See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/301357726

Offshore Supply Vessel design and operation: A human factors exploration

Chapter · September 2011

CITATIONS READS

2 1,548

2 authors:

Vincentius Rumawas Bjørn Egil Asbjørnslett

WE sustain.no Norwegian University of Science and Technology
20 PUBLICATIONS 87 CITATIONS 72 PUBLICATIONS 1,673 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Vincentius Rumawas on 18 April 2016.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Advances in Safety, Reliability and Risk Management – Bérenguer, Grall & Guedes Soares (eds)
© 2012 Taylor & Francis Group, London, ISBN 978-0-415-68379-1

Offshore Supply Vessel design and operation: A human factors

exploration

V. Rumawas & B.E. Asbjørnslett

Department of Marine Technology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway

ABSTRACT: Surveys of human factors on offshore supply vessels were conducted using qualitative
approaches: observations, interviews and discussions. The aim of the study is to find out if human factors
is considered in ship and marine system design, and how human factors is applied. Some problems that
were mentioned by previous studies were re-examined. Some significant improvements were identified
both in the design and operation of Offshore Supply Vessels (OSVs). However, several issues remain.
Typical problems that are still recognized: disturbing noise, ergonomics issues, layout and arrangement
related problems, flooding of alarms, and limited space. Novel problems with respect to the application of
new technologies were identified: imperfect automation, abundant checklists and procedures, redundant
data entry, and overflow of information.

1 INTRODUCTION captains playing “chicken” in sea lanes with forty

ships around, “radar assisted collisions”, tugboats
This article is part of a study investigating human blocking radio channels, owners egging their cap-
factors in marine system design. The study was trig- tains on, understaffed and under budgeted coast
gered by previous findings which stated that most guard, and many other ‘amazing’ cases. He refers to
accidents at sea were caused by human errors or the marine system as an “error-inducing” system, a
human related factors (McCafferty & Baker, 2006, system in which the configuration of its components
Moore, Bea & Roberts 1993). Some experts argue induces errors and defeats attempts to reduce error.
that less than adequate design is one significant The larger effects sought, with a research study
factor that leads to human errors. Meister (1971, into this context, is reduction of probability of
p 266) states that the typical design engineer does accidents at sea by taking human factors into
not consider human factors in his design. Reason account in ship and marine system design. The
(1990, p 173) states that: main research question is directed towards finding
“Rather than being the main instigator of an acci- out if ship design has already considered human
dent, operators tend to be the inheritors of systems factors, and how it is being applied.
defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, There are several ways to answer the questions
faulty maintenance and bad management decisions. addressed above. First, one can ask the design-
Their part is usually that of adding the final garnish ers. Second, one can do an evaluation through the
to a lethal brew whose ingredients have already been design itself, either by doing a field survey or by
long in cooking.” reviewing the plan, traditionally on paper or using
Squire (2007) cites one master who complains computer model. Third, one can ask the users, by
of being frustrated to sail the vessel which was using interviews or questionnaires, of their assess-
designed without input from the crew. Grave- ment of the vessel. And last but not least, one can
son (2002) claims that human factors in shipping do evaluation through the rules and regulations
draws attention, but is rarely addressed and not that control how to design and build a ship.
taken seriously. Calhoun & Stevens (2003) accuse Rumawas and Asbjørnslett (2010) found that there
systems and equipment failures to be the common are numerous standards and guidelines for designers
factor for accidents in many industries. The sys- to refer to for taking human factors into account in
tems and equipment are not well designed to meet marine system design. Given redundant rules, stand-
human’s physical or cognitive capabilities. ards and guidelines addressing human factors in
Perrow (1999) describes marine accidents as a marine system design, although not all are mandatory,
fascinating country. He addresses lots of problems one might ask whether the reality is in accordance
in the maritime industry that have been encoun- with the regulations. This research aims to answer
tered: a frying pan that destroys a luxury liner, that particular question through field surveys.

