K.

Aiko
Rice shortage and transportation

In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Japan, Indonesia and the WarMyths and
realities 152 (1996), no: 4, Leiden, 633-655

This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl

 KURASAWA-INOMATA AIKO

Rice shortage and transportation

In retrospect, people in Java almost unanimously state that during the

Japanese period they suffered from terrible shortages of rice, and urban
people often give testimony of seeing many people dying on the street.
Indeed, remaining Japanese archives show that in 1944 and 1945 socio-
economic conditions deteriorated to such an extent that the death rate was
much higher compared with the Dutch period (see Tables 1 and 2). It is
difficult to establish exactly what were the main causes of death, but it is
probable that malnutrition directly and indirectly increased the death rate.
Japanese statistics from Semarang Central Hospital show that during the
six months between February 1943 and September 1943, 832 persons
were treated for starvation and 366 died in the hospital.1
All these data tempt me to draw the conclusion that there must indeed
have been terrible shortages of foodstuff during the Japanese occupation,
as the informants indicate. Then, how and why did this miserable situation
come about? To solve this question, let me first examine Japanese food
policy during the occupation of Java.

Forced delivery of paddy under Japanese rule

By the end of the Dutch period, Java had managed to become self-
sufficient in rice. In 1939 the production of rice (paddy) was about 8.4
million tons (about 4.5 tons of milled rice) (Indisch Verslag 1940:282).
Between 1936 and 1941 Java was annually exporting 319,000 tons
(average) of milled rice,2 but this did not necessarily mean that the Javanese
were eating well. The average annual consumption of rice per person
(1929-38) was 84 kilograms, in other words 230 grams per day,3 although

1
Report of Soebardjo on the living conditions of the population with regard to the
requisition of paddy by the government, 21 January 1944. Waseda University Tokyo,
Nishijima Collection, doc. JV 48.
2
Nanpo Gunseisokanbu 'Gunseika ni okeru Jawa to Madura no shokuryo jijo to
sono taisaku' [The food situation and recommended measures in Java and Madura
during the Japanese occupation]. Boeicho Senshishitsu Gunseishiryo, no. 117.
3
Report of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Enemy Branch, on the economic
situation of the Netherlands Indies prior to World War II, 12 January 1944, p. 51.
Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, The Hague, Collection Warners, no. 068-108. Accord-
ing to research on estate labourers in 1937-38, their average rice consumption was
228 grams a day, so the figures almost coincide. See report of the Gunseikanbu
Choshashitsu on estate labourers and their average consumption 'Noen rodosha no
seikatsu jotai' (translation of an unpublished Dutch research report), November 1943,
p. 60.

BK1 152-IV (1996) 111

634 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

it is said that people wanted to eat 400 grams a day if only they could
afford to (Kiyohiko 1944:147).4 Therefore, in this case 'self-sufficiency'
simply means that Java did not have to import any extra rice, but it did not
necessarily mean that people actually had enough rice.
When the Japanese occupied Java, one of their most important motives
was to acquire the resources and commodities needed to enable them to
pursue the war and at the same time to make each occupied area self-
sufficient which was formulated as: 'The main "resources" expected from
Java were foodstuffs and manpower (labour). Therefore, pressure was put
on the Javanese population to surrender as much foodstuff as possible to
the Japanese military authorities'. To assure the acquisition of rice, the
Japanese introduced a new policy called the forced delivery of paddy.5
This was implemented to compel the peasants to sell a certain quantity of
their production to the military government at the official price, which was
much lower than the market price. The quota assigned to each area differed
depending on the production capacity, calculated from Dutch statistics.
The quota was allocated by the Food Control Agency of the military
government (originally named the Shokuryo Kanri Jimusho, then the Juyo
Busshi Kodan and later the Shokuryo Kanrikyoku) in the first place to
each residency (shu) from where it was divided among the lower local
administrative units: from residency to regency, from regency to district,
from district to subdistrict, and finally from subdistrict to village.
Thus the quotas were allocated collectively to each village as the basic
unit, and not personally to each peasant. Therefore, how and how much
rice was to be taken away from each peasant depended on the village
head. But in most cases, a fixed percentage of the product was taken away
from all peasants without exception, regardless of the size of their
landholdings, and it was to be surrendered directly from their rice field to
the village authority. The harvest was scrutinized by the village officials,
and special organizations such as the nogyo kumiai (agricultural co-
operation) were set up in each village to administer the collection of rice.
The heads of each local administrative unit were very keen to fulfil their
individual quotas, because it was they who were responsible for the
collection of the allocated quantity of rice and they who were blamed if
the target was not reached. Attaining the target was very difficult, because
the peasants were unwilling to sell, and tried to conceal their harvest as
much as possible. Therefore, very often when the administrative head
passed the order on to the lower units, they increased the quota. Since this

4
According to this research well-to-do peasants were eating 400 grams daily, while
less well-to-do peasants were forced to substitute other cereals as part of their diet. In
Japan the average per capita consumption was 158 kilograms a year, or 433 grams a
day. See also Johnson 1953:74.
5
This policy reflected the contemporary situation in Japan. The information on this
policy in Java is contained in Kurasawa 1988:Chapter 2. This Chapter was based on
the writer's interviews in villages in Java, as well as on Japanese archives.

