April 4, 2016
G.R. No. 187633
HEIRS OF DELFIN and MARIA TAPPA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, HENRY CALABAZARON and VICENTE
MALUPENG, Respondents.
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm the decision of the CA.
The action for quieting of title
should not prosper.
The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of
possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 59 an action for quieting of title is
essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit:
x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure"... an adjudication that a
claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so
that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from
any danger of hostile claim." In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, "... not
only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he
who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he
could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even
to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x. "60 (Emphasis in the original.)
In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the Civil Code,
which state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.61
Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.
First, Spouses Tappa's claim of iegal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent
and the certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103 issued in their name cannot stand. The
certificate of title indjcates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We
agree with the CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had
already become private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of
the Public Land Act,62 which governs public patent applications.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects. whatsoever.1awp++i1 Private ownership of land-as when there
is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a
clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or
previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land,
because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of
Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in
character and have passed to private ownership.63
In Magistrado v. Esplana, 64 we cancelled the titles issued pursuant to a free patent after
finding that the lots involved were privately owned since time immemorial. A free patent
that purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of
its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. 65
In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has
been in possession of the Tappa family, even before the 1963 Affidavit was executed.
After the execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective portions
of the property. Delfin testified that before his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo had
been occupying the lot since before the war, and that Delfin was born there in 1934.66
Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as 1948,
and paid the real property taxes (evidenced by real property tax payment receipts in the
name of Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961).67 Spouses Tappa were likewise
shown to pay the real property taxes from 1961 to 2000.68 Similarly, respondents also
declared their respective portions of Lot No. 3341 for taxation in their names in 1994,
and paid real property taxes on those portions from 1967 to 2004.69 Although tax
declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 70
Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and
Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property,
while Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.71 The
complaint stated further that since 1963. the respondents "continuously occupied portion
of the subject land." 72
In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had been segregated
from the public domain. 73 At the time the patent and the certificate of title were issued
in 1992, Spouses Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at
least to the half of the lot, since 1934; and respondents were also in possession of the
other half since 1963. Therefore, the free patent issued covers a land already segregated
from the public domain.
In Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,74 we ruled, thus:
Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land by respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain and
the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent. Hence, the free patent covering
Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are void.75
Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by
respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were able to
obtain a free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of some of
its portions. Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void
not only because it covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently included76
respondents' portion of the property. In Avila v. Tapucar, 77 we held that "[i]f a person
obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said
certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included."78
In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title
means beneficial ownership. 79 As discussed, the free patent and the certificate of title
issued to Spouses Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.
The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although
an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses
Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's
rights to the property.
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or
claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is,
in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or
terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the
title.80
The 1963 Affidavit it is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated and
appears to be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother, and sisters. It is also notarized
by a public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-
half (l/2) of which is actually owned by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary to the claim of
Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo's. Respondents' argue that this
affidavit evidences the title of their predecessor-in-interest over Lot No. 3341 and
effectively, theirs.81
The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription.
The CA correctly found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation in the
execution of the 1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiated."82 The CA pointed out that,
"[a]side from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was presented to prove
the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving."53 Also, the 1963
Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys
the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution.
Thus, we affirm the ruling of the CA that the requisites for an action to quiet title are
wanting in this case.84
There is no collateral attack
on the Certificate of Title.
Spouses Tappa argue that respondents collaterally attacked the certificate of title of Lot
No. 3441 when they raised the issue of its validity. Spouses Tappa used the same
argument against the CA when it declared the certificate of title to be without legal effect.
85
Spouses Tappa's argument is without merit. The certificate of title was not collaterally
attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529,86 provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law." This rule is not applicable in this case.