670
 A number of field researches have been docu- In contrast with most of the studies mentioned
mented, based upon different methodologies, and above, this research seeks to cover a broader con-
focusing on different aspects of the vessel. Strong cept of human factors issues in ship and marine
(2000) did a survey to find out about ship’s habita- system design. Each aspect of human factors
bility. Based on a literature review, initial interviews dimension will be reviewed. Issues from previous
and a pilot survey, Strong documented the crew’s research will be re-examined. The objective of
evaluation of the existing ships and their prefer- the exploratory phase of the study is to present
ences for the future warships. Adequate levels of a broad picture of human factors application in
privacy and facilities for both individual and social ship design. Some interesting findings will be high-
relaxation are considered as important aspects in lighted. The results will be used as a reference for
the ship’s accommodation. Hardwick (2000) did further investigations.
a comparative study on the accommodations in
royal naval and merchant naval fleets by visiting
ships and submarines and interviewing the crew. 2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Suggested factors include the drive toward cabin-
based accommodation for all cabin crew, increased The methods applied in this article are mainly
space for sleeping and personal stowage, improv- qualitative approaches. Qualitative research is
ing ambient conditions (noise and temperature), defined as a research strategy that usually empha-
and provision of other facilities. sizes words rather than quantification in the col-
Lutzhoft (2005) based on an ethnographic lection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2001). The
approach, points out illumination problems on the study is conducted in its natural setting, where the
bridge, displays that are too bright and cannot be author becomes an observer on two offshore sup-
dimmed, equipment that is not attached properly ply vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea. Several
that the operator must put duct tape on, and similar different data collection techniques are applied,
problems on 15 vessels that she visited. Andersson i.e., in-depth interviews, focus-discussions, and
and Lutzhoft (2007) conducted interviews, field observations.
studies and questionnaires regarding environ- Interviews are conducted informally with all
mental conditions in the engine department, ergo- departments onboard. Almost all personnel are
nomic issues, engine and control room layout and surveyed. Questions asked vary from a general type
technical interfaces. They found many deficiencies of questions like: ‘how long have you been work-
in the engine room on a merchant ship that do ing on this vessel’ and ‘how do like working here’,
not comply with ergonomic principles, as well to the more specific ones, like: ‘do you experience
as occupational, health and safety requirements. difficulties on your job’, ‘what is the most severe
Grundevik, Lundh and Wagner (2009) did surveys incident that you experienced onboard, ’etc. Some
on seven Swedish merchant vessels; interviewing, probing questions to reexamine previous findings
evaluating the design of engine control room are also asked, like: ‘is there anybody ever hit by
(ECR), the layout, consoles and workstations. the hook, squeezed between containers’, etc. The
They also used questionnaires. The result shows interviews and discussions are recorded and then
that the ECR design has not developed sufficiently summarized as a report for each visit. Observa-
to meet the demand and less in accordance with the tions are made especially when the personnel are
technological progress. Ergonomic issues were also in their working stations, doing their job. Pictures
reported, such as insufficient leg space, the position are taken and documented as evidence. Several
of the consoles, and visibility problems. Defective important issues found during the exploratory
hardware components, software bugs, and defec- process are noted for further review or confirma-
tive software are among the most common system/ tion. Additional archive data exploration on ship
equipment failures mentioned. accidents is carried out.
Dalpiaz, Emmrich, Miller and McQuillan Lloyd’s Register (LR) describes human factors
(2005) used 3D computer model to review a new as: something that concerned with the task people
US Navy ship. They found that incorrect height/ do and the environment they do it in—fitting the job
orientation for equipment, machinery and other to the person (LR, 2008). Human factors in marine
manually operated equipment as the most com- design can be broken down into eight dimensions
mon mistakes (20%). Stairs, ladders, steps and (LR, 2009):
walkways designs were also found to be incorrect
(17%). Other deficiencies cover inaccessibility to - Habitability
valves, hand wheels and hand pumps (15%), incor- - Workability
rect control panel, console design, control and - Controllability
display designs (8%), and problems with access - Maintainability
and personnel movement (6%). - Maneuverability

