753525

research-article2018
EAU0010.1177/0956247817753525Environment And UrbanizationShort Title

Land-based financing in sub-Saharan

African cities

Stephen Berrisford, Liza Rose Cirolia and

Ian Palmer

Stephen Berrisford is an Abstract Decentralization reforms and rapid urbanization place increasing
international expert on pressure on African urban authorities. In response, land-based finance has been
local government, urban
gaining popularity within development discourses as a method of increasing local
law and city planning, and
an adjunct professor at the autonomy and financing local government infrastructure provision. This paper
African Centre for Cities. discusses the conceptual basis for land-based finance, the instruments that form
part of this approach, and the actual application in several African cities. Drawing
Address: University of Cape
on three case studies (Addis Ababa, Harare and Nairobi) and a high-level scan of 29
Town, African Centre for
Cities, Cape Town, Western developments in various African cities, we show how land-based finance is being
Cape, South Africa; e-mail: implemented in practice and discuss the potential for wider uptake. We conclude
stephen@berrisford.co.za that African city governments are using land-based financing, albeit in inconsistent
ways. We argue that urban authorities should consider the more extensive and
Liza Rose Cirolia is a
researcher at the African progressive use of land-based financing instruments, despite the constraints
Centre for Cities, working imposed by both technical and political conditions. A progressive agenda for local
on housing, municipal government finance in African cities should take land-based finance seriously, as
finance, and infrastructure. well as the local practices and institutional arrangements through which it operates.
Address: e-mail: liza.
cirolia@uct.ac.za Keywords  African cities / infrastructure / land-based finance / land value
capture / local government finance
Ian Palmer is an expert in
local government finance
and urban development,
and an adjunct professor
at the African Centre for
Cities.
I. Introduction
Address: e-mail: ian@pdg. Over recent decades, African local authorities have experienced an
co.za
increase in both the scope of their responsibilities (due to decentralization
reforms) and the scale of the need (largely due to urbanization). Despite the
tendency of national governments to resist relinquishing responsibilities
and the pervasive anti-urban bias, both the functions local authorities are
meant to perform and the overall area and numbers of people they are
1. Bekker, S and G Terborn meant to serve have grown rapidly.(1)
(2012), Power and High levels of poverty and inequality, on the one hand, and constrained
Powerlessness: Capital
Cities in Africa and African fiscal decentralization, on the other, have limited the resources available
Decentralization: Local Actors, to African urban authorities to fulfil these expanding functions and to
Powers and Accountability, address urban growth.(2) Resources to invest in capital development (i.e.
HSRC Press, Cape Town;
also Ribot, J C (2002), African
long-term infrastructure investments) have been particularly lacking. Due
Decentralization: Local Actors, to the diversity of African cities, trends in income and expenditure are
Powers and Accountability, UN difficult to determine.(3) However, it is possible to point to some shared
Research Institute for Social challenges. For example, African local governments often focus on
Development, Geneva.
operational expenses (such as salaries) and have little surplus to invest
in capital; significant revenue flows are captured by national state-owned
Environment & Urbanization Copyright © 2018 International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). 1
1–18.https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247817753525
DOI: 10.1177/0956247817753525 www.sagepublications.com
ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

entities (such as utility companies) and are thus not reflected on local 2. Pieterse, E and K Hyman
(2014), “Disjunctures between
government balance sheets; direct lending to local governments for
urban infrastructure, finance
infrastructure is minimal; and local revenue collection (for example, and affordability”, in S Oldfield
property tax collection) tends to be inefficient and not maximized.(4) and S Parnell (editors), The
The result is that local governments remain unable to shape their own Routledge Handbook of Cities
of the Global South, Routledge,
development and deliver much-needed infrastructure services. London, pages 191–205.
This paper focuses on the potential for local governments to address 3. Bird, R M (2011), Are There
their infrastructure needs through various forms of land-based financing. Trends in Local Finance?
As we show in Section III, land-based financing refers to a suite of land and A Cautionary Note on
Comparative Studies and
planning tools. Agglomeration, increasing land demand, infrastructure
Normative Models of Local
investments and planning decisions all drive up the value of urban land. Government Finance, Institute
Land-based financing is based on a recognition that property owners on Municipal Finance and
and developers benefit from this rising value and should be willing to Governance, University of
Toronto.
pay for these gains. Using land-based financing, it is possible for local
4. Briceño-Garmendia, C, K
governments to marshal various instruments to capture this rising Smits and V Foster (2009),
value with an eye towards long-term capital investment. They may Financing Public Infrastructure
collect revenue that they can use for urban investment, require direct in Sub-Saharan Africa: Patterns
and Emerging Issues, World
investment from developers, or use the revenue stream to leverage the
Bank, Washington, DC.
finance needed for larger investment projects (i.e. through borrowing).
The conceptual basis of this argument is spelled out in Sections II and III.
Section II outlines the argument for land-based financing in the urban
African context. Section III describes the instruments and preconditions
for land-based finance.
Section IV dives into the practices of land-based finance in sub-Saharan
African cities. Here we recognize the divergence between theory and practice.
Drawing primarily on three in-depth case studies of land-based finance
in Addis Ababa, Harare and Nairobi, the real experiences of African cities
are explored. In all of these cases, the local government has some duties
and powers. Performing these functions requires capital and operational
funding. However, the extent to which they are able to fulfil these functions
varies widely, as can be seen in Table 1 (on page 3).
Section IV also draws on rapid assessments of 29 commercially driven
land development projects in 22 of the largest cities in sub-Saharan Africa,
spread across 16 countries. The countries were: Angola (Luanda Sul and
Kilamba projects), Benin (Arcon Ville project), Cameroon (Sawa Beach
and Olembe housing projects), Cote d’Ivoire (Abidjan Golf Resort and
L’operation les floraisons), the Democratic Republic of Congo (La Cité
Du Fleuve and Kiswishi projects), Ethiopia (Senga Tera Redevelopment
and Casainches), Ghana (Gold Coast City, Accra Mall and Kumasi City
Mall), Kenya (Tatu City and the Two Rivers project), Mozambique (Vila
Olímpica), Nigeria (Owerri Mall, Central Abattoir and Carlton Gate
Estate), Rwanda (Gacuriro Estate Phase 1 and Gaposho Estate Phases 1
and 2), Senegal (Urban Pole of Diamniadio), South Africa (Pennyville and
Cornubia projects), Uganda (Akright Satellite City), Zambia (Mukuba Mall
project) and Zimbabwe (Budiriro Housing Development). In both the in-
depth case studies and the rapid assessments, the aim is to understand
how and to what extent land-based financing is applied.
These data were collected by a large team of scholars and practitioners
across various institutions, led by a team of associate professors from the
African Centre for Cities. The authors of this paper were directly involved
in data collection in the three case study cities. Data collection involved
a review of legislation and policies, site visits to various projects, and
between 15 and 30 interviews per case with actors in the land and finance
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Ta b l e 1
Overview of city case studies

