THE DYNAMICS OF NIGERIA'S DECOLONIZATION POLICY IN AFRICA

Author(s): Nereus I. Nwosu

Source: Transafrican Journal of History , 1993, Vol. 22 (1993), pp. 74-86
Published by: Gideon Were Publications

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24328637

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 THE DYNAMICS OF NIGERIA'S DECOLONIZATION
POLICY IN AFRICA

Nereus I. Nwosu

Accepted December 10 1992

Abstract
This study shows that a lot still remains undone in the process
of decolonization of Africa. It establishes that only political
independence has been achieved in the continent. As of now,
economic and cultural imperialism remains a burden in the
region. The reason for this is that the African leadership lacks
the will to challenge foreign capitalist domination of the
continent. In spite of the attempts by Nigerian governments to
move ahead in the decolonization of the African economy and
culture, the dependent relationship existing between the coun
try and the developed economies of the West has proved a
handicap. The only way to achieve African decolonization
seems to be through a joint effort of all states within the
continent by a process of economic integration. Essentially,
this forms the basis for the formation of an African Economic
Community (AEC).

Introduction
Apart from South Africa, Namibia's independence in 1990 marked an end to the era
of colonialism and minority regimes in Africa. Prior to the 1960s, many African
countries were subjected to the administration of foreign powers who came mainly
from Europe. This system of government has been described as colonialism
(Ezenwe, 1984:5). Indeed, the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 marked the beginning
of foreign domination of originally dispersed Africans. However, the rise of
nationalism in most African states following the end of the Second World War and
the formation of the United Nations in 1945 led to the independence of these states.
The forerunner was Ghana which got her political independence on 6th March,
1957. Since then all African States have secured their self government. Nigeria,
with the highest population in the continent achieved political freedom on 1st
October, 1960.
Since independence, different African regimes have shown interest in the
liberation of African countries still under colonialism. Most of these states are in
the Southern African sub region which were mostly colonized by Portugal.
Essentially, this study attempts to look at the contribution of Nigeria in the
decolonization process in Africa. This is looked at under three sub-sections:
political, economic and cultural issues.

Transafrican Journal of History, Vol. 22, 1993 74 - 86

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 Transafrican Journal of History

Political Freedom
Nigeria has been in the forefront of political decolonization of Africa. Beginning
from Balewa's regime, the principle of African political liberation has formed a
cardinal objective ofthe country's foreign policy (Nwosu, 1991:33). However, this
call has been made in the belief that the process of self government should be gradual
(Aluko, 1977:170). This is to avoid upturning the social systems of the affected
countries. This gradualist approach was informed by the perception of Prime
Minister Balewa that the crisis witnessed in Congo at independence came mostly
because of the unpreparedness of the elite of that state to assume the position of
leadership. Due essentially to this, the Balewa regime advocated for a period of
tutelage for African countries with the hope of their attaining political independence
by 1970 (Mackintosh, 1963-64:211). Balewa's call for gradual approach to
independence should be seen from his view that colonial rule was a basic necessity
for the development of the African person. This was partly why he regarded the
British as one of Nigeria's best friends all through his life (Ojedokun, 1971:21).
In spite of Balewa's gradualist approach, his government contributed immensely
both morally and financially to the liberation of many African States (Ogbu,
1967:27). His regime, for instance, was among the major contributors to the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) fund for African liberation Movements
(Ogbu, 1967:27). It also used every available opportunity to condemn colonialism
in the continent. Balewa's attachment to African Liberation could be discerned from
the first foreign policy speech he delivered to the Nigerian legislature on 20th
August, 1960 (Epelle, 1964:57).
Subsequent regimes have also demonstrated great interest in the political indepen
dence of dependent African States. A remarkable difference between these regimes
and Balewa was that the succeeding governments, particularly the Murtala Muhammed
administration, demonstrated greater assertiveness in confronting colonialism in
Africa. The Gowon government, in spite of its enthusiastic disposition to the
countries of Western Europe and America used all possible avenues to call for the
abrogation of colonialism in the continent. That regime also gave financial aid to
the African liberation movements. Besides, it sponsored several African children
from the colonized states to study in Nigeria for future service to their countries. In
doing these, the Gowon administration remained sensitive to the reactions of her
traditional western friends whose companies dominate the Nigerian economy
(Ogunbadejo, 1976:26).
It was the Muhammed regime that for the first time in Nigerian history not only
confronted colonialism with rhetorics delivered at various summits but challenged
the West to open confrontation. The administration's abhorrence of colonialism
could be seen in the way that the regime seized the initiative in settling the Angolan
war of independence in 1975. In doing this, the Muhammad government was