112
 Rice shortage and transportation 635

procedure was carried out at each level, the quantity the peasants were
finally ordered to produce was usually much higher than that the Japanese
intended to collect. Despite such subterfuges, according to Japanese
statistics the Japanese military government was never able to obtain the
required quantity (see Tables 3, 4, and 5). Be that as it may, peasants
actually claim that a considerable quantity of their rice was taken away,
stating there was a big difference between official statistics and reality.
Two of the factors which may account for this gap are either the
disappearance or the spoilation of the rice which had been collected as it
was being transported to the military administration.
At this point let me demonstrate how rice circulated during the Japanese
occupation. The first point to bear in mind is that under the Japanese rule
the local economic autarchy of each residency was strictly imposed and
rice trade between residencies was forbidden unless carried out under a
special order from the central government. Though the decree prohibiting
this was issued locally by the residency governor, the basic policy in this
direction was set by the Gunseikanbu (Japanese military administration),
on the basis of a principle previously formulated in Tokyo. By prohibiting
direct contact between the residencies, the central government expected to
maintain a grip on the flow of commodities throughout Java. To serve this
purpose, rice was collected by the central agency following the hierarchy
shown in the Chart. After the rice had been surrendered to the village
authority, it passed through many hands before it reached its final destina-
tion. It is now impossible to trace the quantity received at each stage, but
some sporadic information shows that very often the quantity actually
received and the quantity reported to the upper unit were at variance with
each other.
For example, in Pemalang Regency it was reported that 10,842 tons
were actually delivered to a rice mill by village authorities in one month,
but the rice miller reported a quantity of only 7,856 tons. In another
regency 160,000 quintals6 were delivered, but according to the report from
the rice miller to the Shokuryo Kanri Jimusho (Office for Food Manage-
ment), the quantity received was only 110,000 quintals (Anderson
1966a:99). This is an apt place to quote from a report which records in-
justices committed by local officials and rice millers in Indramayu: 'Upon
receipt of a bribe local government officials help Chinese rice merchants
and rice millers [to take away rice illegally] and therefore extraordinarily
high quotas had to be requested of the peasants'.7
Blackmarketing was rampant among people engaged in every stage of
production and distribution. Among the farmers there were also those who
specialized in smuggling. Peasants in Anjatan, Indramayu, one of the

6
One quintal is 100 kilogrammes.
7
Report of Prawoto Soemodilogo 'Menindjaoe keadaan di Indramajoe' [Inspection
of the situation in Indramajoe]. ARA, Algemene Secretarie Batavia I, XX 11-2.

113
636 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

richest rice-producing areas, had three main routes for smuggling out rice.
One was to go by boat along the north coast. Profits were largest if the rice
was carried westwards to Merak or other harbours in Banten, where is was
sold to smugglers from South Sumatra. This information corroborates the
statement by Twang Peck Yang (1987:73) who writes that Palembang was
the centre of the trade within the smaller confines of the major Indonesia
islands of Borneo, Java, and Sumatra. Goods for Shonan (Singapore) from
Java were first concentrated in Palembang, which means that rice sold to
smugglers from South Sumatra was not consumed only in Sumatra, but also
transported to Singapore and Malaya. Because of the ease with which
smugglers could be detected, this route was very risky. Therefore peasants
found a second way of bringing rice by rail from Haurgeulis Station8 to
Jakarta. Such an endeavour was possible if a collaborator could be found
among the railway staff. There was also a third way which was carrying
the produce to Jakarta by road. A poor peasant in Indramayu Regency
once told me that he used to buy hand-milled rice from well-to-do peasants
in his village for one talen (25 cents) per litre and then took this to Jakarta
twice a week. Usually he sold the rice to Chinese shopkeepers for two
guilders fifty per litre.9
The blackmarketeering by rice millers and retailers must have been on a
larger scale. Twang Peck Yang (1987:73) states that sometimes smuggling
was carried out by Chinese in cooperation with Japanese. In those cases, I
think this involved not individual Japanese but military units, which were
often ordered to forage for supplies themselves. Faced with such autarchy,
each military unit had to acquire goods from Chinese traders at black
market prices.
The rice which had been illegally siphoned off was sold on the black
market at high prices (see Table 6). But often it was deliberately held back,
waiting for even higher black market prices, since rice was worth its weight
in gold in those days and was a prime item for speculation. This exacer-
bated the shortage even more.
Another factor which accounts for the gap between statistics and reality
was the transportation problem. Informants state that paddy often rotted
while stored in warehouses awaiting transportation. In a campaign to
ensure the smooth delivery of rice in 1944, the Barisan Pelopor oentoek
mengangkoel Bahan Makanan (Vanguard Troop for the Transport of
Foodstuff), headed by the shuchokan (resident), was organized in each shu
(residency) in an effort to get the system running (Asia Raya, 8 June 1943).
Somewhat later, a campaign called the Gerakan Penjerahan Padi (Paddy
Delivery Movement) was inaugurated in April 1945 under the aegis of the
Djawa Hokokai (Jawa Public Service Association) and sponsored by the

s
A station on the north coast of Java between Jakarta and Cirebon, located between
Cikampek and Jatibarang.
9
Author's interview with Riwan in Anjatan, Indramayu, 8 February 1981.

114
 Rice shortage and transportation 637

Sendenbu (Propaganda Bureau). In this campaign, one of the basic

programmes was the improvement of transportation facilities, for which
purpose it was proposed to mobilize the members of the Barisan Pelopor
(Pioneer Corps), a semi-military organization under the Djawa Hokokai
(Tjahaja, 21 April 1945).
During the Japanese occupation, all means of transport were very scarce
and I have drawn the conclusion that this was one of the main factors that
disturbed the smooth circulation of commodities. Therefore I want to move
on to discuss the Japanese transportation policy, which was vital to the
'acquisition of resources', and consider to what extent the dearth of trans-
portation was responsible for the shortages of rice.