671
- Survivability this occasion to occur. On January 2000, OSV
- Occupational health and safety Highland Pioneer collided with an offshore instal-
- System safety lation in Liverpool Bay. After the accident, the
operators implement a number of actions, includ-
The complete human factors framework devel- ing the challenging of all vessels approaching the
oped for this study is presented in Appendix A. 500 m safety zone around installations and passage
The framework is also derived based on several plans for supply vessels (MAIB, 2001).
guidelines published by the American Bureau of Robson (2003) made a database on ship/platform
Shipping (ABS, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2003). In the collision incidents, based on 557 cases in the period
surveys, the author has no assumptions about the of 1975 until 2001. The research was requested by
vessels viewed from the above framework. No pre- the Offshore Division of the Health and Safety
defined questionnaire is used, but simple and direct Executive (HSE). From the report, it can be con-
questions like: ‘what do you think of the cabin, the cluded that most incidents occurred during cargo
galley, the system, the safety on the vessel’, etc. transfer (128 cases/23%) and when the vessels
The objects of the study are the vessel as a complete were approaching installation (103 cases/18,5%).
entity and the elements, such as the accommodation, The primary cause factors identified are misjudg-
the ship control center (bridge), the engine room, the ment (124 cases/22%), and weather conditions
engine control room, the cargo deck and the layout or (67 cases/12%).
the arrangement of the vessel as separate units. In this research, two different offshore supply
vessels are chosen as the samples. They are working
in the Norwegian Continental Shelf for the same
3 The scope of the study: Offshore oil company. Both vessels are among the top of the
supply vessel line in the respective ship-owners fleet. However,
they have different owners, operators as well as
Offshore supply vessels (OSVs) have been chosen to shipyards and manufacturers. Built in 2008, OSV A
be the research population. This particular type of is almost 94 m long, 21 m width, and 8 m depth to
vessel represents one of the most advance designs in main deck. She follows the traditional OSV design
the maritime industry. OSVs are the main mean of with her superstructure at the fore. OSV B, built in
transportation for offshore platforms. They carry 2007, is 92 m long, 21 m width, and 10 m depth to
goods to supply the platforms which include brine, main deck. Vessel B has her superstructure at the
mud, cement, drill water, potable water, fuels, metha- aft. Both vessels carry DNV Comfort class nota-
nol, chemicals, pipes, drill strings, casings, food, and tion, which shows that the vessels comply with a
whatever is required by the installations. OSVs also set of criteria for noise and vibration on board.
bring back cargoes out of the installations, includ- The surveys were conducted in October 2010
ing drill cuttings (Hansson, 2006, Gibson, 2009). and in February 2011.
OSV design is characterized by large flat cargo deck
and a number of tanks underneath the deck.
Injuries occurring on supply vessels are mostly 4 Results of on-board surveys
occupational injuries, however, there are some risks
of organizational accidents taking place. Navigat- The results of the field surveys that have been carried
ing the vessel near the platforms is identified as one out can be distinguished in two parts. The first part is
of the risky operation (Antonsen, 2009). Hansson in relation with previous findings, incidents or acci-
(2006) has made a study to improve safety for off- dents, confirming what measures have been taken to
shore supply services in the North Sea. In her report, improve the condition. The second part is in relation
several accident events are mentioned that include: to human factors frameworks in ship design.
- A deckhand hit by a hook in the head
- Person squeezed between moving containers on 4.1 Some improvements as a result of previous
deck incidents
- A deckhand falling against a hose coupling when
a large wave hit the vessel 4.1.1 Design
- Persons slipping or twisted a foot To avoid water on deck, the OSVs now are designed
- Fall caused by slippery deck or obstacles with high bulwarks or side rails. Most of the time,
- Fall down a ladder the cargo deck is dry.
To secure tubular cargo on deck, automated
- Collision between vessel and installation.
cargo securing system has been installed on OSV
Among all types of accidents, collision with the A. The system consists of portable stanchions
offshore installation is considered to be the most which can run transversely the full width of the
severe one for OSVs. Efforts have been put to avoid deck in series of tracks.