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Dynamics of Nigeria's Decolonization Policy

prepared to challenge the Washington regime to an open combat. This was not only
refusing to accede to the move by the Ford administration to broker a government
of national unity made up of all Angolan liberation groups but by also making public
Gerald Ford's letter to the government (Usman, 1979:287-8). The Nigerian
government described the letter as "an insult to the African leaders" (Aluko,
1979:91). Consequently, Muhammed refused a visit to Nigeria by Henry Kissinger,
the then United States Secretary of State. The Muhammed's regime went ahead to
recognize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as the sole
legitimate government of Angola and used the forum of the extra ordinary summit
of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government to solicit for African
support for the MPLA. Muhammed's administration adopted this step because
according to the Head of State:

On the other hand are FNLA and UNITA, two movements which no doubt
played their part in the liberation struggle but which have forfeited their right
to the leadership of the Angolan people by joining hands with neo-colonialist
adventurers and racist soldiers of fortune, including the apostles of apartheid,
in a determined effort to destroy the sovereignty of Angola. After the moral
and material support which Nigeria gave to the Angolan Liberation Struggle,
the Federal Military Government cannot support any movement that seeks to
hand the fruits of Angola, indeed African labour to the enemies of the
Angolan and the African people (The Guardian, 1983).

It is on record that following these developments the Muhammed's regime

embarked on a diplomatic blitzkrieg to secure the recognition and support of
Africans for the MPLA Government of Angola. It ban be argued that the MPLA
owes much of its survival as the government of Angola to this singular act by the
Nigerian government. This was because with the firm stand of the Muhammed
regime against the United states position and the sensitization of many African States
on the issue, the Ford administration's stand became questionable. Thus, the
domestic support which Gerald Ford needed to sustain his government's Angolan
policy was eroded. What the White House did was to find an Angolan surrogate like
Jonas Savimbi and his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) Movement to fight her battle (Omonubi, 1986:25).
Subsequent governments after Muhammed have in their own ways shown
enthusiasm in the political decolonization of Africa. Hence, the Obasanjo and
Babangida regimes did not waste time in leading a boycott of both the 1976 Montreal
Canada Olympic Games and the 1986 Ediburgh Scotland Commonwealth Games
because of racist South Africa (Akinrinade et al 1986:13). The nationalization of
the assets of the British Petroleum by the Obasanjo administration in 1979 and the

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 Transqfncan Journal of History