The Rikuyu Sokyoku (Land Transportation Bureau)

The Rikuyu Sokyoku, which had its head office in Bandung, was in charge
of all sorts of non-military land transportation in Java during the Japanese
period. It was set up on 1 June 1942 as an external bureau of the
Gunseikanbu.10 The Japanese staff was recruited mainly from the Japanese
National Railway Company and the Ministry of Transport, while Dutch
and Indonesian staff (about 38,000 persons) were recruited from the former
staff of the various railway companies of the Dutch period." The reason
why Dutch staff, which totalled 251 persons, was still employed was simply
because the Japanese needed their expertise.
The first most urgent work facing the Rikuyu Sokyoku was to repair the
railtrack and bridges that had been destroyed by the Dutch. According to
a report by the Head of Transportation Department of the Gunseikanbu
submitted to the Gunseikan (Administrative Superintendent), the deliberate
destruction by the KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) had been
concentrated on bridges: 46 bridges had been destroyed and required a
huge effort to repair. Sabotage had also been carried out on the lines
connecting the harbours of Tanjung Priok in Jakarta, Tanjung Perak in
Surabaya, and Cilacap, which had been partially destroyed. Cilacap station,
the bengkel (repair shop) at Tegal and some of the locomotives had also
been destroyed. With these exceptions, the damage was not so serious that

10
Prior to the inauguration of this bureau as an organization for military administra-
tion, the Army Railway Troops seized all the existing railway facilities and put them
under their control. During the former period, the Dutch directors of three big railway
companies were appointed to manage the railways in exactly the same manner they
had done during the Dutch period. Mededeeling van den Bevelhebber van het
Nipponsche Leger no.l, Het Spoorwegbedrijf op Java. Boeicho Senshishitsu
Gunseishiryo, no. 18. Hereafter cited as Mededeelingen bevelhebber 1944.
11
Report of the Head of the Transportation Department of the Military Super-
intendent (Gunseikan) on 'Jawa tetsudo senryo iko un'ei fukkyu jokyo hokoku'
[Situation on the management and the recovery of railways after the occupation of
Java], 25 September 1942. Boeicho Senshishitsu Gunseishiryo. Hereafter cited as Jawa
tetsudo 1942. The Dutch staff was active only until 1 October 1942, when they were
finally interned.

115
638 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

the operation of trains was totally disrupted.12 Repairs had been started by
the engineering corps as soon as the Japanese seized power. The Rikuyu
Sokyoku continued these efforts, and by the end of 1943 most of the
bridges had been restored (Rikuyu Sokyoku 1975:151).
In Java and Madura there were 23 railway companies, including one
nationally owned (Staatsspoorwegen (State Railway Organization)), and
they were divided into three groups.13 The total length of railtrack was
about 5,200 kilometres with 642 stations and 343 halts (Rikuyu Sokyoku
1975:52, 88). In 1934 the length per every 100 square kilometres was
about 5.6 km, and though it was shorter than the railtrack in Europe, it was
more or less similar to that of Japan, which was 5.8 km per 100 square
kilometres, and much higher than in any other country in Asia (Nanyo
Sosho 1937). Besides this, there were about 10,000 kilometres of rail
sidings, and more than 50,000 five-ton wagons owned by sugar estates.14
With the inauguration of the Rikuyu Sokyoku, all existing railway
companies were put under one single civilian command. The Rikuyu
Sokyoku was not just in charge of the railways, but also controlled all sorts
of land transportation including trucks, buses, horse carts, ox carts, becak,
and so on. The total length of road in Java at the end of Dutch rule was
6,441 kilometres,15 over a thousand kilometres longer than the railtrack.
However, the number of trucks available in Java was only 5,726,16 which
was much fewer than the number of railway wagons, of which the number
was estimated at about 20,000 (Rikuyu Sokyoku 1975:151). These data
allow us to assume that the quantity of cargo transported by truck was not
particularly great, and hence road haulage was not as important as rail
freight. For example, in the late Dutch period, the quantity of rice trans-
ported by truck was 300,000 tons, while that carried by railway was three
times the quantity at 900,000 tons (Rijstpositie 1946:82). On the basis of
these data, the focus of this paper should be turned on the railways, which
can be considered to have been a more important means of transportation
tonnage-wise.
In October 1944, the Rikuyu Sokyoku was dissolved and the railways
were placed completely under military command, while the Jidosha
Sokyoku (Automobile Bureau) was set up in the Gunseikanbu for the
administration of road transport, and the Jawa Unyu Kaisha (Java
Transport Company) was set up to manage short-distance transport
between railway stations and the outlying areas (Rikuyu Sokyoku
1975:269, 274, 282).

12
Jawa tetsudo 1942.
13
Mededeelingen bevelhebber 1944.
14
Report of the Marei Gunseikanbu Chosashitsu on 'Jawa ni okeru kamotsu yuso no
genkyo' [The situation of cargo transportation in Java], June 1944. Boeicho
Senshishitsu Gunseishiryo, no. 18. Hereafter cited as Kamotsu yuso no genkyo 1944.
15
Kamotsu yusono genkyo 1944:46.
16
Kamotsu yusono genkyo 1944:20.

116
 Rice shortage and transportation 639

Changes under Japanese rule

Under Japanese rule, several important changes were made in the transport
system to comply with military demands and also to accomodate to the
change in the economic structure. The first consideration was that military
demands were to be given priority in transportation. A large number of
wagons had to be set aside for the transport of the army and commodities.
The task of the Rikuyu Sokyoku was to administer civilian transport only,
the transport of soldiers and military equipment falling under the
competence of the 4th Army Railway Troops, but both had to rely on the
same facilities. The problem was that these two organizations had to be
coordinated, and in this the military carried a disproportionate amount of
weight. One military man was posted at each station, and priority was
always given to the transport of troops and their supplies (Rikuyu Sokyoku
1975:78). In order to give military use a freer rein, passenger trains were cut
back, and general travel restrictions were imposed on the population
(Rikuyu Sokyoku 1975:78). This percentage increased proportionally as
the war situation worsened for the Japanese and, after the transfer of all
management from the Rikuyu Sokyoku to military hands in October 1944,
it mounted even more (Rikuyu Sokyoku 1975:270).
Secondly, the kind of items to be.carried and their quantities changed. In
the pre-war period the cash crops for export, such as sugar, rubber, tea, and
coffee, constituted the main products of Java, and the share of those
products in the transport sector had been considerably large (see Table 7).
The outbreak of war, however, disrupted all exports and imports, and the
production of those export crops was cut back. For example, sugar
production in 1943 was reduced to 60% of that of 1942, in 1944 to 55%,
and in 1945 to only 15%.17 Production of foodstuffs such as rice, tapioca,
and maize had to take priority, and all sorts of efforts were made to raise
the production. Part of the rice was to be supplied to Japanese troops
fighting on the front in the east of Indonesia. Despite all efforts the
quantity did not reach parity with pre-war cash crops, but the transport of
rice did exceed that of sugar in 1943.
The third change was in the direction of and the distance covered by
the transportation system. In the Dutch period, since the main items
requiring transportation were the goods for export, the direction of
transport was from the inland production areas to the nearest port on the
north coast. More than half of the total volume for export was shipped
from the ports in East Java, and Tanjung Perak harbour in Surabaya alone
shipped about one-third of the total volume."1

