G.R. No.

101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, et.al petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for
the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was instituted as
a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but
are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable;
they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a
ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,
such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result
of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential
loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at
one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire
island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and
varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including
the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds
and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in
marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the
entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of
the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-
billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic
uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic
changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse
effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention
to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares
of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests
are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares
for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex
"A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares
per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be
bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet
unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff
minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and
unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March
2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the
rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public
policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it
is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity
and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full
and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law —
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape
of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause
of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents
of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this
case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of
E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint
a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state
in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither
be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to
have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would
be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil
case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before
the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both
in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree
with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all
intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are
seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and
redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to
state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-
equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
— generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air,
water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation
of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement
of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments
of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only
for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people,
the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account
social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve
as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the
State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the
attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and
act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution
involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule
that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what
the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz,
a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents
a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment
of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He
was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to
whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right;
nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification
of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
28
Corp. this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State,
in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally
matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to
renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

G.R. No. 209271

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS,
INC., Petitioner
vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA
PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG
III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ
LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO
KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE., JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL
CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondents.
CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner-in-Intervention
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209276
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY AND THE FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE
AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT
SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR.
BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN,
ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO,
DR. WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO,
NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, and EDWIN MARTHINE
LOPEZ, Respondents.
CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner-in-Intervention.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209301
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BANOS FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA
PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG
III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA
PAZLUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO
KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL
CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209430
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAÑOS, Petitioner,
vs.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA
PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG
III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ
LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO
KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL
CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, and EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are nine (9) Motions for Reconsideration 1 assailing the Decision2 dated
December 8, 2015 of the Court (December 8, 2015 Decision), which upheld with modification
the Decision3 dated May 17, 2013 and the Resolution4 dated September 20, 2013 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013.
The Facts
The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for "bioengineered eggplants," known
as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong), administered pursuant to the Memorandum
of Undertaking5 (MOU) entered into by herein petitioners University of the Philippines Los
Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), and the University of the Philippines Mindanao Foundation, Inc.
(UPMFI), among others. Bt talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil
bacterium Bt, which produces the CrylAc protein that is toxic to target insect pests.
The Cry1Ac protein is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and
shoot borer, the most destructive insect pest to eggplants.6
From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB), the implementing
institution of the field trials, conducted a contained experiment on Bt talong under the
supervision of the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP). 7 The NCBP,
created under Executive Order No. (EO) 430, 8 is the regulatory body tasked to: (a) "identify and
evaluate potential hazards involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments or the
introduction of new species and genetically engineered organisms and recommend measures to
minimize risks"; and (b) ''formulate and review national policies and guidelines on biosafety,
such as the safe conduct of work on genetic engineering, pests and their genetic materials for
the protection of public health, environment[,] and personnel[,] and supervise the
implementation thereof."9 Upon the completion of the contained experiment, the NCBP issued
a Certificate10 therefor stating that all biosafety measures were complied with, and no
untoward incident had occurred.11
On March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued two (2)-year
Biosafety Permits12 for field testing of Bt talong13after UPLB's field test proposal satisfactorily
completed biosafety risk assessment for field testing pursuant to the Department of
Agriculture's (DA) Administrative Order No. 8, series of 2002 14 (DAO 08-2002),15 which provides
for the rules and regulations for the importation and release into the environment of plants and
plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology. 16 Consequently, field testing
proceeded in approved trial sites in North Cotabato, Pangasinan, Camarines Sur, Davao City,
and Laguna.17
On April 26, 2012, respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)
(Greenpeace), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG), and
others (respondents) filed before the Court a Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and
Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO)18 (petition for Writ of Kalikasan) against herein petitioners the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
the BPI and the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) of the DA, UPLBFI, and ISAAA, and
UPMFI, alleging that the Bt talong field trials violated their constitutional right to health and a
balanced ecology considering, among others, that: (a) the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC), as required by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151, 19 was not secured prior to
the field trials;20 (b) the required public consultations under the Local Government Code (LGC)
were not complied with;21 and (c) as a regulated article under DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is
presumed harmful to human health and the environment, and that there is no independent,
peer-reviewed study showing its safety for human consumption and the
environment.22 Further, they contended that since the scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt
talong remained insufficient or uncertain, and that preliminary scientific evaluation shows
reasonable grounds for concern, the precautionary principle should be applied and, thereby,
the field trials be enjoined.23
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued 24 a Writ of Kalikasan against petitioners (except UPLB25) and
UPMFI, ordering them to make a verified return within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days, as provided for in Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.26 Thus, in compliance therewith, ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLBFI, and UPMFI 27 filed their
respective verified returns,28 and therein maintained that: (a) all environmental laws were
complied with, including the required public consultations in the affected communities; (b) an
ECC was not required for the field trials as it will not significantly affect the environment nor
pose a hazard to human health; (c) there is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-
reviewed, on the safety of Bt talong for human consumption; (d) at any rate, the safety of Bt
talong for human consumption is irrelevant because none of the eggplants will be consumed by
humans or animals and all materials not used for analyses will be chopped, boiled, and buried
following the conditions of the Biosafety Permits; and (e) the precautionary principle could not
be applied as the field testing was only a part of a continuing study to ensure that such trials
have no significant and negative impact on the environment.29
On July 10, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution 30 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for
acceptance of the return of the writ and for hearing, reception of evidence, and rendition of
judgment.31 In a hearing before the CA on August 14, 2012, UPLB was impleaded as a party to
the case and was furnished by respondents a copy of their petition. Consequently the CA
directed UPLB to file its comment to the petition 32 and, on August 24, 2012, UPLB filed its
Answer33 adopting the arguments and allegations in the verified return filed by UPLBFI. On the
other hand, in a Resolution34 dated February 13, 2013, the CA discharged UPMFI as a party to
the case pursuant to the Manifestation and Motion filed by respondents in order to expedite
the proceedings and resolution of the latter's petition.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision35 dated May 17, 2013, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and directed
petitioners to pem1anently cease and desist from conducting the Bt talong field trials.36 At
the outset, it did not find merit in petitioners' contention that the case should be dismissed on
the ground of mootness, noting that the issues raised by the latter were "capable of repetition
yet evading review" since the Bt talong field trial was just one of the phases or stages of an
overall and bigger study that is being conducted in relation to the said genetically-modified
organism.37 It then held that the precautionary principle set forth under Section 1,38 Rule 20 of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases 39 is relevant, considering the Philippines' rich
biodiversity and uncertainty surrounding the safety of Bt talong. It noted the possible
irreversible effects of the field trials and the introduction of Bt talong to the market, and found
the existing regulations issued by the DA and the Department of Science and Technology
(DOST) insufficient to guarantee the safety of the environment and the health of the people. 40
Aggrieved, petitioners separately moved for reconsideration. 41 However, in a Resolution42 dated
September 20, 2013, the CA denied the same and remarked that introducing genetically
modified plant into the ecosystem is an ecologically imbalancing act. 43 Anent UPLB 's argument
that the Writ of Kalikasan violated its right to academic freedom, the CA emphasized that the
writ did not stop the research on Bt talong but only the procedure employed in conducting the
field trials, and only at this time when there is yet no law ensuring its safety when introduced to
the environment.44
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed their respective petitions for review on certiorari before this Court.
The Proceedings Before the Court
In a Decision45 dated December 8, 2015, the Court denied the petitions and accordingly,
affirmed with modification the ruling of the CA. 46 Agreeing with the CA, the Court held that the
precautionary; principle applies in this case since the risk of harm from the field trials of Bt
talong remains uncertain and there exists a possibility of serious and irreversible harm . The
Court observed that eggplants are a staple vegetable in the country that is mostly grown by
small-scale farmers who are poor and marginalized; thus, given the country's rich biodiversity,
the consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and
irreversible.47
The Court likewise agreed with the CA in not dismissing the case for being moot and academic
despite the completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials, on account of the following
exceptions to the mootness principle: (a) the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; and (b) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.48
Further, the Court noted that while the provisions of DAO 08-2002 were observed, the National
Biosafety Framework (NBF) established under EO 514, series of 2006 49 which requires public
participation in all stages of biosafety decision-making, pursuant to the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety50 which was acceded to by the Philippines in 2000 and became effective locally in
2003, was not complied with.51 Moreover, the field testing should have been subjected to
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), considering that it involved new technologies with
uncertain results.52
Thus, the Court permanently enjoined the field testing of Bt talong. In addition, it declared DAO
08-2002 null and void for failure to consider the provisions of the NBF. The Court also
temporarily enjoined any application for contained use, field testing, propagation,
commercialization, and importation of genetically modified organisms until a new
administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.53
The Issues Presented in the Motions for Reconsideration
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration, 54 arguing, among others, that: (a) the case
should have been dismissed for mootness in view of the completion and termination of the Bt
talong field trials and the expiration of the Biosafety Permits; 55 (b) the Court should not have
ruled on the validity of DAO 08-2002 as it was not raised as an issue; 56 and (c) the Court erred in
relying on the studies cited in the December 8, 2015 Decision which were not offered in
evidence and involved Bt corn, not Bt talong.57
In their Consolidated Comments,58 respondents maintain, in essence, that: (a) the case is not
mooted by the completion of the field trials since field testing is part of the process of
commercialization and will eventually lead to propagation, commercialization, and
consumption of Bt talong as a consumer product;59 (b) the validity of DAO 08-2002 was raised
by respondents when they argued in their petition for Writ of Kalikasan that such
administrative issuance is not enough to adequately protect the Constitutional right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology;60 and (c) the Court correctly took judicial notice of
the scientific studies showing the negative effects of Bt technology and applied the
precautionary principle.61
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the motions for reconsideration on the ground of mootness.
As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. 62 The requirement of the
existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy" for the proper exercise of the power of judicial
review proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the comis of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or
to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. 63
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be
raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination
thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.64
Nevertheless, case law states that the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 65 Thus, jurisprudence recognizes these four
instances as exceptions to the mootness principle.
In the December 8, 2015 Decision of the Court, it was held that (a) the present case is of
exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved, and (b) it is likewise capable of
repetition yet evading review. Hence, it was excepted from the mootness principle. 66 However,
upon a closer scrutiny of the parties' arguments, the Court reconsiders its ruling and now finds
merit in petitioners' assertion that the case should have been dismissed for being moot and
academic, and that the aforesaid exceptions to the said rule should not have been applied.
I. On the paramount public interest exception.
Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-fast rule in determining whether a case
involves paramount public interest in relation to the mootness principle. However, a survey of
cases would show that, as a common guidepost for application, there should be some
perceivable benefit to the public which demands the Court to proceed with the resolution of
otherwise moot questions.
In Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,67an action for declaratory judgment assailing the
validity of Republic Act No. (RA) 4880, 68 which prohibits the early nomination of candidates for
elective offices and early election campaigns or partisan political activities became moot by
reason of the holding of the 1967 elections before the case could be decided. Nonetheless, the
Court treated the petition as one for prohibition and rendered judgment in view of "the
paramount public interest and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections [of
1969] being barely six months away."69
In De Castro v. Commission on Elections,70 the Court proceeded to resolve the election protest
subject of that case notwithstanding the supervening death of one of the contestants.
According to the Court, in an election contest, there is a paramount need to dispel the
uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate.71
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,72the Court ruled on the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017, s. 2006,73 which declared a state of National Emergency, even though
the same was lifted before a decision could be rendered. The Court explained that the case was
one of exceptional character and involved paramount public interest, because the people's
basic rights to expression, assembly, and of the press were at issue.74
In Constantino v. S'andiganbayan,75 both of the accused were found guilty of graft and corrupt
practices under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. 76 One of the accused appealed the conviction, while
the other filed a petition for certiorari before the Court. While the appellant died during the
pendency of his appeal, the Court still ruled on the merits thereof considering the exceptional
character of the appeals in relation to each other, i.e., the two petitions were so intertwined
that the absolution of the deceased was determinative of the absolution of the other accused. 77
More recently, in Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO), 78the petitioner prayed
that the Commission on Audit (COA) be ordered to audit the MECO which is based in Taiwan,
on the premise that it is a government-owned and controlled corporation. 79 The COA argued
that the case is already moot and should be dismissed, since it had already directed a team of
auditors to proceed to Taiwan to audit the accounts of MECO. 80 Ruling on the merits, the Court
explained that the case was of paramount public interest because it involved the COA's
performance of its constitutional duty and because the case concerns the legal status of
MECO, i.e., whether it may be considered as a government agency or not, which has a direct
bearing on the country's commitment to the One China Policy of the People's Republic of
China.81
In contrast to the foregoing cases, no perceivable benefit to the public - whether rational or
practical - may be gained by resolving respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan on the merits.
To recount, these cases, which stemmed from herein respondents petition for Writ
of Kalikasan, were mooted by the undisputed expiration of the Biosafety Permits issued by the
BPI and the completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials subject of the same.82 These
incidents effectively negated the necessity for the reliefs sought by respondents in their
petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no longer any field test to enjoin. Hence, at the time
the CA rendered its Decision dated May 17, 2013, the reliefs petitioner sought and granted by
the CA were no longer capable of execution.
At this juncture, it is important to understand that the completion and termination of the field
tests do not mean that herein petitioners may inevitably proceed to commercially propagate Bt
talong.83 There are three (3) stages before genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) may become
commercially available under DAO 08-2002 84 and each stage is distinct, such that "[s]ubsequent
stages can only proceed if the prior stage/s [is/]are completed and clearance is given to engage
in the next regulatory stage."85 Specifically, before a genetically modified organism is allowed to
be propagated under DAO 08-2002: (a) a permit for propagation must be secured from the
BPI; (b) it can be shown that based on the field testing conducted in the Philippines, the
regulated article will not pose any significant risks to the environment; (c) food and/or feed
safety studies show that the regulated article will not pose any significant risks to human and
animal health; and (d) if the regulated article is a pest-protected plant, its transformation event
has been duly registered with the FPA.86
As the matter never went beyond the field testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks related
to propagation were pursued or the requirements therefor complied with. Thus, there are no
guaranteed after-effects to the already concluded Bt talong field trials that demand an
adjudication from which the public may perceivably benefit. Any future threat to the right ,of
herein respondents or the public in general to a healthful and balanced ecology is therefore
more imagined than real.
In fact, it would appear to be more beneficial to the public to stay a verdict on the safeness
of Bt talong - or GMOs, for that matter - until an actual and justiciable case properly presents
itself before the Court. In his Concurring Opinion 87 on the main, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen (Justice Leonen) had aptly pointed out that "the findings [resulting from the Bt
talong field trials] should be the material to provide more rigorous scientific analysis of the
various claims made in relation to Bt talong."88 True enough, the concluded field tests ·- like
those in these cases – would yield data that may prove useful for future studies and analyses. If
at all, resolving the petition for Writ of Kalikasan would unnecessarily arrest the results of
further research and testing on Et talong, and even GMOs in general, and hence, tend to hinder
scientific advancement on the subject matter.
More significantly, it is clear that no benefit would be derived by the public in assessing the
merits of field trials whose parameters are not only unique to the specific type of Bt
talong tested, but are now, in fact, rendered obsolete by the supervening change in the
regulatory framework applied to GMO field testing. To be sure, DAO 08-2002 has already been
superseded by Joint Department Circular No. 1, series of 2016 89 (JDC 01-2016), issued by the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the DA, the DENR, the Department of Health
(DOH), and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), which provides a
substantially different regulatory framework from that under DAO 08-2002 as will be detailed
below. Thus, to resolve respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan on its merits, would be
tantamount to an unnecessary scholarly exercise for the Court to assess alleged violations of
health and environmental rights that arose from a past test case whose bearings do not find
any - if not minimal -- relevance to cases operating under today's regulatory framework.
Therefore, the paramount public interest exception to the mootness rule should not have been
applied.
II. The case is not one capable of repetition vet evading review.
Likewise, contrary to the Court's earlier ruling, 90 these cases do not fall under the "capable of
repetition yet evading review" exception.
The Court notes that the petition for Writ of Kalikasan specifically raised issues only against the
field testing of Bt talong under the premises 'of DAO 08,..2002, 91 i.e., that herein petitioners
failed to: (a) fully inform the eople regarding the health, environment, and other hazards
involved;92 and (b) conduct any valid risk assessment before conducting the field trial. 93 As
further pointed out by Justice Leonen, the reliefs sought did not extend far enough to enjoin
the use of the results of the field trials that have been completed. Hence, the petition's
specificity prevented it from falling under the above exception to the mootness rule. 94
More obviously, the supersession of DAO 08-2002 by JDC 01-2016 clearly prevents this case
from being one capable of repetition so as to warrant review despite its mootness. To
contextualize, JDC 01-2016 states that:
Section 1. Applicability. This Joint Department Circular shall apply to the research,
development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the environment, and
management of genetically-modified plant and plant products derived from the use of modern
technology, included under "regulated articles."
As earlier adverted to, with the issuance of JDC 01-2016, a new regulatory framework in the
conduct of field testing now applies.
Notably, the new framework under JDC 01-2016 is substantially different from that under DAO
08-2002. In fact, the new parameters in JDC 01-2016 pertain to provisions which prompted the
Court to invalidate D'AO 08-2002. In the December 8, 2015 Decision of the Court, it was
observed that: (a) DAO 08-2002 has no mechanism to mandate compliance with inten1ational
biosafety protocols;95 (b) DAO 08-2002 does not comply with the transparency and public
participation requirements under the NBF; 96 and (c) risk assessment is conducted by an informal
group, called the Biosafety Advisory Team of the DA, composed of representatives from the
BPI, Bureau of Animal Industry, FPA, DENR, DOH, and DOST.97
Under DAO 08-2002, no specific guidelines were used in the conduct of risk assessment, and
the DA was allowed to consider the expert advice of, and guidelines developed by, relevant
inteniational organizations and regulatory authorities of countries with significant experience in
the regulatory supervision of the regulated article. 98 However, under JDC 01-2016, the
CODEX Alimentarius Guidelines was adopted to govern the risk assessment of activities
involving the research, development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release into
the environment, and management of genetically modified plant and plant products derived
from the use of modem biotechnology.99 Also, whereas DAO 08-2002 was limited to the DA's
authority in regulating the importation and release into the environment of plants and plant
products derived from the use of modern biotechnology, 100 under JDC 01-2016, various relevant
government agencies such as the DOST, DOH, DENR, and the DILG now participate in all stages
of the biosafety decision-making process, with the DOST being the central and lead agency. 101
JDC 01-2016 also provides for a more comprehensive avenue for public participation in cases
involving field trials and requires applications for permits and permits already issued to be
made public by posting them online in the websites of the NCBP and the BPI. 102 The
composition of the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) has also been modified to include an
elected local official in the locality where the field testing will be conducted as one of the
community representatives.103 Previously, under DAO 08-2002, the only requirement for the
community representatives is that they shall not be affiliated with the applicant and shall be in
a position to represent the interests of the communities where the field testing is to be
conducted.104
JDC 01-2016 also prescribes additional qualifications for the members of the Scientific and
Technical Review Panel (STRP), the pool of scientists that evaluates the risk assessment
submitted by the applicant for field trial, commercial propagation, or direct use of regulated
articles. Aside from not being an official, staff or employee of the DA or any of its attached
agencies, JDC 01-2016 requires that members of the STRP: (a) must not be directly or indirectly
employed or engaged by a company or institution with pending applications for pennits under
JDC 01-2016; (b) must possess technical expertise in food and nutrition, toxicology, ecology,
crop protection, environmental science, molecular biology and biotechnology, genetics, plant
breeding, or animal nutrition; and (c) must be well-respected in the scientific community. 105
Below is a tabular presentation of the differences between the relevant portions of DAO 08-
2002 and JDC 01-2016:

