TORRALBA, JILL E.

-JD2-FSUUCOL-PROPERTYLAW

PROPERTY LAWS

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11573, July 16, 2021]

AN ACT IMPROVING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS FOR IMPERFECT LAND TITLES, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE PUBLIC
LAND ACT,” AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
“PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE”

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to simplify, update and
harmonize similar and related provisions of land laws in order to simplify and remove ambiguity in its
interpretation and implementation. It is also the policy of the State to provide land tenure security by
continuing judicial and administrative titling processes.

Section 2. Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twelve (12)
hectares of land, and who, for at least twenty (20) years prior to the filing of an application for
agricultural free patent, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either personally or through a
predecessor-in-interest, a tract or tracts of alienable and disposable agricultural public lands subject
to disposition, and who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon shall be entitled, under the
provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent issued for such tract or tracts of such land not to
exceed twelve (12( hectares.”

Section 3. Section 45 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:

“SEC. 45. All applications for agricultural free patents shall be filed before the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). For provinces with no CENRO, the application shall be filed with the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO).

“The CENRO or the PENRO, as the case may be, is mandated to process the application within one
hundred and twenty (120) days from filing, including compliance with the required notices and other
legal requirements. The CENRO shall thereafter forward its recommendation to the PENRO if the area
of the land is below five (5) hectares; to the DENR Regional Director if the area of the land is at least
five (5) up to ten (10) hectares; and to the Secretary of the DENR if the area of the land is more than
(10) up to twelve (12) hectares.

“Upon receipt of the recommendation from the CENRO, or upon the completion of the processing of
the application within the reglementary period, the PENRO, DENR Regional Director, or the Secretary
of the DENR, as the case may be, shall approve or disapprove the application for agricultural free
patent within five (5) days. In case of approval, the agricultural free patent shall forthwith be issued.

“In case of conflicting claims among different claimants, the parties may seek the proper
administrative and judicial remedies.”

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Section 4. Section 47 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 7196, is
hereby repealed.

Section 5. Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:

“SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have perfected or completed,
may file a petition at any time, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives,
in the Regional Trial Court of the province where the land is located, for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title to land not exceeding twelve (12) hectares:

“(a) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest – (a predecessor in interest is

a person or entity that previously held the rights or interests that are now held by another person or
entity) have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable-(transferable) and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of ownership, for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.

“(b) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of
accession or accretion under the provision of existing laws; and

“(c) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided by law.”

Section 6. Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file at any time, in the proper Regional Trial
Court in the province where the land is located, an application for registration of title to land, not
exceeding twelve (12) hectares, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

“(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain not covered by existing certificates of title or patents under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under this section.

“(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of
accession or accretion under the provisions of existing laws.

“(3) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

“Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

“Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro-(sale agreement that allows the seller to
repurchase the property sold within a specified time frame. The term is also known as conventional
redemption), the vendor a retro-(seller) may file an application for the original registration of the land:
Provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the
registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro-(buyer),
the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

“A trustee on behalf of the principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by the
trustee, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.”

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Section 7. Proof that the Land is Alienable and Disposable. For purposes of judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles filed under Presidential Decree No. 1529, a duly signed certification by a duly
designated DENR geodetic engineer that the land is part of alienable and disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain is sufficient proof that the land is alienable. Said certification shall be
imprinted in the approved survey plan submitted by the applicant in the land registration court. The
imprinted certification in the plan shall contain a sworn statement by the geodetic engineer that the
land is within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and shall state the applicable
Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, Proclamations and the
Land Classification Project Map Number covering the subject land.

Should there be no available copy of the Forestry Administrative Order, Executive Order or
Proclamation, it is sufficient that the Lad Classification (LC) Map Number, Project Number, and date
of release indicated in the land classification map be stated in the sworn statement declaring that
said land classification map is existing in the inventory of LC Map records of the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is being used by the DENR as land classification map.

Section 8. Penalties. – In addition to the penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and in Republic
Act No. 8560, as amended, otherwise known as the “Philippine Geodetic Engineering Act of 1998,” a
geodetic engineer who shall prepare, willingly or through gross inexcusable negligence, a projection
map that contains false, fraudulent, or incomplete data or information, and the DENR official who
shall certify and approve such protection map, shall be penalized with a fine of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than six (6) months but not exceeding six (6) years, or
both, at the discretion of the court.

Section 9. Removal of Restrictions. – The provisions of Republic Act No. 11231 shall be applicable to
Free Patents issued under this Act.

A free patent is a land grant given by the government to a Filipino citizen who has occupied and
cultivated the land for at least 30 years. It's a type of patent, which is a government grant of a right,
privilege, or authority.

Eligibility
The applicant must be a natural-born Filipino citizen
The applicant must have occupied and cultivated the land for at least 30 years
The applicant must have paid the corresponding real property taxes

Process
The applicant must apply for the free patent
The CENRO processes the application and forwards a recommendation to the PENRO
The PENRO approves or disapproves the patent
If approved, the patent is issued

Types of free patents

Agricultural free patent, Residential free patent, Miscellaneous sales patent, and Special patent

Section 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this
Act, the Secretary of the DENR shall promulgate the implementing rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of this Act.

Section 11. Separability Clause. – If any provisions or part of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the remaining parts or provisions not affected shall remain in full force and effect.

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Section 12. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, executive orders, executive issuances, letters of
instructions, rules and regulations, or any part thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Section 13. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

Facts:
The case revolves around the application for original registration of title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
(respondent) for a parcel of land in Batangas, Philippines. The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner), opposed the application. The trial court, and
subsequently the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of the respondent, leading the case to be escalated
to the Supreme Court.

The application involved Lot 10705-B, with an area of 56.4007 hectares. Notices of the hearing were
duly published and posted. The Director of Lands filed an opposition, and one Ceferino Carandang
later appeared as an oppositor but failed to file a written opposition and was defaulted. During the
hearings, the respondent presented witnesses to establish the predecessors-in-interest’s possession
since 1942. Despite petitioner’s appeal on the grounds of insufficient evidence of possession and the
respondent’s qualification to acquire the land, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issues:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable.
2. Whether the respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or
earlier.
3. Whether a corporation is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, setting aside the decisions of the lower courts.

1. On the alienable and disposable nature of the land, the Court found that the certifications
provided by the respondent, issued by Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) officials, were not sufficient to prove that the land was alienable and disposable. The
Court highlighted the lack of authority of the issuing officials and the discrepancy in the stated
dates of land classification.

2. Regarding possession and occupation, the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that the
evidences, including testimonies and tax declarations presented by the respondent, were
insufficient to prove the necessary quality of possession dating back to 12 June 1945 or earlier.

3. On the qualification of the corporation to apply for registration, based on the 1987 Constitution,
the Supreme Court affirmed that private corporations are prohibited from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. The Court clarified that registration could only confirm a
conversion to private land already effected by operation of law from the completion of the
requisite period of possession, which was not established in this case.