17
NEFIS Periodiek no. 2, 1945 on 'De suikerindustrie op Java tijdens de Japansche
bezetting'. RIOD, Indische Collectie.
18
Kamotsu yuso no genkyo 1944:7.

117
 640 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

Under Japanese rule commercial trade was suspended, and commodities

carried outside Java were very limited. For example, in 1942 the total
quantity of exports to Japan was only 40,000 tons, and that to the other
occupied areas in Southeast Asia was 20,000 tons.19 Besides this, when the
tide of war turned against Japan, harbours except for Tanjung Priok in
Jakarta were unable to be used for security reasons (Rikuyu Sokyoku
1975:233-4). About 500,000 tons of sugar were still transported in 1943,
but mostly from estates in Central and East Java to the big cities all over
Java,20 rather than from the inland to the north coast harbours. This is
because more production centres of export crops were located in Central
and East Java than in West Java. Consequently, the flow of commodities
largely changed direction, with a flow from East to West unequivocally
emerging which disturbed the smooth allocation of wagons.
The drastic shortage of fuels under Japanese rule induced the fourth
change. In the Dutch period, coal imported from Sumatra and Borneo was
used for the main railway lines, and timber was used for the other trains. In
1941 63,200 tons of coal were imported, of which 37,800 tons were for
railway fuel, and 824,500 tons of timber were also used to fire engines.21
After the outbreak of the war Java was deprived of new supplies of coal,
owing to the shortage of ships. Consequently timber was used as fuel.
Ironically, to obtain fuel and thus to build up the transport capacity of the
railways, 500 wagons had to be allocated daily for the transport of timber
which made severe inroads on the means of transporting rice and other
commodities.22 Demand for timber was so urgent that finally it had to be
used undried. The upshot was that teak suffered from unplanned felling,
which had serious consequences for a long time after the war. Since teak
alone was not enough, other kinds of trees such as rubber had to be used,
although their efficiency as a fuel was not up to the standard of teak.23
The fifth change was occasioned by the fact that there were two railway
gauges in Java and the Japanese tried to unify them into a single narrow
gauge of 1.067 metres, which is the same as the railways in Japan. This
entailed the dismantling of the wide gauge railway between Semarang and
Surakarta, but while this was happening rail-building materials were being
sent to Thailand to construct the new Burma-Siam Railway (Rikuyu
Sokyoku 1975:150).24 Since a new narrow-gauge railway could not there-
fore be constructed to replace the dismantled track, this exacerbated the
lack of transportation facilities. The reason the Japanese were so insistent

19
Kamotsu yuso no genkyo 1944:17-8.
20
Kamotsu yuso no genkyo 1944:33.
21
Kamotsu yuso no genkyo 1944:44.
22
Kamotsu yuso no genkyo 1944:45.
23
Kamotsu yuso n o genkyo 1944:45.
24
See also Kamotsu yuso no genkyo 1944:21. Not only railways, but also
locomotives and rolling stock, as well as many skilled labourers in railway repair
depots, were taken to Thailand.

118
 Rice shortage and transportation 641

on the unification of the gauge is by no means certain. Indubitably, it is

desirable to have a unified system when engaging in a military operation,
and earlier in Manchuria and Korea, the railway gauges had been unified.
But, considering the cost involved and the benefit to be gained, I wonder
whether it was really worth doing.
The sixth and final reason contributing to a lack of transportation may
have been to some extent the shortage of skilled labour. The Dutch staff
was active only until 1 October 1942, when they were finally interned. By
that time 135 Japanese had arrived as part of the second detachment, to
support the 85 who had been sent at the end of May. This brought the
total number of skilled railway staff to 220. Numerically this was almost
comparable with the Dutch employees, who had numbered 251 (Rikuyu
Sokyoku 1975:150)25. But numbers are not everything and it is doubtful
whether the newly arrived Japanese, who were not expert on Indonesia,
could really compete with the expertise of the Dutch. The drain of skill was
made worse because some Indonesian engineers and skilled labourers were
taken to Burma and Thailand to work on the new railway there.26 All of
these factors as a whole may well have had a very adverse effect on the
efficiency of the railway system in Java.