We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,87 where we stated that,
"[ w ]hat cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the
law refers to ownership which is represented by that document."88 Ownership is different
from a certificate of title, the latter being only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. 89 Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.90
In Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla, 91 citing Lacbayan v. Samay, Jr., 92 we
reaffirm this ruling, and stated that:
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have
acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does
not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always
be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.93
In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their Answer, is Spouses Tappa's
claim of sole ownership over Lot No. 3341. As affirmative defense, respondents claimed
that Spouses Tappa were owners of only one-half (1/2) of the lot since it was originally
owned by Genaro, the father of Lorenzo and Irene. 94 Respondents claim that Lorenzo
and Irene became ipso facto co-owners of the lot. 95 Thus, respondents claim that, by
virtue of a valid transfer from Irene's heirs, they now have ownership and title over
portions of Lot No. 3341, and that they have been in continuous, exclusive, and
uninterrupted possession of their occupied portions.96 Malupeng and Calabazaron claim
ownership and title over their respective portions by virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims
ownership and title by virtue of succession. Therefore, it is the ownership and title of
Spouses Tappa which respondents ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only serves as the
document representing Spouses Tappas' title.
Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title of Spouses Tappa is
indefeasible.97 We have already ruled that the one-year prescriptive period does not
apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the
property.98 This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is
imprescriptible.99 In this case, respondents have been proved to be in possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. Thus, their claim against Spouses Tappa cannot be
barred by the one-year prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 54191, May 8, 1990
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54191 May 8, 1990
ISAAC MAGISTRADO and FELISA BAGASINA, petitioners,
vs.
DOROTEA ESPLANA and PELAGIA OLIVA, respondents.
Carlos A. Rañeses for petitioners.
Dy-Liacco & Verdadero for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
It appears that the petitioners spouses were the owners of nine parcels, ricelands in character, located in Iriga, Camarines Sur.
They acquired the same by virtue of free patent titles (OCT Nos. 17485, 16532, 17691, 16734, 16405, 17090, 16443, 16643, and
16444) issued by the National Government. On April 12, 1967, the petitioner, Isaac Magistrado, with the conformity of his wife, the
petitioner, Felisa Bagasina, conveyed the same (together with one unregistered riceland) in favor of the respondents for the
purchase price of P18,000.00.
On March 23, 1971, the petitioners instituted an action for legal redemption against the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 allowing redemption by the vendors within five years from the sale. After trial, the then
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, 1 rendered a verdict dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint. For insufficient
proof, be claims for damages contained in defendants' answer under the caption "counterclaims" are also
ordered dismissed. Finally, it is further ordered that once this decision becomes final, a copy of the same
together with the Deed of Sale and the owner's copy of the certificates of title be presented to the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Camarines Sur for registration upon payment by defendants of the corresponding
fees therefor. With costs against the plaintiff. 2
The Court of Appeals 3 modified the decision of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations and in the light of the aforequoted authorities,
decision is hereby, rendered modifying the decision appealed from by ordering the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause or action; ordering the plaintiff or the defendant or whoever is in possession of
Original Certificates of Title, Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I and J to return them to the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur at Iriga City; ordering the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur at Iriga City to cancel said
Original Certificate Title or all titles issued subsequent thereto; ordering the parcels of land covered by said
titles reverted to the grantor (Government of the Philippine Islands) without of course prejudice to the filing of
proper application for their registration; ordering the plaintiff to reimburse defendant the sum of P18,000.00
less the value of the tenth parcel of land, the determination of which shall be by the trial court; ordering the
defendant to reimburse Roman Aguilar the sum; of P6,553.00. 4
The petitioners assign what emerges as a lone error in this appeal:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT
LEGALLY ENTITLED TO REPURCHASE THE LAND IN QUESTION FROM THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS. 5
In dismissing the Appeal, the Court of Appeals found the Lands to be private in nature, and accordingly, beyond the authority of
the Government to dispose of by way of free patents, and for which legal redemption was not possible. Thus:
We accept the challenge, particularly the proposition that the first nine lots described in the complaint were
not public lands but, since time immemorial, were owned and continuously possessed, and cultivated by
private persons, from whom the plaintiff acquired the same as their exclusive, private properties; and that
the plaintiffs filed free patent applications to said lots only and for the sole purpose of obtaining title thereto
as cheaply as possible. That since the said nine (9) lots were not public land but private property, the
Director of Land had no power or authority to dispose of them under the free patent provisions of the Public
Land Act and said Director of Lands would not have approved the free patent applications filed by the
plaintiffs had not the latter falsely alleged therein that said lots were parts of the public agricultural land
unclaimed and unoccupied by anyone so that the purported certificates of title issued to the plaintiffs based
upon the free patents guaranteed to them are wholly null and void and, in any case, the said lots do not
come under the provisions of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.6
This appeal also faces a dismissal.