DAO 08-2002 JDC 01-2016

1. As to coverage and government participation

WHEREAS, under Title IV, Chapter 4, Section ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

19 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the
Section 1. Applicability. This Joint
Department of Agriculture, through the
Department Circular shall apply to the
Bureau of Plant Industry, is responsible for
research, development, handling and use,
the production of improved planting
transboundary movement, release into the
materials and protection of agricultural
environment, and management of
crops from pests and diseases; and
genetically-modified plant and plant
xxxx products derived from the use of modern
biotechnology, included under "regulated
PART I
articles."
GENERAL PROVISIONS
xxxx
xxxx
ARTICLE III. ADMINISTRATIVE
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS FRAMEWORK
xxxx Section 4. Role of National Government
Agencies Consistent with the NBF and the
Section 2
laws granting their powers and functions,
Coverage
national government agencies shall have the
A. Scope - This Order covers the importation following roles:
or release into the environment of: 1. Any
A. [DA]. As the principal agency of the
plant which has been altered or produced
Philippine Government responsible for the
through the use of modem biotechnology if
promotion of agricultural and rural growth
the donor organism, host organism, or
and development so as to ensure food
vector or vector agent belongs to any of the
security and to contribute to poverty
genera or taxa classified by BPI as meeting
the definition of plant pest or is a medium alleviation, the DA shall take the lead in
for the introduction of noxious weeds; or addressing biosafety issues related to the
country's agricultural productivity and food
2. Any plant or plant product altered or
security.x x x.
produced through the use of modern
biotechnology which may pose significant B. [DOST]. As the premier science and
risks to human health and the environment technology body in the country, the DOST
based on available scientific and technical shall take the lead in ensuring that the best
information. available science is utilized and applied in
adopting biosafety policies, measures and
B. Exceptions. - This Order shall not apply to
guidelines, and in making biosafety decision.
the contained use of a regulated article,
which is within the regulatory supervision of
NCBP. x xx.
C. [DENR]. As the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation
management, development and proper use
of the country's environment and natural
resources, the DENR shall ensure that
environmental assessments are done and
impacts identified in biosafety decisions. x x
x.
D. [DOH]. The DOH, as the principal
authority on health, shall formulate
guidelines in assessing the health impacts
posed by modern biotechnology and its
applications. x x x.
E. [DILG]. The DILG shall coordinate with the
DA, DOST, DENR and DOH in overseeing the
implementation of this Circular in relation to
the activities that are to be implemented in
specific LGUs, particulady in relation to the
conduct of public consultations as required
under the Local Government Code. x x x.

2. As to guidelines in risk assessment

PART I ARTICLE II. BIOSAFETY DECISIONS

GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 3. Guidelines in Making Biosafety

Decisions
xxxx
The principles under the NBF shall guide
Section 3
concerned agencies in making biosafety
Risk Assessment
decisions, including:
A. Principles of Risk Assessment - No
xxxx
regulated article shall be allowed to be
imported or released into the environment B. Risk Assessment. Risk assessment shall be
without the conduct of a risk assessment mandatory and central in making biosafety
performed in accordance with this Order. decisions, consistent with policies and
The following principles shall be followed standards on risk assessment issued by the
when performing a risk assessment to NCBP; and guided by Annex III of the
determine whether a regulated article poses Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Pursuant to
significant risks to human health and the the NBF, the following principles shall be
environment: followed when performing a risk assessment
to determine whether a regulated article
1. The risk assessment shall be carried out in
poses significant risks to human health and
a scientifically sound and transparent
the environment.
manner based on available scientific and
technical information. The expert advice of, 1. The risk assessment shall be carried out in
and guidelines developed by, relevant a scientifically sound and transparent
international organizations and regulatory manner based on available scientific and
authorities of countries with significant technical information. The expert advice of
experience in the regulatory supervision of and guidelines developed by, relevant
the regulated article shall be taken into international organizations, including
account in the conduct of risk assessment. intergovernmental bodies, and regulatory
authorities of countries with significant
x x xx
experience in the regulatory supervision of
the regulated article shall be taken into
account. In the conduct of risk assessment,
CODEX Alimentarius Guidelines on the Food
Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from
the Recombinant-DNA Plants shall
internationally adopted as well as other
internationally accepted consensus
documents.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

3. As to public participation

PART III ARTICLE V. FIELD TRIAL OF REGULATED

APPROVAL PROCESS FOR FIELD TESTING OF ARTICLES
REGULATE ARTICLES
Section 12. Public Participation for Field
xxxx Trial
Section 8 A. The BPI shall make public all applications
and Biosafety Permits for Field Trial through
Requirements for Field Testing
posting on the NCBP and BPI websites, and
xxxx in the offices of the DA and DOST in the
province, city, or municipality where the
G. Public Consultation. - The applicant,
field trial will be conducted.
acting through its IBC, shall notity and invite
comments on the field testing proposal from
the barangays and city/municipal x x xx
governments with jurisdiction over the field
test sites. The IBC shall post for three (3)
consecutive weeks copies of the Public
Information Sheet for Field Testing approved
by the BPI in at least three (3) conspicuous
places in each of the concerned barangay
and city/municipal halls. The Public
Information Sheet for Field Testing shall,
among others, invite interested parties to
send their comments on the proposed field
testing to BPI within a period of thirty (30)
days from the date of posting. It shall be m a
language understood in the community.
During the comment period, any interested
person may submit to BPI written comments
regarding the application. The applicant shall
submit proof of posting in the form of
certifications from the concerned barangay
captains and city/municipal mayors or an
affidavit stating the dates and places of
posting duly executed by the responsible
officer or his duly authorized representative.