% of local gov. revenue

City, country National devolution legislation spent on capital works

Addis Ababa, Decentralized governance was enshrined in the constitution in 61%

Ethiopia 1995. Addis Ababa is a city-state, within the system of federal
government in the country. It is granted the right to self-rule by
the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
Addis Ababa has a progressive tax-sharing arrangement with the
national government.
Harare, The 2013 constitution of Zimbabwe expanded the mandates of 1%
Zimbabwe local governments. However, at the time of this research, the
national government had not implemented devolution.
Nairobi, Kenya’s 2010 constitution focused on devolving significant 10%
Kenya responsibilities and funding to the newly formed counties.
Nairobi is a city-county, along with Mombasa. Implementation
of the county system and devolution began in 2013. Important
legislation includes the Urban Areas and Cities Act of 2011
(revised in 2015).

SOURCES: DFID (2015a), Report on Harare Case Study, Report No 1.9 of Urban Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan
Africa – harnessing land values, housing and transport; DFID (2015b), Report on Nairobi Case Study, Report
No 1.8 of Urban infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa – harnessing land values, housing and transport; and
DFID (2015c), Report on Addis Ababa Case Study, Report No 1.7 of Urban infrastructure in Sub-Saharan
Africa – harnessing land values, housing and transport.

sectors. All case studies and assessments were undertaken in 2015 as part
of a project for the UK Department for International Development (DFID).
A series of topical and county reports were produced as part of this project
and are referenced in the bibliography of this paper.
In the concluding section of this paper (V), we argue that there is
considerable scope to expand land-based finance and improve the
functioning of existing tools. To do so successfully, it is important to
understand the contextual issues in each country and city, particularly the
political economy of land development: who decides which developments
will be approved and the extent to which public funds will be used to
support an approved project. Important issues include the functioning
of land markets, property development, and city planning. Critically,
we do not aim to position land-based finance as a panacea for African
local governments’ infrastructure deficits or revenue constraints. There
are undeniable technical and political constraints to easy application.
Instead, we hope that this paper will encourage deeper consideration of
the integral relationship among local government finance, urban land,
and infrastructure provision in African cities.

II. Conceptual Framework

This section provides an argument for land-based financing in African

cities. By explaining the “fiscal gap” that requires the mobilization of

3
ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

funds and then providing an overview of the current ways in which local
governments raise money to fund infrastructure and operations, it lays
out the basic vocabulary for understanding land-based finance.

a. The urban fiscal gap

Many cities in sub-Saharan Africa experience a gap between the money

that is available to finance urban infrastructure and the money that is
needed to meet a growing backlog in services.(5) It is difficult to estimate 5. UCLG (2010), Local
this fiscal gap in urban Africa. The majority of studies that look at Government Finance: The
Challenges of the 21st
Africa’s fiscal gaps use country-level aggregations and data.(6) They focus Century; also Gutman, J, A
on national rather than urban infrastructure. However, the World Bank Sy and S Chattopadhyay
has attempted to address this knowledge void. According to the World (2015), Financing African
Infrastructure: Can the World
Bank, addressing the need for urban infrastructure in Africa would cost Deliver?, Brookings.
between US$ 12.5 and 35 billion per year (depending on how costs are
6. See reference 4; also
measured).(7) This estimate uses a “base cost” model, which means the real Briceño-Garmendia, C and
fiscal need is likely much higher. Importantly, this modelling does not M Shkaratan (2011), “Kenya’s
differentiate between the levels of government, but aggregates the total infrastructure: a continental
perspective”, World Bank Policy
gap regardless of responsibility. Research Working Paper 5596.
Establishing the exact size of this gap in infrastructure or gap in local 7. Paulais, T (2012), Financing
government finance is not particularly useful. Frequent references to Africa’s Cities: The Imperative of
this gap can be daunting, demoralizing, and ultimately unproductive for Local Development, World Bank.
African urban authorities, who are already well aware of the deficits in 8. Bhattacharya, A, M
infrastructure, services and capacity. African urban authorities are equally Romani and N Stern (2012),
Infrastructure for Development:
aware of the structural obstacles to accessing significant pots of long-term Meeting the Challenge, Centre
finance (for example, the high returns that investors require).(8) The urban for Climate Change Economics
development literature recognizes that local-level revenue mobilization and Policy, Grantham Research
Institute on Climate Change
has the potential to increase authorities’ ability to “internalize” the and the Environment,
benefits of urban agglomeration,(9) shape their own urban development accessed 18 November
trajectory (which is currently being shaped by national state-owned 2017 at http://www.lse.
ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
enterprises and the private sector), and improve local service provision
content/uploads/2014/02/PP-
(including the much-needed infrastructure).(10) It is therefore more useful infrastructure-for-development-
to consider the various ways local authorities can and do raise revenue for meeting-the-challenge.pdf.
infrastructure, rather than focus on the hypothetical fiscal gap. 9. International Growth Centre
(2016), African Urbanization: An
Analytic Policy Guide.
b. Mobilizing finance 10. USAID (1984), Municipal
Financial Analysis Handbook,
accessed 17 November 2017 at
A useful point of departure is to unpack the common tools used by African http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
urban authorities to raise revenue and/or cover the costs of infrastructure. PNAAS479.pdf.
These include transfers, own-source revenue, donations and aid, and
mobilizing of external service providers through partnership arrangements.

