Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 1

Case No. 24-5784

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DANIEL LOCKRIDGE,

Defendant-Appellant.

On appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee

BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES

Francis M. Hamilton III

United States Attorney
Eastern District of Tennessee

Brian Samuelson
Assistant United States Attorney
800 Market Street, Suite 211
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902
865.545.4167
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ ii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................... 1

ISSUES......................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................... 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................... 4

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 4

I. The district court did not improperly delegate judicial

authority to Lockridge’s probation officer. ....................................... 4

II. Lockridge’s “frequency” argument is foreclosed by

binding precedent. ......................................................................... 11

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 12

DESIGNATION OF RELEVANT DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENTS ... 13

i
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624 (6th Cir. 2024) .......................... 5, 7, 10

United States v. Carpenter, 702 F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2012) .............................5, 6, 7

United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009) ..................................... 9

United States v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2017) ................................... 12

United States v. Lindsay, No. 24-5089, 2024 WL 4225715

(6th Cir. Sept. 18, 2024) .................................................................. 5, 11, 12

United States v. Logins, 503 F. App’x 345 (6th Cir. 2012) ...........................5, 6, 7

United States v. Martinez, 987 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2021) ..................................... 9

United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2nd Cir. 2015) ........................................ 9

United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011) ......................................... 9

United States v. Vaughn, 119 F.4th 1084 (6th Cir. 2024)......................... 5, 11, 12

Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2001) .................................. 7

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 3583 ....................................................................................... 6, 7

18 U.S.C. § 3603 ........................................................................................... 5

21 U.S.C. § 841 ............................................................................................. 3

Other Authorities

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Overview of Probation

and Supervised Release Conditions (July 2024), available at
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/overview_of_
probation_and_supervised_release_conditions_0.pdf ...........................7, 8, 9

ii
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 4

INTRODUCTION

In this sentencing appeal, defendant Daniel Lockridge challenges the

conditions of his supervised release. His arguments are meritless and should

be rejected.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The United States does not request oral argument.

ISSUES

1. The district court imposed drug and mental-health treatment as

conditions of Lockridge’s supervised release but declined to specify whether

treatment should take place in an inpatient or an outpatient setting. By statute,

the court may modify the conditions at any time. Did the court unlawfully

delegate judicial power to Lockridge’s probation officer?

2. Controlling circuit precedent holds that courts need not specify the

frequency of drug testing when imposing testing as a special condition of

supervised release. Did the district court err by imposing drug testing as a

special condition of supervised release without specifying the frequency of

testing?

1
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Daniel Lockridge served his country honorably in Iraq and Afghanistan

and returned a decorated combat veteran. (R. 83, Revised PSR at 490.) Like

too many veterans, he suffers from various mental-health disorders, including

anxiety, a panic disorder, and combat-related PTSD. (Id. at 491.) He also has

a long history of abusing drugs and alcohol. (Id.) He started drinking in high

school and says he “drank a pint of liquor and a case of beer every day” for

fifteen years. (Id.) He eventually began using about a gram of

methamphetamine every day, and he continued doing so until his arrest in

2023. (Id.) Yet he has never received substance-abuse treatment. (Id.)

At some point, Lockridge began to deal drugs in addition to using them.

(Id. at 479-82.) A man who overdosed in a Chattanooga, Tennessee, hotel

room identified Lockridge as his methamphetamine supplier. (Id. at 480-81.)

A woman said she had been buying methamphetamine from Lockridge every

week for two years. (Id. at 481.) Recorded telephone calls captured Lockridge

plotting to smuggle methamphetamine into a county jail hidden in a bar of

soap. (Id. at 481-82.) The police twice found Lockridge in possession of

methamphetamine. (Id. at 482.) And Lockridge himself admitted that he had

helped traffic methamphetamine between Atlanta and Eastern Tennessee,

purchasing kilogram quantities every two weeks for months. (Id. at 481.)

2
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 6

Lockridge pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting possession with intent to

distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).