Construction of the Bayah line and wooden boats

This complex of factors combined to disrupt the efficient transportation
and smooth circulation of goods. As one of the remedies to overcome the
shortage of fuels, the Japanese opened a coal-mining project at Bayah on
the south coast of Banten. Unlike other mining projects, which were
entrusted to private Japanese companies, the coal-mine at Bayah was put
under the direct management of the Gunseikanbu. The annual production
target was 3,000,000 tons, but before this could be achieved all the
necessary equipment had to be installed, and it took some time before
actual production could begin (Gunseikanbu 1944). It is claimed that this
was the only terrain in Java where the coal seams occur in sufficient depth
and are of adequate quality for exploitation. In 1903, a concession had
been granted to A. R. Kerkhoven, but was never exploited.27 It is a very
remote and isolated area, from where it was very difficult to transport the
product, which may explain why the Dutch never tried to exploit it.
The Japanese desperately needed coal, and had to seek it at all cost.
Therefore, they decided to open a new railway line connecting this area to

25
See also Jawa tetsudo 1942.
26
Interviews with Sastro Dibyo (16, 24, 31 October 1992; 4 and 11 November 1992
in Jakarta), Wakijang (25 November 1992 in Jakarta), Paimin (29 December 1992 in
Jakarta) and Soetadi (28 January 1993 in Bekasi). All of them were taken to Thailand
and Burma.
27
NEFIS Report on the new railway built by the Japanese in West Java, Brisbane, 1
July 1944. Maritime History, Collectie Ha-7/bb. Hereafter cited as New railway West
Java 1944.

119
 642 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

the existing railway line. The new railway would have a length of about
100 kilometres and would run between Saketi and Bayah. The project was
very ambitious and difficult to carry out, because it had to be completed in
a short period of time and construction materials and tools were in short
supply.
Work started in February 1943, and large numbers of romusha were
recruited for it. According to the reminiscences of the Japanese who were
engaged in the construction, the number of romusha at work on a
particular day ranged from 25,000 to 50,000, and up to its completion in
April 1944, a total of 120,000 people had been mobilized (RikuyuSokyoku
1975:34). Though the scale was much smaller, this construction can be
compared with that of the Burma-Siam railway, the Kula railway (in
Malaysia), and the Central Sumatra railway (between Bukittingi and
Pekanbaru), all systems of which the construction was motivated by
military requirements.
The famous communist nationalist Tan Malaka worked in this mine at
Bayah under an assumed name and later recorded his experiences there.
He writes that there were about 15,000 romusha working in the mine, of
whom about 400 to 500 died every day (Tan Malaka 1948:147-160). He
also mentions the construction of the railway, and compares it to the
construction of the road between Anyar and Banyuwangi in Dutch times.
The construction was completed in April 1944 and a grand ceremony
was held to celebrate this achievement. The news was announced widely
both in newspapers and on the radio without mentioning the exact
location of the mine or the railway. The radio broadcast was monitored by
the Allied Forces, and according to a monitoring record compiled by the
Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) in Brisbane, various
speculations were being made about the exact location of the coal-mine
and the new railway.28
Unfortunately, the production of coal at Bayah was so limited that there
was no chance of making use of this railway for its transportation. The
railway was abandoned after the war, so it did not even contribute to
Indonesian development.
Another tactic that the Japanese employed to increase transport capa-
city was the construction of small-sized wooden boats designed for coastal
transportation. The Zosenkyoku (Shipping Bureau) was set up in the
Gunseikanbu to organize this undertaking. There were shipyards in
Jakarta, Tegal, Semarang, Surabaya, and Cilacap. Experts were sent from
Japan, and eventually there were 215 Japanese and 44,455 Indonesians
employed on the project (Rikuyu Sokyoku 1975:317).
The annual target for 1944 was to construct 700 boats of 150 tons.
Actual production fell far short, being 234 in 1943 and 219 in 1944. Since

28
New railway West Java 1944:2-3.

120
 Rice shortage and transportation 643

there were no new parts available, hot bulb engines and diesel engines had
to be produced locally for which iron was taken from the sugar factories.
This project consumed a lot of teak. The demand was so urgent that they
had to use timber that was not properly seasoned, which led to shrinkage
and subsquent gaps in the hull after launching, so only about 10% of the
boats constructed could actually be used (Rikuyu Sokyoku 1975:319-26).
All the examples discussed above show that transport policy during the
Japanese occupation was full of ambitious reforms and constructions,
consuming large quantities of the budget, resources, and manpower, but
that its effectiveness was very limited.

Transportation of rice and uneven distribution

Having reviewed the general transportation dilemma, let us come back to
the rice problem. To what extent was the transport of essential commod-
ities really cut back during the Japanese occupation? Statements from
former staff of the Rikuyu Sokyoku confirm that rice transport was given
priority. Even so, the quantity transported fell in comparison with the pre-
war period. Since swathes had been cut in the production of sugar and
other estate crops, it must have been possible to allocate more wagons to
rice and other essential foodstuffs. The quantity of rice transported in a
year between November 1942 and October 1943 is shown in Table 8.
According to this, the total quantity of rice transported by railway during
this period was about 700,000 tons, while the figure for 1940 had been
about 900,000 tons (Rijstpositie 1946:82). The figure of 700,000 tons is
from the early stage of the occupation, when the food situation had not yet
deteriorated drastically. Since we do not have figures for the later years, we
have to make projections from those figures, in the knowledge that the
situation must have worsened in the later period.
Of course we cannot attribute the shortage of rice solely to inadequate
transportation. In spite of a spirited campaign to increase production, there
was a fall in production during the occupation. This was rooted in all sorts
of problems: corruption, black marketing, and deliberate hoarding for
speculation. The shortage was also exacerbated by the excessive control
imposed by the Japanese. Before Japanese rule small-scale peasants used
to hand-mill the rice at home and sell it at nearby local markets, little by
little. This was prohibited by the Japanese, immediately preventing the
smooth flow of rice on a small-scale. It was a combination of all these
factors that the shortage in transportation capacity aggravated the
situation.
Table 9 shows the quantity of rice that the military government planned
to be brought into and out of each residency in Java, compared with the
actual quantity. As has been mentioned above, the policy of local autarchy
was implemented, but this did not necessarily mean that all kinds of
movements of commodities between the residencies were stopped.