4. As to membership in the Institutional Biosafety Committee

PART I ARTICLE III. ADMINISTRATIVE

GENERAL PROVISIONS
FRAMEWORK
Section 1
xxxx
Definition of Terms
Section 6. Institutional Biosafety Committee
xxxx
The company or institution applying for and
L. "IBC" means the Institutional Biosafety granted permits under this Circular shall
Committee established by an applicant in constitute an IBC prior to the contained use,
preparation for the field testing of a confined test, or field trial of a regulated
regulated article and whose membership has article. The membership of the IBC shall be
been approved by BPI. The JBC shall be approved by the DOST-BC for contained use
responsible for the initial evaluation of the or confined test, or by the DA-BC for field
risk assessment and risk management trial. The IBC is responsible for the conduct
strategies of the applicant for field testing. It of the risk assessment and preparation of
shall be composed of at least five (5) risk management strategies of the applicant
members, three (3) of whom shall be for contained use, confined test, or field
designated as "scientist-members" who shall trial. It shall make sure that the environment
possess scientific and technological and human health are safeguarded in the
knowledge and expertise sufficient to enable conduct of any activity involving regulated
them to evaluate and monitor properly any articles.
work of the applicant relating to the field
The IBC shall be composed of at least five (5)
testing of a regulated article. The other
members, three (3) of whom shall be
members, who shall be designated as
designated, as scientist-members and two
"community representatives", shall not be
(2) members shall be community
affiliated with the applicant apart from being
representatives. All scientist-members must
members of its IBC and shall be in a position
possess scientific or technological knowledge
to represent the interests of the
and expertise sufficient to enable them to
communities where the field testing is to be
property evaluate and monitor any work
conducted. For the avoidance of doubt,
involving regulated articles conducted by the
NCBP shall be responsible for approving the
applicant.
membership of the IBC for contained use of
a regulated article. The community regresentative must not be
affiliated with the applicant, and must be in
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
a position to regresent the interests of the
communities where the activities are to be
conducted. One of the community
regresentatives shall be an elected official of
the LGU. The other community
representative shall be selected from the
residents who are members of the Civil
Society Organizations represented in the
Local Poverty Reduction Action Team,
pursuant to DILG Memorandum Circular No.
2015-45. For multi-location trials,
community representatives of the IBC shall
be designated per site. x x x. (Underscoring
supplied)

5. As to the composition and qualifications of the members of the Scientific and

Technical Review
Panel

PART I ARTICLE III. ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK

 GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1 xxxx

Definition of Terms Section 7. Scientific and Technical Review

Panel (STRP) The DA shall create a Scientific
xxxx
and Technical Review Panel composed of a
EE. "STRP" means the Scientific and pool of non-DA scientists with expertise in
Technical Review Panel created by BPI as an the evaluation of the potential risks of
advisory body, composed of at least three regulated articles to the environment and
(3) reputable and independent scientists health. x x x
who shall not be employees of the
xxxx
Department and who have the relevant
professional background necessary to The DA shall select scientists/experts in the
evaluate the potential risks of the proposed STRP, who shall meet the following
activity to human health and the qualifications:
environment based on available scientific
A. Must not be an official, staff or employee
and technical information.
of the DA or any of its attached agencies;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
B. Must not be directly or indirectly
employed or engaged by a company or
institution with pending applications for
permits covered by this Circular;
C. Possess technical expertise in at least one
of the following fields: food and nutrition;
toxicology, ecology, crop protection,
environmental science, molecular biology
and biotechnology, genetics, plant breeding,
animal nutrition; and
D. Well-respected in the scientific
community as evidenced by positions held in
science-based organizations, awards and
recognitions, publications in local and
international peer-reviewed scientific
journals.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the regulatory framework now applicable in
conducting risk assessment in matters involving the research, development, handling,
movement, and release into the environment of genetically modified plant and plant products
derived from the use of modem biotechnology is substantially different from that which was
applied to the subject field trials. In this regard, it cannot be said that the present case is one
capable of repetition yet evading review.
The essence of cases capable of repetition yet evading review was succinctly explained by the
Court in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.,106 where the constitutionality of the Executive Department's
lump-sum, discretionary funds under the 2013 General Appropriations Act, known as the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), was assailed. In that case, the Court rejected the
view that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms
undertaken by the Executive Department and former President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III's
declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF." Citing the historical evolution of the
ubiquitous Pork Barrel System, which was the source of the PDAF, and the fact that it
has always been incorporated in the national budget which is enacted annually, the Court ruled
that it is one capable of repetition yet evading review, thus:
Finally, the application of the fourth exception [to the rule on mootness] is called for by
the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional
imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The relevance of the issues before the Court does
not cease with the passage of a "PDAF-free budget for 2014." The evolution of the "Pork Barrel
System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of
truth to petitioners' claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different
collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the government had already backtracked on a
previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review"
exception in order "[t]o prevent similar questions from re-emerging." The situation similarly
holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain
public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition
and hence; must not evade judicial review.107 (Emphases supplied)
Evidently, the "frequent" and "routinary" nature of the Pork Barrel Funds and the PDAF are
wanting herein. To reiterate, the issues in these cases involve factual considerations which are
peculiar only to the controversy at hand since the petition for Writ of Kalikasan is specific to
the field testing of Bt talong and does not involve other GMOs.
At this point, the Court discerns that there are two (2) factors to be considered before a case is
deemed one capable of repetition yet evading review: (1) the challenged action was in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same
action.
Here, respondents cannot claim that the duration of the subject field tests was too short to be
fully litigated. It must be emphasized that the Biosafety Permits for the subject field tests were
issued on March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, and were valid for two (2) years. However, as
aptly pointed out by Justice Leonen, respondents filed their petition for Writ of Kalikasan only
on April 26, 2012 - just a few months before the Biosafety Permits expired and when the field
testing activities were already over.108 Obviously, therefore, the cessation of the subject field
tests before the case could be resolved was due to respondents' own inaction.
Moreover, the situation respondents complain of is not susceptible' to repetition. As discussed
above, DAO 08-2002 has already been superseded by JDC 01-2016. Hence, future applications
for field testing will be governed by JDC 01-2016 which, as illustrated, adopts a regulatory
framework that is substantially different from that of DAO 08-2002.
Therefore, it was improper for the Court to resolve the merits of the case which had become
moot in view of the absence of any valid exceptions to the rule on mootness, and to thereupon
rule on the objections against the validity and consequently nullify DAO 08-2002 under the
premises of the precautionary principle.
In fact, in relation to the latter, it is observed that the Court should not have even delved into
the constitutionality of DAO 08-2002 as it was merely collaterally challenged by respondents,
based on the constitutional precepts of the people's rights to infonnation on matters of public
concern, to public participation, to a balanced and healthful ecology, and to health. 109 A cursory
perusal of the petition for Writ of Kalikasan filed by respondents on April 26, 2012 before the
Court shows that they essentially assail herein petitioners' failure to: (a) fully infom1 the people
regarding the health, environment, and other hazards involved; 110 and (b) conduct any valid risk
assessment before conducting the field trial. 111 However, while the provisions of DAO 08-2002
were averred to be inadequate to protect (a) the constitutional right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology since "said regulation failed, among others, to anticipate 'the
public implications caused by the importation of GMOs in the Philippines"'; 112and (b) "the
people from the potential harm these genetically modified plants and genetically modified
organisms may cause human health and the environment, [and] thus, x x x fall short of
Constitutional compliance,"113 respondents merely prayed for its amendment, as well as that of
the NBF, to define or incorporate "an independent, transparent, and comprehensive scientific
and socio-economic risk assessment, public information, consultation, and participation, and
providing for their effective implementation, in accord with international safety
standards[.]"114 This attempt to assail the constitutionality of the public info1mation and
consultation requirements under DAO 08-2002 and the NBF constitutes a collateral attack on
the said provisions of law that runs afoul of the wdlsettled rule that the constitutionality of a
statute cannot be collaterally attacked as constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and
not collaterally.115 Verily, the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions
and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary, in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.
This means that the measure had first been carefuliy studied by the executive department and
found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved. 116
All told, with respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already mooted by the expiration of
the Biosafoty Permits and the completion of the field trials subject of these cases, and with
none of the exceptions to the mootness principle properly attending, the Court grants the
instant motions for reconsideration and hereby dismisses the aforesaid petition. With this
pronouncement, no discussion on the substantive merits of the same should be made.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8,
2015 of the Court, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated May 17, 2013 and the
Resolution dated September 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013, is
hereby SET ASIDE for the reasons above-explained. A new one is ENTERED DISMISSING the
Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) filed by respondents Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura, and
others on the ground of mootness.
G.R. No. L-20850 November 29, 1965
THE EDWARD J. NELL COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PACIFIC FARMS, INC., respondent.
Agrava & Agrava for petitioner.
Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari, taken by Edward J. Nell Co. — hereinafter referred to as appellant — from
a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On October 9, 1958, appellant secured in Civil Case No. 58579 of the Municipal Court of Manila
against Insular Farms, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as Insular Farms a judgment for the sum of
P1,853.80 — representing the unpaid balance of the price of a pump sold by appellant to
Insular Farms — with interest on said sum, plus P125.00 as attorney's fees and P84.00 as costs.
A writ of execution, issued after the judgment had become final, was, on August 14, 1959,
returned unsatisfied, stating that Insular Farms had no leviable property. Soon thereafter, or on
November 13, 1959, appellant filed with said court the present action against Pacific Farms, Inc.
— hereinafter referred to as appellee — for the collection of the judgment aforementioned,
upon the theory that appellee is the alter ego of Insular Farms, which appellee has denied. In
due course, the municipal court rendered judgment dismissing appellant's complaint. Appellant
appealed, with the same result, to the court of first instance and, subsequently, to the Court of
Appeals. Hence this appeal by certiorari, upon the ground that the Court of Appeals had erred:
(1) in not holding the appellee liable for said unpaid obligation of the Insular Farms; and (2) in
not granting attorney's fees to appellant.
With respect to the first ground, it should be noted that appellant's complaint in the municipal
court was anchored upon the theory that appellee is an alter ego of Insular Farms, because the
former had purchased all or substantially all of the shares of stock, as well as the real and
personal properties of the latter, including the pumping equipment sold by appellant to Insular
Farms. The record shows that, on March 21, 1958, appellee purchased 1,000 shares of stock of
Insular Farms for P285,126.99; that, thereupon, appellee sold said shares of stock to certain
individuals, who forthwith reorganized said corporation; and that the board of directors
thereof, as reorganized, then caused its assets, including its leasehold rights over a public land
in Bolinao, Pangasinan, to be sold to herein appellee for P10,000.00. We agree with the Court
of Appeals that these facts do not prove that the appellee is an alter ego of Insular Farms, or
is liable for its debts. The rule is set forth in Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 15, Sec.
7122, pp. 160-161, as follows:
Generally where one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to another
corporation, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the transferor, except: (1)
where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2) where the
transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the corporations; (3) where the purchasing
corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; and (4) where the transaction is
entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation that appellee had expressly or impliedly
agreed to assume the debt of Insular Farms in favor of appellant herein, or that the appellee is
a continuation of Insular Farms, or that the sale of either the shares of stock or the assets of
Insular Farms to the appellee has been entered into fraudulently, in order to escape liability for
the debt of the Insular Farms in favor of appellant herein. In fact, these sales took place (March,
1958) not only over six (6) months before the rendition of the judgment (October 9, 1958)
sought to be collected in the present action, but, also, over a month before the filing of the case
(May 29, 1958) in which said judgment was rendered. Moreover, appellee purchased the shares
of stock of Insular Farms as the highest bidder at an auction sale held at the instance of
a bank to which said shares had been pledged as security for an obligation of Insular Farms in
favor of said bank. It has, also, been established that the appellee had paid P285,126.99 for said
shares of stock, apart from the sum of P10,000.00 it, likewise, paid for the other assets of
Insular Farms.
Neither is it claimed that these transactions have resulted in the consolidation or merger of the
Insular Farms and appellee herein. On the contrary, appellant's theory to the effect that
appellee is an alter ego of the Insular Farms negates such consolidation or merger, for a
corporation cannot be its own alter ego.
It is urged, however, that said P10,000.00 paid by appellee for other assets of Insular Farms is a
grossly inadequate price, because, appellant now claims, said assets were worth around
P285,126.99, and that, consequently, the sale must be considered fraudulent. However, the
sale was submitted to and approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. It must be
presumed, therefore, that the price paid was fair and reasonable. Moreover, the only issue
raised in the court of origin was whether or not appellee is an alter ego of Insular Farms. The
question of whether the aforementioned sale of assets for P10,000.00 was fraudulent or not,
had not been put in issue in said court. Hence, it may, not be raised on appeal.
Being a mere consequence of the first assignment of error, which is thus clearly untenable,
appellant's second assignment of error needs no discussion.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. It
is so ordered.

