Table of Contents

Title Page

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY------------------------------------------------2

Unit 1: Definition and Scope of Philosophy-----------------------------------------------------------3

Definition of Philosophy------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3
Layman Understanding of Philosophy-------------------------------------------------------------------3
Academic Conception of Philosophy---------------------------------------------------------------------5
Unit 2: Philosophy as the Parent Discipline----------------------------------------------------------6
Historical Background of Philosophy--------------------------------------------------------------------6
The Gestation Period/Era------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7
The Era of “delivery” and settlement -------------------------------------------------------------------7
Does Philosophy still remain the parent discipline? ---------------------------------------------------8
Unit 3: Branches of Philosophy------------------------------------------------------------------------10
Logic ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10
Metaphysics---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------11
Epistemology ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Ethics -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
Aesthetics------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------13
Unit 4: Philosophy and Other Disciplines Contents ---------------------------------------------15
Philosophy and Science --------------------------------------------------------------------------15
Philosophy and Religion----------------------------------------------------------------------------------17
Unit 5: Sources of Knowledge and Criteria for Knowing ---------------------------------------18
Difference between knowledge, opinion and belief -------------------------------------------------18
Sources of knowledge --------------------------------------------------------------------------------20
Unit 6: Philosophy of Religion--------------------------------------------------------------------------23
The Field and its Significance -----------------------------------------------------------------------------23
The Meaningfulness of Religious Language ------------------------------------------------------------25
Religious Forms of Life and Practices -------------------------------------------------------------------27
The Concept of God ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------29
Religious Pluralism -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------50

PART TWO: BASIC CONCEPTS OF LOGIC------------------------------------------------------53

Unit 1: Nature of Arguments-----------------------------------------------------------------------------54

Unit 2: Meanings and Definitions in Logic------------------------------------------------------------66

PHILOSOPHY Page 1
 Course Introduction

Welcome to the course ‘Philosophy.’ This is a semester course work of three (4) credit hours. The
course should equip you with an in depth knowledge and appreciation of the importance of
philosophy in theology.

Philosophy is a pioneer parent of all disciplenes. It is from philosophy that all sciences we have today
emerged at different times through a long period of evolution. Philosophy is a subject matter that
provides us with critical analysis and understanding of nature and the universe in general. It provides
bases for all sciences and knowledge inquiries. As far as philosophy is very vast field of study, we
cannot cover all of its theories, concepts and critical areas of concern. For this reason, this module
only provides the introductory cocncepts of the subject matter specifically focusing on concepts
related to theology.

On the other hand, logic is a branch of philosophy that deals with the analysis and evaluation of
arguments. We engage in arguments and fallacies in our daily lives either intentionally or
unintentionally. Though logic by itself is vast in nature, this module also only introduces the basic
concepts of logic and methods of logical reasoning.

For simplification of presentation, this module is divided into two parts as part-I and part-II. Part-I of
the modules deals with the basic concepts of philosophy, while part-II of the module discusses the
fundamentals of logic. Module part-I is further classified in to six units, while part-II of the module
comprises two units. Detailed contents of each and every part are given under each of the units.

Course Objectives:

By the end of this course, you will be able to:

 Explain the meaning and scope of philosophy

 Differentiate the concepts philosophy, science and religion
 Identify and describe the basic branches of philosophy
 Understand the concept of philosophy of religion and differentiate it from the other areas of
philosophy
 Identify the nature of arguments
 Relate and know the relationship between logic and language
 Describe fallacy and the nature of informal fallacies
 Have a complete understanding of categorical propositions

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 PART ONE

PHILOSOPHY

UNIT 1
DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

1.1. Introduction

This study unit introduces you to the definition and scope of philosophy as a discipline. The unit
will focus particularly on the complex nature of the definition of philosophy, the way both
layman and academics interpret philosophy.

1.2. Definition of Philosophy

Whenever a question such as what is philosophy is asked, no straight forward answer can be
given. Because of the complex nature of the discipline it is not easy to define philosophy
in a way acceptable to every philosopher. For instance, it is easy to ask a student of biology
or physics what the definition of their respective disciplines are and get a straight forward
answer. But this is not possible with philosophy. Philosophy as a discipline does not have
a universal definition. So the first problem a student of philosophy encounters is that
of the definition of philosophy. Philosophers do not agree among themselves on what
philosophy is. Either they run away from defining the subject or they mostly do so according
to their various schools of thought, culture and even tradition. That is why for most
introductory textbooks on philosophy, the best way to define philosophy is to do philosophy,
(Popkin 1982: XV).

But you should remember that even if there is an element of truth in this approach, the logic
behind it is not hundred percent correct. You do not necessarily need to practice something
before you explain or understand it. For instance, someone interested in the definition of
death does not necessarily need to die before he explains or understands it. If he is told that the
only way to define death is to die first, he is likely to give up the attempt. Even if the best
way to define philosophy is to expose the student to the rigours of deep philosophizing, this
remains partial. What you should always have in mind is that when a student of philosophy
asks a question “What is Philosophy” he has started philosophizing and to philosophize is
to wonder about life and about the fundamental problems of human existence.

1.4. Layman Understanding of Philosophy

In the absence of a universal definition or understanding of philosophy, the discipline has been
given various meanings and definitions. This section focuses on one aspect only which is
the conception of the discipline by the layman. And by layman, it mean the average man-in-
the-street. According to William Halverson, there is a popular belief of the meaning of

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philosophy, and since this is one of the common ways in which people who are not
professional philosophers understand and use the term, it is one of the strongest
impressions that people have of philosophy (1967:4).

My Philosophy of Life
To the average man-in-the street, Philosophy is used first to mean “an attitude towards a certain
line of action”, a “general view of life or a general theory or principles about how we ought
to conduct our lives” (Halverson, 1967: 4). That is why in the street if you ask a common man:
“What is your Philosophy of Life”? You will get answers such as: “My Philosophy of Life is
to take things gently” or “ I don’t like the philosophy of the capitalist system of
government”. You can see here that for a layman, a person’s philosophy becomes “the
sum total of his fundamental beliefs and convictions” that is, the main principles that guide
or control his life. To Halverson this impression of Philosophy is understood to have
a very practical orientation. And a Philosophy of Life… include views on such things as the
nature of man and man’s place in the universe, some convictions about what things are worth for
and so on (1967:4).

Taking Things Philosophically

This is another way the common man understands Philosophy. You can remember that in our
daily lives sometimes when someone looses a very close relation, he is advised to take it
philosophically. For H. Harold, this implies that the individual sees the problem in its broad
perspectives or as part of a large scheme of things: hence he faces the situation calmly and
reflectively with poise and composure (1997:10).
In this situation, “taking the loss of someone philosophically” simply means that the person
rationalized death believing that whatever will be, will be irrespective of whatever any man may
think or do. And for Joseph I. Omoregbe, whatever happens, happens necessarily and “there is
nothing any man can do to prevent it from happening” (1989:26). The person’s intention here
is to see birth and death as part of the universal scheme. In other words birth and death are all
part of life.

Being a Philosopher or Getting Philosophical

You can remember that in our daily lives, when two individuals engage themselves in an
argument on a given topic and one excels in sustaining his position in a systematic, logical
and consistent manner, the person is often qualified as “being a philosopher”. At other times,
when someone makes an imprecise and vague statement about something, that is, a statement
that cannot be easily explained or understood, to a layman, the person is simply “getting
Philosophical”.

In conclusion, you should always remember that to the layman, philosophy is concerned with
matters that are uncommon, profound, beyond the understanding of most men, or at worst
simply vague and imprecise.

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1.5. Academic Conception of Philosophy

As stated earlier, there is no straight forward answer to the question: “what is

philosophy?” We have two ways to understand philosophy. The first way is that of the
layman as discussed above. The second is the concern of this section that is, the
academic or professional conception of philosophy. You should always bear in mind that the
professional or academic understanding of philosophy is almost the opposite of that of the
layman. Unlike the layman, the professional philosopher begins to define philosophy
from its origin.

According to academic philosophers, philosophy originated from the Ancient Greek City State
of Miletus. This was around the late 5th and early 6 th century B.C. But you should also
quickly remember that this Eurocentric view which limits the Origin of Philosophy to the
Ancient Greeks has been criticized and rejected by some contemporary African philosophers. To
some African Philosophers such as Eboussi Boulaga, Marcien Towa, E. Njoh Mouelle and
P.O. Bodunrin, P hilosophy also has an African origin. There existed early intellectual,
scientific and philosophical activities in Ancient Africa long before their European or Western
counterparts began any meaningful philosophical inquiry. It is on record that Ionian
Philosophers especially Pythagoras and Thales visited Africa notably Ancient Egypt and
“were educated in all disciplines of knowledge by African teachers “(I.C Onyewuenyi,
1987:44). In the preface to the African Origin of Greek Philosophy this is what P.O
Bodunrin says:
 It is impossible to think that the Greek or western Philosophers would not have been
influenced by African thought (I.C Onyewuenyi, 1987:8).

According to Onyewuenyi, “what is called Greek Philosophy should be regarded as

haven’t been stolen from Africa” (1987:8). Any one that claims that Greece is the only birth
place of philosophy commits an unforgivable historical mistake. It is also an unfortunate
deliberate attempt to discredit the achievement of the black people and a gross injustice to
the contributions of African Philosophy.

“Love of Wisdom”
You should always bear in mind that despite the critic of Eurocentrism as
aforementioned, Ancient Greece remains the first place in Europe where philosophy was
systematized as a discipline. Pythagoras was the first to make a standard comment about the
nature and definition of philosophy. He was a Greek mystic, mathematician and
philosopher. It is on record that “ when he was called Wise man, he said that his wisdom only
consisted in knowing that he was ignorant and that he should therefore not be called a wise man
but a “lover of wisdom” (A.C. Ewing, 1951:9).

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 UNIT 2
PHILOSOPHY AS THE PARENT DISCIPLINE

2.1. Introduction

This study unit introduces you to the analysis of Philosophy as the parent of all
disciplines. It also x-rays the origin and development of Philosophy. Special attention will be
given to how other disciplines were born of and later emancipated from Philosophy.

2.2. Objectives

It is hoped that at the end of this unit you should be able to:
• Know how and why Philosophy can be referred to as the parent discipline
• Discuss the relationship between Philosophy and the sciences
• Demonstrate the perennial character of Philosophy

2.3. Historical Background of Philosophy

To the layman, when you say that Philosophy is the parent of all disciplines, it sounds to him
like as a joke. To him it is absurd to see any relation between that abstract subject called
Philosophy and economics, physics, political science, etc. In order to know if this position is
defendable, I believe that the historical background of Philosophy is very necessary.

As already mentioned in unit 1, it was curiosity and the desire for knowledge for its own sake,
followed by a feeling of wonder that actually triggered off Philosophy.

It is on record that the first philosophers especially the Ionians or Miletians were
mainly concerned about the nature of the universe. For instance, they were wondering about the
constant process of change, of transition from day to night, from life to death and vice versa
etc. Thales of Miletus was the first to identify water as the “primary substance” of the universe.
That is why even today, some scholars still address him as the “father of Philosophy”. On other
hand, Anaximenes said the primary stuff was air, Anaximander said it was “the unlimited” or
“the indeterminate boundless” and Heraclitus said it was fire. What you should always remember
here is that the main purpose of all these Ionians was “to understand”, “to know” and it is on this
that Philosophy is grounded. And, this was the beginning of philosophic enterprise. At that
particular period, there was no difference between Philosophy and science or, as Bertrand Russell
puts it, “Philosophy and science which were not originally separated–were therefore born
together” (1945:3). Till today, the Ionian thinkers are best known as “Greek Philosopher
Scientists”. For instance, Thales is credited with the prediction of the eclipse of 585 B.C.
Anaximander is known to have made an ingenious guess as to the origin of man. He was the
first to maintain that man was originally born from animals of another species.

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Anaximenes is known to be the first scientist to explain the cause of rainbow.
According to him, rainbow is the result of the sun’s ray falling on the thick cloud which
they cannot penetrate. Always bear in mind that during the era of Ionian speculations,
all knowledge was one. There was no difference between scientific procedures and
magical procedures. In Coplestone’s word: “the early Ionian thinkers or wise men pursued all
sorts of scientific consideration… and these were not clearly separated from Philosophy”.
(1962: 32) that is why, even today, no serious Astronomer, Geographer, Physicist, Historian etc
can resist to paying homage to Ionian philosophers.

2.4. The Gestation Period/Era

You should bear in mind that even after the Ionian thinkers, Philosophy remained pregnant with
science for a very long time. In fact, science is the oldest child of Philosophy.

In Plato’s and Aristotle’s writings, for instance, it was difficult to differentiate the
philosophical from the scientific. These two philosophers considered so many issues, some
of which now belong to the special sciences. Aristotle is mostly known to have delved into
almost all disciplines. He dealt with various subjects such as logic, Biology, Meta-Physics,
Politics, Anatomy, and so on. It is on record that his writings were used as Encyclopedia of
Philosophy in the Middle-Ages because almost all the universities in that period considered
Philosophy as an all embracing discipline. This is one of the reasons why: “the highest degree
awarded in the arts and sciences, regardless of the special field of concentration, still bears the
title of “Doctor of Philosophy” (Lewis, 1973:770).

You should always bear in mind that this was because most scientific learning until Galileo
was largely speculative, therefore, it was easier for Philosophy to contain them.

Even in modern period, Philosophy is still seen as an encyclopedic discipline. All degrees, no
matter the discipline, from Medicine, Law to Engineering, Pharmacy, Natural Sciences,
Social Sciences, all end with Doctor of Philosophy, Ph.D.

2.5. The Era of Delivery and Settlement

When the pregnancy of Philosophy was due, the moment of delivery and settlement,
became unavoidable. Many disciplines that were still under Philosophy broke away and
decided to stay on their own. The 18th century can be considered as the “take off” of
“delivery” and settlement. It is in this period that “natural Philosophy” which later
became “natural science” began to stand on its own. This split was the result of the
orientation of some early Greek Philosopher-scientists such as Democritus, Epicurus,
Leucippus, Lucretius and Pythagoras. You should always remember that “natural
Philosophy” later split into what today we call, chemistry, Physics, Biology, etc.

The 19th century witnessed the breaking away and settlement of the social sciences from the
parent discipline. You should know that it is tautological to say that the social sciences

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originated from Greek philosophers. You should also know that the birth of social sciences was a
gradual process. Apart from the ancient Greek philosophers, the birth and settlement of the
social sciences was hastened in the 19th century by the works of some philosophers such as
Malthus, Ricardo, Karl Marx, Auguste Comte, etc. You should always bear in mind that the
birth of the social sciences came along with some problems among social scientists themselves.
They were two factions. The first faction championed the cause of a single social science
while the second championed the diversity of the discipline. The second faction won the
battle. Thus, Economics became the first to attain the status of single social science. The
next was political science, followed by anthropology. Sociology and Psychology came
much later.

2.6. Does Philosophy Still Remain The Parent Discipline?

The answer to the question d o e s p h i l o s o p h y s t i l l r e m a i n t h e p a r e n t

d i s c i p l i n e is yes. However this does not mean that all is well with Philosophy. The
breaking away of natural and social sciences from Philosophy cannot be overlooked. Even
today some critics claim that in future other disciplines will also spring from Philosophy,
since some questions we now consider as philosophical will in future not be so regarded. It
is in line with this claim that J.L Austin, for instance, maintained that Philosophy is at the
verge of giving birth to a new type of linguistic theory. Nowadays, some philosophers,
themselves, express the sentiment that even logic, which is one of the traditional branches of
Philosophy will soon break away because of its strong affinity to mathematics. But you
should always bear in mind that despite all this, Philosophy was, is, and remains the parent
discipline. This is one of the reasons why Aristotle almost 3000 years ago, called it “the first
and the last science”.

According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the “first science” because it is logically

presupposed by every other science. It is also the “last science” because in order to
understand it we must, to some extent, have mastered the other science (Passmore,
1972:219).

In Aristotle’s view, all sciences share in Philosophy. Therefore, it is the only discipline that is
universal. Other special Sciences concern themselves with a part of being or reality. It is
the duty of a Philosopher to co-ordinate the fundamental principles of the various sciences.
The philosopher identifies and offers solutions to certain problems of world outlook and
methodology which all sciences share and which cannot be solved within the framework of
specialized research (Konstantinou, 1982:16). In conclusion, you must always remember
that no matter what, Philosophy can be compared to Shakespeare’s King Lear. It is on
record that it was from Pythagoras that Philosophy derived its origin and meaning. In
academic circles, therefore, Philosophy comes from two Greek words “Philo” meaning
“love” and “Sophia” meaning “Wisdom”. Hence, etymologically Philosophy means “love of
wisdom”. In the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary for instance, the word “wise”
literally means “having or showing experience”, knowledge, good judgment, prudence
etc” if you follow closely the Oxford Dictionary, it is implied that an individual can be

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knowledgeable but lack wisdom. Here wisdom simply means that the individual has certain
qualities which some others do not have. However, in Pythagoras’ opinion, it is impossible for
an individual to be wise but lack knowledge. The term wisdom goes beyond mere
knowledge. The basic aim of Philosophy is to “deal with pulsating problems of life”.
That is why early Greek philosophers did philosophize primarily to satisfy their curiously to
know the origin of the objective reality such as the perplexing features and immensity of the
natural world, the facts of man’s birth, growth, death and delay.

Wonder About Man and Wonder About The World

Always remember that the desire to know and to satisfy their curiosity led early Greek
philosophers to begin to wonder about man and the world. According to them, all knowledge
begins in wonder, doubt and curiosity. Thus when you wonder about man and the world
you are philosophizing. Aristotle emphasized that: “it is owing to their wonder that men now
begin and first began to philosophize”.

Before Aristotle, Plato had already put it this way: “this sense of wonder is the mark of the
Philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin”. In line with this, it is obvious that
Philosophy is all embracing. The entire universe is its scope and subject matter.

2.7. Conclusion

This study unit dealt with the definition and scope of Philosophy. It dealt specifically with the
various definitions and interpretations of Philosophy.

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 UNIT 3
BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY

3.1. Introduction

This study introduces you to the major branches of Philosophy. It is an opportunity for you to
know the divisions and sub-divisions within Philosophy

3.2. Objectives

The main purpose of this unit is to inform you about the main divisions of Philosophy. It is hoped
that at the end of this unit you should be able to:

· Know the major branches of Philosophy

· Define and discuss Logic
· Define and discuss Metaphysics
· Define and discuss Epistemology
· Define and discuss Ethics
- Describe Aesthetics

3.3. Logic
You should always remember that whenever a question such as what is logic is asked no
straight forward answer can be given. Logic has been variously defined by different
scholars. Copi for instance, defines “logic as the study of the methods and principles used in
distinguishing good (correct) from bad (incorrect) reasoning” (1972). On the other hand,
Nancy sees Logic “as the science that appraises reasoning as correct or incorrect” (1990:34).
Kahane on his part defines logic as “an attempt to distinguish between correct (valid) and
incorrect (invalid) arguments” (1968:2). Logic can also be defined as the science of good or
bad reasoning. Etymologically, logic as a discipline derives from the Greek word Logos, which
means study, word or discourse. Basically, you can notice that in all definitions the main
concepts which stand out clearly are reasoning and argumentation. Therefore we can
say that logic is the study of the criteria of differentiating correct from incorrect
arguments. The logician is most concerned with argument which is a group of propositions
whose function is to make a claim about something. Always remember that any argument
must have premises and conclusion. And the conclusion of any argument must follow or be
inferred from the premises.
For example:
· P1 If you do not attend logic class, you will fail
· P2 You have not attended logic class
· C therefore you will fail

Arguments are either “Deductive” or “Inductive”. In logic, an argument is deductive when

the conclusion follows from its premises with absolute necessity or certainty.

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Deduction is the process of moving from the general to the specific. In other words, in logic
we deduce when we move from a proposition describing a condition that holds in all instances
to a particular instance. For example:

· P1 All men are mortal

· P2 Socrates is a man
· C therefore Socrates is mortal

However, inductive arguments are those in which the premises do not lead to the
conclusion with certainty. Induction is based on “probability”. For instance, when you say
Peter is drunk most of the time. Today he will be drunk as well. Here most of the time, does
not entail all the time. Therefore, one cannot conclude with certainty that Peter will be drunk
today. You can see that there is no necessity in this conclusion. Probability is what characterizes
it.
3.4. Metaphysics

Unlike logic, metaphysics is the study of the “first principle” or ultimate reality. It is also called
the theory of Being. It is the only science that deals with the study of the basic and fundamental
issues of the universe. According to Aristotle, all other disciplines study “aspects of reality
or being, but none of them concerns itself with the study of being as such” (Mann, 1966:18).
However, there must be a science of being, “a science of the first things or of the most real”
(Mann, 1966:16).