672
 To improve safety in bulk cargo transfer, hose on recent OSV designs. Both vessels have excellent
securing systems are being developed and tested. standard of facilities. Every crew member has his/
On OSV A it is still under development, and on her own cabin equipped with bed, TV set, inter-
OSV B the pilot project proves to work well. net connection, table, sofa, wardrobe, with toilet
With these improvements, some accidents on and shower inside. The galley, the mess room, the
the deck can be avoided: person squeezed between lounge, the gym, the laundry and all related facili-
containers, person falling because of slippery deck, ties are available in good conditions and consid-
and people hit hose coupling. ered more than sufficient. Big screen TV sets with
satellite connections, leather sofas, reclining seats,
4.1.2 Procedures DVD movies, game consoles, and personal compu-
In 2006 a joint project between maritime and ter with internet connection are among the stand-
offshore organizations in Denmark, the Nether- ard facilities on both OSVs.
lands, Norway and the UK developed the North Based on observation made by the author, it
West European (NWEA) Guidelines for the Safety can be noted that there are significant differences
Management of Offshore Supply and Anchor between OSV A and B in their stability (of roll-
Handling Operations (NWEA, 2011). The guide- ing) and overall noise as the result of the differ-
lines were revised during 2008–2009, and updated ent superstructure locations. OSV B is more stable
in June 2009 (NWEA, 2009). Some items in the and quiet. The crew on OSV B confirms this state-
guidelines that are related to the cases mentioned ment. They sleep well and experience few incident
in Hannson (2006), are discussed as follows: of motion-induced sickness. Some noise problems
are identified on OSV A caused by tunnel thrust-
- To avoid injury of the crew while loading at
ers and wave slamming. Another issue is the smell
sea, it is now forbidden for the deckhands to
of methanol inside the accommodation area after
help position suspended lifts. The crane opera-
loading and unloading. It is quite strong and
tor must be able to place lift in position without
disturbing.
any assistance from the deckhands. Cherry pick-
In OSV A, the beds lie perpendicular to the
ing, selective discharge of cargo from within the
length of the ship, while in OSV B, the beds orien-
stow, is also forbidden.
tation are parallel with the ship’s longitudinal axis.
- To avoid the vessel hitting the offshore installa-
The arrangement on OSV A is in contradiction to
tion, now applied 500 m safety zone. The vessel
the crew’s expectation (Hardwick, 2000).
is not allowed to set the offshore installation as
the final destination of the voyage, but further
4.2.2 Workability
away from the structure. The vessel must con-
Both OSVs provide high workability standard,
tact offshore installations approximately one
adopting the level of which the oil and gas indus-
hour before arrival. Both parties must com-
tries follow. This includes the hardware, the soft-
plete checklists before the vessel can approach
ware and the user. Some interesting findings are
the installation. They must ensure the safety of
discovered as follow:
the loading unloading process with respect to
environmental condition. Should anybody feel 4.2.2.1 Users
unsafe to conduct loading unloading, they can Adaptation and familiarization for new users are
refuse to proceed without any pressure. required on both OSVs due to novelty of the sys-
tems. This practice has been formalized in train-
Therefore, the probability of a person experi-
ing programs. Simulator-based training becomes
encing an accident on decks also minimized, as
obligatory for OSVs bridge operators.
well as the probability of the vessel hitting the
In contrast with Squire (2007), who claims there
installation.
is a lack of user feedback in ship design, most sen-
ior officers and engineers in OSV A and B were
4.2 Results on human factors exploratory survey involved in the process of building the vessel and
in the design stage.
Some exploratory surveys on both OSVs, viewed
from the human factors perspectives, were con- 4.2.2.2 Equipment and software
ducted. The human factors framework in Appen- Many systems on both OSVs are digital and com-
dix A is applied. puterized. New types of problems are therefore
recognized such as: compatibility issues, operat-
4.2.1 Habitability ing system problems, expiration date issues, over-
All crew members on both OSVs have no com- loaded systems, data validity, etc. The officers on
plaints with respect to the accommodation facilities OSV A stated that there is too much information
on board. Most issues raised by Strong (2000) and presented on the screens. Not everything is neces-
Hardwick (2000) have been responded to positively sary, but some particular ones, which sometimes