Doctrine:
The Supreme Court reiterated essential doctrines:
– All lands not appearing clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State, making it the applicant’s
burden to prove otherwise.

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– A corporation cannot acquire alienable lands of the public domain but may hold them through lease.
– The qualifications for alienable and disposable lands require incontrovertible evidence proving the DENR
Secretary’s approval of the land classification.

Class Notes:
1. **Presumption of State Ownership:** All lands of the public domain are presumed to belong to the State
unless proven otherwise by the applicant through clear evidence.
2. **Alienable and Disposable Land Proof:** The applicant must present substantial evidence that the land has
been classified as alienable and disposable by the DENR Secretary, including the official release of the land
from the public domain and a verified survey.
3. **Corporation’s Ineligibility to Acquire Public Lands:** Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, private
corporations are barred from acquiring lands of the public domain, which can only hold such lands through
lease.

Historical Background:
The case underlines the stringent requirements set forth by Philippine law and the Constitution regarding the
registration of land titles, particularly those classified as alienable and disposable by the government. It
accentuates the prohibition against corporations from owning lands of the public domain, a rule aimed at
preventing large landholdings by corporations and ensuring land remains accessible to Filipino individuals.

Facts:
Background of the Case
The case originated from a Petition for Registration of Title filed on January 27, 1999, by respondents
Apostolita San Mateo, Brigida Tapang, Rosita Accion, and Celso Mercado before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, Branch 127. The subject of the petition was a 12,896 square-meter parcel of land located in
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig City, described as Lot 3226, MCadm 590-D of the Conversion Plan AS-00-000233.

Ownership and Possession Claims

Respondents claimed that the land was originally owned by their grandfather, Leocadio Landrito, who had
been in possession of a 5,500 square-meter portion since 1948, as evidenced by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 3659.
Upon Leocadio’s death, the property was inherited by his three children: Crisanta, Amador, and Juanito.
Amador and Juanito later mortgaged their shares to Crisanta and her husband, but they failed to settle their
obligations. Consequently, the widows of Amador and Juanito executed waivers of rights in favor of the
respondents, who are the heirs of Crisanta.

Supporting Documents
Respondents submitted the following documents to support their petition:
Original tracing cloth plan AS-00-000233, blueprints, and technical description of the land.
Surveyor’s certificate.
Deed of extra-judicial settlement of Leocadio’s estate.
Various tax declarations and tax receipts.
Oppositions to the Petition

Several parties opposed the petition:

Globe Steel Corporation (GSC): Claimed that the application might encroach on its adjoining properties.
New Donavel Compound Neighborhood Association, Inc. (NDCNAI): Argued that it had a better right of
possession, as its members were the actual occupants of the lot.
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA): Contended that the lot is below the reglementary lake elevation
of 12.50 meters, making it part of the Laguna Lake bed and thus inalienable public land.
LRA Report

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On July 25, 2008, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) adjusted the area of the property to 12,776 square
meters to rectify a discrepancy in the technical description.

RTC Decision
On November 3, 2010, the RTC granted the petition for registration, ruling that:
Respondents and their predecessors had been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the lot since
1948. The lot is alienable and disposable, as evidenced by certifications from the DENR-South CENRO and
LLDA.

CA Decision
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision on September 14, 2012, rejecting the Republic’s
arguments regarding jurisdiction, possession, and alienability.

ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
II.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS HAVE POSSESSED THE PROPERTY FOR THE LENGTH OFTIME REQUIRED BY LAW
III.
WHETHER RESPONDENTS PROVED THAT THE PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE

RULING:
On the issue of whether the respondents were able to prove that the subject property is alienable and
disposable, we find that the respondents failed to prove that the property sought to be registered is indeed
alienable and thus subject to registration. Respondents merely relied on the certification of DENR-South
CENRO to the effect that the subject property is alienable. But as discussed below, this is insufficient, as
respondents failed to present any proof that the DENR Secretary approved such certification. We rule that the
CA’s reliance solely on the DENR-South CENRO certification constitutes reversible error on its part.

Material to the resolution of this issue is this Court’s ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,19 which,
similar to the one at bar, is one for registration of property. There, the Court said:

The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO
No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of
land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.

Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMSDENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public
infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure
projects.

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum
to the trial court, has no probative value.

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Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Facts:
This case began with Manuel Dee Ham causing the survey of the Subject Property under
Plan Psu-169919 in 1958. The plan was approved by the Director of Lands, and the Property
was declared in Manuel’s name for tax purposes. Upon Manuel’s death in 1961, his wife,
Esperanza Gerona, and their children inherited the Property, which they later transferred to
the Dee Ham family corporation, Pasig Rizal Co., Inc. (PRCI). Esperanza executed an
Affidavit formalizing the transfer on November 6, 2009.

Procedural History:
In 2010, PRCI applied for original registration of title over the Subject Property at the RTC
in Pasig City, asserting ownership and continuous possession for over 50 years. The
Republic of the Philippines opposed the application. The RTC ruled in favor of PRCI, a
decision the Republic challenged before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision, leading the Republic to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether PRCI established the Subject Property as alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain.
2. Whether the certifications issued by the DENR Regional Technical Director and the
DENR RED-NCR were sufficient to prove the alienable and disposable status of the land for
registration purposes under PD 1529.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court decided to remand the case to the CA, highlighting two significant legal
matters for resolution: (a) the requirements for original registration of land acquired
through prescription; and (b) evidence sufficient to prove the alienable and disposable
status of land for registration purposes under PD 1529.

Doctrine:
The classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable by the State constitutes
unequivocal proof of its conversion to patrimonial property, making it open to private
acquisition.

Class Notes:
1. Agricultural lands classified by the State as alienable and disposable are deemed
converted to patrimonial property (Civil Code, Articles 420-422).
2. Ownership over real property can be acquired through prescription under conditions laid
down by law (Civil Code, Articles 1113, 1127, and 1129).
3. The Regalian doctrine presumes that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
except those proven to be privately owned.
4. RA 11573 amends Section 14 of PD 1529, simplifying the confirmation process for
imperfect land titles and specifying proof of the alienable and disposable status of the land.

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Historical Background:
This case reflects the complex interplay between the Regalian doctrine, the State’s power to
classify lands of the public domain, and private claims to land ownership in the Philippines.
The legal proceedings demonstrate the transition and interpretation of laws concerning land
registration and the recognition of long-standing possession and use as a basis for
confirming imperfect titles.

Facts:
On January 11, 2008, Efren S. Buenaventura filed a petition for the original registration of title for Lot No.
1788, Cad. 674 with the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal. Buenaventura claimed ownership through a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 4, 1993, and presented evidence of exclusive occupation, tax declaration, and its
classification as alienable and disposable. The Republic, represented by the OSG, opposed the application on
June 16, 2008, arguing the absence of proof that the land was alienable and disposable.