Transfers
Transfers (also known as grants) are designed to overcome the gap between
the ability to raise finance (largely held by national governments) and
the responsibilities that require this funding (increasingly held by local
governments).(11) Transfers are generally broken down into two types: 11. Bahl, R W and J F Linn
conditional and unconditional.(12) Conditional transfers come with (1992), Urban Public Finance
in Developing Countries, World
set expenditure obligations. For example, in South Africa, the Human Bank.
Settlements Development Grant is a large conditional grant transferred 12. Alm, J (2010), Municipal
to provinces to provide housing subsidies. In Kenya, a range of newly Finance of Urban
developed conditional grants for health are meant to be transferred to Infrastructure: Knowns and

4
 L A ND - B A S ED F I N A NC I N G I N S UB - S A H A R A N A F R I C A N C I T I E S

Unknowns, Wolfensohn Center county governments. The grant purpose (be it health, housing, bulk
for Development at Brookings.
infrastructure, etc.) dictates what expenditures are allowed. Unconditional
grants, in contrast, do not have conditions on spending and can be used by
local governments for the fulfilment of their general mandates. They can
be used for operational or capital expenditure, as the local authority sees
fit. Conditional grants tend to be a much smaller share of transfers. For
example, in FY 2015/16 Nairobi City County received 13 billion Kenyan
shillings in “equitable share” and only 472 million Kenyan shillings in
13. 1 US dollar is equivalent to conditional grants.(13)
around 100 Kenyan shillings. In much of Africa, transfers are vital to the operations of local
14. See reference 4. governments.(14) Transfers from national governments to sub-national
entities account for a large proportion of the total income of local
15. Steffensen, J (2006), “Local governments. For example, Steffensen(15) shows that national transfers
government organization and to Ugandan local governments accounted for nearly 90 per cent of
finance: Uganda”, in A Shah
(editor), Local Governance in
their total income in 2003. Local governments in Ethiopia (excluding
Developing Countries, World Addis Ababa) receive around 70 per cent of their income from national
Bank, Washington, DC. transfers.(16) Significantly, instead of depending on transfers, the city
16. Goodfellow, T (2015), “Taxing administration of Addis Ababa is entitled to raise income tax from its
the urban boom: property residents directly, which is in contrast to the situation elsewhere in the
taxation and land leasing
in Kigali and Addis Ababa”, country, where income tax is collected nationally and then transferred to
International Centre for Tax local governments.(17)
and Development Working
Paper 38.
Own-source revenue
17. UN-Habitat (2017), The State
of Addis Ababa 2017: The Addis
Own-source revenue is the revenue that local governments collect within
Ababa We Want, accessed 17 their jurisdictions.(18) This includes the fees, charges and taxes imposed
November 2017 at https:// by the local government. A fee or user charge is directly related to the
unhabitat.org/books/the-state-
use of a service, such as water, sanitation, parking, market stall rental
of-addis-ababa-2017-the-addis-
ababa-we-want/. and the like. Charges can also be indirect. Fees and charges follow the
18. See reference 12. “user pays” principle of public finance, ensuring that those who use a
19. See reference 7. particular service hold the burden of sustaining it.(19) Fines operate in a
similar manner and are charged to those who break particular rules and
conventions (i.e. noise, parking, etc.).
In contrast to charges, a tax is a proportional payment. According
to theories of decentralization, taxes that serve heavily redistributive
purposes and that are movable (i.e. taxes on things that can move
to capture more advantageous taxation deals) should be collected
by national governments to avoid local-level competition and the
movement of people and businesses. In contrast, immovable taxes (for
20. Brand, D (2016), Local instance, on land) are best collected by local government.(20) For this
Government Finance: A reason, property tax is seen as “good tax” for local government collection
Comparative Study, Sun Press,
Stellenbosch. within conventional economic theory.(21) It tends to be the only “pure
21. Oates, W E (1993), “Fiscal tax” imposed by municipalities,(22) although African cities do raise a wide
decentralization and economic variety of charges and licence fees that are often construed as taxes by
development”, National Tax citizens. Taxes, however, are generally used for the provision of public,
Journal Vol 46, No 2, pages
237–243.
non-divisible investments or for redistribution purposes.
In many African cities, important “tradeable services”, which are
22. Bahl, R, J F Linn and D
L Wentzel (editors) (2013), revenue generating (such as water and electricity), are not provided by
Financing Metropolitan local governments, but rather by utility companies. Local governments are
Governments in Developing often left with less lucrative fees and charges (slaughter permits, boda boda
Countries, Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy, Cambridge, MA. [motorcycle taxi] licences and the like). In addition, collecting property
23. See reference 16; also Roy,
tax in African cities remains a challenge.(23) These realities constrain the
K (2000), “Designing a property own-source revenue-raising potential of local authorities, explaining their
tax reform strategy for sub- reliance on national transfers.
5
ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