121
Indonesians working in Japanese shipbuilding on the north coast of Java {Pandji Poestaka 7, 1944)
 Rice shortage and transportation 645

Commodities were concentrated at the central agency, and the areas

where particular commodities were in short supply could only produce
these due to the planning and order exercised by the central agency. In
short, local autarchy meant a ban on direct and uncontrolled exchange of
commodities between the residencies. Table 9 shows that the quantity
actually brought into and out on the orders of the central agency was only
about 30% of the quantity originally planned, revealing a yawning gap
between planning and realization. This can be attributed to the shortage of
long-distance transportation facilities. If the spontaneous and natural flow
of rice from surplus areas to the nearest deficient areas, which could be
carried by short-distance transportation vehicles such as ox-carts, had been
allowed, the situation might have been different. Control by the central
government caused tremendous inconvenience and inefficiency, and this,
combined with an overall shortage of transportation facilities, brought
about a very uneven supply of rice. Consequently, the main problem lies
not in how much was available in Java in total, but in the uneven supply
per region. In some areas the situation may not have been severe enough
to cause starvation, but in other areas people found themselves in a terrible
state. Distribution in cities was very irregular and therefore rationing was
uneven (see Tables 10, 11, and 12).
According to Japanese archives rice production was 3,677,940 tons of
milled rice in 1944.29 The military government managed to acquire 759,000
tons, of which 592,500 tons were then distributed to the urban popu-
lation.30 Therefore, according to my calculations based on these figures,
people in Java theoretically had access to 3,511,440 tons of rice (3,677,940
- (759,000-592,000)) in 1944, which was about 700,000 tons less than the
quantity available in 1939. In terms of daily consumption per person, this is
about 192 grams, or a drop of 38 grams (a 17% decrease). The inter-
pretation of the 192 grams for consumption and the 17% decrease might
differ depending on the definition of a subsistence quantity. Already low
consumption was reduced even further* which I am sure was a heavy blow
to most of the population, but I doubt that their consumption reached such
dire straits that it was enough to cause serious starvation.
My interviews in Java reveal that most people were not actually in a
position to be able to consume that quantity and a proportion of the
population was living below subsistence level. In the areas where rice
production was scanty or where compulsory collection was very severely
enforced or where the distribution system did not work well, there was an
awfully low supply and it was this that caused serious malnutrition and

29
From Table 3 it is evident that production for 1944 was 6,811,000 tons of paddy.
Since the yield was about 54%, this can b e calculated as 3,677,940 tons of milled rice.
30
N a n p o Gunseisokanbu 'Gunseika ni okeru Jawa-Madura no shokuryo jijo to sono
taisaku' [The food situation and recommended measures in Java and M a d u r a during
the Japanese occupation] no.117. Boeicho Senshishitsu Gunseishiryo, no. 117.

123
646 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

widespread starvation. In my interpretation, the problem lay not in the total

quantity but in the fact that the rice was unevenly distributed. And I
suppose this uneven distribution could have been solved to some extent if
only the transportation system had worked more effectively. More
recently, the widespread starvation of two million people in North Vietnam
was made worse because rice in the Mekong Delta could not be
transported to the north, a situation which I think was more or less
analogous to that in Java during the Japanese occupation.

REFERENCES
Anderson, B.R.O'G.
1966a 'The problem of rice', Indonesia 2:77-123.
1966b 'Japan: "The light of Asia"', in: J. Silverstein (ed.) Southeast Asia in
World War II: Four essays, pp. 13-51. New Haven: Yale University
Southeast Asia Studies. [Monograph Series 7.]
Gunseikanbu (ed.)
1990 Gunseika Jawa sangyo sokan [Industry in Java under the Japanese
occupation], Vol. I and II. Tokyo: Ryukeisho Sha. [Reprint of Boeicho
Senshishitsu Gunseishiryo 1944, no. 73 and 74. Jakarta].
Indisch verslag
1940 Indisch verslag. Batavia: Landsdrukkerij.
Johnson, B.F.
1953 Japanese food management in World War II. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford
University Press.
Kiyohiko, Terauchi
1944 'Noson jittai chosa hokoku; Marang-shu, Maran-ken Shingosari-gun
Karanpuroso-son Tashimadu-ku' [Village research report; Tasikmadu
village, Karangpuroso subdistrict, Singosari district, Malang regency,
Malang residency]. Jawa Gunseikanbu Chosashitsu.
Kurasawa, Aiko
1988 Mobilisation and control; A study of social change in rural Java, 1942-
1945. [PhD thesis, Cornell University.]
1993 Mobilisasi dan kontrol; Studi tentang perubahan sosial di pedesaan
Jawa, 1942-1945 Jakarta: Grasindo.
Nanyo Sosho
1937 Nanyo Sosho Ranryo To-indo hen [Series on the Southern Areas, Vol.1,
The Netherlands East Indies]. Toa Keizai Chosakyoku.
Rijstpositie
1946 'De rijstpositie van Nederlandsch Indie", Economisch Weekblad voor
Nederlandsch Indie 12-11:81-2.
Rikuyu Sokyoku
1975 Rikuyu Sokyokushi [History of Rikuyu Sokyoku]. Tokyo: Jawa Rikuyu
Sokyokushi Kantokai.
Tan Malaka
1948 Dari pendjara ke pendjara, Vol.11. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Murba.
Twang Peck Yang
1987 The transformation of the Chinese business community in Indonesia
1940s-1950s. [PhD thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.]