During the trial, Buenaventura testified to his ownership and pre-1993 possession of the land, mentioning a
reduction in area due to a road project. Witnesses from the Land Registration Authority and DENR testified to
the non-coverage of the land by any title and its classification as alienable and disposable. On June 29, 2009,
the RTC granted Buenaventura’s application, declaring him the owner and ordering the registration of the
property, subject to public use easement.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), asserting a lack of proof for alienable status and successful
possession claim. The CA, on September 13, 2011, affirmed the RTC’s decision, validating the CENRO
certification about the land’s alienable status and Buenaventura’s claimed possession.

Issues:
1. Whether a Certificate from CENRO suffices to establish the land’s alienability.
2. Whether Buenaventura established ownership and possession to apply for land registration.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court analyzed the legal requirements for land registration as per Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529,
amended by R.A. No. 11573. The Republic claimed that prior rulings, such as T.A.N. Properties, Inc., mandated
a further certification by the DENR Secretary beyond the CENRO certification for establishing land as alienable.

– On proving the land’s alienable status, the Court reiterated that current precedence, until superseded by R.A.
11573, required both a CENRO certification and documentation of the DENR Secretary’s approval.
Buenaventura’s case was initially inadequate without showing such an approval as per past jurisprudence.
– Concerning possession, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ findings, binding in this case.
Buenaventura sufficiently demonstrated his possession consistent with the statutory requirements.

Doctrine:
The case reestablished that prior to R.A. 11573, land applicants needed both CENRO certification and DENR
Secretary’s documented issuance for land to be considered alienable. With R.A. No. 11573’s enactment, a duly
signed DENR geodetic engineer’s certificate might suffice to establish a land’s status, reflecting a curative
statute application’s nature.

Class Notes:
1. CENRO Certification – Previously inadequate alone; requires DENR Secretary documentation.
2. R.A. No. 11573 (September 1, 2021) – Amendments allow a simplified certificate process for land’s
alienability.
3. Land Registration – Requires possession since June 12, 1945 per P.D. 1529; adjusted to twenty years pre-
filing by R.A. No. 11573.
4. Prior rulings necessitate evidence validation of land status, corroborated by additional legal documents.

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Historical Background:
This case reflects ongoing efforts to simplify the confirmation process for land titles in the Philippines.
Historically, prolonged possession was required to convert public land to private property, with complex proof
necessary for classification. Reforms introduced by R.A. 11573 reflect a broader governmental trend to
streamline land administrative processes, increasing legal land tenure security and addressing lengthy
bureaucratic ownership claims. This modernization aims to more effectively reflect and respond to indigenous
and local needs while safeguarding public land interests

Facts:
Appeal interposed by Regina Antonio and others from order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
dismissing their complaint filed against Pelagio Barroga, the Director of Lands and others. Appellants' action was
for the annulment of Free Patent No. 26383 and the corresponding original certificate of title No. 2799 both
issued in the names of Pelagio and Marcelo Barroga. Their complaint substantially alleged that they were the
children of the deceased Jorge Antonio who, during his lifetime, was the absolute owner of a parcel of land
located in Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. That the defendants applied with the Bureau of Lands
for a free patent in connection with said parcel of land, alleging that it was public land although they knew that
it was the private property of Jorge Antonio; that subsequently, the free patent and certificate of title already
mentioned were issued in the names of said defendants, who on March 26, 1961 mortgaged and/or sold the
property to the defendants Francisca Bautista and Inocencio Salvador, for which reason the latter two were
impleaded as defendants.

Within the reglementary period appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that
appellants' cause of action had already prescribed. Appellants filed a written opposition thereto and on May 28,
1962 the lower court denied the motion because the grounds relied upon had to be established by evidence. In
view of this, appellees filed their answer alleging therein that the late Eusebio Rellera, their predecessor in
interest, was the absolute owner of the land and that Rellera's legal heirs had sold the same to Pelagio Barroga,
as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale.

On July 15, 1963, appellants filed an amended complaint — which was admitted by the lower court — to implead
the Director of Lands as defendant. Within the reglementary period.
Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss alleging that the other defendants had admitted in their answer that
their predecessor in interest, Eusebio Rellera, was the absolute owner of the land in question and that they
acquired the property from Rellera's legal heirs. From this they concluded that the land was private property
and that therefore the free patent and original certificate of title issued in favor of the Barrogas were void
because the Director of Lands had no right to dispose of private property.

The lower court ruled that the first was well founded and dismissed the complaint.

Appellants now raise in effect the same issues, namely: that the Barrogas are concluded by their admission that
the land in question was private property; that, consequently, it was not within the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of it in favor of any party, and that, as a result, the free patent and the original certificate of
title mentioned heretofore issued in the name of the Barrogas were void and must be ordered cancelled.

RULLING:
We find no merit in appellants' contention.
It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted either the invalidity or
insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of his predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but
neither the allegation made in his answer that his aforesaid predecessor in interest was the absolute owner of

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the property covered by said Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's invalidity or insufficiency are
grounds for the annulment of the free patent and original certificate of title in question. Evidently, it was
Barroga's privilege to rely or not to rely upon his claim of private ownership in favor of his predecessor in interest
and of whatever the latter's Titulo Real was worth. He decided not to rely upon them and to consider instead
that the property covered by the Titulo Real was still part of the public domain. Acting accordingly, he applied
for a free patent and was successful. It must be borne in mind that the Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title
and that its holder still had to prove that he had possessed the and covered by it without interruption during a
period of ten years by virtue of a good title and in good faith.
We may well presume that Barroga felt that he had no sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he
decided to acquire the land as part of the public domain.

Having arrived at this conclusion, we are constrained to agree with the trial court that because the record shows
that the complaint was filed many years after the free patent and certificate of title it sought to annul had
become final and indefeasible, the facts set forth in said pleading do not constitute a cause of action in favor of
appellants.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

VICENTE E. KAYABAN and FLORENTINA LAGASCA-KAYABAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE VICENTE M. SANTIAGO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch
V, CFI of Pangasinan, respondents.

Edilberto Ga. Esguerra for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor General
Felix J. Bautista for respondents.

The present case started with an action for illegal detainer filed in the municipal court of Alcala Pangasinan on
April 20, 1967 and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 246. The plaintiff was Vicente Kayaban, one of the
petitioners herein, the other petitioner being his wife Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban; and the defendants were
the spouses Benjamin Orpindo and Leonila Aguilar-Orpindo. The property involved was Lot No. 9, one of
several lots covered by O.C.T. No. P-1214 in the plaintiff's name. Another title, O.C.T. No. P-1215, covering
other lots, was in the name of his wife Florentina, and both were issued way back on September 22, 1956 as a
result of free patent applications filed by them in 1955.

On July 12, 1967, just before the hearing of the illegal detainer case was terminated in the municipal court, the
Orpindo spouses, together with Ruea Whiting Vds. de Kayaban and her children, filed a complaint against the
Kayaban spouses in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for reconveyance of Lot No. 9, which complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. U-1022. Sometime later the illegal detainer case was decided adversely to the
plaintiff, who thereupon appealed to the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No.
U-1034.