Indeed, the science of being would be the most basic for in a sense all other special
sciences presupposed it” (Mann, 1966:16). That science according to Aristotle is
Metaphysics. In his view, metaphysics studies the totality of things in the universe both the
possible and the real, the visible and the invisible. Metaphysics is a general study of existence
and reality.

Andronicles is credited with the coining of the word “metaphysics”. History tells us that the
word “Metaphysics was actually an editorial mistake. It is on record that several decades
after Aristotle’s death Andronicles decided to sort through his works and gave them titles.
Aristotle wrote a series of books dealing with nature which he himself called “the physics”.
When Andronicles reached the batch of writings that followed “the physics” he did not
know what to call them, so he invented a word “metaphysics” Etymologically, the word
metaphysics came from two Greek words META which means “after” and PHYSIKA which
means “Physics” or “nature”. So the Greek word METAPHYSIKA means “after the things
of nature or after physics.

You should also bear in mind that even if Aristotle is considered as the founding father of
metaphysics as a science of reality he was not the first to raise metaphysical problems.
Metaphysics as an intellectual enterprise dates back to the pre-Socratic philosophers such as
Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes as well as Pythagoras, Parmenides and Heraclitus. The
concern of these philosophers was the search for the primary stuff of the universe. They were

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also concerned with determining the ultimate constitutive elements and grounds for the
unity of things. Metaphysics deals with questions such as: what is reality? Why something
instead of nothing? Is reality one or many”. Is the universe self-caused or does it involve the
concept of a creator?

What is the transcendent origin and foundation of this existence? Is reality essentially
spiritual or material? Do persons have minds distinct from their bodies? What is mind? Is it a
series of experiences? What is matter? Which is primary? What are their
relationships? Are men free? Does God exist? What is the divine? If you look deep into
these questions, you will discover that the answers lie beyond the boundaries of our experience.
This simply means that the criterion for settling such question is not empirical possibility, but
freedom from logical contradiction.

3.5. Epistemology
Epistemology is one of the most important branches of Philosophy. Etymologically, it
derives from two Greek words “Episteme” which means “knowledge” and “logos” which means
“study, discourse or reasoning”. Epistemology is best known as the branch of critical
Philosophy which consists in investigating the scope, source and limitations of human
knowledge. Epistemology tries to discover what knowledge is and how it differs from mere
opinion or belief. That is why it is also called theory of knowledge. According to Aristotle,
“every man wants to know,” and this is very relevant to man’s life. As a discipline, it deals
with questions such as: What is the nature of human knowledge? What is the relation between
knowledge and belief? What makes some beliefs true and others false? Is the human mind
capable of knowing? Can we know anything with certainty or must we be satisfied with mere
guesses and opinions? How are we to define truth? How do you know that the physical world
exists? What is the relation between knowledge and reality? Does all knowledge of the real
world arise out of experience or do we have knowledge that is in some degree independent of
experience? If all knowledge does arise out of experience and if experience can give us some
degree of probability, how is it possible to achieve the absolute certainty that we claim to have
achieved in the realms of logic and mathematics?

3.6. Ethics

Ethics is mostly known as “the branch of Philosophy which deals with the morality of
human actions in society” (Omoregbe, 1989:2). Etymologically ethics comes from the Greek
word “Ethos” which means “custom” or “character”. Sometimes it is called “Moral Philosophy”.
And you should always remember that Socrates was the first to systematize the discipline. He
was the first to claim that “the unexamined life is not worth living”.

Socrates devoted all his life to a critical examination of human behaviour. He was the first to
confess that “the only thing I know is that I know nothing”. In his opinion, ethics is also referred
to as “the science of human conduct”. The subject matter of ethics is human conduct and
precisely those actions which we perform consciously and willfully. The major business of

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ethics is to compare what you do and what you ought to do. Ethics is not primarily concerned
with facts or the “is”, but rather with the “ought”. In other words, ethics is not interested in the
ontic but in the ontological question. Thus, the focus on the “ought” as primary mission is
what differentiates ethics from other disciplines. You should also know that ethics is divided
into descriptive, prescriptive or normative, and meta-ethics.

a. Descriptive Ethics
The duty of descriptive ethics is to examine the moral views held by men or the society and to
confirm whether these views are universal or not. In Udoidem’s words: The study of human
actions centres on the description of … How human beings behave or act without actually
making value judgments or prescribing what human beings should or should not do (1992:70).

b. Normative or Prescriptive Ethics

The main duty of normative ethics is to prescribe what ought to be both for humans and
society. In other words, it prescribes that criteria for human actions properly be judged as morally
good or bad.

c. Meta-Ethics
It is the part of ethics that deals with the logic and language of ethical concepts and terms. In
other words, meta-ethics is mostly concerned with the elucidation or description of the precise
meaning of the key terms of moral appraisal such as “good”, “bad”, “right” “wrong”,
“ought”, etc. In this sense, meta-ethics is morally descriptive. For instance “God is good”. In
this sentence the term “good” simply describe how God is.

As a normative discipline, ethics deals with questions such as: How domen ought to
behave” What is morality? What is the nature of moral responsibility? What is the
definition of good? What is the chief goal for which all men should strive? Is it
accumulation of wealth or is it pleasure or happiness? Has man any final end? Is there any
real difference between morally right and wrong actions? Or is it merely a matter of feeling?
What is the role of punishment? Are moral judgments on what we ought to do objective or
subjective or are they arbitrary?

3.7. Aesthetics
This is derived from the Greek word aisthanomai which means “to perceive”. The term “aesthetic”
was coined by Baumgarten in his Reflection on Poetry (1735) as a name for one of the two branches
of the study of knowledge. In other words, for the study of sensory experience coupled with feeling,
which according to him, provide a different type of knowledge from a distinct abstract ideas studied
by logic.

Aesthetic is intimately connected with sensory experience and the kind of feelings it arouses. As a
branch of philosophy, aesthetic examines the nature of art and the character of our experience of art
and of the natural environment. Recognition of aesthetic as a separate branch of philosophy coincided
with the development of theories of art in the Eighteenth Century in England and in the Continent.

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These theories grouped together painting, poetry, sculpture, music and dance as the same kind of
thing or the fine arts.

Aesthetics is the philosophy of beauty, that is, physical beauty. It studies art forms. It raises such
questions as: What is the purpose of art? What is the nature of beauty? How does one recognize a
great work of art? Are there objective standards to beauty? Is there a special object of attention that
we call aesthetic object? Is there a distinctive value, aesthetic value, comparable with moral,
epistemic and religious values?

4.8. Conclusion

This study unit dealt with the major branches of Philosophy and their characteristics.

PHILOSOPHY Page 14
 UNIT 4
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER DISCIPLINES CONTENTS

4.1. Introduction

This study unit introduces you to the analysis of the relationship between Philosophy and other
disciplines. Bearing in mind that there is no discipline per se that does not stem from
Philosophy as parent discipline (unit 3), the main focus of this unit will be specifically
on the relationship between Philosophy, the sciences and religion.

4.2. Objectives

It is hoped that at the end of this unit you should be able to:

· Know the point of convergence and divergence between Philosophy and science
· Know the point of convergence and divergence between Philosophy and religion
· Define and discuss the subject matter of Philosophy , science and religion

4.3. Philosophy and Science

You should bear in mind that until late 16th and early 19th centuries all scientific knowledge was
within the ambit of philosophical inquiry. In other words, Philosophy was the “science”
per excellence. But according to Archie J. Bahm:

As reflections upon problems became increasing, complex and as special techniques were
developed, specialists limited the range of these inquiries, and the particular sciences were born.
Among the first were mechanics, mathematics and astronomy. Among the latest were psychology
and sociology. The romance of the maturing of these offspring of the fecund mother must
be left to the history of science (1995:10).

The Nature of Scientific Knowledge

Unlike Philosophy, science is best known as “an exact discipline”. In line with this, The Oxford
Advanced Dictionary also defines science as “knowledge arranged in an orderly manner,
especially knowledge obtained by observation and testing of facts….” For Frolov, the
nature of scientific knowledge goes beyond this “positivist” definition. According to him,
science is also “the field of research directed towards obtaining further knowledge of
nature, society and thought”… It (science) is not limited to natural or exact sciences. Science is
an integral system with its components flexibly correlated in history, study of nature, study of
society, natural science (1984:372).

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There is no doubt that science stemmed from Philosophy. It is also true that as a
discipline, science bears some specific characteristics different from Philosophy .
According to Harold H. Titus, scientific knowledge can be defined as:

A system of man’s understanding of nature, society and thought. It reflects the world in
concepts, categories and laws whose truth is verified by practical experience. Science is
the study of the totality of the concrete spheres of material reality. It is concerned to
investigate and establish objective laws of nature by forming working hypothesis by which
man may be enabled to harness nature to his purposes and transform his environment (1997:65).

From the above definition of science, it should be clear to you that the main purpose of
science as discipline is to observe, understand natural phenomena and then control
processes. To any scientist it is assumed that the universe, the orderly and natural
phenomena are predictable and lawful.

Convergences and Divergences between Philosophy and Science

Always remember that it is improper to consider Philosophy and science as competitors. Even
though science originated from Philosophy as a discipline their subject matter is different.
The scientist main business is to explain natural phenomena, while a philosopher does not
intend to do so. An average scientist always seeks for explanation while the philosopher
basically seeks for justification. You should also know that the two main scientific purposes are
prediction and control over phenomena. There are also six steps procedures in any
scientific inquiry which one cannot avoid. These are: observation, inductive
generalization, hypothesis, attempted verification of hypothesis, proof or disproof
and knowledge. Thus prediction and control based on the laws of induction are what makes
science not only original but also different from Philosophy. As academic disciplines, their
methodologies are quite different.

The philosopher’s inquiry begins where that of the scientist stops. It may be difficult for a
scientist to answer philosophical questions. Philosophy operates at a different level. A
scientist cannot answer philosophical questions such as: “ is the world divided into mind and
matter or is it possessed of independent power”. Is the mind subject to matter or is it possessed
of independent power? Has the universe an y unity or purpose? Is it evolving towards some
goal? Are there really laws of nature or do we believe in them only because of our inmate love
of order? Does God exist? You can see that none of these questions can find answer in the
scientist’s laboratory. You should also bear in mind that even though the kind of knowledge
that the scientist and philosopher seek is different, the purpose of their disciplines is often
similar because both of them are motivated by sheer curiosity and the satisfaction of having
knowledge of the universe purely for the pleasure of the understanding.

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4.4. Philosophy and Religion

The purposes of Philosophy and religion are fundamentally opposed. A philosopher is always
critical while a religionist is not. For a religionist, the role of reason is basically one of
interpreting and defending the dogma derived from sources whose authority and truth is taken
on faith. A ny serious philosopher begins his investigations from a position of intellectual
neutrality regardless of where his personal sympathies may lie. In Philosophy, any known
assumption is subject to critical scrutiny, while religion is purely dogmatic. In religion,
knowledge is sought principally as a means to achieve what a given religion takes to be
human kind’s final happiness or destiny. While in Philosophy, knowledge is sought simply
for its own sake. Philosophy often questions the assumptions of religion.

You should also know that the purposes of Philosophy should not be confused with those of the
religious minister, the theologians, the psycho-analyst, pastors and imams. A philosopher is
not a magician. Critical reasoning, neutrality and the desire for knowledge for its own sake are
the basic concerns of a philosopher. It is in this sense that Philosophy is very different from
religion. Details of philosophy of religion are going to be dealt with in unit six of part-one of this
module.

4.5. Conclusion

This study unit dealt with the relationship between Philosophy and other disciplines. It
focused specifically on the relationship between Philosophy, science and religion.

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 UNIT 5
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE AND CRITERIA FOR KNOWING

5.1. Introduction

This study unit introduces you to the different sources and criteria for knowing. It is an
opportunity for you to differentiate between common sense and philosophical
understanding of knowledge, belief and opinion. The different sources of knowledge will be
emphasized.

5.2. Objectives

It is hoped that at the end of this study unit, you should be able to:

· Differentiate between knowledge, opinion and belief.

· Discuss the common sense and philosophical understanding of knowledge, opinion and belief
· Identify the different sources of knowledge
· Discuss the criteria for knowledge

5.3. Difference between Knowledge, Opinion and Belief

In ordinary language it seems there is no difference, at all, between knowledge, opinion
and belief. Often, they are used interchangeably. In the daily life, it is easy for someone to
say he “knows” when he should say he “believes”. On the other hand he “believes” when he
should say he “knows”. You should always remember that the question of knowledge is not an
easy one. It is not easy to align our thoughts with reality. Our mind is always puzzled when
it comes to adjusting our beliefs to the knowledge of things in the world, so that our
beliefs become grounded in evidence. Therefore, the relationship and the difference between
knowledge, opinion and belief depend on the person’s position.

5.3.1. Commonsense Understanding of Knowledge, Opinion and Belief

As stated earlier, often times knowledge, opinion and belief are used interchangeably. This
confusion mostly appears in common sense usage. To a layman knowledge implies many
things. For instance, knowledge can even be synonymous with acquaintance. When a
layman asks a question such as: “Do you know the Vice – President of Leadstar College of
Management and Leadership?” In his mind this question is the same as “are you acquainted
with the Vice-President?” However, the truth is that you might know the Vice President in
the sense of being acquainted with him without knowing much about him.

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On the other hand, it is also possible to know a great deal about some other person which you
have never met. For instance as a student of Philosophy, you know a great deal about Plato
but I am sure that you never met him. Also, in daily life, some people say they “know”
while they mean “believe” or “think”. For instance, when a layman says that a particular
medicine is good. What he has in mind is “think” because he might have some authoritative
persons saying it that that medicine is good. Most of the time we hear people saying that they
“know” that Black men are cursed, nothing good can come out of them. They “know”
that things will never work well for them. It is clear that in the above statements there is an
obvious confusion between knowledge, opinion and belief. And, this is what happens in the daily
life of a layman.

5.3.2. Philosophical Understanding of Knowledge, Opinion and Belief

The philosophical understanding of knowledge is very different from that of the layman. For a
layman, knowledge, opinion and belief are interwoven. But it is not possible in Philosophy.
For a philosopher, you say “know” when you possess information that is beyond doubt.
Philosophical knowledge follows the logic of proposition. i.e. “I know that…” for example,
“I know that China is the most populated country in world”. “I know that Kenya and
Ethiopia are neighbours”. According to John Hospers, if we take the letter “X” to stand for
any proposition, some requirements must be met in order for us to assert, truly that we know
“X”:

 “X” must be true”,

 “We must have evidence for ‘X’, that is, reason to believe ‘X’,
 “Not only must ‘X’ be true, we must believe that ‘X’ is true”,
 “There must be no counter – evidence”.

Hospers adds that:

The moment you have some reasons to believe that a proposition is not true, this
immediately negates a person’s claim to know it. You cannot know ‘X’ if X is not true. If I say
I know ‘X’, but ‘X; is not true, my statement is self – contradicting for part of what is
involved in knowing ‘X’ is that ‘X’ is true (1956:144).

According to him, “there may be numerous statements that you believe but do not know to be
true, but there can be none, which you know to be true but don’t believe... for believing is a
defining characteristic of knowing. But believing ‘X’ is not a defining characteristic of ‘X’
being true. ‘X’ can be true even though neither he nor I nor anyone believes it. After all, the
earth was round even before anyone believed that it was (1956:145).

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What matters here is that knowledge implies being sure, being certain. Also believing can be seen
as a pre-condition for knowledge. Because when you know something, you have a right to a
certain confidence in your belief as a true and reliable guide to action. Thus, you cannot say you
know something which you are not sure of. But it is possible to believe something you are not
sure of. You can believe in the existence of God, yet you are not sure of his existence. There is
no problem in a statement such as “I think that God exists but I am not sure”. But you can say for
instance that “I know he will come but I am not sure”. Knowledge is more qualitative than
opinion and belief. An opinion or belief cannot be true unless it is grounded or supported with
evidence. Evidence is the unique characteristic of knowledge.

That is why customs and some hereditary matters are always at odds with knowledge. You
should know that it is not because some customs, beliefs or hereditary affairs are
unquestionable that they are synonymous with knowledge. Some unquestionable beliefs are not
well founded or grounded in evidence. Therefore, they do not constitute knowledge.
Always remember that the knower must not only be able to adduce sufficient evidence
but must also know that he knows his beliefs. For to know is to know that you know. It
must be clear to you now that knowledge is quite different from opinion or belief. We have
knowledge only when we can provide reasons and evidence for our claims. On the contrary,
belief or opinion is based on inner, personal certainty and conviction. Knowledge is
objective i.e. It must be communicable and verifiable.

5.4. Sources of Knowledge

One of the perennial questions in the history of Philosophy has always been this: How does
knowledge come about? How do we know propositions to be true? Or by what means do we
come by our knowledge of the real world? Answers to these questions have been given through
the following means:

(a) Reason
(b) Sense experience
(c) Authority
(d) Intuition
(e) Revelation/faith and
(f) Mystical experience.

5.4.1. Reason

Rationalism is the theory which believes that human beings can acquire knowledge of reality
by the use of our minds alone, by thinking or pure reason. To any rationalist, reason is a
necessary ingredient for all our knowledge claims. This is one of the reasons why Aristotle
defines man as “a rational animal”. Thus, the ability to think is what is called reason.

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Any serious rationalist agrees that we cannot acquire knowledge through sense
experience without the powers of reason. For them, it is true that our perceptual
experience provides the raw material for judgments, but without reason, we cannot make
judgments at all.

For instance, to reason that the object in front of you is a blackboard you must first of all
recognize it as a blackboard based on certain perceptual characteristics such as colour, smell,
taste, size, shape as they recur in your experience. Then, by way of abstraction, you are able
to recognize a blackboard when there is a combination of these characteristics. To the
rationalist therefore “… reason is the prima-matrix of human knowledge and with it alone
the certainty of human knowledge is guaranteed” (Ayer, 1956:54).

5.4.2. Sense Experience

Sense experience is another source of knowledge. Empiricists are the proponents of sense
experience theory. To any empiricist, as far as knowledge is concerned, only sense experience
matters. In other words, empiricism is the philosophical theory which denies reason while
insisting that experience is always the necessary ingredient in our knowledge claims of the
natural world.

5.4.3. Authority
Authority is also considered as one of the sources of knowledge. Authority as source of
knowledge occurs when we make certain claims to knowledge based on the authority of
someone who is a specialist in the particular field of knowledge. “Magister dixit” i.e. the
‘Master said”. For instance, I know it is true because Dr. C h a l c h i s a a L i i b a n said so.
Here, Dr. Chalchisaa Liiban becomes an authority on the subject. But you should always
remember that even as a source of knowledge, authority is a relative term. A man may be an
authority in a certain field of knowledge like Dr. C h a l c h i s a a L i i b a n in Philosophy but
not in psychology even if he claims some knowledge of it. It is fallacious reasoning to
ascribe authority to someone who is not a specialist in a particular field of knowledge.

5.4.4. Intuition
Another source of knowledge is intuition; Balm defines intuition as the “immediacy of
apprehension” (1995:5). According to him:

· … Intuition is the name we give to the way awareness apprehends when

awareness apprehends appearance directly. No intuiting exists apart from awareness, no
awareness exists without intuiting (1995:5).

That is why you sometimes hear people say: “I have a sense of intuition”. “I know by intuition
that Dr. Chaalchisaa will be here soon.

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5.4.5. Revelation and Faith

These are also considered as sources of knowledge. It is common to hear people: “it was
revealed to me in a dream” or “it was revealed to me by God and I have faith in it”. “My
faith guides me in this matter and I know that it is certainly true”.

5.5. Conclusion

This study unit dealt with different sources of knowledge and their criteria for knowing. It also
emphasized on the common sense and philosophical understanding of knowledge, belief and
opinion.

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 UNIT 6
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

6.1. Introduction

Philosophy of religion is the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts
involved in religious traditions. It involves all the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics,
epistemology, logic, ethics and value theory, the philosophy of language, philosophy of science,
law, sociology, politics, history, and so on. Philosophy of religion also includes an investigation
into the religious significance of historical events (Example, the Holocaust) and general features
of the cosmos (Example, laws of nature, the emergence of conscious life, widespread testimony of
religious significance, and so on). Section one of this unit offers an overview of the field and its
significance, with subsequent sections covering developments in the field since the mid-twentieth
century. These sections will address philosophy of religion as studied primarily in analytic
departments of philosophy and religious studies in English speaking countries.