Donations Saharan Africa: an analytical

framework applied to Kenya”,
Donations (also referred to as aid) are given for the purpose of development Public Budgeting and Finance;
without the need for repayment.(24) Unlike transfers or grants, donations Franzsen, R C D (2003),
tend to be given by organizations outside of the state. This funding can be Property Taxation within the
given directly to local governments, channelled through NGOs, granted Southern African Development
Community (SADC): Current
to national governments or regional bodies and subsequently released to Status and Future Prospects
local governments, or allocated directly for projects. Aid tends to be more of Land Value Taxation in
prevalent in low-income African countries where there is a perceived Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,
South Africa and Swaziland,
need for development, particularly by foreign governments and NGOs. Lincoln Institute of Land
For example, South African local governments are not major recipients Policy, Cambridge, MA; and
of donor funding, as South Africa is not a low-income county. One of Franzsen, R and W McCluskey
(2017) (editors), Property Tax in
the major concerns around aid is the lack of coordination among donor
Africa: Status, Challenges, and
agencies.(25) Prospects, Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy, Cambridge, MA.
Funding from external service providers 24. See reference 22.
In many cities, there are external service providers appointed by the city 25. See reference 22.
or mandated by national government to provide services. Since service
providers may be able to bring in external funding such as loans and
grants, this is one method that local governments can use to mobilize
funding for infrastructure. There are two predominant groups of service
providers: parastatal organizations, which are independent legal entities
with majority ownership by national, regional or local government, and
public–private partnerships, where a service provider is appointed to
provide a service requiring investment in infrastructure. As the provision
of capital funding is included in the arrangement, the contracts will be in
the form of concessions; build, operate and transfer (BOT) financing; or 26. Jomo, K S, A Chowdhury,
similar contractual arrangements.(26) K Sharma and D Plat (2016),
“Public-private partnerships
In sub-Saharan Africa, few public–private partnerships (PPPs) provide and the 2030 Agenda for
urban infrastructure,(27) although private companies have been engaged in Sustainable Development: fit
water supply in South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique, with varying levels for purpose?”, UN Department
of Economic and Social Affairs
of success. However, the provision of services by parastatals is common. Working Paper 148.
Water and wastewater services are commonly provided by parastatals.(28) 27. See reference 7.
The extent to which these parastatals can raise funds to cover infrastructure
28. Banerjee, A, V Foster, Y
investments in cities is an important consideration. Typically, they do not Ying, H Skilling and Q Wodon
have the fiscal resources to attract commercial lenders, and most funding (2010), “Cost recovery, equity,
for these entities comes from national governments, thus failing to truly and efficiency in water
tariffs: evidence from African
broaden the range of infrastructure finance sources.(29) utilities”, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 5384;
also McDonald, D A (2016),
“To corporatize or not to
III. Land-Based Financing corporatize (and if so, how?)”,
Utilities Policy Vol 40, pages
For local governments to fulfil their functions and shape the future of 107–114.
African cities, new and innovative revenue-raising instruments are needed 29. See reference 4.
or, alternatively, existing instruments must be more robustly deployed.
Considering the limited extent to which transfers, cities’ own-source
revenue and service-provider funding are currently able to fund much-
needed investments in infrastructure, land-based financing becomes an
important funding option.
It is important to differentiate land value capture and land-based
financing, as these concepts are commonly used together in the literature.
The concept of land value capture refers to a suite of instruments that
allow the rising value of urban land to be leveraged by the state.(30) This 30. Peterson, G E (2009),
capacity is further enhanced if local governments have control over Unlocking Land Values to

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Finance Urban Infrastructure, urban infrastructure budgets or over planning processes (i.e. the ability to
Washington, DC, World Bank;
regulate development).(31) Land value capture seeks to quantify, collect and
also McGaffin, R, M Napier
and L Gavera (2014), Value distribute the value of urban land that has risen due to state investment
Capture in South Africa— and regulation.(32) It is implemented through “instruments designed to tax
Conditions for Their Successful development value that are applied through the planning system”.(33) Land-
Use in the Current Legal
Context, Springer. based financing refers to a broader category of financing mechanisms
31. DFID (2015d), Land-
that include land value capture as well as contributions made by property
based Financing for Urban owners or property developers, regardless of whether land values are
Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan increasing. Suzuki et al.(34) also add the important criterion that money
African Cities, Report number
raised through land-based finance mechanisms must be used to fund
1.1 of Urban infrastructure
in Sub-Saharan Africa infrastructure. Crook et al.(35) characterize these instruments as “designed
– harnessing land values, to raise funds from developers to help pay for the infrastructure needed, on the
housing and transport. one hand to allow their development to go ahead or to mitigate its impact and,
32. Global Land Tool Network on the other hand simply to pay for infrastructure requirements”.
(2016), Leveraging Land:
Land-based Finance for Local
The concepts of land value capture and land-based finance have been
Governments - A Reader, taken up by practitioners, academics and activists in African cities who
accessed 17 November 2017 are concerned with the “social value” of urban land and equity in the
at https://gltn.net/home/
urban property market.(36) This section discusses the common instruments
download/leveraging-land-
land-based-finance-for-local- of land-based finance and the established preconditions necessary for
governments-a-reader/. successful implementation.
33. Crook, T, J Henneberry and
C Whitehead (editors) (2016),
Planning Gain: Providing a. Instruments
Infrastructure and Affordable
Housing, Wiley-Blackwell,
Chichester, page 9.
Ad-hoc contributions
34. Suzuki, H, J Murakami, Y H
Ad-hoc contributions are one-off capital contributions. Developers can
Hong and B Tamayose (2015), make these when requested by a municipality, or when they determine
Financing Transit-Oriented that this contribution is a prerequisite to the development being viable.
Development with Land Values: These contributions can be in-kind and/or financial in nature. In-kind
Adapting Land Value Capture
in Developing Countries, World contributions refer to cases where the developer of a project builds
Bank. additional infrastructure in exchange for the approval of their application.
35. See reference 33, pages 26 In-kind contributions tend not to refer to the internal infrastructure
and 29. of a project, as it is common practice for this to be provided by the
developer. Instead, they refer to the provision of connector infrastructure,
36. Brown-Luthango, M (2010), bulk infrastructure, or social and economic infrastructure that might,
Access to Land for the Urban theoretically, be provided by a local authority. A local authority can also
Poor—Policy Proposals for
South African Cities, Springer; require that property owners within an area that is impacted by a project
also Napier, M, S Berrisford, assist in paying for the infrastructure. This is generally done before the
C Kihato, R McGaffin and L investment occurs so that the finance can be available for the project.(37)
Royston (2013), Trading Places:
Accessing Land in African
Cities, African Minds, Cape Sale of development rights
Town. Development rights are valuable. When these rights are granted, the
37. See reference 30, Peterson value of land is increased. Local authorities can sell development rights
(2009).
to developers. For example, the right to convert rural land to urban
land, to increase densities, or to convert residential land to commercial
38. See reference 30, Peterson
(2009).
land increases the value of that land.(38) Like the contributions discussed
above, the sale of development rights is a one-off transaction. The sale of
development rights is an effective way to raise funding for infrastructure, in
particular when there is rapidly increasing demand for urban development.

Impact fees and development charges

Impact fees and development charges (terms often used interchangeably
in the literature) are one-off capital contributions made by the

7
ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

developer.(39) This charge is designed to cover the costs of the bulk and 39. Tanzi, V (2016), “Public
finance in developing countries:
connector infrastructure associated with the development. A consistent
an introduction”, in M M
and transparent formula is required for calculating the impact that the Erdoğdu and B Christiansen,
development will have on the infrastructure network (thus differentiating Handbook of Research on
these fees from ad-hoc contributions).(40) This instrument has the positive Public Finance in Europe and
the MENA Region, page 1.
effect of avoiding individual negotiations associated with each property
40. See reference 30, Peterson
development and mitigating the potential for nepotism or corruption. It (2009).
also calls on the local authority to ideally ringfence the monies received,
either by type of infrastructure service or by service delivery zone, so that
the developer has some sense that they will receive the benefit that the
payment was intended to cover.