Still later, upon a letter-complaint to the Solicitor General's Office by the lawyer for the Orpindos, the said
Office filed, on December 17, 1968, an action for annulment of the two free patent titles of the Kayabans and
for reversion of the lands covered thereby to the State. The case was docketed as Case No. U-2080.

The three cases — U-1022, U-1034 and U-2080 — were consolidated and tried jointly before respondent court,
which rendered its decision on July 31, 1970. Case No. U-1022, for reconveyance, was dismissed and the
property involved therein was declared to be the "absolute and exclusive property of defendant Vicente
Kayaban." Case No. U-2034, for illegal detainer, was decided in favor of the plaintiff therein Vicente Kayaban

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and the defendants were ordered to vacate the land and to pay monthly rentals thereon until possession was
finally restored to the plaintiff. The losing parties in those two cases did not appeal from the decision, which
consequently became final.

The petition now before Us is by the spouses Vicente Kayaban and Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban for review of
the decision insofar as Civil Case No. U-2080 is concerned. The dispositive portion of that decision is as follows:

3. In Civil Case No. 2080, Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-1214 and P-1215 subject-matter thereof and under
the names of Vicente Kayaban and Florentina Lagasca-Kayaban are hereby declared null and void; however,
they are hereby declared to be the rightful and exclusive owners and possessors of all the properties therein
covered, with the right to apply for the confirmation of their titles thereto in a proper judicial proceeding. The
Philippine National Bank * having acted in good faith is absolved of any liability, and its right to recover on the
mortgage loan may be enforced. Without pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.

The facts as found by the respondent court on the basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioners are as
follows: The lands covered by the two titles were inherited by Vicente Kayaban and his co-heirs from their
father and common predecessor-in-interest, Gabriel Kayaban, who’s last will was admitted to probate in 1923.
After the properties were partitioned, Vicente Kayaban acquired the shares of his co-heirs by purchase and
afterwards he and his wife applied for and obtained the two free patent titles in question.

The respondent court recognized and declared the petitioners to be the rightful and exclusive owners of the
properties covered by the said titles and denied the Solicitor General's prayer that they be reverted to the
State, but nevertheless declared the titles null and void on the ground that since the owners had acquired the
properties partly by inheritance from their father and the rest by purchase from their co-heirs, and their father
had been in possession thereof for many years before them, the lands were no longer public and hence not
subject to disposition by the government under the Public Land Act. The procedure that should have been
followed, said the court, was judicial confirmation of an imperfect title and not administrative legalization
thereof through patent application.

We find the present appeal meritorious. We note in the first place that nowhere in the record is it shown that
the complaint in Case No. U-2080 for annulment of the appellants' titles and for reversion of the lands covered
thereby to the State was filed at the behest of the Director of Lands. What does appear in the stipulation of
facts submitted by the parties below is as follows:

6. That this instant case praying primarily to declare "null and void" the Original Certificates of Titles Nos. P-
1214 and P-1215, has been initiated by Atty. Nestor C. Fernandez upon his letter complaint to the Solicitor
General's Office;

7. That Atty. Nestor C. Fernandez is neither a claimant, possessor, nor does he have any right whatsoever over
any portion of the lands covered by the Original Certificates of Titles Nos. P-1214 and P-1215.

Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the applications of the appellants and who
ordered the issuance of the corresponding free patents in their favor in his capacity as administrator of the
disposable lands of the public domain, the action for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least
with his prior authority and consent.

In the second place, the dictum of the lower court that the appellants chose the wrong remedy in applying for
free patents instead of obtaining a judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles involves a technicality that is
of no material consequence now in view of the declaration by the same court that the appellants are the
rightful and exclusive owners of the lands covered by said titles. Indeed, insofar as the kind of land that may be
the subject of one or the other remedy is concerned, there is no difference between them. Both refer to public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes; both require continuous occupation and cultivation either by the
applicant himself or through his predecessors-in-interest for a certain length of time; and both are modes of
confirming an imperfect or incomplete title — one judicially and the other administratively. * The fact that the
appellants inherited part of the lands in question from their father and acquired the rest by purchase from
their co-heirs does not necessarily imply that they had become private lands in the sense of being no longer

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subject to disposal under the provisions of the Public Land Act. What is not to be denied is that in connection
with their free patent applications the appellants, as well as the Director of Lands, considered the lands as still
part of the public domain, although the appellants had an imperfect title to them. The following statement in
the decision of this court in the case of Antonio vs. Barroga, 23 SCRA 360 (April 29, 1968) is apropos:

It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted either the invalidity of
insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of his predecessor-in-interest on July 22, 1894, but
neither the allegation made in his answer that his aforesaid predecessor-in-interest was the absolute owner of
the property covered by said Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's invalidity or insufficiency are
grounds for the annulment of the free patent and original certificate of title in question. Evidently, it was
Barroga's privilege to rely or not to rely upon his claim of private ownership in favor of his predecessor-in-
interest and whatever the latter's Titulo Real was worth. He decided not to rely upon them and to consider
instead that the property covered by the Titulo Real was still a part of the public domain. Acting accordingly,
he applied for a free patent and was successful. It must be borne in mind that its holder still had to prove that
he possessed the land covered by it without interruption during a period of ten years by virtue of a good title
and in good faith (Royal Decree of June 25, 1880). We may well presume that Barroga felt that he had no
sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he decided to acquire the land as part of the public domain.
(Emphasis supplied)

Finally, whether the titles in question were obtained through judicial or administrative legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title is of no practical importance. The certificates of title in either case is the same,
namely, that provided for in Section 122 of Act No. 496, which, except for some restrictions as to alienability
within entitled to all the protection afforded by the Torrens System of registration.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from (Case No. U-2080) is reversed insofar as it declares null and void
Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-1214 and P-1215 in the names of Vicente Kayaban and Florentina Lagasca-
Kayaban, respectively. No pronouncement as to costs.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the Decision dated November 8, 2013 and Resolution dated April 29, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94720, entitled Heirs of the Spouses Donato Sanchez and Juana Meneses, represented by
Rodolfo S. Aguinaldo v. Republic of the Philippines.

Respondents filed an amended petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 45361 that
covered Lot No. 854 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 26.[2] In said
petition, respondents made the following allegations:

That OCT No. 45361 was issued in the name of their predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Sanchez, pursuant to
Decree No. 41812 issued in relation to a Decision dated March 12, 1930 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Pangasinan;
Said lot was declared for taxation purposes in the name of the spouses Sanchez and that when the latter died
intestate, they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. Said Deed, however, could not be registered because
the owner's copy of OCT No. 45361 was missing; and
The Offices of the Register of Deeds (RD) of Lingayen and Dagupan, Pangasinan issued a certification that the
copies of Decree No. 41812 and OCT No. 45361 could not be found among its records.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the CFI issued an Order dated June 24, 2001 giving due
course thereto and ordered the requisite publication thereof, among others. Meanwhile, the Administrator of

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the Land Registration Authority (LRA) requested the trial court, which the latter granted through its October
11, 2002 Order, to require respondents to submit the following documents:

Certification from the RD that OCT No. 45361 was either lost or destroyed;
Copies of the technical description of the lot covered by OCT No. 45361, certified by the authorized officer of
the Land Management Bureau/LRA; and
Sepia film plan of the subject lot prepared by the duly licensed geodetic engineer.

