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SGI 2024 | 2 Germany Report

Executive Summary
Democratic government

Germany’s political system is strengthened by robust and resilient democratic

institutions. All public entities are effectively constrained by reliable checks
and balances and adherence to the rule of law. A pluralistic media
environment promotes open debates and disseminates high-quality
information, including critical evaluations of governmental performance.
Additionally, democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law enjoy
considerable support from political and economic elites, as well as from the
general public. A vibrant civil society significantly contributes to public
discourse and inspires the younger generation to value democracy and open
exchange.

However, the resilience of democratic principles in Germany faces significant

challenges amid increasing polarization, particularly evidenced by the rise of
support for the far-right party AfD. While not all AfD supporters reject
democratic principles, many prominent party representatives openly espouse
nationalistic and homophobic views. Issues such as immigration and the
management of refugee inflows – considered the most pressing problem by
survey respondents at the end of the observation period (Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen 2024) – have contributed to the radicalization of certain segments of
the population.

A troubling trend in policy debates is the tendency to dismiss opposing views

as malevolent rather than legitimate differences. This polarization first
appeared during the 2015 refugee crisis and has persisted through subsequent
controversies, including government policies during the pandemic, attitudes
toward Russia, and support for Ukraine.

Moreover, democratic values have not firmly taken root in certain migrant
communities. In Turkish communities, for instance, a majority aligns with
Turkey’s autocratic leadership. Similarly, within Arab communities, the Gaza
conflict has incited open anti-Semitic outbursts. This indicates that despite
residing in democratic societies, some migrant population segments do not
resonate with fundamental democratic principles.
SGI 2024 | 3 Germany Report

Despite these challenges, a significant majority of Germans continue to vote

for democratic parties, and populist movements – unlike in some other
European countries – have yet to attain political power. Nonetheless, the future
remains uncertain, especially in the eastern states, where the AfD has gained
substantial support in polls.

One drawback of Germany’s rules-based approach and its deep trust in an

ever-expanding set of regulations is the escalating bureaucratic burden.
Companies view red tape and increasingly detailed regulations as major
impediments to entrepreneurial efforts. Researchers also criticize stringent
constraints, citing issues such as data protection and bans on certain
technologies, which they argue drive cutting-edge research out of Germany.

Governing with foresight

German governments typically make well-informed decisions, closely

collaborating with scientific communities, particularly during crises with
inherent knowledge limitations. Despite programmatic differences, coalitions
like the current “Traffic Light” coalition (comprising the SPD, FDP, and
Green parties) manage to agree on programs through comprehensive coalition
agreements over the legislative term. The current government’s agenda, as
outlined in its coalition agreement, is forward-looking, placing a strong
emphasis on climate protection and digitalization.

However, weaknesses emerge in the realm of strategic foresight. Firstly, there

is a notable lack of strategic planning for potential crisis scenarios, as
evidenced by the lack of preparedness for the pandemic and the Russian war
against Ukraine. Secondly, communication often devolves into cacophony,
especially under crisis conditions. The government struggles to establish a
unifying narrative shared by all coalition partners, hindering its ability to
provide clear guidance and orientation to the country. This problem may, to
some extent, reflect a lack of charisma among leading politicians, but the issue
has persisted from the chancellorship of Angela Merkel to the current
leadership under Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

Sustainable policymaking

Germany’s policy approach must grapple with two notable deficiencies. First,
there is a reluctance to prepare the welfare state for demographic aging.
Support for the bold Hartz reforms of the 2000s has waned, and some of these
reforms have even been reversed. Rather than preparing for future challenges,
the welfare state agenda focuses on further expanding and completing social
protection. With the end of the peace dividend, rising energy prices,
SGI 2024 | 4 Germany Report

deglobalization, and risks to the German industrial economic model, the

financial sustainability of the welfare state is now at risk. High corporate and
income tax rates have become obstacles to investment and employment,
undermining the economic foundation of the German model. Second, the
Federal Constitutional Court’s Debt Brake ruling imposes a stringent budget
constraint, further limiting available policy space. Debates on reforming the
German Debt Brake often overlook the inherent fiscal constraints arising from
lower growth and an aging population, which are not artificial constraints
created by constitutional fiscal rules.

Key Challenges
Germany is confronted with the following key challenges.

Strengthening resilient democracy:

German political elites must create a unified strategy to address both external
and internal threats to democracy. Externally, this involves enhancing
European and German leadership in a world where the reliability of the United
States as a defender of democracy and peace is uncertain. Internally, it requires
engaging with AfD voters and those migrant communities that hold autocratic
and illiberal views from their countries of origin instead of embracing the
human rights and democratic values of their current home.

Building a consensus on the energy transition:

While there is broad consensus on Germany’s responsibility for global climate
policies and widespread support for ambitious measures, recent debates on
increasing the CO2 price and technological constraints in home heating have
exposed limits to this acceptance. An unfair and overly costly climate policy
plays into the hands of populists, promoting unscientific narratives and climate
change denial.

German energy policy must strive for more efficient and socially balanced
climate prescriptions. The government’s failure to offset the rising CO2 price
for vulnerable households through a “Klimageld” (Climate Allowance) and its
adoption of excessively costly regulations for homeowners signal a
misdirection. Environmental economists advocate for a more stringent pricing
approach and increased technology neutrality to achieve a cost-effective and
impactful climate policy.
SGI 2024 | 5 Germany Report

Migration and integration policy challenges:

Germany’s commendable efforts to provide refuge to refugees face challenges
as reception capacities approach their limits, according to local politicians in
the municipalities where real integration issues materialize. Integration
difficulties are particularly evident in Arab communities that openly reject
Western values and hold anti-Israel stances. Additionally, the poor
performance of students with migrant backgrounds in the education system
underscores the constraints on integration capacity. These circumstances
provide ammunition to right-wing groups like the AfD, which exploit them as
signs of a loss of control.

Moreover, the labor market integration of Ukrainian refugees in Germany lags

behind other European countries. Collaborative efforts with European partners
to update asylum rules are underway, but further adjustments may be
necessary to counter far-right populist sentiments and demonstrate political
control.

Welfare state reforms:

Recent reforms in pension, old-age, unemployment insurance, and the health
system have predominantly expanded welfare protection. Some Hartz
measures were rolled back through the Bürgergeld, and certain pension
reforms were countered by initiatives like “Rente mit 63” (entering retirement
at 63) and guarantees for minimum pensions. While the social motivation
behind these steps is commendable, financing constraints are increasingly
evident. The pension and health systems are ill-prepared for the imminent
demographic upheaval caused by the retirement wave of the baby boomer
generation. Necessary reforms, such as raising the pension age or initiatives to
increase working hours, face political resistance. Pension committees or
reform templates provided by the German Council of Economic Experts have
been blatantly rebuffed by leading politicians, creating a political taboo around
the inevitable reforms.

Addressing the financial sustainability of the social security system is crucial

for mobilizing resources for the impending transition needs. There is a
legitimate debate about whether the constitutional Debt Brake needs to be
reformed to allow for deficit-financed investment. However, if welfare
spending continues to crowd out future-oriented spending in public budgets,
new debt will not be the solution.

Comprehensive tax reform:

Germany needs comprehensive tax reform. The tax system still suffers from
numerous unjustified exemptions, particularly in the VAT system. By OECD
standards, high effective corporate tax rates and significantly elevated
SGI 2024 | 6 Germany Report

marginal tax rates for average earners discourage economic activities, ranging
from investment to employment. The growing preference for leisure among
German workers correlates with these strong disincentives. A reform aimed at
revenue neutrality, while designing a more efficient tax structure, is
imperative. Although the process is anticipated to be conflict-ridden, it is clear
that the current tax system places an unnecessary burden on Germany’s
economic activities.
SGI 2024 | 7 Germany Report

Democratic Government

I. Vertical Accountability

Elections

Free and Fair Both independent candidates and candidates from registered parties may run
Political
for election to the Bundestag. To qualify for the ballot, political parties and
Competition
Score: 9
candidates must meet specific registration requirements outlined in the
Political Parties Act (Parteigesetz). These requirements differ based on
whether the qualification concerns a party or an independent candidate.

At the subnational level, the State Election Act of a state (Landeswahlgesetz)

specifies the criteria for candidates and parties. Non-established parties – those
that have not held at least five seats in the Bundestag or a state parliament
(Landtag) continuously since the last election – must be assessed for eligibility
by the Federal Election Committee (Bundeswahlausschuss) or, in the case of
state elections, by the respective state’s Election Committee. These parties
must submit various documents, such as a declaration of intent, their
manifesto, and a demonstration of their status as a party (Parteieigenschaft, §2
Abs. 2 PartG).

Additionally, non-established parties and non-partisan candidates must provide

a minimum number of signatures from eligible voters in the electoral district
where they intend to run for election. Candidates are also required to submit
personal information and details about their party affiliation
(Bundeswahlleiterin, 2021). Rejected parties have the right to appeal the
decision up to 75 days before the election (OSCE, 2022: 5).

The Basic Law (§ 21 Abs. 1 GG) mandates that parties disclose their assets
and the origins of their financial resources. While parties must identify donors
of contributions above €500, transparency is required only for donations
exceeding €10,000 from a single donor within one year. In such cases, parties
must disclose the donor’s name, address, and the total amount given.
SGI 2024 | 8 Germany Report

Furthermore, donations exceeding €50,000 must be reported to the president of

the German parliament immediately, and these donations are also made
available online (BMI, 2023).

Regarding media access for parties and candidates, the activities of

broadcasting media are regulated by the laws of the Länder, with no general
media-related regulations at the federal level. However, the Interstate Treaty
on Broadcasting and Telemedia (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag) provides a general
framework, ensuring the plurality of opinion and balanced coverage of all
major political, ideological, and social forces.

All parties with a list in at least one federal state are to receive an
“appropriate” amount of broadcasting time. The amount of airtime allocated to
each party depends on its performance in the previous general election. While
campaigning in public media is free of charge, private media charge for
election airtime. The OSCE notes that this could make it difficult for smaller
parties to afford airtime, especially for the 2023 Berlin elections, which
included more than two elections in one cycle (OSCE, 2023: 9).

In addition to public and private media campaigns, an increasing number of

parties and candidates are utilizing social media channels like Facebook and
Instagram for electoral campaigns, with a substantial portion focusing on
negative campaigning. During the federal elections in 2021, candidates often
sought to discredit their opponents through disinformation and hate speech
(Ruttloff et al., 2023). In Germany, as in other OECD countries,
disinformation spread through social media has been shown to impact voter
loyalty, leading to vote switching. For the 2017 federal election, the AfD in
particular benefited from the fact that many CDU voters were receptive to
disinformation distributed over social media (Zimmermann and Kohring,
2020).

Free and Fair According to the Federal Election Act (Bundeswahlgesetz), all German
Elections
citizens who are at least 18 years old are eligible to vote. German citizenship is
Score: 10
defined in Article 116 of the Basic Law. At the state level, analogous State
Election Acts are in place. In recent years, several states and their
municipalities have reduced the voting age to 16 years. Only at the municipal
level and in elections to the European Parliament do non-Germans with EU
citizenship have a right to vote.

German citizens residing abroad are eligible to vote if they have lived in the
Federal Republic of Germany for at least three uninterrupted months. This stay
must occur after the age of 14 and cannot be more than 25 years ago. If no
SGI 2024 | 9 Germany Report

such residency took place, citizens permanently residing outside of Germany

can provide proof that they are personally affected by the political situation in
Germany.

German citizens can only be disqualified from voting based on a judicial

decision that declares them ineligible to vote (Bundeswahlleiterin, 2021a).
This includes convicted criminals with a prison sentence of one year or more
(§45 Abs.1 StGB). The exclusion of people incapable of contracting guilt and
residing in psychiatric clinics and of disabled citizens needing caregivers for
all matters was ruled unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2019).

Regarding voter registration, it is generally not necessary for individuals to

register to vote. Instead, all eligible voters are included in their municipality’s
electoral roll if they reported their residence within Germany to the
registration office at least 42 days before the election. In that case, all entitled
voters receive an election notification up to 21 days before the election. If
someone erroneously does not receive the notification, they can appeal against
the electoral roll within the time frame of 20 to 16 days before the election
(BMI, 2023).

The specific procedure for elections is described in the Federal Election Act
and by Federal Election Regulations, with similar acts at the state level. This
procedure includes the preparation of elections, the elections themselves, and
the determination of the results. For supervision, the Federal Election Act
prescribes electoral bodies whose members are bound to discretion and to
perform their duties impartially. Additionally, the execution of the election in
the polling stations is organized by election workers (Wahlhelfer*innen), who
are responsible for tasks such as verifying a voter’s eligibility based on the
electoral roll, counting the votes, and determining the result for the respective
district. The role of election workers is honorary; if appointed, the position is
obligatory for each eligible voter.

Elections in Germany are always held on a Sunday, with polling stations open
from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. This schedule ensures that a majority of voters are able
to vote in person. German elections follow five electoral principles based on
Article 38 of the Basic Law: they are universal, direct, free, equal, and secret.

In addition to voting on Election Day, early voting is available to all eligible

voters, either in person or by mail. Voters receive a form to request a ballot
paper along with their election notification. This ballot paper can then be used
to vote before the election date, either by mail or in person at the responsible
municipal authority office. Voters can request ballot papers until the Friday
SGI 2024 | 10 Germany Report

before the election. For the vote to be counted, the ballot must be submitted to
the relevant office no later than 6 p.m. on the Sunday of the election.

The Federal Ministry of Interior and Community estimates there are around
90,000 polling stations, given that an electoral district comprises
municipalities or districts with up to 2,500 inhabitants. Polling stations should
be barrier-free for voters with disabilities, considering the general accessibility
of the location itself and the setup of the polling station. The election
notification informs voters whether the polling station is barrier-free in
practice. If needed, election workers provide voter assistance to people with
disabilities.

The free and fair elections index assigned Germany a value of 0.95, suggesting
that government intimidation and election fraud are not particularly present in
Germany. Similarly, the clean elections index for 2022 categorizes Germany
as having almost no voting irregularities, assuming that any observed
irregularities are likely unintentional and not biased toward specific groups’
participation (V-Dem, 2022).

Quality of Parties and Candidates

Socially Rooted Legal aspects of the German political system only moderately hinder the
Party System
representation of legal aspects of the German political system only moderately
Score: 9
hinder the representation of relevant societal interests. For example, political
parties can be prevented from representing undemocratic interests. According
to Article 21 of the Basic Law, parties must adhere to democratic principles
and are deemed unconstitutional if they impair these principles. If the Federal
Constitutional Court determines a party is unconstitutional, it can be dissolved
and prohibited from being re-established.

However, prohibiting a party is not easily achieved. The rejection of

democratic principles in a party’s manifesto is insufficient for a ban; the party
must threaten democracy through its concrete actions. This requirement poses
a significant obstacle because it is difficult to differentiate between the actions
of individual party members and the actions of the party as an entity.
Additionally, any ruling must consider the jurisdiction of the European Court
of Human Rights, which allows prohibition only if a party has realistic
chances of being elected and implementing goals that threaten democracy.

Due to these strong barriers, only two parties have ever been banned in
Germany: the SRP and the KPD. The NPD, which was determined to be
unconstitutional, was not banned because the Federal Constitutional Court
SGI 2024 | 11 Germany Report

ruled it did not have the potential to enforce its anti-democratic goals
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2017).

The German electoral system includes a five percent threshold for political
parties to gain seats in parliament and thus represent specific societal interests.
This threshold was implemented in 1949 to ensure the operability of the
parliament and to form a stable government. In the 2021 federal elections,
8.7% of the votes were for parties that did not surpass the 5% threshold and,
hence, did not receive seats in the German parliament (Statista, 2023). A
similar trend can be found in various state elections in 2023. In Bavaria, 9.7%
of the votes – including those for the FDP and The Left – did not exceed 5%
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2023). In Hesse, 12.1% of the votes, including those for
The Left, did not meet the threshold (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt,
2023). In Berlin, the percentage was 13.7%, with the FDP included in this
figure (Tagesschau, 2023a). Therefore, an increasing share of votes is not
represented in the parliament.

In June 2023, German Federal President Steinmeier signed a new law for
electoral reform (Wahlrechtsreform) to decrease the size of the Bundestag to
630 members. The Bundestag currently consists of 736 representatives
(Tagesschau, 2023b). The reform abolishes the so-called
“Grundmandatsklausel.” Previously, a party could be represented in the
Bundestag if it won at least three constituencies (Direktmandat), even if the
party itself did not exceed the five percent threshold. Under the new law,
candidates with a Direktmandat will receive a seat in parliament only if their
party exceeds the five percent threshold.

This change will likely lead to the elimination of The Left party from the
Bundestag because it’s current presence in the chamber is a function of the
three-constituency rule. Moreover, the parliamentary representation of the
CSU is in jeopardy. This party runs only in one of the 16 states, Bavaria,
where it wins almost all constituencies; nonetheless, its overall nationwide
vote share was just 5.2% in 2021. A loss of 0.3 percentage points would
eliminate this party from the Bundestag as well. Thus, the change in the
electoral law clearly has the potential to hinder the representation of relevant
societal interests.

In October 2023, the citizens’ association Mehr Demokratie filed a complaint

against the reform with the Constitutional Court, worrying that millions of
votes would be invalidated (Tagesschau, 2023c).

During the last federal election in 2021, almost all political parties published
manifestos that are publicly accessible on their websites and are relatively
SGI 2024 | 12 Germany Report

distinct from one another (V-Dem, 2023). A majority of parties also published
additional manifestos formulated in simple language. Moreover, since 2002,
the Federal Agency for Civic Education has provided the “Wahl-O-Mat,”
which allows voters to determine how closely their preferences on relevant
topics align with the manifestos of various parties running for election (BpB,
2021).

Additionally, a majority of Germany’s major political parties have permanent

local branches to support local interests (V-Dem, 2023). This practice stems
from German federalism, where the responsibility for some tasks lies with the
states rather than the federal government (§73ff. Basic Law). Some state-level
responsibilities are delegated to municipalities, making local party branches
relevant as well.

The Varieties of Democracy data shows a value of 3.76 for the party linkages
indicator, suggesting that constituents mainly respond to a party’s program and
its ideas for society. The value also indicates that, to a lesser extent, voters are
rewarded with local collective goods. Clientelism, however, does not appear to
be very present in political parties (V-Dem, 2023).

Regarding the different societal interests represented through the major

political parties, left, center, and right positions are present in the parliament.
According to the Manifesto Project (2023), which uses a right-left position
scale derived from party manifestos, The Left, the SPD, the South Schleswig
Voter’s Union, and the Greens are classified as left-wing parties. The FDP and
CDU are positioned in the middle of the scale, making them center parties.
The AfD is classified as a right-wing party.

Effective Cross- The Liberal Democracy Index, based on the Varieties of Democracy Project,
Party
allocated Germany a score of 0.81 for 2022 on a scale from 0 to 1 (Our World
Cooperation
Score: 8
in Data, 2023). Further, according to the Manifesto Project, which analyzes the
manifestos of the major political parties in a country, all major parties in
Germany make favorable statements about the necessity of democracy. The
Greens (5.241) and the Left (5.084) receive the highest scores, suggesting the
highest number of positive mentions of democracy in their manifestos. In
contrast, the AfD (2.033) receives the lowest score, followed by the CDU with
a score of 2.559. Additionally, while the AfD has a relatively low score of
0.064, it is the only major party for which statements against the idea of
democracy can be observed, either in general or within its manifesto
(Manifesto Project, 2023). Hence, liberal democratic values are widely
accepted and supported within the major political parties apart from parts of
the AfD. In Saxony, Thuringia, and Saxony-Anhalt, for instance, the AfD was
classified as a secured right-wing extremist party by the states’ domestic
SGI 2024 | 13 Germany Report

intelligence services based on the justification that the AfD pursues anti-
constitutional goals in these states (Tagesschau, 2023).

The cooperation of two or three parties to form a majority and thereby govern
is standard in Germany at all federal levels. This cooperation in developing
and executing policies is a crucial aspect of German politics. Various coalition
combinations exist, and there are no barriers to coalitions between democratic
parties with one exception: The CDU currently excludes coalitions with the
Left. However, this position is under discussion due to the need to form stable
democratic governments amid the rising share of AfD votes, particularly in
East Germany (Zeit Online, 2023b).

The major political parties regularly criticize and distance themselves from the
AfD, and there are demands, for instance from the Greens in Berlin, to
examine the possibility of prohibiting the AfD (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2024).
Additionally, the domestic intelligence service classified the AfD as a
suspected right-wing extremist case in 2022, which allows it to observe the
party as a whole (Tagesschau, 2022).

However, according to the “Politbarometer” by the news outlet ZDF, the AfD
would receive 22% of the votes in a federal election as of January 12, 2024
(Politbarometer 2024). Therefore, it is not clear how effective efforts to
neutralize the AfD are. While other parties distance themselves from
cooperation at the state or federal level, the newspaper “Die Zeit” showed in
July 2023 that cooperation on a communal level has already taken place in
several instances. This includes collaborations in Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and
Thuringia where the AfD is classified as a secured right-wing extremist
organization (Zeit Online, 2023a).

Existing obstacles in the party system, both by law and in practice, pose no
significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation among
democratic parties. However, the strength of the AfD necessitates coalitions
across the left and right camps, which find it very difficult to agree on and
jointly defend reforms. This situation is likely to increase support for the AfD.

Access to Official Information

Transparent As of September 2006, Germany has a Freedom of Information Act

Government
(Informationsfreiheitsgesetz, IFG) that grants everyone the right to obtain
Score: 9
information from federal authorities or other public bodies of the German
government (Schaar, 2019). There are no prerequisites for accessing this
information. Additionally, the requested information must be provided by the
SGI 2024 | 14 Germany Report

respective agency within one month, although it may involve a fee (BMI,
2023).

According to Articles 3 to 6 of the Act, there are four key exceptions to access.
First, intelligence services are not required to disclose information.
Additionally, the right to information does not include data of third parties,
business secrets and intellectual property, or information concerning ongoing
administrative procedures. Federal agencies, however, must state and justify
both the reasons for exemptions from the obligation to inform and any delays
that exceed the time limit (BMI, 2023).

In 2022, 491 inquiries after § 12 Abs. 1 IFG were filed, a decrease from the
previous year. Most of these inquiries were directed to either the Federal
Ministry of Health or the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BfDI, 2023).
Simultaneously, as the point of contact for people who believe their rights
have been violated, the federal commissioner for data protection and freedom
of information reported 310 cases in which individuals claimed a violation of
their right to official information according to the IFG (BfDI, 2023).

II. Diagonal Accountability

Media Freedom and Pluralism

Free Media Media freedom in Germany is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Basic
Score: 8
Law (Article 5), which includes freedom of speech and prohibits media
censorship. The media is considered the fourth pillar of democracy, and this
freedom extends to publicly owned media (Rundfunk).

Additionally, publicly owned media in Germany operates under a legally

secured mandate based on the Interstate Treaty on the Modernization of Media
(Medienstaatsvertrag), which provides a framework for both public and private
broadcast media. According to constitutional requirements set by the Federal
Constitutional Court, the government is prohibited from interfering with or
influencing the selection, content, or implementation of programs (Grundsatz
der Staatsfreiheit). However, public media often faces criticism for being too
close to the government, primarily because the supervisory board, the
Rundfunkrat, includes multiple former and active politicians. This raises
concerns about the neutrality of public media (Grimberg, 2020).
SGI 2024 | 15 Germany Report

Generally, censorship of print and broadcast media is rare and usually

concerns only highly sensitive issues. If attempts at censorship are discovered,
the responsible officials are typically punished (V-Dem, 2023). However, an
incident in June 2023, where the Bavarian Federal Police wiretapped the
climate activist group “Letzte Generation” and their press contacts, raised
concerns about interference with press freedom. While the Munich public
prosecutor’s office deemed the interception reasonable, experts viewed it as an
infringement on press freedom (Brack, 2023).