G.R. No. 125078 May 30, 2011

BERNABE L. NAVIDA, et.al, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. DIZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, General
Santos City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD
FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT
CO., DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDS
INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 125598
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, which arose out of two civil cases that were filed in different courts but whose factual
background and issues are closely intertwined.
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 1250781 and 1255982 both assail the Order3 dated May 20, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617. The said
Order decreed the dismissal of the case in view of the perceived lack of jurisdiction of the RTC
over the subject matter of the complaint. The petition in G.R. No. 125598 also challenges the
Orders dated June 4, 19964 and July 9, 1996,5 which held that the RTC of General Santos City no
longer had jurisdiction to proceed with Civil Case No. 5617.
On the other hand, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 126654, 6 127856,7 and 1283988 seek the reversal
of the Order9 dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No.
24,251-96, which also dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were consolidated in the Resolutions
dated February 10, 1997,10 April 28, 199711 and March 10, 1999.12
The factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows:
Proceedings before the Texas Courts
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by
citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs
sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on
farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in,
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases therein
that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil
Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v.
Shell Oil Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The defendants in the
consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Pertinently, the court ordered that:
Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez and Isae Carcamo will be dismissed 90 days after the entry of
this Memorandum and Order provided that defendants and third- and fourth-party defendants
have:
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States xxx;
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defense
within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order in any action commenced by a
plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which his injury occurred. Any
plaintiff desiring to bring such an action will do so within 30 days after the entry of this
Memorandum and Order;
(3) waived within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order any limitations-based
defense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;
(4) stipulated within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order that any discovery
conducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the
same extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and
(5) submitted within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order an agreement
binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.
xxxx
Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result from this Memorandum and Order, in the event
that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in
which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court
will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for [forum non
conveniens].13
Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078 and 125598
In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General
Santos City (the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed a
Joint Complaint14 in the RTC of General Santos City on August 10, 1995. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 5617. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical
Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co.,
Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as
DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte
Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL
MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac
Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as
defendant companies.)
Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the
reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They
claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970’s up to
the early 1980’s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at;
and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. Navida,
et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the
defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of
commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be
exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known,
were highly injurious to the former’s health and well-being.
Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively filed their
Motions for Bill of Particulars.15 During the pendency of the motions, on March 13, 1996,
NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint Complaint, 16 excluding Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.,
Ameribrom, Inc., Bromine Compounds, Ltd. and Amvac Chemical Corp. as party defendants.
Again, the remaining defendant companies filed their various Motions for Bill of
Particulars.17 On May 15, 1996, DOW filed an Answer with Counterclaim.18
On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos
City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case, to wit:
THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
xxxx
The substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign
companies cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and
beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the
complaint included the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their
distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of
commerce.
Accordingly, the subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the
present case, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants
outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts,
including the present Regional Trial Court.19
Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged by Navida, et al., in their
complaint is a tort category that is not recognized in Philippine laws. Said the trial court:
THE TORT ASSERTED IN THE PRESENT COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT FOREIGN COMPANIES
IS NOT WITHIN THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BECAUSE
IT IS NOT A TORT CATEGORY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW
The specific tort asserted against defendant foreign companies in the present complaint is
product liability tort. When the averments in the present complaint are examined in terms of
the particular categories of tort recognized in the Philippine Civil Code, it becomes stark clear
that such averments describe and identify the category of specific tort known as product
liability tort. This is necessarily so, because it is the product manufactured by defendant foreign
companies, which is asserted to be the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the
plaintiff workers, and the liability of the defendant foreign companies, is premised on being
the manufacturer of the pesticides.
It is clear, therefore, that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present case, if and
only if the Civil Code of the Philippines, or a suppletory special law prescribes a product liability
tort, inclusive of and comprehending the specific tort described in the complaint of the plaintiff
workers.20
Third, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that Navida, et al., were coerced into submitting
their case to the Philippine courts, viz:
FILING OF CASES IN THE PHILIPPINES - COERCED AND ANOMALOUS
The Court views that the plaintiffs did not freely choose to file the instant action, but rather
were coerced to do so, merely to comply with the U.S. District Court’s Order dated July 11,
1995, and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District
Court.21
Fourth, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant
companies therein, thus:
THE DEFENDANTS’ SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION IS CONDITIONAL AS IT IS ILLUSORY
Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in
the Philippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over
persons of the defendants through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary
appearance of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the "Defendants’ Amended
Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens" (Annex to the
Complaint) filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that "(t)he authority of each
designated representative to accept service of process will become effective upon final
dismissal of these actions by the Court". The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the
case is not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom
(par. 3(h), 3(i), Amended Complaint). Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the
defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with
the U.S. courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is
also conditional. x x x.
The appointment of agents by the defendants, being subject to a suspensive condition, thus
produces no legal effect and is ineffective at the moment.22
Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the
Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. The trial court
expounded:
THE JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING
This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their
appeal of the decision of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the
parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum,
violates the rule on ‘forum shopping’ so abhorred in this jurisdiction. x x x.
xxxx
THE FILING OF THE CASE IN U.S. DIVESTED THIS COURT OF ITS OWN JURISDICTION
Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This
court takes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action.
The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of
venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent
jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial
acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction. x x x.
xxxx
THIS CASE IS BARRED BY THE RULE OF "LITIS PENDENCIA"
Furthermore, the case filed in the U.S. court involves the same parties, same rights and
interests, as in this case. There exists litis pendencia since there are two cases involving the
same parties and interests. The court would like to emphasize that in accordance with the rule
on litis pendencia x x x; the subsequent case must be dismissed. Applying the foregoing
[precept] to the case-at-bar, this court concludes that since the case between the parties in the
U.S. is still pending, then this case is barred by the rule on "litis pendencia." 23
In fine, the trial court held that:
It behooves this Court, then to dismiss this case. For to continue with these proceedings, would
be violative of the constitutional provision on the Bill of Rights guaranteeing speedy disposition
of cases (Ref. Sec. 16, Article III, Constitution). The court has no other choice. To insist on
further proceedings with this case, as it is now presented, might accord this court a charming
appearance. But the same insistence would actually thwart the very ends of justice which it
seeks to achieve.
This evaluation and action is made not on account of but rather with due consideration to the
fact that the dismissal of this case does not necessarily deprive the parties – especially the
plaintiffs – of their possible remedies. The court is cognizant that the Federal Court may resume
proceedings of that earlier case between the herein parties involving the same acts or
omissions as in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this case is now considered DISMISSED. 24
On June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City likewise issued an Order, 25 dismissing DOW’s
Answer with Counterclaim.
CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each filed a motion for reconsideration 26 of the RTC Order
dated May 20, 1996, while DOW filed a motion for reconsideration 27 of the RTC Order dated
June 4, 1996. Subsequently, DOW and OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration28 of the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996.
In an Order29 dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City declared that it had already lost
its jurisdiction over the case as it took into consideration the Manifestation of the counsel of
NAVIDA, et al., which stated that the latter had already filed a petition for review on certiorari
before this Court.
CHIQUITA and SHELL filed their motions for reconsideration30 of the above order.
On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to assail the
RTC Order dated May 20, 1996, which was docketed as G.R. No. 125078.
The RTC of General Santos City then issued an Order 31 dated August 14, 1996, which merely
noted the incidents still pending in Civil Case No. 5617 and reiterated that it no longer had any
jurisdiction over the case.
On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for Review on
Certiorari,32 challenging the orders of the RTC of General Santos City dated May 20, 1996, June
4, 1996 and July 9, 1996. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 125598.
In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General Santos City erred in ruling
that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as the persons of the
defendant companies.
In a Resolution33 dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 125598 with
G.R. No. 125078.
CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 34 which sought the reversal of the RTC
Orders dated May 20, 1996, July 9, 1996 and August 14, 1996. The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 126018. In a Resolution35 dated November 13, 1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid
petition for failure of CHIQUITA to show that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
CHIQUITA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 36 but the same was denied through a
Resolution37 dated January 27, 1997.
Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC of Davao City and G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856, and
128398
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE,
and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao
City. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in G.R.
No. 126654, hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et al.) amended their Joint-Complaint on May
21, 1996.38
Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al., ABELLA, et al., alleged that, as workers in the banana
plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were
exposed to nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such
exposure resulted in "serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited
to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities." 39 ABELLA, et al., claimed that
the defendant companies manufactured, produced, sold, distributed, used, and/or made
available in commerce, DBCP without warning the users of its hazardous effects on health, and
without providing instructions on its proper use and application, which the defendant
companies knew or ought to have known, had they exercised ordinary care and prudence.
Except for DOW, the other defendant companies filed their respective motions for bill of
particulars to which ABELLA, et al., filed their opposition. DOW and DEL MONTE filed their
respective Answers dated May 17, 1996 and June 24, 1996.
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Case No. 24,251-96 in its Order dated October 1,
1996, which, in its entirety, reads:
Upon a thorough review of the Complaint and Amended Complaint For: Damages filed by the
plaintiffs against the defendants Shell Oil Company, DOW Chemicals Company, Occidental
Chemical Corporation, Standard Fruit Company, Standard Fruit and Steamship, DOLE Food
Company, DOLE Fresh Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands, Inc., Chiquita Brands International, Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruits Co., all foreign corporations with
Philippine Representatives, the Court, as correctly pointed out by one of the defendants, is
convinced that plaintiffs "would have this Honorable Court dismiss the case to pave the way for
their getting an affirmance by the Supreme Court" (#10 of Defendants’ Del Monte Fresh
Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co., Reply to Opposition dated July 22, 1996).
Consider these:
1) In the original Joint Complaint, plaintiffs state that: defendants have no properties in the
Philippines; they have no agents as well (par. 18); plaintiffs are suing the defendants for
tortuous acts committed by these foreign corporations on their respective countries, as
plaintiffs, after having elected to sue in the place of defendants’ residence, are now compelled
by a decision of a Texas District Court to file cases under torts in this jurisdiction for causes of
actions which occurred abroad (par. 19); a petition was filed by same plaintiffs against same
defendants in the Courts of Texas, USA, plaintiffs seeking for payment of damages based on
negligence, strict liability, conspiracy and international tort theories (par. 27); upon defendants’
Motion to Dismiss on Forum non [conveniens], said petition was provisionally dismissed on
condition that these cases be filed in the Philippines or before 11 August 1995 (Philippine date;
Should the Philippine Courts refuse or deny jurisdiction, the U. S. Courts will reassume
jurisdiction.)
11. In the Amended Joint Complaint, plaintiffs aver that: on 11 July 1995, the Federal District
Court issued a Memorandum and Order conditionally dismissing several of the consolidated
actions including those filed by the Filipino complainants. One of the conditions imposed was
for the plaintiffs to file actions in their home countries or the countries in which they were
injured x x x. Notwithstanding, the Memorandum and [O]rder further provided that should the
highest court of any foreign country affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdictions over these
actions filed by the plaintiffs in their home countries [or] the countries where they were
injured, the said plaintiffs may return to that court and, upon proper motion, the Court will
resume jurisdiction as if the case had never been dismissed for forum non conveniens.
The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above
but because it shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in
its Special report "Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility," to wit:
1. Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines
should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies
since the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws. There has
been no decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by
DBCP. This means there is no available evidence which will prove and disprove the relation
between sterility and DBCP.
2. Retired Supreme Court Justice Abraham Sarmiento opined that while a class suit is allowed in
the Philippines the device has been employed strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify as a class
suit injury within the contemplation of Philippine statute.
3. Retired High Court Justice Rodolfo Nocom stated that there is simply an absence of doctrine
here that permits these causes to be heard. No product liability ever filed or tried here.
Case ordered dismissed.40
Docketed as G.R. No. 126654, the petition for review, filed on November 12, 1996 by ABELLA, et
al., assails before this Court the above-quoted order of the RTC of Davao City.
ABELLA, et al., claim that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
According to ABELLA, et al., the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case since Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil Code are broad enough to cover the acts
complained of and to support their claims for damages.
ABELLA, et al., further aver that the dismissal of the case, based on the opinions of legal
luminaries reported in a newspaper, by the RTC of Davao City is bereft of basis. According to
them, their cause of action is based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. They
also maintain that the absence of jurisprudence regarding the award of damages in favor of
those adversely affected by the DBCP does not preclude them from presenting evidence to
prove their allegations that their exposure to DBCP caused their sterility and/or infertility.
SHELL, DOW, and CHIQUITA each filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Order
dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. DEL MONTE also filed its motion for
reconsideration, which contained an additional motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge.
The presiding judge of Branch 16 then issued an Order 41 dated December 2, 1996, voluntarily
inhibiting himself from trying the case. Thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of
Davao City.
In an Order42 dated December 16, 1996, the RTC of Davao City affirmed the Order dated
October 1, 1996, and denied the respective motions for reconsideration filed by defendant
companies.
Thereafter, CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review dated March 5, 1997, questioning the Orders
dated October 1, 1996 and December 16, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. This case was
docketed as G.R. No. 128398.
In its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing the case motu
proprio as it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as over the
persons of the defendant companies which voluntarily appeared before it. CHIQUITA also
claims that the RTC of Davao City cannot dismiss the case simply on the basis of opinions of
alleged legal experts appearing in a newspaper article.
Initially, this Court in its Resolution43 dated July 28, 1997, dismissed the petition filed by
CHIQUITA for submitting a defective certificate against forum shopping. CHIQUITA, however,
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by this Court in the Resolution 44 dated
October 8, 1997.
On March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its petition for review on certiorari before this Court
assailing the above-mentioned orders of the RTC of Davao City. Its petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 127856.
DEL MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 24,251-96, as
defined under the law and that the said court already obtained jurisdiction over its person by its
voluntary appearance and the filing of a motion for bill of particulars and, later, an answer to
the complaint. According to DEL MONTE, the RTC of Davao City, therefore, acted beyond its
authority when it dismissed the case motu proprio or without any motion to dismiss from any
of the parties to the case.
In the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, April 28, 1997, and March 10, 1999, this Court
consolidated G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398.
The Consolidated Motion to Drop DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL as Party-Respondents filed by
NAVIDA, et al. and ABELLA, et al.
On September 26, 1997, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed before this Court a
Consolidated Motion (to Drop Party-Respondents).45 The plaintiff claimants alleged that they
had amicably settled their cases with DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL sometime in July 1997.
This settlement agreement was evidenced by facsimiles of the "Compromise Settlement,
Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement," which were attached to the said motion. Pursuant
to said agreement, the plaintiff claimants sought to withdraw their petitions as against DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
DOLE, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however, opposed the motion, as well as the settlement
entered into between the plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
The Memoranda of the Parties
Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced by the parties, this Court, in a
Resolution dated June 22, 1998,46 required all the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
CHIQUITA filed its Memorandum on August 28, 1998; 47 SHELL asked to be excused from the
filing of a memorandum alleging that it had already executed a compromise agreement with
the plaintiff claimants.48 DOLE filed its Memorandum on October 12, 1998 49 while DEL MONTE
filed on October 13, 1998.50 NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed their Consolidated
Memorandum on February 3, 1999; 51 and DOW and OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a Memorandum
on December 23, 1999.52
The Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R. No. 125598
On July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R.
No. 125598, 53 explaining that the said petition "is already moot and academic and no longer
presents a justiciable controversy" since they have already entered into an amicable settlement
with NAVIDA, et al. DOW and OCCIDENTAL added that they have fully complied with their
obligations set forth in the 1997 Compromise Agreements.
DOLE filed its Manifestation dated September 6, 2004, 54 interposing no objection to the
withdrawal of the petition, and further stating that they maintain their position that DOW and
OCCIDENTAL, as well as other settling defendant companies, should be retained as defendants
for purposes of prosecuting the cross-claims of DOLE, in the event that the complaint below is
reinstated.
NAVIDA, et al., also filed their Comment dated September 14, 2004, 55 stating that they agree
with the view of DOW and OCCIDENTAL that the petition in G.R. No. 125598 has become moot
and academic because Civil Case No. 5617 had already been amicably settled by the parties in
1997.
On September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed its Comment on Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review Filed by Petitioners in G.R. No. 125598, 56 stating that it has no objections to the
withdrawal of the petition filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL in G.R. No. 125598.
In a Resolution57 dated October 11, 2004, this Court granted, among others, the motion to
withdraw petition for review filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL.
THE ISSUES