Due to difficulties encountered in securing said documents, respondents moved for the archiving of the case,
which motion was granted by the trial court. It was later revived when respondents finally secured the said
documents.

The petition was published anew and trial later ensued, with the following documents submitted by
respondents in evidence, to wit:

Decision dated March 12, 1930 (written in Spanish) in Cadastral Case No. 40, GLRO Cad. Record No. 920
adjudicating Lot No. 854 in favor of the spouses Donato Sanchez and Juana Meneses which was certified by
the LRA as a true copy of the original; and
Certified true copy of the Registrar's Index Card containing the notation that OCT No. 45361 covering Lot No.
854 was listed under the name of Donato Sanchez.

On January 11, 2008, the LRA submitted its Report pertaining to the legality of the reconstitution sought in
favor of respondents, the relevant portions of which, as quoted by the CA in the assailed Decision, are as
follows:

(2) From Book No. 35 of the Record Book of Cadastral Lots on file at the Cadastral Decree Section, this
Authority, it appears that Decree No. 418121 was issued to Lot No. 854, Dagupan Cadastre on January 12,
1931, in Cadastral Case No. 40, GLRO Cad. Record No. 920. Copy of the said decree, however, is no longer
available in this Authority.

(3) The plan and technical description of lot 854, cad 217, Case 3, Dagupan Cadastre, were verified correct by
this Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the same have been approved under (LRA) PR-07-01555-R
pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.

On June 30, 2008, however, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack
of sufficient evidence, ruling that RA No. 26 only applies in cases where the issuance of the OCT sought to be
reconstituted has been established, only that it was lost or destroyed. While acknowledging the existence of
Decree No. 418121 which was issued for the lot subject of the case, the RTC nevertheless held that there is no
established proof that OCT No. 45361 was issued by virtue of said Decree.

Aggrieved, respondents moved for reconsideration of the above Decision, insisting that there was sufficient
evidence to prove the issuance of OCT No. 45361. Instead of filing a comment thereto, the RD of Dagupan City
manifested that OCT No. 45361 had been superseded by TCT No. 10202 issued to a certain Rufino Mariñas
with notation that the land it covered was "originally registered on the 29th day of January, [1931] xxx as OCT
No. 45361 pursuant to Decree No. 418121 issued in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 920." Furthermore, TCT No.
10202 was cancelled by TCT No. 44365 and later by TCT No. 80792 in the name of Dagupan Doctors Villaflor
Memorial Hospital, both bearing a note which reads, "The name of the registered owner of OCT No. 45361 is
not available as per certification of the [RD of Lingayen], dated August 18, 1982, entries nos. 107415 and
107416, respectively."

Disagreeing with the trial court's findings and holding that Lot 854 was judicially awarded to respondents'
predecessor-in-interest in Cadastral Case No. 40, GLRO Cad. Record No. 920, the CA reversed the RTC ruling on
appeal and directed the reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 in favor of herein respondents.

The CA held that even though respondents were unable to present the documents necessary for reconstitution
of title as enumerated under Section 2 of RA No. 26, particularly (a) to (e) thereof, the documentary pieces of

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evidence presented by respondents fall under paragraph (f) of said provision and are sufficient to warrant the
reconstitution of OCT No. 45361. In this regard, the CA emphasized that the certificates of title which the RD
manifested to have superseded OCT No. 45361 all bear the notation to the effect that Lot No. 854 was
originally registered on January 29, 1931 as OCT No. 45361 pursuant to Decree No. 418121 issued in G.L.R.O.
Cadastral Record No. 920, the name of the registered owner of which is not available. This, to the CA,
substantially complies with the requirement enunciated in Republic v. Tuastumban that the documents must
come from official sources which recognize the ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in the assailed Resolution, petitioner
lodged the instant petition questioning the sufficiency of the documents presented by respondents to warrant
the reconstitution of the alleged lost OCT No. 45361.

We resolve to grant the petition.

The Court agrees with the trial court that no clear and convincing proof has been adduced that OCT No. 45361
was issued by virtue of Decree No. 418121. The Decision dated March 21, 1930 and the Registrar's Index Card
containing the notation on OCT No. 45361 do not cite nor mention that Decree No. 418121 was issued to
support the issuance of OCT No. 45361. At this point, it is well to emphasize that a petition for reconstitution
of lost or destroyed OCT requires, as a condition precedent, that an OCT has indeed been issued, for obvious
reasons.

Assuming arguendo that respondents were able to sufficiently prove the existence of OCT No. 45361
considering the totality of the evidence presented, the Court finds that reconstitution thereof is still not
warranted, applying Section 15 of RA No. 26. Said provision reads:

Section 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as supported by parole evidence or
otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title,
and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that the said
certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and that the description, area and
boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of
title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued.

As explicitly stated in the above-quoted provision, before a certificate of title which has been lost or destroyed
may be reconstituted, it must first be proved by the claimants that said certificate of title was still in force at
the time it was lost or destroyed, among others. Here, the mere existence of TCT No. 10202, later cancelled by
TCT No. 44365, which, in turn, was superseded by TCT No. 80792, which bear the notations:

originally registered on the 29th day of January, [1931] xxx as OCT No. 45361 pursuant to Decree No. 418121
issued in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 920.

The name of the registered owner of OCT No. 45361 is not available as per certification of the [RD of
Lingayen], dated August 18, 1982, entries nos. 107415 and 107416, respectively.

clearly shows that the OCT which respondents seek to be reconstituted is no longer in force, rendering the
procedure, if granted, a mere superfluity.

Additionally, if indeed OCT No. 45361 was lost or destroyed, it is necessary that the RD issue a certification
that such was in force at the time of its alleged loss or destruction. Definitely, the RD cannot issue such
certification because of the dearth of records in support of the alleged OCT No. 45361 in its file. The
presentation of alleged derivative titles TCT No. 10202, TCT No. 44365 and TCT No. 80792 will not suffice to
replace this certification because the titles do not authenticate the issuance of OCT No. 45361 having been
issued by the RD without any basis from its official records. As a matter of fact, it is a wonder how the
derivative titles were issued when the existence of OCT No. 45361 could not be established based on the RD's
records. The RD failed to explain how it was able to make an annotation of the original registration of the lot
under OCT No. 45361 when respondents are now asking for its reconstitution. It is also highly suspicious why
respondents are asking the reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 when, supposedly, it has already been cancelled

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and new titles have already been issued based on transfers purportedly made by respondents. Lastly, of what
use is the reconstituted OCT No. 45361 when the lot has already been transferred to other persons. It will
practically be of no value or worth to respondents.