6.2. Objectives

It is hoped that at the end of this study unit, you should be able to:

· Difine philosophy of religion and identify its significance

· Discuss meaningfulness of religious language
· Identify and describe religious forms of life and practices
· Discuss the concept of God
- Elucidate Religious Pluralism

6.3. The Field and its Significance

The philosophical exploration of religious beliefs and practices is evident in the earliest recorded
philosophy, east and west. In the west, throughout Greco-Roman philosophy and the Medieval era,
philosophical reflection on God, or gods, reason and faith, the soul, afterlife, and so on were not
considered to be a sub-discipline called “philosophy of religion.” The philosophy of God was simply
one component among many interwoven philosophical projects. This intermingling of philosophical
inquiry with religious themes and the broader enterprises of philosophy (Example political theory,
epistemology, et al.) is apparent among many early modern philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke, and George Berkeley. Only gradually do we find texts devoted exclusively to religious
themes. The first use of the term “philosophy of religion” in English occurs in the 17 th century work
of Ralph Cudworth. Cudworth and his Cambridge University colleague Henry More produced
philosophical work with a specific focus on religion and so, if one insisted on dating the beginning of
philosophy of religion as a field, there are good reasons for claiming that it began (gradually) in the
mid- 17th century (see Taliaferro 2005). Much of the subject matter treated by Cudworth and More is
continuous with the current agenda of philosophy of religion (arguments about God's existence, the
significance of religious pluralism, the nature of good and evil in relation to God, and so on), and
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many of the terms that are in current circulation had their origin in Cudworth's and his colleague's
work (they coined the terms theism, materialism, consciousness, et al.).

Today philosophy of religion is a robust, intensely active area of philosophy. Almost without
exception, any introduction to philosophy text in the Anglophone world includes some philosophy of
religion. The importance of philosophy of religion is chiefly due to its subject matter: alternative
beliefs about God, Brahman, the sacred, the varieties of religious experience, the interplay between
science and religion, the challenge of non-religious philosophies, the nature and scope of good and
evil, religious treatments of birth, history, and death, and other substantial terrain. A philosophical
exploration of these topics involves fundamental questions about our place in the cosmos and about
our relationship to what may transcend the cosmos. Such philosophical work requires an investigation
into the nature and limit of human thought. Alongside this complex, ambitious projects, philosophy of
religion has at least three factors that contribute to its importance for the overall enterprise of
philosophy.

Philosophy of religion addresses embedded social and personal practices. Philosophy of religion is
therefore relevant to practical concerns; its subject matter is not all abstract theory. Given the vast
percentage of the world population that is either aligned with religion or affected by religion,
philosophy of religion has a secure role in addressing people's actual values and commitments. A
chief point of reference in much philosophy of religion is the shape and content of living traditions. In
this way, philosophy of religion may be informed by the other disciplines that study religious life.

Another reason behind the importance of the field is its breadth. There are few areas of philosophy
that are shorn of religious implications. Religious traditions are so comprehensive and all-
encompassing in their claims that almost every domain of philosophy may be drawn upon in the
philosophical investigation of their coherence, justification, and value.

A third reason is historical. Most philosophers throughout the history of ideas, east and west, have
addressed religious topics. One cannot undertake a credible history of philosophy without taking
philosophy of religion seriously.

While this field is vital for philosophy, philosophy of religion may also make a pivotal contribution to
religious studies and theology. Religious studies often involve important methodological assumptions
about history and about the nature and limits of religious experience. These invite philosophical
assessment and debate. Theology may also benefit from philosophy of religion in at least two areas.
Historically, theology has often drawn upon, or been influenced by, philosophy. Platonism and
Aristotelianism have had a major influence on the articulation of classical Christian doctrine, and in
the modern era theologians have often drawn on work by philosophers (from Hegel to Heidegger and
Derrida). Another benefit lies in philosophy's tasks of clarifying, evaluating, and comparing religious
beliefs. The evaluation has at times been highly critical and dismissive, but there are abundant periods
in the history of ideas when philosophy has positively contributed to the flourishing of religious life.
This constructive interplay is not limited to the west. The role of philosophy in distinctive Buddhist
views of knowledge and the self has been of great importance. Just as philosophical ideas have fueled
theological work, the great themes of theology involving God's transcendence, the divine attributes,
providence, and so on, have made substantial impacts on important philosophical projects. (Hilary

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Putnam, for example, has linked the philosophy of truth with the concept of a God's-eye point of
view.)

At the beginning of the 21st century, a more general rationale for philosophy of religion should be
cited: it can enhance cross-cultural dialogue. Philosophers of religion now often seek out common as
well as distinguishing features of religious belief and practice. This study can enhance
communication between traditions, and between religions and secular institutions.

6.4. The Meaningfulness of Religious Language

A significant amount of work on the meaningfulness of religious language was carried out in the
medieval period, with major contributions made by Maimonides (1135–1204), Thomas Aquinas
(1225–1274), Duns Scotus (1266–1308), and William of Ockham (1285–1347). This work built on
the even earlier work on religious language by Philo (20 BCE–50 CE), Clement (150–215), and
Origen of Alexandria (185–259). In the modern era, the greatest concentration on religious language
has taken place in response to logical positivism and to the latter work of Wittgenstein (1889–1951).
This section and the next highlight these two more recent movements.

Logical positivism promoted an empiricist principle of meaning which was deemed lethal for
religious belief. The following empiricist principle is representative: for a propositional claim
(statement) to be meaningful, it must either be about the bare formal relations between ideas such as
those enshrined in mathematics and analytic definitions (“A is A,” “triangles are three-sided”) or
there must in principle be perceptual experience providing evidence of whether the claim is true or
false. (The stronger version of positivism is that claims about the world must be verifiable at least in
principle). Both the weaker view (with its more open ended reference to evidence) and the strict view
(in principle confirmation) delimit meaningful discourse about the world. Ostensibly factual claims
that have no implications for our empirical experience are empty of content. In line with this form of
positivism, A. J. Ayer (1910–1989) and others claimed that religious beliefs were meaningless. How
might one empirically confirm that God is omnipresent or loving? In an important debate in the 1950s
and 1960s, philosophical arguments about God were likened to debates about the existence and habits
of an unobservable gardener, based on a parable by John Wisdom in 1944–1945. The idea of a
gardener who is not just invisible but who also cannot be detected by any sensory faculty seemed
nonsense. It seemed like nonsense because they said there was no difference between an
imperceptible gardener and no gardener at all. Using this garden analogy and others crafted with the
same design, Antony Flew (see his essay in Mitchell 1971) made the case that religious claims do not
pass the empirical test of meaning. The field of philosophy of religion in the 1950s and 1960s was
largely an intellectual battlefield where the debates centered on whether religious beliefs were
meaningful or conceptually absurd.

Empirical verificationism is by no means dead. Some critics of the belief in an incorporeal God
continue to advance the same critique as that of Flew and Ayer, albeit with further refinements.
Michael Martin and Kai Nielsen are representatives of this approach. And yet despite these efforts,
empiricist challenges to the meaningfulness of religious belief are now deemed less impressive than
they once were.

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In the history of the debate over positivism, the most radical charge was that positivism is self-
refuting. The empiricist criterion of meaning itself does not seem to be a statement that expresses the
formal relation of ideas, nor does it appear to be empirically verifiable. How might one empirically
verify the principle? At best, the principle of verification seems to be a recommendation as to how to
describe those statements that positivists are prepared to accept as meaningful. But then, how might a
dispute about which other statements are meaningful be settled in a non-arbitrary fashion? To
religious believers for whom talk of “Brahman” and “God” is at the center stage of meaningful
discourse, the use of the principle of empirical verification will seem arbitrary and question-begging.
If the positivist principle is tightened up too far, it seems to threaten various propositions that at least
appear to be highly respectable, such as scientific claims about physical processes and events that are
not publicly observable. For example, what are we to think of states of the universe prior to all
observation of physical strata of the cosmos that cannot be observed directly or indirectly but only
inferred as part of an overriding scientific theory? Or what about the mental states of other persons,
which may ordinarily be reliably judged, but which, some argue, are under-determined by external,
public observation? A person's subjective states—how one feels—can be profoundly elusive to
external observers and even to the person him or herself. Can you empirically observe another
person's sense of happiness? Arguably, the conscious, subjective states of persons resist airtight
verification and the evidence of such states does not meet positivist's standards (van Cleve 1999,
Taliaferro 1994). Also worrisome was the wholesale rejection by positivists of ethics as a cognitive,
normative practice. The dismissal of ethics as non-cognitive had some embarrassing ad hominum
force against an empiricist like Ayer, who regarded ethical claims as lacking any truth value and yet
at the same time he construed empirical knowledge in terms of having the right to certain beliefs. Can
an ethics of belief be preserved if one dispenses with the normativity of ethics?

The strict empiricist account of meaning was also charged as meaningless on the grounds that there is
no coherent, clear, basic level of experience with which to test propositional claims. The experiential
“given” is simply too malleable (this has been called “the myth of the given”), often reflecting prior
conceptual judgments and, once one appreciates the open-textured character of experience, it may be
proposed that virtually any experience can verify or provide some evidence for anything. A mystic
might well claim to experience the unity of a timeless spirit everywhere present. Ayer allowed that in
principle mystical experience might give meaning to religious terms. Those who concede this
appeared to be on a slippery slope leading from empirical verificationism to mystical verificationism
(Alston 1991). A growing number of philosophers in the 1960s and 1970s were led to conclude that
the empiricist challenge was not decisive. Critical assessments of positivism can be found in work by,
among others, Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, and John Foster.

One of the most sustained lessons from the encounter between positivism and the philosophy of
religion is the importance of assessing the meaning of individual beliefs in comprehensive terms. Carl
Hempel developed the following critique of positivism, pointing the way to a more comprehensive
analysis of the meaning of ostensible propositional claims. Hempel's observations apply with equal
force to the philosophy of meaning and science, as well as to the philosophy of religion.

But no matter how one might reasonably delimit the class of sentences qualified to introduce
empirically significant terms, this new approach [by the positivists] seems to me to lead to the
realization that cognitive significance cannot well be construed as a characteristic of individual

PHILOSOPHY Page 26
sentences, but only of more or less comprehensive systems of sentences (corresponding roughly to
scientific theories). A closer study of this point suggests strongly that… the idea of cognitive
significance, with its suggestion of a sharp distinction between significant and non-significant
sentences or systems of such, has lost its promise and fertility… and that it had better be replaced by
certain concepts which admit of differences in degree, such as the formal simplicity of a system; its
explanatory and predictive power; and its degree of conformation relative to the available evidence.
The analysis and theoretical reconstruction of these concepts seems to offer the most promising way
of advancing further the clarification of the issues implicit in the idea of cognitive significance.
(Hempel 1959, 129)

If Hempel is right, the project initiated by Ayer had to be qualified, taking into account larger
theoretical frameworks. Religious claims could not be ruled out at the start but should be allowed a
hearing with competing views of cognitive significance. Ronald Hepburn summarizes a widely held
conviction that complements Hempel's position: “There can be no short-cut in the philosophy of
religion past the painstaking examination and re-examination of problems in the entire field… . No
single, decisive verification-test, no solemn Declaration of Meaninglessness, can relieve us of the
labor” (Hepburn 1963, 50). Ayer himself later conceded that the positivist account of meaning was
unsatisfactory (Ayer 1973).

With the retreat of positivism in the 1970s, philosophers of religion re-introduced concepts of God,
competing views of the sacred, and the like, which were backed by arguments that appealed not to
narrow scientific confirmation but to broad considerations of coherence, breadth of explanation,
simplicity, religious experience, and other factors. But before turning to this material, it is important
to consider a debate within philosophy of religion that was largely inspired by the Austrian
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein.

6.5. Religious Forms of Life and Practices

Wittgenstein launched an attack on what has been called the picture theory of meaning, according to
which statements may be judged true or false depending upon whether reality matches the picture
represented by the belief. This understanding of truth and beliefs—which is similar to the
correspondence theory of truth in which the statement “God exists” is true if and only if God exists—
seemed to Wittgenstein to be misguided. It gives rise to insoluble philosophical problems and it
misses the whole point of having religious beliefs, which is that the meaning is to be found in the life
in which they are employed. By shifting attention away from the referential meaning of words to their
use, Wittgenstein promoted the idea that we should attend to what he called forms of life. As this
move was applied to religious matters, a number of philosophers either denied or at least played down
the extent to which religious forms of life involve metaphysical claims. Norman Malcolm, B. R.
Tilghman, and D. Z. Phillips have all promoted this approach to religion. It may be considered non-
realist in the sense that it does not treat religious beliefs as straightforward metaphysical claims that
can be adjudicated philosophically as either true or false concerning an objective reality. By their
lights, the traditional metaphysics of theism got what it deserved when it came under attack in the
mid-twentieth century by positivists.

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This Wittgensteinian challenge, then, appears to place in check much of the way philosophers in the
west have approached religion. When, for example, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume
argued for and against the justification of belief in God, metaphysics was at the forefront. They were
interested in the best possible arguments for and against God's existence. The same preoccupation
with the truth or falsehood of religious belief is also central to ancient and medieval philosophical
reflection about the Divine. When Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas articulated arguments for God's
existence they were engaged in full-fledged metaphysics.

At least two reasons may support recent non-realism. First, it has some credibility based on the
sociology of religion. In the practice of religion it appears that we have something more (one might
well say something deeper) than “mere” metaphysical theorizing. Religion seems pre-eminently to be
focused upon how we live. Phillips has examined different religious practices such as prayer and the
belief in an afterlife, concluding that both are intelligible because the motives behind each can be held
intact without any of the metaphysical “baggage” traditionally linked with them. For example, prayer
to God by parents for the recovery of a child's health may be understood as an expression of their
anguish and an effort to center their hope on the child's getting better, and not as an attempt to
persuade God to violate the laws of nature by miraculously healing their child.

A second reason that might be offered is that the classical and contemporary arguments for specific
views of God have seemed unsuccessful to many philosophers (though not to all, as observed in
section 4.2, below). Tilghman takes this line and argues that if the traditional arguments for God's
existence are re-interpreted as part of religious life and not treated as if they were adjudicating
metaphysical truth-claims, then they have an intelligibility and force that they otherwise lack.

Non-realist views have their critics from the vantage point both of atheists such as Michael Martin
and theists such as Roger Trigg. By way of a preliminary response it may be pointed out that even if a
non-realist approach is adopted this would not mean altogether jettisoning the more traditional
approach to religious beliefs. If one of the reasons advanced on behalf of non-realism is that the
traditional project fails, then ongoing philosophy of religion will still require investigating to
determine whether in fact the tradition does fail. As John Dewey once observed, philosophical ideas
not only never die, they never fade away.

A more substantial reply to Wittgensteinian non-realism has been the charge that it does not preserve
but instead undermines the very intelligibility of religious practice. Let us concede that religious
practice is antecedent to philosophical theories that justify the practice—a concession not shared by
all. Even so, if one engages in a religious practice, such as prayer to God or Buddhist meditation to
see through the illusion of having a substantial, enduring ego, the development of some sort of
philosophical theory to make sense of this practice seems inevitable. Once such a theory is in place
(and historically there have been no lack of these theories), it makes sense to raise the question of its
truth. While Malcolm has proposed that it makes sense to believe in God without believing that God
exists, others have submitted that lack of belief that God exists makes belief in God meaningless.
Belief that X is prior to belief in X. One may hope that something will occur (a child recovers from
illness) without the accompanying belief that it will occur, but it is more puzzling to suppose that one
can trust a Divine being without believing or hoping there is some Divine reality there to rely upon.

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While non-realism might seem to lay the groundwork for greater tolerance between religions (and
between religions and the secular world) because it subverts the battle over which religion has a true
picture of the cosmos, critics have lamented the loss of a normative way of choosing between
religions, ways that seem to be used in commonplace philosophical reflection on the merits of
religion. So, today it is still not at all unusual for people to claim they have changed religions (or
stayed with their own or abandoned all religion or converted to a religion), for reasons like the appeal
to religious experience, answered or unanswered prayer, miracles or the lack of them, moral and
cultural relativism, an overwhelming sense of the reality of good and evil, and so on.

Although realists and non-realists are at odds in debate, each side can learn from the other. Non-
realists can consider the realist approach to divine attributes and a philosophy of God as reflections of
a religious form of life. And a realist philosophical treatment of God's goodness may reveal important
insights about practical religious forms of life. On the other hand, the non-realist approach to religion
may offer a fitting caution to realists about approaching religion as a mere theoretical, abstract
enterprise. Imagining a middle ground is not easy, however. D. Z. Phillips writes:

To ask whether God exists is not to ask a theoretical question. If it is to mean anything at all, it is to
wonder about praising and praying; it is to wonder whether there is anything in all that. This is why
philosophy cannot answer the question “Does God exists?” with either an affirmative or a negative
reply ….” There is a God”, though it appears to be in the indicative mood, is an expression of faith
(Phillips 1976, 181).

To successfully secure a position somewhere in between extreme non-realism and realism, one would
need to see the intelligibility of asking both theoretical questions such as “Is there a God?” as well as
searching out the meaningful practices of faith, praise, and prayer. Near the end of his life, D.Z.
Phillips' own train of thought seemed to land him solidly in Feuerbachian atheism (and thus Phillips
concluded his work as a solid realist):

In “God is love,” is the “is” one of predication as in “Tony Blair is prime minister”? In the latter case,
I can refer to Tony Blair without knowing that fact…But when I say “God is love,” or “God is
gracious,” what is the “it” to which the love or grace are attributed? There is none. That is “the
metaphysical subject” which, as Feuerbach says, is an illusion (Phillips 2004, 155).

A better example of someone who was a realist but took religious forms of life as a central reference
point is John Clayton (see especially his Religions, Reasons and Gods: Essays in Cross-Cultural
Philosophy of Religion).

6.6.2. The Concept of God

6.6.2.1. Philosophical Reflection on Divine Attributes

Most philosophy of religion in the west has focused on different versions of theism. Ancient
philosophy of religion wrestled with the credibility of monotheism and polytheism in opposition to
skepticism and very primitive naturalistic schemes. For example, Plato argued that the view that God
is singularly good should be preferred to the portrait of the gods that was articulated in Greek poetic
tradition, according to which there are many gods, often imperfect and subject to vice and ignorance.

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The emergence and development of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam on a global scale secured the
centrality of theism for philosophical enquiry, but the relevance of a philosophical exploration of
theism is not limited to those interested in these religions and the cultures in which they flourish.
While theism has generally flourished in religious traditions amid religious practices, one may be a
theist without adopting any religion whatever, and one may find theistic elements (however
piecemeal) in Confucianism, Hinduism, some versions of Mahayana Buddhism, as well as in the
religions of some smaller scale societies. The debate over theism also has currency for secular
humanism and religious forms of atheism as in Theravada Buddhist philosophy. Consider first the
philosophical project of articulating theism and then the philosophy of divine attributes.

Terms applied both to God and to any aspect of the world have been classified as either univocal
(sharing the same sense), equivocal (used in different senses), or analogical. There is a range of
accounts of analogous predication, but the most common—and the one assumed here—is that terms
are used analogously when their use in different cases (John limps and the argument limps) is based
on what is believed to be a resemblance. It seems clear that many terms used to describe God in
theistic traditions are used analogously, as when God is referred to as a father, shepherd, or fountain.
More difficult to classify are descriptions of God as good, personal, knowing, omnipresent, and
creative. Heated philosophical and theological disputes centre on unpacking the meaning of such
descriptions, disputes that are often carried out with the use of thought experiments.

In thought experiments, hypothetical cases are described—cases that may or may not represent the
way things are. In these descriptions, terms normally used in one context are employed in expanded
settings. Thus, in thinking of God as omniscient, one might begin with a non-controversial case of a
person knowing that a proposition is true, taking note of what it means for someone to possess that
knowledge and of the ways in which the knowledge is secured. A theistic thought experiment would
seek to extend our understanding of knowledge as we think of it in our own case, working toward the
conception of a maximum or supreme intellectual excellence befitting the religious believers'
understanding of God. Various degrees of refinement would then be in order, as one speculates not
only about the extent of a maximum set of propositions known but also about how these might be
known. That is, in attributing omniscience to God, would one thereby claim God knows all truths in a
way that is analogous to the way we come to know truths about the world? Too close an analogy
would produce a peculiar picture of God relying upon, for example, induction, sensory evidence, or
the testimony of others. One move in the philosophy of God has been to assert that the claim “God
knows something” employs the word “knows” univocally when read as picking out the thesis that
God knows something, while it uses the term in only a remotely analogical sense if read as
identifying how God knows (Swinburne 1977).