124
 CHART
Mechanism of Paddy Delivery

Shokuryo Kanri Jimusho

(later Shokuryo Kanri Kyoku)

Shokuryo Kanri Jimusho

branch
Surabaya and Jakarta
Beikoku Tosei Kai
assignment for delivery
Kencho
Beikoku Tosei Kai
branch I
Guncho

order for distribution Soncho

Organization for
Rice miller paddy collection Fanners
(Kumiai and others) paddy
delivery
distribution

supply for supply for

civilians the military

Beikoku Oroshiuri Freight depot

Kumiai

Beikoku Shokuryo
Kouri or Haikyu Military men
Kumiai Kumiai

Rice distributor
at village/town

Tonarigumi

Consumer
648 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

Table 1. Birth and death rates during the Japanese occupation

Residency Births in Deaths in Surplus
1,000s 1,000s of deaths
1939 1943 1944 1939 1943 1944 1944
Banten 30 28 24 24 20 28 4
Jakarta 64 74 51 50 46 50 -1
Bogor 55 60 45 37 41 50 5
Priangan 126 120 120 80 85 118 -2
Cirebon 73 76 65 50 57 80 15
Semarang 73 63 48 52 55 103 55
Pati 71 57 43 45 50 81 38
Pekalongan 104 104 80 65 70 120 40
Banyumas 92 96 70 44 48 86 16
Kedu 108 100 80 61 63 100 20
Yogyakarta 63 62 49 34 34 53 4
Surakarta 94 96 83 52 62 115 32
Surabaya 53 51 41 42 44 62 21
Bojonegoro 40 40 30 44 45 70 40
Kediri 81 91 68 40 42 71 3
Madiun 83 67 55 35 40 57 2
Malang 83 75 65 59 55 82 17
Besuki 50 51 47 36 37 47 0
Madura 45 41 32 18

Source: ARA, Ministerie van Kolonien, Vb. 30-12-50/91.

Table 2. Birth and death rates in Kedu and Pati Residency

Births Deaths
per thousand per thousand
Kedu Residency
1st quarter 1944 31.5 29.5
2nd quarter 1944 32.4 33.0
3rd quarter 1944 25.8 39.2
Wonosobo Regency
3rd quarter 1944 29.1 53.7
Purworedjo Regency
3rd quarter 1944 23.8 42.7
Pati Residency
1939 38.6 7
4th quarter 1943 22.0 23.0
2nd quarter 1944 25.0 38.0
Kudus Regency
4th quarter 1943 22.0
2nd quarter 1943 7 45.0
Source: Anderson 1966b:48.

126
 Rice shortage and transportation 649

Table 3. Rice requisitions and deliveries, April 1943-March 1944

Residency Target %of Deliveries Deliveries
(tons) yield" (tons) Rate (%)
Banten 39,777 13.5 31,517 79.2
Jakarta 337,883 41.6 293,807 87.0
Bogor 86,143 15.2 69,472 80.6
Priangan 40,262 5.1 41,383 102.8
Cirebon 152.903 2L4 128.692 84.2
West Java 656,968 20.7 564,871 86.0

Semarang 67,660 15.6 53,691 79.4

Pekalongan 84,141 15.7 85,519 101.6
Pati 44,894 12.4 31,382 69.9
Banyumas 73,861 16.2 75,009 101.6
Kedu 43,010 8.8 45,229 105.2
Yogyakarta 12,619 5.8 7,903 62.6
Surakarta 30.521 _L0 16.141 52.9
Central Java 356,706 12.2 314,874 88.3

Surabaya 71,320 15.7 68,650 96.3

Bojonegoro 10,482 3.4 11,440 109.1
Madiun 28,156 7.9 29,218 103.8
Kediri 68,171 16.5 70,511 103.4*
Malang 144,301 26.4 139,552 96.7
Besuki 303,945 44.0 291,430 95.9
Madura _ _ _
East Java 626,376 21.9 610,801 97.7
JAVA 1,640,049 18.3 1,490,546 90.9
* Percentage corrected by the author.
" Since there was no record of the production of each residency during the
occupation, the yield here is based on that of 1940.
Sources: Nanpo Gunseisokanbu, Gunseika ni okeru Jawa-Madura no shokuryo jijo to
sono taisaku, Boeicho Senshishitsu no. 117, pp. 42-3. The total amount collected
almost corresponds to the total amount processed in rice mills, as stated in 'NEFIS
Periodiek', no. 1, p. 26.

127
650 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

Table 4. Rice requisitions and deliveries, April 1944-March 1945

Residency Target %of Deliveries Deliveries
(tons) yield* (tons) Rate (%)
Banten 66,000 22.3 18,483 28.0
Jakarta 324,000 39.8 151,237 46.7*
Bogor 100,000 17.6 50,572 50.6
Priangan 84,000 10.7 50,936 60.6
Cirebon 108.000 15.1 87.399 80.9
West Java 682,000 21.5 358,627 52.6

Semarang 78,000 18.0 73,596 94.4

Pekalongan 88,000 16.4 73,214 83.2
Pati 34,000 9.4 28,411 83.6
Banyumas 80,000 17.5 43,864 54.8
Kedu 54,000 11.0 25,237 46.7
Yogyakarta 14,400 6.6 13,067 90.7
Surakarta 44.800 10.3 46.538 103.9*
Central Java 393,200 13.4 303,927 77.3

Surabaya 120,000 26.4 103,030 85.9

Bojonegoro 30,000 9.7 28,995 96.7*
Madiun 42,000 11.8 39,648 94.4
Kediri 95,200 23.0 60,978 64.1
Malang 162,000 29.6 161,522 99.4
Besuki 378,000 54.7 284,369 75.2*
Madura _ _ _
East Java 827,200 37.5 678,542 82.0*
JAVA 1,902,400 21.2 1,341,096 70.5
* Percentage corrected by the author.
Sources: Nanpo Gunseisokanbu, Gunseika ni okeru Jawa-Madura no shokuryo jijo to
sono taisaku, Boeicho Senshishitsu no. 117, pp. 42-3.