A new law regulating whistleblower protection took effect in July 2023. While
it prohibits reprisals against whistleblowers and obliges enterprises and
organizations to establish secure channels for informants, the Whistleblower
Netzwerk (2023) criticizes that these regulations only cover reports addressed
to internal or external governmental channels. Public whistleblowers are
protected only in exceptional cases. Article 32 of the Whistleblower Protection
Act (Hinweisgeberschutzgesetz, HinSchG) specifies that public
whistleblowers are protected only when they did not receive an answer from
external channels or if the relevant information relates to an immediate and
obvious danger to the public. This complicates cooperation between
investigative journalists and whistleblowers, particularly in cases of white-
collar crime and illegal intelligence activities (RSF, 2023).

Media freedom in Germany has worsened in recent years, according to RSF’s

annual ranking, which assigned Germany 81.91 points out of 100. There were
103 recorded attacks on reporters in 2022, an increase from previous years (65
in 2020 and 80 in 2021). Many attacks go unreported, suggesting the actual
number is higher. Most attacks are physical, with many journalists being
kicked or hit. Approximately 84% of these attacks are attributed to the extreme
right, conspiracy ideologies, or antisemitism. One-third of journalists reported
that police did not help when attacks occurred, and in some cases, police
carried out the assaults. Additionally, police often did not investigate, or
journalists refrained from filing complaints due to fear of further attacks.
Besides physical violence, populist politicians attempt to create mistrust
toward the media, and hate speech and threats on social media are increasing
issues, especially for people of color, women, or journalists reporting on
gender issues.

The government seldom blocks websites, but it has blocked Russian state-
owned media outlets following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine due to an EU
regulation. Additionally, Vodafone, following a regional court order in
Munich, has blocked multiple streaming and file-sharing websites in response
to complaints from rights holders (Freedom House, 2023).
SGI 2024 | 16 Germany Report

To combat hate speech and the distribution of fake news and misinformation,
Germany introduced the Network Enforcement Act
(Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz). This law requires social networks to delete
such content. According to Google’s Transparency Report, German
government agencies made 293 requests to take down content in the second
half of 2022 (Freedom House, 2023). The lack of judicial oversight is
problematic, as there is no judicial remedy if a social media network restricts
an individual’s freedom of speech or right to information.

The Digital Services Act, an EU directive that came into force in November
2022, aims to enable the deletion of illegal content and protect users’
fundamental rights. Member states are required to implement this directive by
February 2024 (Reporter ohne Grenzen, 2023).

Lastly, while journalists in Germany adhere to a self-binding code of ethics,

self-censorship is not a prevalent or documented issue, either online or in other
media (Freedom House, 2023). If self-censorship occurs, it is only on isolated,
highly political issues (V-Dem, 2023).

Pluralism of Pluralism of opinions within the media is an important aspect in Germany,

Opinions
especially in publicly owned media. Based on the requirements formulated by
Score: 8
the Federal Constitutional Court, publicly owned media should portray the
diverse existing opinions to support free and comprehensive opinion
formation. In this regard, the government must ensure that the media content
fulfills a minimum of objectivity, mutual respect, and balance in opinions
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2007).

As explained earlier in our discussion on media freedom, there are supervisory

boards for publicly owned media, namely a board of directors
(Verwaltungsrat) and a Media Commission (Rundfunkrat). The board of
directors oversees the operations of publicly owned media, excluding program
design, while the Media Commission monitors the programs and their content,
representing the interests of the general public (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006).
The commission is intended to include representatives from various key
institutions and social groups, including politicians. Based on a ruling by the
Federal Constitutional Court, the number of governmental and government-
related members cannot exceed one-third of the total number of commission
members.

As previously mentioned, since politicians are present on the commission,

public-owned media has been increasingly criticized for a lack of neutrality.
Critics claim it is too close to the government and does not fulfill the
SGI 2024 | 17 Germany Report

requirement for diversity. Further, it is criticized for reporting that is too one-
sided. In fact, a study found that trust in the neutrality of public-owned media
has decreased over recent years. In October 2023, 39%, compared to 25% in
2020, had no or very little trust in the credibility of the public-owned
television stations ARD and ZDF (ZDF, 2023).

Still, derived from the V-Dem index for media, all major media outlets critique
the government consistently. Additionally, based on a 2022 media bias score
of 3.35, even though there is a focus on governing parties, the German media
covers opposition parties more or less impartially (V-Dem, 2023).
According to the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), the
transparency of ownership poses a low risk for print and broadcasting media.
The Interstate Media Treaty mandates that privately owned media must
disclose ownership information to maintain a broadcasting license and must
report any changes. Additionally, the Political Parties Act requires political
parties to disclose their holdings in media companies. Online-only media,
which do not require a license, face lower requirements. For the digital media
sphere, the CMPF indicates that pluralism is at a higher risk compared to print
and broadcast media, criticizing the legislature for not adapting laws to media
digitalization (Holznagel and Kalbhenn, 2022). A major problem is that the
current instruments used to monitor media diversity primarily cover the supply
side but largely ignore the actual usage behavior of citizens, especially in the
digital sphere (Stark and Stegmann, 2021).

Issues concerning monopolies are primarily regulated by the Federal Cartel

Office (Bundeskartellamt). Additionally, to prevent monopolies, a separate
independent regulatory body, the Commission on Concentration in the Media
(KEK), evaluates whether changes in ownership structures or new licensing
procedures for privately owned media give a company a dominating influence
on public opinion. The commission works to secure pluralism of opinion.

Media pluralism has, however, decreased in recent years, particularly affecting

print media. The number of sold copies of newspapers decreased by around
one million from 2022 to 2023. Moreover, a small number of media outlets
hold a large share of the market. For instance, in the second quarter of 2023,
the Bild, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
were the highest circulated newspapers nationally and held a significant share
of readers (Statista, 2023). Likewise, as of September 2023, the top five
broadcasters – ZDF, ARD Dritte, ARD Das Erste, RTL, and VOX – held over
50% of the market share (AFG, 2023).
SGI 2024 | 18 Germany Report

Civil Society

Free Civil The Basic Law grants every German citizen the right to assemble peacefully
Society
and unarmed (Article 8). The Federal Act concerning Assemblies and
Score: 9
Processions (Versammlungsgesetz des Bundes) specifies relevant regulations
regarding the right to freedom of assembly. As the states are responsible for
assemblies, some states, such as Bavaria, have enacted their own state laws
concerning assemblies. Generally, no prior notification or permission is
necessary. However, the regulations differ for assemblies taking place
outdoors. These assemblies need to be registered with a public authority at
least 48 hours before being announced and may be restricted. This ensures that
the authorities can provide protection for the assembly and manage
consequences for third parties. Further, in the case of a direct threat to public
safety, an assembly may be forbidden or dissolved. The prohibition, however,
is considered a last resort to be used when restrictions to avert a threat are not
sufficient (BMI, 2023).

In June 2023 the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the overall
prohibition of assemblies during the Covid pandemic by the state of Saxony
was disproportionate and that exceptions should have been clearly regulated.
Simultaneously, it declared that restrictions during a pandemic are justified as
a pandemic poses a threat to people’s lives and health
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 2023).

Overall, the allocated score of 3.88 for the year 2022 (V-Dem, 2023) suggests
that state authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful
assemblies, where a ban or restriction of an assembly concerns only lawful,
necessary, and proportionate limitations. Likewise, the World Justice Project’s
score for Germany is 0.9, with 1.0 being the highest possible score (World
Justice Project, 2022).

While government intimidation is not a systematic issue in Germany, the

research project “Police use of excessive force” found that in 2021 there were
2,790 investigations against police officers due to the unlawful use of force,
55% of which were related to protests or other political assemblies. It is
important to note that the study’s sample is not representative (Grasnick,
2023).
SGI 2024 | 19 Germany Report

Additionally, freedom of association is granted to every citizen based on

Article 9 of the Basic Law. However, associations violating the constitution or
criminal laws are prohibited. Once an association is banned, it becomes illegal
and must be dissolved. In practice, the relatively high score of 0.88 implies
that political and civic groups are able to form and operate with a significant
amount of freedom (V-Dem, 2023).

Effective Civil The Basic Law, the German constitution, allows all German citizens to form
Society
associations and organizations (Article 9, Passage 1) and specifically to form
Organizations
(Capital and
trade unions and employers’ organizations for all professions (Article 9,
Labor) Passage 3) to preserve and improve labor and economic conditions
Score: 8 (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949).

As a result, Germany has many trade unions and business organizations. These
organizations are economically and politically independent and are funded by
membership fees, which are tax-deductible for both employees and employers
(Rütters/Mielke, n.d.; Hans Böckler Stiftung, 2013; Vereinigte Lohnsteuerhilfe
e.V., 2023).

Wage bargaining in Germany operates autonomously. Trade unions and

employer organizations negotiate wages and working conditions
independently without political intervention. The government does not
typically intervene in collective bargaining rounds and is not entitled to settle
disputes between unions and business organizations (Strünck, n.d.).
Government pleas and other political institutions usually do not affect these
negotiations and are quickly rejected by the negotiating parties. There are no
serious debates about limiting the autonomy of wage bargaining (Lesch et al.,
2023: 26).

Major civil society organizations (CSOs) have the organizational strength to

independently formulate policy proposals. For example, the Initiative New
Social Market Economy (Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft, INSM),
funded by the employers’ organizations of the metal and electro industries,
aims to rethink and improve the German social market economy. It was
initially kickstarted with €100 million in funding (Hans Böckler Stiftung,
2013). On the trade union side, in 2022, a reform of the works constitution law
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) was proposed by experts from the German Trade
Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) and several law professors
(Verdi, 2022).

Labor and capital CSOs generally play an advisory role in the policymaking
process. They can make proposals, although the federal government is not
obliged to react to them. It is unclear to what extent the government feels
SGI 2024 | 20 Germany Report

compelled to respond to these proposals, but governments often actively seek

CSO advice. For instance, in July 2022, Chancellor Scholz invited trade
unions and employer organizations to participate in a “Concerted Action” to
discuss dealing with inflation and the energy crisis.

Many trade unions and business organizations come together in umbrella

organizations. The German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund) is an umbrella organization for eight major German trade
unions, representing approximately six million members. Membership has
declined since German reunification (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung,
n.d.). The Confederation of German Employers (Bundesvereinigung der
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände) is the main umbrella organization for
employers’ organizations. It consists of 14 state associations and 46 federal
professional associations from nearly every economic sector, representing
about one million enterprises with more than 30 million employees (Die
Arbeitgeber, n.d.).

Compared to many other European countries, the number and intensity of

strikes in Germany are low. In the 2010s, an average of 18 working days per
1,000 employees were lost each year due to strikes. This is largely due to
German strike law, which disallows strikes for political reasons
(Deutschlandfunk, 2023).

Most Germans hold favorable views of unions. Specifically, 69% of Germans

support strong unions, and 51% associate positive views with trade unions,
while only 15% have a negative perception. (Nienhüser et al. 2022: 29).

Effective Civil Every German citizen has the right to form and join associations and
Society
organizations (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949, Art. 9). Welfare
Organizations
(Social Welfare)
associations like the Red Cross or Caritas receive approximately 90% of their
Score: 9 funding through social insurance (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, n.d.).
In contrast, clubs such as sports clubs or youth groups like the Scout
movement are primarily financed by their own revenue, including membership
fees, donations, and entrance fees. Additionally, they may be eligible for
grants from state, federal, or EU funding (Deutsches Ehrenamt, n.d.).
Membership fees for nonprofit, charitable, or cultural organizations are tax-
deductible, while those for leisure organizations, such as sports clubs, are not
(American Express, 2023).

Important welfare associations participate in various advisory councils within

federal ministries, particularly the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs and the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women
and Youth (Bundesregierung, 2019). Organizations such as churches, trade
SGI 2024 | 21 Germany Report

chambers, and welfare associations may be invited to comment on draft laws

before they are discussed in the Bundestag, the German parliament
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen, n.d.). Beyond this, they have no official
role in the policymaking process. However, due to their prominence and
influence, they can initiate and shape public discussions and draw attention to
specific issues. Social welfare CSOs sometimes make suggestions for new
laws or amendments to existing laws, but the Bundestag or the federal
government is not obliged to consider them.

Free welfare work is primarily organized through six main organizations, such
as the Red Cross, Caritas, and Diakonie. Together, they form the Federal
Association of Free Welfare Care, collaborating to increase their political and
public influence and achieve their mutual goals (Bundesverband der Freien
Wohlfahrtspflege, n.d.). The Federal Association of Free Welfare Care has
approximately 1.7 million full-time employees, mostly engaged in care work,
and between 2.5 and 3 million volunteers (Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, n.d.). Overall, there are more than 600,000 associations in Germany
with more than 50 million members. About 27 million people are part of a
sports club.

For most major CSOs, there are no studies assessing the quality of their
reputations. However, the Red Cross achieved second place out of 130 ranked
firms and organizations in the Purpose Readiness Index, which measures the
credibility of German companies in terms of their positive contribution to
society (GlobeOne, 2022).

Effective Civil Environmental associations enjoy high levels of respect and trust in German
Society
society. According to a 2016 survey, 60% of German citizens reported having
Organizations
(Environment)
great or very great trust in environmental organizations. This compares with
Score: 9 69% for the police, 44% for trade unions, 29% for churches, and 18% for
political parties (Polis Gesellschaft für Sozial- und Marktforschung mbH,
2016). Therefore, environmental CSOs are well-positioned to draw attention to
environmental issues and inform the public about nature and environmental
concerns.

Environmental CSOs are primarily funded by membership fees and donations,

but they may also receive public funding (Bundesamt für Naturschutz, n.d.).
The federal government finances certain projects conducted by environmental
associations if they strengthen awareness and engagement for the protection of
nature and the environment (Umweltbundesamt, 2023). For instance, the
German branch of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) received €33
million in government funding from Germany and abroad during the 2020-
2021 accounting year (Fuchs, 2022). Additionally, membership fees and
SGI 2024 | 22 Germany Report

donations to organizations active in environmental and nature protection are

tax-deductible (LohnsteuerKompakt, n.d.).

Major German environmental CSOs, such as NABU, BUND, and WWF, have
the organizational strength to independently formulate policies and often
propose enhancements and amendments to existing laws. For example, a group
of CSOs proposed a revised version of the Federal Forests Act
(Bundeswaldgesetz) in fall 2023 (NABU, 2023). These organizations also
contribute to the development and enhancement of the national sustainability
strategy (Bundesregierung, 2023).

The German League for Nature Conservation and Environmental Protection

(Deutscher Naturschutzring, DNR) serves as the principal umbrella
organization for German environmental CSOs. It comprises approximately
100 member organizations, collectively reaching 11 million people (Global
Nature Fund, n.d.). The DNR coordinates projects among its members, seeks
to influence political discourse on environmental and climate protection, and
advocates for a diverse, open-minded, and tolerant society (Deutscher
Naturschutzring, n.d.). The largest German environmental CSO is the German
Union for Nature Conservation (Naturschutzbund Deutschland, NABU), with
more than 900,000 members. NABU is also part of the DNR (NABU, n.d.).

CSOs mainly have an advisory role in the political process in Germany. While
environmental CSOs often propose new laws and regulations, these are merely
suggestions, and the federal government and parliament are not obliged to
consider them. The role of environmental CSOs in the policymaking process is
further discussed under “Effective Involvement of Civil Society Organizations
(Environment).”

III. Horizontal Accountability

Independent Supervisory Bodies

Effective Public The Basic Law assigns the Federal Court of Audit (Bundesrechnungshof) the
Auditing
responsibility for public auditing in Germany, specifically auditing accounts
Score: 10
and ensuring the federation properly and efficiently administers public
finances. To carry out these duties, members of the court enjoy judicial
independence (Article 114, Paragraph 2, Basic Law). As an independent body,
the Federal Court of Audit is subject only to the law and holds the same status
as the federal ministries, the Office of the Federal President, and the Federal
SGI 2024 | 23 Germany Report

Chancellery. It is autonomous and independent in its choice of audit methods,

the depth of the audit, and has the legal authority to decide on the content of
the audit (Seyfried, 2021).

During an audit, relevant bodies are required to provide information and

cooperate, including sharing confidential or secret data. The Federal Court of
Audit must simply state that the information is essential to fulfilling its
mandate to obtain the necessary information (Article 28 Prüfungsordnung des
Bundesrechnungshofes).

The president of the Federal Court of Audit is elected by parliament

(Bundestag) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat) based on the federal
government’s suggestion. After the election, the president is appointed by the
federal president. There is no debate prior to the election, and the Bundestag
vote is conducted in secret, requiring a majority of its members. This process
ensures the independence of the court’s president, and reelection is not
permitted (Article 5 Bundesrechnungshofgesetz). Given that the court’s
members, including the president, enjoy judicial independence, the potential
removal of the president adheres to Article 97 of the Basic Law, which
outlines judicial independence. Thus, dismissal, whether permanent or
temporary, is only possible through a judicial decision based on the law.

As a federal authority, the Federal Court of Audit’s financial and personnel

resources are funded by the federal budget. The court submits its budget
request, including estimates of the resources required to fulfill its mandate, to
the federal government, where the final budget is then subject to political
negotiations. Currently, the court has a staff of around 1,050 employees and an
annual budget of €187 million (Bundesrechnungshof, 2023a). While these
costs are low compared to the size of the federal budget (below 0.1%), the
resources should be sufficient to effectively monitor the federal budget given
the size of the institution.

According to the Open Budget Survey (2021), Germany’s budget oversight,

comprising audit and legislative oversight, scores an impressive 91 out of 100
points, ranking it first in global budget oversight. The audit oversight alone is
awarded a score of 95. Additionally, the survey rates public access to
budgetary information at 73 out of 100, and the audit report – which examines
the soundness and completeness of the government’s year-end accounts – at
67 points. Since these scores exceed 61 points, they indicate that Germany
publishes sufficient information about the use of public resources to facilitate
effective public debate.
SGI 2024 | 24 Germany Report

Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Audit only examines, criticizes, or

recommends cost-saving measures and does not have the authority to issue
legally binding judgments. For media access, the Court publishes press
releases, statements, and background information on its website. The Court
further encourages the media to contact the designated press officer with any
questions or requests for additional information (Bundesrechnungshof, 2023b).
The legislature reviews the Court’s reports and regularly invites Court
representatives to public hearings. If federal ministries receive critical remarks
or suggestions for changes from the Court, they must adhere to the “comply or
explain” principle. They may diverge from the Court’s guidance but must
provide arguments to justify their disagreement with a particular view or
suggestion.

Effective Data Following chapter four of the Federal Data Protection Act
Protection
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG), the national data protection authority in
Score: 9
Germany is the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of
Information (Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz und die
Informationsfreiheit, BfDI). The BfDI is considered a supreme federal
authority responsible for protecting the fundamental right of informational
self-determination. It functions as both a supervisory body and an advisor to
the Bundestag regarding data protection issues. Additionally, the
commissioner is independent in the performance of tasks and the exercise of
power, thus free from both direct and indirect external influence (Article 10
BDSG).

While the BfDI operates independently and can choose which audits to
undertake, citizens have the right to file a complaint with the commissioner if
they believe their rights regarding data protection or access to information
have been infringed (BfDI, n.d.). Furthermore, the BfDI has access to all
necessary information, as each public authority is obligated to provide all data
or information needed by the commissioner to fulfill the relevant tasks (Article
16 BDSG).

The BfDI is elected, without prior debate, by the Bundestag with more than
half of the parliament’s statutory members at the proposal of the federal
government. To be eligible for election, the candidate for the commissioner’s
office must be at least 35 years old and possess sufficient qualifications,
experience, and skills in the domain of data protection. If elected, the BfDI
serves for five years; however, reelection for one additional term is possible.
Although the dismissal of the federal commissioner is possible, the standards
for removal are high. Thus, removal from office is only possible at the request
of the president of the Bundestag due to the commitment of serious
SGI 2024 | 25 Germany Report

misconduct or by no longer fulfilling the necessary requirements (Article 11f.

BDSG).

Similar to the previously examined Federal Court of Audit, the BfDI, as a

federal body, is financed by the federal budget, with the final amount of
financial resources depending on political considerations. For the financial
year 2024, the federal commissioner is allocated €45 million, making up
0.01% of the total federal budget (Bundesmisterium der Finanzen, 2023). With
50 additional positions added in 2022, the BfDI had a personnel budget for
396.4 positions. Eighty percent of these positions were filled, meaning that
301 people worked for the BfDI in 2022 (BfDI, 2023). (Note that additional
data protection authorities exist in each federal state, which significantly
increases the budget and the number of people employed in this area)

The BfDI submits an annual report (Tätigkeitsreport) detailing its work to the
federal government, parliament, and council. The report is also available to the
public on the BfDI’s website. Additionally, the authority published 13 press
releases in 2022. The media can also submit inquiries to the BfDI. In 2022, the
commissioner responded to 413 requests by email and 406 by telephone.

Furthermore, in 2022, the authority was involved in 119 draft laws, 109
regulations, 33 directives, and 12 additional projects initiated either by the
European Union or at the national level. While the commissioner criticized the
often untimely inclusion of the BfDI, overall inclusion increased by almost
50% (BfDI, 2023a). However, as of April 2022, many recommendations made
by the BfDI in his annual report have not been fully implemented or have not
been implemented at all (BfDI, 2023b). Specifically, in his 2022 report, the
BfDI criticized that none of the recommendations from the 2021 report were
fully implemented. Regarding the legislature, the commissioner serves as an
advisor to the parliament. This means the BfDI is included as an expert on data
protection in parliamentary committees and supports the parliamentary
consultation process through detailed statements on relevant issues (BfDI,
2023).

Rule of Law

Effective Judicial The separation of powers in Germany, which ensures an independent

Oversight
judiciary, is regulated by the Basic Law (Article 20, Paragraph 2; Article
Score: 10
92ff.). Judicial power is vested in judges and courts, including the Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) and other
specialized federal courts. A similar structure exists at the subnational state
level. Notably, judges are independent and exclusively bound by the law,
SGI 2024 | 26 Germany Report

meaning they possess the legal autonomy to interpret and review existing laws
and decide on issues without outside interference. However, the BVerfG does
not initiate legal proceedings; it only becomes active once a complaint is
submitted.

Next to the framework conditions set by the law, additional measures ensure
the exercise of independent judicial review. For instance, judges must swear
an oath (Richtereid) to fulfill their positions true to the law and with the
purpose of only truth and justice (Article 38 Deutsches Richtergesetz, DRiG).
Additionally, the German Association of Judges has outlined multiple theses
for judicial ethics in Germany, including independence, impartiality, and
integrity (Deutscher Richterbund, 2018).

Still, the capacity to exercise independent judicial review is restricted by the

required legal education, which is offered only by universities (Article 5f.
DRiG). In principle, access to a sufficient legal education is open to everyone,
provided they hold a higher education entrance qualification (Abitur) with
minimum grades. However, in Germany, school performance and the
likelihood of achieving a university degree are significantly influenced by
socioeconomic background. In this respect, an indirect selection bias might
exist.