Here a medieval distinction comes into play between the res significata (what is asserted—for
instance, that God knows X) and modus significandi (the mode or manner in which what is signified
is realized or brought about—for instance, how God knows X). We might have a good grasp of what
is meant by the claim that a being is omniscient while having little idea of how a being might be so.
Thought experiments aimed at giving some sense to the Divine attribute of omniscience have been
advanced by drawing attention to the way we know some things immediately (bodily positions,
feelings and intentions), and then by extending this, coaxing us into conceiving a being that knows all

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things about itself and the cosmos immediately (see Beaty 1991 and Zagzebski 2008 for a
constructive view, and Blumenfeld in Morris (ed.) 1987 for criticism).

Utilizing thought experiments and language in this way, philosophical theology has a stake in the
soundness and richness of the imagination, picturing the way things might be “in one's mind's eye,”
whether or not this relies on any actual imagery. Philosophers are now more cautious about drawing
such inferences as we are increasingly aware of how some features of an imagined state of affairs
might be misconceived or overlooked. Even so, it has been argued that if a state of affairs appears to
one to be possible after careful reflection, checking it against one's background knowledge in other
areas, then there is at least some warrant in judging the state of affairs to be a bona fide possibility
(Sorensen 1992; see also Taliaferro 2002 and Gendler and Hawthorne 2002).

Work on the divine attributes has been vast. To generate a portrait of the literature on divine
attributes, consider the issues that arise in reflection on omniscience, eternity, and goodness.

6.6.2.2. Omniscience

Imagine there is a God who knows the future free action of human beings. If God does know you will
freely do some act X, then it is true that you will indeed do X. But if you are free, would you not be
free to avoid doing X? Given that it is foreknown you will do X, it appears you would not be free to
refrain from the act.

Initially this paradox seems easy to dispel. If God knows about your free action, then God knows that
you will freely do something and that you could have refrained from it. God's foreknowing the act
does not make it necessary. Does not the paradox only arise because we confuse the proposition,
“Necessarily, if God knows X, then X” with “If God knows X, then necessarily X”? After all, it is
necessarily the case that if I know you are reading this entry right now, then it follows that you are
reading this entry, but your reading this entry may still be seen as a contingent state of affairs. But the
problem is not so easily diffused, however, because if God does infallibly know that some state of
affairs obtains then it cannot be that the state of affairs does not obtain. Think of what is sometimes
called the necessity of the past. Once a state of affairs has obtained, it is unalterably or necessarily
the case that it did occur. If the future is known precisely and comprehensively, isn't the future like
the past, necessarily or unalterably the case? If the problem is put in first-person terms and one
imagines God foreknows you will freely turn to a different entry in this Encyclopedia (moreover, God
knows with unsurpassable precision when you will do so, which entry you will select and what you
will think about it), then an easy resolution of the paradox seems elusive. To highlight the nature of
this problem imagine God tells you what you will freely do in the next hour. Under such conditions,
is it still intelligible to believe you have the ability to do otherwise if it is known by God as well as
yourself what you will indeed elect to do? Self-foreknowledge, then, produces an additional related
problem because the psychology of choice seems to require prior ignorance about what we will
choose.

Various replies to the freedom-fore knowledge debate have been given. Some adopt compatibilism,
affirming the compatibility of free will and determinism, and conclude that foreknowledge is no more
threatening to freedom than determinism. While some prominent philosophical theists in the past
have taken this route (most dramatically Jonathan Edwards in the eighteenth century), this seems to
PHILOSOPHY Page 31
be the minority position in philosophy of religion today (exceptions include Paul Helm and Lynne
Baker). A second position adheres to the libertarian outlook, which insists that freedom involves a
radical, indeterminist exercise of power, and concludes that God cannot know future free action.
What prevents such philosophers from denying that God is omniscient is that they contend there are
no truths about future free actions, or that while there are truths about the future, God freely decides
not to know them in order to preserve free choice. On the first view, prior to someone's doing a free
action, there is no fact of the matter that he or she will do a given act. This is in keeping with a
traditional, but controversial, interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of time and truth. Aristotle may
have thought it was neither true nor false prior to a given sea battle whether a given side would win it.
Some theists, such as Richard Swinburne, adopt this line today, holding that the future cannot be
known. If it cannot be known for metaphysical reasons, then omniscience can be analyzed as knowing
all that it is possible to know. That God cannot know future free action is no more of a mark against
God's being omniscient than God's inability to make square circles is a mark against God's being
omnipotent. Other philosophers deny the original paradox. They insist that God's foreknowledge is
compatible with libertarian freedom and seek to resolve the quandary by claiming that God is not
bound in time (God does not so much foreknow the future as God knows what for us is the future
from an eternal viewpoint) and by arguing that the unique vantage point of an omniscient God
prevents any impingement on freedom. God can simply know the future without this having to be
grounded on an established, determinate future. But this only works if there is no necessity of eternity
analogous to the necessity of the past. Why think that we have any more control over God's timeless
belief than over God's past belief? If not, then there is an exactly parallel dilemma of timeless
knowledge. For outstanding current analysis of freedom and foreknowledge, see the work of Linda
Zagzebski.

6.6.2.3. Eternity

Could there be a being that is outside time? In the great monotheistic traditions, God is thought of as
without any kind of beginning or end. God will never, indeed, can never, cease to be. Some
philosophical theists hold that God's temporality is very much like ours in the sense that there is a
before, during, and an after for God, or a past, present, and future for God. This view is sometimes
referred to as the thesis that God is everlasting. Those adopting a more radical stance claim that God
is independent of temporality, arguing either that God is not in time at all, or that God is
“simultaneously” at or in all times. This is sometimes called the view that God is eternal as opposed
to everlasting.

Why adopt the more radical stance? One reason, already noted, is that if God is not temporally bound,
there may be a resolution to the earlier problem of reconciling freedom and foreknowledge. As
Augustine put it: “For He does not pass from this to that by transition of thought, but beholds all
things with absolute unchangeableness; so that of those things which emerge in time, the future,
indeed, are not yet, and the present are now, and the past no longer are; but all of these are by Him
comprehended in His stable and eternal presence” (The City of God, 1972, XI, 21). If God is outside
time, there may also be a secure foundation explaining God's immutability (changelessness),
incorruptibility, and immortality. Furthermore, there may be an opportunity to use God's standing
outside of time to launch an argument that God is the creator of time.

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Those affirming God to be unbounded by temporal sequences face several puzzles which I note
without trying to settle. If God is somehow at or in all times, is God simultaneously at or in each? If
so, there is the following problem. If God is simultaneous with the event of Rome burning in 410, and
also simultaneous with your reading this entry, then it seems that Rome must be burning at the same
time you are reading this entry. (This problem was advanced by Nelson Pike; Stump and Kretzmann
have replied that the simultaneity involved in God's eternal knowledge is not transitive). A different
problem arises with respect to eternity and omniscience. If God is outside of time, can God know
what time it is now? Arguably, there is a fact of the matter that it is now, say, midnight on 1 July
2010. A God outside of time might know that at midnight on 1 July 2010 certain things occur, but
could God know when it is now that time? The problem is that the more emphasis we place on the
claim that God's supreme existence is independent of time, the more we seem to jeopardize taking
seriously time as we know it. Finally, while the great monotheistic traditions provide a portrait of the
Divine as supremely different from the creation, there is also an insistence on God's proximity or
immanence. For some theists, describing God as a person or person-like (God loves, acts, knows) is
not to equivocate. But it is not clear that an eternal God could be personal. For recent work on God's
relation to time, see work by Katherin Rogers (Rogers 2007, 2008).

6.6.2.4. The Goodness of God

All known world religions address the nature of good and evil and commend ways of achieving
human well-being, whether this be thought of in terms of salvation, liberation, deliverance,
enlightenment, tranquility, or an egoless state of Nirvana. Notwithstanding important differences,
there is a substantial overlap between many of these conceptions of the good as witnessed by the
commending of the Golden Rule (“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”) in many
religions. Some religions construe the Divine as in some respect beyond our human notions of good
and evil. In some forms of Hinduism, for example, Brahman has been extolled as possessing a sort of
moral transcendence, and some Christian theologians and philosophers have likewise insisted that
God is only a moral agent in a highly qualified sense, if at all (Davies 1993). To call God good is, for
them, very different from calling a human being good.

Here I note only some of the ways in which philosophers have articulated what it means to call God
good. In treating the matter, there has been a tendency either to explain God's goodness in terms of
standards that are not God's creation and thus, in some measure, independent of God's will, or in
terms of God's will and the standards God has created. The latter view has been termed theistic
voluntarism. A common version of theistic voluntarism is the claim that for something to be good or
right simply means that it is willed by God and for something to be evil or wrong means that it is
forbidden by God.

Theistic voluntarists face several difficulties: moral language seems intelligible without having to be
explained in terms of the Divine will. Indeed, many people make what they take to be objective moral
judgments without making any reference to God. If they are using moral language intelligibly, how
could it be that the very meaning of such moral language should be analyzed in terms of Divine
volitions? New work in the philosophy of language may be of use to theistic voluntarists. According
to a causal theory of reference, “water” necessarily designates H2O. It is not a contingent fact that
water is H2O notwithstanding the fact that many people can use the term “water” without knowing its

PHILOSOPHY Page 33
composition. Similarly, could it not be the case that “good” may refer to that which is willed by God
even though many people are not aware of (or even deny) the existence of God? Another difficulty
for voluntarism lies in accounting for the apparent meaningful content of claims like “God is good.”
It appears that in calling God “good” the religious believer is saying more than “God wills what God
wills.” If so, must not the very notion of goodness have some meaning independent of God's will?
Also at issue is the worry that if voluntarism is accepted, the theist has threatened the normative
objectivity of moral judgments. Could God make it the case that moral judgments were turned upside
down? For example, could God make cruelty good? Arguably, the moral universe is not so malleable.
In reply, some voluntarists have sought to understand the stability of the moral laws in light of God's
immutably fixed, necessary nature.

By understanding God's goodness in terms of God's being (as opposed to God's will alone), we come
close to the non-voluntarist stand. Aquinas and others hold that God is essentially good in virtue of
God's very being. All such positions are non-voluntarist in so far as they do not claim that what it
means for something to be good is that God wills it to be so. The goodness of God may be articulated
in various ways, either by arguing that God's perfection requires God being good as an agent or by
arguing that God's goodness can be articulated in terms of other Divine attributes such as those
outlined above. For example, because knowledge is in itself good, omniscience is a supreme good.
God has also been considered good in so far as God has created and conserves in existence a good
cosmos. Debates over the problem of evil (if God is indeed omnipotent and perfectly good, why is
there evil?) have poignancy precisely because they challenge this chief judgment over God's
goodness. (The debate over the problem of evil is taken up in section 4.2.)

The choice between voluntarism and seeing God's very being as good is rarely strict. Some theists
who oppose a full-scale voluntarism allow for partial voluntarist elements. According to one such
moderate stance, while God cannot make cruelty good, God can make some actions morally required
or morally forbidden which otherwise would be morally neutral. Arguments for this have been based
on the thesis that the cosmos and all its contents are God's creation. According to some theories of
property, an agent making something good gains entitlements over the property. The crucial moves in
arguments that the cosmos and its contents belong to their Creator have been to guard against the idea
that human parents would then “own” their children (they do not, because parents are not radical
creators like God), and the idea that Divine ownership would permit anything, thus construing our
duties owed to God as the duties of a slave to a master (a view to which not all theists have objected).
Theories spelling out why and how the cosmos belongs to God have been prominent in all three
monotheistic traditions. Plato defended the notion, as did Aquinas and Locke. (See Brody 1974 for a
defense.)

A new development in theorizing about God's goodness has been advanced in Zagzebski 2004.
Zagzebski contends that being an exemplary virtuous person consists in having good motives.
Motives have an internal, affective or emotive structure. An emotion is “an affective perception of the
world” (Zagzebski 2004, xvi) that “initiates and directs action” (Ibid., 1). The ultimate grounding of
what makes human motives good is if they are in accord with the motives of God. Zagzebski's theory
is perhaps the most ambitious virtue theory in print, offering an account of human virtues of God. Not
all theists resonate with her bold claim that God is a person who has emotions, but many allow that
(at least in some analogical sense) God may be see as personal and having affective states.

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One other effort worth noting to link judgments of good and evil with judgments about God relies
upon the ideal observer theory of ethics. According to this theory, moral judgments can be analyzed
in terms of how an ideal observer would judge matters. To say an act is right entails a commitment to
holding that if there were an ideal observer, it would approve of the act; to claim an act is wrong
entails the thesis that if there were an ideal observer, it would disapprove of it. The theory can be
found in works by Hume, Adam Smith, and Hare and Firth (1970). The ideal observer is variously
described, but typically is thought of as an impartial omniscient regarding non-moral facts (facts that
can be grasped without already knowing the moral status or implications of the fact—for instance,
“He did something bad” is a moral fact; “He hit Smith” is not), and as omnipercipient (Firth's term for
adopting a position of universal affective appreciation of the points of view of all involved parties).
The theory receives some support from the fact that most moral disputes can be analyzed in terms of
different parties challenging each other to be impartial, to get their empirical facts straight, and to be
more sensitive—for example, by realizing what it feels like to be disadvantaged. The theory has
formidable critics and defenders. If true, it does not follow that there is an ideal observer, but if it is
true and moral judgments are coherent, then the idea of an ideal observer is coherent. Given certain
conceptions of God in the three great monotheistic traditions, God fits the ideal observer description
(and more besides, of course). Should an ideal observer theory be cogent, a theist would have some
reason for claiming that atheists committed to normative, ethical judgments are also committed to the
idea of a God or a God-like being. (For a defense of a theistic form of the ideal observer theory, see
Taliaferro 2005; for criticism see Anderson, 2005.)

6.6.2.5. God's Existence

In some introductory philosophy textbooks and anthologies, the arguments for God's existence are
presented as ostensible proofs which are then shown to be fallible. For example, an argument from
the apparent order and purposive nature of the cosmos will be criticized on the grounds that, at best,
the argument would establish there is a purposive, designing intelligence at work in the cosmos. This
falls far short of establishing that there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent, and so
on. But two comments need to be made: First, that “meager” conclusion alone would be enough to
disturb a scientific naturalist who wishes to rule out all such transcendent intelligence. Second, few
philosophers today advance a single argument as a proof. Customarily, a design argument might be
advanced alongside an argument from religious experience, and the other arguments to be considered
below. True to Hempel's advice (cited earlier) about comprehensive inquiry, it is increasingly
common to see philosophies—scientific naturalism or theism—advanced with cumulative arguments,
a whole range of considerations, and not with a supposed knock-down, single proof.

One reason why the case for and against major, comprehensive philosophies are mostly cumulative is
because of discontent in what is often called foundationalism. In one classical form of
foundationalism, one secures first and foremost a basis of beliefs which one may see to be true with
certainty. The base may be cast as indubitable or infallible. One then slowly builds up the justification
for one's other, more extensive beliefs about oneself and the world. Many (but not all) philosophers
now see justification as more complex and interwoven; the proper object of philosophical inquiry is
overall coherence, not a series of distinguishable building operations beginning with a foundation.

PHILOSOPHY Page 35
One way of carrying out philosophy of religion along non-foundationalist lines has been to build a
case for the comparative rationality of a religious view of the world. It has been argued that the
intellectual integrity of a religious world view can be secured if it can be shown to be no less rational
than the available alternatives. It need only achieve intellectual parity. John Hick and others
emphasize the integrity of religious ways of seeing the world that are holistic, internally coherent, and
open to criticism along various external lines (see Hick 2004, 2006). On the latter front, if a religious
way of conceiving the world is at complete odds with contemporary science, that would count as
grounds for revising the religious outlook. The case for religion need not, however, be scientific or
even analogous to science. If Hick is right, religious ways of seeing the world are not incompatible
with science, but complementary. Independent of Hick but in the same spirit, Plantinga has proposed
that belief in God's existence may be taken as properly basic and fully warranted without having to be
justified in relation to standard arguments for God from design, miracles, and so on. Plantinga argues
that the tendency to believe in God follows natural tendencies of the human mind. This stance
comprises what is commonly referred to as Reformed Epistemology because of its connection to the
work of the Reformed theologian John Calvin (1509–1564) who maintained that we have a sense of
God (sensus divinitatis) leading us to see God in the world around us. Plantinga has thereby couched
the question of justification within the larger arena of metaphysics. By advancing an intricate,
comprehensive picture of how beliefs can be warranted when they function as God designed them, he
has provided what some believe to be a combined metaphysical and epistemic case for the rationality
of religious convictions (see Beilby (ed.) 2002).

Who has the burden of proof in a debate between a theist and an atheist? Antony Flew (1984) thinks
it is the theist. By his lights, the theist and atheist can agree on a whole base line of truths (such as the
findings of the physical sciences). The question then becomes, Why go any further? Flew wields a
version of Ockham's razor, arguing that if one has no reason to go further, one has reason not to go
further. (As it happens, Flew has subsequently claimed that there are good reasons for going beyond
the natural world, and he is currently a theist; see Flew 2008.) His challenge has been met on various
fronts, with some critics claiming that Flew's burden of proof argument is wedded to an outmoded
foundationalism, that any burden of proof is shared equally by atheists and theists, or that the theist
has an array of arguments to help shoulder a greater burden of proof. The position of fideism is a
further option. Fideism is the view that religious belief does not require evidence and that religious
faith is self-vindicating. Karl Barth (1886–1968) advocated a fideistic philosophy. (For a critical
assessment of fideism, see Moser 2010, chapter 2.) Hick and Plantinga need not be considered
fideists because of the high role each gives to experience, coherence, and reflection.

Table 1 lists some key theistic arguments, along with some of the leading advocates.

Ontological S.T. Davis, D. Dombrowski, C. Dore, E.J. Lowe, N. Malcolm, A.

Plantinga, J. Ross, W. Rowe, R. Swinburne, R. Taylor
Cosmological W. Craig, S.T. Davis, R. Gale, R. Koons, H. Meynell, B. Miller, R.
Purtill, T. O'Connor, A. Pruss, W. Rowe (partial advocate)
Design D. and R. Basinger, R. Collins, W. Craig, S.T. Davis, J. Foster,
R.A. Larmer, R. Swinburne
Miracles W. Craig, P. Dietl, J. Earman, D. Geivett, R. Swinburne

PHILOSOPHY Page 36
Values—Moral Experience P. Copan, C.S. Evans, A.C. Ewing, M. Linville, G. Mavrodes, H.P.
Owen, M. Wynn
Argument from Consciousness R.M. Adams, J.P. Moreland, M. Rea, R. Swinburne
Religious Experience W. Alston, C. Frank, J. Gellman, G. Gutting, K.M. Kwan, R.
Swinburne, W. Wainwright, K. Yandell
Cognition R. Creel, A. Plantinga, R. Taylor
Wager Arguments J. Jodan, N. Rescher, G. Schlesinger, T.V. Morris

Table-1. Theistic Arguments

To sketch some of the main lines of argument in this literature, consider the ontological,
cosmological, and teleological arguments, arguments from the problem of evil, and the argument over
the cognitive status of religious experience.

6.6.2.6. Ontological arguments

There is a host of arguments under this title; all of them are based principally on conceptual, a priori
grounds which do not involve a posteriori empirical investigation. If a version of the argument
works, then it can be deployed using only the concept of God and some modal principles of inference,
that is, principles concerning possibility and necessity. The argument need not resist all empirical
support, however, as I shall indicate.

The focus of the argument is the thesis that, if there is a God, then God's existence is necessary. God's
existence is not contingent—God is not the sort of being that just happens to exist. That this is a
plausible picture of what is meant by God may be shown by appealing to the way God is conceived in
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions. This would involve some a posteriori, empirical research
into the way God is thought of in these traditions. Alternatively, a defender of the ontological
argument might hope to convince others that the concept of God is the concept of a being that exists
necessarily by beginning with the idea of a maximally excellent being. If there were a maximally
excellent being what would it be like? It has been argued that among its array of great-making
qualities (omniscience and omnipotence) would be necessary existence. Once fully articulated, it can
be argued that a maximally excellent being which existed necessarily could be called “God.”