Public land leasing and land sales

Most public authorities own some urban land. This land can be leased 41. See reference 16; also see
or sold to raise revenue for infrastructure provision.(41) For land-sale and reference 30, Peterson (2009).
land-lease options, the state must have control over a large supply of land
(such as in Addis Ababa or Luanda). A proactive urban authority, with
the requisite financial resources and technical capacity, can also land
bank (such as has been done in many South African cities). This refers to
buying up land in areas where it will become more valuable over time (for
example, in urban expansion areas or where there will be high levels of
infrastructure investment in the future). The purchase of land around a
new development (such as a highway or train station), and the subsequent
resale of that land by the public sector or relevant authority, is a method
to capture some of the gains that an infrastructure investment creates.(42) 42. See reference 30, Peterson
(2009).
Land readjustment
Land readjustment is a tool whereby landowners who own property
adjacent to one another pool their land together for reconfiguration
and reconstruction. Often, landowners surrender a portion of their land
in exchange for infrastructure, or to raise funds to defray infrastructure
costs. Some of the land may also be sold to generate additional funding
and some may be contributed towards streets and parks.(43) 43. Several authors have
written on the potential of land
adjustment in Africa. Examples
Betterment levies/taxes include Botswana [Fourie, C
A betterment levy is a tax or charge levied on a specific group of properties. (2004), Land Readjustment for
It should be based on some measurable feature of the property (such as Peri-Urban Customary Tenure:
The Example of Botswana,
frontage or area). The tax is based on the projected increase in the value Earthscan Press, London] and
of the property resulting from the investment in public infrastructure Ethiopia [Adam, A G (2015),
that the state has made or will make.(44) Betterment levies have proved “Land readjustment as an
successful in Latin America.(45) alternative land development
tool for peri-urban areas
of Ethiopia”, Property
Property taxes and property tax surcharges Management Vol 33, No 1,
pages 36–58.] The Global
Property tax is the most basic and commonly applied form of land-based Land Tools Network has, on a
finance for local governments. A property tax is a recurrent tax levied on number of occasions, brought
property by the local government.(46) There are various ways this can be representatives of African
countries together to discuss
calculated, including a flat rate, an area rate or a value rate, levied on the the possibilities of using land
land, the property or both.(47) In some situations, a property tax surcharge readjustment (particularly land
can be levied. Like the betterment levy, a surcharge may be applied in sharing) for slum upgrading.
some areas or situations – for instance, if the property is in a business The Global Land Tools Network
has written country reports for
improvement district or receiving benefits from a public investment.(48) Ghana, Kenya, Namibia and
Rates can only be seen as an infrastructure financing measure when the Rwanda.

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 L A ND - B A S ED F I N A NC I N G I N S UB - S A H A R A N A F R I C A N C I T I E S

44. See reference 7; also see operating account is in surplus, which is rarely the case in African cities,
reference 30, Peterson (2009).
and the extra funds available are directed to infrastructure investment or
45. See reference 7. intended for servicing loans or repaying bonds.
46. Malpezzi, S (1999),
Designing a Property Tax
Reform Strategy for Sub- Tax increment financing (TIF)
Saharan Africa: An Analytical TIF is a tool that allows municipalities to borrow money to promote
Framework Applied to Kenya. economic development and then to earmark property tax revenue from
47. See reference 34. increases in assessed values within a designated TIF district for repayment
48. UN-Habitat (2009), Guide of the loan.(49) This is generally undertaken through issuing a bond or
to Municipal Finance, Nairobi,
available at https://www.
bonds to cover the cost of the infrastructure. There is some debate as to
citiesalliance.org/sites/ whether a TIF is a land-based financing tool. However, since a TIF allows
citiesalliance.org/files/UNH_ for property tax revenue to be invested in infrastructure, it is useful to
Guide_Municipal_Finance.pdf. consider here.(50)
49. Dye, R F and D F Merriman
(2000), “The effects of tax
increment financing on
economic development”,
b. Conditions for land-based finance
Journal of Urban Economics
Vol 47, No 2, pages 306–328; According to the urban public finance literature, there are several
also Weber, R (2002), enabling conditions that allow land-based financing to contribute to local
“Extracting value from the
city: neoliberalism and urban
government revenue generation and infrastructure provision.(51) Without
redevelopment”, Antipode Vol these preconditions being met, it is difficult for the tools discussed above
34, No 3, pages 519–540. to work well. Considering these preconditions is important for grounding
50. To date, no African cities the study of land-based finance, recognizing the limits of these tools, and
have used TIFs. However, preventing the inappropriate or universal application of these instruments.
there have been discussions
regarding TIFs in South
African cities where there are Demand for property
established municipal bond A prerequisite for land-based financing is a sufficient and (ideally)
markets. McGaffin, R, M Kirova,
F Viruly and K Michell (2016), growing demand for urban land and land development. Without this
“Value capture in South Africa growing demand, and thus increasing land value, there is nothing for the
– A way to overcome urban state to capture.(52) In addition, without this demand there will be much
management challenges
and unlock development
more resistance to charges and taxes being imposed on landowners and
opportunities?”, SAPOA 2016. property developers. Obviously, the need for rising land values creates a
51. See reference 31. challenge for local governments in Africa, as rising land values tend to
52. See reference 34. exclude the poor.(53)
53. Goodfellow, T (2017),
“Taxing property in a neo- Supply of property
developmental state: The To meet the growing demand for urban land, there must be a flexible
politics of urban land value
capture in Rwanda and supply of urban land. This requires available land that can be utilized
Ethiopia”, African Affairs Vol for development, active developers (either public or private) to develop
116, No 465, pages 549–572. this land and bring it to market, and sufficient funding to support the
54. See reference 50, McGaffin developments.(54) This includes both development finance and end-user
et al. (2016).
finance. Without a responsive supply, increasingly demand will result in
the growth of informal development and speculation as the constrained
supply pushes up the prices of the available land and property.