In their Consolidated Memorandum, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., presented the following
issues for our consideration:
IN REFUTATION
I. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
a) The court did not simply dismiss the case because it was filed in bad faith with petitioners
intending to have the same dismissed and returned to the Texas court.
b) The court dismissed the case because it was convinced that it did not have jurisdiction.
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
II. THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
a. The acts complained of occurred within Philippine territory.
b. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is broad enough to cover the acts complained of.
c. Assumption of jurisdiction by the U.S. District Court over petitioner[s’] claims did not divest
Philippine [c]ourts of jurisdiction over the same.
d. The Compromise Agreement and the subsequent Consolidated Motion to Drop Party
Respondents Dow, Occidental and Shell does not unjustifiably prejudice remaining respondents
Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita.58
DISCUSSION
On the issue of jurisdiction
Essentially, the crux of the controversy in the petitions at bar is whether the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96,
respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.
Remarkably, none of the parties to this case claims that the courts a quo are bereft of
jurisdiction to determine and resolve the above-stated cases. All parties contend that the RTC
of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over the action for damages,
specifically for approximately ₱2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of
defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure
to DBCP that was manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the stream of commerce by
defendant companies happened in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable
basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., assert that the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code,
as well as Article 2176 thereof, are broad enough to cover their claim for damages. Thus,
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., pray that the respective rulings of the RTC of General Santos
City and the RTC of Davao City in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 be reversed and that the
said cases be remanded to the courts a quo for further proceedings.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-
delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In addition, DOLE states that if there
were no actionable wrongs committed under Philippine law, the courts a quo should have
dismissed the civil cases on the ground that the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., stated no cause of action against the defendant companies. DOLE also
argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies
as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a
decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying
the customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. DOLE posits
that the Philippines is the situs of the tortious acts allegedly committed by defendant
companies as NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which
occurred in the Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other reproductive system
problems that they allegedly suffered. Finally, DOLE adds that the RTC of Davao City gravely
erred in relying upon newspaper reports in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 given that
newspaper articles are hearsay and without any evidentiary value. Likewise, the alleged legal
opinions cited in the newspaper reports were taken judicial notice of, without any notice to the
parties. DOLE, however, opines that the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 was
proper, given that plaintiff claimants merely prosecuted the cases with the sole intent of
securing a dismissal of the actions for the purpose of convincing the U.S. Federal District Court
to re-assume jurisdiction over the cases.
In a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the cases filed before them. The Amended Joint-Complaints sought approximately ₱2.7
million in damages for each plaintiff claimant, which amount falls within the jurisdiction of the
RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not
the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in
consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which
states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the
action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the RTC by making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs
during the course of the proceedings. None of the defendant companies ever objected to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts a quo over their persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the
remand of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City, respectively.
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over Civil Case Nos.
5617 and 24,251-96, respectively
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein.59 Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature
through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (₱200,000.00).60
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
Here, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., sought in their similarly-worded Amended Joint-
Complaints filed before the courts a quo, the following prayer:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment
be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants:
a) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF moral damages in the amount of One Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱1,500,00.00);
b) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF nominal damages in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱400,000.00) each;
c) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF exemplary damages in the amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱600,000.00);
d) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF attorneys fees of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00); and
e) TO PAY THE COSTS of the suit.61
From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that
the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately ₱2.7 million for each of the plaintiff
claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City
and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of
the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate that:
THE CAUSES OF ACTION
4. The Defendants manufactured, sold, distributed, used, AND/OR MADE AVAILABLE IN
COMMERCE nematocides containing the chemical dibromochloropropane, commonly known as
DBCP. THE CHEMICAL WAS USED AGAINST the parasite known as the nematode, which plagued
banana plantations, INCLUDING THOSE in the Philippines. AS IT TURNED OUT, DBCP not only
destroyed nematodes. IT ALSO CAUSED ILL-EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH OF PERSONS EXPOSED TO
IT AFFECTING the human reproductive system as well.
5. The plaintiffs were exposed to DBCP in the 1970s up to the early 1980s WHILE (a) they used
this product in the banana plantations WHERE they were employed, and/or (b) they resided
within the agricultural area WHERE IT WAS USED. As a result of such exposure, the plaintiffs
suffered serious and permanent injuries TO THEIR HEALTH, including, but not limited to,
STERILITY and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.
6. THE DEFENDANTS WERE AT FAULT OR WERE NEGLIGENT IN THAT THEY MANUFACTURED,
produced, sold, and/or USED DBCP and/or otherwise, PUT THE SAME into the stream of
commerce, WITHOUT INFORMING THE USERS OF ITS HAZARDOUS EFFECTS ON HEALTH
AND/OR WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON ITS PROPER USE AND APPLICATION. THEY allowed
Plaintiffs to be exposed to, DBCP-containing materials which THEY knew, or in the exercise of
ordinary care and prudence ought to have known, were highly harmful and injurious to the
Plaintiffs’ health and well-being.
7. The Defendants WHO MANUFACTURED, PRODUCED, SOLD, DISTRIBUTED, MADE AVAILABLE
OR PUT DBCP INTO THE STREAM OF COMMERCE were negligent OR AT FAULT in that they,
AMONG OTHERS:
a. Failed to adequately warn Plaintiffs of the dangerous characteristics of DBCP, or to cause
their subsidiaries or affiliates to so warn plaintiffs;
b. Failed to provide plaintiffs with information as to what should be reasonably safe and
sufficient clothing and proper protective equipment and appliances, if any, to protect plaintiffs
from the harmful effects of exposure to DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do
so;
c. Failed to place adequate warnings, in a language understandable to the worker, on
containers of DBCP-containing materials to warn of the dangers to health of coming into
contact with DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
d. Failed to take reasonable precaution or to exercise reasonable care to publish, adopt and
enforce a safety plan and a safe method of handling and applying DBCP, or to cause their
subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
e. Failed to test DBCP prior to releasing these products for sale, or to cause their subsidiaries or
affiliates to do so; and
f. Failed to reveal the results of tests conducted on DBCP to each plaintiff, governmental
agencies and the public, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliate to do so.
8. The illnesses and injuries of each plaintiff are also due to the FAULT or negligence of
defendants Standard Fruit Company, Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Dole Food Company, Inc.,
Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. in that they failed to exercise
reasonable care to prevent each plaintiff’s harmful exposure to DBCP-containing products
which defendants knew or should have known were hazardous to each plaintiff in that they,
AMONG OTHERS:
a. Failed to adequately supervise and instruct Plaintiffs in the safe and proper application of
DBCP-containing products;
b. Failed to implement proper methods and techniques of application of said products, or to
cause such to be implemented;
c. Failed to warn Plaintiffs of the hazards of exposure to said products or to cause them to be so
warned;
d. Failed to test said products for adverse health effects, or to cause said products to be tested;
e. Concealed from Plaintiffs information concerning the observed effects of said products on
Plaintiffs;
f. Failed to monitor the health of plaintiffs exposed to said products;
g. Failed to place adequate labels on containers of said products to warn them of the damages
of said products; and
h. Failed to use substitute nematocides for said products or to cause such substitutes to [be]
used.62 (Emphasis supplied and words in brackets ours.)
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,
et al., attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to their
exposure to nematocides containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses,
specifically to their reproductive system.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants – a
quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point
to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling,
using, and/or otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain
DBCP, "without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without
instructions on its proper use and application." 63
Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, 64 this Court has always reminded that jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a
quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., with individual claims of approximately ₱2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which
obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered
resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations
located in the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located
in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their
cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City
and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the
cases.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the
territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., "the manufacture of the pesticides, their
packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their
becoming part of the stream of commerce,"65 and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act
complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal
civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be
commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff.66
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of
the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where
they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the
courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages.
Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors,
co-workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather
in the Philippines. Considering the great number of plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is
not far-fetched to assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of evidence
to support the claim of plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact
that the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., against the defendant
companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the
instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases. 67
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of all the defendant companies
It is well to stress again that none of the parties claims that the courts a quo lack jurisdiction
over the cases filed before them. All parties are one in asserting that the RTC of General Santos
City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendant companies in the action below. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly
appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he defendant’s
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons." In this
connection, all the defendant companies designated and authorized representatives to receive
summons and to represent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant
companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several
voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating
during the course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan,68 held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is
acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by
service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is
tantamount to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s
jurisdiction.69
Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the subject matter of
the instant case. What is more, this jurisdiction, which has been acquired and has been vested
on the courts a quo, continues until the termination of the proceedings.
It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise of
jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all
questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect
its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case. 70
Plaintiffs’ purported bad faith in filing the subject civil cases in Philippine courts
Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith merely to
procure a dismissal of the same and to allow them to return to the forum of their choice, this
Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by
evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as
these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.
When this Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-
lived.71 This is especially true with respect to allegations of bad faith, in line with the basic rule
that good faith is always presumed and bad faith must be proved.72
In sum, considering the fact that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints filed by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., and that the courts a quo have also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all
the defendant companies, it therefore, behooves this Court to order the remand of Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City,
respectively.
On the issue of the dropping of DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL as respondents in view of their
amicable settlement with NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are further praying that DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL be
dropped as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96. The non-settling defendants allegedly manifested that they intended to file their
cross-claims against their co-defendants who entered into compromise agreements. NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the non-settling defendants did not aver any cross-claim in
their answers to the complaint and that they subsequently sought to amend their answers to
plead their cross-claims only after the settlement between the plaintiff claimants and DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were executed. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., therefore, assert
that the cross-claims are already barred.
In their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE are opposing the above motion of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., since the latter’s Amended Complaints cited several instances of tortious
conduct that were allegedly committed jointly and severally by the defendant companies. This
solidary obligation on the part of all the defendants allegedly gives any co-defendant the
statutory right to proceed against the other co-defendants for the payment of their respective
shares. Should the subject motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., be granted, and the
Court subsequently orders the remand of the action to the trial court for continuance,
CHIQUITA and DOLE would allegedly be deprived of their right to prosecute their cross-claims
against their other co-defendants. Moreover, a third party complaint or a separate trial,
according to CHIQUITA, would only unduly delay and complicate the proceedings. CHIQUITA
and DOLE similarly insist that the motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., to drop DOW,
SHELL and OCCIDENTAL as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, be denied.
Incidentally, on April 2, 2007, after the parties have submitted their respective memoranda, DEL
MONTE filed a Manifestation and Motion 73 before the Court, stating that similar settlement
agreements were allegedly executed by the plaintiff claimants with DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA
sometime in 1999. Purportedly included in the agreements were Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96. Attached to the said manifestation were copies of the Compromise Settlement,
Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement between DEL MONTE and the settling plaintiffs, as
well as the Release in Full executed by the latter.74 DEL MONTE specified therein that there
were "only four (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who are claiming against the Del Monte
parties"75 and that the latter have executed amicable settlements which completely satisfied
any claims against DEL MONTE. In accordance with the alleged compromise agreements with
the four plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617, DEL MONTE sought the dismissal of the Amended
Joint-Complaint in the said civil case. Furthermore, in view of the above settlement agreements
with ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, DEL MONTE stated that it no longer wished to
pursue its petition in G.R. No. 127856 and accordingly prayed that it be allowed to withdraw
the same.
Having adjudged that Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 should be remanded to the RTC of
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively, the Court deems that the
Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
should likewise be referred to the said trial courts for appropriate disposition.
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, "[a] compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced."
Like any other contract, an extrajudicial compromise agreement is not excepted from rules and
principles of a contract. It is a consensual contract, perfected by mere consent, the latter being
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which
are to constitute the contract.76 Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. 77 A
compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata 78 and this holds true
even if the agreement has not been judicially approved. 79 In addition, as a binding contract, a
compromise agreement determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to it. 80
In light of the foregoing legal precepts, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao
City should first receive in evidence and examine all of the alleged compromise settlements
involved in the cases at bar to determine the propriety of dropping any party as a defendant
therefrom.
The Court notes that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) that was filed by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., only pertained to DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL in view of
the latter companies’ alleged compromise agreements with the plaintiff claimants. However, in
subsequent developments, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA supposedly reached their own amicable
settlements with the plaintiff claimants, but DEL MONTE qualified that it entered into a
settlement agreement with only four of the plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No. 5617. These four
plaintiff claimants were allegedly the only ones who were asserting claims against DEL MONTE.
However, the said allegation of DEL MONTE was simply stipulated in their Compromise
Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement and its truth could not be verified with
certainty based on the records elevated to this Court. Significantly, the 336 plaintiff claimants in
Civil Case No. 5617 jointly filed a complaint without individually specifying their claims against
DEL MONTE or any of the other defendant companies. Furthermore, not one plaintiff claimant
filed a motion for the removal of either DEL MONTE or CHIQUITA as defendants in Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
There is, thus, a primary need to establish who the specific parties to the alleged compromise
agreements are, as well as their corresponding rights and obligations therein. For this purpose,
the courts a quo may require the presentation of additional evidence from the parties.
Thereafter, on the basis of the records of the cases at bar and the additional evidence
submitted by the parties, if any, the trial courts can then determine who among the defendants
may be dropped from the said cases.
It is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for the same quasi-delict is solidary. A solidary obligation is one in which each of
the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand
the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors.81
In solidary obligations, the paying debtor’s right of reimbursement is provided for under Article
1217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or
more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to
each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt
is due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the
debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to
the debt of each.1avvphil
The above right of reimbursement of a paying debtor, and the corresponding liability of the co-
debtors to reimburse, will only arise, however, if a solidary debtor who is made to answer for
an obligation actually delivers payment to the creditor. As succinctly held in Lapanday
Agricultural Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 82 "[p]ayment, which means not only
the delivery of money but also the performance, in any other manner, of the obligation, is the
operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the
share which corresponds to each of the [other] debtors."83
In the cases at bar, there is no right of reimbursement to speak of as yet. A trial on the merits
must necessarily be conducted first in order to establish whether or not defendant companies
are liable for the claims for damages filed by the plaintiff claimants, which would necessarily
give rise to an obligation to pay on the part of the defendants.
At the point in time where the proceedings below were prematurely halted, no cross-claims
have been interposed by any defendant against another defendant. If and when such a cross-
claim is made by a non-settling defendant against a settling defendant, it is within the discretion
of the trial court to determine the propriety of allowing such a cross-claim and if the settling
defendant must remain a party to the case purely in relation to the cross claim.
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 84 the
Court had the occasion to state that "where there are, along with the parties to the
compromise, other persons involved in the litigation who have not taken part in concluding the
compromise agreement but are adversely affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be
precluded from invoking in the same proceedings an adequate relief therefor." 85
Relevantly, in Philippine International Surety Co., Inc. v. Gonzales, 86 the Court upheld the ruling
of the trial court that, in a joint and solidary obligation, the paying debtor may file a third-party
complaint and/or a cross-claim to enforce his right to seek contribution from his co-debtors.
Hence, the right of the remaining defendant(s) to seek reimbursement in the above situation, if
proper, is not affected by the compromise agreements allegedly entered into by NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., with some of the defendant companies.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos.
125078, 126654, and 128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated May 20, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617, and the Order
dated October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, and its subsequent
Order dated December 16, 1996 denying reconsideration in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, and
REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and
appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte to withdraw its petition in G.R. No.
127856. In view of the previous grant of the motion to withdraw the petition in G.R. No.
125598, both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.

