank, September.

25
Thissen, Mark and Hans Löfgren (1998). “A New Approach to SAM Updating with an
Application to Egypt, ”Environment and Planning Series A, vol. 30, no. 11, pp. 1991-2003.

World Bank (1994). Kingdom of Morocco: Poverty, Adjustment, and Growth. Volumes I-II.
Report 11918-MOR, Washington, D.C.

World Bank (1995). Kingdom of Morocco: Towards Higher Growth and Employment. Volumes
I-II. Report 14155-MOR, Washington, D.C.

World Bank (1997a). RMSM Simulation data. Mimeo.

World Bank (1997b). World Development Indicators. Electronic format (CD-ROM).

World Bank (1997c). Kingdom of Morocco: Rural Development Strategy. Integrating the Two
Moroccos (1997-2010. Synthesis Report. Volumes II-III. Report 16303-MOR, Washington, D.C.

United Nations (1998). COMTRADE database. U.N. Statistical Division, New York, New York.

USDA (United States Department of Agriculture) (1998). The General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade and the World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO). <http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/policy/
gatt/gattover.html>. Accessed December 10, 1998.

26
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 2.1: Structure of production and employment, 1994-1995
Employment
GDP Exports Imports Rural Urban Total

(%)
Agriculture 18.5 7.9 5.5 77.0 6.3 44.8
Industry 26.5 51.3 75.8 9.3 27.2 17.5
Construction 4.3 – – 4.1 7.1 5.4
Government Administration 12.2 – – 0.9 11.5 5.7
Other services 38.4 40.8 18.7 8.7 47.9 26.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Total (bn Dh or '000 workers) 279.3 70.6 86.1 4640.2 3870.4 8510.5

Note: GDP and trade data are for 1994; employment data are for 1995.

28
Table 2.2. Tariff and non-tariff rates and values for Morocco, 1994.

Non-tariff Aggregate EU tariff Non-EU Aggregate EU tariff Non-EU

barrier tariff rate rate tariff rate tariff revenue revenue tariff revenue
(%) (%) (%) (%) (mn Dh) (mn Dh) (mn Dh)
Hard wheat 60.1 16.2 16.9 40.5 40.5
Soft wheat 177.9 16.2 16.6 15.9 180.5 85.7 94.8
Barley 25.2 21.8 37.6 21.9 14.8 7.1
Maize 19.6 17.5 20.9 122.6 40.6 82
Sunflower 29.6 37.4 29.5 192.3 3.1 189.2
Other industrial crop 29.4 18.4 35.4 380.9 84.4 296.5
Vegetable 10.8 15.3 25.2 25.2
Olives 51.1 46.7 60.8 20.8 13.1 7.8
Other fruit 63.9 78.6 61.3 15.3 2.8 12.6
Milk 44.1 98.2 97.3 99.3 9.3 5.1 4.1
Beef 162 89.7 88.9 96.7 139.2 125.2 14
Sheep-goat meat 154.8 90.9 90.6 91.1 26.6 10.3 16.2
Sheep-goat wool 158.8 92.3 94.4 91 5.1 2 3.1
Other animal 186.6 88.2 87.9 89.6 890.7 751.1 139.7
Forestry 3 19.4 7.6 7.6
Fishing 48.3 68.5 7.9 7.9
Mining 8.4 18.1 6.6 142.3 48.6 93.7
Petroleum 20.6 46.8 16.3 1647.8 522.8 1125
Manufacturing 2 31.6 37 22.1 16527.2 12344.9 4182.3
Total 29.6 37.2 19.8 20403.7 14095.1 6308.6

Source: Model SAM.

29
Table 2.3. Social and economic indicators: nation-wide and by locale (rural and
urban)

Rural Urban Total

Population (1994)
mn 12.7 13.4 26.1
% 48.6 51.4 100.0
Annual population growth (1982-1994)
Natural 2.6 1.7 2.2
Post-Migration 0.7 3.6 2.0
Poverty rate (1991) 18.0 7.0 13.1
Electricity access (1994) 9.7 80.7 46.2
Safe water access (1994) 4.0 74.2 40.1
Illiteracy rate (1994)
Male 61.0 25.0 41.0
Female 89.0 49.0 67.0
Total 75.0 37.0 55.0
Primary school enrollment rates (1991)
Male 56.5 86.7 69.9
Female 29.9 84.7 52.8
Total 43.2 85.7 61.3
Labor market data (1995)
Labor force
'000 5,024.4 4,982.1 10,006.4
% 50.2 49.8 100.0
Participation rate 39.5 36.0 37.7
Unemployment
'000 384.2 1,111.7 1,495.9
% (of labor force) 7.6 22.3 14.9
Employment
'000 4,640.2 3,870.4 8,510.5
% 54.5 45.5 100.0
Skilled labor (% of total) 5.6 41.1 21.7