The ontological argument goes back to St. Anselm (1033/34–1109), but I shall explore a current
version relying heavily on the principle that if something is possibly necessarily the case, then it is
necessarily the case (or, to put it redundantly, it is necessarily necessary). The principle can be
illustrated in the case of propositions. That six is the smallest perfect number (that number which is
equal to the sum of its divisors including one but not including itself) does not seem to be the sort of
thing that might just happen to be true. Rather, either it is necessarily true or necessarily false. If the
latter, it is not possible, if the former, it is possible. If one knows that it is possible that six is the
smallest perfect number then one has good reason to believe that. Do we have reason to think it is
possible that God exists necessarily? In support of this, one can also appeal to a posteriori matters,
noting the extant religious traditions that uphold such a notion. The fact that the concept of God as a
necessarily existing reality seems to be coherently conceived widely across time and cultures is some
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evidence that the concept is coherent (it is possible there is a God), for God's existence has
plausibility, thus can also contribute to believing it is possible God exists. There is an old
philosophical precept that from the fact that something exists, it follows that it is possible (ab esse ad
posse valet consequentia). A related principle is that evidence that something exists is evidence that it
is possible that such a thing exists. There does not appear to be anything amiss in their thinking of
God as necessarily existing; if the belief that God exists is incoherent this is not obvious. Indeed, a
number of atheists think God might exist, but conclude God does not. If we are successful in
establishing the possibility that God necessarily exists, the conclusion follows that it is necessarily the
case that God exists.

There have been hundreds of objections and replies to this argument. Perhaps the most ambitious
objection is that the argument can be used with one minor alteration to argue that God cannot exist.
Assume all the argument above is correct, but also that it is possible that God does not exist. Atheists
can point out that many theists who believe there is a God at least allow for the bare possibility that
they could be wrong and there is no God. If it is possible that there is no God, then it would
necessarily follow that there is no God. Replies to this objection emphasize the difficulty of
conceiving of the non-existence of God. The battle over whether God is necessary or impossible is
often fought over the coherence of the various divine attributes discussed in section 3. If you think
these attributes are compossible, involve no contradictions, and violate no known metaphysical truths,
then you may well have good grounds for concluding that God is possible and therefore necessary.
However, if you see a contradiction, say, in describing a being who is at once omniscient and
omnipotent, you may well have good grounds for concluding that God's existence is impossible.

Another objection is that it makes no sense to think of a being existing necessarily; propositions may
be necessarily true or false, but objects cannot be necessary or contingent. Some philosophers reply
that it makes no less sense to think of an individual (God) existing necessarily than it does to think of
propositions being necessarily true.

A further objection is that the ontological argument cannot get off the ground because of the
question-begging nature of its premise that if there is a God, then God exists necessarily. Does
admitting this premise concede that there is some individual thing such that if it exists, it exists
necessarily? Replies have claimed that the argument only requires one to consider an ostensible state
of affairs, without having to concede initially whether the state of affairs is possible or impossible. To
consider what is involved in positing the existence of God is no more hazardous than considering
what is involved in positing the existence of unicorns. One can entertain the existence of unicorns and
their necessary features (that necessarily if there were unicorns, there would exist single-horned
beasts) without believing that there are unicorns.

Finally, consider the objection that, if successful in providing reasons to believe that God exists, the
ontological argument could be used to establish the existence of a whole array of other items, like
perfect islands. Replies to this sort of objection have typically questioned whether it makes sense to
think of an island (a physical thing) as existing necessarily or as having maximal excellence on a par
with God. Does the imagined island have excellences like omniscience, omnipotence (a power which
would include the power to make indefinitely many islands), and so on?

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Classical, alternative versions of the ontological argument are propounded by Anselm, Spinoza, and
Descartes, with current versions by Alvin Plantinga, Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm, and C.
Dore; classical critics include Gaunilo and Kant, and current critics are many, including William
Rowe, J. Barnes, G. Oppy, and J. L. Mackie. The latest book-length treatment of the ontological
argument is a vigorous defense: Rethinking the Ontological Argument by Daniel Dombrowski (2006).

6.6.2.7. Cosmological arguments

Arguments in this vein are more firmly planted in empirical, a posteriori reflection, but some versions
employ a priori reasons as well. There are various versions. Some argue that the cosmos had an initial
cause outside it, a First Cause in time. Others argue that the cosmos has a necessary, sustaining cause
from instant to instant. The two versions are not mutually exclusive, for it is possible both that the
cosmos had a First Cause and that it currently has a sustaining cause.

The cosmological argument relies on the intelligibility of the notion of something which is not itself
caused to exist by anything else. This could be either the all-out necessity of supreme pre-eminence
across all possible worlds used in versions of the ontological argument, or a more local, limited
notion of a being that is uncaused in the actual world. If successful, the argument would provide
reason for thinking there is at least one such being of extraordinary power responsible for the
existence of the cosmos. At best, it may not justify a full picture of the God of religion (a First Cause
would be powerful, but not necessarily omnipotent), but it would nonetheless challenge naturalistic
alternatives and bring one closer to theism.

Both versions of the argument ask us to consider the cosmos in its present state. Is the world as we
know it something that necessarily exists? At least with respect to ourselves, the planet, the solar
system and the galaxy, it appears not. With respect to these items in the cosmos, it makes sense to ask
why they exist rather than not. In relation to scientific accounts of the natural world, such enquiries
into causes make abundant sense and are perhaps even essential presuppositions of the natural
sciences. Some proponents of the argument contend that we know a priori that if something exists
there is a reason for its existence. So, why does the cosmos exist? If we explain the contingent
existence of the cosmos (or states of the cosmos) only in terms of other contingent things (earlier
states of the cosmos, say), then a full cosmic explanation will never be attained. At this point the two
versions of the argument divide.

Arguments to a First Cause in time contend that a continuous temporal regress from one contingent
existence to another would never account for the existence of the cosmos, and they conclude that it is
more reasonable to accept there was a First Cause than to accept either a regress or the claim that the
cosmos just came into being from nothing. Arguments to a sustaining cause of the cosmos claim that
explanations of why something exists now cannot be adequate without assuming a present,
contemporaneous sustaining cause. The arguments have been based on the denial of all actual
infinities or on the acceptance of some infinities (for instance, the coherence of supposing there to be
infinitely many stars) combined with the rejection of an infinite regress of explanations solely
involving contingent states of affairs. The latter has been described as a vicious regress as opposed to
one that is benign. There are plausible examples of vicious infinite regresses that do not generate
explanations: for instance, imagine that I explain my possession of a book by reporting that I got it
from A who got it from B, and so on to infinity. This would not explain how I got the book.
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Alternatively, imagine a mirror with light reflected in it. Would the presence of light be successfully
explained if one claimed that the light was a reflection of light from another mirror, and the light in
that mirror came from yet another mirror, and so on to infinity? Consider a final case. You come
across a word you do not understand; let it be “ongggt”. You ask its meaning and are given another
word which is unintelligible to you, and so on, forming an infinite regress. Would you ever know the
meaning of the first term? The force of these cases is to show how similar they are to the regress of
contingent explanations.

Versions of the argument that reject all actual infinities face the embarrassment of explaining what is
to be made of the First Cause, especially since it might have some features that are actually infinite.
In reply, Craig and others have contended that they have no objection to potential infinities (although
the First Cause will never cease to be, it will never become an actual infinity). They further accept
that prior to the creation, the First Cause was not in time, a position relying on the theory that time is
relational rather than absolute. The current scientific popularity of the relational view may offer
support to defenders of the argument.

It has been objected that both versions of the cosmological argument set out an inflated picture of
what explanations are reasonable. Why should the cosmos as a whole need an explanation? If
everything in the cosmos can be explained, albeit through infinite, regressive accounts, what is left to
explain? One may reply either by denying that infinite regresses actually do satisfactorily explain, or
by charging that the failure to seek an explanation for the whole is arbitrary. The question, “Why is
there a cosmos?” seems a perfectly intelligible one. If there are accounts for things in the cosmos,
why not for the whole? The argument is not built on the fallacy of treating every whole as having all
the properties of its parts. But if everything in the cosmos is contingent, it seems just as reasonable to
believe that the whole cosmos is contingent as it is to believe that if everything in the cosmos were
invisible, the cosmos as a whole would be invisible.

Another objection is that rather than explaining the contingent cosmos, the cosmological argument
introduces a mysterious entity of which we can make very little philosophical or scientific sense.
How can positing at least one First Cause provide a better account of the cosmos than simply
concluding that the cosmos lacks an ultimate account? In the end, the theist seems bound to admit
that why the First Cause created at all was a contingent matter. If, on the contrary, the theist has to
claim that the First Cause had to do what it did, would not the cosmos be necessary rather than
contingent?

Some theists come close to concluding that it was indeed essential that God created the cosmos. If
God is supremely good, there had to be some overflowing of goodness in the form of a cosmos (see
Kretzmann and Stump in Morris 1987, on the ideas of Dionysius the Areopagite; see Rowe 2004 for
arguments that God is not free). But theists typically reserve some role for the freedom of God and
thus seek to retain the idea that the cosmos is contingent. Defenders of the cosmological argument
still contend that its account of the cosmos has a comprehensive simplicity lacking in alternative
views. God's choices may be contingent, but not God's existence and the Divine choice of creating the
cosmos can be understood to be profoundly simple in its supreme, overriding endeavor, namely to
create something good. Swinburne has argued that accounting for natural laws in terms of God's will
provides for a simple, overarching framework within which to comprehend the order and purposive

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character of the cosmos (see also Foster 2004). At this point we move from the cosmological to the
teleological arguments.

Defenders of the cosmological argument include Swinburne, Richard Taylor, Hugo Meynell,
Timothy O'Connor, Bruce Reichenbach, Robert Koons, and William Rowe; prominent opponents
include Antony Flew, Michael Martin, Howard Sobel, Nicholas Everitt, and J. L Mackie.

6.6.2.7. Teleological arguments

These arguments focus on characteristics of the cosmos that seem to reflect the design or
intentionality of God or, more modestly, of one or more powerful, intelligent God-like agents. Part of
the argument may be formulated as providing evidence that the cosmos is the sort of reality that
would be produced by an intelligent being, and then arguing that positing this source is more
reasonable than agnosticism or denying it. As in the case of the cosmological argument, the defender
of the teleological argument may want to claim only to be giving us some reason for thinking there is
a God. Note the way the various arguments might then be brought to bear on each other. If successful,
the teleological argument may provide some reason for thinking that the First Cause of the
cosmological argument is purposive, while the ontological argument provides some reason for
thinking that it makes sense to posit a being that has Divine attributes and necessarily exists. Behind
all of them an argument from religious experience may provide some initial reasons to seek further
support for a religious conception of the cosmos and to question the adequacy of naturalism.

One version of the teleological argument will depend on the intelligibility of purposive explanation.
In our own human case it appears that intentional, purposive explanations are legitimate and can truly
account for the nature and occurrence of events. In thinking about an explanation for the ultimate
character of the cosmos, is it more likely for the cosmos to be accounted for in terms of a powerful,
intelligent agent or in terms of a naturalistic scheme of final laws with no intelligence behind them?
Theists employing the teleological argument will draw attention to the order and stability of the
cosmos, the emergence of vegetative and animal life, the existence of consciousness, morality,
rational agents and the like, in an effort to identify what might plausibly be seen as purposively
explicable features of the cosmos. Naturalistic explanations, whether in biology or physics, are then
cast as being comparatively local in application when held up against the broader schema of a theistic
metaphysics. Darwinian accounts of biological evolution will not necessarily assist us in thinking
through why there are either any such laws or any organisms to begin with. Arguments supporting
and opposing the teleological argument will then resemble arguments about the cosmological
argument, with the negative side contending that there is no need to move beyond a naturalistic
account, and the positive side aiming to establish that failing to go beyond naturalism is unreasonable.

In assessing the teleological argument, we can begin with the objection from uniqueness. We cannot
compare our cosmos with others to determine which have been designed and which have not. If we
could, then we might be able to find support for the argument. If we could compare our cosmos with
those we knew to be designed and if the comparison were closer than with those we knew not to be
designed, then the argument might be plausible. Without such comparisons, however, the argument
fails. Replies to this line of attack have contended that were we to insist that inferences in unique
cases were out of order, then we would have to rule out otherwise perfectly respectable scientific
accounts of the origin of the cosmos. Besides, while it is not possible to compare the layout of
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different cosmic histories, it is in principle possible to envisage worlds that seem chaotic, random, or
based on laws that cripple the emergence of life. Now we can envisage an intelligent being creating
such worlds, but, through considering their features, we can articulate some marks of purposive
design to help us judge whether the cosmos was designed rather than created at random. Some critics
appeal to the possibility that the cosmos has an infinite history to bolster and re-introduce the
uniqueness objection. Given infinite time and chance, it seems likely that something like our world
will come into existence, with all its appearance of design. If so, why should we take it to be so
shocking that our world has its apparent design, and why should explaining the world require positing
one or more intelligent designers? Replies repeat the earlier move of insisting that if the objection
were to be decisive, then many seemingly respectable accounts would also have to fall by the
wayside. It is often conceded that the teleological argument does not demonstrate that one or more
designers are required; it seeks rather to establish that positing such purposive intelligence is
reasonable and preferable to naturalism. Recent defenders of the argument this century include
George Schlesinger, Robin Collins, and Richard Swinburne. It is rejected by J. L. Mackie, Michael
Martin, Nicholas Everitt, and others.

One feature of the teleological argument currently receiving increased attention focuses on
epistemology. It has been contended that if we do rely on our cognitive faculties, it is reasonable to
believe that these are not brought about by naturalistic forces—forces that are entirely driven by
chance or are the outcome of processes not formed by an overriding intelligence. An illustration may
help to understand the argument. Imagine coming across what appears to be a sign reporting some
information about your current altitude (some rocks in a configuration giving you your current
location and precise height above sea-level in meters). If you had reason to believe that this “sign”
was totally the result of chance configurations, would it still be reasonable to trust it? Some theists
argue that it would not be reasonable, and that trusting our cognitive faculties requires us to accept
that they were formed by an overarching, good, creative agent. This rekindles Descartes' point about
relying on the goodness of God to ensure that our cognitive faculties are in good working order.
Objections to this argument center on naturalistic explanations, especially those friendly to evolution.
In evolutionary epistemology, one tries to account for the reliability of cognitive faculties in terms of
trial and error leading to survival. A rejoinder by theists is that survival alone is not necessarily linked
to true beliefs. It could, in principle, be false beliefs that enhance survival. In fact, some atheists think
that believing in God has been crucial to people's survival, though the belief is radically false. Martin
and Mackie, among others, object to the epistemic teleological argument; Plantinga, Richard Creel
and Richard Taylor defend it.

Two recent developments in teleological argumentation have involved the intelligent design
hypothesis and fine tuning arguments.

The first is an argument that there are orders of biological complexity emerging in evolution that are
highly unlikely if accounted for by random mutation and natural selection or any other means in the
absence of a purposive, intentional force (Behe 2007). Debate on the intelligent design (ID) proposal
includes questions of whether it is properly scientific, about the biochemistry involved, and whether
(if the ID hypothesis is superior to non-ID accounts) the ID hypothesis can inform us about the nature
of the intelligent, designing forces. While the ID hypothesis has been defended as an allegedly
scientific account—it is not based on an appeal to Genesis (as Creationism is)—many scientists argue

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that ID is not a scientific theory because it is neither testable nor falsifiable. Some also argue that ID
goes beyond the available evidence and that it systematically underestimates the ability of non-
intelligent, natural causes (plus chance) to account for the relevant biological complexity. Critics like
Kenneth Miller contend that Behe does not take into sufficient account the adaptive value of very
minor changes in evolution (such as the sensitivity to light found in algae and bacteria) that gradually
lead to complex organs such as the eye (Miller 1999).

Fine tuning arguments contend that the existence of our cosmos with its suns, planets, life, et al.
would not have come about or continued in existence without the constancy of multiple factors. Even
minor changes to the nuclear weak force would not have allowed for stars, nor would stars have
endured if the ratio of electromagnetism to gravity had been different. John Leslie observes:
“Alterations by less than one part in a billion to the expansion speed early in the Big Bang would
have led to runaway expansion, everything quickly becoming so dilute that no stars could have
formed, or else to gravitational collapse inside under a second” (Leslie 2007, 76). Robin Collins and
others have argued that theism better accounts for the fine tuning than naturalism (see Collins 2003;
for criticism of the argument, see Craig & Smith 1993).

A more sustained objection against virtually all versions of the teleological argument takes issue with
the assumption that the cosmos is good or that it is the sort of thing that would be brought about by an
intelligent, completely benevolent being. This leads us directly to the next central concern of the
philosophy of God.

6.6.2.8. Problems of evil

If there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and completely good, why is there evil? The
problem of evil is the most widely considered objection to theism in both western and eastern
philosophy. There are two general versions of the problem: the deductive or logical version, which
asserts that the existence of any evil at all (regardless of its role in producing good) is incompatible
with God's existence; and the probabilistic version, which asserts that given the quantity and severity
of evil that actually exists, it is unlikely that God exists. The deductive problem is currently less
commonly debated because it is widely acknowledged that a thoroughly good being might allow or
inflict some harm under certain morally compelling conditions (such as causing a child pain when
removing a splinter). More intense debate concerns the likelihood (or even possibility) that there is a
completely good God given the vast amount of evil in the cosmos. Consider human and animal
suffering caused by death, predation, birth defects, ravaging diseases, virtually unchecked human
wickedness, torture, rape, oppression, and “natural disasters.” Consider how often those who suffer
are innocent. Why should there be so much gratuitous, apparently pointless evil?

In the face of the problem of evil, some philosophers and theologians deny that God is all-powerful
and all-knowing. John Stuart Mill took this line, and panentheist theologians today also question the
traditional treatments of Divine power. According to panentheism, God is immanent in the world,
suffering with the oppressed and working to bring good out of evil, although in spite of God's efforts,
evil will invariably mar the created order. Another response is to think of God as being very different
from a moral agent. Brian Davies and others have contended that what it means for God to be good is
different from what it means for an agent to be morally good (Davies 2006). A more desperate
strategy is to deny the existence of evil, but it is difficult to reconcile traditional monotheism with
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moral skepticism. Also, insofar as we believe there to be a God worthy of worship and a fitting object
of human love, the appeal to moral skepticism will carry little weight. The idea that evil is a privation
or twisting of the good may have some currency in thinking through the problem of evil, but it is
difficult to see how it alone could go very far to vindicate belief in God's goodness. Searing pain and
endless suffering seem altogether real even if they are analyzed as being philosophically parasitic on
something valuable. The three great monotheistic traditions, with their ample insistence on the reality
of evil, offer little reason to try to defuse the problem of evil by this route. Indeed, classical Judaism,
Christianity and Islam are so committed to the existence of evil that a reason to reject evil would be a
reason to reject these religious traditions. What would be the point of the Judaic teaching about the
Exodus (God liberating the people of Israel from slavery), or the Christian teaching about the
incarnation (Christ revealing God as love and releasing a Divine power that will, in the end, conquer
death), or the Islamic teaching of Mohammed (the holy prophet of Allah who is all-just and all-
merciful) if slavery, hate, death, and injustice did not exist?

In part, the magnitude of the difficulty one takes the problem of evil to pose for theism will depend
upon one's commitments in other areas of philosophy, especially ethics, epistemology, and
metaphysics. If in ethics you hold that there should be no preventable suffering for any reason,
regardless of the cause or consequence, then the problem of evil will conflict with your acceptance of
traditional theism. Moreover, if you hold that any solution to the problem of evil should be evident to
all persons, then again traditional theism is in jeopardy, for clearly the “solution” is not evident to all.
Debate has largely centered on the legitimacy of adopting some middle position: a theory of values
that would preserve a clear assessment of the profound evil in the cosmos as well as some
understanding of how this might be compatible with the existence of an all powerful, completely
good Creator. Could there be reasons why God would permit cosmic ills? If we do not know what
those reasons might be, are we in a position to conclude that there are none or that there could not be
any? Exploring different possibilities will be shaped by one's metaphysics. For example, if you do not
believe there is free will, then you will not be moved by any appeal to the positive value of free will
and its role in bringing about good as offsetting its role in bringing about evil.

Theistic responses to the problem of evil distinguish between a defense and a theodicy. A defense
seeks to establish that rational belief that God exists is still possible (when the defense is employed
against the logical version of the problem of evil) and that the existence of evil does not make it
improbable that God exists (when used against the probabilistic version). Some have adopted the
defense strategy while arguing that we are in a position to have rational belief in the existence of evil
and in a completely good God who hates this evil, even though we may be unable to see how these
two beliefs are compatible. A theodicy is more ambitious and is typically part of a broader project,
arguing that it is reasonable to believe that God exists on the basis of the good as well as the evident
evil of the cosmos. In a theodicy, the project is not to account for each and every evil, but to provide
an overarching framework within which to understand at least roughly how the evil that occurs is part
of some overall good—for instance, the overcoming of evil is itself a great good. In practice, a
defense and a theodicy often appeal to similar factors, the first and foremost being what many call the
Greater Good Defense.