If the respondents still insist on the reconstitution of OCT No. 45361, the proper procedure is to file a petition
for the cancellation and re-issuance of Decree No. 418121 following the opinion of then LRA Administrator
Benedicto B. Ulep. In said Opinion, Administrator Ulep explained the reason for the necessity of the petition
for cancellation of the old decree and its re-issuance, thus:

1. Under the premises, the correct proceeding is a petition for cancellation of the old decree, re-issuance of
decree and for issuance of OCT pursuant to that re-issued decree.

In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123361, March 3, 1997, our
Supreme Court had affirmed the efficacy of filing a petition for cancellation of the old decree; the re-issuance
of such decree and the issuance of OCT corresponding to that re-issued decree.

"Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit amended petition, but this
was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to his Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P.
Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to
accept the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decree under the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 [1968], and the lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the
omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to re-issue the decrees in order to have a basis for the
issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in their opposition.

Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept the amended petition subject to the
private respondent's being given the opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence
already on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing evidence shall be given the
parties."
Following the principle laid down in the above-quoted case, a question may be asked: Why should a decree be
canceled and re-issued when the same is valid and intact? Within the context of this discussion, there is no
dispute that a decree has been validly issued. And in fact, in some instances, a copy of such decree is intact.
What is not known is whether or not an OCT is issued pursuant to that decree. If such decree is valid, why is
there a need to have it cancelled and re-issued?

Again, we invite you back to the highlighted provision of Section 39 of PD 1529 which states that: "The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration." This provision is significant because it
contemplates an OCT which is an exact replica of the decree. If the old decree will not be canceled and no new
decree issued, the corresponding OCT issued today will bear the signature of the present Administrator while
the decree upon which it was based shall bear the signature of the past Administrator. This is not consistent
with the clear intention of the law which states that the OCT shall be true copy of the decree of registration.
Ostensibly, therefore, the cancellation of the old decree and the issuance of a new one is necessary.

2. Republic Act No. 26 for reconstitution of lost OCT will not lie.

It is so basic under Republic Act No. 26 that the same shall only apply in cases where the issuance of OCT has
been established, only that it was lost or destroyed under circumstances provided for under said law. Again,
within the context of this discussion, RA No. 26 will not apply because in this case, there is no established
proof that an OCT had been issued. In other words, the applicability of RA No. 26 hinges on the existence of
priorly issued OCT.

Will reconstitution of Decree lie then? Again, the answer is no. There is no showing that the decree is lost. In
fact, it can be established that a decree, pursuant either to a cadastral proceeding or an ordinary land
registration case, has been issued. Under existing land registration laws and jurisprudence, there is no such
thing as reconstitution of a decree. RA No. 26 cannot likewise be the basis because the latter refers to an OCT
and not a decree of registration.

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3. For as long as a decree has not yet been transcribed (entered in registration book of the RD), the court
which adjudicated and ordered for the issuance of such decree continues to be clothed with jurisdiction.

This matter has been settled in several cases, to name a few:

"There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The
reason is what is stated in the consideration of the second assignment error, that the judgment is merely
declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party.
Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefore has
been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered."

"We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as
it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced
after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party. And his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party." (Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA
1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315)
Furthermore, in Gomez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-77770, December 15, 1988, 168 SCRA 503, the Supreme
Court declared that:
"Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not
become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the entry of
the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not
been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not
elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."
(Also cited in Labarada v. CA and Ramos v. Rodriguez, 244 SCRA 418, 423-424)

4. The heirs of the original adjudicate may file the petition in representation of the decedent and the re-
issued decree shall still be under the name of the original adjudicate.

It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the death of the decedent. The heirs shall then succeed
into the shoes of the decedent. The heirs shall have the legal interest in the property, thus, they cannot be
prohibited from filing the necessary petition.

As the term connotes, a mere re-issuance of the decree means that the new decree shall be issued which shall,
in all respects, be the same as that of the original decree. Nothing in the said decree shall be amended nor
modified; hence, it must be under the name of the original adjudicatee.

In sum, from the foregoing, it may be safely concluded that for as long as the decree issued in an ordinary or
cadastral registration case has not yet been entered, meaning, it has not yet been transcribed in the
Registration Book of the concerned Registrar of Deeds, such decree has not yet attained finality and therefore
may still be subject to cancellation in the same land registration case. Upon cancellation of such decree, the
decree owner (adjudicatee or his heirs) may then pray for the issuance of a new decree number and,
consequently, pray for the issuance of an original certificate of title based on the newly issued decree of
registration.

As such, we find no reason to disturb the ruling of the RTC that reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 is not
warranted under the circumstances, albeit on a different ground.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 8, 2103 and its Resolution dated April 29, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94720 are

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hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 in Dagupan City in Cad
Case No. 20001-0043-D is hereby REINSTATE

Facts:
On July 28, 2010, Claro Yap filed a petition for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for Lot No. 922, claiming inheritance and possession of the property
through acquisitive prescription since 1945. Despite the issuance of a valid decree (No. 99500) for the lot in
1920, no OCT had been issued. The RTC found Yap’s evidence sufficient and granted the petition. The Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing insufficiency
of evidence and non-joinder of indispensable parties, which the CA denied, affirming the RTC’s decision.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court was petitioned to review the CA’s decision.

Issues:
1. Whether the RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of Decree No. 99500, its re-issuance, and the issuance
of an OCT to Claro Yap.
2. Whether the action has prescribed.
3. Whether the principle of res judicata applies in land registration cases preventing the application of the
statute of limitations.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, holding that:
1. The RTC correctly ordered the cancellation and re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 for the issuance of an OCT
to Claro Yap. The evidence presented sufficiently established Yap’s claim.
2. The action had not prescribed because land registration cases, being special proceedings aimed at
establishing ownership, do not fall within the ambit of the statute of limitations pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court or the Civil Code’s provisions on prescription.
3. Res judicata applies to land registration cases once a decision becomes final, making such decisions binding
against the whole world and not subject to statute of limitations or laches.

Doctrine:
– In land registration proceedings, a final and executory judgment confirming the title and ordering its
registration constitutes res judicata against the whole world. Such judgments do not require execution within
a specific timeframe as they are considered declaratory in nature, and are therefore not subject to the statute
of limitations or laches.

Class Notes:
– Importance of demonstration of continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for acquisitive prescription
claims.
– Final judgments in land registration cases do not require further action to enforce ownership except in
circumstances of dispossession.
– The principle of res judicata in land registration cases: once a judgment becomes final, it is binding against
the whole world and not subject to the statute of limitations.
– The process of re-issuance of a decree for the purpose of issuing an OCT requires that the decree and the
certificate be exact replicas of each other, necessitating the cancellation and re-issuance even when the
original decree is intact but no certificate was issued.