The members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat, with each body electing half of the members. Elections are
conducted based on a two-thirds majority (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2023a).
While the standard majority for votes in the Bundestag or Bundesrat is a
simple majority, the vote for appointing judges to the BVerfG requires a
higher majority, which increases the likelihood of politically unbiased justices.
Additionally, judges are appointed for a limited term of 12 years and are not
eligible for reelection.

Generally, citizens in Germany have secure and effective access to justice (V-
Dem, 2023) and can challenge government action through a constitutional
complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court if they claim the action violated
their fundamental rights or rights equivalent to fundamental rights. While any
person may lodge a constitutional complaint, there are preconditions. All legal
remedies must be exhausted before a complaint can be lodged. Additionally,
the complaint must meet the deadline of one month after a court or
administrative decision and adhere to certain requirements in its content and
form (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2023b).

The judicial independence established by law holds for the majority of rulings
by the Federal Constitutional Court. For instance, the Freedom House Index
SGI 2024 | 27 Germany Report

considers Germany’s judiciary to be independent. Further, the index indicates

that the court seldom makes decisions that disregard its actual views and
merely reflect the government’s decisions. Nevertheless, some criticism
focuses on the regular meetings between the Federal Constitutional Court and
the federal government, with allegations that these meetings affect the judges’
impartiality. The BVerfG dismissed these complaints as unfounded (FAZ,
2023).

Finally, the government and parliament accept rulings by the FCC and act
accordingly.

Universal Civil Civil rights in Germany are governed by the basic rights (Grundrechte) that are
Rights
safeguarded by the Basic Law. According to Article 1 of the Basic Law, these
Score: 9
rights act as defenses against the state and bind the legislative, executive, and
judiciary branches. In principle, only the state must adhere to these rights.
However, derived from Article 1, the state has a protective duty, obligating it
to shield citizens from threats arising from the unlawful activities of third
parties, i.e., non-state actors (Belling, Herold and Kneis, 2014).

The Basic Law ensures both personal freedom (Article 2) and equality before
the law (Article 3), stating that all people are equal before the law and that
everyone has the right to personal development, life, and physical integrity.
Additionally, the so-called basic judicial rights guarantee Constitutional Court
proceedings (Article 101ff.). They prohibit capital punishment, torture, and
inhumane treatment of those in custody. Imprisonment not based on a judicial
order is possible for a maximum of one day. Furthermore, the judicial basic
rights ensure a fair trial, meaning that everyone is entitled to a hearing in
accordance with the law. Due to the specifications “all” or “every person,”
these rights apply not only to citizens but to everyone.

According to the Rule of Law Index, Germany ranks fourth globally for civil
justice. The index’s score of 0.85 indicates that civil justice is effectively and
timely enforced in practice. Consistent with this, Germany is considered free
based on the Civil Liberties Index (Freedom House, 2023). However, there is
concern regarding the individual expression of religious faith, sexual
orientation, or gender identity due to a rise in hate crimes related to
antisemitism, Islamophobia, sexual orientation, and gender (Amnesty
International, 2023). Another significant concern is the continuing increase in
politically motivated crimes.

Discrimination remains a significant issue in various diverse areas of

Germany. Preventive measures include an action plan against right-wing
extremism introduced by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community
SGI 2024 | 28 Germany Report

in March 2023. However, the plan neither recognizes nor addresses systemic
and institutional racism. Additionally, there are proposals for a law that would
allow transgender, intersex, and non-binary individuals to legally change their
gender and name through a simple declaration at a registration office. This
would eliminate the current requirement for a psychological expert opinion
and court decision (Amnesty International, 2023). Further measures addressing
gender discrimination are discussed in the section on gender equality (Policy
Efforts and Commitment to Achieving Gender Equality).

Lastly, due process generally prevails in criminal and civil matters (Freedom
House 2023), with the Rule of Law Index (2023) allocating a score of 0.76.
This score indicates that most people have and can afford equal access to
justice, including advice and representation. The score further implies there are
no significant barriers in the form of linguistic obstacles or unreasonable
procedural hurdles.

Effective It is generally assumed that corruption is relatively rare in Germany. This

Corruption
implies that cases of corruption are nonetheless detected, such as the
Prevention
Score: 8
procurement of masks for the pandemic (Handelsblatt, 2021) or the case of
overspending and bribery at the public broadcaster RBB (Tagesschau, 2022).

Germany has robust legal frameworks to combat corruption. Relevant laws

include the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), which criminalizes corruption-
related offenses such as bribery, embezzlement, and fraud. Germany is also a
signatory of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Corruption
Risk, 2023). Additionally, the Lobbying Register Act, which requires
representatives of special interests to register at the Bundestag, came into force
in January 2022. Regulatory bodies such as the Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority and the Federal Court of Audit oversee financial institutions,
auditors, and accounting practices to ensure compliance with regulatory
standards.

As for party financing regulations aimed at preventing corruption, parties are

required to report their finances annually. However, there are very few
limitations on procuring private income. For instance, only donations from
corporations and anonymous donations over a certain amount are banned, and
income sources such as political foundations are prohibited. Public funding is
allocated based on the results of the previous elections, with no specific
regulations on how the funds should be distributed. Parties are banned from
vote buying, which constitutes the only regulation on party spending.
Sanctions for violating the laws include fines or the loss of public funding
(EuroPam, 2017).
SGI 2024 | 29 Germany Report

Regarding the regulations for officeholders, including ministers and members

of parliament, they are required to declare interests in a company, gifts, further
remunerated activities, and stocks that come with more than 25% of voting
rights. Members of parliament must also declare additional income sources
and positions on advisory bodies of companies and foundations. Members of
parliament only face sanctions for late or non-filing of their declarations with
the president of the parliament. The head of state, in contrast, is not bound by
the financial disclosure legislation (EuroPam, 2017).

Both the financial reports by political parties and the declarations by

officeholders are made public. While Germany receives a full score for its de
jure transparency, it has a de facto transparency score of 9.5 out of 14, which
is below the regional average. This score results from the fact that some public
financial data is only partially accessible or available (Corruption Risk, 2023).

The Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) made

14 recommendations, raising various issues regarding the implementation of
integrity mechanisms. The 2022 GRECO report considers only one of these
recommendations to be implemented satisfactorily: the training on integrity for
the Federal Police. Still, GRECO criticizes Germany for not enhancing the
monitoring capacities of the Federal Police. The other recommendations have
either been only partly implemented or not implemented at all. The report
specifically criticizes that many representatives of special interests are not
affected by the Lobby Register Act and that further rules should be
implemented to disclose more detailed information about lobbyist contacts
(GRECO, 2022).

Legislature

Sufficient The legislature in Germany includes the Federal Parliament (Bundestag), the
Legislative
state parliaments (Landtage), and the Federal Council (Bundesrat).
Resources
Score: 10
The finances of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat are part of the federal
budget. For 2023, €1.141 billion was allocated for parliament, constituting
0.24% of the overall budget. The budget for the Council was set at €39.7
million, which is 0.01% of the total budget (Bundesministerium der Finanzen,
2023). According to the V-Dem Index (2023) score of 0.99, the legislature
controls the resources that finance its internal operations and the perquisites of
its members.

While the federal budget is designed by the Federal Ministry of Finance and
decided on by the government, parliament holds the budgetary right, meaning
SGI 2024 | 30 Germany Report

the budget draft must secure a majority in parliament. Consequently, the

budget must be submitted to the Bundestag and Bundesrat for discussion and
frequent revision before it can take effect (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.). The
budgeting process at the state level follows the same procedure.

The Bundestag has additional resources in the form of administrative support

staff, totaling 3,200 employees. The administration consists of multiple
departments. For example, the central division of the administration is
responsible for financial and personnel resources. Specifically, it draws up the
budget and financial plan and handles public procurement. This means that the
legislative body exercises control over its own resources.

Additionally, as part of the administration, the Bundestag has a library and

documentation directorate responsible for collecting documents necessary for
parliamentary work starting from 1949. Furthermore, the Bundestag has a
research service directorate, which is divided into ten thematic research
sections. These research sections are intended to strengthen the decision-
making ability of individual members of parliament and parliamentary
committees in the legislative process by compiling and preparing information
in a way that covers, if possible, all opinions or alternatives on an issue
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a).
According to the federal budget for 2023, the legislature has approximately
€4.5 million allocated to parliamentary committees and citizens’ councils.
However, the budget does not make it clear how much of that allowance is
spent on independent research (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2023).

Even though the exact monetary allowance available for the research unit is
unclear, the legislative research unit produces a significant number of reports
each month. For instance, in October 2022, 28 reports were published, while in
September, the different thematic units published 59 reports. Moreover, the
research unit provides internal briefing documents to parliamentarians.
Nevertheless, most of the publications were reports and not studies (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2023b).

Effective As the Bundestag is a “working parliament,” parliamentary committees play a

Legislative
crucial role in the legislative process. Germany has several permanent
Oversight
Score: 9
committees established by the Basic Law (Article 44ff) that significantly
influence policymaking (V-Dem, 2023). In addition to their legislative
influence, these committees oversee government activities.

When investigating a subject, committees generally have the right to take

evidence, and the executive branch is required to provide requested
documents. However, the government sometimes attempts to withhold
SGI 2024 | 31 Germany Report

information. In such cases, the responsible minister must present reasons for
the refusal. Additionally, the committee can appeal the decision to the Federal
Constitutional Court or the Federal Court of Justice (Deutscher Bundestag,
2016).

Additionally, following Article 43 of the Basic Law, the legislature has the
right to require presence. This means parliament and its committees can
require members of the executive to attend committee meetings for
questioning. If summoned witnesses are absent without excuse, the committee
can order their compulsory appearance without a court order or impose a fine
of up to €10,000 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
According to the V-Dem index (2023), the legislature regularly questions
members of the executive branch, requiring ministers or the head of
government to explain policies or testify regarding various issues. Committees
specifically set up to investigate misconduct – so-called committees of inquiry
– will be discussed in the next text on legislative investigations. It cannot be
determined, however, if the answers provided are satisfactory to the
committee.

Effective As previously mentioned, parliamentary committees exercise oversight of the

Legislative
government. Specifically, committees of inquiry function to investigate
Investigations
Score: 8
possible misconduct by the executive branch. A committee must be set up at
the request of at least one-quarter of the members of parliament, regardless of
their party (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d). Thus, the opposition can, in principle,
initiate the setup of a committee of inquiry, even against the will of the
governing coalition. As of 2020, around three-quarters of the 46 committees of
inquiry set up since 1949 were based on a request from the opposition
(Knelagen, 2021).

Nonetheless, in July 2023, a committee of inquiry requested by the CDU to

examine the CumEx Scandal was denied by the governing coalition on the
premise that the issue was not within the government’s competence. It was
argued that, as a federal committee of inquiry can only examine misconduct
covered by the government’s competence, the committee would be
unconstitutional. However, Article 44 of the Basic Law does not stipulate that
a committee of inquiry can only deal with issues covered by the government’s
competence. Moreover, this was the first time in the Federal Republic’s
history that a majority denied a committee of inquiry despite at least 25% of
members of parliament demanding it. The CDU filed a complaint with the
Federal Constitutional Court (Kohnert and Kornmeier, 2023).

Regarding the actual capacity of committees to investigate unconstitutional or

illegal government activities, the V-Dem index (2023) estimates that it is
SGI 2024 | 32 Germany Report

nearly certain the legislature would conduct an investigation resulting in an

unfavorable decision or report to the executive if the executive were engaged
in unconstitutional or illegal activity.

As committees of inquiry are primarily an instrument of parliamentary control

designed to hold the government accountable, the outcomes of such
investigations do not necessarily have severe consequences for the
government. Depending on the extent of an investigation’s success, its
outcome can have political consequences, such as damaging the reputation of
government members or leading to changes in policy content. Additionally,
the outcome can have legal consequences if illegal actions are uncovered.
However, the impact of an investigation largely depends on two factors:
whether the committee can expose illegal or unconstitutional activities and the
amount of media attention the investigation receives, which creates additional
public pressure on the government (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).

Legislative Committees in the Bundestag play a crucial role in guiding policies. Based on
Capacity for
consultations within a committee and public hearings of experts, stakeholders
Guiding Policy
Score: 10
and other relevant actors providing information on the issues, committees then
give a recommendation to the plenary session (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
Each legislative term, the legislature can independently decide on the number
of its committees, with the exception of four committees defined in Basic Law.
These are a committee on the European Union (Art. 45), a committee on
foreign affairs and a defense committee (Art. 45a), and a petitions committee
(Art. 45c).

For the 20th electoral term, the legislature set up 25 committees, whereby
slightly more committees than ministries exist. Generally, the parliamentary
committees for most policy areas fully align with the ministries’ areas. For
example, the corresponding committee for the Federal Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs is the Committee of Labor and Social Affairs. In some cases,
the overall policy areas of a ministry are split into two committees. This is the
case, for instance, for the Economic Committee and the Committee on Climate
Protection and Energy, which coincide with the responsibilities of the Federal
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, or for the Ministry of
Finance, which is covered by the Committee of Finance and the Committee of
Budget.

Additionally, it is possible that multiple committees can bear the responsibility

for the policy areas of one ministry or that one committee handles issues not
clearly assigned to a single ministry. Nevertheless, the division into diverse
parliamentary committees still allows for effective monitoring of the executive
SGI 2024 | 33 Germany Report

and guiding of the development of legislative proposals (Deutscher Bundestag,

2023a).

Generally, the sizes of the committees differ, but the distribution of seats is
always proportional to the majority ratio in parliament. For the 20th electoral
term specifically, committee sizes range from 19 to 49 members, with the
Committee on Labor and Social Affairs being the largest (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2023a). Every year, parliament has at least 20 session weeks that
are mandatory for members of parliament. During those weeks, committees
meet every Wednesday, while some committees also meet on Thursdays. To
manage the workload, additional meetings for hearings are often held on
Mondays (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023b).

Opposition parties regularly hold chairs of legislative committees. The number

of committee chairs held by opposition parties is proportional to their seat
shares. Out of the 25 committees, opposition parties hold the chairs of eleven
committees. The opposition always holds the chair of the budget committee. In
the current term, the CDU/CSU holds the chairs of the Economic and Finance
committees, while Die Linke holds the chair for the Committee on Climate
Protection and Energy (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a).

Bills are routinely revised during the committee phase, although to varying
degrees (Ismayr 2012). Generally, parliament makes its final decision based on
the recommendations of the responsible committees (Deutscher Bundestag,
n.d.), and only rarely does the final decision deviate from the committee
recommendation.
SGI 2024 | 34 Germany Report

Governing with Foresight

I. Coordination

Quality of Horizontal Coordination

Effective Germany has a high level of intergovernmental communication, especially

Coordination
between the Federal Chancellery and the line ministries. This does not always
Mechanisms of
the GO/PMO
lead to successful cooperation between the units. While the chancellor gives
Score: 7 guidelines and direction to foster coherent policymaking across the line
ministries, inter-party conflict – typical for German coalition governments and
heightened under the current “Traffic Light Coalition” – still occasionally
leads to intergovernmental tensions. However, formal and informal
mechanisms of coordination often successfully calm or fully prevent outright
conflict.

Coordination mechanisms between the German Federal Chancellery and the

line ministries exist and are frequently used for both formal and informal
coordination. The German Federal Chancellery employs around 620 staff
members. Its policy units assess, filter, and analyze policies and current
developments, supporting the German Chancellor (Olaf Scholz). Some of
these units, known as “Spiegelreferate,” mirror the responsibilities of each line
ministry in the chancellery and facilitate policy work in these areas (Busse and
Hofmann, 2019).

The design and preparation of bills and policy proposals, following the
“Ressortprinzip,” is largely the prerogative of the line ministries, while the
chancellor should provide direction and priorities (“Richtlinienprinzip”).
Line ministries typically share policy proposals with officials from the
chancellery before introducing them in the federal cabinet, where the
chancellor must ultimately sign off on them. This process aligns priorities.
Conflicts are often resolved in the weekly meetings between the head of the
SGI 2024 | 35 Germany Report

chancellery and the state secretaries. However, this mechanism frequently

reaches its limits when coalition parties publicize their differences and seek to
gain an advantage in political competition.

Weekly meetings occur between line ministries and the chancellery at various
levels. These include meetings between the chief of the chancellery and the
state secretaries, as well as lower-level meetings within interministerial
working groups that include the chancellery.

During the observation period, conflicts between coalition partners emerged

on almost all relevant issues, from support for Ukraine to the budget, from
welfare programs for less wealthy families to energy policy. The chancellery
was rarely able to mitigate these conflicts (see Zohlnhöfer and Engler 2024).

Effective Policy proposals often affect the responsibilities of several line ministries and
Coordination
require coordination. The German ministerial bureaucracy provides some
Mechanisms
within the
incentives and established mechanisms for coordination across ministries.
Ministerial However, in most cases, one line ministry leads a policy proposal, and
Bureaucracy coordination with other ministries is secondary. Given the political differences
Score: 7 among the three coalition partners of the Traffic Light Coalition, tensions and
power struggles between line ministries have regularly occurred in the
policymaking process.

Interministerial working groups exist at all hierarchical levels, though their

permanence and formalization vary.

Digital coordination and digital administration are explicit goals of German

governance. Although intranets and digital platforms for interministerial
exchanges are in use, digital administration has not yet reached its full
potential. According to the “Digital Check” implemented by the Bundestag in
2022 and performed yearly by the Norm Control Council (NKR), there is
ample room for improvement in development, utilization, and education
related to digital coordination tools (“Digitalcheck,” 2023).

In accordance with the “Rotationsbeschluss,” a decision by the government in

1995, regular exchanges of employees between the chancellery and the line
ministries are encouraged and mandatory. This is an established practice in
both agencies (Busse and Hofmann, 2019). Often, employees who have
completed a stint at the chancellery are later promoted to make use of their
increased oversight and experience, providing incentives for job rotation and
encouraging information exchanges across ministerial boundaries.
SGI 2024 | 36 Germany Report

According to the GGO (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der

Bundesministerien), line ministries are required to cooperate and coordinate on
policy designs before presenting them in the federal cabinet. However, this
process is usually not enforced (“Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der
Bundesministerien,” 2020).

Political practice and precedent ensure that ministries generally avoid making
proposals that might be blocked by other ministries and that conflicts between
ministries are often resolved before cabinet meetings. Policy proposals in
specific areas cannot be made without the involvement of the responsible
ministry, such as budgetary decisions, which must involve the Federal
Ministry of Finance. However, the Traffic Light Coalition and their respective
ministries often clash on topics where party lines do not align, occasionally
resulting in public conflict and conflicting policy proposals reaching the
media. This has, in some cases, mitigated fluidity in coordination. The root of
these issues lies more in party politics than in organizational structure.

Complementary Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal interministerial

Informal
coordination. The most important informal meeting often occurs in the
Coordination
Score: 7
coalition committee, which consists of the chancellor, the vice-chancellor, and
the heads of each party in the coalition (“Koalitionsvertrag 2021,” 2021). In
general, informal meetings support formal coordination between the
chancellery and line ministries.

The informal meetings between the head of the chancellery and the state
secretaries reportedly resolve many intergovernmental disagreements before
they reach more formal channels (Busse and Hofmann, 2019; Hebestreit and
Korte, 2022). These informal coordination processes seem to be less effective
in the current coalition than in previous governments (Deutschlandfunk 2023).

Quality of Vertical Coordination

Effectively The provision of public services in Germany, including education, housing,

Setting and
healthcare, waste management, public transport, and land use, is generally
Monitoring
National
well-organized among various levels of governance. Due to the country’s
(Minimum) federal constitution, subnational governments enjoy a relatively high level of
Standards autonomy and decision-making power. Consequently, defining nationwide
Score: 8 standards can be challenging in some areas. However, according to the
constitutional understanding of German federalism, full harmonization of
standards through central guidance is not desirable.
SGI 2024 | 37 Germany Report

Public services are split among the federal, subnational, and communal levels
and, in some cases, outsourced to nonprofit institutions or indirect public
administrations (such as social security). In certain instances, minimum
standards are decided at the federal level, such as the BSI (Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) minimum standard for IT security,
while in others, subnational governments impose rules (Hebestreit and Korte,
2022; Hegele and Behnke, 2017).

Environmental standards are defined at the national level. For education,

federal states have the authority to set standards but coordinate to some extent
through the committee of state ministers for culture and education
(Kultusministerkonferenz). Compared to a centralized governance system, this
leads to greater differences in school organization and educational attainment.
Healthcare is organized nationally and divided into a two-tier mandatory
healthcare system that generally functions well at high costs and is mainly
controlled by independent national agencies.

Frequent assessments and reports on compliance with minimum standards are

provided by ministries, responsible providers, intergovernmental agencies, and
independent nonprofit institutions. Subnational governments function as
supervisory bodies, taking on sanctioning and oversight roles in the provision
of public services.

Effective Cooperation between the Bund and the Länder is integral to the German
Multilevel
federal system and generally functions well to ensure the provision of public
Cooperation
Score: 8
goods and public services. Subnational governments are represented at the
national level in the Bundesrat, and weekly meetings are held – both formally
and informally – between members of parliament and members of the
Bundesrat. This frequent exchange is supported by formal structures. Due to
the relatively high independence and power of subnational governments in
Germany, the Länder often serve as checks and balances for national
policymaking. They also enjoy more power than the national government in
areas such as education and other domains that primarily affect the state level.

All states have representatives in Berlin, and both state and national
governments have expanded institutions for horizontal and vertical
coordination.

State prime ministers meet quarterly in the “Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz,”

where state-level issues are discussed among states, and foundational political
questions regarding the states are discussed among ministers. Twice a year,
this is followed by talks with the chancellor. The “Fachministerkonferenzen” –
SGI 2024 | 38 Germany Report

conferences of area ministers – consolidate and support coordination within

departments. Additionally, many smaller working units focused on specialized
issues facilitate coordination among ministerial and administrative bodies.

Local governments also enjoy relatively high power over their jurisdictions.
They are integrated into a tightly woven system of constituencies and are
responsible for providing some public goods themselves.
One aspect where German horizontal coordination struggles is digitalization.
This is often criticized at all levels (“Digitalcheck,” 2023). Backlogs and a
lack of technology and expertise at the local level often prevent advances in
information and coordination between levels of government.

II. Consensus-Building

Recourse to Scientific Knowledge

Harnessing In Germany, the formulation of political decisions – whether concerning

Scientific
strategic, long-term issues such as climate policy or immediate crises like the
Knowledge
Effectively
pandemic and energy crises – is intricately woven with extensive consultations
Score: 9 within the scientific community. This consultative process stands on two
foundational pillars: first, routine engagements and policy recommendations
from well-established scientific advisory boards; and second, on-demand, ad
hoc consultations that have assumed an increasingly pivotal role, particularly
in addressing urgent decision-making requirements during recent crises.

Central to the established advisory framework are scientific advisory boards

within individual ministries, whose members are chosen based on their
academic expertise and a diversity of academic perspectives, within the
bounds of accepted scientific principles. These boards enjoy a notable degree
of autonomy in selecting their focus areas and organizing their work. Several
other esteemed expert advisory bodies, such as the German Council of
Economic Experts and the German Advisory Council on the Environment,
contribute expertise and advice through regular reports on prevailing policy
challenges.

The Robert Koch Institute (RKI) has played a consequential role in pandemic
decision-making through its meticulous monitoring of objective data.
Additionally, the German Ethics Council has showcased a high profile in
media discussions and governmental decisions, particularly on ethical
quandaries arising during the pandemic, such as vaccine distribution priorities
and the role of mandatory vaccination. Finally, the German National Academy
SGI 2024 | 39 Germany Report

of Sciences Leopoldina and the National Academy of Science and Engineering

(acatech) regularly provide scientific expertise on various topics.