We are satisfied that there was ample evidence to demonstrate the private character of the nine parcels of land the petitioners
have sought to redeem. As found by the Court of Appeals:
That for several year before the application for free patent, the nine (9) parcels of land were cultivated as
ricelands by various individuals as their own private properties and that the land involved in this case as well
as all the lands similarly situated on the outskirts of the city proper could not be classified as public lands at
or before the years 1961 to 1962, time of application for free patent and issuance of approved patents, a
copy of the official inaugural program of the City's proclamation on September 3, 1968 (Exh. "55") on pages
2 to 3 of which it was stated that the first settlement of IRIGA was established in the year 1578 and that the
town of Iriga was recognized as such by the Spanish authorities in 1683 (Exh. "55-A") was presented.
Defendant purchased the land of Francisco Papa on June 3, 1967 at the price of P12,000.00 (Exh. "56") to
enable defendant to construct a road which he declared to have already started and thus connect the lands
he bought from the plaintiff with the National Road. Approved plan of the subdivision survey (LRC) PSD-
107674 of Lot 3 of the deed of Sale is marked Exh. "57". A certain Roman Aguilar bought the second parcel
of land mentioned in the complaint (Exh. "58") and that Aguilar has constructed his house thereon. Before
the sale of the lands involved in this case, plaintiff and defendant had already previous dealings over a
portion of the Esplana Subdivision in 1966 and a contract to pay in installment was executed and signed by
them (Exhs. "59" and "59-A"). That Lot No. 3 is already covered by a Subdivision Survey Plan (Exh. "57")
duly approved by the Land Registration Commission but without Court approval as yet and defendant in the
company of plaintiff secured from the Philippine National Bank, Iriga City Branch when the former redeemed
the same by paying the loan of plaintiff and said payment constituted as part of the purchase price of the
whole transaction. 7
The rule is that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on this Court. In the absence of any showing of a grave
abuse of discretion, 8 we will not be justified in reviewing those findings.
The contention of the petitioners that the nine patents may no longer be challenged by "mere assertions" that the lands in
question are private, has no merit. First, the respondent's claims are supported by competent evidence. They are not bare
assertions. Second, the Court of Appeals has found that the petitioners had deliberately misled the Director of Lands into thinking
that the lands were part of the public domain when several persons had occupied it and had laid claims to it.
The Court of Appeals did not err in invoking the case of De la Concha v. Magtira, 9 where this Court held:
Private ownership of land (as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered
possessory information) is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the
Public Land law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant to
another a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership.
Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a
certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered by it is really a part of the disposable land
of the public domain. 10
Although Magtira requires the existence of a title to prove the private character of land, the Court adds that so long as there is a
clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, and hence, a registrable possession, by present or
previous occupants, by any proof that would be competent and admissible, the property must be considered to be private. 11 The
various OCTs adverted to above must also face cancellation.
We, however, modify the Appellate Court's decision insofar as it ordered reversion to the Government. As we said, since the nine
parcels are after all private properties, they can not be restored to the Government which to begin with, had no right to dispose of
them. The reasonable conclusion is that they must stay with the respondents as legitimate buyers and owners thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED subject to the modification that: (1) OCT
Nos. 17485, 16532, 17691, 16734, 16405, 17090, 16443, 16643, and 16444 are hereby declared CANCELLED; (2) The
respondents shall retain the nine parcels covered thereby. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