Note: Units are in percent (unless otherwise indicated)

30
Table 3.1. Disaggregation of activities, factors, and institutions.

No. Sets Elements

45 Activities
38 Rural

15 Irrigated crops Soft wheat

Hard wheat
Barley
Maize
Other cereal
Legumes
Fodder
Sugarbeet
Sugarcane
Sunflower
Other industrial crop
Vegetable
Olive
Citrus
Other fruit

2 Irrigated livestock Cow

Sheep-goat

13 Rainfed crops Soft wheat

Hard wheat
Barley
Maize
Other cereal
Legumes
Fodder
Sugarbeet
Sunflower
Other industrial crop
Vegetable
Olive
Other fruit

2 Rainfed livestock Cow

Sheep-goat

3 Other agriculture Other animal

Forestry
Fishing

3 Rural non-agriculture Manufacturing

Construction
Other service

31
Table 3.1. Cont'd.

Sectors Sets Elements

7 Urban Mining
Petroleum
Electricity
Manufacturing
Construction
Other service
Public administration

7 Factors
4 Agriculture resources irrigated land
water
rainfed land
pasture
3 Other skilled labor
unskilled labor
capital

4 Households
2 Rural Poor
Non-poor
2 Urban Poor
Non-poor

3 Other institutions
1 Government Government
2 Rest of the world EU
Other

32
Figure 3.1. Technology for Production Activities

Output
(linear)

Value added Intermediate

(CES) (linear)

Land/water sectoral inputs

Labor Capital
(linearized (CES)
CES)
Imported Domestic
Land Water

33
Figure 3.2. Commodity flow in CGE model

34
Table 3.2. Macro SAM for Morocco, 1994 (billion current Dh.)
Factors Institutions S-I Activity Commodity Tax/Sub/Tariff Total

1. 2a. 2b. 2c. 3. 4. 5. 6a. 6b. 6c. 6d. 7.

1. Factors 238.35 238.35

2. Institutions
2a. Household 232.92 7.74 21.42 262.07
2b. Government 5.38 2.02 15.21 23.70 20.47 66.78
2c. Rest of World 0.06 5.55 7.04 86.21 98.85
3. Savings-Investment 45.05 8.03 6.69 59.77

4. Activities 639.75 639.75

5. Commodities 194.24 40.78 70.75 59.77 392.12 7.97 3.20 768.81

6.Tax/Sub/Tariff
6a. Direct Taxes 15.21 15.21
6b. Indirect Taxes 9.28 14.42 23.70
6c. Subsidies 3.20 3.20
6d. Import Tariffs 20.47 20.47
7. Total 238.35 262.07 66.78 98.85 59.77 639.75 768.81 15.21 23.70 3.20 20.47

35
Table 4.1 Alternative trade policy simulations: Scenario definitions

Item AAEU TARIFF TARIFF + NTB TRADE-LIB

Industrial tariffs

EU AAEU* AAEU* AAEU* AAEU*

Non-EU No change Unified at 29%** Unified at 29%** Unified at 10%**

Agricultural tariffs

EU No change Unified at 29%** Unified at 29%** Unified at 10%**

Non-EU No change Unified at 29%** Unified at 29%** Unified at 10%**

Non-tariff barriers No change No change Eliminated** Eliminated**

AAEU = implementation of the Association Agreement with the European Union with status-quo policies.
TARIFF = tariff unification
TARIFF + NTB = tariff unification plus non-tariff barriers cut
TRADE-LIB = tariff unification and reduction plus non-tariff barriers cut

Notes:
* AAEU = Gradual elimination of tariffs on industrial imports from EU 1999-2010.
**Tariff unification and elimination of non-tariff barriers is done gradually 1999-2005. In 1994, the average
tariff for industrial and agricultural imports was 29%.