acquisition of 80 per cent share in Barclays Bank Limited by the same government
were huge testimonies of that regime's resolve to fight colonialism and apartheid in
Africa. These moves were made principally to forestall the intransigence of the then
British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher over the question of Zimbabwean
independence and apartheid policy in South Africa (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer,
1981:50).
The nationalization of the assets of British Petroleum on the heels of the 1979
Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, forced Margaret Thatcher to rethink
her government's policy on Southern Africa. The effect of the seizure of the British
Petroleum assets in Nigeria on the Conservative Government of Thatcher becomes
clearer when it is realized that as at 1979, the company was one of the largest
prospecting oil firms in the country's highly profitable petroleum industry. Its
capacity could only be compared then with those of Shell Petroleum Development
Company, Mobil, Texaco and Total. The Barclays Bank, on the other hand, was
the second largest bank in Nigeria as at the time of the acquisition of eighty per cent
share by the Obasanjo regime. It was second only to another British Bank, Standard
Bank in both assets and branch network throughout the federation. This is still the
case today. Imposition of sanctions on these two firms was, therefore, very
discomforting to the Thatcher administration. Its impact on the British public
opinion was to develop a negative attitude towards their government's policy on
Southern Africa (Aluko, 1981:228). That Thatcher allowed the constitutional
conference which led to the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980 demonstrates
the effectiveness of these sanctions.
The decisions of Muhammed and Obasanjo regimes could be attributed to the high
regard attached to African decolonization by both administrations. It could also be
attributed to the centralized nature of military governments where the federal regime
determines to a very large extent the direction of national policy (Muhammed,
1975). This contrasts sharply with what was obtained under the two civilian
administrations. Here, the different regional or state governments made centrifugal
demands on foreign policy matters (Gambari, 1980:100-11). They even at times
challenged the federal government over certain external issues. An instance was the
various demands on the federal government by the regional administrations over the
country's relationship with Israel. Whereas the Northern Regional government
called for a complete isolation of Israel, the Western and Eastern Regional
governments advocated for strong relationship. What resulted from this was the
"adoption of diplomatic balance" by the Balewa government. This could be seen in
the federal government's decision to allow Israel to establish a diplomatic mission
in Lagos without a corresponding embassy by Nigeria in Tel Aviv (Gambari,
1980:100-11). This kind of pressure was again noticeable during the Second
Republic when the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and some state Houses of Assembly

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Dynamics of Nigeria's Decolonization Policy

called on the federal government to engage in a war with Cameroon following the
killing of five Nigerian soldiers by the former's gendarmes on 16th May, 1981
(Macebuh, 1981:302-3). Also, the acquisition of foreign loans by some state
governments during the Second Republic sometimes against the advice of the federal
government affected central control of external affairs under the regime. The federal
government under such a domestic environment was bound to be more circumspect
in her external affairs posture.
The Babangida administration like its predecessors has also maintained the stance
that the political decolonization of Africa constitutes an important element of
Nigeria's foreign policy. Hence, in spite of all pretensions to reform the apartheid
policy by Pretoria, President Babangida has insisted that:

Our stand against the odious apartheid regime remains unshaken and we are
not deceived by the cosmetic reforms which the Afrikaneers have been
making. Faced with the intransigence of the Pretoria regime, we have no
option other than to continue to support the liberation struggles of the
peoples of Namibia and South Africa led by SWAPO and the ANC
respectively. We consider their armed struggle to be a legitimate course of
action and will continue to support their efforts in every way possible until
the system of apartheid is dismantled (Babangida, 1988:9).

Nigeria's opposition to racism in South Africa together with those of other

countries and the liberation struggle of the African National Congress (ANC) has
resulted in the abrogation of the Population Registration Act, the Land Act, the
Group Areas Act and the Special Amenities Act. These are the four most prominent
but notorious pillars of apartheid policy. In spite of this abrogation, the Pretoria
regime is still resisting the call for a constitutional conference that will lead to black
majority rule in that country. Nigeria has thus insisted that the political and
economic isolation of South Africa should remain. Despite this stand, countries like
United States and Britain have decided to end their isolation of pretoria regime. The
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and some other international sporting
associations have also decided to re-admit South Africa into their fold. In fact, there
were suggestions that South Africa should participate in the fifth all Africa Games
which took place in Egypt between 20th September - 1st October, 1991. Nigeria
opposed the move, insisting that a lot still needs to be done before South Africa could
be rehabilitated. Nigeria's position could be understood from the perspective that
the country's foreign policy elite believe that it has an important role to play in the
apartheid problem. The reason is due mainly to the belief that the nation is one of
the richest in the continent and has the highest population. Again, President
Babangida is the current Chairman of the OAU, a post he believes carries
responsibility of taking the lead in crucial African matters. Also, a Nigerian, Emeka

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 Transafrican Journal of History

Anyaoku is the Secretary General of the Commonwealth.

Nigeria's interest in African decolonization was further manifested in her
enthusiasm over Namibia's political independence in 1990. Because of this the
country despatched some of her policemen and electoral officers to that nation to
monitor the independence process (NTA News, 1991). In doing this, Babangida's
administration was making it clear that Nigeria would not welcome any excuse(s)
on the part of Pretoria to delay Namibia's self government.