Temporary commissions, featuring leading researchers in the relevant policy

field, are established for specific reform topics. Another avenue for scientific
guidance is provided by parliamentary expert hearings. For significant
legislation, Bundestag committees conduct expert hearings, which are
transparently broadcast through Bundestag television. Despite occasional
concerns that experts are selected based on their alignment with specific
positions, these hearings serve as a crucial instrument for providing scientific
advice to the parliament. The Bundestag also benefits from its own scientific
service, which offers succinct summaries of the scientific state of knowledge
to its members through briefings.

Ad hoc scientific advice is organized flexibly, involving bilateral

conversations and larger rounds of experts in digital talks. This approach has
become standard practice during crises, including the pandemic and recent
energy challenges. Noteworthy policy decisions, such as those addressing the
surge in gas and electricity prices during the energy crisis, have been shaped
through close collaboration with researchers advising on optimal design.

The frequency of advice depends on the urgency of the situation, with recent
crises necessitating even weekly digital expert meetings with ministers.
Critically, all significant crisis-related decisions by the German government in
recent years have been informed by scientific insights. Challenges, however,
arise in the realm of long-term reform, where a prevalent political present-bias
impedes acceptance of viable, forward-looking solutions. An illustrative
example is the German pension system, where resistance against
comprehensive reform, including adjustments to the statutory pension age,
persists despite scientific recommendations. While complaints from non-
governmental experts about superficial participation surface occasionally, the
broader German scientific community generally recognizes that their advice is
considered by policymakers, even if, constrained by political realities,
decisions may not consistently align with this advice.

Involvement of Civil Society in Policy Development

Effective Trade unions and business organizations generally have only an advisory role
Involvement of
in the political process in Germany. However, they still wield some political
Civil Society
Organizations
influence. These groups are part of the self-governing bodies of social security
(Capital and insurances. Representatives from both sides are often invited to participate in
Labor) public hearings in parliament as experts or stakeholders. They also contribute
Score: 7 to legislative initiatives on issues of central importance to capital and labor.
SGI 2024 | 40 Germany Report

Furthermore, representatives from unions and employers’ organizations sit on

numerous advisory boards and bodies that advise the federal government
(Rütters/Mielke, n.d.).

One exception to the limitation on advising roles is the minimum wage

commission, which is entitled to set the minimum wage. It is composed of
three representatives each from the trade unions and business organizations,
plus one chairman (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2023). However, the new
government elected in 2021 decided to set the minimum wage themselves and
raised it to €12 per hour. After that, the usual process allowing the commission
to decide the minimum wage was restored (Lesch et al., 2021, p. 194), at least
for the time being.

There are no official, regular meetings between trade unions, business

organizations, and government officials. However, certain ministers – first and
foremost the minister of labor and the minister for economic affairs, and
sometimes even the chancellor himself – meet regularly with representatives
from capital and labor to discuss current affairs. It is difficult to determine how
much the government acts upon these consultations.

In July 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with trade unions and business
organizations for a “concerted action” (Konzertierte Aktion) but did not invite
the federation of small and medium-sized businesses (Bundesverband der
Mittelständischen Wirtschaft). This omission was heavily criticized by the
federation (Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, 2022). That being said, criticism of or
dissatisfaction with too little participation in the political process is rare.

In Germany, wage bargaining operates autonomously. Trade unions and

employers’ organizations negotiate wages and working conditions without
political intervention. Consequently, the government does not interfere in
collective bargaining rounds and is typically not entitled to resolve disputes
between unions and business organizations (Strünck, n.d.). Pleas from the
government and other political institutions usually do not influence the
collective bargaining rounds and are typically rejected by the negotiating
parties swiftly. Additionally, there are no serious debates about limiting the
function of autonomy in wage bargaining (Lesch et al., 2023: 26).

Effective Social welfare associations and initiatives can highlight certain issues in the
Involvement of
public eye, draw attention to political problems, and build pressure for change.
Civil Society
Organizations
However, their political role in Germany is primarily advisory.
(Social Welfare) After the publication of a draft law, organizations such as chambers, churches,
Score: 7 and civil society organizations (CSOs) are free to comment on it before it is
discussed in the Bundestag, the German parliament. They thus have the
SGI 2024 | 41 Germany Report

opportunity to shape discussions about upcoming laws, both in public and

within the Bundestag. Sometimes, organizations are specifically invited by the
responsible ministry to comment on a draft law. These comments are made
public on the website of the ministry responsible for the draft law
(Bundesministerium für Finanzen, n.d.).

The current government has shortened the official period for commenting on
draft laws many times recently. This has left associations and experts with too
little time to fully understand and react to proposed legislation. This practice
has been heavily criticized by some organizations (RedationsNetzwerk
Deutschland, 2023).

CSOs are sometimes consulted by the Bundestag or certain ministries. While

this has historically been limited, there has recently been an increase in
consultation opportunities for CSOs. The involvement of social welfare CSOs
in decision-making and the development of draft laws varies greatly among
different ministries. These organizations mainly use lobbying to gain political
influence. Certain recognized associations have the Right of Association
(Verbandsklagerecht) to take legal action on behalf of the public (Hummel et
al., 2022: 3, 71). Apart from that, social welfare CSOs do not participate in the
policymaking process, and there are no serious discussions to extend their role.
Free welfare work in Germany is primarily organized under six main
organizations, such as the Red Cross, Caritas, and Diakonie. These social
welfare CSOs perform numerous social tasks, caring for sick or disabled
people, the elderly, and youth. Additionally, they operate many hospitals and
residential homes for the elderly and disabled (Bundesregierung, 2020).
Consequently, they assist the government in caring for the most vulnerable in
society, which makes them politically powerful and influential. Without them,
the German welfare state would collapse.

The six free welfare head organizations participate in various advisory

councils in federal ministries, particularly in the Federal Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs and the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior
Citizens, Women and Youth (Bundesregierung, 2019).

Another example of organizations consulted in policymaking are churches.

Both the Protestant and Catholic churches of Germany have official
plenipotentiaries at the Bundestag. They are consulted in legislative processes
and draw attention to grievances in various fields of politics, such as social,
labor, asylum, and family policies (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, n.d.).
Social welfare CSOs like Caritas and Diakonie perform similar functions but
do not have official offices in the Bundestag. Additionally, these organizations
often make suggestions for new laws or amendments to existing laws.
SGI 2024 | 42 Germany Report

However, these are merely suggestions, and the Bundestag and the federal
government are not obliged to consider them. Similar to citizens, organizations
have the opportunity to start a petition. If it reaches 50,000 signatures, the
Bundestag must discuss it (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.).

Criticism or dissatisfaction with having too little influence in Berlin or too

little participation in the political process seems rare among social welfare
CSOs.

The free welfare organizations are funded mainly through social insurances
and governmental grants. However, they are independent associations;
therefore, the government is not entitled to moderate disputes between major
CSOs (Schmid, n.d.). The six free welfare head organizations come together in
the Federal Working Group of Free Welfare Care (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft
der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege,).

Effective Environmental CSOs are highly respected and trusted in German society,
Involvement of
making them well-suited to raise awareness about environmental issues and
Civil Society
Organizations
inform the public about environmental protection issues. The federal
(Environment) government supports environmental CSOs, such as BUND, NABU, and DNR,
Score: 7 in their efforts and projects. These associations collaborate with the
government and public administration to implement projects related to nature
and the environment (Bundesregierung, 2023).

The federal government and the Bundestag, the German parliament, can
consult environmental CSOs. The involvement of CSOs in the decision-
making and development of draft laws varies greatly among the different
federal ministries. CSOs primarily use lobbying to gain political influence.
Recognized associations have the Right of Association (Verbandsklagerecht)
to take legal action on behalf of the public, particularly in cases related to
environmental protection, nature conservation, and animal welfare (Hummel et
al., 2022: 3, 71). Any organization can comment on recent draft laws before
they are discussed in the Bundestag, allowing them to shape the discussion
about environmental laws both publicly and in parliament (Bundesministerium
der Justiz, 2024).

Environmental CSOs contribute to the development and enhancement of the

national sustainability strategy (Bundesregierung, 2023). Like German
citizens, they can start a petition. If a petition reaches 50,000 signatures, the
Bundestag is obliged to discuss it (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.). Apart from
these avenues, environmental CSOs do not participate directly in the
policymaking process, and there are no serious discussions underway to
extend their role.
SGI 2024 | 43 Germany Report

There are no regular, official meetings between environmental organizations

and government officials. While certain ministers and sometimes even the
chancellor often meet with trade unions and business organizations, this does
not seem to be the case with environmental CSOs. However, the Expert
Council on Climate Issues (Expertenrat für Klimafragen, ERK), founded in
2020, consists of five experts in innovation and climate. Its main task is to
monitor German carbon emissions and highlight any overshooting of sector-
specific emission goals. The Bundestag and the federal government can
request special reports from the ERK on climate topics, in addition to a
mandatory report on carbon emissions and climate goals every two years
(Expertenrat für Klimafragen, n.d.).

Environmental CSOs frequently criticize the federal government’s plans and

actions and sometimes file lawsuits against the government. For example, in
November 2023, the Bund für Natur- und Umweltschutz (BUND) and the
Deutsche Umwelthilfe filed a suit against a governmental program of
immediate action. The government had to develop this action plan due to
overshooting carbon emissions in the building and transportation sectors. The
court ruled in favor of the environmental organizations, stating that the
program lacked short-term policies to immediately address the excess
emissions (Energiezukunft, 2023). This is not the only case of an
environmental CSO or a group of such organizations filing a suit against the
federal government.

Major environmental CSOs are independent associations, and the federal

government is not entitled to moderate disputes within or between them.

Openness of Government

Open As a member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), Germany is

Government
committed to open government and is required to submit a National Action
Score: 8
Plan (NAP) every two years. These NAPs are developed in collaboration with
civil society and are expected to contain 5 to 15 independent commitments
regarding open government (Federal Chancellery, 2021). In August 2023,
Germany adopted its fourth NAP and a new national data strategy designed to
improve data utilization to promote innovation, transformation, and
competitiveness in the economy, public sector, scientific industry, and society.
This initiative aims to enable a more responsible and innovative use of data,
thereby fostering societal progress (Die Bundesregierung, 2023).
SGI 2024 | 44 Germany Report

In 2017, Germany adopted the Federal Open Data Act, which obligates federal
authorities to publish data in machine-readable and open formats (OECD,
2020). Additionally, the Second Open Data Act and the Data Use Act were
adopted in 2021. Based on the Data Use Act, uniform and non-discriminatory
terms of use for public sector data are to be created (Federal Ministry for
Digital and Transport, 2022). Further, as of 2024, the Second Open Data Act
expanded the group of authorities obligated to the Open Data principle by
including the federal administration. In line with this, as of 2024, research data
collected by the federal administration or on its behalf must be published as
open data (Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat, 2023). Lastly, by
the end of 2024, the government wishes to adopt a Transparency Act
(Transparenzgesetz), which is supposed to simplify cooperation within the
government and improve participation opportunities for citizens.

The national metadata portal GovData was created to facilitate access to

information across different regions and administrative levels. Its purpose is to
provide an overview of data from federal, state, and municipal administrations,
along with links to access the original data (Bundesministerium des Inneren
und für Heimat, 2023). While the portal allows users to provide feedback by
mail, it does not offer an interactive feedback function.

Additional portals include two by the Federal Statistical Office: one on open
data for the sustainable development indicators and the Dashboard
Deutschland (German Dashboard). These portals also feature communication
tools but lack interactive feedback functions. However, they do offer
guidelines on how to use the available data.

Overall, the World Justice Index ranks Germany’s open government with a
score of 0.79 out of 1.0. Germany is ranked 13th globally and 11th regionally.
The index further indicates that both Germany’s publicized laws and
government data, as well as its complaint mechanisms, are good (World
Justice Project, 2023).

According to the German Council of Economic Experts, “both in terms of

availability and access to research data, Germany continues to lag behind other
countries” (Sachverständigenrat, 2023a). In its yearly report for 2023 – 2024,
the council acknowledges that some improvement initiatives have been
introduced but still heavily criticizes the lack of data availability and timely
provision of data (Sachverständigenrat, 2023b). While the OECD Open Useful
and Re-usable Data report from 2019 scored Germany’s data accessibility at
0.27 out of 0.33 – one of the highest scores compared to other OECD countries
– it also found the availability of data (0.17) and the government’s support to
reuse data (0.07) to be lacking (OECD, 2020).
SGI 2024 | 45 Germany Report

Data published by governments is generally barrier-free. In 2022, the

government adopted key points of the Federal Accessibility Initiative, whereby
information on laws and administration, for instance, is to be translated more
systematically into sign language and plain language and is supposed to have
subtitles more frequently (Bundeskanzleramt, 2023). Still, while the Federal
Open Data Act theoretically requires this, there is no data available to make an
informed comment on how accessible the data is to machines based on data
formats in practice.

III. Sensemaking

Preparedness

Capacity for Strategic foresight approaches have been strengthened in the German
Strategic
government over the past few years. The Bundesakademie für
Foresight and
Anticipatory
Sicherheitspolitik has established a Strategic Foresight Competence Center,
Innovation which supports federal ministries and authorities in incorporating and
Score: 6 expanding the concepts and methods of strategic foresight in their work. In
particular, the BAKS offers the Strategic Foresight methodology seminar and
other event formats (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, 2024). The
BAKS provides information about the broad arsenal of foresight methods,
including most that are mentioned in the question.

The Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) plays a coordinating

role with its “Vorausschau” (Foresight) initiative. A mid-term conference of
this initiative gathered contributions from various ministries, each of which
has increasingly devoted resources to strategic foresight over the past ten
years. Consequently, attention to long-term trends has grown. Structures also
include a strategic foresight group in the Federal Chancellery. Experts see
some impact of these increasing foresight analyses on government policies
(Bovenschulte et al. 2021).

Currently, the BMBF Vorausschau initiative is ongoing, with trends and topics
continuously being developed for discussion within and outside the BMBF. A
future office has been established to systematically search for and briefly
describe new developments using scientific methods. Every six months from
2019 to mid-2022, 50 to 60 topics were identified, updated, and then discussed
with the Zukunftskreis (Future Circle), a committee of experts from science,
business, and culture.
SGI 2024 | 46 Germany Report

Finally, the Future Circle identifies topics that it believes could be important
for future developments and should be further investigated. The initial focus –
in a first detailed study – is on the social values of people and how they are
changing. The Chancellor’s Council for the Future (“Zukunftsrat”) primarily
advises the federal government on new developments in science and
technology.

Other scientific institutions advising the government also apply strategic

foresight tools. The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) integrates
strategic foresight into its policy advisory processes. Specialists aim to assist
policymakers in making sophisticated, long-term decisions within a dynamic
global context by applying foresight methodology. This adaptable
methodology allows for customization to address specific circumstances in
areas of interest (DGAP, 2024).

Information on whether strategic foresight know-how plays a significant role

in the recruitment of top civil servants is not available. It is also unclear
whether this forward-looking approach has already had a significant impact on
policy reflections. The prevailing impression is that the German government
often responds reactively to major upheavals and crises. For example, events
such as the Russian aggression against Ukraine or the sudden halt of Russian
gas imports were not systematically analyzed as potential scenarios
beforehand.

Analytical Competence

Effective Germany’s Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) system has received

Regulatory
commendable scores from the OECD, according to their most recent
Impact
Assessment
assessment (OECD, 2022). The OECD evaluates RIA based on criteria such as
Score: 8 systematic adoption, transparency, methodology, and oversight. In 2018,
Germany, alongside Estonia and the Czech Republic, held a top position based
on the combined score, marking an improvement from 2015 to 2018.

In Germany, RIAs are mandatory for all primary laws and subordinate
regulations prepared by the federal government, with no exceptions. Even in
emergency cases, legislative initiatives undergo a proportional impact
assessment that analyzes the resulting compliance costs.

In terms of methodological rigor, a principle of proportionality is applied.

Proposals with low compliance costs or those expected to bring about minor
changes are exempt from detailed quantitative assessments, including
SGI 2024 | 47 Germany Report

compliance costs and other regulatory impacts. The decision to skip

quantitative assessment requires approval from the National Regulatory
Control Council (NKR), based on an estimation of regulatory compliance
costs.

The focus of RIAs has largely been on the cost side of regulation, with less
attention given to potential benefits.

Stakeholders participate in impact assessments through avenues such as

parliamentary expert hearings during the legislative process. The Better
Regulation Unit (BRU) in the Federal Chancellery serves as the central
coordinating and monitoring body for the federal government’s program on
better regulation and bureaucracy reduction. Its mandate has expanded to
include the evaluation and enhancement of the ex ante procedure, assessing
early-stage compliance costs for Germany in planned EU legislation.

Operating independently from the government, the National Regulatory

Control Council (NKR) reviews the quality of all RIAs, provides advice
throughout the rulemaking stages, and holds responsibilities in administrative
simplification and burden reduction. In November 2019, the German
government introduced additional requirements for independent quality
control of ex post evaluations, a task also managed by the NKR.

Since 2018, Germany has centralized all ongoing public consultations on a

government website in alignment with the federal government’s commitment
to enhancing transparency in the legislative process.

Effective Germany has committed to a formal sustainability strategy since 2002 and has
Sustainability
continuously developed this strategy, now aligning with the SDGs. The last
Checks
Score: 8
update of the strategy occurred in 2021 (Bundesregierung, 2021), and the next
revision is ongoing, with a further update expected in 2024 (Bundesregierung,
2023).

There are no explicit SDG-related action plans, but the ministries are bound by
this strategy when developing their policies. The Federal Chancellery leads on
sustainability issues, and oversight, advisory, consultative, and cross-
government coordination mechanisms are in place. A system of SDG-related
indicators is used to define targets and check for compliance.

Since 2009, the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries (GGO) have
stipulated that impact assessments must demonstrate whether the effects of a
project align with sustainable development (Section 44 (1) sentence 4 GGO).
This requirement entails examining the effects on the Sustainable
SGI 2024 | 48 Germany Report

Development Goals (SDGs) and their specific targets, as well as the goals and
indicators of the German Sustainable Development Strategy, in detail. The
GGO explicitly requires consideration of the long-term consequences of the
measure. To facilitate this assessment, a web-based tool for electronic
sustainability assessment (eNAP) is available (BMJ, 2023).

In the German Bundestag, the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable

Development monitors German sustainability policy. One of its tasks is to
oversee the sustainability assessments conducted by the ministries as part of
the legislative impact assessment.

The capacity to measure progress is generally strong. Germany’s statistical

agencies, both at the federal and state levels, possess substantial capabilities,
high expertise, and integrity, ensuring they provide reliable data on progress
concerning the SDGs.

Effective Ex Post The obligation to conduct efficiency studies and performance reviews in
Evaluation
accordance with Section 7 (2) of the Federal Budget Code (BHO) includes an
Score: 6
examination of the achievement of objectives, effectiveness, and efficiency
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz, 2023).

In 2013, the State Secretaries’ Committee on Bureaucracy Reduction and

Better Regulation adopted the “Concept for the Evaluation of New Regulatory
Projects” (Bundeskanzleramt, 2021). This policy mandates a mandatory
evaluation of every significant law or regulation after three to five years. A
regulatory project is considered significant if the annual compliance costs
amount to €1 million, or if the costs incurred by citizens exceed €1 million or
100,000 hours (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020).

There is no legal requirement to involve stakeholders in evaluations, but

evaluation methods often include the involvement of stakeholders, such as
through interviews.

The government aims to publish all evaluations on a central platform, but this
announcement has not yet been realized, thus the lack of transparency on
evaluations remains an issue.

Line ministries determine the practicalities of evaluations themselves,

resulting in heterogeneous methods across different ministries. A frontrunner
in this regard is the Ministry for Development Cooperation, which has
established an external evaluation agency to provide expertise and
SGI 2024 | 49 Germany Report

independence. However, some ministries still adhere to a rather formalistic

approach to evaluations.

Particularly when evaluations are commissioned to external service providers

from universities or research institutes, the methodological quality is high.
However, internal evaluations remain common and frequently tend to be more
descriptive and qualitative.

The impact of evaluations on actual policy decisions is difficult to measure.

Too often, political decision makers are still characterized by an input-oriented
mindset, focusing more on the amount of money spent on a policy rather than
on the impact achieved.
SGI 2024 | 50 Germany Report

Sustainable Policymaking

I. Economic Sustainability

Circular Economy

Circular In general, the ministry responsible for circular economy policies is the
Economy Policy
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety
Efforts and
Commitment
and Consumer Protection (BMUV). Germany does not yet have a circular
Score: 7 economy strategy. However, as of April 2024, the government – particularly
the BMUV – is developing a National Circular Economy Strategy (NKWS).
The foundation for this strategy was published in April 2023. The strategy will
be based on the EU Circular Economy Action Plan and is intended to serve as
a framework for combining existing strategies relevant to raw material policy.
Nevertheless, the strategies contributing to the goals of the NKWS, such as the
National Bioeconomy Strategy and the National Lightweighting Strategy, are
to remain independent.

The overall goal of the strategy is to reduce the consumption of primary raw
materials. While no concrete measures to achieve this goal exist yet, they are
supposed to improve market conditions for secondary raw materials (materials
obtained through recycling) to increase their share in the use of raw materials.
Additionally, the measures aim to promote resource efficiency and product
design focused on long service life, circularity, and reparability (BMUV,
2023).

As the full strategy does not yet exist, there are no sector-specific action plans
in the strategy so far. However, the strategy will focus on eight fields of
action, such as plastic, metals, and textiles. The BMUV plans to monitor
progress regarding the measures and goals through a set of indicators. While it
is still unclear what indicators the BMUV intends to use, the plan is to adapt
measures in line with the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. Again,
as the strategy is still being developed, no statement can be made on its
comprehensiveness (BMUV, 2023).
SGI 2024 | 51 Germany Report

There are, however, a few existing policies supporting the transition to a

circular economy. As of 2012, Germany has a Circular Economy Act with the
goal of protecting natural resources through a circular economy and promoting
environmentally sound waste management to protect the environment and
humans. The act was adapted in 2020 following an EU directive (BMUV,
2022).

An important area of German waste management policy is the product

responsibility of manufacturers, which ensures environmentally sound waste
prevention at the production level. This contributes to resource efficiency
through various acts, such as the Packaging Act and the Waste Oil Ordinance
(BMUV, 2020a).

Additionally, Germany introduced the German Resource Efficiency Program

III in 2020, which includes 118 measures to improve efficiency and indicators
to monitor set targets. Specifically, the program includes four goals for a
circular economy, such as promoting and preparing reuse. One priority
measure is to facilitate donations by retailers to avoid the destruction of
unusable products from returns, for instance (BMUV, 2020b).

The Circular Economy Act, after its adjustment in 2020, obligated federal
institutions and agencies to give preference to the purchase of resource-
friendly, low-waste, repairable, low-pollutant, and recyclable products as long
as no unreasonable additional costs occur based on that purchase (BMUV,
2022). Public procurement will also be a field of action included in the
NKWS. Whether current public procurement policy aligns with that strategy
will be seen once the NKWS is published.

Overall, Germany had a resource productivity, defined as the GDP divided by

domestic material consumption, of 2.8 compared to the EU27 average of 2.1 in
2022 (Eurostat, 2024a). Additionally, the country had a circular material use
rate – the share of material recycled and fed back into the economy – of 13%
in 2022, whereas the EU27 average was 11.5%, indicating an increase since
2010 (Eurostat, 2024b).