36
Table 4.2. Simulation results: Alternative trade policy scenarios

TARIFF TRADE-
1998 AAEU TARIFF + LIB
value NTB

% annual growth 1998-2012

Real GDP at factor cost (bn. 1994 Dh.)
Agriculture 48.46 2.16 2.07 1.88 1.83
Rural non agriculture 27.21 3.43 3.23 3.40 3.48
Urban 191.06 4.07 4.04 4.08 4.11
Real factor income (bn 1994 Dh.)
Total 265.42 3.24 3.29 4.10 4.18
Irrigated resources 6.38 6.71 6.57 6.23 5.93
Rainfed resources 20.04 5.57 5.41 3.98 3.48
Unskilled labor 37.96 3.91 3.79 4.05 4.01
Skilled labor 94.91 2.63 2.70 3.94 4.14
Capital 106.12 2.74 2.90 4.14 4.27
Labor shares (%)*
Agriculture 43.47 43.48 42.88 39.29 38.36
Rural non agriculture 11.00 10.11 10.13 11.08 11.30
Urban 45.53 46.41 46.99 49.63 50.34
Real household per capita income (‘000 1994 Dh)
All 9.77 1.88 1.94 2.32 2.41
Urban Poor 3.08 2.66 2.58 2.95 2.96
Urban Non-poor 13.45 1.65 1.78 2.12 2.25
Rural Poor 3.00 2.86 2.71 2.71 2.60
Rural Non-poor 7.52 2.19 2.15 2.65 2.67
Real trade quantities (bn 1994 Dh.)
Exports 80.05 4.52 4.42 4.93 5.29
Agriculture exports 5.45 -0.13 -0.23 -0.13 0.13
To EU 4.15 -0.55 -0.52 -0.72 -0.75
To non-EU 1.30 1.07 0.62 1.50 2.42
Industrial exports 43.89 5.97 5.82 6.57 7.04
To EU 28.97 5.72 5.52 6.33 6.81
To non-EU 14.91 6.45 6.36 7.01 7.48
Imports 98.12 4.17 4.08 4.52 4.81
Agriculture imports 7.86 6.20 6.32 10.25 11.38
From EU 3.32 5.61 6.28 12.17 13.32
From non-EU 4.54 6.60 6.35 8.50 9.63
Industrial imports 69.75 4.75 4.64 4.50 4.66
From EU 39.86 7.38 7.57 7.42 6.75
From non-EU 29.89 -1.11 -2.52 -2.63 0.61
Real exchange rate (index 1998 = 100) 100.00 105.02 106.94 113.74 116.37
(% of GDP)**
Tariffs 7.34 2.46 2.56 3.52 1.63
Value added tax -0.42 4.09 3.86 2.21 4.03
Note: See table 4.1 for description of the simulations. *In all columns, share of labor force by aggregate sector
(not annual growth). **Except for the 1998 column, GDP shares in 2012.

37
Figure 4.1. Household per capita income – urban poor Figure 4.2. Household per capita income – urban non-poor

Figure 4.3. Household per capita income – rural poor Figure 4.4. Household per capita income – rural non-poor

38
Figure 4.5. Factor income – resources in irrigated agriculture Figure 4.6. Factor income – resources in rainfed
agriculture

Figure 4.7. Factor income – unskilled labor Figure 4.8. Factor income – skilled labor

Figure 4.9. Factor income – Capital

39
Table 4.3 Complementary policy simulations: Scenario definitions

Scenario Description

TRANSFER
Rainfed factor compensation TRADE-LIB + transfers to owners of rainfed agricultural
resources (land and pasture), in each period fully
compensating for loss compared to AAEU

SKILL-UPGRADE
Rural skill enhancement TRADE-LIB + in each period, the stock of rural skilled
labor is augmented by 5% with the additional labor
coming from the unskilled labor of rural households