673
become vague because of the underlying com- workshop instead. It is located 10 m away from
plexity. However, this statement was refuted by an the cargo deck, and is not facing directly to
officer on OSV B who claimed that all information the deck.
presented is important.
The chief engineer on OSV A said that in the 4.2.2.5 Accessibility
beginning they had lots of problems with the sys- Based on observations made in this study,
tems installed on the vessel. Many systems were personnel’s accessibility is not a priority in the
not ready for use and the engineers had to deal OSV designs. OSV A has a vessel entry hatchet
with them. In contrast, the engineers on OSV B that people have to duck under to pass. OSV B
were satisfied with their systems, which they said has a long and high ladder to climb before enter-
were ready from day one. ing a narrow and winding gangway. On OSV B,
access to some areas can only be reached by using
4.2.2.3 Procedures a vertical ladder. There is one ladder around 6 m
There are abundant procedures, checklists and high, 90 degrees vertical, and installed without any
forms to fill in during OSVs operations. Some are safety cage.
perceived necessary, but others are found to be Both the engine rooms on OSV A and B, have
irritating. Some people realize the importance of places where people have to duck to go through, and
the procedures, but others are reluctant, especially there are other places where people need to climb
when they have to do the same entry over and over up. However, there is no extreme acrobatic opera-
again. In a small focus discussion, officers on OSV tion that must be done by the crew on both OSVs as
A agree that they need to fill in the check lists, but mentioned by Andersson & Lutzhoft (2007).
they expected better design of the forms and the
checklists. 4.2.3 Controllability
The ship control centers and engine control rooms
4.2.2.4 Physical environment on OSVs are full of computerized systems with high
Deckhands on OSV B identify environmental con- degree of automation. Gibson (2007, p 23) states
ditions as one of the most difficult situations that that: “All the craft (supply) require a degree of sophis-
the crew must live with. When mean wind speed tication unheard of previously and even currently in
reaches above 25 knots or significant wave height much of the marine world.” The design has leapt for-
above 4 m, cargo loading unloading is ceased. ward, beyond the conventional control centers.
The vessel is requested asked to move away from There is no traditional wheel to steer the vessel nor
the installation and wait until sea state improves. handle for the engine telegraph to regulate the speed
Waiting on a vessel in high seas is unpleasant expe- on the bridge. Most controls are replaced by joystick,
rience. Sailing on high seas, especially with the trackball, mouse, keyboard, and touch screen.
accommodation forward is even worse. Moreover, Problems met on both OSVs, include:
when somebody must sleep with the head just next
to the slamming area. - Strong lights that cannot be dimmed, disturb-
In some locations of the vessel, noise is identi- ing visibility at night, as addressed by Lutzhoft
fied as a problem. On OSV B, the workshop on the (2005), and still found on both OSVs.
deck, often used as the dirty mess, is noisy because - Flooding of alarms on the bridge. Some audio
of the close proximity of the engine room air alarms are considered to be annoying by the
intake. Thus far, there is no complaint associated officers, and some visual warnings are consid-
with high/low temperature as well as vibrations. ered to be irrelevant.
The engine control rooms on both OSVs are - Abundant communications on the bridge. There
located on the main deck. This is favorable for the are many communication channels that the crew
human operators. They are spared from electro- should always monitor. Sometimes they are
magnetic fields, high noise levels, vibrations and overwhelmed with the calls.
the probability of CO2 exposures. The engine con- - Ergonomic issues; placement of switches or
trol room on OSV A is considered too small by the other controls that do not follow ergonomic
chief engineer. principles.
There are several layout and arrangement issues
On OSV A, the engine console is designed with
found on both vessels that are related to the work-
no leg space for the operator sitting in front of
ability on board:
the workstation. This issue has been criticized by
- On OSV A, the linen room is converted to be a Grundevik, et al (2009).
server room. On OSV B there are switches that are difficult
- On OSV B, there is no dirty mess where deck- to press, leaving the operator sometimes confused
hands spend their time while waiting for load- about whether he has already activated (or deacti-
ing unloading operations at sea. They use the vated) the system.