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6.6.2.8. Evil and the Greater Good

In the Greater Good Defense, it is contended that evil can be understood as either a necessary
accompaniment to bringing about greater goods or an integral part of these goods. Thus, in a version
often called the Free Will Defense, it is proposed that free creatures who are able to care for each
other and whose welfare depends on each other's freely chosen action constitute a good. For this good
to be realized, it is argued, there must be the bona fide possibility of persons harming each other. The
free will defense is sometimes used narrowly only to cover evil that occurs as a result, direct or
indirect, of human action. But it has been speculatively extended by those proposing a defense rather
than a theodicy to cover other evils which might be brought about by supernatural agents other than
God. According to the Greater Good case, evil provides an opportunity to realize great values, such as
the virtues of courage and the pursuit of justice. Reichenbach (1982), Tennant (1930), Swinburne
(1979), and van Inwagen (2006) have also underscored the good of a stable world of natural laws in
which animals and humans learn about the cosmos and develop autonomously, independent of the
certainty that God exists. Some atheists accord value to the good of living in a world without God,
and these views have been used by theists to back up the claim that God might have had reason to
create a cosmos in which Divine existence is not overwhelmingly obvious to us. If God's existence
were overwhelmingly obvious, then motivations to virtue might be clouded by self-interest and by the
bare fear of offending an omnipotent being. Further, there may even be some good to acting
virtuously even if circumstances guarantee a tragic outcome. John Hick (1978) so argued and has
developed what he construes to be an Irenaean approach to the problem of evil (named after St.
Irenaeus of the second century). On this approach, it is deemed good that humanity develops the life
of virtue gradually, evolving to a life of grace, maturity, and love. This contrasts with a theodicy
associated with St. Augustine, according to which God made us perfect and then allowed us to fall
into perdition, only to be redeemed later by Christ. Hick thinks the Augustinian model fails whereas
the Irenaean one is credible.

Some have based an argument from the problem of evil on the charge that this is not the best possible
world. If there were a supreme, maximally excellent God, surely God would bring about the best
possible creation. Because this is not the best possible creation, there is no supreme, maximally
excellent God. Following Adams (1987), many now reply that the whole notion of a best possible
world, like the highest possible number, is incoherent. For any world that can be imagined with such
and such happiness, goodness, virtue and so on, a higher one can be imagined. If the notion of a best
possible world is incoherent, would this count against belief that there could be a supreme, maximally
excellent being? It has been argued on the contrary that Divine excellences admit of upper limits or
maxima that are not quantifiable in a serial fashion (for example, Divine omnipotence involves being
able to do anything logically or metaphysically possible, but does not require actually doing the
greatest number of acts or a series of acts of which there can be no more).

Those concerned with the problem of evil clash over the question of how one assesses the likelihood
of Divine existence. Someone who reports seeing no point to the existence of evil or no justification
for God to allow it seems to imply that if there were a point they would see it. Note the difference
between seeing no point and not seeing a point. In the cosmic case, is it clear that if there were a
reason justifying the existence of evil, we would see it? William Rowe thinks some plausible
understanding of God's justificatory reason for allowing the evil should be detectable, but that there

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are cases of evil that are altogether gratuitous. Defenders like William Hasker and Stephen Wykstra
reply that these cases are not decisive counter-examples to the claim that there is a good God. These
philosophers hold that we can recognize evil and grasp our duty to do all in our power to prevent or
alleviate it. But we should not take our failure to see what reason God might have for allowing evil to
count as grounds for thinking that there is no reason. This later move has led to a position commonly
called skeptical theism. Michael Bergmann, Michael Rea, and others have argued that we have good
reason to be skeptical about whether we can assess whether ostensibly gratuitous evils may or may
not be permitted by an all good God (Bergmann 2001; Bergmann and Rea 2005; for criticism see
Almeida and Oppy 2003).

Some portraits of an afterlife seem to have little bearing on our response to the magnitude of evil here
and now. Does it help to understand why God allows evil if all victims will receive happiness later?
But it is difficult to treat the possibility of an afterlife as entirely irrelevant. Is death the annihilation
of persons or an event involving a transfiguration to a higher state? If you do not think that it matters
whether persons continue to exist after death, then such speculation is of little consequence. But
suppose that the afterlife is understood as being morally intertwined with this life, with opportunity
for moral and spiritual reformation, transfiguration of the wicked, rejuvenation and occasions for new
life, perhaps even reconciliation and communion between oppressors seeking forgiveness and their
victims. Then these considerations might help to defend against arguments based on the existence of
evil. Insofar as one cannot rule out the possibility of an afterlife morally tied to our life, one cannot
rule out the possibility that God brings some good out of cosmic ills.

The most recent work on the afterlife in philosophy of religion has focused on the compatibility of an
individual afterlife with some forms of physicalism. Arguably, a dualist treatment of human persons
is more promising. If you are not metaphysically identical with your body, then perhaps the
annihilation of your body is not the annihilation of you. Today, a range of philosophers have argued
that even if physicalism is true, an afterlife is still possible (Peter van Inwagen, Lynne Baker, Trenton
Merricks, Kevin Cocoran). The import of this work for the problem of evil is that the possible
redemptive value of an afterlife should not be ruled out (without argument) if one assumes
physicalism to be true. (For an extraordinary, rich resource on the relevant literature, see The Oxford
Handbook of Eschatology, ed. by J. Walls.)

6.6.2.9. Religious Experience

Perhaps the justification most widely offered for religious belief concerns the occurrence of religious
experience or the cumulative weight of testimony of those claiming to have had religious experiences.
Putting the latter case in theistic terms, the argument appeals to the fact that many people have
testified that they have felt God's presence. Does such testimony provide evidence that God exists?
That it is evidence has been argued by Jerome Gellman, Keith Yandell, William Alston, Caroline
Davis, Gary Gutting, Kai-Man Kwan, Richard Swinburne and others. That it is not (or that its
evidential force is trivial) is argued by Michael Martin, J. L. Mackie, Kai Nielson, Matthew Bagger,
John Schellenberg, William Rowe, and others. In an effort to stimulate further investigation, I shall
briefly sketch some of the moves and countermoves in the debate.

Objection: Religious experience cannot be experience of God for experience is only sensory and if
God is non-physical, God cannot be sensed.
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Reply: The thesis that experience is only sensory can be challenged. Yandell marks out some
experiences (as when one has “a feeling” someone is present but without having any accompanying
sensations) that might provide grounds for questioning a narrow sensory notion of experience.

Objection: Testimony to have experienced God is only testimony that one thinks one has experienced
God; it is only testimony of a conviction, not evidence.

Reply: The literature on religious experience testifies to the existence of experience of some Divine
being on the basis of which the subject comes to think the experience is of God. If read charitably, the
testimony is not testimony to a conviction, but to experiences that form the grounds for the
conviction. (See Bagger 1999 for a vigorous articulation of this objection, and note the reply by Kai-
man Kwam 2003).

Objection: Because religious experience is unique, how could one ever determine whether it is
reliable? We simply lack the ability to examine the object of religious experience in order to test
whether the reported experiences are indeed reliable.

Reply: As we learned from Descartes, all our experiences of external objects face a problem of
uniqueness. It is possible in principle that all our senses are mistaken and we do not have the public,
embodied life we think we lead. We cannot step out of our own subjectivity to vindicate our ordinary
perceptual beliefs any more than in the religious case. (See the debate between William Alston and
Evan Fales 2004).

Objection: Reports of religious experience differ radically and the testimony of one religious party
neutralizes the testimony of others. The testimony of Hindus cancels out the testimony of Christians.
The testimony of atheists to experience God's absence cancels out the testimony of “believers.”

Reply: Several replies might be offered here. Testimony to experience the absence of God might be
better understood as testimony not to experience God. Failing to experience God might be
justification for believing that there is no God only to the extent that we have reason to believe that if
God exists God would be experienced by all. Theists might even appeal to the claim by many atheists
that it can be virtuous to live ethically with atheist beliefs. Perhaps if there is a God, God does not
think this is altogether bad, and actually desires religious belief to be fashioned under conditions of
trust and faith rather than knowledge. The diversity of religious experiences has caused some
defenders of the argument from religious experience to mute their conclusion. Thus, Gutting (1982)
contends that the argument is not strong enough to fully vindicate a specific religious tradition, but
that it is strong enough to overturn an anti-religious naturalism. Other defenders use their specific
tradition to deal with ostensibly competing claims based on different sorts of religious experiences.
Theists have proposed that more impersonal experiences of the Divine represent only one aspect of
God. God is a person or is person-like, but God can also be experienced, for example, as sheer
luminous unity. Hindus have claimed the experience of God as personal is only one stage in the
overall journey of the soul to truth, the highest truth being that Brahman transcends personhood. (For
a discussion of these objections and replies and references, see Taliaferro 1998.)

How one settles the argument will depend on one's overall convictions in many areas of philosophy.
The holistic, interwoven nature of both theistic and atheistic arguments can be readily illustrated. If
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you diminish the implications of religious experience and have a high standard regarding the burden
of proof for any sort of religious outlook, then it is highly likely that the classical arguments for God's
existence will not be persuasive. Moreover, if one thinks that theism can be shown to be intellectually
confused from the start, then theistic arguments from religious experience will carry little weight.
Testimony to have experienced God will have no more weight than testimony to have experienced a
round square, and non-religious explanations of religious experience—like those of Freud (a result of
wish-fulfillment), Marx (a reflection of the economic base) or Durkheim (a product of social
forces)—will increase their appeal. If, on the other hand, you think the theistic picture is coherent and
that the testimony of religious experience provides some evidence for theism, then your assessment of
the classical theistic arguments might be more favorable, for they would serve to corroborate and
further support what you already have some reason to believe. From such a vantage point, appeal to
wish-fulfillment, economics, and social forces might have a role, but the role is to explain why some
parties do not have experiences of God and to counter the charge that failure to have such experiences
provides evidence that there is no religious reality. For an excellent collection of recent work on
explaining the emergence and continuation of religious experience, see Schloss and Murray (eds.)
2009.

There is not space to cover the many other arguments for and against the existence of God, but
several additional arguments are briefly noted. The argument from miracles starts from specific
extraordinary events, arguing that they provide reasons for believing there to be a supernatural agent
or, more modestly, reasons for skepticism about the sufficiency of a naturalistic world view. The
argument has attracted much philosophical attention, especially since David Hume's rejection of
miracles. The debate has turned mainly on how one defines a miracle, understands the laws of nature,
and specifies the principles of evidence that govern the explanation of highly unusual historical
occurrences. There is considerable debate over whether Hume's case against miracles simply begs the
question against “believers.” Detailed exposition is impossible in this short entry, but I argue
elsewhere that Hume's case against miracles is most charitably seen as part of his overall case for
naturalism (Taliaferro 2005).

There are various arguments that are advanced to motivate religious belief. One of the most
interesting and popular is a wager argument often associated with Pascal (1623–1662). It is designed
to offer practical reasons to cultivate a belief in God. Imagine that you are unsure whether there is or
is not a God. You have it within your power to live on either assumption and perhaps, through
various practices, to get yourself to believe one or the other. There would be good consequences of
believing in God even if your belief were false, and if the belief were true you would receive even
greater good. There would also be good consequences of believing that there is no God, but in this
case the consequences would not alter if you were correct. If, however, you believe that there is no
God and you are wrong, then you would risk losing the many goods which follow from the belief that
God exists and from actual Divine existence. On this basis, it may seem reasonable to believe there is
a God.

In different forms the argument may be given a rough edge (for example, imagine that if you do not
believe in God and there is a God, hell is waiting). It may be put as an appeal to individual self-
interest (you will be better off) or more generally (believers whose lives are bound together can
realize some of the goods comprising a mature religious life). Objectors worry about whether one

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ever is able to bring choices down to just such a narrow selection—for example, to choose either
theism or naturalism. Some think the argument is too thoroughly egotistic and thus offensive to
religion. Many of these objections have generated some plausible replies (Rescher 1985). For a
thoroughgoing exploration of the relevant arguments, see the collection of essays edited by Jeffrey
Jordan (1994).

Recent work on Pascalian wagering has a bearing on work on the nature of faith (is it voluntary or
involuntary?), its value (when, if ever, is it a virtue?), and relation to evidence (insofar as faith
involves belief, is it possible to have faith without evidence?). For an excellent overview and
promising analysis, see Chappell (1996), Swinburne (1979), and Schellenberg (2005). A promising
feature of such new work is that it is often accompanied by a rich understanding of revelation that is
not limited to a sacred scripture, but sees a revelatory role in scripture plus the history of its
interpretation, the use of creeds, icons, and so on (see the work of William Abraham).

Two interesting new, rather different developments in debate over the evidence for God's existence
need to be observed. John Schellenberg has developed what may be called the “hiddenness of God
objection.” Schellenberg argues that perfect love necessarily belongs to any personal Divine being,
and that such perfect love entails openness to a personal relationship with the Divine being, a
relationship that would require creatures to know or at least be aware of the Divine being.
Schellenberg then contends that the fact that there are many nonbelievers in this God of love who
would not resist God's disclosure (whether through religious experience or argument) is evidence
against the existence of a personal Divine being. The Divine being or God would have been more
evident (see Shellenberg 2007; for a reply, see Taliaferro 2009).

In a private communication, Schellenberg has pointed out that his target is not only the God of
Christianity but “any personal Divine being.” Making the above adjustment about “any personal
Divine being” and Schellenberg's point about “perfect love” and its entailments will make clearer the
scope of Schellenberg's project. Taking a very different approach to theism, Paul Moser has recently
criticized what he refers to as the preoccupation in philosophy of religion with what he calls
“spectator evidence for God,” evidence that can be assessed without involving any interior change
that would transform a person morally and religiously. Eschewing fideism, Moser holds that when
one seeks God and willingly allows oneself to be transformed by God's perfect love, one's very life
can become evidence of the reality of God (see Moser 2008, 2010). While this proposal may worry
secular philosophers of religion, Moser is not out of keeping with the pre-Christian Platonic tradition
that maintained that inquiry into the good, the true, and the beautiful involved inquiry in which the
inquirer needed to endeavor to be good, true, and beautiful.

Another burgeoning question in recent years is whether the cognitive science of religion (CSR) has
significance for the truth or rationality of religious commitment. According to CSR, belief in
supernatural agents appears to be cognitively natural (Barrett 2004, Keleman 2004, Dennett 2006, De
Cruz, H., & De Smedt, J. 2010) and easy to spread (Boyer 2001). The naturalness of religion thesis
has led some, including Alvin Plantinga it seems (2011: 60), to imply that we have scientific evidence
for Calvin's sensus divinitatis. But others have argued that CSR can intensify the problem of divine
hiddenness, since diverse religious concepts are cognitively natural and early humans seem to have
lacked anything like a theistic concept (Marsh 2013). There are many other questions being

PHILOSOPHY Page 49
investigated about CSR, such as whether it provides a debunking challenge to religion (Murray and
Schloss 2009), whether it poses a cultural challenge for religious outlooks like Schellenberg's
Ultimism (Marsh forthcoming), and whether it challenges human dignity (Audi 2013). Needless to
say, at the present time, anyhow, there is nothing like a clear consensus on whether CSR should be
seen as worrisome, welcome, or neither, by religious believers.

6.7. Religious Pluralism

In the midst of the new work on religious traditions, there has been a steady, growing representation
of non-monotheistic traditions. An early proponent of this expanded format was Ninian Smart, who,
through many publications, scholarly as well as popular, secured philosophies of Hinduism and
Buddhism as components in the standard canon of English-speaking philosophy of religion.

Smart championed the thesis that there are genuine differences between religious traditions. He
therefore resisted seeing some core experience as capturing the essential identity of being religious.
Under Smart's tutelage, there has been considerable growth in cross-cultural philosophy of religion.
Wilfred Cantwell Smith also did a great deal to improve the representation of non-Western religions
and reflection.

The explanation of philosophy of religion has involved fresh translations of philosophical and
religious texts from India, China, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Exceptional figures from non-Western
traditions have an increased role in cross-cultural philosophy of religion and religious dialogue. The
late Bimal Krishna Matilal made salient contributions to enrich Western exposure to Indian
philosophy of religion. Among the mid-twentieth-century Asian philosophers, two who stand out for
special note are T.R.V. Murti (1955) and S.N. Dasgupta (1922). Both brought high philosophical
standards along with the essential philology to educate Western thinkers. As evidence of non-Western
productivity in the Anglophone world, see Arvind Sharma 1990 and 1995. There are now extensive
treatments of pantheism and student-friendly guides to diverse religious conceptions of the cosmos.

The expanded interest in religious pluralism has led to extensive reflection on the compatibility and
possible synthesis of religions. John Hick is the preeminent synthesizer of religious traditions. In an
important book, Hick (1974) advanced a complex picture of the afterlife involving components from
diverse traditions. Over many publications and many years, Hick has moved from a broadly based
theistic view of God to what Hick calls “the Real,” a noumenal sacred reality. Hick claims that
different religions provide us with a glimpse or partial access to the Real. In an influential article,
“The New Map of the Universe of Faiths,” Hick raised the possibility that many of the great world
religions are revelatory of the Real.

Seen in [an] historical context these movements of faith—the Judaic-Christian, the Buddhist, the
Hindu, the Muslim—are not essentially rivals. They began at different times and in different places,
and each expanded outwards into the surrounding world of primitive natural religion until most of the
world was drawn up into one or the other of the great revealed faiths. And once this global pattern
had become established it has ever since remained fairly stable... Then in Persia the great prophet
Zoroaster appeared; China produced Lao-tzu and then the Buddha lived, the Mahavira, the founder of
the Jain religion and, probably about the end of this period, the writing of the Bhagavad Gita; and
Greece produced Pythagoras and then, ending this golden age, Socrates and Plato. Then after the gap
PHILOSOPHY Page 50
of some three hundred years came Jesus of Nazareth and the emergence of Christianity; and after
another gap the prophet Mohammed and the rise of Islam. The suggestion that we must consider is
that these were all movements of the divine revelation. [emphasis added] (Hick 1989, 136)

Hick sees these traditions, and others as well, as different meeting points in which a person might be
in relation to the same reality or the Real: “The great world faiths embody different perceptions and
conceptions of, and correspondingly different responses to, the Real from within the major variant
ways of being human; and that within each of them the transformation of human existence from self-
centeredness to Reality-centeredness is taking place” (Ibid., 240). Hick uses Kant to develop his
central thesis.

Kant distinguishes between noumenon and phenomenon, or between a Ding an sich [the thing itself]
and the thing as it appears to human consciousness…. In this strand of Kant's thought—not the only
strand, but the one which I am seeking to press into service in the epistemology of religion—the
noumenal world exists independently of our perception of it and the phenomenal world is that same
world as it appears to our human consciousness…. I want to say that the noumenal Real is
experienced and thought by different human mentalities, forming and formed by different religious
traditions, as the range of gods and absolutes which the phenomenology of religion reports. (Ibid.,
241–242)

One advantage of Hick's position is that it undermines a rationale for religious conflict. If successful,
this approach would offer a way to accommodate diverse communities and undermine what has been
a source of grave conflict in the past.

Hick's work since the early 1980's provided an impetus for not taking what appears to be religious
conflict as outright contradictions. He advanced a philosophy of religion that paid careful attention to
the historical and social context. By doing so, Hick thought the apparent conflict between seeing the
Real as the personal or the impersonal reality could be reconciled (see Hick 2004, 2006).