G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED
WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented
herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity
as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's
Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE),
SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII
and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management
Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J.
SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY
OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181527
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL,
RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal capacity and as representatives of the
SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN,
CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS
WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE),
JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR Regional Director-
Region VII and as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board,
ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director - Environmental Management Bureau-Region
VII, DOE Regional Director for Region VIII 1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated
between the islands of Negros and Cebu.2
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and
Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it
nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international and
municipal laws.3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, which seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection with SC-46; to prohibit
respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to provide
petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil Exploration
Project.4
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in
the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which
inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos
(Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to
be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the
protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner
is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in
the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.5
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a
non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization, established for the welfare of the
marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong)
and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as representatives of the
subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R.
Sibbaluca, as then DENR Regional Director for Region VII and Chairman of the Tañon Strait
Protected Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a
company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public respondents: Alan C.
Arranguez (Arranguez) and Antonio Labios (Labios), in their capacities as then Director of the
EMB, Region VII and then Regional Director of the DOE, Region VII, respectively. 6
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-I 02 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology,
sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also
conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. 7
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.8
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A
multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to
determine the area's underwater composition.9
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since
the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the
Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, 10 JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586,
entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes."11
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board 12 of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-
Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, 13 wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's
application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. 14 Months later, on November 16, 2007,
JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan
town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.16
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for redress,
via two separate original petitions both dated December 1 7, 2007, wherein they commonly
seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of
the 1987 Constitution.
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike 17 its name as a respondent on the ground that
it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX. In support of its motion, it submitted the branch office
application of JAPEX,18 wherein the latter's resident agent was clearly identified. SOS claimed
that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities
in the Philippines.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS' s motion on the ground that
it was premature, it was pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory. They claimed that SOS
admitted that "it is in law a (sic) privy to JAPEX" since it did the drilling and other exploration
activities in Tañon Strait under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They argued that it would
be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX had not yet been joined in the case; and that it
was "convenient" for SOS to ask the Court to simply drop its name from the parties when what
it should have done was to either notify or ask JAPEX to join it in its motion to enable proper
substitution. At this juncture, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also asked
the Court to" implead JAPEX Philippines as a corespondent or as a substitute for its parent
company, JAPEX.19
On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.
On May 26, 2008, the FIDEC manifested 20 that they were adopting in toto the Opposition to
Strike with Motion to Implead filed by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in
G.R. No. 180771.
On June 19, 2008, public respondents filed their Manifestation 21 that they were not objecting to
SOS's Motion to Strike as it was not JAPEX's resident agent. JAPEX during all this time, did not
file any comment at all.
Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the parties were given
ample chance and opportunity to answer the issues herein, issued a Resolution directing the
Court's process servicing unit to again serve the parties with a copy of the September 23, 2008
Resolution of the Court, which gave due course to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and
181527, and which required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The February 7,
2012 Resolution22 reads as follows:
G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait, e.g.,
Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et al.) and G.R. No. 181527 (Central
Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, et al.). - The Court
Resolved to direct the Process Servicing Unit to RE-SEND the resolution dated September 23,
2008 to the following parties and counsel, together with this resolution:

Atty. Aristeo O. Carino 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre

Counsel for Respondent Supply 146 Valero Street
Oilfield Services, Inc. Salcedo Village, Makati City

JAPEX Philippines Ltd. 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre

146 Valero Street
Salcedo Village, Makati City

JAPEX Philippines Ltd. 19th Floor Pearlbank Centre

c/o Atty. Maria Farah Z.G. 146 Valero Street
Nicolas-Suchianco Salcedo Village, Makati City

Atty. Maria Farah Z.G. Suite 2404 Discovery Centre

Nicolas-Suchianco 25 ADB Avenue
Resident Agent of JAPEX Ortigas Center, Pasig City
Philippines Ltd.