(R. 45, Revised Plea Agreement at 74.) In recognition of his military service,

the district court departed below his Guidelines range and sentenced him to

210 months in prison and three years of supervised release. (R. 104, Sent. Tr.

at 770-72; R. 95, Judgment at 704-05.) The conditions of that release required

Lockridge to participate in substance-abuse and mental-health treatment

programs:

[Special Condition A:] The defendant must participate in a program of

testing and/or treatment for drug and/or alcohol abuse, as directed by
the probation officer, until such time as the defendant is released from
the program by the probation officer.

[Special Condition B:] The defendant must participate in a program of

mental health treatment, as directed by the probation officer, until such
time as the defendant is released from the program by the probation
officer.

(R. 95, Judgment at 707; accord R. 104, Sent. Tr. at 788.)

Lockridge objected to those conditions, arguing that Special Condition A

“should include a schedule or other limit on the frequency of testing” and that

both conditions “should be clarified that only outpatient treatment is currently

contemplated.” (R. 76, Objections to PSR at 397; accord R. 104, Sent. Tr. at

747-48.) The district court overruled those objections, and Lockridge now

appeals. (R. 104, Sent. Tr. at 748; R. 97, Notice of Appeal, 714-15.)

3
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

District courts are not drug- or mental-health-treatment experts. So

when a court imposes such treatment as a condition of supervised release, the

court may leave the details to actual experts so long as the court determines

whether treatment is required and retains “ultimate authority” over the

condition. That is exactly what happened here. The district court determined

that that Lockridge “must participate” in such treatment—i.e., that treatment is

required. And by statute, the court may modify Lockridge’s conditions of

release at any time, meaning the court, not a probation officer, has final say

over the inpatient/outpatient issue. The court therefore did not err by

delegating first say over that issue to treatment professionals.

As Lockridge concedes, binding precedent forecloses his argument that

Special Condition A should have specified the frequency of drug testing.

Because the district court did not err when imposing the conditions of

Lockridge’s supervised release, his sentence should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I. The district court did not improperly delegate judicial authority to

Lockridge’s probation officer.

Federal law grants probation officers the authority and the responsibility

to “use all suitable methods, not inconsistent with the conditions specified by

4
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 8

the court” to help defendants improve their “conduct and condition.”

18 U.S.C. § 3603(3); United States v. Vaughn, 119 F.4th 1084, 1087 (6th Cir.

2024). But that authority is not unlimited. United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th

624, 634 (6th Cir. 2024). “Article III draws a line in the sand: imposing

punishment upon a defendant convicted of a crime, a core judicial function,

cannot be delegated.” Id.

When crafting conditions of supervised release, a sentencing court

remains on the permissible side of the non-delegation line so long as it reserves

“the ‘ultimate authority’ to determine the conditions’ contours.” Id. at 634-35.

In Campbell, for example, the sentencing court explained that if there were

“any questions or concerns” about a particular supervised-release condition,

the court would “take the issue up” and “resolve” it. Id. at 635. “That was

enough to satisfy any delegation concerns under [this Court’s] precedent.” Id.

Consistent with the “ultimate authority” rule, sentencing courts may

“leave implementation specifics to probation.” Vaughn, 119 F.4th at 1087-88;

accord United States v. Lindsay, No. 24-5089, 2024 WL 4225715, at *1 (6th Cir.

Sept. 18, 2024). In the context of special drug or mental health treatment

conditions, that means the court “need only decide whether such treatment is

required.” United States v. Carpenter, 702 F.3d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting

United States v. Logins, 503 F. App’x 345, 352 (6th Cir. 2012)) (discussing drug

5
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 9

treatment); see also Logins, 503 F. App’x at 350 (noting “similar results in the

context of mental health counseling”). “Decisions such as which program to

select and how long it will last can be left to the discernment of the probation

officer.” Carpenter, 702 F.3d at 885 (quoting Logins, 503 F. App’x at 352).

“Furthermore, the details of the treatment, including how often and how many

drug tests will be performed, can be left to the expertise of the professionals

running the program.” Id. (quoting Logins, F. App’x at 352).

The district court here fully complied with these non-delegation rules.