The response to Hick's proposal has been mixed. Some contend that the very concept of “the Real” is
incoherent (Plantinga) or not religiously adequate. Indeed, articulating the nature of the real is no easy
task. Hick writes that the Real “cannot be said to be one thing or many, person or thing, substance or
process, good or bad, purposive or non-purposive. None of the concrete descriptions that apply within
the realm of human experience can apply literally to the unexperienceable ground of that realm….
We cannot even speak of this as a thing or an entity” (Ibid., 246). It has been argued that Hick has
secured not the equal acceptability of diverse religions but rather their unacceptability. In their
classical forms, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity diverge. If, say, the Incarnation of God in Christ did
not occur, isn't Christianity false? In reply, Hick has sought to interpret specific claims about the
Incarnation in ways that do not commit Christians to the “literal truth” of God becoming enfleshed.
The “truth” of the Incarnation has been interpreted in such terms as these: in Jesus Christ (or in the
narratives about Christ) God is disclosed. Or: Jesus Christ was so united with God's will that his
actions were and are the functional display of God's character. Perhaps as a result of Hick's challenge,
philosophical work on the incarnation and other beliefs and practice specific to religious traditions
have received renewed attention (see, for example, Taliaferro and Meister 2010). Hick has been a
leading, widely appreciated force in the expansion of philosophy of religion in the late twentieth
century.
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In addition to the expansion of philosophy of religion to take into account a wider set of religions, the
field has also seen an expansion in terms of methodology. Philosophers of religion have re-discovered
medieval philosophy—the new translations and commentaries of medieval Christian, Jewish, and
Islamic texts have blossomed. There is now a self-conscious, deliberate effort to combine work on the
concepts in religious belief alongside a critical understanding of their social and political roots (the
work of Foucault has been influential on this point), feminist philosophy of religion has been
especially important in re-thinking what may be called the ethics of methodology and, as this is in
some respects the most current debate in the field, it is a fitting point to end this entry by highlighting
the work of Pamela Sue Anderson and others.

Anderson (1997 and 2012) seeks to question respects in which gender enters into traditional
conceptions of God and in their moral and political repercussions. She also advances a concept of
method which delimits justice and human flourishing. A mark of legitimation of philosophy should
be the extent to which it contributes to human welfare. In a sense, this is a venerable thesis in some
ancient, specifically Platonic philosophy which envisaged the goal and method of philosophy in terms
of virtue and the good. Feminist philosophy today is not exclusively a critical undertaking, critiquing
“patriarchy.” For a constructive, subtle treatment of religious contemplation and practice, see Coakley
(2002). Another key movement that is developing has come to be called Continental Philosophy of
Religion. A major advocate of this new turn is John Caputo. This movement approaches the themes
of this entry (the concept of God, pluralism, religious experience, metaphysics and epistemology) in
light of Heidegger, Derrida, and other continental philosophers. For a good representation of this
movement, see Caputo 2001.

6.8. Conclusion

This study unit dealt with religious philosopy and its significance, the meaningfulness of religious
language, religious forms of life and practices, the concept of god and religious pluralism.

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 PART TWO

LOGIC

BASIC CONCEPTS OF LOGIC

INTRODUCTION TO MODULE PART-II

1.1. Definition of Logic

The word logic is derived from a Greek word “logus”, meaning reason. Thus, logic is the subject
matter of reason. Although different philosophers defined logic differently, no one can be able to find
a clear cut meaning to it. However, we can generally define logic as a science that analyzes and
evaluates arguments.

1.2. The Purpose of Logic

This course attempts to introduce the fundamental concepts of logic and methods of logical
reasoning. It aims at developing a system of methods and principles that we may use as a criterion for
evaluating the arguments of others and as guides in constructing arguments of our own.

It is important to increase confidence making sense while criticizing arguments of others and
advancing our own argument. The purpose of studying logic is mainly to develop methods and
techniques of distinguishing good arguments from bad arguments.

1.3. Objectives

After covering this part of the module the distance learners shall be able to:

 Define the concept logic and know nature of arguments

 Know and explain the relationship between language and logic
 Identify fallacies in general and describe informal fallacies
 Discuss categorical propositions

This part of the module contains the following units:

Unit 1: The Nature of Arguments

Unit 2: Logic and Language; Meanings and Definitions

PHILOSOPHY Page 53
 UNIT 1

NATURE OF ARGUMENTS

1.1. Introduction

This study unit introduces you to the definition and types of arguments, Validity, and strength
of arguments. It will also deals with the concepts of sound, unsound, cogent and aauncogent
arguments, and how are they differentiated.

1.2. Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

 Define arguments, and describe types of arguments
 Identify arguments from passages containing non-arguments
 Describe sound and unsound arguments
 Elucidate cogent and uncogent arguments

An argument is a group of statements, one of which (the conclusion) is claimed to follow from the
other or others (the premises). It can be either good argument in which the conclusion really does
follow from the premises or bad arguments in which the conclusion really does not follow from the
premises, even though it is claimed to.

A statement is a sentence that is either true or false i.e. typically a declarative sentence. Statement,
thus, have a truth value.

Example; The sun rises in the east. (True)

All living things are animals. (False)

Unlike statements, many sentences cannot be said either true or false.

These include the following;

 Questions  Suggestions
 Proposals  Commands
 Exclamations
Example: What is your name? (Question)

Let’s go to Finfine next week. (Proposal)

I suggest that he is coming here. (Suggestion)

Shut up the door. (Command)

Hi! (Exclamation)

PHILOSOPHY Page 54
 Premise/s and Conclusion of an Argument

All statements are sentences, but all sentences are not statements. The statements that make up an
argument are divided in to one or more premises and one and only one conclusion.

Premises: are the statements that set forth the evidence.

Conclusion: is the statement that is claimed to follow from the evidence.

Example 1: All mammals are animals. Premises

Goat is a mammal.
Therefore, goat is an animal. Conclusion

In this argument the conclusion really does follow from the premises, and so the argument is a good
one.

Example 2: Some mammals are animals. Premises

Goat is a mammal.
Therefore, goat is an animal. Conclusion

In this argument the conclusion does not in fact follow from the premises, even though it is claimed
to, and so the argument is not a good argument.

There are certain indicator words/phrases that provide clues in identifying premises and conclusion in
an argument.

Some typical premise indicators:

 since  as  in as much as
 as indicated by  given that  owing to
 because  seeing that
 for
 in that
 may be inferred from  for the reason that

Example: This building worth a lot of money, since it is made of aluminum.

Premise indicator Premise

One premise indicator not indicated above is “for this reason,” because it is special in that it comes
immediately after the premise it indicates.

Some typical conclusion indicators include:

 therefore  entails that  we may infer

 wherefore  hence  it must be
 accordingly  thus  whence
 we may conclude  consequently  so

PHILOSOPHY Page 55
  it follows that  implies that  as a result

Example: This pen is out of ink. Consequently, it will not write.

Conclusion indicator Conclusion

In cases where there are no indicators, the following questions must be made to point out to
conclusion.

 What single statement is claimed to follow from the others (premises)?

 What is the arguer trying to prove?
 What is the main point in the passage?
Example: Private Universities deserve increased expenditures in the years ahead. Not only do their
research activities depend up on it, but these institutions will more pay for themselves in
terms of technological expansion. Furthermore, at current funding levels they cannot
fulfill their anticipated potential.

This argument is analyzed as follows;

Premise 1: The research activities of Private Universities are dependent up on their own
expenditures.
Premise 2: The private Universities will more pay for themselves in terms of technological
expansion.
Premise 3: At current funding levels private universities cannot fulfill their anticipated potential.
Conclusion: Private Universities deserve increased expenditures in the years ahead.

Proposition and inference are concepts that are related to statement and argument respectively. A
proposition is the meaning or information content of a statement, while an inference is the reasoning
process used to produce an argument. In the loose sense of the term, argument and inference are used
interchangeably and also true for proposition and statement.

1.1. Recognizing Arguments

All passages do not contain arguments. Hence, two important conditions are required for the
occurrence of an argument.

a) At least one of the statements in the passage must present evidence (reasons for
something)__Premise(s)
b) There must be a claim that something follows from the evidence (reasons)__Conclusion

An argument is not necessarily required to be good argument, but there must be some kind of evidence
i.e. premise(s) and some kind of claim that something follows from the evidence i.e. conclusion. For

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an argument to exist, it is not always necessary to have indicator words. There are arguments without
indicators.

In order to distinguish passages that contain arguments from passages that do not contain arguments, it
is important to know some typical kinds of non-arguments. The typical kinds of non-arguments are the
following:

1. Warnings and Pieces of Advice: Are kinds of discourse aimed at modifying someone’s behavior.
Example: Do not take my book without permission. (Warning)
I suggest you take logic during your first year. (Advice)
2. Statements of Belief or Opinion: Are expressions of what someone happens to believe or think at
a certain time.
Example: I think having tea at night is better than having it in the morning.

3. Description: Consists of one or more statements that, taken together, cause a certain picture to
appear in the mind of the reader or listener. Example: Lelise is a pointed nose, beautiful and
pleased girl I had ever seen.
4. Report: A group of statements that conveys information about some situation or event.
Example: President Obama and his Europen partners have decided to bombard the IS and IL,
current terrorist groups in Syria and Libya.
5. Expository Passages: A passage in which the objective is not to prove the topic sentence, but only
to expand or elaborate it.
Example: Students in higher education become stressful, especially during examinations. Each and
every student develops a style of his/her own to become successful in whatever he/she
can be able to do so. They expend their time being busy.
6. An Illustration: Consists of a statement about a certain subject combined with a reference to one
or more specific instances intended to exemplify that statement.
Example 1: Several metals have a high melting point; the melting point of copper is 1083°c.

Example 2: Chemical elements can be represented by molecular formulas. Thus, oxygen is

represented by “O2”.

The purpose of, ’thus’, is not to indicate that something is being proved but only to show how
something is done.

7. Conditional Statements: Are an “if…then…” statements.

Example: If it rains, then the valley will flood.

Conditional statements are made up of antecedent (the statement immediately following “if”) and
consequent (the statement immediately following “then”). In conditional statements neither the
antecedent nor the consequent is asserted to be true, unlike arguments in which both the premise and
conclusion are true, even though, at least hypothetically.

Generally, the relationship between conditional statements and arguments can be summarized as
follows:

a) A single conditional statement is not an argument

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 b) A conditional statement may serve as either the premise or the conclusion(both) of an
argument
c) The inferential content of a conditional statement may be re-expressed in the form of an
argument
Conditional statements are very important to express the relationship between necessary and
sufficient conditions in logic. An event ‘A’ is said to be a necessary condition for an event ‘B’
whenever ‘B’ cannot occur without the occurrence of ‘A’. On another hand, an event ‘A’ is said to
be a sufficient condition for an event ‘B’ whenever the occurrence of ‘A’ is all that is required for the
occurrence of ‘B’.

8. Explanations: Composed of explanandum (the statement that describes the event or the
phenomenon) and explanans (the statement that does the explaining). Explanans
are not an argument because explanans are intended to show why something is the
case than providing that something is the case.
9. Loosely Associated Statements: Are a set of word that does not provide evidence (premise) for
the conclusion to be proved.

1.2. Type of Arguments: Deductive and Inductive

Arguments in general can be classified in to two groups as deductive and inductive arguments in the
subject matter of logic.

a) Deductive Arguments
These arguments are arguments in which the conclusion is presumed to follow necessarily from the
premise(s).

Example 1: All mammals are animals.

Lion is a mammal.
Therefore, lion is an animal.

Example 2: All plants are living things.

An Oliver is a plant.
Therefore, an Oliver is a living thing.

Example 3: The fox is a member of the mangoose family.

All member of the mangoose family are carnivores.
Therefore, it necessary follows that the fox is a carnivore.

b) Inductive Arguments
These types of arguments are arguments in which the conclusion is presumed to follow only
probably from the premise(s).

Example 1: Majority of accountants are intelligent.

Chala is an accountant.
Therefore, Chala is an intelligent.

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Example 2: Mr. Lata likes to drink Coca-cola.
Coca-cola is related to Pepsi.
Therefore, it is probably that Mr. Lata likes to drink Pepsi.

Three important factors should be taken into consideration in order to decide whether an argument is
deductive or inductive.

a) The nature of the link between premise(s) and conclusion

b) The occurrence of indicator words, and
c) The form of argumentation the arguer uses

The following words are deductive argument indicators:

 certainly  definitely
 absolutely  necessarily

On the other hand, we do have the following inductive argument indicators:

 improbable  likely
 probable  reasonable to conclude
 plausible  unlikely, etc
 implausible

The indicator “it must be the case that” and “must happen that” are ambiguous because “must”
can imply either probability or necessity.

Inductive and deductive indicator words often suggest the correct interpretation. Occasionally, an
argument consists of indicator words, and the conclusion does not follow either necessarily or
probably from the premise(s). In this case, it is important to follow the nature of the link between
premise(s) and conclusion, and the form of argumentation the arguer uses.

Some typical deductive arguments include the following in general expressions:

i) An Argument Based on Mathematics

Arguments in pure mathematics are deductive, except arguments that depend on statistics, which are
usually inductive.

Example: Putting ten red and two blue pens in to a given bag, one can conclude that the bag
contains twelve pens.

ii) An Argument from Definitions

Consists of an argument in which the conclusion is claimed to depend merely up on the definitions of
some word (phrase) in the premise(s).

Example: Because, Ribera is mendacious, it follows that he tells lies.

PHILOSOPHY Page 59
 iii) Categorical Syllogism
Syllogism is an argument consisting of exactly two premises and one conclusion, while categorical
syllogism is a syllogism in which a statement begins with one of the words “all”, “no” or “some”.

Example: All lasers are optical devices.

Some lasers are surgical instruments.
Therefore, some optical devices are surgical instruments.

iv) A Hypothetical Syllogism

This type of syllogism is a syllogism having a conditional statement for one or more or both of its
premises.

Example:

If electricity flows through a conductor, then a magnetic field is produced.

If magnetic field is produced, then a nearby compass will be deflected.
Therefore, if electricity flows through a conductor, then a nearby compass will be deflected.

Although certain forms of such arguments can sometimes be interpreted inductively, the deductive
interpretation is usually the most appropriate.

v) A Disjunctive Syllogism
This type syllogism consists of syllogism having an “either…or…” statement for one or both of its
premises.

Example: Either breach of law is a crime or it is not punishable.

Breach of law if not a crime.
Thus, breach of law is not punishable.

Similar to hypothetical syllogism, these types of arguments are usually best taken as deductive
arguments.

On the other hand, some typical inductive form of argumentation consists of the following:

i. Predictions
In predictions the premises deals with some known events in the present or past, and the conclusion
moves beyond this event to some event in the relative future which is uncertain.

Example: Because meteorology has indicated the existence of cloud on Monday, it rains on
Tuesday.

ii. Arguments from Analogy (Similarity)

Arguments from analogy depend on the existence of analogy or similarity between two states of
affairs (things).

Example: Because the coffee in a certain cafe at Ambo town has a high salt content, the coffee in a
nearby café has a high salt content.

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 iii. An Inductive Generalization
This is an argument that proceeds from the knowledge of a selected sample to some claim about the
whole group.

Example: Two oranges selected from a red sack is tasty, thus all oranges in the red sack are tasty.

iv. An Argument from Authority

This argument is an argument in which the conclusion rests up on a statement made by some
presumed authority (witness). But, the authority may be mistaken or lying.

Example: Earnings for Leadstar College will be up next year because of a statement to that effect
by the owner.

v. Arguments Based on Signs

This is an argument that proceeds from knowledge of a certain sign to knowledge of a thing
(situation) that the sign symbolizes. But, the sign may be misplaced or error.

Example: One might see a sign indicating that the road makes several sharp turn one kilometer
ahead. Based on this information, he/she might argue that the road does make several
harp turns one kilometer ahead.

vi. Causal Inferences

A causal inference underlies arguments that proceed from knowledge of a cause to knowledge of the
effect or from knowledge of an effect to knowledge of a cause. Specific instances of cause and effect
can never be known with absolute certainty.

Example 1: After testing a piece of food and finding it dry, one might conclude that it had been
overcooked. (Effect to cause)

Example 2: From knowing that a bottle of wine had been accidentally left in the freezer overnight,
we might conclude that it had frozen. (Cause to effect)

These types of arguments are sometimes confused with arguments of sign, but sign is not usually
produced by the thing it signifies, while effect is always produced by its correlative cause.

The traditional differentiation which holds that inductive arguments are those that proceed from the
particular to general, while deductive arguments proceed from general to particular is true. But, this
fact should not be used as a criterion as there are deductive arguments that proceed from general to
general, particular to particular, from particular to general and from general to particular which also
holds true to inductive arguments.

1.3. Validity and Invalidity; Truth and Falsity

Validity and invalidity are the distinctive (intrinsic) characteristics of deductive arguments. Valid
deductive argument is an argument in which the conclusion follows necessarily from the premise(s).
It is an argument such that if the premises are assumed true it is impossible that the conclusion be
false.

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An invalid deductive argument is an argument in which the conclusion does not necessarily follow
from the premises. It is an argument such that if the premises are assumed true, it is possible that
the conclusion be false.

There is no middle ground between valid and invalid, and thus, if the conclusion does follow
necessarily, the argument is valid; if not, it is invalid. There are no arguments that are almost valid or
almost invalid. Besides, there is only an indirect relation between validity and truth. For an argument
to be valid it is not necessary that either the premises or conclusion be true; but only that if the
premises are assumed true, the conclusion be true on the basis of that assumption.

Example: All scientists are accountants. (False)

Lamesa is a scientist. (False) Valid Argument
Therefore, Lamesa is an accountant. (False)

Just as the occurrence of false premises and false conclusion does not prevent an argument from
being valid, so the occurrence of true premises and true conclusion does not guarantee validity.

Example: All scientists are human beings. (True)

Chala is a human being. (True) Invalid Argument
Therefore, Chala is a scientist. (True)

In this example, there is a probability that Chala is not a scientist, because all human beings are not
scientists. The question is not whether the premises and conclusion are true but whether the
conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. The second example above is invalid because, if
one assumes that the premises are true, it is possible that the conclusion be false.

Note: Any deductive argument having true premises and false conclusion is necessarily invalid.

Generally, the relationship between validity of deductive argument and truth or falsity of the premises
and conclusion can be depicted as follows:

Premises Conclusion Validity

T T ?
T F Invalid
F T ?
F F ?
1.4. Sound and Unsound Arguments

A sound argument is a deductive argument that is valid and has all true premises. Both of these
conditions must be met for an argument to be sound and if either is missing the argument is unsound.
A sound deductive argument does in fact have true premises means that every sound argument, by
definition, will have a true conclusion as well. A sound argument, therefore, is what is meant by a
“good” deductive argument in the fullest sense of the term.

PHILOSOPHY Page 62
Shortly,
Sound Valid True
Argument= = +
Argument Premises

1.5. Strength and Weakness; Truth and Falsity

Strength and weakness are distinctive characteristics (property) of inductive arguments, as are
validity and invalidity is distinctive properties of deductive arguments.

A strong inductive argument is an argument in which the conclusion follows probably from the
premises. This means that, it is an argument such that if the premises are assumed true, then on the
basis of that assumption, it is probable that the conclusion is true

A weak inductive argument, on the other hand, is one in which the conclusion does not follow
probably from the promises. This implies that, it is an argument such that if the premises are
assumed true; then, on the basis of that assumption, it is not probable that the conclusion is true.

Example 1: This basket contains one hundred apples.

Eighty apples selected at random were found to be ripe. Strong Inductive Argument
Therefore, probably all one hindered apples are ripe.

Example 2: This basket contains one hundred apples.

Three apples selected at random were found to be ripe. Weak Inductive Argument
Therefore, probably all none hindered apples are ripe.

Unlike validity and invalidity, strength and weakness admit of degrees. In the above examples, the
first argument is not absolutely strong nor the second absolutely weak. Both arguments would be
strengthened or weakened by the random selection of a larger or smaller sample. The incorporation
of additional premises in to an inductive argument will also generally tend to strengthen or weaken it.
As with validity and invalidity, strength and weakness are only indirectly related to truth and falsity.

Examples 1: Of the many Ethiopian rulers in the past, the vast majority have been federalists. (False)
Therefore, probably the next Ethiopian ruler will be a federalist. (Probably False)

Strong Inductive Argument

Example 2: During the past 65 years, inflation has consistently reduced the value of the American dollar. (True)
Therefore, probably the industrial productivity will increase in the years a head. (Probably True).

Weak Inductive Argument

In this second example there is no direct connection between inflation and industrial productivity
which made it be weak, though the premise is true and the conclusion be probably true.

Note: - Any inductive argument having true premises and a probably false conclusion is always
weak.

The relationship between strength and weakness on one hand, and truth and falsity on the other hand,
can be depicted as follows:

PHILOSOPHY Page 63
 Premises Conclusion Strength

T Probably T ?
T Probably F Weak
F Probably T ?
F Probably F ?

1.6. Cogent and Uncogent Arguments

A cogent argument is an inductive argument that is strong and has true premises. If either of these
conditions is missing the argument is uncogent. A cogent argument is the inductive analogue of a
sound deductive argument and is what is meant by a “good” inductive argument without
qualification. Because the conclusion of a cogent argument is genuinely supported by true premises,
it follows that the conclusion of every cogent argument is probably true.