Lastly, market surveillance, aimed at ensuring the effective implementation of

waste regulations within the context of a circular economy, is conducted by
the states while considering regional conditions. The supreme state authorities
responsible for waste law collaborate in the Federation/Länder Working Group
on Waste (LAGA) to promote the exchange of information and experiences.
Additionally, LAGA maintains relationships with relevant associations and
works on the development of statutory provisions (BMUV, 2021).
SGI 2024 | 52 Germany Report

Viable Critical Infrastructure

Policy Efforts The German National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP
and Commitment
Strategy) was developed in 2009 and serves as the central strategic basis for
to a Resilient
Critical
CIP, although it is not legally binding. The strategy focuses on three main
Infrastructure goals: prevention, reaction, and sustainability. This means avoiding serious
Score: 8 disruptions and failures of important infrastructure services, minimizing
potential consequences if avoidance is not possible, and regularly evaluating
measures and analyzing national and international disruptions to foster
continuous learning (BMI, 2009).

The CIP strategy does not specify concrete measures, goals, or indicators.
Instead, it provides a framework for existing and planned activities, guiding a
structured approach to protecting critical infrastructure and coordinating tasks
between ministries. It does not include sector-specific action plans but has led
to the development of various action plans, programs, and laws for the
protection of essential technical infrastructure, such as digital, transport, water,
and energy sectors, all of which have precautionary and safeguarding laws.

For instance, the Energy Security Act (Energiesicherungsgesetz) regulates the

energy sector, the Water Security Act (Wassersicherstellungsgesetz) covers
the water sector, and the Traffic Safety Act (Verkehrssicherstellungsgesetz)
governs the transport sector. Additionally, the IT Security Act (IT-
Sicherheitsgesetz) addresses the protection of digital infrastructure (BBK,
2020).

To date, Germany does not have a comprehensive law specifically for the
protection of critical infrastructure. However, based on the current
government’s coalition agreement, the BMI proposed a draft law in July 2023
to identify critical infrastructures at the federal level and define minimum
standards for CIP operators. The aim is to create a framework that
encompasses the various critical infrastructure sectors currently regulated
individually (BMI, 2023a).

Germany’s policy efforts to protect critical infrastructure mainly focus on

cybersecurity. Besides the IT Security Act, the BMI published a cybersecurity
strategy in 2016, which was updated in 2021. This updated strategy, resulting
from the monitoring and evaluation process, formulates multiple guidelines,
fields of action, and strategic goals, including the protection of critical
infrastructure from cyberattacks. The strategy outlines measures to prevent and
protect against such threats and describes three criteria to monitor the progress
SGI 2024 | 53 Germany Report

of these measures. The strategy is evaluated every four years and is updated
every four to six years (BMI, 2021). For the protection of railways and
maritime infrastructure, the Federal Police use surveillance measures,
including cameras, sensors, and task forces (BMI, 2023b).

The BMI, as the ministry tasked with civil protection, coordinates strategies,
measures, and activities related to critical infrastructure protection. It is
supported by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance,
the Federal Office for Information Security, and the Federal Agency for
Technical Relief. In October 2022, the BMI introduced a joint critical
infrastructure unit (GEKKIS) to provide situational reports and facilitate
structured information exchange between departments to address challenges
jointly (BMI, 2023b).

To ensure effective policy implementation, the cybersecurity strategy plans to

involve critical infrastructure operators in a nationwide information exchange
on a voluntary basis. Operators are also required to regularly submit
information on IT security measures to the Federal Office for Information
Security (BMI, 2021).

In conclusion, while Germany has policies targeting the protection of critical

technical infrastructure, an overall strategy with clearly defined measures is
still lacking. However, the government is committed to updating and
improving the protection of basic technical infrastructure.

Decarbonized Energy System

Policy Efforts With a score of 68.3 on a scale from 0 to 100, Germany ranks 18th out of 115
and Commitment
countries on the 2021 Energy Transition Index. This places Germany above
to Achieving a
Decarbonized
the world average of 59.35, making it a leading country in the energy
Energy System transition. The country’s transition readiness is scored at 69.2 points, placing
by 2050 Germany ninth (World Economic Forum, 2021).
Score: 8

In general, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action
(BMWK) is responsible for energy policies. It is currently working on
developing a system development strategy (Systementwicklungsstrategie) that
will function as a cross-sectoral strategy for transforming the energy system.
In November 2023, the BMWK published a progress report on the strategy.
The report suggests that the strategy will define robust transformation paths
and focus on the industry, building, and transport sectors while also covering
energy supply and infrastructure (BMWK, 2023).
SGI 2024 | 54 Germany Report

Although Germany does not yet have an overarching strategy for transforming
its energy system, the government has formulated specific goals for the energy
sector. Measures to achieve these objectives are included in other existing
programs and plans.

First, the Federal Climate Change Act (Klimaschutzgesetz) sets legally

binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets for individual sectors,
including the energy sector. For 2030, the emission volume is set at a
maximum of 108 million tons of CO2-equivalents, representing a 77%
reduction compared to 1990. These emission goals are continuously
monitored. If the sector does not meet its emission target, the responsible
ministry must develop and implement an immediate program with measures to
meet the required target (Umweltbundesamt, 2023).

Second, measures to reach these targets are outlined in the Action Plan 2050
(Klimaschutzplan 2050) and the Climate Protection Program 2030
(Klimaschutzprogramm 2030), which specify multiple actions to achieve
climate neutrality. For example, the Climate Protection Program 2030 includes
the gradual reduction and eventual end of coal-fired power generation.
Onshore wind energy is also to be expanded, specifically by accelerating
planning procedures, involving local citizens at an early stage, and improving
the permit situation (BMU, 2019).

Third, through the adaptation of the Renewable Energy Sources Act

(Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), a primary target for the energy sector is
to increase the share of renewable energy sources to a minimum of 80% by
2030, supporting the measure of significantly scaling back fossil-based energy.
To achieve this, a set of immediate measures was adopted by the parliament in
2022, including actions such as accelerating the planned expansion of onshore
wind turbines (BMWK, 2024).

In 2022, Germany had electricity production capacities – the maximum

amount of power that can be generated – of 66,163 megawatts for wind
energy, 10,974 megawatts for hydro energy, and 1,592 megawatts for energy
from solid biofuels. The wind energy capacity was particularly notable,
increasing from 33,477 megawatts in 2013. Germany’s wind energy capacity
is the highest among countries in the Euro area. For wind energy, Germany
ranked sixth and fourth for solid biofuel energy. Germany also had the highest
solar energy capacity in the Euro area in 2020, with 53,671 megawatts
(Eurostat, 2024a).
SGI 2024 | 55 Germany Report

Finally, due to a lack of specific information, no informed statement can be

made on whether the government monitors the effective implementation of
policies if the implementation is delegated or whether it can intervene if the
implementation is endangered.

Adaptive Labor Markets

Policies Germany’s labor market increasingly faces shortages across all sectors and
Targeting an
qualification levels. In this setting, employers have a growing self-interest in
Adaptive Labor
Market
retaining and developing the skills of their workforce. Moreover, Germany has
Score: 8 a tradition of long and stable employment where employees tend to stay with
their employers for extended periods. The average duration of employment
with a given company is 11.2 years (2020) and has not substantially changed
from the levels in the 1990s (iwd, 2022). This environment encourages
employers to invest in their workforce’s skills.

However, participation in training measures is only at 8% (the survey asks

about participation in a measure in the past four weeks), which is clearly
below the EU average of 12% with much higher numbers in Scandinavia
(Destatis, 2023). Regulation on paid leave for external training measures is the
responsibility of the federal states. In 14 of the 16 states, there is a legal claim
for this type of paid leave amounting, in most cases, to 5 days per year (DGB,
2022).

Employers and employees alike must be incentivized to invest in their skills.

Germany faces an issue due to high marginal tax rates (see “Policies Targeting
Adequate Tax Revenue”), which not only disincentivize longer working hours
but also higher skill-related salaries. Moreover, Germany’s labor market is
heavily regulated with high hurdles for dismissals. On one hand, this provides
job security; on the other hand, it can reduce incentives for demotivated
workers to invest in their skills.

Germany leads the countries with a particularly generous and established

short-time work scheme system. The German system provided a template for
many other industrial countries, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. In
severe crises like the pandemic, the support is intensified.

The mission of the Federal Agency for Labor (Bundesagentur für Arbeit: BA)
is to support worker mobility across firms, industries, regions, and countries.
Current evaluations of the BA’s effectiveness are lacking. Although high
employment growth in recent years suggests effective mobility, it is unclear
whether the BA has played a significant role in this success.
SGI 2024 | 56 Germany Report

Policies The German welfare state provides a generous level of support through a
Targeting an
guaranteed minimum-income citizens’ benefit for job-seekers (Bürgergeld).
Inclusive Labor
Market
Bürgergeld and financial support for housing costs (Wohngeld) are also
Score: 7 available for low-income workers. Income from work is offset against the
Bürgergeld and Wohngeld, but not fully. In general, transfer recipients can
increase their available income by taking up work. However, there is an
ongoing debate about whether the often marginal increase in income is
sufficient to create incentives to work. The debate has intensified after
significant increases in the level of Bürgergeld due to the semi-automatic
inflation indexation of the system. Low-skilled individuals are confronted with
effective hourly wages (in terms of additional money compared to non-work)
of just a few euros. This may effectively prevent the unemployed from
sacrificing their leisure time for a very limited monetary return. Current
studies propose reducing the margin by which work income reduces transfers
to increase work incentives (ifo and zew, 2023). Other concepts suggest
cutting back the generosity of transfers and/or increasing financial sanctions
for transfer recipients refusing to take up a job offer (MDR, 2023).

The German labor market policies have always included a wide range of
measures: activation and vocational integration, career choice and vocational
training, special programs for taking up employment, participation of people
with disabilities, and employment-creating measures (see for details GIB,
2020).

Young people receive special attention in all these measures and participate
disproportionately in these programs. Moreover, some active labor market
policies explicitly target young individuals, such as measures aimed at the
beginning of occupational training. This may include special courses to
prepare certain groups for their occupational training (GIB, 2020).

Germany has a developed welfare state with extensive regulations on regular

and special-purpose unpaid holidays – such as for family tasks, illness, and
care – working times, and work safety. Social partners also pay significant
attention to continuously adjusting rules to match changing life realities and
the possibilities of remote work. This creates a solid foundation for workers to
achieve a work-life balance. The very low hours worked per capita – much
lower than in most other OECD countries – also indicate that workers in
Germany have ample opportunity to spend their time outside of work.

So far, employers are not legally obliged to accept remote work. However, in
many sectors, remote work has become the norm, and competition among
companies for qualified workers supports this development. In 2022, 24.2% of
SGI 2024 | 57 Germany Report

workers regularly worked from home, which is double the pre-pandemic level
(Destatis, 2024).

Policies Social protection in Germany is generally comprehensive. The Bürgergeld

Targeting Labor
minimum-income support is available to all job-seekers, regardless of prior
Market Risks
Score: 9
employment, and includes health insurance and access to public services,
including the free public education system. Additionally, states and
municipalities provide targeted support to low-income households through
subsidized public transport and free access to various public services.
However, the German pension insurance system bases pensions on individual
contributions. Consequently, workers with extensive part-time employment or
marginal employment (geringfügige Beschäftigung) may face low pension
entitlements in old age. In these cases, the Bürgergeld system offers basic
protection, supplemented by various instruments aimed at bolstering the
pensions of workers with limited employment (see “Policies Aimed at Old-
Age Poverty” Prevention).

Every worker has the right to join a trade union, but union membership has
been declining, dropping from 9.8 million in 1994 to 5.6 million in a DGB
trade union in 2022 (Statista, 2024). Interest in trade union membership is
particularly low among high-skilled employees in the service sector, whereas
the industry and public sectors have higher membership rates. Worker
representation, independent of trade union membership, is supported by
guaranteed company co-determination.

The Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Works Constitution Act), effective since 1952,

defines comprehensive information, consultation, and co-determination rights
for works councils. However, coverage is not universal and is declining, with
only 41% of workers employed by companies with a works council (IAB,
2023). Co-determination is more prevalent in older, larger, and industrial
companies, and less common in newer, smaller companies in the service
sector.

There are no significant restrictions on the portability of pensions or social

insurance, as social insurance is not tied to a specific employer or sector.
Private pension claims against a former employer are generally portable, with
limitations only for very short employment contracts. Typically, after a few
years, the non-forfeitability (Unverfallbarkeit) of private pension claims is
reached, allowing the worker to transfer the contract to a new employer or
receive financial compensation.
SGI 2024 | 58 Germany Report

Sustainable Taxation

Policies Germany’s tax system has effectively generated dynamic revenue growth.
Targeting
From 2019, the last year before the COVID-19 pandemic, to 2023, revenues
Adequate Tax
Revenue
increased from €799 billion to €916 billion, a rise of 14.6% despite the strong
Score: 6 economic downturn caused by the pandemic (BMF 2023 a,b). Current tax
projections indicate continued strong growth, with revenues expected to
surpass €1 trillion in 2025 (BMF, 2023a).

However, the German tax system must today be seen as one of the significant
reasons for a declining German growth potential. High marginal tax rates
disincentivize both employment and corporate investment.

The top marginal personal income tax rate of 47.5% is comparable to the
OECD average (OECD 2023), but the average marginal rate remains a key
challenge for Germany’s competitiveness. An average single earner pays
marginal taxes, including social security contributions, of 58.4% of labor
costs. This places Germany at a top position in the OECD and 15 percentage
points above the OECD average (OECD 2023: 75). These high marginal tax
rates reduce the willingness to work and incentivize a cutback of working
hours. This situation has serious consequences for the country’s growth
potential given the shrinking labor force due to the aging population.

The corporate tax system in Germany lacks international competitiveness.

Over the past decade, Germany’s position in effective corporate tax rate
comparisons has steadily declined. In 2022, very few industrial countries
impose a higher tax burden on companies. Among 35 European countries,
Japan, and the United States, Germany ranks third in its effective average tax
rate on companies, which includes all details of tax base definitions (ZEW,
2023). In Europe, only Spain imposes a slightly larger tax burden on
companies. Consequently, Germany has lost considerable tax appeal as a
destination for foreign direct investment. Although Germany is among the
initiators of the new OECD rules on international minimum corporate tax
rates, this project is unlikely to improve German tax competitiveness since the
international minimum tax rate will be set far below the German level.

The German tax administration, by international standards, effectively collects

revenues and combats tax evasion. International estimates on the size of the
shadow economy consistently report GDP shares for Germany that are clearly
below the average for EU and OECD countries (Hassan and Schneider, 2016).
SGI 2024 | 59 Germany Report

Policies In principle, the German tax system treats entities with similar tax-paying
Targeting Tax
abilities in a similar manner. Exemptions often relate to sectoral tax subsidies.
Equity
Score: 7
For example, farmers are exempt from paying the motor vehicle tax (Kfz-
Steuer) and benefit from a tax subsidy on diesel fuel consumption. These
exemptions often have historical origins and are defended by special interest
groups, even if they have clearly lost their justification. Following a 2023
ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Debt Brake, the government
has proposed phasing out these sectoral tax exemptions, which, from the
perspective of equal sectoral treatment, would represent progress.

A specific feature of the German income tax system is its attention to the
details of each individual tax case. Taxpayers can claim reductions for a
multitude of special circumstances. Although this attempt to ensure maximum
fairness for each case creates significant complexity, it contributes to vertical
equity.

Germany’s tax and transfer system is notably effective in redistributing

income between the rich and the poor among OECD countries. This system
significantly reduces inequality in market incomes, resulting in a more
equitable post-tax scenario. The Gini coefficient, which is 0.49 for pre-tax
market incomes, drops to 0.29 for disposable incomes after applying all
redistributive tax and transfer mechanisms (Sachverständigenrat 2019). Thus,
the tax and transfer system excels in achieving its redistributive objectives and
equalizing incomes.

Germany taxes inheritances but allows generous provisions for corporate

wealth. There is no wealth tax, and the idea is highly controversial. Therefore,
while income is significantly equalized through the tax system, this is less true
for wealth.

Policies Aimed at The German income tax system is one of the most differentiated and complex
Minimizing
in the global tax landscape. While standard tax declarations for employees’
Compliance
Costs
wages are generally straightforward, the ambition to account for all the
Score: 5 individual features of a single tax case has resulted in substantial complexities
and reporting requirements.
Hence, tax compliance costs in Germany are significant. Digital tax
declaration possibilities have advanced in recent years, with more information,
such as from employers and health insurers, being centrally provided. Still, an
SME in Germany needs a relatively high number of hours to comply with its
tax reporting and declaration requirements (World Bank 2020).
SGI 2024 | 60 Germany Report

Policies Aimed at Since the ecological tax reforms of the late 1990s, the German tax system has
Internalizing
included “green” taxes designed to internalize the ecological damage produced
Negative and
Positive
by certain polluting activities. German industry is subject to the European
Externalities emissions-trading system, which features market-based pricing of CO2
Score: 8 emissions. In 2021, Germany took another significant step toward
comprehensive CO2 pricing by introducing a national price on CO2 for fossil
fuels used for heating and cars. This CO2 levy is increasing from its starting
price of €25 in 2021 to €45 in 2024 and €55 in 2025. In 2027, a European
emission trading system is planned to cover emissions from traffic and
buildings. With this system, the CO2 price will then be determined as the
market price in this trading system (Bundesregierung, 2024).

Critics argue that the government could do more with price incentives. The
current administration seeks to steer the green transition through regulations
that mandate specific technologies. A recent example is the new Building
Energy Act (Gebäudeenergiegesetz). This act prescribes in detail which
technology must be used under certain circumstances. The concept of a price
mechanism is to leave these decisions to the voluntary actions of agents,
potentially leading to higher efficiency.

Subsidies and tax incentives are largely focused on measures with ecological
or research-related justifications. Among the largest federal subsidies are
support for energy efficiency in buildings, support for microelectronics,
hydrogen infrastructure, charging and fueling infrastructure, measures for
natural climate protection, and climate protection contracts with industry
(BMF, 2023). The financial capacity of the government to fund these
incentives has been curtailed by the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on
the German Debt Brake, forcing the government to reprioritize these subsidies.
However, the government remains committed to using substantial financial
incentives to support the green transition.

Sustainable Budgeting

Sustainable Germany enacted its current constitutional fiscal rule, the Debt Brake
Budgeting
(Schuldenbremse), in 2009. The rule’s full application was phased in over
Policies
Score: 8
several years and took full effect for the federal budget in 2016 and for the
states in 2020. The Debt Brake is established in Articles 109 and 115 of the
German Basic Law, comprising both structural and cyclical elements. The
structural component restricts the federal government from incurring new debt
beyond 0.35% of the nominal gross domestic product annually. The cyclical
element permits additional borrowing during economic downturns, with the
obligation to repay when economic conditions recover. Additionally, there is
SGI 2024 | 61 Germany Report

an escape clause that enables the Bundestag to temporarily lift the Debt Brake
by a simple majority in cases of natural disasters or other exceptional
emergencies beyond the state’s control. The states have to balance their
budgets without an allowance for a deficit but, like the federal level, can incur
deficits in a downturn and also activate an escape clause.

Germany’s Debt Brake has served as an effective fiscal rule, helping the
government counteract the inherent biases in the political process. Unlike
many other EU and OECD countries, Germany managed to reduce its debt-to-
GDP ratio following the financial crisis. By 2019, when the country faced the
fiscal consequences of the pandemic, Germany was in the favorable situation
of having significant fiscal buffers, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of approximately
60%.
In reaction to the pandemic and the energy crisis, the federal government has
increasingly used budgetary cosmetics to expand its debt leeway through
extra-budgetary funds such as the Climate and Transformation Fund (Klima-
und Transformationsfonds: KTF). Through the KTF, a deficit allowance
justified by the pandemic emergency was shifted for use in later years. This
practice was halted by a significant ruling in November 2023 by the Federal
Constitutional Court (FCC). The Court declared this creative construction
unlawful and the related budget void. Consequently, in a turbulent and
conflict-ridden process, the government had to adjust both the 2023 and 2024
budgets with spending cuts and cuts to tax exemptions that had benefited the
restaurant sector and farmers.

The FCC’s ruling has clearly strengthened the Debt Brake’s effectiveness. The
budgetary reactions have demonstrated how helpful such a fiscal rule is for a
government to prevail against fierce lobbying pressure. Without the pressure
from the strengthened fiscal rule, the government would not have been able to
cut tax subsidies for restaurants and farmers, although these cuts find
overwhelming support from tax and public finance experts.
Whether the tight Debt Brake presents an obstacle to public investment or
other future-oriented spending is the subject of an intensive debate. The Debt
Brake does not include a golden rule or similar provisions that would permit
additional debt for investment spending. In a recent survey of German
economists, a large majority supports the Debt Brake in principle, but 44%
favor reforming it (ifo, 2023). Reform supporters often wish to exempt gross
or net investment from the deficit ceiling.

The annual budgetary process is embedded in medium-term financial

planning. Each year, the government provides budgetary projections for the
next five years, adding foresight to the budgetary process. Once per legislative
term, the government publishes a Report on the Sustainability of Public
SGI 2024 | 62 Germany Report

Finances (the last report: BMF, 2020), which adopts a very long-term
perspective.

The role of off-budget funds outside the core budget has significantly
increased in recent crisis years. Fiscal support to cope with various crises –
from the pandemic to flood damage and the energy crisis – has been mobilized
through these special funds. Experts have criticized this reliance on off-budget
funds, arguing that it damages budgetary transparency. The Constitutional
Court’s ruling has now initiated a correction. As a consequence of the ruling,
the government has announced plans to decrease or close down key special
funds.

The German Ministry of Finance has recently implemented a system of SDG

tagging, where ministries classify their spending with respect to the SDGs. In
the future, the federal budget will more transparently show how it supports the
SDGs. Germany has committed to several spending targets, including the
NATO spending target of 2.0% of GDP on defense and the development
spending target of 0.7% of GDP. However, the government increasingly aims
to implement principles of performance budgeting, which implies taking a
critical view of mere input spending targets. Instead, the government wants to
assess the budget more on the basis of outcomes and impact achieved.

Sustainability-oriented Research and Innovation

Research and With the FONA strategy (Forschung für Nachhaltigkeit, research for
Innovation Policy
sustainability) published at the end of 2020, the Federal Ministry of Education
Score: 9
and Research (BMBF) has aligned its research funding for climate protection
and greater sustainability with the United Nations 2030 Agenda. The FONA
strategy focuses on the global SDGs and outlines three strategic goals to which
research can significantly contribute. These goals are detailed in eight priority
fields of action, each with specific measures to achieve the strategic
objectives. For instance, to meet climate goals, one action involves
establishing green hydrogen. To preserve habitats, another action is
developing the biodiversity monitor for Germany. Like all such strategies,
FONA expresses a political commitment, but it is not legally binding.

Startups benefit from various federal and state support schemes. However, like
any other companies, they suffer from intense regulation and bureaucratic
burdens in Germany across various fields, such as labor market, taxation, data
protection, and environmental regulation. Venture capital markets are
underdeveloped in Europe compared to the US. The German venture capital
SGI 2024 | 63 Germany Report

market has shown high growth rates over recent years, with investment more
than doubling between 2018 (€1.5 billion) and 2021 (€4.0 billion) (Statista,
2024). After this peak, investment volumes decreased due to the difficult
environment of high inflation and interest rates.

Since 2020, Germany has applied an R&D tax incentive. Since then, spending
on R&D staff has benefited from a 25% tax allowance that will be paid out if
the entity makes a loss. The allowance can be applied to a maximum of €2
million, which limits the subsidy to €500,000 per company per year. This
amount was doubled for the period between mid-2020 and mid-2026 in the
context of pandemic support measures (Bundestag, 2023).