Economic Liberation
As is the case with political decolonization, an attempt to free the African economy
has led Nigerian regimes to enter into all kinds of bilateral and multilateral economic
agreements with several African countries. Hence, the country together with Togo
initiated in May 1975, the formation of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) to integrate the economy of the sub-region (Aluko, 1981:12). It
is due to the belief of Nigerian leaders in the efficacy of ECOWAS that the country
contributes a greater proportion of the annual budget of the organization (Akindele,
1988:139). Its imposing secretariat is at Abuja, the new capital of Nigeria, with the
country contributing $5 million of the budgeted $15 million of the cost of building
it (Africa Research Bulletin, 1986:8264). However, the ECOWAS, after sixteen
years of its formation, has not succeeded in integrating West African economy.
In the words of Sidwaya:

ECOWAS is very far from its objectives. The slowness and the poor level of
application of its decisions constitutes a constant problem. The countries are
over enthusiastic about taking commitments that they speedily forget (Africa
Research Bulletin, 1989:9593).

Most of the states within the West African sub-region still view each other with
suspicion and are, therefore, reluctant to surrender part of their sovereignty to
ECOWAS. Their pattern of economic transactions still shows a lot of dependency
on their former colonizers. The French Speaking countries appear to be greatly
affected by this bug. Hence, their monetary systems are still greatly tied to the
French Franc. Nigeria, the big brother in the sub-region is also caught in this
dilemma. This became obvious following the introduction of the foreign exchange
market. Today, the value of the national currency (Naira) is determined by the
available amount of British Pound Sterling and American dollar in the economy.
What ultimately results from this is that no matter how these nations try to be
independent, the existing centre - periphery relationship would undermine their
efforts. The major obstacle seems to be the lack of basic infrastructure for a
meaningful industrial and technological take-off. This cannot possibly be achieved

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Dynamics of Nigeria's Decolonization Policy

in an economy that is steeply based on the production of primary goods (Akindele,

1988: 106). Intermediate and heavy industries such as iron and steel, petroleum and
manufacturing are mostly controlled by foreign firms which do all they could to
perpetuate the existing relationship. Thus, in spite of the fact that Nigeria remains
a major exporter of oil in the world, that sector of her economy is dominated by
European and American firms such as Mobil, Total, Shell, Elf, Agip and Texaco.
Even in terms of export, Nigeria's oil continues to witness increased purchase by the
West to the neglect of Africa (Central Bank of Nigeria, 1990). This could be
explained on the grounds that most African countries lack the financial resources to
purchase oil in high quantity. The lack of purchasing power by states in the continent
thus explains Nigeria's decision to sell oil to them at concessionary prices in the
1970s (Mayall, 1976:330). The domination of the Nigerian economy by foreign
capital is well represented in the words of William Graf when he posited out that:

Activist foreign policy was thus conducted on the strength of the country's
growing integration into the world capitalist economy. Well over 90 % of its
imports came from, the advanced capitalist countries (Graf, 1988:236).

As part of the process of decolonizing the African economy, Nigeria with the
assistance of some other countries initiated the African Economic Community
(AEC). The treaty establishing the Community was signed during the 1991 OAU
Assembly of Heads of State and Government Summit in Abuja, Nigeria. The AEC
is essentially a revival of the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action whose purpose was to foster
co-operation among African states on economic issues. It was also established to
uplift the continent's economy through a process of integration. However, the idea
remains a dream. This is possibly so because of the economic realities existing in
most African countries where the economy is dominated by foreigners with very
limited local input (Barango, 1980:55). The colonial experience where most of the
economies of Africa were plundered and integrated into the world capitalist system
defies the efforts of the continent's economic integrationists (Nwoke, 1988:1). As
earlier indicated, most African States produce primary goods for export to Europe.
These are manufactured into finished products and returned to Africa for consump
tion at a very high cost. Hence, the tendency of many Africans developing taste for
foreign products becomes high that it requires enormous effort to pull out of such
a habit. Nigerian experience since the introduction of Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) in 1986 provides a good illustration. The resistance of many
citizens to SAP could partly be explained by the fear that the idea of sel f-reliance may
compel them to abandon some of their acquired foreign tastes. Before SAP, many
Nigerians made it a point to flaunt that the water they drank and the bread they ate
came from Europe or America. In fact, one of the major accusations levelled against
the politicians of the country's Second Republic was their massive importation of