Shortly,
Cogent Argument Strong Argument True Premises
= +

Generally, whether an argument is inductive or deductive, there are basically two separate questions
that are involved in its evaluation:

1. Does the conclusion follow from the premises?

2. Are the premises true?
The answer to the first question determines whether a deductive argument is valid or invalid and
whether an inductive argument is strong or weak. Then assuming the argument is valid or strong, the
answer to the second question determines whether a deductive argument is sound or unsound and
whether an inductive argument is cogent or uncogent.

Note: In logic one never speaks of an argument as being “true“ or “False”, and one never also speaks
a statement as being “valid“ or “invalid”, “strong” or ”weak”.

6.8. Conclusion

The various alternatives open to statements and arguments may be diagramed as follows, and
provides us an undertading of the basic concepts covered in this unit.

PHILOSOPHY Page 64
 Statement Deductive Arguments

True False
Valid Invalid

Sound Unsound

(All are unsound)

Inductive Arguments

Strong Weak

(All are uncogent)

Cogent Uncogent

PHILOSOPHY Page 65
 UNIT 2

MEANINGS AND DEFINITIONS IN LOGIC

2.1. Introduction

Language and its application is one of the fundamental areas of the study of logic. For that matter this
unit focuses on meanings and definitions. As far as its details are concerned; topics such as cognitive,
directive and emotive meanings, intension and extension of terms, and definitional techniques are
covered. Language and law and their purposes, definitional techniques, and rules of lexical
definitions will be the main focuses of this unit.

2.2. Objectives

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

 Identify emotive and cognitive meaning of terms
 Define and differentiate intension and extension of terms
 Describe definitions and their purposes
 Identify and explain definitional techniques
 Identify and discuss criteria for lexical definitions

Ordinary language serves various functions in our day-to-day lives. The contemporary philosopher
Ludwig Wittgenstein thought the number of these functions to be virtually unlimited. They are
important to ask questions, to tell lies, to form a hypothesis, to tell jocks, to sing songs, to issue
commands.

To fit with our purpose, we select three of the main linguistic functions:

To convey information
To express or evoke feelings.
Directive functions, which are exemplified through commands and requests.

The following three statements show how language serves the above three purposes respectively,
which the first statement is intended to convey information, the second one is to express or evoke
feelings, and the third one gives directive meaning.

Examples:

1. The first written constitution of Ethiopia was formulated is 1931; however the first federal
constitution is effected since 1995.
2. Death Penalty is the final, cruel and inhuman form of all punishments, in which hopeless
prisoners are taken from their cells and terribly slaughtered.
3. Derive carefully please! Remember that if you negligently cause damage, you will be thrown to
jail.

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The above statements employ their own distinct terminologies to accomplish their respective
functions. The first statement conveys cognitive meaning, which uses terminologies such as
‘codified’, ‘first’ and ‘written’, whereas the second statement contains emotive meaning and it
employs terminologies like ‘cruel’, ‘hopeless’, “terribly’ and ‘slaughtered’, and the third statement
includes words such as ‘Please’, ‘carefully’ and others to transmit command.

Emotively charged statements usually have both cognitive and emotive meanings, however, it is
logically advisable to distinguish the two and emphasis should be given to the former since logic is
mainly concerned with it. This is primarily because of the fact that emotively charged sentences are
mainly accompanied by expressions of prejudices and feelings rather than rational, justifiable and
factual information about an event or the subject concerned. Moreover, we cannot use emotively
charged sentences in arguments since the sentences cannot be evaluated as true or false.

It is not logical to argue that emotively charged statements have no cognitive meanings; rather the
cognitive meanings of emotively charged statements have to do with value claims, which are
important parts of cognitive meaning of emotive statements. This will force readers or listeners to
separate value claims and cognitive meanings from emotive meanings so as to get the real meaning of
the argument proposed. And, it is important to separate value claims form emotive meanings of
emotively charged statements to secure the purpose of logic. Here, the logical presumption is that
value claims cannot stand by themselves; rather they normally have evidences to support them. And,
emotively charged statements are usually familiar with disciplines such as; military, advertising,
politics and other related fields.

2.4. The Intension and Extension of Terms

It is clear that arguments and their logical status is the main topic of logic. And, arguments are
consisting of statements, which are composed of words that have meanings which are convoyed
through definitions. Moreover, logic is highly dependent on definitions to deliver specific meanings
to terms.

Though words is general are primary units of ordinary languages, we in this chapter, are not mainly
concerned with them, rather with terms. A term is a word or group of words, which can be used as
the subject of a statement. Proper names, common names and descriptive phrases can be
considered as terms. The followings are some of the examples, which are used as terms.

Proper names Common names Descriptive Phrases

- Boonsaa - house - pen under the tables

- South America - person - those who study hard

-
Plant
On the other hand, verbs, adjectives, prepositions, conjunctions and the like can not be considered
as terms since they can not serve as subjects of statement. For example, words such as; ‘however’,
‘argue fairly’, ‘controversial’…cannot be taken as terms. In short, to consider a word or a group of
words as a term or non-term, one should be aware whether or not it serves as the subject of the

PHILOSOPHY Page 67
statement. And one must distinguish when words are used from they are mentioned. When words
have been mentioned or quoted, they usually serve as subjects so that they can be treated as terms.

Examples: 1. ‘Carefully’ is an eight-letter word.

2. We should derive carefully.

As far as the above two examples is concerned, the word “carefully” is mentioned in the first example
so that it can be considered as a term where as the word “carefully” is used as an adverb in the second
example so that it can never be considered as a term.

Words are symbols, which signify meanings. And, terms are made up of words having two kinds of
meanings: intensional and extensional. The intentional meaning contains the attributes or qualities,
which the term connotes where as extensional meaning consists of members of the class that the
term denotes. And, extensional meaning is usually termed as extension or denotation, where as its
intentional meaning is called intension or connotation. For example, the intentional meaning of the
terms ‘human being’ contains attributes of being rational, social, and moral as well as political animal
and its extensional meaning consists of all human beings in the universe.

Intentional definition is usually exposed to subjective application in the sense that individuals’
positive or negative inclinations or an attitude towards the subject to be defined restricts us from
having similar connotative meaning about it. For example, the following two meanings of the term
abortion are as follows:

1. Abortion is an act, which is illegal, immoral and inhuman and it clearly violates the
fundamental human rights of an infant baby.

2. Abortion is an act, which is performed by responsible medical professionals so as to save the

endangered life of the mother.

Thus, one can understand two contradictory meanings given to the term abortion. Thus, to get ride of
such subjective or partial intentional meaning of a term, conventional definition can be taken as an
alternative. Conventional definition refers to the attributes in that the things that are denoted by the
term are supposed to have in the minds of competent speakers of the language in question.

With regard to denotative definition, it is the same from person to person: however, it may change
with the passage of time. Fore example, there is having similar denotative definition from person to
person to terms: “currently living cat” and “cat”. However, there will be differences with different
time in the sense that the former denotes currently existing cats where as the latter denotes all the
past, present and future cats.

As to the relationship between intentional and extensional meanings of terms;

A. When we increase the intentional meaning of a term, we are decreasing its extensional
meaning and when we decrease the intentional meaning of a term, we are increasing its
extensional meaning.

This implies that the intentional meaning of a term is conversely or indirectly related with its
extensional meaning.

PHILOSOPHY Page 68
 Increasing intension /decreasing extension

Biology, Natural sciences, Sciences

Increasing extension/decreasing intension.

 When we say we are increasing extension, we are to mean that we are denoting more classes or
members than the preceding terms in a series. And the converse is the case when we say we are
decreasing extension.

 When we say we are increasing intension, we are to mean that we are to be more specific or we
are attributing more about the term than its preceding and the converse is the case when we mean
we are decreasing intension.

B. Intensional definition of a given term usually determines its extensional definition in the
sense that when someone gives us clues about the attributes or qualities of a given term, we
can easily identify the class or categories, which satisfy the above attributes. But, extensional
definition of a term cannot determine, but can suggest, its intentional meaning. This rule
becomes problematic when we apply it to proper names. However, we can resolve this by
giving some identifying clues about the subject to be defined as it will be witnessed in the
following example.

Example ; Gamachu, the person who lives in the next building.

 Another important point is about those terms having no extensional meanings, which are
technically called terms with empty extension. These terms have no classes, members or
categories which are included in them. For example, words like ‘Satan’, ‘Unicorn’, ‘God’ and
the like are terms with empty extension since such entities do not have extensional meanings.

2.5. Definitions and their Purposes

Philosophers such as Plato and his contemporaries perceive the purpose of definitions as to
understand the essential forms of the object to be defined. However, as to the perception of most
logicians, definitions are usually destined to assign meaning to words or groups of words. Based on
this presumption, a definition is composed of two essential parts: Definiendum and definiens.
Definiendum is the word, which is supposed to be defined, and definiens is a word or group of words,
which does the defining. And there are five different types of definitions categorized based on their
respective purposes. These are:

1. Stipulative Definition

Stipulative definition assigns meanings to words for the first time either through coining new words
or assigning new meanings to old words. The prime function of stipulative definition is to substitute a
more complex expression by simpler one. And, it is often caused by some new phenomenon or
development. Moreover, it is used to set up secret codes in areas of military expression and other
related developments. Thus new creations as well as developments demand new names so that
stipulative definition may serve for this purpose. Since stipulative definitions are completely arbitrary
assignments of meanings to words, they cannot have any truth-value so that they cannot be asserted
PHILOSOPHY Page 69
as “true” or “false”. And stipulative definitions cannot give any new information about the subject to
be defined; however, they may be more or less convenient or appropriate than others.

Examples:

- “Logphobia” means fear of taking logic course.

- “Sexercise” means especially vigorous sexual activity.

2. Lexical Definition

Lexical definition is usually called dictionary definition since it is used to report the meaning that the
subject to be defined has in a language. Unlike stipulation definition, lexical definition can be
evaluated as true or false with reference to the actual usage of the word. And, a good lexical
definition should avoid or resist ambiguous meanings.

Here it should be underlined that ambiguity and vagueness are two different notions. A word is said
to be vague if it lacks precision of application words such as love, happiness, rich, normal… are
vague since they are employed in different situations so that they might have different meanings. On
the other hand, a word is said to be ambiguous when it contains two distinct meanings in that
particular situations. Words like ‘Sound’, ‘light’, ‘right’…are ambiguous words.

Examples:

- “Belt” means (1) a trap worn around the waist; (2) a trip of land

- “Even” means (1) equal in size; (2) calm or tranquil; (3) divided by 2.

3. Précising Definition

A précising definition is primarily intended to reduce the vagueness of the word. This helps us to
reach a decision to the applicability of the word to a specific situation. In areas where words are taken
from ordinary usage and applied to highly systematic field such as science, mathematics, law,
medicine and other related fields, they must be clearly stated through précising definition. Moreover,
précising definitions are different from stipulative definitions since their assignments of meanings to
words are not arbitrary. And, the assignment of meaning in any précising definition should be
appropriate and legitimate to the context in which the term is applied.

Examples:

- “Antique” means, at least 100 years old.

- “High” means, in regard to the interest rates, at least two points alone the prime rate.

4. Theoretical Definition

A theoretical definition gives a theoretical meaning to the word to be defined or it provides a way of
viewing the definiendum which in turn suggests deductive consequences and further investigation on
scientific experimentation. But this does not mean that all theoretical definitions are associated with

PHILOSOPHY Page 70
science, rather many terms in philosophy such as substance, idea, God… have been given theoretical
definitions. Theoretical definitions, like stipulative definitions, can never be evaluated as true or false;
however, they can be considered as more interesting or fruitful depending on the deductive
consequences they imply and the result of experiment they suggest.

Examples:

- “Atom” means indivisible unit of matter having perceptible qualities.

- “Sin” means an intentional violation of the law of God.

5. Persuasive Definition

A persuasive definition is characterized through assigning emotively charged meaning to the

definiendum as if it were having such meaning in the language in which it is used. This would create
positive or negative attitude toward the subject to be defined. And, persuasive definitions are
attributed to the synthesis of stipulative, lexical, and theoretical definitions backed by emotional
appeals so as to impose a certain attitude up on audiences or readers. The central objective of a
percussive definition is to influence the attitude of the readers or listeners, as it is an instrument of
persuasion. Finally persuasive definitions can be evaluated as true or false though it is not its primary
mission.

Examples:

- “Homeless person” means a helpless individual who has lost his family and home as a
result of life’s vicissitudes.

- “Doctor” means a person possessed of special God-like powers to heal the sick.

2.6. Definitional Techniques

There are various techniques, which are important to produce definitions. And, one can employ the
techniques so as to show how the two kinds of meaning (intention and extension) are indicated or
presented. For that matter, some forms of extensional definitions are discussed first followed by
various forms of intentional meaning.

 Demonstrative (Ostensive) Definition

Demonstrative definition as a form of extensional definition is the most primitive form of all
definitions. It is indicated through pointing towards the subject to be defined. Demonstrative
definitions may be either partial or complete depending on whether all or only some of the members
of the subject to be defined are pointed out.

This definition is important for someone to communicate with a foreigner who does not speak the
language of the former. It is limited by time and space. Moreover, sign languages to which they
usually consist of gestures are those, which this definition is supposed to be expressed.

PHILOSOPHY Page 71
 Examples:

- “Tree” Means this and this  

- “House” Means this and this  
 Enumerative Definition

An enumerative definition is another form of extensional definition that assigns meanings to the
objects, which are supposed to be defined through naming them individually or in groups. Like
demonstrative definitions, enumerative definitions may also be either partial or complete, which the
latter is logically preferable.

Examples:

- “Politician” means someone as Nelson Mandela, Barrack Obama or Robert Mugabe.

- “Planet” means like earth, Saturn and Neptune.

 A Definition by Subclass

A definition by subclass is another type of extensional definition to assign a meaning to a term by

naming the subclasses of the class denoted by the term and it can be partial or complete like that of
enumerative definition. And, a complete definition by subclass is more preferable than that of the
partial one.

Examples:

- “Fruit” means something such as an apple, peach, pear, or banana.

The above three types of extensional definitions are crucial techniques in producing lexical and
stipulative definitions. Moreover, extensional definitions could also serve as techniques for
theoretical and persuasive definitions. Extensional definition, on the other hand, cannot serve as
précising definition since the purpose of précising definition is to clarify vague words and vagueness
is exclusively an issue of intentional meaning.

Here we can also forward different forms of intentional definitions as follows:

 A Synonymous Definition

It is a kind of intentional definition that the definiens is a synonym of the word being defined. If a
single word is found having the same intentional meaning with the word to be defined, synonymous
definition is highly appropriate way of assigning intentional meaning. But, the problem is on the
difficulty of getting a single word to satisfy this requirement.

Examples
- “Obese” Means fat
- “Skinny” means thin.

PHILOSOPHY Page 72
 An Etymological Definition assigns meanings to a word through showing its root, origin or
ancestors in both its own language as well as other languages. Most of the time, English words
have ancestors in other language such as Greek, Latin, French and others. This definition gives
the word’s original meaning, which other meanings can be derived. It also enables us to get the
historical details of the word to be defined as well as other related words.

Examples

- “Virtue” is a word derived from the Latin ‘virtues’, which means strength.
- “Philosophy” is a word derived from the Greek ‘philo’, which means love, and Sophia, which
means wisdom.
 An Operational Definition

It gives meaning to a word through setting experimental procedures, which will be applied to it. It
describes an operation to be performed. This kind of definition is assigned to bring abstract concepts
to the empirical reality. It delivers only part of the intentional meaning of a term and this problem in
more serious when this definition is outside the framework of science.

Examples
- A knife is “Sharp” if it produces a thin scratch when very gently drawn over one’s thumbnail.
- A liquid is “Viscous” if one feels resistance when drawing one’s hand through it.

 A Definition by Genus and Difference

It assigns a meaning to a term by identifying a genus term and one or more difference words. It is
more applicable and adequate definition than any other intensional definitions. In logic, “genus”
means a relatively larger class, as ‘Species” is a relatively smaller subclass of genus and “Specific
difference” is the attribute that differentiate species from genus. To construct this definition, we
should first select or find the genus term and then identify the specific difference. And this definition
is the most effective of all intentional definitions to produce stipulative, lexical, précising, theoretical
and persuasive definitions.

Examples:

-“Triangle” means a three-sided plane figure.

- “Father” means a male person.

2.7. Rules for Lexical Definitions

As it has been underlined before, lexical definition is important to report the way a word is used in a
language and it is the most frequently existed in a dictionary definition. Thus, the followings are
some of the rules and requirements, which a lexical definition should satisfy:

Rule one - A lexical definition should be stated with proper grammar. That is a mistaken grammar is
one of the sources of errors in any lexical definition.

PHILOSOPHY Page 73
 Examples of Ungrammatical definitions

- “Drunk” means when a person consumes more alcohol than they should.
- “Judge” means who decides if you go to jail or pay someone pays you or your pay a fine or get
of free.
Rule two: – A lexical definition should show the essential meaning of the word being defined.
Examples of definitions that do not show the essential meanings of the terms to be defined:
- “Water” means the kind of liquid that comes out of the faucet.
- “Man” means an animal that laughs.
Rule three – a lexical definition should be neither too narrow nor too broad so as to maximize its
precision. If it were too broad, it would include too much and if it is too narrow, it
would include little.

Examples of definition those are too narrow:

- “Politician” means a man elected to fill a political office.

- “Musician” means a person who plays the violin.

Examples of definitions those are too broad:

- “Pencil” means a writing instrument.

- “Rice” means edible grain.

Rule four – A lexical definition should not be circular as circularity is a definition, which creates
unnecessary overlapping of meaning that hinders the proper explanation of the word
being defined. But, there might be cases where some words are intrinsically circular
which is normal.

Examples of Circular definitions:

- “Cemetery Plot” means a plot in a cemetery.

- “Screw driver” means something that derives screws.

Rule Five - A lexical definition should not be negative when it can be affirmative, however, if some
words are intrinsically negative, it is natural and appropriate.

Examples of negative definition:

- “Light” means the absence of darkness.

- “Disease” means the absence of health.

Rule Six – A lexical definition should not be expressed in figurative, obscure, vague and ambiguous
language.

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 Examples of Figurative definition

- “Cigarette” means a Coffin nail.

- “Love” means never having to say you are sorry.
- “Politics” is the land of Liberty.

Examples of Obscure Definitions

- “Telephone” means a spherical membranous gas enclosure.
- “Tooth brush” means a setaceous dental particle desolator.

Rule Seven – A lexical definition should avoid affective expressions and terminologies. Affective
definitions are those definitions of terms, which are there so as to produce value –
laden meanings and subjectivity up on the readers and listeners, which in turn
influence the attitudes these parties:

Rule Eight – A lexical definition should indicate the context to which the definiens (defining terms)
pertains. This in turn avoids the problem of brood, narrow, vague and ambiguous
definitions.

Examples for Definitions that fail to indicate the context of the definienus.

- “Beat” means going against the wind.

- “King” means to double up playing pieces.

 Differentiate emotive and cognitive meaning of terms

 Identify intension and extension of terms
 Write down the types of definitions and their respective purposes
 Elucidate definitional techniques
 Mention the eight criterion for lexical definitions

2.8. Conclusion

It has been said that there are three different uses of language; informative, expressive, and directive.
In the law, it is in rare cases that we use language to express attitudes. Sometimes it is used merely to
inform others, but most commonly languages are used to direct conduct. Directive languages may
take the form of explicit commands or by explaining how something is to be done or by giving notice
of what is permitted so that they often have the direction of conduct as their main function.

And, legal rules directing conduct need to be clear and unambiguous. In other words, those who are
subject to the law should access precise legal principles (Constitution or any other law), which clearly
show their rights as well as duties so that they can claim their rights and discharge their
responsibilities. Thus, the languages used in laws should be at most precise so that they can
effectively secure their purpose.

The quest for precision sometimes results in the difficulty of languages particularly in statues and
formal contracts. That is when words and phrases in a contracts and statues, for example, are vague

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and ambiguous; it will subvert the destiny of law in realizing or delivering free, fair and impartial
justice to the party concerned.

Moreover, the need for precision also results in considerable attention being given to definitions of
the words used in laws and administrative rules. Persuasive and theoretical definitions have little
place in law. Stipulative definitions may be introduced when a statue relies on special terms.

Therefore, précising definitions are the most widely employed of all definitions in law. Words or
phrases may have several meanings in the sense that some have broader meanings others have
narrower or more than one meaning so that it needs to be resolved through précising definition.

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