674
 A serious issue is found in the system automa- engines, two azipull propellers, two bow thrusters,
tion. The automation sometimes does not follow and one azimuth thruster. The whole system is
the traditional way of operating the vessel. For integrated in a complete maneuvering system, as
instance, in previous designs, when autopilot was well as in the DP system. This integration makes it
active, the vessel moved forward, and the crew easy to operate the vessel. There is no doubt that
tried to override the system, reversing the vessel, the maneuverability of both OSVs is more than
the system would not respond to change the direc- sufficient to do their missions.
tion of the vessel, but only to the velocity. The well
stimulation vessel Big Orange XVIII hit Ekofisk 4.2.6 Survivability, occupational health
2/4-W platform in June 2009 (Petroleum Safety and safety (OHS), and system safety
Authority Norway, 2009) because of this situa- OSVs follow the same safety standard as in the oil
tion. The same case experienced by Far Symphony, and gas industry. They have high concern regard-
striking West Venture on March 2004 (Hydro Oil & ing safety, health and security issues. They apply
Energy, 2004). zero tolerance for drug and alcohol, but still accept
Measures have been taken by changing the smoking. They have a good standard in all safety
design of the autopilot on OSVs. Now, the autopi- equipment and facilities. They follow procedures
lot will automatically be deactivated when the crew like permit to work, using of checklists, conduct-
operates the joystick. Fortunately, there have been ing safety meeting, toolbox talk, risk assessment
no autopilot incidents on OSV A or B. Both still and safety job analysis. Safety drills and exercises
modified their autopilot systems. are conducted often. Some of the personnel think
An automation incident occurred in the opera- it is too much and they are tired of the drill.
tion of dynamic positioning (DP) system. An While it is forbidden to bring mobile phones on
officer on OSV A shared his experience when the offshore installations, almost everybody on OSVs
DP system failed. Instead of being steady on one bring their own. They still can use their phone in
spot, the vessel was suddenly moving towards the most areas. Some of the crew are quite occupied
offshore installation. He took over the control, shut with their device. An officer on OSV A identifies
down the DP system, and backed away the ship mobile phone as one of the most dangerous thing
from the structure. One hose was still connected on board.
to the installation and it snapped off. The system One risky operation that is still acknowledged
installed on OSV A is the DP3 system, i.e., the on cargo deck is when the deckhand is supposed to
highest class in the market with most redundan- fetch the hook which is lowered by the crane. There
cies. The return period was mentioned by the man- were several occasions observed that the hook
ufacturer to be more than 120 years, yet it failed swayed in the air and almost hit the deckhand.
in less than 2 years. Some officers mentioned they One issue regarding the location of the fire stor-
had similar experiences on other vessels, but not in age on OSVA is noted. The room is facing directly
particular with DP3. on to the main deck without any alternative access.
In case of fire, which is most likely to occur on
4.2.4 Maintainability deck, it will be difficult for the fire fighters to enter
The way the crew do maintenance on board has this storage area and prepare for action. Another
changed a lot in the last decade. The operators issue is regarding the paint and chemical store
follow the maintenance program that is generated which is located adjacent to the crew’s cabin.
by the system. Evidently, the system is not 100%
accurate. Some corrections and adjustments must
be made, for instance the standard running hours.
False alarm or warning occurs from time to time. 5 CONCLUSIONS
A broken sensor is the most likely cause. During
surveys on both OSVs, there has been no defec- Based on the observations made in this study it can
tive hardware or software issues found as raised by be seen that many measures have been adjusted in
Grundevik et al (2009). Lack of storage for sup- ship design with respect to human factors. Increas-
plies, tools and provisions is a common complaint ing the height of the bulwarks, developing auto-
on board. One can notice that OSV A has less mated cargo securing system and hose securing
space than B. Limited space to do maintenance is system are among the measures that are hard evi-
one thing. Climbing and crawling are among other dences. Developing guidelines and procedures for
things common in maintenance. the offshore supply operations can be classified as
soft evidence. Therefore, we can contradict most
4.2.5 Maneuverability notions addressed by Meister (1971) and Graveson
Recent OSVs are equipped with large maneuver- (2002). Human factors has been considered in
ing capabilities. Both OSV A and B have four main OSV design, and it is taken seriously.