Effective and supported local government

The different land-based financing tools require local governments to be
capacitated in different ways. Overall, to implement land-based financing,
it is necessary to have a supportive national fiscal framework that gives
local government the right to collect revenue or enter into contracts to
55. Moeti, K, J Mafunisa, S support service provision.(55) There must also be the political will at the
Nsingo and T Makonda (2007), local level to implement this financing model, given that taxation is never
Public Finance Fundamentals,
Juta, Cape Town. politically popular. There must be the skills and capacity to implement

9
ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

it uniformly and transparently. Finally, a functional planning system

(including a city-wide plan for regulation of land and future development)
to guide decision-making is important.(56) Without a functional plan, it is 56. See reference 34.
difficult to charge for additional development rights or ascertain where
future land value increases will be.

Willing land owners and developers

The limited opportunities for investment in African cities make urban real
estate an attractive asset class for local, global and diaspora investors.(57) 57. See reference 53.
On the back of this investment, many larger African cities have a growing
class of postcolonial landlords.(58) Land-based financing shifts the costs of 58. See reference 53.
urban development from the (more general) taxpayer to the landowner.
Evidence from studies of property tax reform in Africa shows that efforts to
ensure that landowners contribute to the costs of urban development are,
unsurprisingly, resisted.(59) This is particularly true in cases where landowners 59. Dillinger, W (1991), “Urban
do not feel they are going to see the benefit of payment. The ability of property tax reform: guidelines
and recommendations”,
landowning elites to sway the decision-making apparatus of the state away Working Paper, Infrastructure
from such land-based financing methods as increased property tax is well- and Urban Development
documented.(60) One of the conditions for effectively implementing land- Department, World Bank.
based finance is a weak class of landholding elites. If land elites are well 60. Jibao, S S and W Prichard
(2015), “The political economy
connected to politicians or effectively mobilized among themselves, land-
of property tax in Africa:
based financing will be more difficult. It is of course possible to align the Explaining reform outcomes in
interests of landholders and developers with the land-based finance agenda; Sierra Leone”, African Affairs
however, this requires a deep understanding of the incentives that these Vol 114, No 456, pages 404–
431; also Fjeldstad, O H, M Ali
actors respond to, particularly in the medium to long term. and T Goodfellow (2017), Taxing
the Urban Boom: Property
Taxation in Africa, Chartered
IV. Land-Based Financing In African Cities Management Institute Insight
No 1.

It is important to ground the study of land-based finance in the experiences

of African cities. This section draws on such experiences from each of the
case study cities – Addis Ababa, Harare and Nairobi – as well as from the
multi-project study. It looks at: the conditions for land-based finance
in African cities (based on conditions spelled out above); the current
application of various instruments; and the outcomes and implications of
this application. Terminology in this section is aligned with the interviews
in each place (with the more conventional terms in brackets).

a. Conditions for land-based financing

Addis Ababa
Important preconditions for land-based finance are in place in Addis
Ababa. There is demand for urban land and a strong local government,
supported by well-developed fiscal legislation. The fact that all land is
state owned offers additional scope. Addis Ababa’s largest constraint is on 61. DFID (2015c), Report on
the supply side.(61) Land can only be released for development once the Addis Ababa Case Study,
state has serviced it, and the limited capacity of the state constrains land Report No 1.7 of Urban
infrastructure in Sub-Saharan
release. Moreover, much of the unserviced land, which could be used for Africa – harnessing land values,
development, is occupied in peri-urban areas by small-scale farmers, and housing and transport.
within the urban fabric by informal settlements. While people whose land
is taken for development purposes are compensated for their (generally
very modest) structures, they have little say in the process. Increasingly,
amidst growing popular opposition, the Ethiopian authorities’ approach
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to removing occupants from land for development has proved to be

practically difficult and politically costly.

Harare
Harare has few of the prerequisites for land-based financing. Because
access to finance is so constrained by the national economic downturn,
the demand for land development is relatively limited. On the supply
62. DFID (2015a), Report on side, Harare does have a seasoned and resilient development sector.(62)
Harare Case Study, Report No However, the challenge of accessing development finance prevents the
1.9 of Urban Infrastructure
in Sub-Saharan Africa expansion of supply and demand. In addition, the reluctant embrace of
– harnessing land values, devolution by the national government (in no small part aided by the
housing and transport. tensions of opposition politics) creates little room for manoeuvre for the
local government. In addition, there are notably inconsistent and often
63. Kamete, A and I Lindell anti-poor applications of land and planning regulations.(63) The provision
(2010), “The politics of ‘non- of infrastructure services (and thus the collection of revenue from users
planning’ interventions in
African cities: Unravelling
of services such as water, electricity and roads) has been shifted from the
the international and local city to national agencies, which further undermines Harare’s capacity to
dimensions in Harare and implement land-based financing effectively.
Maputo”, Journal of Southern
African Studies Vol 36, No 4,
pages 889–912. Nairobi
Nairobi has some of the preconditions in place for land-based financing.
There is a rapidly increasing demand for urban land and a responsive supply.
The 2013 devolution process has created opportunities for strengthening
and empowering the newly established Nairobi City County. However,
land remains highly contested and politicized; the relationship among
landholding elites, local bureaucrats and politicians is complex. Whether
the will exists to systematically and transparently capture urban land value
for investment in urban infrastructure remains unknown.

b. Current application of land-based financing instruments

Addis Ababa
All land is publicly owned in Addis Ababa – owned by the national
government but managed by the Addis Ababa City Administration. The
state leases serviced land in the city to developers and public institutions.
Land leasing is the major form of formal land supply and of land-based
finance. It takes two forms: direct allocation and auction.

•• Allocation of leases: According to the World Bank’s Urbanization

Review, direct allocation is the dominant mode of leasing land in
64. World Bank Group, Federal Addis Ababa (this is also called “allotment”).(64) Allocation is used as a
Democratic Republic of procedure to transfer urban land for the construction of government
Ethiopia, and Cities Alliance
(2015), Ethiopia Urbanization
office buildings, social services, condominium or self-help housing
Review: Urban Institutions for projects, places of worship, and other projects that have national or
Middle Income Ethiopia. regional significance. Land is allocated at a reduced price, referred to
as the “benchmark” price. While this price is meant to cover some cost
recovery, this is not always the case. The prices are consistently between
65. See reference 64. two and seven times lower than the prices offered at auction.(65)
•• Auction of leases: Land auction is the process whereby serviced land
is put out to bid; the state uses a variety of weighted criteria to decide
66. See references 16 and 64. among the bids.(66) Less than 10 per cent of serviced land in Addis
Ababa is auctioned. Lease arrangements include the value and lifespan