Responsibility for promoting science and research is divided between the

federal government and the state governments. For example, the federal
government exercises legislative powers in areas such as research funding and
training grants (Art. 74 (1), no. 13 GG). The higher education sector, however,
is fundamentally the responsibility of the federal states (Art. 30, 70 GG). The
federal and state governments have two coordinating and advisory bodies at
their disposal: the Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz (Joint Science
Conference, GWK) and the Wissenschaftsrat (Science Council, WR). At the
federal level, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research takes the lead.

The government continuously monitors the progress of its research and

innovation policies and their outcomes. A key in-depth report is the
Bundesbericht Forschung und Innovation (Federal Report Research and
Innovation). The Federal Report is the standard reference work on Germany’s
research and innovation policy. It provides an overview of the activities of the
federal and state governments in research and innovation and presents data and
facts in a structured manner. The report is published every two years, with the
most recent edition from 2022 (BMBF, 2022). Research and innovation policy
is also evaluated annually by the independent Commission of Experts for
Research and Innovation (EFI).

Agencies and research associations that receive public research funds are
subject to continuous monitoring. This includes audits from state and federal
audit institutions and, more important, performance-related reporting
requirements to their sponsors. Moreover, responsible ministries send their
delegates to the supervisory bodies of the sponsored units.
SGI 2024 | 64 Germany Report

Stable Global Financial System

Global Financial Germany is ranked seventh on the 2022 Financial Secrecy Index by the Tax
Policies
Justice Network, scoring 57 out of 100 points, where 100 points indicate full
Score: 8
secrecy, and zero points signify full transparency. According to the index,
Germany still has some way to go to achieve full transparency. Additionally,
with a score of 58 out of 100, Germany ranks 24th on the 2021 Corporate Tax
Haven Index, which assesses jurisdictions based on their complicity in helping
multinational corporations underpay corporate income tax. Overall, Germany
loses approximately $26 billion in taxes per year due to global tax abuse,
amounting to 2.7% of tax revenue. This is slightly below the global average of
2.8% and the regional average of 3.1% (Tax Justice Network, 2023).

According to the Tax Justice Network (2022: secrecy indicator 20), Germany
demonstrates above-average participation in international transparency
commitments and engagement in international judicial cooperation on money
laundering and other criminal matters. The country has ratified relevant
international agreements, such as the Multilateral Tax Convention and the UN
Convention Against Corruption (Tax Justice Network, 2022). Additionally,
Germany is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), whose
recommendations are recognized as global standards for anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing.

According to the FATF’s follow-up report on Germany in 2023, 17

recommendations are ranked as compliant for the country, while 20 are ranked
as largely compliant, and 3 as only partially compliant. This shows an
improvement, as two recommendations were upgraded to the largely
compliant ranking (FATF, 2023). Overall, based on the 2022 FATF report,
Germany has made significant reforms since 2017. However, it remains at
high risk of terrorist financing, and the FATF suggests that it could be more
proactive by freezing terrorist assets as a preventive measure.

Nevertheless, the report acknowledges that Germany performs well in

investigating, prosecuting, and disrupting financing activities related to
terrorism. It also highlights the positive introduction of the Transparency
Register, a federal government initiative to prevent money laundering and
terrorist financing (FATF, 2022).

In October 2023, the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) proposed a new

strategy to combat financial crime based on the draft law “Combating
Financial Crimes Act” (Finanzkriminalitätsbekämpfungsgesetz). A key change
will be the establishment of the Federal Financial Crime Agency (FFCA) in
2024, which will begin operations in 2025. The agency will consolidate core
SGI 2024 | 65 Germany Report

competencies to facilitate and enhance cooperation. One focus area of the

FFCA will be investigating cases of international money laundering.
Additionally, the quality of the data in the Transparency Register is to be
improved (BMF, 2023).

To enhance information transparency in international financial markets,

Germany is part of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international body
that makes recommendations on the global financial system to promote
financial stability. One of the FSB’s goals is to encourage coordination and
information exchange among authorities, including national financial
authorities and international standard-setting bodies (FSB, 2020).
Additionally, as of July 2020, credit institutions, tax consultants, lawyers and
auditors are required to report tax structuring models. The group for
international information exchange in the special task force against tax
structuring models – created in 2022 – is responsible for using these reports
for quick reactions to avoid tax losses (BMF, 2022).

Lastly, the BMF campaigns for what it refers to as fair corporate taxation on
an international level (BMF, 2024). In this regard, Germany supports and has
argued for the two-pillar solution to address tax challenges arising from the
digitalization of the economy, which was agreed upon by the members of the
OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) in
2021. The two-pillar solution proposes a reform to the global financial system.
The objective of pillar one is to ensure a fair international distribution of taxes,
while the aim of the second pillar is to introduce a global minimum corporate
tax of 15% (OECD, 2021).

II. Social Sustainability

Sustainable Education System

Policies In Germany, education is widely acknowledged as a public good. Article 7,

Targeting Quality
Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law states that the government holds primary
Education
Score: 8
responsibility for education, which is predominantly funded by taxpayers. The
inherent public interest in education places an obligation on the state to ensure
the effectiveness of the educational system (Hepp, 2013). More specifically,
education in Germany is regulated at the state level. Consequently, individual
states have their own school acts (Schulgesetze) and thus different policies and
regulations.
SGI 2024 | 66 Germany Report

As described, the financial resources for education are predominantly provided

by the government. For public school systems, municipalities and states share
responsibilities for finances. Generally, states finance the teaching personnel
while municipalities usually provide resources for material costs. Because the
finances are not regulated at the federal level, differences across municipalities
and states can be observed regarding schools’ financial resources (Schrooten,
2021). For instance, in 2021, spending per student in Berlin was around
€13,300, while it was €8,200 in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. However,
spending cannot be compared directly, as schools in different states differ in
factors such as structure and educational offerings (Destatis, 2023a).

Since the Basic Law outlines the government’s responsibility for providing
education, resources must be available even in times of economic crisis or
government transition. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the system struggled
with schools’ digital backwardness regarding equipment and teacher training.
Nevertheless, federal and state governments reacted quickly by providing
additional crisis programs and digital investment budgets. Generally, the
budget ranges from approximately 6 to 7% of GDP, with 7% for 2021 and
7.1% for 2020 (Destatis, 2023b).

Concerning human resources, in 2021, Germany had a ratio of pupils and

students to teachers and academic staff of 14.8 for primary schools and 12.1
for upper-secondary schools. Both ratios are above the EU average (Eurostat,
2023).

To provide highly skilled educators, teachers undergo a multi-stage training

process that includes a university program and preparatory training, known as
the Referendariat. The specifics of university education for aspiring teachers
vary among the states. In Bavaria, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania,
and Saxony, students graduate with a state examination (Staatsexamen),
whereas in other states, students earn a bachelor’s and master’s degree.

Although the framework is designed to facilitate the recruitment of highly

skilled educators, Germany faces a considerable teacher shortage, particularly
in STEM subjects. An improvement in the situation is unlikely, especially
since the number of students enrolling in teaching programs has declined.
Even with a 100% graduation rate, it is insufficient to address the teacher
shortage. Additionally, there is criticism that the current education system does
not adequately prepare educators for digitalization or the challenges arising
from increased heterogeneity in schools (Stiferverband, 2023).
SGI 2024 | 67 Germany Report

As of 2004, Germany has national educational standards implemented by the

federal states and introduced into core curricula, forming the basis for
consistent skill development for all students from primary school to the end of
the upper-secondary level. Each state has its own core curriculum, developed
by the individual state’s departments of education and cultural affairs (e.g.,
Hessisches Kultusministerium, n.d.). However, it is unclear to what extent
these curricula are adapted to labor market demands.

The provision of training programs and education with relevant hands-on skills
occurs through vocational training under the dual system. This system is
referred to as “dual” since training takes place at two learning locations: in the
company and at vocational school (Kultusministerkonferenz, n.d.). Besides the
option of vocational training under the dual system, several companies also
offer dual study programs. Vocational training and these study programs, due
to the dual involvement of both the public and private sectors, are highly
responsive to the changing skill needs of the labor market.

With regard to lifelong learning, adults in Germany participated in non-formal

learning for an average of 4.24 hours per week before the COVID-19
pandemic and 3.23 hours per week during the pandemic lockdowns. This is
slightly less than the OECD average of 4.54 hours (pre-COVID) and 3.42
hours (during lockdowns). Additionally, 45% of adults in Germany choose not
to participate in available education and training opportunities, compared to
the OECD average of 50%.

According to the OECD Skills Outlook for 2021, fundamental skills –

specifically reading competence in this study – increased by 25 points from
age 15 to 27, compared to an OECD average increase of 13 points (OECD,
2021).

Sustainable development is included in most German school curricula.

However, current surveys indicate that the sustainability dimension is not yet
systematically integrated into school teaching and remains a secondary
concern (Deutsches Schulportal, 2024).

Policies School attendance in Germany is compulsory, with the number of mandatory

Targeting
years varying between nine and ten years depending on the state. Preprimary
Equitable Access
to Education
education, in contrast, is not mandatory. However, there are regulations
Score: 6 ensuring that children have access to early childhood development and care
(Edelstein, 2013).

On the federal level, Article 24 of Book 8 of the German Social Code – Child
and Youth Services – regulates that children from ages one to three, as well as
SGI 2024 | 68 Germany Report

children from age three until the beginning of primary school, have a legal
claim to early childhood development, care, and preprimary education. In
March 2023, 90.1% of children between the ages of three and six, as well as
36.4% of children below the age of three, were enrolled in child daycares. The
childcare quotas vary across individual states. In Bremen, for instance, only
86% of children over three years old attend child daycare, while the
percentage is considerably higher in Thuringia at 94.4% (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2023).

While children from the age of one on have the right to a childcare slot, the
demand exceeds the supply of available slots, meaning not every child has
access to preprimary education. This particularly applies to children below
three years of age, as the need and actual rate of childcare for this group differ
by 13.6 percentage points (BMFSFJ, 2023). A study by the Federal Institute
for Population Research showed that disadvantaged families are
disproportionately affected by this issue. Children below three from families
vulnerable to poverty and with parents with low levels of education are less
likely to receive a place in childcare. Furthermore, only 24% of children who
do not speak German at home are in childcare, compared to 38% of children
from primarily German-speaking households. These findings are problematic,
as these children could particularly benefit from preprimary education
(Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung, 2023).

Nevertheless, the share of children enrolled in early childhood education

systems in Germany is still above the OECD average and the EU25 average
(OECD, 2023).

Regarding primary and secondary education, the previously mentioned

compulsory schooling (Schulpflicht) is regulated by the school laws of the
respective state, with the specific structure varying between states. Once
schooling is no longer compulsory, secondary schools have mandatory
attendance (Deutscher Bundestag, 2019). These regulations result in high
enrollment rates in Germany, with a rate of 99% for the age group of six to
fourteen and 88% for ages 15 to 19, which is above the OECD average
(OECD, 2023).

During primary school, all children, regardless of socioeconomic background,

attend the same educational institutions. Depending on the state, primary
education extends from year one to year four or until year six. Secondary
education is divided into different school forms with varying levels of
education. Students receive a recommendation for secondary school based on
grades and, occasionally, other criteria such as learning behavior
(Schullaufbahnempfehlung). While it is not mandatory to follow this
SGI 2024 | 69 Germany Report

recommendation, some states require students to take an entrance exam or pass

a probationary period if they choose a non-recommended type of school
(Edelstein, 2013).

Equitable access to all levels of secondary and tertiary education, regardless of

socioeconomic background, is an issue in Germany. For example, the
probability of a child attending the highest level of secondary schooling
(Gymnasium) is only 21.1% if no parent graduated with an Abitur and the
family’s net monthly household income is below €2,600. This probability
increases to 80.3% if both parents have an Abitur and earn a net monthly
household income of over €5,500 (Wößmann et al., 2023). Similarly, only
27% of students from non-academic households go on to study at a university,
while this share is 79% for students from academic households
(Stifterverband, 2022).

Additionally, the German education system offers second-chance education

opportunities (Zweiter Bildungsweg, ZBW). The ZBW is part of adult
education and enables adults to obtain a school-leaving certificate later in life.
This opportunity exists for all levels of secondary education. However, since
the ZBW, like other parts of the education system, is regulated by the states,
individual regulations and opportunities vary depending on the state. Despite
the availability of second-chance education, the overall number of people
obtaining school-leaving qualifications through this route is rather small, with
around 50,000 participants (Käpplinger, Reuter and Pfeil, 2020).

Sustainable Institutions Supporting Basic Human Needs

Policies According to the principle of local self-governance, municipalities in Germany

Targeting Equal
are responsible for providing essential services (Daseinsvorsorge) (Hanesch,
Access to
Essential Services
2020). Additionally, there are different forms of basic income support. First,
and Basic Income following the Second Book of the Social Code (SGB II), the citizen’s benefit
Support (Bürgergeld) replaced the previous unemployment assistance in 2023. This
Score: 8 benefit ensures the socio-cultural subsistence minimum, considering the needs
for food, clothing, personal hygiene, household goods, household energy
without the shares attributable to heating and hot water production, and
participation in social and cultural life.

Generally, income support depends on an individual’s personal situation. For

single people, parents, and individuals over 18, the citizen’s benefit amounts to
€502 in 2023. Importantly, to be eligible, citizens must be employable
(BMAS, 2023). Individuals in need who are not employable due to illness,
disability, or having reached retirement age can receive social assistance
SGI 2024 | 70 Germany Report

(Sozialhilfe), which is regulated in the Twelfth Book of the Social Code (SGB
XII). Like the citizen’s benefit, social assistance is meant to provide a
minimum subsistence level in case of insufficient income and assets (BMAS,
2021).

As the allowance is continuously adjusted for inflation, the allowance for the
citizen’s benefit and social assistance will be raised by €61 for 2024.
Consequently, single adults will receive €562 (Die Bundesregierung, 2023b).

The Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS) and the Federal
Employment Agency provide detailed information about access to basic
income support on their websites, including eligibility for citizens’ benefits
and the application process. Generally, applications for citizens’ benefits can
be completed online. However, the Federal Employment Agency also offers
in-person consultations at respective job centers where individuals can apply
for the benefit (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2023a).

For individuals receiving minimum-income benefits under SGB II or XII

(citizens’ benefit or social assistance), rent and heating costs are covered in
addition to the benefit allowance. However, the costs must be reasonable and
should be discussed with the job center first (Bundesagentur für Arbeit,
2023b). If individuals are not eligible for a citizens’ benefit, they can request
support for low-income households in the form of a housing benefit
(Wohngeld). This housing benefit is a contribution to rent or homeowner
charges, meaning it only partially covers the costs. The federal government’s
housing benefit reform in January 2023 increased both the size of the housing
benefit and the number of people eligible to receive it. Additionally, the
reform introduced a permanent heating cost component. To determine
eligibility and the amount of the benefit, the Federal Ministry for Housing,
Urban Development and Building (BMWSB) provides a housing benefit
calculator on its website (BMWSB, 2023).

The provision of water and sanitation is obligatory for the state and is
regulated by municipalities as part of their infrastructure services. Water is an
operating cost included in the rent for a house or an apartment, and it is
therefore either fully or partially covered for individuals who receive
minimum-income benefits or housing benefits. Sanitation requires a fee to the
municipality or public or private supply companies. While there are no special
regulations, such as reductions or benefits for low-income individuals, the
costs for those entitled to citizen’s benefits or social assistance are covered, as
they are considered housing costs. However, these costs must be reasonable.
Otherwise, the housing benefit allowance includes sanitation as part of
ancillary costs along with rent and heating (Hanesch, 2020).
SGI 2024 | 71 Germany Report

Concerning energy, companies do not offer tariffs based on income, so low-

income households cannot receive special tariffs. Household energy is,
however, part of the allowance provided by minimum-income benefits and is
thereby covered for those entitled to citizens’ benefits or social assistance.
Energy can further be partly covered through the housing benefit if it falls
under heating costs (Hanesch, 2020). Additionally, following the increased
costs for energy, one-off energy price flat rates of €200 were paid to university
students in 2023. Employed persons and pensioners received €300 in 2022
(Die Bundesregierung, 2023a).

In June, July, and August 2022, a public transport ticket for nine euros per
month was offered. The so-called 9-Euro Ticket could be used for all local and
regional transportation throughout Germany. As of May 2023, a similar public
transportation ticket for €49 (Deutschlandticket) is available. Various large
towns offer favorable “Social Tickets” (Sozialtickets) for transfer recipients
(Arbeitslosenhilfe, 2023). While already available at some universities,
students are expected to receive the ticket with a 40% discount starting in the
summer semester of 2024 (Die Bundesregierung, 2023c). Although this ticket
is available to everyone, financial relief for digital infrastructure is only
available to people eligible for minimum-income benefits following SGB II
and XII, as the received money is meant to cover digital services (Hanesch,
2020).

Regarding financial services, Germany introduced the Payment Accounts Act

(Zahlungskontengesetz, ZKG) in 2016, which transposed the European
Payment Accounts Directive into German law. The act stipulates that every
consumer residing in the EU has the right to a payment account. This right
exists regardless of a person’s creditworthiness and also applies to asylum-
seekers or people without a permanent residence. According to the ZKG,
every institution is required to offer a basic account option, including all basic
payment services. While this means that institutions must enable cash deposits
and withdrawals, transfers, direct debits and card payments, loans or
overdrafts are not available with a basic account (Hanesch, 2020).

Policies While the previous text outlined existing policies, the following text illustrates
Targeting Quality
their quality. As Germany introduced the unemployment benefit reform in
of Essential
Services and
2023, no statistics are yet available to assess how well the new benefit ensures
Basic Income the fulfillment of basic human needs. The following statements are therefore
Support based on the preceding unemployment benefit.
Score: 7
SGI 2024 | 72 Germany Report

Nevertheless, while minimum-income benefits under SGB II and XII are

calculated based on an income and consumption sample to ensure the socio-
cultural subsistence minimum, they are often criticized as insufficient.
Simultaneously, critics argue that the increased allowance from the citizens’
benefit reduces the motivation for unemployed individuals to seek work
(Handelsblatt, 2022).

Despite the coverage of housing costs through minimum-income benefits or

housing allowances, 41.5% of the population at risk of poverty spent more
than 40% of their disposable income on total housing costs in 2022. This is
significantly higher than the EU average of 33.1% (Eurostat, 2023a).

To assess the quality of policies ensuring access to water and sanitation, the
proportion of the population with utility bill arrears can be considered. In
2018, 7.4% of the population at risk of poverty in Germany had arrears on
their utility bills. Although this proportion was higher than that of the total
German population, it was significantly below the EU-27 average of 16.3%.
Furthermore, an interruption of the water supply in Germany can only occur in
the case of eviction (European Commission, 2020).

In contrast, the number of people at risk of poverty who could not afford
regular use of public transportation in 2014 was above the EU-27 average:
9.9% compared to 5.8%. Additionally, the share of low-income individuals
reporting they could not use public transportation regularly was more than 5
percentage points higher than the share of the total population facing the same
difficulties. However, because these statistics are from 2014, the effect of the
new Deutschlandticket has not been taken into account.

According to the European Social Policy Network (ESPN), Germany has

national coverage of uninterrupted basic energy supply (European
Commission, 2022). While this indicates that every household can access
energy, cash benefits do not seem to fully ensure complete access to energy.
As described under “Policies Targeting Equal Access to Essential Services and
Basic Income Support,” 13.6% of the population at risk of poverty could not
keep their homes adequately warm in 2022. Still, this share is lower than the
EU average of 20.1% (Eurostat, 2023b).

Regarding access to digital infrastructure, available cash benefits often do not

enable full access to an internet connection for personal use at home. While
only 2.6% of the overall population could not afford an internet connection in
2022, this share increases considerably for unemployed people to 11.9%,
which is above the EU average of 6.9% (Eurostat, 2023c).
SGI 2024 | 73 Germany Report

Finally, according to ESPN national experts, Germany’s policies generally

make it easy for consumers to open a Basic Account. However, these accounts
can be expensive, potentially costing more than standard bank accounts, which
can deter people from accessing such accounts (European Commission, 2020).

Sustainable Health System

Policies Germany is investing in the digitalization of its health system. Sixteen percent
Targeting Health
of the €25.4 billion German Recovery and Resilience Plan is dedicated to
System
Resilience
healthcare investments. The funds are planned to be invested in the digital
Score: 8 strengthening of public healthcare, hospital modernization, and more
(OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2023, p.
17ff.). Additionally, a public research data center for health
(Forschungsdatenzentrum Gesundheit) is currently under construction. It will
collect data from the statutory health insurances and use it for research,
prevention, and better control of the health system. It will use artificial
intelligence to collect and analyze data, optimize processes, and deliver data-
supported diagnoses and therapy recommendations (Bundesministerium für
Gesundheit, 2023a).

In Germany, it is mandatory to be insured in health insurance, either statutory

or private. As a result, only 0.1% of Germany’s population is not part of health
insurance. Additionally, Germany had the highest per-capita healthcare
spending in the European Union, with more than €5,000 per person in 2021.
Citizens’ direct payments for health services not covered by insurance were
among the lowest in the EU at 12%, compared to an EU average of 15%.
Furthermore, Germany has one of the lowest percentage rates of unmet needs
for medical care in the European Union, with a rate lower than 1%. The share
of medical consultations by phone increased during the COVID-19 pandemic
but remains low compared to other EU countries (OECD/European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2023).

Compared to other European OECD countries, the German health insurance

system has one of the best coverage rates for medical treatments. Additionally,
76% of patients were able to secure a doctor appointment the same day or the
next day the last time they needed medical care. This is the highest rate among
all European OECD countries (Finkenstädt, 2017, p. 69ff.).

The number of surgeries conducted in Germany dropped during the Covid-19

pandemic; however, the decline was less severe than in other EU countries.
This indicates that the health system was able to maintain its usual services
during the crisis more effectively than the systems in other countries
SGI 2024 | 74 Germany Report

(OECD/European Observatory on Health System and Policies, 2023).

Hospitals face significant challenges due to labor shortages of nurses,
caretakers, and doctors, as well as limited capacities, leading to inadequate
patient care (Tagesspiegel, 2022). To address these issues, a reform of
hospitals and their funding is planned. The reform aims to change the funding
structure to ensure hospitals are economically sustainable, even with fewer
patients than expected. Previously, funding was calculated based on the
number of patients treated, which sometimes forced hospitals to discharge
patients early. The reform seeks to ensure that decisions about patient
treatment are based on medical rather than economic considerations
(Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 2023b).

As in other industrial countries, high demand and supply chain problems have
caused temporary shortages in pharmaceuticals in recent years, prompting
discussions on the need to reshore production to Europe and Germany.
However, in typical years, the supply of drugs remains stable. In Europe,
Germany leads in the rapid deployment of innovative pharmaceuticals
(Pharma Fakten, 2023).

Between 1992 and 2020, spending on healthcare in Germany increased by an

average of 3.6% per year, and the share of healthcare spending compared to
the gross domestic product also increased (Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, 2022). The insurance contributions are not sufficient to cover total
healthcare expenses. In 2019, expenses exceeding €50 billion had to be
financed by governmental grants (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019).

Policies Health insurances in Germany finance various examinations for the early
Targeting High-
detection of diseases such as cancer and diabetes, starting at different ages
Quality
Healthcare
(Betanet, n.d.). Statutory insurants receive a reminder about the opportunity to
Score: 9 undergo a cancer screening every five years (OECD/European Observatory on
Health Systems and Policies, 2023).