Historical Background:
The case exemplifies the procedural and substantive intricacies inherent in Philippine land registration law,
specifically regarding the re-issuance of decrees and issuance of OCTs long after a decree’s original issuance. It
reflects the judicial system’s recognition of the unique and enduring nature of land ownership and the special
considerations necessary for protecting such ownership across generations.
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Facts:
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco), alleged to own 72,000 hectares of land
based on Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 issued in 1894, engaged in logging operations on its claimed property.
Piadeco’s Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. PWR 2065-New issued by the Bureau of Forestry
was set to expire on December 31, 1964. However, the Director of Forestry canceled this certificate on April
11, 1964, following Piadeco’s unauthorized cutting of trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed
Reservations, areas excluded from the certificate.

Piadeco filed a petition in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan against the government officials, who in
turn filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The CFI
granted a preliminary injunction in Piadeco’s favor but later dissolved it. Piadeco continued operations even
after their registration certificate expired, leading to the impounding of logs by the Armed Forces upon
Presidential directive to halt illegal logging. Piadeco then sought to execute the dissolved CFI injunction, which
led to the present petitions.

Issues:
1. Whether Piadeco’s Spanish title (Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136) is registrable with the Bureau of Forestry.
2. Whether Piadeco may continue logging operations on the basis of the expired registration certificate No.
PWR 2065-New.
3. Whether the cancellation of Piadeco’s registration certificate by the Director of Forestry was valid.
4. Whether the CFI judgment reinstating Piadeco’s registration certificate and making the injunction
permanent could still be executed after the certificate’s expiration.
5. Whether Piadeco is entitled to the removal of logs cut before the expiration of the certificate.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that Piadeco’s title was not among those registrable under the applicable forestry
administrative order, and as such, the land in question is considered public forest land. Piadeco’s expired and
canceled registration certificate does not entitle it to continue logging operations or to haul logs cut before its
expiration. The CFI judgment was deemed functus officio because the certificate expired, making execution of
the judgment null and void. Piadeco’s logging operations were considered unlawful, and the government
seizure of the impounded logs was authorized. Piadeco’s petitions were denied and ruled against in all
presented legal issues.Law firm websites

Doctrine:
The validity of a Spanish title over land must be conclusively proven in appropriate land registration
proceedings. Only certain titles specified by the Bureau of Forestry are registrable, and such registration
provides exemption from the payment of forest charges. The presumption is that land belongs to the State
unless proven otherwise, and the preservation and conservation of public forests are within the State’s police
power in the interest of general welfare.

Historical Background:
The case falls within the era of rapid industrialization and development in the Philippines, a period of increased
logging activities potentially detrimental to the environment. The government, through the Bureau of Forestry
and courts, affirmed its commitment to sustainable utilization of forest resources and resolved controversies
involving claims of land ownership based on colonial titles in light of contemporary laws and regulations. This
case demonstrates the tension between development and conservation during this critical juncture in
Philippine history.

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Facts:
Bantigue Point Development Corporation, the respondent, filed an application for original
registration of title over a parcel of land with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario,
Batangas on July 17, 1997. The land in question was Lot 8060, with an area of
approximately 10,732 square meters located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas, and
had an assessed value of P14,920. The RTC set the initial hearing past the 90-day period
required, and subsequently issued a second Order setting the hearing within the mandatory
period provided by law.

The Republic opposed the application on January 8, 1998. On March 31, 1998, the records
were transferred to the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas, on the
presumption that the property’s value was less than P100,000, and thus within that court’s
delegated jurisdiction for land registration cases. The MTC ruled in favor of the respondent,
which led the Republic to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed
the appeal and upheld the MTC’s decision, stating that the Republic was estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction, as it only raised the jurisdictional issue on appeal.

Issues:
1. Is the Republic estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MTC over the
application for original registration of land title for the first time on appeal, having not
raised the issue at the trial court?
2. Did the MTC fail to acquire jurisdiction over the case due to non-compliance with
procedural requirements and the property’s assessed value?

Court’s Decision:
In the decision written by Justice Sereno, the Supreme Court resolved the issues as follows:
1. The Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MTC, even if only
raised on appeal. The Court noted that the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter
can be raised at any stage of the proceedings as it is conferred only by the Constitution or
the law.

2. The MTC properly acquired jurisdiction. The Court rejected the Republic’s argument that
the MTC lacked jurisdiction due to the RTC’s failure to adhere to the prescribed period for
setting the initial hearing and due to the alleged selling price of the land exceeding
P100,000. However, the Court remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings to
determine whether the property is indeed part of alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as the
respondent’s evidence (a CENRO certification) fell short of the required
proof.

Doctrine:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings.
Additionally, a certification from the CENRO alone is insufficient to prove that the property
in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; a certified true copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary is also necessary.

Class Notes:
– Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or law, not by waiver
or omission of the parties or court acquiescence.
– The Judiciary Reorganization Act stipulates MTCs may be assigned to hear land
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registration cases if the property does not exceed P100,000 in value.

– In original land registration applications, the applicant must prove the alienable and
disposable nature of the land through an approved land classification from the DENR
Secretary, not just a CENRO certification.

Historical Background:
This case illustrates the interplay between the delegated jurisdiction of municipal trial
courts and the procedural standards for land registration in the Philippines. The decision
underscores the legal principle that estoppel does not bar challenges to jurisdiction over the
subject matter when such challenges are raised at the appellate level. Additionally, it
reflects the judiciary’s adherence to the Regalian Doctrine regarding land ownership and
the need for clear proofs of a property’s status within the public domain.

Facts:
Petition for Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate Copy: David Patungan (petitioner) filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, seeking the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 31510, which was lost. The OCT was issued pursuant to Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00150832, granted to the petitioner under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).

RTC Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction:

The RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
has exclusive jurisdiction over the reissuance of lost or destroyed CLOAs and Emancipation Patents (EPs) under
Section 1(f), Rule II of the 2009 DARAB Rules.

The RTC held that the petition involved a CLOA registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), making it
an agrarian matter under DARAB's jurisdiction.

Petitioner's Argument:
The petitioner argued that the RTC has jurisdiction under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), as the OCT was already registered with the Register of Deeds (RD). He contended that
the DARAB's jurisdiction applies only to unregistered CLOAs and EPs, not to Torrens titles already issued.

Respondent's Position:
The Register of Deeds of Pangasinan agreed with the petitioner, stating that the RTC has jurisdiction under PD
1529, which governs land registration cases.

Ratio:
Jurisdiction of the RTC under PD 1529: Section 2 of PD 1529 vests the RTC with exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions filed after the original registration of title, including petitions for the issuance of a new owner's
duplicate copy of a lost or destroyed title. This jurisdiction is not limited by the source of the title (e.g.,
whether it originated from a CLOA).

DARAB's Limited Jurisdiction:

The DARAB's jurisdiction under Section 1(f), Rule II of the 2009 DARAB Rules is limited to agrarian disputes and
matters involving the implementation of CARP. The petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy
of a title does not involve an agrarian dispute or the implementation of CARP.