675
 Compared with the problems raised by others American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). 2001a. Guide for
(Strong, 2000, Hardwick, 2000, Lutzhoft, 2005, Crew Habitability on Ships. Houston, TX.
Anderson & Lutzhoft, 2007, Grundevik et al, 2009, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). 2001b. Guide for
Dalpiaz et al, 2005, Calhoun & Stevens, 2003) this Passenger Comfort on Ships. Houston, TX.
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). 2003. Guidance
research states that there have been significant Notes for the Application of Ergonomics to Marine
improvements in this particular OSVs segment. Systems. Houston, TX.
However, illumination problems on the bridge, Andersson, M & Lutzhoft, M. 2007. Engine Con-
ergonomic issues of the workstations and layout trol Rooms—Human Factors. Human Factors in
issue of the cabin still exist. Ship Design, Safety & Operation Conference. 21–22
Two issues mentioned in Hansson (2006) still Mar 2007. RINA HQ, London, UK.
remain: deckhands are exposed to be hit by the Antonsen, S. 2009. The relationship between culture and
hook and the risk of falling down of the ladder. safety on offshore supply vessels. Journal of Safety
Referring to the human factors framework Science, Vol 47 (8): 1118–1128.
Bryman, A. 2001. Social Research Methods. New York:
developed by Lloyd’s Register (see Appendix A), it
Oxford University Press.
can be concluded from this study that the crew are Calhoun, SR & Stevens, SC. 2003. Human Factors in
most satisfied by the habitability of the vessel and Ship Design, in Lamb T (ed). Ship Design and Con-
less satisfied by the maintainability. struction Vol 1. NJ: The Society of Naval Architects
It can also be concluded that there is no such a and Marine Engineers.
perfect ship, but it is possible to differentiate the Dalpiaz, TM, Emmrich, M, Miller, G, & McQuillan, D.
better one. OSV B is significantly better than A 2005. Conducting a human factors engineering 3-D
with respect to the designs impact on human fac- computer modeling ship design review. Conference on
tors. All personnel on board confirm that B is a Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety & Operation.
good ship to live in and to work on. 23–24 Feb 2005. RINA HQ, London, UK.
Gibson, V. 2009. Supply Ship Operations A Handbook.
On the other hand, it is obvious to accept the 3rd ed. Aberdeen: La Madrila Press.
fact that humans are not easily satisfied. OSV B Gibson, V. 2007. The History of the Supply Ship.
has lots of space for storage, but the crew still ask Aberdeen: La Madrila Press.
for more. Graveson, A., 2002. Human Factors in Ship Design
There are some interesting findings worth not- and Operation. Conference on Human Factors in Ship
ing for further investigations: Design, Safety & Operation. 21–22 March 2007. RINA
HQ, London, UK.
- The DP system failure and its consequences Grundevik, P., M. Lundh, & E Wagner. 2009. Engine
- Flooding of alarms, communications and Control Room—Human Factors. Conference on
information Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation. 25–26
- Abundant procedures, checklists and data entry Feb 2009. RINA HQ, London, UK.
- Abundant safety drills and exercises Hansson, L. 2006. Safety Management for Prevention of
- Excessive (rolling) motion Occupational Accidents. Doctoral thesis at Norwegian
University of Science and Technology. IMT-2006–17.
- Noise generated from the tunnel thrusters and Trondheim: Tapir Uttrykk.
slamming Hardwick, C. 2000. A comparative assessment of priori-
- Smell (of chemical) inside the accommodation. ties for accommodation standards between royal naval
From this research, DP system failure proved and merchant naval fleets. Conference on Human Fac-
tors in Ship Design and Operation. 27–29 Sept. 2000.
to be hazardous and has likelihood to escalate RINA HQ, London, UK.
into fatal accident. Other issues like alarms, com- Hydro Oil & Energy. 2004. Investigation report on Col-
munications, noises and are subject for further lision between Far Symphony and West Venture
evaluation. (in Norwegian: Gransking: Kollisjon mellom Far Sym-
phony og West Venture 7.03.04.). 21 March 2004.
Lloyd’s Register Group (LR). 2009. The Human Element
Endnote Best Practice for Ship Operators Continuous Improve-
ment of the Human Element. July 2009 Version 1.1.
Above all, the final finding from this research shows Lloyd’s Register (LR). 2008. The Human Element An
Introduction. Booklet. ISBN 1-900839-31-8.
that the better vessel for human factors unfortunately
Lutzhoft, M. 2005. Human Integration of Bridge Tech-
is the least popular for the market/business. nology. Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and
Operation Conference. 23–24 Feb 2005. RINA HQ.
London, UK.
REFERENCES Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB). 2001.
Report on the investigation of the collision between
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). 2000. Guide for the offshore supply vessel Highland Pioneer and the
Bridge Design and Navigational Equipment/Systems. DA jack-up rig of the Douglas offshore installation in
Houston, TX. Liverpool Bay on January 2000. Report No 15/2001.