40
Table 4.4. Simulation results: Alternative complementary domestic policy scenarios

TRADE – TRANSFER SKILL –

AAEU LIB UPGRADE

% annual growth 1998-2012

Real GDP at factor cost (bn. 1994 Dh.)
Agriculture 2.16 1.83 1.80 1.86
Rural non agriculture 3.43 3.48 3.48 3.73
Urban 4.07 4.11 4.16 4.42
Real factor income (bn 1994 Dh.)
Total 3.24 4.18 3.86 4.34
Irrigated resources 6.71 5.93 5.53 6.67
Rainfed resources 5.57 3.48 3.09 4.08
Unskilled labor 3.91 4.01 3.71 4.49
Skilled labor 2.63 4.14 3.93 4.03
Capital 2.74 4.27 3.89 4.45
Labor shares (%)*
Agriculture 43.48 38.36 38.03 37.34
Rural non agriculture 10.11 11.30 11.30 11.18
Urban 46.41 50.34 50.67 51.49
Real household per capita income ( ‘000 1994 Dh.)
All households 1.88 2.41 2.34 2.57
Urban Poor 2.66 2.96 2.72 3.46
Urban Non-poor 1.65 2.25 2.07 2.08
Rural Poor 2.86 2.60 3.03 3.83
Rural Non-poor 2.19 2.67 2.78 3.33
Real trade quantities (bn 1994 Dh.)
Exports 4.52 5.29 5.25 5.60
Agriculture exports -0.13 0.13 0.12 -0.16
To EU -0.55 -0.75 -0.76 -0.93
To non-EU 1.07 2.42 2.41 1.89
Industrial exports 5.97 7.04 6.99 7.43
To EU 5.72 6.81 6.76 7.14
To non-EU 6.45 7.48 7.43 7.96
Imports 4.17 4.81 4.78 5.04
Agriculture imports 6.20 11.38 11.32 11.93
From EU 5.61 13.32 13.23 13.79
From non-EU 6.60 9.63 9.59 10.27
Industrial imports 4.75 4.66 4.65 4.89
From EU 7.38 6.75 6.73 6.99
From non-EU -1.11 0.61 0.60 0.82
Real exchange rate (index 1998 = 100) 105.02 116.37 116.41 116.55
(% of GDP)**
Tariffs 2.46 1.63 1.61 1.67
Value added tax 4.09 4.03 8.04 4.07
Transfers and compensations 3.75

Note: See Tables 4.1 and 4.3 for definitions of the simulations. *In all columns, share of labor force by
aggregate sector (not annual growth). **Except for the 1998 column, GDP shares in 2012.

41
Figure 4.10. Household per capita income – urban poor Figure 4.11. Household per capita income – urban non-poor

Figure 4.12. Household per capita income – rural poor Figure 4.13. Household per capita income – rural non-poor

42
 Figure 4.14. Government transfers to owners of rainfed for
TRANSFER scenario (% of GDP)

Figure 4.15. Political support – Dirham power Figure 4.16. Political support – people power

43
APPENDIX
Table A.1.1. Mathematical Statement of the static module of the Morocco Rural-Urban
CGE Model1
SETS
a0 A activities (=A')
a0 APRD (dA) production activities
a0 AFAG (dA) factor-aggregation activities
c0C commodities
z0 Z factors and institutions (domestic and rest of the world) (=Z')
f 0 F (dZ) factors (=F')
f 0 FA (dF) aggregate factors
f 0 FAFE (dFA) aggregate factors with full employment
f 0 FAUN (dFA) aggregate factors with (potential) unemployment
f 0 FD (dF) disaggregated factors (irrigated land, water)
i 0 I (dZ) domestic institutions (households and government)
h0 H (dI) households
(a, a ))0 MA mapping: production activity a is linked to factor-aggregation activity a'

PARAMETERS
sav
f̄ foreign savings (foreign currency)
we
p̄c world price of exports (foreign currency)
wm
p̄c world price of imports (foreign currency)
d
p̄ price index for domestic output (non-tradables)
f
q̄f supply of (aggregate or disaggregate) factor f
dst
q̄c stock change for commodity c
g
q̄c government consumption
inv
q̄c fixed investment demand for c
t̄ z z ) transfer to institution/factor z from institution/factor z'
min
w̄f minimum wage for (potentially unemployed) aggregate factor f
f
"f a quantity of disaggregated factor f per unit of factor-aggregation activity a
i
"ca intermediate input c per unit of production activity a
(a c yield of commodity c per unit of production activity a
f
2i f share of domestic institution i in income of aggregate factor f
hg
2h nominal GDP share transferred from government to household h
sav
2h share of post-tax income of household h to savings
ntb
2h share of non-tariff-barrier rent to household h
Fc rate of household consumption subsidy for commodity c
d
Jh direct tax rate for household h
i
Ja indirect tax rates for activity a
m
Jc import tariff rate
ntb
Jc rate of non-tariff barrier
s
Jc rate of sales tax
d
Tc weight of commodity c in domestic sales price index