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 Transqfrican Journal of History

rice and meat from America. This was necessitated by the reason that the political
elite saw their economic interest as coinciding with those of their class in the West.
They were, therefore, reluctant to throw away what was considered a life long
opportunity on the altar of African decolonization. The present AEC it is hoped will
do better than its predecessors. The problem, however, is that the same leaders who
have been described as visionless still remain at the apex in most African States
(Azikiwe, 1974:18).
Nigeria's current call on the European colonialists for reparation to Africa is a step
towards redressing the plunder of the continent's economy. In the words of
President Babangida, Africa as a whole should fight "in all possible ways the just
battle for international reparations against the centuries of humiliation and exploi
tation to which it had been subjected" (Babangida, 1991:5). But, the pertinent
question is, of what benefit would reparation be for the people of Africa? Past
experiences indicate that even if Europe agrees to pay, the money would be diverted
into private bank accounts abroad (Crowder, 1987:17). Nigeria's experience under
the Second Republic where State resources were diverted into private and corporate
accounts testifies to the above. At least, that was evident in the reports of the various
tribunals of inquiries set up by the succeeding Buhari regime. Also, the heavy jail
sentences netted out to several politicians following the overthrow of the Shagari
government on 31st December 1983, illustrates the use of state power by politicians
to accumulate personal wealth (Joseph, 1983:24; Othman, 1984:450-2andUwazurike,
1990:70). That essentially explains the high clamour for political power in Nigeria.
Similar occurrences exist in several other African States such as Ghana, Liberia,
Zaire and Central African Republic (Ayoade, 1988:105-6). Indeed, the high
incidence of political and economic corruption led the present Nigerian government
of General Babangida into making a clean sweep of the old politicians with the
introduction of what he called "new breed" politics. It has also partly led to most
of the pro-democracy movements currently going on in Africa and Eastern Europe.
The reparation call by the Nigerian government would require greater devotion and
re-orientation of the African political leadership if the continent hopes to benefit
positively from it.
In spite of Nigeria's effort, the contradictions inherent in her economy explains
the dilemma which the country's policy elite has faced in their attempt to decolonize
the African economy. Nigerian economy despite pretensions of self-reliance is still
heavily dependent on foreign capital to survive (Ihonvbereand Ekekwe 88/3:2777).
It is, therefore, not surprising that the major heights of the country's economy such
as oil, manufacturing, construction and banking are still controlled and manipulated
by foreign multinational corporations. This becomes increasingly so in an era when
the emphasis of the government is on privatization , commercialization and
attraction of foreign investment to the economy. It was on this basis that Babangida's

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Dynamics of Nigeria's Decolonization Policy

regime decided to reverse the principles that informed the indigenization policy of
the 1970s. Today, some of the areas reserved exclusively for Nigerians have been
declared open to all. Akin Fadahunsi captures the problem inherent in the Nigerian
economy this way:

Indeed to ensure that the country remains within the capitalist sphere of
influence in spite of her commitment to a non-aligned foreign policy most of
the investments to be undertaken in the productive sectors of the economy
were to be left to the private sector. Since the nascent indigenous capitalist
class is too weak to go into such economic ventures the alternative has to be
the foreign private investor. The government role - in plan implementation
was reduced to the provision of the appropriate^ climate-tax incentives,
accelerated capital depreciation rates, tariffs etc. - for foreign private
entrepreneurs to thrive. The mixed-economy strategy which is to be the
concomitant of the non-aligned foreign policy on the economic front did not
take off. The mixture was weighted in favour of the private sector
(Fadahunsi, 1979:3-4).