676
 Southampton, UK. Available online: http://www.maib. Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) Norway. 2009. Inves-
gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm? file = /highland-pioneer. tigation of Big Orange XVIII’s collision with Ekofisk
pdf (downloaded 5 Jan 2011). 2/4-W 8 June 2009. [Online: http://www.ptil.no/nyheter/
McCafferty, D.B. and C.C. Baker. 2006. Trending the granskingsrapport-etter -kollisjon-mellom-big-orange-
Cause of Marine Incidents. Learning from Marine xviii-og-ekofisk-2–4-w-article5983–24.html]
Incidents Conference. 25–26 January 2006. RINA HQ, Reason, J. 1990. Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge
London, UK. University Press.
Meister D. 1971. Human Factors: Theory and Practice. Robson, JK. 2001. Ship/platform collision incident data-
Wiley Series in Human Factors. USA: John Wiley & base (2001). A report prepared by Serco Assurance
Sons, Inc. for the Health and Safety Executive 2003. Research
Moore WH, Bea RG, and Roberts, KH. 1993. Improving Report 053.
the Management of Human and Organization Errors Rumawas, V & Asbjørnslett, 2010. A content analysis
(HOE) in Tanker Operations. Ship Structures Sympo- of human factors in the design of marine systems.
sium, Arlington, Virginia. International Conference on Ship and Offshore Tech-
NWEA Guidelines for the Safe Management of Offshore nology Developments in Ship Design and Contruction
Supply and Rig Move Operations. Updated June 2009. (ICSOT). Surabaya, 11–12 Nov 2010. Royal Institu-
[Online: http://www.nwea.info/]. tion of Naval Architecture.
NWEA Common Guidelines Info [Online: http://www. Squire, D. 2007. ‘Fit for Purpose’—Keeping the Crew in
nwea.info/] Accessed: 8 March 2011. Mind. Conference on Human Factors in Ship Design,
Perrow, C. 1999. Normal accidents: living with high-risk Safety and Operation. 21–22 March 2007. RINA,
technologies. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press. London, UK.

Accommodation

Washing

Bathroom

Hazard identification Toilet

Potential for human error Habitability Galleys

Risk analysis Messroom

Management of risks Exercise area

Operating instructions & procedures Recreation & personal study facilities

System Safety
Communication/working language Personal storage

Business imperative

Training & familiarization Users

Potential for environmental damage & pollution Equipment & software

Recording, reporting & feedback procedures Materials

Procedures

Effect of work Physical environment

Working environment Workability Social environment

Living conditions Accessibility

OHS policy Information, handbooks

Safe working practices Communications

Development of safety culture Signage

Permit to work Occupational Health and Safety Protective equipment

Health awareness

Medical screening Ship control centers

Medical support Machinery control rooms

Cargo control rooms

Balanced diet Human Factors in
Drug and alcohol policy Ship Design Equipment

Provision, maintenance, access & use of PPE Systems

Interfaces
Controllability
Firefighting Communication facilities

Damage control Control & switches

Lifesaving & security facilities Displays

Security arrangements Alarms

Survivability
Ship layout Video-display units

Equipment fit Computer workstations

Manpower availability

Emergency response system & procedure Accessibility

Tools provision & location

Propulsion systems Onboard expertise

Steering system Disposal of parts & equipment

Thrusters Through-life support

Potential weather conditions Location of heavy spare-parts

Communications Maintenance tasks

Manoeuvrability
Min & max manoeuvring speed Maintainability Manuals

Critical system redundancy Diagnostics

Through-life costs Schematics

Protection of the environment Bench space

Fuel economy Noise protected communications

Policy for onboard spares

Storage of spare parts and supplies

Handling of heavy parts

Appendix A. Human Factors in Ship Design Framework.

677

View publication stats