45
Table A. 1.1 (con't)
VARIABLES
eg government expenditures
h
eh household consumption expenditures
gdp nominal GDP at market prices
sav
g government savings
a
pa output revenue per unit of production activity a
d
pc price of domestic output sold domestically
e
pc price of exports
m
pc price of imports
q
pc price of composite good
va
pa value-added (net) price for production activity a
x
pc average producer price
xac
pa c producer price for commodity c from production activity a
a
qa level of (production or factor-aggregation) activity a
d
qc domestic sales of domestic output
e
qc exports
f
qf a demand for (aggregate/disaggreg.) factor f from (prod./factor aggreg.) activity a
h
qch consumption demand for c from household h
int
qc intermediate input demand for c
m
qc imports of c
q
qc supply of composite commodity c
x
qc total output of commodity c
xac
qa c production of commodity c from production activity a
r exchange rate (units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency)
wf wage of (aggregate/disaggregate) factor f
f
yf income of aggregate factor f
g
y government income
if
yi f income of domestic institution i from aggregate factor f
h
yh income of household h

Functions
CES(•) constant elasticity of substitution
CET(•) constant elasticity of transformation
LES(•) linear expenditure system
Table A.1.1 (con't)
EQUATIONS

# Equation Domain Description

Price Block

1
m
pc ' p̄c
wm
(1 %Jc %Jc ) r
m ntb c 0C import price in domestic currency

2
e
pc ' p̄c r
we c 0C export price in domestic currency

d
(pc qc % pc qc )
d m m c 0C average demand price of composite
q s
3 pc ' (1 %Jc ) commodity
q
qc

d
( pc qc %pc qc )
d e e c0C average producer price of
x
4 pc ' commodity c
x
qc

pa ' j (a c pa c a0APRD
a xac gross price for production activity
5
c0C

pa ' pa ( 1& Ja ) & j "ca pa a0APRD

va a i i q value added (net) price for
6
c0C production activity

Supply and Trade Block

7
a
qa ' CES [qfa, a ]
f a0APRD level of domestic production activity

f
qf a ' CES ( [wf , pa ]
va f 0FA demand for aggregate factor f from
82 a0APRD production activity a

j "ca qa
qc
int
'
i a c 0C intermediate input demand
9
a0APRD

j wf "f a $ wlw
f a
qa $ 0 a0AFAG MC $ MR for factor-aggregation
103
f0FD activity a
f f
qf a ' "f a qa
a f 0FD demand for disaggregated factor f
11 a0AFAG from factor-aggregation activity a

j
f
qlw, a ' qa )
a a0APRD mapping of factor-aggregation
12 )
a 0AFAG | activities to production activity a
(a,a ))0 MA

xac
qa c ' (a c qa
a a0APRD output of commodity c from
13 c 0C production activity a

47
Table A.1.1 (con't)
x
qc ' CES [qa c ]
xac c 0C output aggregation function for
14
commodity c
xac
qa c ' CES ( [pa c , pc ]
xac x a0APRD demand for commodity c from
15 c 0C production activity a
x
qc ' CET [qc , qc ]
e d c 0C CET function transforming output to
16
exports and domestic sales

qc
e
pc
e c 0C FOC for output transformation
(
17 ' CET
d d
qc pc

CES function aggregating imports

q m d
18 qc ' CES [qc , qc ] c 0C and domestic sales to composite
supply

qc
m
pc
d c 0C FOC for commodity aggregation
(
19 ' CES
d m
qc pc

Institution block

j wf qf a
f
yf '
f f 0FA income of aggregate factor f
20
a0APRD

if f f
yi f ' 2i f ( y f & t̄ row , f r) i 0I income of domestic institution i
214 f 0FA from aggregate factor f

y h ' j yh f % 2h gdp % t̄ h, row r h 0H

h if hg household income
f0FA
2h j
22 ntb ntb wm m
% Jc p̄c qc r
c0C

23
h
eh '
sav
( 1 & 2h ) (1 & Jh ) y h & t̄ row , h r
d h h 0H household consumption expenditure

h
qch ' LES ([ (1 & Fc ) pc , e h ]
q h c 0C household consumption demand
24 h0H

y g ' ygov , f % j Jh y h % j Jc ( pc qc % pc qc )
if d h s d d m m government income
h0H c0C