Lockridge’s argument to the contrary should be reviewed—and rejected—de

novo. Carpenter, 702 F.3d at 884.

For starters, the district court never relinquished ultimate authority over

the challenged conditions. The court may, at any time, reduce or modify those

conditions—effectively granting the court veto power over any instruction the

probation officer may give. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). If the probation officer

instructs Lockridge to attend inpatient treatment, Lockridge may petition the

court, and the court, not the probation officer, will determine whether

inpatient treatment is appropriate. See id. And if Lockridge refuses to attend

inpatient treatment, the court, not the probation officer, will determine

whether he has violated his conditions of release and whether that violation

warrants punishment. Id. § 3583(e)(3). All the probation officer can do is

6
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 10

petition the court to exercise its punitive power, and that is not a delegation of

a judicial function. (Contra Lockridge Br. at 4.) See Campbell, 122 F.4th at

634-35; cf. Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 359-60 (6th Cir. 2001)

(rejecting unlawful-delegation challenge in part because the district court was

“empowered to revoke or modify any condition of probation” (quotation

marks omitted)); see also Logins, 503 F. App’x at 353-54 (Merritt, J., concurring)

(deeming unlawful-delegation challenge “frivolous” on plain error review

where defendant had not yet sought modification under § 3583(e)(2).)

Because the district court retained final say over the inpatient/outpatient

decision, it did not err by giving the probation officer first say. The court did

its part by deciding “whether . . . treatment is required.” Carpenter, 702 F.3d at

885. The decision of “which program to select” could therefore be left in the

first instance to “the discernment of the probation officer” and “the expertise of

[treatment] professionals.” Id.

It makes sense to view the inpatient/outpatient decision as a delegable

treatment detail for several reasons. First, crafting an effective treatment plan

requires current information. Take drug treatment: “A thorough

understanding of the nature and severity of the defendant’s substance abuse

problem is an essential first step toward establishing an effective plan for

correctional intervention.” Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Overview

7
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 11

of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions, at 45 (July 2024).1 And

developing that understanding requires either “a recent and well-documented

history of substance abuse” or “the administration of a validated screening

instrument.” Id. A sentencing court will rarely have “recent” information

about what a defendant’s specific treatment needs will be upon release.

Second, crafting an effective treatment plan requires expertise. “When

screening and/or other case information indicates substance dependence, a

clinical assessment is typically the next step.” Id. “An assessment is more

comprehensive than a screening and is generally conducted by a clinically

trained substance abuse professional or probation officer.” Id. “The assessor

identifies the defendant’s substance abuse severity, strengths, weaknesses, and

readiness for treatment and provides a written recommendation for the

appropriate level of services.” Id. District courts are poorly positioned to

perform such a specialized task. Probation officers, on the other hand, “are

expected to have sufficient knowledge about addition and available treatment

services to make informed decisions.” Id.

Third, an effective treatment plan “should be collaboratively developed

by the treatment provider, the probation officer, and the defendant.” Id.

1
Available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
overview_of_probation_and_supervised_release_conditions_0.pdf.
8
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 12

“Substance abuse treatment and case planning is a dynamic process and

should be adjusted throughout the course of supervision in response to the

defendant’s current risk and needs.” Id. at 47. That kind of dynamism and

collaboration is impossible at sentencing. Similar concerns apply when

developing mental health treatment plans. See id. at 49-52.

In short, district courts are better positioned to review a decision about

whether treatment should be inpatient, outpatient, or somewhere in-between

than they are to make that decision in the first instance. As long as the court

decides whether treatment is required and retains ultimate authority to revisit

the condition, the court may—and almost certainly should—let professionals

design the initial treatment plan.

Lockridge’s counterargument is not convincing. (Lockridge Br. at 5-9.)

He relies exclusively on out-of-circuit cases, and those cases all follow the same

flawed logic: inpatient treatment is more restrictive than outpatient treatment,

they reason, so the choice cannot be entrusted to a probation officer. See

United States v. Martinez, 987 F.3d 432, 435-36 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v.

Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 122-23 (2nd Cir. 2015); United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d

686, 695-96 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th

Cir. 2009). None of those cases grapple with the essential point: the choice is

not entrusted to the probation officer, at least not in the end, because the

9
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 13

district court can modify or eliminate the condition at any time. Indeed,

Lockridge does not attempt to reconcile the cases he cites with this Court’s

precedent, under which reservation of “ultimate authority” is “enough to

satisfy any delegation concerns.” Campbell, 122 F.4th at 634-35.

Lockridge asserts that a “better approach” would put the obligation to

seek modification on the probation officer rather than the defendant.

(Lockridge Br. at 8.) District courts certainly have discretion to draft their

supervised-release conditions that way, and whether that approach is better—

and for whom—likely depends on a variety of on-the-ground factors that those

courts are best positioned to assess.2 From the perspective of the non-

delegation doctrine, however, it makes no difference. Both paths lead to the

courthouse.

It is clear that Lockridge should receive substance-abuse and mental-

health treatment upon his release. It is not yet clear what form that treatment

should take. Lockridge’s probation officer, in consultation with Lockridge and

2
Can a probation officer secure an inpatient bed for their supervisee if
inpatient treatment is forbidden by the terms of supervised release? If so, can
the probation officer obtain a modification quickly enough to not lose the spot?
And if not, will the probation officer have to seek modification without
knowing whether a spot is even available? Can supervisees obtain funding for
inpatient treatment if such treatment is not required? It is easy to imagine
ways in which Lockridge’s “better approach” might make things worse, not
least of all for defendants who need and want inpatient treatment.
10
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 14

others, will make an assessment and work out the details when the time comes.

If Lockridge objects to his treatment plan, he may ask the court to modify it; if

he refuses to comply, he may ask the court not to punish him. In all events,

the court, not his probation officer, will have the last word. There is no

delegation problem with that.

II. Lockridge’s “frequency” argument is foreclosed by binding precedent.

As Lockridge admits, Vaughn forecloses his argument that Special

Condition A should have “specif[ied] the frequency of testing.” (Lockridge Br.

at 2, 9-10.) See Vaughn, 119 F.4th at 1088-89 (rejecting de novo an objection

“to the court’s failure to specify drug-testing frequency”). “[T]esting caps

apply only to mandatory conditions—not special conditions.” Vaughn, 119

F.4th at 1088. The district court was therefore not required to include a testing

cap in Special Condition A.

Lockridge is wrong, however, to suggest that Vaughn is inconsistent with

the out-of-circuit cases he cites. (Contra Lockridge Br. at 9-10.) Those cases

“required caps on the number of drug tests when the district court imposes

them as part of a mandatory drug-testing condition.” Lindsay, 2024 WL

4225715 at *2 (discussing the same three cases Lockridge cites here). Again,

Lockridge is challenging a special condition, not a mandatory one, so “the

11
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 15

claimed parallels between [those cases] and this one do not hold up.” Id.;

accord Vaughn, 119 F.4th at 1089.

Vaughn squarely addressed and squarely rejected Lockridge’s testing-

frequency argument. Because “[o]ne panel of this court may not overrule the

decision of another panel,” United States v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir.

2017), this Court should reject his argument again.

CONCLUSION

Lockridge’s sentence should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Francis M. Hamilton III

United States Attorney

By: s/ Brian Samuelson

Brian Samuelson
Assistant United States Attorney
800 Market Street, Suite 211
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902
865.545.4167

12
 Case: 24-5784 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2025 Page: 16

DESIGNATION OF RELEVANT DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, On appeal from the United
v. States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee
DANIEL LOCKRIDGE, No. 1:23-cr-82
Defendant-Appellant.

ENTRY NO. DESCRIPTION OF ENTRY PAGE ID# RANGE

1 Indictment 1-7
45 Revised Plea Agreement 101-108
76 Objections to Presentence Report 396-398
83 Revised Presentence Report 475-499
95 Judgment 703-709
97 Notice of Appeal 714-715
104 Sentencing Transcript 743-791

s/ Brian Samuelson
Brian Samuelson
Assistant United States Attorney

13