Distinction Between CLOA and Torrens Title:

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Once a CLOA is registered and an OCT is issued, the title must be treated like any other Torrens title. The
DARAB's jurisdiction ends upon the issuance of the OCT, and the RTC assumes jurisdiction over matters
involving the title.

No Agrarian Dispute Involved:

The petition does not relate to tenurial arrangements, compensation for land acquisition, or the terms of
transfer of ownership under CARP. It is a simple request for the issuance of a new duplicate copy of a
registered title, which falls under the RTC's jurisdiction.

Overlapping Jurisdiction Resolved:

While there appears to be an overlap in jurisdiction between the RTC and DARAB, the Court clarified that the
RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of new duplicate titles, regardless of whether the
title originated from a CLOA.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the RTC's jurisdiction over land registration cases is exclusive and not
subject to the DARAB's jurisdiction once a Torrens title has been issued. The case was remanded to the RTC for
further proceedings.

Facts:
This case roots back to a complaint filed by Miriam Jane M. Jacinto, Assistant Vice President of BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI Family), against Register of Deeds officials of San Juan City, including Rico C. Manalastas,
for Grave Misconduct due to alleged negligence in their duties. Miriam alleged that Dy Chiu Ha Tiu (Marian)
fraudulently obtained a loan of P20,000,000 from BPI Family using a fake Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No.
1035) as collateral. The real Paquito Tiu, owner of the property, later contested the loan and the signatures,
revealing the fraud.

Following the sequence of events, BPI Family’s bank personnel submitted the loan and mortgage documents
to the Office of the Register of Deeds of San Juan City for annotation and registration. Rico C. Manalastas, as
Examiner of the said office, along with Gilberto M. Paras and Atty. Lorna S. Dee, were alleged to have failed in
verifying the genuineness and authenticity of TCT No. 1035, which led to the fraudulent loan transaction. The
issue was brought to light when the real Paquito Tiu, alongside his lawyer, challenged the loan documents at
BPI Family’s main office.

The administrative complaint against Dee, Manalastas, and Paras resulted in their one-year suspension
without pay by the Office of the Ombudsman, citing gross negligence. Manalastas appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), which reversed the Ombudsman’s decision, exonerating him. The Office of the Ombudsman then
brought the case to the Supreme Court (SC) for review.

Issues:
The main legal issue for the Supreme Court’s resolution was whether the CA erred in exonerating Manalastas
for negligence in failing to verify the authenticity of the owner’s duplicate copy of the title attached to the real
estate mortgage sought to be annotated with the Office of the Register of Deeds of San Juan City.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court denied the petition from the Office of the Ombudsman, affirming the CA’s decision to
exonerate Manalastas. The Court ruled that the registration of documents is a ministerial duty, meaning the
Register of Deeds cannot be tasked with authenticating documents or investigating potential frauds. It was
noted that the fraud was so professionally executed that it would not be easily detected by the Register of
Deeds. The SC emphasized that Manalastas performed his duties with regularity and in good faith.

Doctrine:
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The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that the registration of documents is a ministerial act, obligating
the Register of Deeds to register an instrument presented for that purpose if it complies with all the requisites
for registration. It reinforced the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.

Class Notes:
– In administrative cases, substantial evidence is the required quantum of proof.
– The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties plays a pivotal role unless substantial
evidence to the contrary is provided.
– Registration of documents by the Register of Deeds is a ministerial act, serving as constructive notice of its
contents to all persons.
– Gross negligence implies a significant lack of care or failure to act on a duty, which was not found in
Manalastas’s actions.

Historical Background:
This case highlights issues surrounding property registration, document fraud, and the responsibilities of
officials in the Register of Deeds. It underscores the challenges in detecting sophisticated fraud and delineates
the scope of duty and ministerial act in the context of document registration. The decision clarifies the legal
expectations from Register of Deeds officials regarding document verification and fraud detection, setting a
precedent for similar future cases.

Facts:
Background of the Case:
Petra Durum Sismaet (Sismaet) filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra (Atty. Cruzabra),
the Registrar of Deeds of General Santos City, for gross ignorance of the law, violation of her duty to respect
courts, and breach of trust as a public official. The complaint arose from Atty. Cruzabra’s actions in annotating
a mortgage contract and an affidavit of cancellation of an adverse claim on a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-32952, which was the subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 4749.

Adverse Claim and Mortgage Annotation:

On January 27, 1993, Sismaet registered an adverse claim on TCT No. T-32952, which was annotated by Atty.
Cruzabra. On May 18, 1993, a mortgage contract between China Banking Corporation and Esteban Co, Jr. (a
defendant in Civil Case No. 4749) was also annotated on the TCT. On February 15, 1994, Co filed an Affidavit of
Cancellation of Adverse Claim, which was also annotated by Atty. Cruzabra, effectively canceling Sismaet’s
adverse claim.

Sismaet’s Allegations:
Sismaet alleged that Atty. Cruzabra’s actions forced her to amend her complaint to include China Banking
Corporation as a defendant. She also claimed that Atty. Cruzabra allowed the annotations despite knowing the
property was under litigation.

Contempt Motion and Disbarment Complaint:

On September 3, 1998, Sismaet moved to cite Atty. Cruzabra in contempt for allowing the annotations. The
next day, she filed the disbarment complaint with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).

Atty. Cruzabra’s Defense:

Atty. Cruzabra argued that the adverse claim expired after 30 days under Section 70 of the Property
Registration Decree, and her duty to annotate was ministerial. She also claimed the complaint violated the rule
against forum shopping, as the issue was already raised in the contempt motion.

IBP Investigation and Recommendation:

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The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended dismissal,
agreeing with Atty. Cruzabra that the adverse claim expired after 30 days. The Land Registration Authority also
found no grounds for administrative liability.

Ratio:
Jurisdiction Over Government Lawyers:
The IBP has limited jurisdiction over government lawyers. Misconduct in their official capacity is generally
under the jurisdiction of their superior or the Ombudsman. However, if the misconduct violates the Lawyer’s
Oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court retains disciplinary jurisdiction.

Ministerial Duty vs. Judicial Discretion:

While the Register of Deeds has a ministerial duty to annotate instruments, they may refuse registration when
the property is under litigation. Atty. Cruzabra’s failure to do so demonstrated gross ignorance of the law.

Cancellation of Adverse Claims:

An adverse claim can only be cancelled by a court order after a hearing. Atty. Cruzabra’s unilateral cancellation
of Sismaet’s adverse claim violated this principle.

Absence of Bad Faith:

The Court found no evidence of corrupt or malicious intent in Atty. Cruzabra’s actions, which mitigated the
penalty imposed.

Previous Disciplinary Record:

Atty. Cruzabra’s prior sanctions for neglect of duty and unauthorized notarial practice were considered in
determining the appropriate penalty.

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