j % j Jc p̄c
5
25 i a a m wm m
% Ja p a q a qc % t̄ gov , row
a0APRD c0C

e g ' j pc q̄c % j 2h gdp % t̄ row , gov r % j j Fc pc qch

q g hg q h government expenditure
26
c0C h0H c0C h0H

gdp ' j j pc ( 1 & Fc )qch % j pc q̄c % j pc q̄c

q h q inv q dst nominal GDP
c0C h0H c0C c0C

j pc q̄c % j pc qc r & j p̄c qc r

27 q g we e wm m
%
c0C c0C c0C

48
 Table A.1.1 (con't)

System Constraint Block

% j qch % q̄c % q̄c c 0C

q int h g inv dst market equilibrium for composite
28 qc ' qc % q̄c
h0H commodity (S=D)

j qf a
f
q̄f '
f f 0FAFE market equilibrium for fully
29 f … lw
a0APRD employed aggregate factors (S=D)

j qf a
f
q̄f $
f
wf $ w̄f
min f 0FAUN market equilibrium for potentially
30 f …lw
a0APRD unemployed aggregate factors (S$D)

j qf a
f
q̄f $
f
wf $ 0 f 0FD market equilibrium for
31
a0AFAG disaggregated factors (S$D)

j p̄c qc % j t̄ row , z ' j p̄c qc % j t̄ z, row % f̄

wm m we e sav current account balance (in foreign
32
c0C z0Z c0C z0Z currency)

j 2h (1 & Jh ) y h % (y & e ) % r f̄ ' j pc ( q̄c

sav g g d h sav q inv dst savings-investment balance
33 % q̄c )
h0H c0C

p̄ d ' j Tc pc
d d price index for domestic output
34
c0C (numéraire)

1. The following notational convention is used: Superscripts are part of variable/parameter names; subscripts are set indices.
Variables are written as one or more base-level Latin letters without a bar. Parameters appear as Greek letters or as Latin letters
with a bar.
2. CES*, CET*, LES* indicate relationships derived from the respective functions.
3. Complementary constraints are shown in brackets in the equation column. lw = the aggregate factor irrigated-land-water, an
aggregation of the disaggregated factors irrigated land and water
4. row = rest of the world
5. gov = government

Note: The mathematical statement is simplified. The following aspects has been suppressed:
(i) domain controls (limiting equations and variables to subsets of the sets indicated); (ii) wage distortion factors (permitting
wage differences across activities); and (iii) special treatments of markets for aggregate factors (permitting rural-urban migration
and activity-specificity); (iv) price-responsiveness of selected intermediate input coefficients; (v) disaggregation of imports and
exports by source and destination (EU vs. non-EU), respectively; and (vi) constant-elasticity demand curves for selected export
commodities-regions in place of fixed export prices. The full model is described in section 3.

49
Table A.1.2. Economic growth and structural change, 1970-1996
Real Growth (% per year) Share of GDP (%)
1970-80 1980-90 1990-96 1970 1980 1996

GNP per capita 2.9 1.5 1.0

GDP at market prices 5.6 3.8 2.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agriculture 2.2 3.8 2.8 19.9 18.4 20.4
Industry 5.9 3.2 2.1 27.0 30.9 30.5
Services 6.8 4.2 3.0 53.1 50.6 49.1

Domestic Absorption 6.2 3.4 3.0 103.9 110.5 104.8

Private Consumption 5.4 3.1 4.4 73.4 68.0 67.8
Government Consumption 10.9 4.7 0.1 12.0 18.3 16.4
Gross Investment 7.0 3.4 0.3 18.5 24.2 20.6
Fixed Investment 7.2 3.7 0.9 14.9 22.2 20.4

Resource gap -3.9 -10.5 -4.8

Exports of Goods & Services 3.4 6.7 3.4 17.6 17.4 25.1
Imports of Goods & Services 6.3 4.6 3.1 21.6 27.9 29.9

Openness (Trade/GDP) 39.2 45.3 55.0

Notes: * Real growth computed at 1987 prices.

** Share data computed at current prices.
Source: WDI 1997, RMSM, December 1997.

50
Table A.1.3. Household incomes disaggregated by source (1994, in percentages)

Urban Poor Urban Non-Poor Rural Poor Rural Non-Poor

Irrigated resources - 0.3 4.9 5.1

Rainfed resources - 1.1 33.5 15.3

Unskilled labor 73.6 7.2 37.0 19.3

Skilled labor 10.6 42.1 - 13.0

Capital - 40.5 15.8 31.0

Government Transfers 4.2 2.4 2.3 4.3

Rest of the World Transfers 11.6 6.5 6.4 11.9

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

51