To prevent such diseases, various strategies aim to sensitize the population

about the importance of balanced nutrition and physical exercise. The national
plan of action for this cause, named IN FORM, was founded in 2008. It
consolidates health initiatives into a national strategy and seeks to prevent
malnutrition, lack of physical exercise, and excess weight by improving the
population’s knowledge about healthy lifestyles and motivating adherence to
such lifestyles (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, n.d.). Since 2015, most
governmental prevention expenses have been directed to schools,
kindergartens, nursing facilities, and firms to enhance health and prevention
knowledge among the population, starting from a young age (Stiftung
Gesundheitswissen, 2021).
SGI 2024 | 75 Germany Report

The federal government plans to prohibit advertising for foods high in sugar,
fat, or salt directed at children in all relevant media to prevent unbalanced
eating and excess weight (Bundesministerium für Ernährung und
Landwirtschaft, 2023).

The prevention of alcohol and tobacco consumption in Germany is progressing

slowly compared to other European countries. However, an increase in
tobacco taxes is taking place from 2022 to 2026, and advertising for tobacco
was banned on billboards and in cinemas in 2020. Germany was the last EU
country to do so, though. There is no smoking ban in private cars yet
(OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2023).

Between 2011 and 2019, the avoidable mortality rate – deaths that could have
been prevented through better public health measures or a more effective
healthcare system – declined by approximately 8%. The avoidable mortality
rate remains below the EU average (OECD/European Observatory on Health
Systems and Policies, 2023).

Germany has one of the lowest percentages of unmet needs for medical care in
the European Union, with under 1%. Moreover, there is only a negligible
difference in the unmet needs rate among different income groups
(OECD/European Observatory on Health System and Policies, 2023).

The German health insurance system has one of the best coverage rates for
medical treatments compared to other European OECD countries. This is true
for both statutory and private insurance (Finkenstädt, 2017).

In 2004, the principle of integrated care was introduced into German law. The
government aimed to prevent multiple examinations of the same patient by
different doctors, thereby saving costs and improving coordination among
care, inpatient treatment, and rehabilitation efforts, as well as coordination
between family doctors and hospitals (Der Paritätische Gesamtverband, 2011).

Policies In Germany, everyone must participate in a health insurance plan, which

Targeting
means that nearly 100% of the population is insured. This mandate ensures
Equitable Access
To Healthcare
affordable access to healthcare for all individuals, regardless of socioeconomic
Score: 8 status, gender, age, ethnicity, and other factors (OECD/European Observatory
on Health Systems and Policies, 2023).

There is a very small percentage of people with unmet needs for medical care,
and the difference among income groups is negligible. In the lowest income
quintile, 0.3% of households reported unmet healthcare needs, compared with
SGI 2024 | 76 Germany Report

0.1% in the highest income quintile. Overall, only 0.2% of households

mentioned unmet needs for medical care due to cost reasons (OECD/European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2023).

The statutory health insurances cover a broad range of medical care and
treatments, and the benefits are equal for anyone who is insured, regardless of
socioeconomic status, gender, age, ethnicity, etc. Persons with high incomes
may choose private insurance, which provides benefits that are at least
equivalent to those of statutory insurance and often better. Asylum-seekers and
recognized refugees are only entitled to emergency, maternity, and preventive
care during the first 18 months of their stay. After that, they can access a
broader range of healthcare (OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems
and Policies, 2023).

A European Parliament study stated that the German health system provides
equal access for both males and females (European Parliament, 2015).

A couple of years ago, the federal government commissioner for people with
disabilities (Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für die Belange von Menschen
mit Behinderungen), Jürgen Dusel, criticized that many doctors’ practices and
their websites are not barrier-free and nursing staffs in hospitals are often not
trained to deal with specific disabilities and the special needs of their disabled
patients (Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für die Belange von Menschen mit
Behinderungen, n.d.). Currently, the federal ministry for health
(Bundesministerium für Gesundheit) is working on an action plan to reduce
barriers and improve accessibility in the health system (Bundesministerium für
Gesundheit, 2023).

To evaluate the equal accessibility of medical care across all regions of

Germany, it is essential first to examine the differences among the sixteen
federal states. In 2015, the number of healthcare professionals in the various
federal states ranged from 55 to 75 professionals per 1,000 inhabitants, with
the German average at 65. The disparities in healthcare expenses per capita
were also minimal, ranging from approximately €4,000 to €4,400, with the
German average at €4,213 (Statistisches Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz, 2017). In
2022, the occupancy of hospital beds in Germany averaged 69%, with a range
of 65% to 74% among the federal states (Gesundheitsberichterstattung des
Bundes, 2023).

An emerging problem is the shortage of doctors in rural areas. Although there

are more doctors than ever since German reunification, they often specialize or
are drawn to the cities. In the countryside, however, a general practitioner is
needed first. The federal states are trying to counteract this problem, for
SGI 2024 | 77 Germany Report

example, by providing scholarships for students who promise to settle in a

rural area when finally becoming a doctor (Deutschlandfunk, 2022).

Gender Equality

Policy Efforts According to the United Nations Development Program’s Gender Equality
and Commitment
Index (GII), Germany had a relatively low and thereby favorable score of
to Achieving
Gender Equality
0.073 for 2021. A lower score indicates lower inequality on a scale from 0 to
Score: 8 1. The GII measures gender-based inequality across three dimensions:
reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor market. The dimensions of
empowerment and the labor market include women with at least a secondary
education, women’s participation in the labor market, and their share of
parliamentary seats. For context, Denmark had the lowest score at 0.013, while
the world average was 0.465 (UNDP, 2023).

The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth
(BMFSFJ) is generally responsible for gender equality policies. Equality is a
central topic for the ministry, and it is divided into multiple sub-categories,
such as equality in the labor market, violence against women, and equality
policies for boys and men. Some initiatives result from interdepartmental
policy coordination. An example of this is policies on equality in education,
for which the BMFSFJ and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(BMBF) cooperate.

Germany is a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). As a control mechanism for the
convention, countries must regularly submit reports outlining newly adopted
equality and women’s policy measures. Germany’s most recent report,
adopted by the federal cabinet in 2021, addressed 80 questions posed by the
CEDAW committee (BMFSFJ, 2021a).

As of 2020, Germany has implemented a strategy to ensure gender equality,

developed interdepartmentally and published by the BMFSFJ, which
formulates nine goals. These goals primarily focus on ensuring equal career
opportunities, income, and participation in politics, business, and science. This
is achieved, for instance, through the promotion of an equal distribution of
paid work and unpaid care work between women and men. Although these
goals are based on current key figures, the measures proposed by the strategy
do not include specific target values. Nevertheless, the strategy outlines
multiple comprehensive key measures in the form of initiatives or policies to
SGI 2024 | 78 Germany Report

achieve the individual goals. Additionally, the strategy identifies an indicator

to measure progress for each action, such as data from the Federal Statistical
Office (BMFSFJ, 2020).

In line with its strategy, Germany has implemented or planned several policies
to support gender equality. The paragraphs below outline a few exemplary
policies in relevant areas.

Regarding education, Germany has a gender-equitable school system, and

more girls than boys complete school with an upper-secondary education.
However, gender stereotypes still need to be addressed to promote career
diversification and equal opportunities. In recent years, several initiatives, such
as “YouCodeGirls,” “Boy’s Day,” and “Girl’s Day,” were launched, and the
BMBF introduced the “National Pact for Women in STEM Professions” to
increase the number of women in STEM occupations (BMFSFJ, 2023a).

For the year 2022, 46.7% of the total labor force were women, which is above
the global share of 39.5% (World Bank, 2023). However, unequal treatment
still becomes apparent in issues such as the gender pay gap. There are policies
in place to promote women’s participation and equal treatment in the labor
market. For instance, as of 2021, executive boards with more than two
members must include at least one woman. Nonetheless, this policy affects
only 66 companies, of which 21 do not have women on their executive boards
(BMFSFJ, 2021).

While a goal of the 2020 strategy is to promote parity in politics, especially in

all parliaments, a corresponding parity act (Paritätsgesetz) in Thuringia was
declared null and void by the Thuringian Constitutional Court. The act
required that candidate lists for state parliamentary elections be filled
alternately by women and men, but it was ruled unconstitutional
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2021).

Lastly, Germany ratified the Istanbul Convention, the most comprehensive

international human rights treaty on preventing and combating violence
against women and domestic violence, in 2017. The convention entered into
force in 2018 (EIGE, 2023). Based on this convention, the BMFSFJ launched
the federal funding program “United against violence against women”
(“Gemeinsam gegen Gewalt an Frauen”). The program aims to expand the
network of support services, improve access to many nationwide help services,
and educate about the various forms of violence (BMFSFJ, 2023a). In
November 2023, the Federal Minister for Family Affairs proposed a new
violence aid act set to enter into force in the current legislative period. The
draft law plans the creation of the legal right to protection and counseling in
SGI 2024 | 79 Germany Report

cases of gender-specific and domestic violence (Zeit, 2023). Additionally, as

of November 2023, the federal government is working on a national strategy
for protection against violence to implement a measure from the Istanbul
Convention (BMFSFJ, 2023b).

Strong Families

Family Policies According to International Labor Organization (ILO) standards, maternity

Score: 8
leave with a duration of at least 18 weeks, but no less than 14 weeks, is
recommended. While it is also suggested that the cash benefits during
maternity leave should represent the full amount of the income received before
the leave, benefits received should not be less than two-thirds of that income
(WHO, 2023).

Germany’s maternity leave system follows the Maternity Protection Act

(Mutterschutzgesetz). The act pertains to all pregnant and breastfeeding
women in an employment relationship and includes regulations for health and
safety at the workplace, protection from dismissal, and benefits before and
after childbirth. Regarding job protection, women have the right to be
employed under the terms of the contract existing before the pregnancy.
Employers are prohibited from terminating an employment contract from the
beginning of a pregnancy until at least four months after childbirth. In the case
of parental leave, the protection from dismissal is extended until the end of the
registered parental leave. Additionally, employers are banned from preparing
measures for a dismissal once the protection period is over.

The protection periods before and after childbirth are six weeks before and
eight weeks after delivery, ensuring Germany meets the minimum ILO
requirement for maternity leave duration. In cases of premature birth, multiple
birth, or if the child has been diagnosed with a disability, the leave after
delivery can be extended to 12 weeks. During that period, women on maternity
leave are entitled to maternity benefits replacing the full pay received before
the pregnancy (BMFSFJ, 2020).

Maternity leave in Germany lasts 14 weeks, which places the country below
the OECD average of 18.5 weeks and the EU average of 21.1 weeks in 2022
(OECD, 2023).

In addition to maternity leave, both men and women are entitled to request
parental leave from their employer. Parental leave is regulated under the
Federal Parental Allowance and Parental Leave Act (Bundeselterngeld- und
Elternzeitgesetz) and can be taken for up to three years (BMFSFJ, 2020).
SGI 2024 | 80 Germany Report

Parental allowance is paid by the government and is divided into three

different types: the Basic Parental Allowance, Parental Allowance Plus, and
the Partnership Bonus.

The Basic Parental Allowance can be paid for up to 12 months and generally
consists of 65% of the net income before the child’s birth, up to a maximum of
€1,800 per month. Low-income households can receive 100%. Households
with very high incomes (€300,000 joint income) are not eligible. If both
parents take parental leave, this period can be extended to 14 months to
encourage sharing family and household responsibilities.

Parental Allowance Plus, on the other hand, is available to parents who work
part-time during parental leave (up to 32 hours per week) and is paid for twice
as long as the Basic Parental Allowance. However, the benefit is only half of
that of the Basic Parental Allowance. Lastly, parents who work part-time can
also apply for the Partnership Bonus, which is paid for up to five months
(BMFSFJ, 2023a).

Taking parental leave into account, Germany has an average total paid leave of
58 weeks, which is above the OECD average of 50.8 weeks but below the EU
average of 64.6 weeks (OECD, 2023). While the parental leave policies enable
both parents to take parental leave to promote shared responsibilities, in 2022,
only 3% of fathers compared to 45.2% of mothers with children below three
years were on parental leave (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2024).

According to Article 45 of Book Five of the German Social Code, people with
statutory health insurance are entitled to 10 days of sick pay per child if a child
under the age of twelve falls ill. Additionally, as of December 2023, parents
can receive sick leave by telephone if their child falls ill and care is necessary.

Moreover, the Caregiver Leave Act (Familienpflegezeitgesetz) allows

employees up to six months in caregiver leave, with a complete or partial
release from work. This release from work is available for close adult relatives
in need of long-term care, as well as close relatives who are minors. A partial
release from work is possible for up to 24 months. To compensate for income
losses, caregivers can apply for interest-free advances with the Federal Office
for Family and Civil-Social Duties (BMFSFJ, 2019).

As of January 2023, Germany has enacted the KiTa-Qualitätsgesetz, focusing

on the further development of quality and the improvement of participation in
child daycare. The act aims to create equal living conditions for children, with
the federal government planning to invest €4 billion in 2023 and 2024
(BMFSFJ, 2023b).
SGI 2024 | 81 Germany Report

As described in the indicators addressing a sustainable education system,

children aged one to three, as well as three to the beginning of primary school,
have a legal claim to early childhood care based on Article 24 of Book 8 of the
German Social Code – Child and Youth Services. However, childcare is not
free throughout Germany. While certain states, such as Berlin or Hesse, offer
some exemptions from charges for daycare, fees must be paid in other states
(Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2018).

In 2017, average costs for children below the age of three were €1,710, while
parents paid €1,630 on average for children between the ages of three and five
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2021). The overall attendance rate in Germany is
36.4% for children under 3, while 90.9% of children attend daycare from the
ages of three to six (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2023).

A more detailed description of attendance is outlined under “Policies

Targeting Equitable Access to Education,” which shows that, despite not all
children having access to childcare, the German average is still above the
OECD average.

Financial support for children in Germany to assist families mainly consists of

the child benefit (Kindergeld) and the supplementary child allowance
(Kinderzuschlag). Parents who are subject to income tax without restriction
and live in Germany receive a monthly sum of €250 per child. Generally, the
child benefit is paid until the age of 18, or 25 if the child is completing
vocational training or a course of study (BMFSFJ, 2023c).

In addition to the child benefit, employed parents can receive supplementary

child allowance if their income is insufficient for the whole family. This
supplementary allowance includes a monthly benefit of €292 as of January
2024 and offers additional benefits such as coverage for school trips, €195 for
school supplies per school year, or a monthly charge for social or cultural
activities up to €15 (BMFSFJ, 2023d).

In 2020, expenditure on family-children benefits amounted to 3.7% of GDP,

which was above the EU average of 2.5% of GDP (Eurostat, 2023).

Sustainable Pension System

Policies Aimed at Every employee in Germany is automatically part of the statutory pension
Old-Age Poverty
insurance. The amount of payments that pensioners receive is based on the
Prevention
Score: 8
income they earned over the span of their working years. The statutory
pension insurance can be combined with private or company plans. The use of
SGI 2024 | 82 Germany Report

private insurance is partially aided by the government (“Riester-Rente”)

(Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2017).

Pensions are lower for individuals with shorter or non-continuous employment

histories due to the strong link between contributions and pension payments.
However, the pension system offers several measures to prevent poverty in old
age for those who experience interruptions in their work histories. For
instance, periods of unemployment due to illness, caring for family members,
and child-rearing are, under certain conditions, treated similarly to regular
employment. These periods then count toward the pension system, thereby
increasing pension incomes (Bundesregierung, 2023: 4).

For child-rearing, each child is granted an additional pension amount

equivalent to the average contribution payment over three years (two and a
half years if the child was born before 1992) (Deutsche Rentenversicherung,
n.d.A). Parents can also earn extra pension claims beyond the three years
covered if they have low incomes during the first ten years of a child’s life,
such as by working part-time to have more time for child-rearing. In this case,
the income used for pension calculation is 50% higher than the actual income,
without requiring higher contributions (Deutsche Rentenversicherung
Oldenburg-Bremen, 2018).

When an individual cares for a family member, friend, or neighbor requiring

high-maintenance care and, as a result, works less than full-time, the
compulsory long-term care insurance, under specific circumstances, pays
additional pension contributions (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, n.d.B).

Self-employed individuals are not automatically part of the statutory pension

system, although they may apply for membership. There are plans to make the
statutory pension system compulsory for the self-employed as well
(Bundesregierung 2023: 4).

The average net income of a single pensioner per month is approximately

€1,700 in West Germany and approximately €1,550 in the eastern part of the
country. This is more than three times higher than the Bürgergeld, the German
long-term unemployment benefit (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales,
2023a, p. 22). In 2020, expenditures on pensions amounted to 12.6% of
Germany’s gross domestic product, which is slightly lower than the EU
average of 13.6% (Eurostat, 2023).

However, employees in non-standard employment, low-paying jobs, or with

interrupted employment histories may face much lower pensions than the
average. If the pension is insufficient to ensure a dignified life, there are
SGI 2024 | 83 Germany Report

several additional aids available for senior citizens. The base pension
(Grundrente) provides supplemental income on top of the normal pension for
seniors who have worked for a long time in underpaid jobs and are therefore
not eligible for a higher pension. Seniors with low incomes may also benefit
from “Wohngeld,” a government-funded aid for low-income households
struggling to pay their rent (Bundesregierung, 2023, p. 4).

The guaranteed minimum pension for seniors (Grundsicherung im Alter) is a

safety net for people above the statutory retirement age whose pension
incomes are too low to cover basic subsistence needs. It is designed to ensure
that every senior can live in dignity, much like the Bürgergeld, the German
long-term unemployment benefit, does for working-age individuals. The
guaranteed minimum pension for seniors is thus a social welfare benefit and is
not linked to statutory pension insurance (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und
Soziales, 2023b).

Policies The statutory retirement age in Germany is 67, but individuals have the option
Targeting
to retire earlier or later. Most people can retire as early as age 63, although this
Intergenerational
Equity
results in reduced pensions for the rest of their lives (Deutsche
Score: 5 Rentenversicherung, n.d.A). Conversely, it is possible to work beyond the
usual retirement age, with each additional month of work increasing the
monthly pension payments by 0.5%. Seniors can draw their pension while still
working (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, n.d.B). Continuing to work after early
retirement is also an option, with job income not limiting or reducing pension
payments (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2023: 4).

Additionally, the statutory pension insurance covers individuals who are not
old enough to retire but are unable to work due to health reasons or can only
work a limited number of hours. If the insured person is determined to be able
to work a few hours per week, they are required to do so and receive reduced
pension payments while also earning job income. Eligibility requires that the
person has been insured for at least five years, with contributions paid for at
least three of those years (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, n.d.C).

The German statutory pension insurance is financed by contributions from

employers and employees, along with government grants. In 2020, receipts
consisted of approximately €250 billion in contributions and about €75 billion
in grants. The underlying principle is a pay-as-you-go system, meaning that
each year’s revenue covers that same year’s expenditures. Without the
government grants, the insurance would incur losses annually (Bundeszentrale
für politische Bildung, 2022). The imbalance between contributions and
payments is expected to grow in the coming decades due to the retirement of
SGI 2024 | 84 Germany Report

the baby boomer generation and increased life expectancies (Deutschlandfunk,

2022).

The statutory pension insurance can be supplemented with private or company

plans. The use of private insurance has been subsidized by the government
since 2002 under the “Riester-Rente” scheme, which was made more generous
in 2018. The goal is to reduce Germany’s reliance on the pay-as-you-go
pension system. Slightly fewer than 10.5 million people participated in the
program in 2020, costing the government around €4 billion (BMF, 2023).

The German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat, SVR) calls

for a reform of the German pension system to stabilize funding and address
demographic changes. Without reform, there is a risk of lower pensions,
leading to a higher risk of poverty among seniors, combined with higher future
contributions (Sachverständigenrat, 2023). Proposed solutions to address the
demographic challenge include raising the retirement age, increasing
contributions, reducing pension payments, or providing additional government
grants (Deutschlandfunk, 2022).

Furthermore, a public pension fund is planned, with financial resources to be

invested in assets, generating revenue to address the pension insurance’s future
financing problems. However, it is still unclear where the money for the fund
will come from and how much relief the fund and its revenue can provide
(Deutschlandfunk, 2023).

Sustainable Inclusion of Migrants

Integration Policy Regarding labor market mobility for migrants, the Migration Integration
Score: 7
Policy Index (MIPEX) rated Germany with a value of 81 for 2019, ranking the
country fifth out of 56. Thus, the MIPEX considers Germany’s labor market
policies favorable for promoting equal-quality employment over the long term.
This means the index recognizes Germany for promoting equal rights,
opportunities to access jobs, and the improvement of skills (MIPEX, 2020).

Germany’s migration regulations must be divided into those for EU member

states and those for non-EU countries. Since EU citizens enjoy freedom of
movement, they are not subject to any restrictions when working in Germany
(The Federal Government, 2019). Therefore, the following policies and
regulations concern immigrants from non-EU member states only.

Germany is among the countries with the lowest restrictions on the

immigration of skilled workers. The Immigration Act for Skilled Workers
SGI 2024 | 85 Germany Report

(Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz) provides the legal framework, defining

skilled workers as individuals with a university degree or qualified vocational
training of at least two years. Migrants with vocational training can obtain
residence and work permits, allowing them to work in any profession they are
qualified for, provided they have an employment contract and a salary
equivalent to that of a German employee.

Skilled workers with a university degree can receive an EU Blue Card.

Applicants must provide a university degree comparable to a German
university degree and have a binding employment contract with a gross annual
salary of at least €58,400 as of 2023. For occupations experiencing a shortage
of employees, such as doctors, this minimum salary decreases to €45,552 per
year (BMI, 2023).

The previously outlined favorable MIPEX score for Germany’s labor market
mobility policies is largely due to improved procedures for recognizing foreign
qualifications and skills. This implies effective recognition procedures.
Moreover, the MIPEX cites targeted support measures for immigrants as a
strength in German labor market policy (MIPEX, 2020).

The German government offers different types of language courses. For

professional purposes, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees provides
free vocational language courses (Berufssprachkurse) that can be combined
with vocational qualifications or work placements (internships). The courses
start at a B1 language level; therefore, existing language skills are a
prerequisite and can be acquired through an integration course
(Integrationskurs). These integration courses consist of a language course and
an orientation module (BMI, 2021).

Nevertheless, in 2021, a lack of language skills was an obstacle for obtaining a

suitable job for 458,400 migrants, while for 369,200 immigrants, the obstacle
lay in the lack of recognition of their qualifications (Eurostat, 2023a).

Regarding training programs, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research

(BMBF) offers the Career Orientation for Refugees program (BOF). The BOF
lasts up to 26 weeks and is designed to help young immigrants and refugees
find training positions through workshops and practical experience. According
to the BMBF, participants receive individual support throughout the program.
However, the BOF is relatively small, with classes limited to a maximum of
twelve participants (BMBF, 2023).

In 2022, the employment rate of migrants was 69.8% compared to the OECD
average of 71%, with an unemployment rate of 5.6%, which was below the
SGI 2024 | 86 Germany Report

OECD average of 7.6%. Compared to 2021, the employment rate increased by

1.5% while the unemployment rate decreased by 0.9%. However, compared to
native-born individuals, the employment rate for migrants was 9.1% lower
while the unemployment rate was 3% higher. Additionally, in 2021, 58.7% of
long-term or permanent immigrants migrated to Germany due to free mobility,
10.7% were labor migrants, 16.2% were family members, and 13.1% were
humanitarian migrants (OECD, 2023).