11
ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

of the lease, the amount to be paid upfront (a down payment), and

the instalment periods.
•• Property taxes: While the city does charge property tax, its capacity
to recover property taxes is very weak. In 2004 it was estimated that
less than 1 per cent of the city’s revenue came from property taxes,
thus making a contribution to operations, but not to capital.(67) 67. See reference 23, Franzsen
and McCluskey (2017).
Harare
Harare implements a basic form of land-based financing, with measures
intended to support new infrastructure provision and the maintenance of
the existing and extensive network, which is managed by the city:

•• In-kind contributions: Harare requests developers to offer an “in-

kind” contribution when they want their developments approved.
This means that, in order to be granted a permit, developers must
contribute public infrastructure, as negotiated with the city. Developers
are often asked to cover both the on-site services (which is typical of
most land-based financing) and off-site infrastructure, such as water
storage facilities and trunk roads.(68) 68. See reference 62.
•• Prescribed percentage (development charge): Harare requires
developers to pay a “prescribed percentage”. It is also referred to as an
“endowment”, a term dating back to colonial-era legislation that has since
been repealed. This is paid with cash, a contribution of land of equivalent
value, or a combination of the two. Without this payment, reflected in a
certificate of compliance, the properties may not be registered.
•• Land sales: The city sells undeveloped city-owned land to private
developers who will become responsible for servicing, surveying and
developing the land. In this case, the city gains both from the revenue
received from the land sales and from the in-kind contributions
made by the developers to service the land and provide the necessary
supporting infrastructure to make the development function.
•• Property taxes. The city depends heavily on property tax revenues,
which make up just under 40 per cent of municipal revenues per
annum.(69) It is, however, unclear if any of this revenue is allocated for 69. See reference 62.
capital investment.

Nairobi
Nairobi shows a similar pattern to Harare. There are several forms of land-
based finance here. These include:

•• In-kind contributions: Large property developers provide their own

on-site infrastructure as well as the off-site infrastructure that is also
needed to support the development. This includes bulk infrastructure,
such as water supply or highway upgrades. In some cases, the county
also asks large developers to build additional infrastructure (such
as a school or clinic) in an area where there are dire needs and no
resources, such as in informal areas.
•• Infrastructure levy (development charge): The city applies an
infrastructure levy on all property developments. This is calculated
at 0.05 per cent of property value. The levy is intended to finance
infrastructure provision. The charge is applied during the planning
approval phase by the planning department. This development cost
is calculated with a standard formula. The county estimates that it will
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 L A ND - B A S ED F I N A NC I N G I N S UB - S A H A R A N A F R I C A N C I T I E S

cost 30,000 Kenyan shillings (or US$ 324) per square foot in “upmarket
areas” and 20,000 Kenyan shillings (US$ 216) per square foot in
“low-income areas”. A similar fee is charged for a change of land use
application. Developers are required to pay a set fee of 130,000 shillings
(US$ 1,406) for a change of land use in an upmarket area. For low-
income areas, the change of land use costs 85,000 shillings (US$ 919).
•• Property taxes. Property tax is an important but strained source of
local government revenue in post-devolution Nairobi. Property rates
70. Office of the Controller account for approximately a quarter of the revenue in Nairobi.(70)
of Budget (2016), Annual
County Governments Budget
Implementation Review
29 projects study
Report FY 2015/16, September, As noted in the methodology section, the 29 studies of individual projects
Nairobi. are high-level rapid assessments. Figure 1 (on page 14) rates each project
on a scale from -5 to 5 based on a set of criteria. A rating of 0 indicates
that there was no land-based financing. In most cases the land-based
financing rating is positive, indicating that developers contributed to
bulk and connector infrastructure in some way.
In most cases these contributions took the form of in-kind contributions
whereby the developers constructed the bulk infrastructure themselves. It
is notable that none of the case studies scored a 5, which is the point at
which the developer contributes to social and community infrastructure
and cross-subsidizes low-income areas as well. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, a number of West African case studies indicate subsidization of
the developer (Cote d’Ivoire, Benin and Cameroon, as well as Angola in
Southern Africa).

c. Outcomes and implications

Addis Ababa
The scale of urban renewal in Addis Ababa has been extraordinary, made
possible by state ownership of the land, complemented by the country’s
land-leasing system. But there are also downsides to the system in
71. See reference 64; also Ethiopia,(71) and more work is needed to ascertain how well it is functioning,
Kaganova, Olga (2014), given the context and specificity. According to Goodfellow,(72) around 6 per
“Land management as a
factor of urbanization”, cent of the total revenue of Addis Ababa comes from land leasing. Since
Ethiopia Urbanization Review land can only be released for allocation or auction once it is serviced, a
background paper. firm (albeit slow) cycle of collection and investment has been established.
72. See reference 16. However, despite having the financial resources, there is limited technical
and professional capacity to service urban land. The insufficient supply
of urban land results in incredibly high prices and, consequently, the
73. See reference 16. formation of informal settlements on unserviced areas.(73)
The case of Addis Ababa suggests that state control of land has the
potential to shape city development in positive ways. However, matching
demand and supply requires state capacity as well as resources. In short,
it is not just about money, but also about state operations. In addition,
the manner of clearing already occupied land for formal land supply has
to be fair and legitimate. In Ethiopia, the occupants of land that is taken
to be leased to developers are seldom willing participants in the process,
because the compensation offered to them is very low.
This type of land-based financing has limited application beyond
Ethiopia, mostly because it requires that the land be owned by the state
and that the state and city have a high degree of control over the way the
land is allocated for lease.
13
ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

F ig u r e 1
Ratings of 29 land-based financing projects in sub-Saharan Africa

SOURCE: DFID (2015e), Sub-Saharan Africa Property Development Overview with Implications for Land-based
Financing, Report No 1.6 of Urban infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa – harnessing land values, housing
and transport.