This Resolution was personally served to the above parties, at the above addresses on February
23, 2012. On March 20, 2012, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. (JAPEX PH), by way of special appearance,
filed a Motion to Admit23 its Motion for Clarification,24 wherein JAPEX PH requested to be
clarified as to whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012 Resolution as this Court's
Order of its inclusion in the case, as it has not been impleaded. It also alleged that JAPEX PH had
already stopped exploration activities in the Taft. on Strait way back in 2008, rendering this case
moot.
On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special appearance, filed a Motion for Extension of
Time25 to file its Memorandum. It stated that since it received the February 7, 2012 Resolution
on February 23, 2012, it had until March 22, 2012 to file its Memorandum. JAPEX PH then asked
for an additional thirty days, supposedly to give this Court some time to consider its Motion for
Clarification.
On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution 26 granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit its
Motion for Clarification. This Court, addressing JAPEX PH's Motion for Clarification, held:
With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated March 19, 2012, this
Court considers JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. as a real party-in-interest in these cases. Under Section
2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. 's allegation that it is a completely distinct corporation,
which should not be confused with JAPEX Company, Ltd., JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. is a mere
branch office, established by JAPEX Company, Ltd. for the purpose of carrying out the latter's
business transactions here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd., has no separate
personality from its mother foreign corporation, the party impleaded in this case.
Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the responsibilities and duties of a
resident agent of a foreign corporation:
SECTION 128. Resident agent; service of process. - The Securities and Exchange Commission
shall require as a condition precedent to the issuance of the license to transact business in the
Philippines by any foreign corporation that such corporation file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some person who must be a
resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served in
all actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that service
upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly
authorized officers of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any such foreign corporation
shall likewise execute and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission an agreement or
stipulation, executed by the proper authorities of said corporation, in form and substance as
follows:
"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in consideration of its
being granted by the Securities and Exchange Commission a license to transact business in the
Philippines, that if at any time said corporation shall cease to transact business in the
Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any summons or
other legal processes may be served, then in any action or proceeding arising out of any
business or transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any summons or other
legal process may be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission and that such service
shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the duly-authorized officers of the
corporation at its home office."
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Commission shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by mail a
copy of such summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office.
The sending of such copy by the Commission shall be a necessary part of and shall complete
such service. All expenses incurred by the Commission for such service shall be paid in advance
by the party at whose instance the service is made.
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty to immediately
notify in writing the Securities and Exchange Commission of the new address.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a resident agent is to receive
summons or legal processes that may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against
the foreign corporation. These cases have been prosecuted in the name of JAPEX Company,
Ltd., and JAPEX Philippines Ltd., as its branch office and resident agent, had been receiving the
various resolutions from this Court, as evidenced by Registry Return Cards signed by its
representatives.
And in the interest of justice, this Court resolved to grant JAPEX PH's motion for extension of
time to file its memorandum, and was given until April 21, 2012, as prayed for, within which to
comply with the submission.27
Without filing its Memorandum, JAPEX PH, on May 14, 2012, filed a motion, asking this Court
for an additional thirty days to file its Memorandum, to be counted from May 8, 2012. It
justified its request by claiming that this Court's April 24, 2012 Resolution was issued past its
requested deadline for filing, which was on April 21, 2012.28
On June 19, 2012, this Court denied JAPEX PH's second request for additional time to file its
Memorandum and dispensed with such filing.
Since petitioners had already filed their respective memoranda, 29 and public respondents had
earlier filed a Manifestation30 that they were adopting their Comment dated March 31, 2008 as
their memorandum, this Court submitted the case for decision.
Petitioners.' Allegations
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait,
petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic
survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that
before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after
the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this
"reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the ''payao," also known as the "fish aggregating
device" or "artificial reef."31 Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute
the incidences of "fish kill"32 observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And
they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public
consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of
the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards' allegations of reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations or discussions with
the fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to the issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it alleges that
during the seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-
kilometer radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area greater than the 1.5-
kilometer radius "exclusion zone" stated in the IEE. 33 It also agrees in the allegation that public
respondents DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued an ECC to public
respondent DOE and private respondent JAPEX without ensuring the strict compliance with
the procedural and substantive requirements under the Environmental Impact Assessment
system, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations. 34 It further claims
that despite several requests for copies of all the documents pertaining to the project in Tañon
Strait, only copies of the P AMB-Tañon Strait Resolution and the ECC were given to the
fisherfolk.35
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does
not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions; that the ECC was
issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations; that public respondents may not be
compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46; and
that all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief. They further
contend that the issues raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the
fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008. 36
ISSUES
The following are the issues posited by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in
G.R. No. 180771:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STAND! TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION;
II. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS VIOLA T[IVE] OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ON-GOING EXPLORATION AND PROPOSED EXPLOITATION FOR OIL
AND NATURAL GAS AT, AROUND, AND UNDERNEATH THE MARINE WATERS OF THE TAÑON
STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE COMMITMENTS TO
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND INSTRUMENTS; AND
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE
(ECC) IN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS AND HABITATS OF MARINE WILDLIFE AND
ENDANGERED SPECIES IS LEGAL AND PROPER.37
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 181527, petitioner FIDEC presented the following issues for our
consideration:
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 EXECUTED BETWEEN RESPONDENTS DOE AND
JAPEX SHOULD BE NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE FOR BEING IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFF-SHORE OIL EXPLORAT[I]ON CONTEMPLATED UNDER SERVICE
CONTRACT NO. 46 ·IS LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE WITHOUT A LAW BEING DULY PASSED EXPRESSLY
FOR THE PURPOSE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TAÑON STRAIT
PROTECTED SEASCAPE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTION GRANTED TO
PETITIONERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE
(ECC) FOR SUCH AN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL PROJECT INSIDE AN ENVIRONMENTALLY
CRITICAL AREA SUCH AS THE TAÑON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE CONFORMED TO LAW AND
EXISTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE MATTER.
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO FURNISH
PETITIONERS WITH COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE TAÑON STRAIT OIL
EXPLORATION PROJECT.38
In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various issues raised by the
petitioners may be condensed into two primary issues:
I. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners
in G.R. No. 180771; and
II. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the "'moot and academic principle' is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case." Courts have decided
cases otherwise moot and academic under the following exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.39
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these
consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both
petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood
issues raised undoubtedly affect the public's interest, and the respondents' contested actions
are capable of repetition.
Procedural Issues
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal standing
to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this
suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 they also assert their right to sue for the faithful
performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for
their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the right to demand that they be
accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the
Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui. 42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to
represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a
campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of
the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect
the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.43
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the
benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.44
In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing
because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural
or juridical persons, viz.:
Section 1. Who may be parties, plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff' may refer to the
claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party
plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a
counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners
therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.45
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal standing
on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action.
Moreover, the public respondents argue that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest
for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this
case.46 Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim that absent
any proof that former President Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering into and
implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her own.47
The public respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards' petition was not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.48
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in
actions before courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States case Sierra
Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton,49 wherein Justice William 0. Douglas, dissenting to the conventional
thought on legal standing, opined:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we
fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced,
or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage. x x x.
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction
found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an
acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a
"person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary,
spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges,
groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modem
technology and modem life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains
or nourishes-fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other
animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its
life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who
have a meaningful relation to that body of water-whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a
zoologist, or a logger-must be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which
are threatened with destruction.50 (Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing
a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought
in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
Rule 3
Parties to Civil Actions
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff' may refer to the
claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party
plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a
counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended
by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included
in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative
may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract
involves things belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural
and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who
cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in
representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental
cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly
injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in
Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's
paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, 51 which
allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to
manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective
provisions.52 (Emphasis ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants
enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes
standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The
terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it
refers to minors and generations yet unborn. 53 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.) Although
this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be
retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there
is no vested rights in rules of procedure."54
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission55 held that:
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create
new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation
of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental · Cases became effective, this
Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental
cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn
"based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned."56 Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.57
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a
suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as
real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The
Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the following reasons, which we quote:
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident of Malacailang
Palace, Manila Philippines. Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent
President of the Philippine Islands. She is personally impleaded in this suit as an unwilling co-
petitioner by reason of her express declaration and undertaking under the recently signed
ASEAN Charter to protect Your Petitioners' habitat, among others. She is meantime dominated
as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time in seeking her signature and
imprimatur hereof and due to possible legal complications that may hereafter arise by reason
of her official relations with public respondents under the alter ego principle in political
law.58 This is incorrect.
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can
not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the
complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff
cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the
unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her
through its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition,
without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President
Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner.
Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the
performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling
the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention." 59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners
in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
Main Issue:
Legality of Service Contract No. 46
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis
Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution
Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1, Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned. 60 Furthermore,
the FIDEC asserts that SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial assistance
agreement validly executed under paragraph 4 of the same provision. 61 The petitioners claim
that La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos 62 laid down the guidelines for a valid
service contract, one of which is that there must exist a general law for oil exploration before a
service contract may be entered into by the Government. The petitioners posit that the service
contract in La Bugal is presumed to have complied with the requisites of (a) legislative
enactment of a general law after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution (such as Republic Act
No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Law of 1995, governing mining contracts) and (b)
presidential notification. The petitioners thus allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which involved
mining contracts under Republic Act No. 7942, does not apply in this case. 63 The petitioners also
argue that Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972
cannot legally justify SC-46 as it is deemed to have been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
subsequent laws, which enunciate new policies concerning the environment. 64 In addition,
petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment by the Filipinos of our natural
resources,65 and paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts but of FTAAs or Financial
Technical Assistance Agreements.66
The public respondents again controvert the petitioners' claims and asseverate that SC-46 does
not violate Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. They hold that SC-46 does not fall
under the coverage of paragraph 1 but instead, under paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution on FTAAs. They also insist that paragraphs 2 and 3, which refer to the grant
of exclusive fishing right to Filipinos, are not applicable to SC-46 as the contract does not grant
exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor does it otherwise impinge on the FIDEC's right to
preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources.67
Ruling of the Court
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-a-vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The
Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphases ours.)
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under
the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in
the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we
quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they
were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with
safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime,
to wit: Summation of the ConCom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the Con Com
deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service
contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance.
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service
contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate or
minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital law regime. In brief, they were going to
permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors, but with safety measures to
prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of
Section 2 of Article XII. This provision reserves or limits to Filipino citizens -- and corporations
at least 60 percent of which is owned by such citizens -- the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources.
This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need
for foreign investments in the EDU of minerals and petroleum resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort of safeguards that would be considered
adequate and reasonable. But some of them, having more "radical" leanings, wanted to ban
service contracts altogether; for them, the provision would permit aliens to exploit and benefit
from the nation's natural resources, which they felt should be reserved only for Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners were heard by the entire body.
They sounded off their individual opinions, openly enunciated their philosophies, and
supported or attacked the provisions with fervor. Everyone's viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony -- including paragraph 4
allowing service contracts with foreign corporations as an exception to the general norm in
paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the same article --was resoundingly approved by a vote of 32 to 7,
with 2 abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical
Or Financial Assistance Are
Service Contracts with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But
unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or "owner" of the
works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and
technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale
mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively
exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.68
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the
safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are
the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard
or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to
give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose
timely objections, if any.69
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void
for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law on Oil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to
promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of
government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the
Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.70
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972,
before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise
repealed, to wit:
ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential Decree No. 87, it would have been done
expressly by Congress. For instance, Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, expressly repealed a number of laws, including a specific provision
in Presidential Decree No. 87, viz.:
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. - (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are
hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions,
memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund;
Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund;
Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential
Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby
repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded
projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section
12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No.
972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87 had not yet been
expressly repealed, it had been impliedly repealed. As we held in Villareña v. The Commission
on Audit,71 "[i]mplied repeals are not lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that when laws are in
conflict with one another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile them. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Marcopper Mining Corporation,72 we said:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before
the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare
et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the
subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all
laws on the subject. (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction
should be preferred.73 This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections 74 expounding on
this point, pronounced:
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony
with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its
construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. x x x.
(Citation omitted.)
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the
ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and
requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.
But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in
the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait
is a NIPAS75 area.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a
general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-
46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. (Italics ours.)
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals,76 this Court held that:
It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law
between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed
written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. x x x. (Citations
omitted.) Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President
himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to
have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez,
Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither
shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts are also
that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres, 77 we
explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and
its limit in this wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation omitted.)
While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As
we have explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the
Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law
regime."78 Thus, they are not just mere formalities, which will only render a contract
unenforceable but not void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not just in an
ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will nullify the
contract. Elucidating on the concept of a "constitution," this Court, in Manila Prince Hotel v.
Government Service Insurance System,79 held:
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. (Emphasis ours.)
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be the
signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration,
development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power
cannot be taken lightly.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any
participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually the acts of then President
Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the
President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary
statute, but in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving the exploitation,
development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount interest to the present
and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the guidelines set by
law are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily
penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved
of these service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum
Board, now the DOE, obtain the President's approval for the execution of any contract under
said statute, as shown in the following provision:
SECTION 5. Execution of contract authorized in this Act. -Every contract herein authorized shall,
subject to the approval of the President, be executed by the Petroleum Board created in this
Act, after due public notice pre-qualification and public bidding or concluded through
negotiations. In case bids are requested or if requested no bid is submitted or the bids
submitted are rejected by the Petroleum Board for being disadvantageous to the Government,
the contract may be concluded through negotiation.
In opening contract areas and in selecting the best offer for petroleum operations, any of the
following alternative procedures may be resorted to by the Petroleum Board, subject to prior
approval of the President[.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987
Constitution with the aforementioned provision of Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be shown
that the government agency or subordinate official has been authorized by the President to
enter into such service contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that
the President subsequently approved of such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is
evident in the case at bar.
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 9147 or
the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act, which bans all marine exploration and
exploitation of oil and gas deposits. They also aver that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or
the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which allows the
exploration of protected areas for the purpose of information-gathering, has been repealed by
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 914 7. The said petitioners further claim that SC-46 is anathema
to Republic Act No. 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, which protects the rights of
the fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal waters, with the exception being limited only
to research and survey activities.80
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the exceptions under Section 14 of the NIP AS Act,
the gathering of information must be in accordance with a DENR-approved program, and the
exploitation and utilization of energy resources must be pursuant to a general law passed by
Congress expressly for that purpose. Since there is neither a DENR approved program nor a
general law passed by Congress, the seismic surveys and oil drilling operations were all done
illegally.81 The FIDEC likewise contends that SC-46 infringes on its right to the preferential use of
the communal fishing waters as it is denied free access within the prohibited zone, in violation
not only of the Fisheries Code but also of the 1987 Constitutional provisions on subsistence
fisherfolk and social justice.82 Furthermore, the FIDEC believes that the provisions in
Presidential Decree No. 87, which allow offshore drilling even in municipal waters, should be
deemed to have been rendered inoperative by the provisions of Republic Act No. 8550 and
Republic Act No. 7160, which reiterate the social justice provisions of the Constitution. 83
The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory construction and argue that Section 14 of
the NIP AS Act is a more particular provision and cannot be deemed to have been repealed by
the more general prohibition in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. They aver that Section 14,
under which SC-46 falls, should instead be regarded as an exemption to Section
27.84 Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 that there was a violation of Section
27 of Republic Act No. 9147, the public respondents assert that what the section prohibits is the
exploration of minerals, which as defined in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, exclude energy
materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials and geothennal energy.
Thus, since SC-46 involves oil and gas exploration, Section 27 does not apply. 85
The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46 and insist that it does not grant exclusive
fishing rights to JAPEX; hence, it does not violate the rule on preferential use of municipal
waters. Moreover, they allege that JAPEX has not banned fishing in the project area, contrary to
the FIDEC's claim. The public respondents also contest the attribution of the declining fish catch
to the seismic surveys and aver that the allegation is unfounded. They claim that according to
the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources' fish catch data, the reduced fish catch started in
the 1970s due to destructive fishing practices.86
Ruling of the Court
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-a-vis Other Laws
Although we have already established above that SC-46 is null and void for being violative of
the 1987 Constitution, it is our duty to still rule on the legality of SC-46 vis-a-vis other pertinent
laws, to serve as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts involving not
only the Tafion Strait, but also other similar areas. While the petitioners allege that SC-46 is in
violation of several laws, including international ones, their arguments focus primarily on the
protected status of the Tañon Strait, thus this Court will concentrate on those laws that pertain
particularly to the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape.
The Tañon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East and
Negros in the West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered species of
dolphins and whales. For this reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Tañon Strait
as a protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 -Declaring the Tañon Strait
situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected Area
pursuant to the NIP AS Act and shall be known as Tañon Strait Protected Seascape. During
former President Joseph E. Estrada's time, he also constituted the Tañon Strait Commission via
Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum and sustained use of the resources in that area
without threatening its marine life. He followed this with Executive Order No. 177, 87 wherein he
included the mayor of Negros Occidental Municipality/City as a member of the Tañon Strait
Commission, to represent the LGUs concerned. This Commission, however, was subsequently
abolished in 2002 by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, via Executive Order No. 72. 88
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature,"89 Congress enacted the NIP AS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants
and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected
areas. These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic
plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly remarkable
areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species
of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial,
wetland, or marine.90 It classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to maintain
essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure
sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the
greatest extent possible.91 The following categories of protected areas were established under
the NIPAS Act:
a. Strict nature reserve;
b. Natural park;
c. Natural monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;
e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;
f. Resource reserve;
g. Natural biotic areas; and
h. Other categories established by law, conventions or international agreements which the
Philippine Government is a signatory.92
Under Section 4 of the NIP AS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set
aside due to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological
diversity and protected against human exploitation.
The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected
area under the category of Protected Seascape. The NIP AS Act defines a Protected Seascape to
be an area of national significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land
while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the
normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas; 93 thus a management plan for each area
must be designed to protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural
conditions.94 Consistent with this endeavor is the requirement that an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the
management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent
with the goals of the NIP AS Act shall be implemented.95
The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under Presidential
Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or
operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an ECC
issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. 96 Pursuant to the EISS, which
called for the proper management of environmentally critical areas, 97 Proclamation No.
214698 was enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects to be considered as
environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS, while DENR Administrative Order No.
2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as "an area
delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are
expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or
implemented in it";99 thus, before a project, which is "any activity, regardless of scale or
magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment," 100 is undertaken in it, such
project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the
environment.101 An EIA is described in detail as follows:
h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) - process that involves evaluating and predicting the
likely impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on the environment during
construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing
appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences
to protect the environment and the community's welfare. The process is undertaken by, among
others, the project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee, affected
communities and other stakeholders.102
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been
declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its
management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an
EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures in obtaining an
ECC103 and that SC-46 falls under the exceptions in Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, due to the
following reasons:
1) The Tañon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;
2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information on possible energy resources;
and 3) Measures are undertaken to ensure that the exploration is being done with the least
damage to surrounding areas.104
We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the
scope of the management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact
assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken
into consideration in the decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the
proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects
and the preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any
damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2
hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to
exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted
only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall
be made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIP AS areas shall
be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIP AS Act are not without exceptions. However,
while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed under
Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to
undergo an EIA under Section 12. In Sotto v. Sotto, 105 this Court explained why a statute should
be construed as a whole:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general
purpose and intent. Consequently each part or section should be construed in connection with
every other part or section and so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine
the attention to the one section to be construed. It is always an unsafe way of construing a
statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into separate words, and
then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some particular definition given by
lexicographers, and then reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these definitions. An
instrument must always be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to
any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the context, the nature of the subject
treated of and the purpose or intention of the parties who executed the contract, or of the
body which enacted or framed the statute or constitution. x x x.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the
EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any
exploration for energy resources may be done in protected areas.
The rationale for such additional requirements are incorporated m Section 2 of the NIP AS Act,
to wit:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy - Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all
components of the natural environment particularly the effect of increasing population,
resource exploitation and industrial advancement and recognizing the critical importance of
protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the environment
notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as
well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the
Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native plants
and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected
areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common
ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural
heritage; that effective administration of this area is possible only through cooperation among
national government, local government and concerned private organizations; that the use and
enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological
diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS),
which shall encompass outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands
that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones
and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated
as "protected areas."
The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to
the second sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means
that when the seismic surveys were done in the Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact
evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon
Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1586, which provides:
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. - The
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National
Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or
areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President may
by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or
instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel, and their specific
functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a) prepare the
proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or area(s); (b) establish ambient
environmental quality standards; (c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or
protective measures against calamitous factors such as earthquakes, floods, water erosion and
others, and (d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from time to
time.
The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46
cannot and will not cure this violation. The following penalties are provided for under
Presidential Decree No. 1586 and the NIPAS Act.
Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for the penalty involving violations of the
ECC requirement:
Section 9. Penalty for Violation. - Any person, corporation or partnership found violating Section
4 of this Decree, or the terms and conditions in the issuance of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate, or of the standards, rules and regulations issued by the National Environmental
Protection Council pursuant to this Decree shall be punished by the suspension or cancellation
of his/its certificates and/or a fine in an amount not to exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) for every violation thereof, at the discretion of the National Environmental
Protection Council. (Emphasis supplied.)
Violations of the NIP AS Act entails the following fines and/or imprisonment under Section 21:
SECTION 21. Penalties. - Whoever violates this Act or any rules and regulations issued by the
Department pursuant to this Act or whoever is found guilty by a competent court of justice of
any of the offenses in the preceding section shall be fined in the amount of not less than Five
thousand pesos (₱5,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000), exclusive of
the value of the thing damaged or imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not more
than six (6) years, or both, as determined by the court: Provided, that, if the area requires
rehabilitation or restoration as determined by the court, the offender shall be required to
restore or compensate for the restoration to the damages: Provided, further, that court shall
order the eviction of the offender from the land and the forfeiture in favor of the Government
of all minerals, timber or any species collected or removed including all equipment, devices and
firearms used in connection therewith, and any construction or improvement made thereon by
the offender. If the offender is an association or corporation, the president or manager shall be
directly responsible for the act of his employees and laborers: Provided, finally, that the DENR
may impose administrative fines and penalties consistent with this Act. (Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the
possible energy resources in the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and
obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities
be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law
upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the
exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. 106 Since there is no
such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy
resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other
issues raised in these consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No.
46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No.
7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, 1 DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA,
FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON
SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained
the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill
effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the
unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by
itself.2 But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the
voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective
offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance,
our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these
agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high
national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude
towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary
on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with
marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation
activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official
indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several
government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of
the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed
from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the
defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion
and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must
be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of
petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the
Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management
Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from
50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No.
34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or
the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of
other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay
through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on
ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for
the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with
defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to
act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted
scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment
facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and
operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and
maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes
but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of
the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine
life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning
up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the
free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which
eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government,
DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels,
and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge
companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal
sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the
Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine
National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed
directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of
December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated
appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do
not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila
Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the
Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners
to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the
following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE
HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT
SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL
POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION
INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF
PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the
headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general
or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can
petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. 8 A
ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing
it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and
imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters
involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the
other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid
waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of
judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its
mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that
petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not
require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in
particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to
clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents
maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of
solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to
such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law,
on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different
concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-
making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be
done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice
Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of
ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and
desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months
from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the
MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the
MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall
likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and
the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid
waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills
and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall
maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of
RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity
of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and
disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in
the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up
a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated,
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to
exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any suggestion that the MMDA
has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be
dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws
would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from
choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and
natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other
hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement
and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water
pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water
pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other
pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and
technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management
Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec.
19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it
shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and
publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months
following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such
action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five
(5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework. 16 Within
twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action
Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it
under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with
the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government
organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action
plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases
should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under
existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control
over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of
Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the
duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the
proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts.
It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts
and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to
construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal
of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached
agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the
setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the
different parts of the country. 19 In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to
provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to
prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO
292),20 is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances
respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources.
Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination
with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a
monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in
Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis. 21 Likewise under
RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of
water quality standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the
prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation
of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked
under EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among
others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national
development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-
wide services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the
formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated
flood control, drainage and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and
MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro
Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood
control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services
shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,
waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974,
and Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary
responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in
accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control
Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and
enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other
floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or
upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or
deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or
from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float
or be washed into such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the
bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into
such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise,
whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of
such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990
was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all
police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the
police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the
capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the
capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG
and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was
made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG
and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and
regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate,
manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national
development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within
the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and
attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the
Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority
shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles,
as well as movement within the port of watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL
73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception
facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge
and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay
waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not
docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal
systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions
of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction. 29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are
dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of
solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or
non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps
as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an
environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or
demolition may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such
as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with
the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws
along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater
directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to
implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the
DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked
to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect
the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of
RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall
formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and
the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not
considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system
shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec.
5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the
regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies
through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation
clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their
environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152),
is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all
levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on
Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide
educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper
use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the
other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school
curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds
and revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s development objectives. 34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a
manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh,
brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of
pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental
strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality
management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from
concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and
quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble
objectives of RA 9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical,
and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the
law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the
cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned
shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain,
remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do
so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons
and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the
counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152
continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof,
any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and
prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident
at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for
utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are
necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination
with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup
operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to
have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements
of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other
funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than
real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the
designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern
themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to
cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the
succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental
spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or
spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from
accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific
polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application
of said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations that
presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding
containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the
aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill
condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or
accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting
the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental
spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even
expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152
may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of
businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in
the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting
provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills
as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD
1152.
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow
reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of
the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the
cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup
operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As
pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec.
17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and
cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires
them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to
stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures
as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying
duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is
properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail
to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies
shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they
have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution
incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup
operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the
Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in
even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly
invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their
cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what
the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is
practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of
environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of
general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents." 35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec.
20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of
such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific
and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable
certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution
incidents" which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by
polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16
of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or
pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the
land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up
in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless
and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution
incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so
undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the
Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay
polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to
contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves
the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275,
previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the
long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation
process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and
contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from
reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic
exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the
ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves
the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices
under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal
level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," 36 the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the
length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures
which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital
Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river
banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and
garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible
for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures
would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously
addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies
of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD
1067 or the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along
banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire
length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural
areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of
public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person
shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing
along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But
while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments
undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial
establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment
facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters,
from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to
comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on
the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage
Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is
shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the
surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in
the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack
alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of
pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be
established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular
note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37,
reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall be
established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including
LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity
of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the
effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which
ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly
complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering,
dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open
dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have
proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that
ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins
the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from
vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of
Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of
substances to the aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine
litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid
substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the
extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act
and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence;
hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some
of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its
former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But
the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with
the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks
and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in
the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend
their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand
becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and
instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in
cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind
two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are
required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides
that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil
and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it
is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. 41 Even assuming
the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay,
they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or
supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government
agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its
waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and
natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government
agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully
implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call
regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to
ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its
indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, 42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in
their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually
discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether
they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing
laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to
require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within
a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing
into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of
fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with
the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation
facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the
provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest
possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, 45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and
restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods,
the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance
with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979,
RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the
Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 46 and the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood
control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws
along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro
Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control
services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and
Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other
concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and
other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as
prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters
within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective
penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws
on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year
from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time
within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, 48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, 49 the DepEd
shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection,
and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of
students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations
Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration,
and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,
and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP
Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
"continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a
quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.