What this implies is that a major reason why economic decolonization of Nigerian
governments has not proved effective is because the political elite do not want to
commit class suicide. Many of them have interest in the continuation of the existing
centre-periphery relationship. This is because the dependent nature of the economy
is extremely beneficial to them. Many of them retire from government jobs into the
boards of these foreign business (Political Bureau, 1987:64). This inevitably creates
obstacles on the commitment of Nigerian leadership to the process of African
economic decolonization. It is, thus, pertinent that the elimination of African
economic subjugation requires a severance in the link between the elite in the centre
and periphery. Unless this is done, the existing situation would subsist. It is this
economic dependence that makes Douglas Anglin to classify Nigeria's policy under
the First Republic as politically non-aligned but economically aligned to the West
(Anglin, 1964).
It is thus a problem for Nigerian governments to determinedly initiate the process
of African economic decolonization. This is so because the state lacks the basic
requirements needed to undertake such an action. The only way to succeed is through
the development of the domestic economy in such a way as to resist external pressures
and manipulations. This can only be done in an atmosphere where the people are
committed to deny themselves some of the benefits of foreign capital. It was perhaps
this resolve that informed the negative attitude displayed by many Nigerians over
whether the country should accept an International Monetary Fund (IMF) support
loan or not in 1985. A deep reflection on the debate shows that a great many of the
opponents of the loan were not seriously bothered about the benefits or otherwise
of the money. The major focus of their attention was on what the IMF represents.

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 Transafrican Journal of History

And the view of many citizens of the developing world is that IMF is an agent of
neocolonialism and destabilization whose conditionality hardly help states to
resuscitate their economies (Akindele, 1988:135).

Cultural Decolonization
As is often claimed, colonialism affected not only the economy of the continent but
also how Africans think and perceive issues (Chinweizu, 1978:223-4). This is
particularly so because of the strong link between politics, economics and culture.
It is usually easy for holders of political and economic power to influence the cultural
disposition of others. This could either be through overt or covert method. The
colonialists, employed both the direct and indirect approach. For instance, the
French tried to bequeath their culture to the colonized Africans through the policy
of assimilation and direct rule (Ezenwe, 1984:4). The greatest avenue used by the
colonialists was through language and education. Hence, today many Africans
derive joy in claiming proficiency in speaking either English or French language
more than their own mother tongue. The Babangida regime's current drive to
indigenise the procedure of teaching in Nigerian primary schools through the use of
vernacular is a step towards not only decolonizing the Nigerian children's mind but
also ensuring the continuity of local languages. But like most changes, this policy
has faced resistance from a great percentage of the country's elite who claim that the
use of indigenous languages will render teaching very difficult.
Another aspect of cultural colonialism still prevalent in Africa is in the area of
audio visual especially the television, video films and cinema. In spite of the
Nigerian government's protestation of indigenization, most television programmes
in the country, particularly movies are still dominated by foreign films, mostly of
American and British origin. The claim of the television houses have often been that
it is more expensive to procure local than foreign films. This position is also
maintained in the area of cinema and video production. A new trend in Nigeria is
the emerging culture of satellite dishes to get easy access to foreign television
programmes. The possession of a satellite dish confers a certain level of class on their
owners. Hence, there is a current rush by the country's nouveau riche to possess
one. Nigerian government decolonization search light should be directed in this
direction. The government should be prepared to invest in the production of
programmes that will teach the positive aspects of African life to the citizens. Too
much emphasis on European and American movies do affect the perception and
attitude of Africans and many a time, the impacts are negative. Nosa Owens Ibie
graphically portrays the nature of foreign films constantly beamed to Nigerians in
these words:

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Dynamics of Nigeria 's Decolonization Policy

Their movie slots (televisions) are essentially foreign. Many of these movies
know no inhibition in the violent content. The trouble is that many people
are hooked on them. Foreign series like "It Tales a Thief" were straight from
the pits of hell, teaching potential thieves and robbers the tactics and
strategies of successful operations. Most, if not all, of the Chinese movies
glorify violence of the martial variety. Even the Indian movies which are
suffused with love themes have their share of gun slingers. But the violence
on TV has not been limited to the physical. Some have been psychological;
others have been cultural or political (Ibie, 1991:A6).