Harare
The contribution of land-based finance – other than property taxes
– in Harare is limited. While the prescribed percentage of new land
developments is routinely collected, it remains small. Between US$
500,000 and 1 million is collected annually from these endowments.(74) 74. See reference 62.
There are two main reasons for this. The first is that developers in Harare
struggle to access the long-term infrastructure or end-user finance
necessary for large developments. This is largely due to macroeconomic

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 L A ND - B A S ED F I N A NC I N G I N S UB - S A H A R A N A F R I C A N C I T I E S

conditions. Secondly, Harare does not ringfence the funds it collects from
developers. This funding goes into the city’s operating account, rather
than a capital account, and is spent on salaries or general operations.
Implementing land-based finance is a challenge in Harare. The city’s
weak financial position and the fuzzy nature of devolution make land-
based financing instruments difficult to implement. In addition, because
many key infrastructure services are provided by national state-owned
enterprises, the city is unable to raise land-based finance to cover the
costs of this infrastructure. Moreover, much of the unchecked peri-urban
development cannot be leveraged by the city through land-based financing,
as the peri-urban land cooperatives that drive these developments do not
75. Tibaijuka, A K (2005), Report need to make the same contributions as urban land developers.(75)
of the Fact-Finding Mission
of Zimbabwe to Assess the
Scope and Impact of Operation Nairobi
Murambatsvina. Nairobi has implemented land-based finance with a model similar to
that in Harare. The charges and contributions are not ringfenced. While
around 6 per cent of the 2013/14 county revenue came from plan approval,
planning and building fees, it is not possible to ascertain how much of
this was raised through the infrastructure contribution. Nor is this money
allocated for infrastructure; according to local officials, it is lumped in with
the operating budget and spent on salaries and other recurrent expenses.
The in-kind contribution is not issued in a uniform or systematic manner,
76. DFID (2015b), Report on making it highly contested and easy to “avoid”.(76) It appears to be
Nairobi Case Study, Report implemented in an ad-hoc way, allowing for individual officials to decide
No 1.8 of Urban infrastructure the extent of necessary contribution. Importantly, Nairobi has done little
in Sub-Saharan Africa
– harnessing land values, to curb rampant speculation in urban land markets or to capture the value
housing and transport. of the large-scale investments by national state-owned enterprises (such
as the Thika Superhighway). In Nairobi, land and corruption are tightly
77. Klopp, J M (2000), “Pilfering intertwined, although counter-efforts are growing.(77) The vested interests
the public: the problem of land of unchecked property markets are apparent and undermine the political
grabbing in contemporary will for value capture.
Kenya”, Africa Today Vol 47, No
1, pages 7–26.
29 projects study
The multi-project study shows many cases where some form of land-
based finance is taking place. However, it is likely that the bulk and
connector infrastructure provided through in-kind contributions are
being driven by the immediate needs of property development for both
on-site and off-site infrastructure, and may not be part of a redistributive
framework of strengthening local government. This could result in
pockets of infrastructure provision for the wealthy, with fewer services for
78. See reference 63. the poor.(78) This would clearly undermine the more progressive intent of
land-based financing efforts.

V. Discussion And Conclusions

Decentralization processes implemented across Africa have radically

expanded the responsibilities of local governments. The fiscal and
capacity pressures increasingly faced by African local governments are felt
most acutely in growing urban areas, where the need to deliver and the
tensions between levels of government are most evident.
This paper argues that land-based financing offers a suite of instruments
that could be deployed by local governments to overcome some of the
15
ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

challenges of infrastructure finance and provision. These instruments can

be used in different ways and they produce different outcomes. Land-
based financing can be used to supplement the existing income streams
of local governments, increasing the ability of urban authorities to capture
the urban dividend and benefit from the growth of cities.
The empirical research presented in this paper shows that land-
based financing is being deployed by some African cities, but to a limited
extent. In most cases, the focus is on in-kind contributions made by the
developer. This includes the installation of connector and (sometimes) bulk
infrastructure needed for their projects to access services. In some cases,
these investments serve the wider public; however, the general trend is for
developers to contribute only infrastructure that serves their project. In both
Nairobi and Harare, notably, developer charges do exist; however, without
this funding being ringfenced for capital expenditure, it has little impact
on infrastructure provision. In contrast, Addis Ababa is able to use its land-
leasing system to raise substantial revenue for infrastructure provision. The
high levels of local government empowerment, coupled with the state’s full
ownership of land, provides the unique conditions for this.
Additionally, the 29 projects studied reinforce a recognition of the
limited and inconsistent application of land-based finance. For some
projects, developers have contributed significantly to the infrastructure pool,
yet in others, the state has heavily subsidized these developments, raising
significant concerns. On the one hand, there is the argument that subsidies
should be reserved for servicing land for housing of the poorest citizens. The
counterargument is that the state should promote economic development
through subsidizing what are often “flagship” property developments. The risk
in the latter case is that the state ends up subsidizing property developments
that have neither demonstrated financial viability nor targeted the needs of
poor citizens, either because of poor market information or undue influence
on the decision-making process by vested interests.
The diverse nature of cities militates against a one-size-fits-all approach
to land-based financing. As African cities continue to grow, there is a dire
need for innovative and locally driven experimentation with land-based
financing instruments. These experiments will need to balance the desire to
attract economic development, on the one hand, with the fiscal sustainability
of local government and the equitable provision of urban infrastructure on
the other. They will require in-depth and targeted analysis of the interplay
among urban land market forces, urban land governance and local political
economic arrangements. In addition, these experiments will need to move
beyond the fixation on the quantity of money that local governments
have available (i.e. the finance gap), and consider the best infrastructure
finance arrangements and configurations for these cities. If this is done, it
will open real opportunities for cities to change current urban development
trajectories, as well as demonstrate a clearer picture of local government’s
role in changing the ways in which urban growth is financed and managed.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to researchers Tsigereda Tafesse, Innocent Chirisa, Brendon

van Niekerk, Brandon Finn and Peter Ngau, all of whom were integral
parts of the DFID-funded research team. Special thanks to Diana Mitlin
and the anonymous reviewers, who offered invaluable suggestions.

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 L A ND - B A S ED F I N A NC I N G I N S UB - S A H A R A N A F R I C A N C I T I E S

Funding

This document is an output from a project funded by the UK Department

for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing
countries. However, the views expressed and information contained in
it are not necessarily those of, or endorsed by, DFID, which can accept
no responsibility for such views or information or for any reliance placed
on them. This article is also based on work undertaken for the African
Centre for Cities’ CityLab Programme. This is part of Mistra Urban
Futures, which is mainly funded by Mistra (the Swedish Foundation for
Strategic Environmental Research) and Sida (the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency).

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