128
 Rice shortage and transportation 651

Table 5. Rice requisitions and deliveries Besuki Residency, April-October 1944

District Deliveries rate % District Deliveries rate %
Bondowoso Regency Panarukan Regency
Bondowoso 61.3 Situbondo 108.7
Jamaran 69.2 Pamarukan 83.5
Wonosari 74.2 Sumberwaru 65.1
Prajekan 66.0 Besuki 56.7

Banyuwangi Regency Jember Regency

Banyuwangi 49.3 Jember 58.5
Rogojampi 33.5 Mayang 69.4
Blambangan 78.8 Kalisat 66.9
Bangorejo 79.4 Rambipuji 85.0
Wuluhan 86.4
Puger 79.6
Tanggul 68.6
Source: 'Documents of Sanyo Kaigi', ARA, Algemene Secretarie I, no. XXV- 26.

Table 6. Black market price of rice in 1944

Area per liter per kg*
Pasar Minggu, Jakarta F. 3.25 F. 3.90
Bogor 3.25 3.90
Ciamis 2.40 2.88
Semarang 1.50 1.80
Pati 2.70 3.24
Bojonegoro 1.20 1.44
Kediri 1.50 1.80
* The price per kg was calculated by the author.
Source: Anderson 1966a:92.

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652 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

Table 7. The amount of cargo transport by national railway (in tons)

Sugar 697,000
Milled rice 465,000
Petroleum 314,000
Stones 280,000
Firewood 191,000
Paddy 161,000
Tapioca 144,000
Lime 118,000
Molasses 140,000
Timber 117,000
Gravel 106,000
Rubber 92,000
Source: Marei Gunseikanbu, Jawa ni okeru kamotsu yuso genkyo (June 1944),
Boeicho Senshishitsu Gunseishiryo, no. 18, p. 1.

Table 8. Tonnage of rice and sugar transported by railway (in tons)

rice sugar
1942
November 49,969 41,060
December 57,051 24,466
1943
January 9,122 24,466
February 48,860 19,443
March 56,343 22,441
April 50,520 24,215
May 63,845 29,715
June 68,777 70,763
July 68,892 85,100
August 67,419 84,472
September 57,096 61,118
October 45.014 35.785
642,908 523,044
Source: Marei Gunseikanbu, Jawa ni okeru kamotsu yuso genkyo (June 1944),
Boeicho Senshishitsu Gunseishiryo, no. 18, p. 33.

130
 Rice shortage and transportation 653

Table 9. Exports and imports of rice between Residencies, April-August 1943

Residency Export allocation Exported amount
(tons) (tons)
Surplus residencies
Jakarta 50,000 22,306
Cirebon 60,000 15,519
Banyumas 30,000 10,798
Pekalongan 20,000 6,367
Pati 8,000 304
Kedu 15,000 3,042
Yogyakarta 0 1,560
Surakarta 5,000 304
Madiun 8,000 2,493
Kediri 3,000 1,793
Malang 40,000 11,131
Besuki 205.000 68.375
Total 444,000 143,992* (32.4%)

Residency Import allocation Imported amount

(tons) (tons)
Deficit Residencies
Banten 10,000 757
Bogor 40,000 10,105
Priangan 40,000 12,503
Semarang 8,000 4,311
Surabaya 22,000 16,290
Bojonegoro 10,000 253
Madura 22.000 5.693
Total 152,000 49,912 (33,0%)
* The original figure in the statistics, 138,378, was corrected by the writer. In theory
the difference between the totals of exported and imported amounts was meant to be
supplies for non-domestic consumption.
Source: Jawa Sangyo Sokan I, 1944, Boeicho Senshishitsu Gunseishiryo, no. 73, pp.
49-50.

131
654 Kurasawa-Inomata Aiko

Table 10. Amount of rice distribution (Unit: grams)

Area Ratio
Jakarta Special Municipality 180
Garut adults 120
children under 10 60
Pekalongan 230
Kediri 150
Bojonegoro adults 200
children under 10 150
Source: Anderson 1966a:91.

Table 11. Amount of rice distribution

Area Ratio
Babakan Ciparaj Village 1/4 liter per person per week
Bandung Regency (32 grams a day)

Cicurug District 100-300 grams for 3-7 days per

Bogor Residency household

Bowerno District 500 grams per family per month

Bojonegoro Residency
Source: Anderson 1966a:91.

Table 12. Amount of rice distribution

Area Ratio
Cikeruh Village no distribution
Tanjungsari District
Sumedang Regency
Klanganan Subdistrict 25g for a peasant once a week
Cirebon Regency
Kesepuan Village 134g for a whole family once a week
Batang Subdistrict, District
Pekalongan Regency
Krenceng Village 1 kg for a family of six persons once a week
Kepung Subdistrict
Paree District
Kediri Regency
Punten Village 50g a day for one person but only for those who do
Batu Subdistrict, District not possess rice fields
Malang Regency
Turen District
Malang Regency

132
 Rice shortage and transportation 655

Table 12. (continued).

Area Ratio
Majantengah Village 600g for one family once every 15 days
Dampit Subdistrict
Pasirian Village Two or three kg for one family once a month, but
Pasirian Subdistrict, District not regularly
Lumajang Regency
Balung Village 0.5 kg for one family once a week
Ambulu District,
Jember Regency
Buduan Village 300g for one person twice a week
Suboh Subdistrict
Besuki District
Situbondo Regency
Ngaban Village lOOg for one person twice a week
Tanggulangin Subdistrict
Porong District
Sidoarjo Regency
Babat Subdistrict no distribution in the villages
Lamongan Regency
Seso Regency no distribution
Jepon Subdistrict
Blora District, Regency
Mantingan Village no distribution
Bulu Subdistrict
Rembang Regency
Gedong Anak Village 1 kg for a whole family once a month
Klepo Subdistrict
Ungaran District
Semarang Regency
Mantianom Village about lOOg for one person a day
Bawang Subdistrict
Banjarnegara District
Cidorak Village lOOg for one person once in three days
Lumbir Subdistrict
Jatilawang District
Banyumas Regency
Banjar District about 50g for one person a day
Ciamis Regency
Source: Kurasawa 1988:162-3.

133