One other obvious aspect of cultural colonization still prevalent in Africa is the
easy readiness of Africans to change their black skin or hair to white. This is
especially the case amongst the ladies. The ultimate aim of doing this is to look like
Europeans. What this implies is inferiority of the black colour. It, therefore,
inevitably leads to a loss of confidence in the ability of the African to compete
favourably with the Europeans even within the former's territory. The Nigerian
leadership has failed to address this issue seriously.
Notwithstanding the above, Nigeria's attempt at decolonizing the African culture
could be seen in her hosting of the Second Black African Festival of Arts and Culture
(FESTAC) in 1977. The country's leadership has equally demonstrated its
commitment to cultural decolonization by setting up the national troupe. All these,
however, cannot eliminate cultural colonization except if there is a concerted and
determined effort by the government to de-emphasize European ways of life. The
present ad hoc measure of setting up a cultural troupe without an enduring cultural
policy simply does not address the question of decolonization. It could, thus, be
argued that cultural decolonization like the economy has not been a success story in
Africa. This is because most African ways of life including state apparatus are still
modelled towards the existing structures in Europe. This is contrary to Frantz
Fanon's timely advice on African culture when he said:

So, comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions
and societies which draw their inspirations from her. Humanity is waiting
for something other from us than such an imitation, which would be almost
an obscene caricature . . . For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity,
comrades , we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts,
and try to set afoot a new man (Fanon, 1967:254-5).

Conclusions
The foregoing analysis has yielded certain conclusions. First, Nigeria's effort in the
political decolonization of Africa has proved positive. It has contributed to the
elimination of colonialism within the continent. This become clear when it is

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 Transafrican Journal of History

realized that the country played a very crucial role in both the Angolan and
Zimbabwean wars of independence.
Secondly, despite Nigeria's efforts at economic decolonization of Africa, a lot still
remains undone. Almost all African states are still economically dependent on
external sources. They still find it difficult to pull out of the subordinate relationship
which existed during the colonial period. Nigeria, therefore, needs to do a lot more
in this direction. Mere intentions such as the formation of the AEC is not enough.
The practicalisation of such aims and the political will to succeed is crucial in
eliminating economic domination and subjugation. Here, Nigeria needs the co
operation of other African states to succeed. At least, her effort at using ECOWAS
as a base for economic integration of the West African sub-region have proved
difficult because of suspicion among member countries. Many African leaders lack
the political will to take action that may threaten their power base, but which in the
long run may benefit their states. They usually prefer to hold to what they know
instead of taking risks. Under such an environment, the status quo remains.
Third, cultural decolonization requires great devotion and self-rediscovery to
achieve. Here, the Nigerian political elite should device ways of demonstrating the
importance of the African personality. It is not enough to mount propaganda
messages. The best available option is leadership by example.
In conclusion, the first phase of African decolonization has just ended. This is
in the political realm. A much harder epoch is the present attempt in economic and
cultural spheres. These are hard because the imperialists realize that their
elimination presupposes challenge to their dominance of the world. It would also
affect their domestic milieu because the centre-periphery relationship would be
affected. What is likely to emerge is an environment of mutual bargaining based on
comparative advantages. The only plausible way for Africa to realize this is through
regional economic integration. That is the whole essence of AEC. The major
obstacle here is that economic transactions among African states have consistently
remained very low. For instance, Nigeria the most populous country in the region,
has far better economic relationships with states of European Economic Community
and the United States than with African countries. This is replicated all over Africa.
For economic integration to be meaningful, all states within the African region must
be prepared to co-operate in raising the level of their economic dealings with each
other. What this immediately suggests is that a way of going beyond the existing
emphasis on the production of primary commodities to manufacturing has to be
found. It is only then that a realistic relationship could exist. That in essence would
mark a major step towards economic decolonization of the continent. The cultural
aspect will result as a consequence of the former.

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Dynamics of Nigeria's Decolonization Policy

About the Author

Nereusl. Nwosu, Ph.D. isalecturerin the Department ofPolitical Science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria.

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