Children of foreigners born in Germany acquire German citizenship if one of

their parents has lived in Germany legally for eight years and possesses a
permanent residence permit. Foreigners living in Germany can obtain
citizenship by fulfilling specific requirements (see below). While Germany’s
naturalization rate increased by 28% from 2021 to 2022 (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2024), the country’s naturalization rate for 2021 was considerably
below the EU average, with a percentage of 1.2% compared to 2.2% (Eurostat,
2023b).

With an allocated value of 42, the MIPEX index ranks access to citizenship in
Germany as only halfway favorable and describes the naturalization process as
clear but demanding. Additionally, Germany has a general ban on dual
citizenship (except for EU members and Switzerland and for people born and
raised in Germany who have two citizenships at birth), which contributes to
low naturalization rates (MIPEX, 2020).

Under current law, immigrants must have lived in Germany for eight years
before applying for citizenship. Naturalization after six years is possible
through what is referred to as special integration achievements, such as
particularly good language skills or civic engagement. A draft law from 2023
proposed shortening the minimum residence time from eight to five years and
to up to three years in cases of special integration achievements. Further, the
draft suggests enabling multiple citizenships in general (BMI, 2023b).

Political participation for immigrants regarding voting in Germany is related to

the naturalization process since only German citizens (and EU citizens in
municipal and European elections) have the right to vote in Germany. Given
the low naturalization rate, 47% of people with a migration background –
around 10.6 million – did not have German citizenship in 2021, rendering
them unable to vote (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2022). Nevertheless, due to
existing policies to consult and support immigrant civil society, political
participation is still considered slightly favorable by the MIPEX, with a score
of 60 (MIPEX, 2020).
SGI 2024 | 87 Germany Report

Generally, family reunification is possible if skilled workers intend to stay in

Germany for over one year. If the marriage occurs after the move to Germany,
the spouse can only come to Germany two years later. The circumstances are
more favorable for highly qualified migrants and immigrants with an EU Blue
Card as exceptions exist in this case (BMI, 2023). Through the Opportunity
Residence Act (Chancen-Aufenthaltsrecht), introduced in 2022, the
requirement that spouses provide a language certificate no longer exists.
According to MIPEX, Germany’s family reunification policies are more
restrictive than those of most Western OECD countries. Therefore, with a
score of 42, the index rates Germany’s family reunification policies as only
halfway favorable (MIPEX, 2020). However, as the index was created for
2019, it does not take into account the changes brought about by the
Opportunity Residence Act.

According to the MIPEX, Germany’s education policies regarding migrants

are moderately favorable, with a score of 55, ranking it as the 15th country.
The index indicates that Germany has made partial progress in addressing
specific needs and opportunities at all school levels (MIPEX, 2020). As
education is regulated by the states, the support schools offer varies across
different states. In Hesse, for instance, measures such as language assessments
and an overall language promotion concept exist, including mandatory
preparatory German courses (Staatliche Schulämter in Hessen, n.d.).

Both the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS) and the
Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community (BMI) are responsible for
migration policies. However, while cooperation is necessary in some aspects,
the BMI mainly focuses on broader migration subjects such as citizenship and
asylum and refugee protection. In contrast, the BMAS deals with issues related
to migrants and their access to the labor market.

The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), an authority of the
BMI, is responsible for executing policies related to the integration of
immigrants and processing asylum applications. The Federal Employment
Agency, the respective authority for the BMAS, handles tasks such as
recognizing qualifications and providing employment consultation.

Additionally, the federal government has a Commissioner for Refugees,

Immigrant and Migration.

Finally, it is not clear whether the government has established target values for
supporting immigrants. The BAMF, however, published a report on migration
and integration in 2022, monitoring educational and labor migration.
SGI 2024 | 88 Germany Report

Effective Capacity-Building for Global Poverty Reduction

Management of As of 2015, Germany has had a Sustainable Development Strategy (GSDS),

Development
which was updated in 2021. The strategy outlines the framework for the
Cooperation by
Partner Country
national implementation of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development
Score: 9 with 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). The first goal is to eradicate
poverty, while additional goals, such as ending hunger and ensuring healthy
lives and promoting well-being for all ages, are also connected to poverty
(United Nations, 2015).

The updated GSDS contains 75 indicators in 39 target areas, which were

adapted based on the findings of the 2017 GSDS. To regularly monitor
progress, the Federal Statistical Office reports on the indicators every two
years. Additionally, the 2021 GSDS details the implementation status of the
different development targets (Federal Government, 2020).

In addition to the Sustainable Development Strategy, the Federal Ministry for

Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has published multiple
development strategies since the start of the new legislative period.
Specifically, there are three core area strategies: a strategy for sustainable agri-
food systems, a strategy for health, social security, and population dynamics,
and a strategy for sustainable economic development, education, and
employment. In addition, the BMZ developed individual strategies for Africa,
Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia that include all relevant fields of
action for the region. These strategies are not binding.

The core area strategy “Sustainable Agri-Foods Systems: A World Without

Hunger,” for instance, includes goals in food and nutrition security,
agriculture, and rural development. Particularly, the goal of promoting rural
development involves aims such as fighting poverty in rural areas by ensuring
secure employment and income opportunities and creating infrastructure for
the general public. While the strategy does not outline specific measures in
terms of concrete initiatives or policies, it identifies several overall targets for
capacity-building, such as securing legitimate land rights and ensuring equal
access to land to strengthen rural governance. The strategy further includes
twelve standard indicators that can be used to monitor the results of programs
or projects in line with the strategy’s goals (BMZ, 2021).

While there is no information on the frequency of government monitoring

progress, reports and evaluations are published by the BMZ or by the German
Institute for Development Evaluation. Evaluation reports follow the BMZ
Evaluation Policy, which outlines the guidelines for evaluating German
development cooperation (BMZ, 2023a).
SGI 2024 | 89 Germany Report

Germany’s net official development assistance (ODA) has steadily increased

since 2018, rising from 0.6% of gross national income (GNI) to 0.8% of GNI
in 2022, compared to an average of 0.37% for all countries in the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2022. In addition to this
continuous increase in ODA relative to GNI, Germany is the second-largest
net contributor to the DAC, with a contribution of $37,918 million for 2022
(OECD, 2024). Furthermore, the 2021 coalition agreement pledged to continue
fulfilling a minimum ODA rate of 0.7% of GNI, allocating 0.2% to the least-
developed countries (SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and FDP, 2021). Based on
these pledges, the development assistance flows can be considered predictable.

The existing cooperation policies support capacity-building for poverty

reduction. The 2021 report on the implementation of the Agenda 2030 details
which policies were enacted to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). For example, to meet the goal of ending poverty, Germany supported
the development of social security systems such as basic insurance and health
insurance. In Malawi, Germany assisted with the introduction of directly
receivable Social Cash Transfers. Nevertheless, according to the report,
development is progressing but still falls short of the target for ending poverty
by 5 to 10% (Bundesregierung, 2021).

Considering the German government’s provision of technology access, the

BMZ supports multiple programs and initiatives. For example, the special
initiative “Transformation of Agricultural and Food Systems” aids in the
development of sustainable and resource-conserving cultivation and
processing technologies, particularly for smallholder farmers. These
technologies include more targeted irrigation and machinery adapted to local
conditions. The initiative encompasses around 300 projects and supports five
knowledge centers for organic farming to facilitate knowledge-sharing and
foster innovation in developing countries (BMZ, 2023b).

In scientific knowledge, the DAAD project “SDG Partnerships,” funded by the

BMZ, promotes the expansion of educational capacities by improving
teaching, research, and higher education management at partner institutions. In
the long term, the program aims to develop sustainable higher education
institutions in partner countries. As of 2023, 34 projects were funded for the
period from 2023 to 2026 (DAAD, 2023).

Germany is a participant in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and

Malaria (GFATM) concerning the provision of healthcare and medicine. The
fund finances national measures against these three illnesses and aims to build
the capacity of recipient countries. As of 2022, Germany contributed €4.6
SGI 2024 | 90 Germany Report

billion to the fund and pledged another €1.3 billion for 2023 – 2025 (The
Global Fund, 2023).

According to the 2021 report on implementing Agenda 2030 in Germany, out

of nine indicators for the SGI goal of ensuring healthy lives and well-being,
five targets are estimated to be reached or almost reached. However, the
indicators for premature mortality in both men and women are developing in
the right direction but are expected to miss the target by 20%
(Bundesregierung, 2021).

III. Environmental Sustainability

Effective Climate Action

Policy Efforts Germany’s climate protection policy consists of three main pillars: the Federal
and Commitment
Climate Change Act (Klimaschutzgesetz), the Climate Action Plan 2050
to Achieving
Climate
(Klimaschutzplan 2050), and climate protection programs.
Neutrality by
2050 The Federal Climate Change Act forms the legal framework for climate
Score: 8 policy. Enacted in 2019, the act makes climate targets legally binding, defining
both overall climate action goals and annual emission limits for individual
sectors. It outlines procedures for monitoring and compliance and includes
mechanisms for readjustment. Following a 2021 ruling by the Federal
Constitutional Court, the targets were intensified: the act now aims for net
climate neutrality by 2045 and a reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) by at
least 65% by 2030 and 88% by 2040, compared to 1990 levels. The annual
emission volumes for each sector were also adjusted (BMWK, 2023a).

The Climate Action Plan 2050, introduced in 2016, is Germany’s long-term

climate protection strategy following the adoption of the Paris Agreement.
Although initially based on achieving climate neutrality by 2050, it outlines
the federal government’s climate policy goals and principles, encompassing
environmental, economic, and social dimensions. The plan addresses all
relevant sectors: energy, building and transportation, industry, and agriculture
and forestry.

Each sector has a specific action plan within the Climate Action Plan, detailing
both general targets and sector-specific measures. For instance, the forestry
sector focuses on GHG sequestration through land use, while the energy sector
targets the expansion of renewable energy. The building sector aims to
SGI 2024 | 91 Germany Report

promote sustainable construction through increased use of sustainable

materials. These action plans include concrete milestones to be achieved by
2030, serving as indicators to measure the overall success of the measures
(BMUB, 2016).

The third component, climate protection programs, establish concrete

measures to achieve climate targets. The latest program, the Climate
Protection Program 2023, was adopted by the cabinet in October 2023.
Developed to address a gap of 200 million tons of CO2 equivalents between
2022 and 2030, the program aims to reduce this gap by 80% through
comprehensive policies.

The program includes specific measures for the energy, building, industry,
transportation, and agriculture sectors. For example, the building sector plans
to introduce a heat planning act to nationalize heat planning and decarbonize
heating networks. The agricultural sector aims to expand organic farming and
develop climate- and animal-friendly livestock practices. For transportation,
measures include strengthening and digitalizing Deutsche Bahn’s network and
expanding railway capacity.

It is anticipated that the current climate protection gap can be closed by 2030
through measures in the electricity and agricultural sectors and significantly
reduced in the building sector. However, the program indicates that further
action is needed in the transportation sector despite the proposed measures
(BMWK, 2023b).

Compliance with the Federal Climate Change Act is not reviewed by the
courts but is monitored by the Federal Environment Agency
(Umweltbundesamt), which annually calculates emission data for each sector
and publishes it in March of the following year. An independent council of
experts reviews this data, monitors progress, and reports its evaluation to the
Bundestag (Die Bundesregierung, 2019).

The Climate Change Performance Index ranks Germany 14th out of 63

countries and the EU for 2024, with a score of 65.8, indicating high
performance. While Germany has adopted multiple policies to accelerate the
expansion of renewable energy, the building and transport sectors are still
falling short of their targets. Nevertheless, Germany’s performance has
improved compared to the previous year (CCPI, 2023a; CCPI, 2023b).

Various strategies contribute to achieving net-zero emissions. The Federal

Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) introduced the
System Development Strategy to establish a climate-neutral energy system by
SGI 2024 | 92 Germany Report

2045. This initiative includes a cross-sectoral mission statement and a strategy

for transforming the energy system (BMWK, 2023b). Additionally, the
Federal Action Plan on Nature-based Solutions for Climate and Biodiversity
promotes soil preservation to protect its significant role in GHG sequestration
(BMUV, 2023).

The federal administration plans to be climate neutral by 2030, making

environmentally friendly public procurement crucial. Article 13, Paragraph 2,
of the Federal Climate Change Act states that the federal government must
align investment planning, selection, and implementation with the climate
targets set by the act.

It is unclear whether the central government can intervene at lower political

levels if effective implementation is endangered or if ministries monitor
implementation. However, the National Climate Initiative (NKI) supports
climate action in companies and municipalities through diverse projects and
network initiatives. According to the NKI, over 1,150 companies and
municipalities are involved in these networks, and around 42 projects were
carried out from 2016 to 2020 (NKI, 2021).

Effective Environmental Health Protection

Policy Efforts Germany does not have a comprehensive strategy to prevent environmental
and Commitment
pollution. However, separate strategies, programs, or plans have been
to Minimizing
Environmental
developed for air, water, and soil pollution, some of which operate at the
Health Risks European level. While the strategies themselves are not legally binding, the
Score: 8 actions proposed to achieve their goals often include the introduction of new
legislation or the adaptation of existing laws, which are then binding.

Regarding air pollution, Germany is required to submit a National Air

Pollution Control Program (NAPCP) to the European Commission every four
years as part of the EU’s National Emissions Reduction Commitments (NEC)
directive. Based on the percentage emissions reduction commitments defined
by the NEC directive for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides (NO2), ammonia,
non-methane volatile organic compounds, and fine particulate matter smaller
than 2.5 micrometers (PM2.5), the NAPCP must include a With Measures
Scenario (WM) and a NEC Compliance Scenario (WAM).

In this context, a scenario refers to the compilation of strategies and measures

and their effect on pollutants. Specifically, the WM is meant to include
measures that have already been adopted, while the WAM contains strategies
and measures aimed at meeting the emissions reduction commitments in the
event of noncompliance.
SGI 2024 | 93 Germany Report

As the NEC directive prescribes specific percentages by which pollutants must

be reduced, the NAPCP aims to achieve clearly defined goals. By requiring the
program to be published every four years, the directive also provides a
mechanism for monitoring progress. The key indicators for measuring
outcomes are whether the goals specified in the directive are met.

Since the goals are based on an EU directive, the measures must be codified
into national law in order to be binding. Germany passed its first NAPCP in
2019 and, as of June 2023, a draft for the second program exists. The 2019
program outlines how effectively the existing measures contribute to meeting
the reduction commitments for each pollutant and what additional measures
should be implemented to address any shortfall (BMUV, 2019). Overall,
Germany’s NAPCP considers 23 policies and measures for adoption and has
adopted 21. For example, the reduction of coal-fired power generation is listed
as an effective measure for sulfur dioxide and PM2.5 reduction (Kaar and
Menadue, 2022).

The increasing pressure from droughts and their impact on forests, agriculture,
and biodiversity prompted the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation, Nuclear Safety, and Consumer Protection (BMUV) to present
the National Water Strategy in 2023. Although this strategy focuses on
ensuring the responsible use of available water resources, it also addresses
health risks associated with water pollution. In support of the EU’s zero
pollution plan, the BMUV’s strategy aims to achieve zero pollutants by 2050.

The strategy includes a program of water measures to operationalize the

National Water Strategy, making it comprehensive. For water pollution, the
proposed measures include the implementation of EU directives from the zero
pollution action plan and the introduction of a limit value in the Groundwater
Ordinance (Grundwasserverordnung) for medicinal products in ground water
(BMUV, 2023).

The implementation progress of the National Water Strategy is monitored

every six years by an interministerial work group with state participation. The
working group will submit a report using the implementation status of the
measures set out in the programs as indicators to measure the outcome of the
goals (BMUV, 2023).

Finally, Germany does not have a separate national strategy to address soil
pollution. The federal government, however, acknowledged the need for
European soil protection in its coalition agreement, thereby supporting the
EU’s soil strategy for 2030. While the soil strategy, similar to the National
SGI 2024 | 94 Germany Report

Water Strategy, focuses on the overall soil ecosystem and its health, the
reduction of soil pollution harmful to human health is one of the long-term
objectives of the strategy (European Commission, 2021).

Generally, existing policies support efforts targeting environmental health. For

air pollution, according to the European Environment Agency, Germany met
the reduction commitments in both 2020 and 2021. Simultaneously, 0% of the
population was exposed to PM2.5, 0.2% to NO2, and 0.4% to an ozone (O3)
concentration above the EU standard. While this suggests a strong
commitment to protecting the public from health risks due to air pollution, the
European Environment Agency still lists around 45,000 deaths per year that
are attributable to either PM2.5, NO2, or O3 (European Environment Agency,
2023). Additionally, the WHO recommends values significantly below the
permitted maximum value for PM2.5 and NO3. Thus, the EU’s limit value for
PM2.5 is 25 micrograms per cubic meter and 40 micrograms for NO3, while
the WHO recommends reducing these values to five micrograms for PM2.5
and ten micrograms for NO3 (Tagesschau, 2022).

Regarding the previous question, it is not possible to make an informed

statement on whether ministries can efficiently monitor implementation or
intervene if effective implementation is endangered.

Effective Ecosystem and Biodiversity Preservation

Policy Efforts In March 2023, Germany introduced the Federal Action Plan on Nature-based
and Commitment
Solutions for Climate and Biodiversity (Aktionsprogramm Natürlicher
to Preserving
Ecosystems and
Klimaschutz, ANK), previously mentioned in P 17. Of the ten fields of action
Protecting to protect the climate and biodiversity, five specifically target the preservation
Biodiversity of ecosystems and biodiversity, each with its own action plan that details
Score: 8 measures and goals. For each measure, the ANK outlines its aim and purpose
and the plans the government has made to achieve it (BMUV, 2023).

The first three fields focus on the protection of intact peatlands, the water
balance of rivers, lakes, and floodplains, and seas and coasts. Protection of
intact peatlands includes the implementation of the federal state target
agreement on climate change mitigation through peat soil conservation and the
National Peatland Protection Strategy from 2022. While marine and coastal
ecosystems are a field of action, the measures mainly focus on protecting and
restoring plant ecosystems to ensure carbon sequestration. The topic of
overfishing is not addressed.
SGI 2024 | 95 Germany Report

The fourth and fifth fields describe measures planned to protect wilderness and
protected areas and conserve forest ecosystems, which can sequester large
quantities of greenhouse gases and are crucial for biodiversity conservation.
With measures for protected areas and forests, Germany aims to expand the
covered areas, following the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 (BMUV,
2023). These measures do not include policies to prevent poaching or the
trafficking of protected flora and fauna species.

To date, the Federal Action Plan is not subject to concrete monitoring efforts.
However, the government aims to develop and implement a biodiversity
monitoring plan to identify and quantify the effects of the Action Plan on
biodiversity conservation in Germany. Additionally, the plan includes
measures to monitor individual ecosystems, such as water balance analyses
and soil quality monitoring (BMUV, 2023a).

The restoration of degraded soils and the goal of ensuring sustainable food
production systems and resilient agricultural practices are not included in the
Action Plan. However, the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL)
published the Organic Farming Strategy 2030 (Bio-Strategie 2030) in 2023.
The main goal of this strategy is to achieve 30% organic farming by 2030,
based on the premise that organic farming is more resource-efficient,
environmentally friendly, and sustainable compared to conventional
agricultural practices. This contributes to biodiversity conservation, reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions, and increased autonomy by requiring less fossil
energy.

With 30 individual measures allocated to six fields of action, the Organic

Farming Strategy includes extensive measures such as promoting biological
and genetic diversity in the agricultural landscape, crops, and livestock.
According to the BMEL, interim and final evaluations will be published in
2026 and 2030, using the implementation status of the measures as indicators.
Additionally, the ministry will continuously monitor and report on the
implementation (BMEL, 2023b).

Both the Organic Farming Strategy and the Federal Action Plan outline
comprehensive policies for their respective goals. However, while the
respective ministries formulate the plans and strategies and the government
aims to commit to these measures and reach the determined goals, they are not
legally binding.

To mitigate issues arising from policy delegation, the Federal Action Plan
intends to foster close cooperation between the federal government and the
states. For example, in peat soil conservation, a permanent federal-state
SGI 2024 | 96 Germany Report

committee will be established to monitor and coordinate implementation,

addressing regional issues. Additionally, the federal government plans to
create voluntary alliances with states, municipalities, and private forest owners
to implement a logging ban in old-growth forests.

Beyond the Organic Farming Strategy and the Federal Action Plan, multiple
policies and programs support ecosystem and biodiversity protection. Since
2007, Germany has had the National Strategy for Biodiversity (Nationale
Strategie zur Biologischen Vielfalt), which includes around 330 goals and 430
measures concerning biodiversity (BMUV, 2023b). Moreover, the Federal
Nature Conservation Act (Bundesnaturschutzgesetz, BNatSchG) includes
regulations on the protection of wild fauna and flora (Article 37ff.) as well as
on marine nature conservation (Article 56ff.).

However, in 2019, the indicator for species diversity and landscape quality by
the German Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt) reached only 75.3%,
falling short of the target value of 100% for 2030. This highlights a
considerable need for development in biodiversity (Umweltbundesamt, 2023).
Another indicator for the success of ecosystem preservation policies in
Germany is the Ocean Health Index (OHI), which scored Germany with 88
points out of 100 for 2020, placing the country above the global average of 72
points. The two main issues identified by the index are clean water and
fisheries, the latter not being included in the Federal Action Plan (Ocean
Health Index, 2020).

Effective Contributions to Global Environmental Protection

Policy Efforts Germany is part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
and Commitment
Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, which provide the framework
to a Global
Environmental
for its climate foreign policy. With a participation rate of 1.0, Germany,
Policy alongside Finland, has the highest participation rate in global and regional
Score: 9 multilateral environmental agreements.

In 2023, coinciding with the UN Climate Change Conference, Germany

adopted its first environmental cooperation strategy, the Strategy on Climate
Foreign Policy (Klimaaußenpolitik-Strategie, KAP). While not legally
binding, the strategy defines specific fields of action and instruments,
signaling Germany’s commitment as a reliable and supportive partner
(BMUV, 2023).
SGI 2024 | 97 Germany Report

The KAP focuses on six areas, including reducing global GHG emissions by
2030, ensuring climate justice, and protecting, promoting, and restoring the
sustainable use of ecosystems. Capacity-building targets are a substantial part
of the strategy. For instance, the KAP calls for tripling installed renewable
energy capacities and doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvement. It
pledges to work with partner countries to advance renewable energies and
enhance energy efficiency (Die Bundesregierung, 2023).

Germany acknowledges that as a member of the G20, it is part of a group

responsible for around 80% of global emissions while also benefiting from
high economic output. Consequently, the strategy emphasizes the particular
responsibility of G20 countries, including Germany, to implement ambitious
climate policies. It also addresses “climate justice,” highlighting that states and
communities in Africa and small island developing states are especially
affected by climate change. Germany addresses some of the resulting spillover
effects (Die Bundesregierung, 2023).

Existing cooperation policies support capacity-building and skills development

for global environmental protection. For example, based on the commitment in
the Paris Agreement to Nationally Determined Contributions (Nationale
Klimabeiträge, NDCs), the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ) and BMUV initiated the NDC Partnership in 2016. The
main objective of the NDC Partnership is to promote the implementation of
the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
through coordinated bilateral and multilateral donor programs (BMZ, 2023a).
Additionally, through the International Climate Initiative (IKI), the BMUV,
BMWK, and Federal Foreign Office support measures helping partner
countries adapt to climate change or restore natural carbon sinks. From 2008
to 2022, with funding of almost €6 billion, the IKI has approved over 950
climate and biodiversity projects globally in more than 150 countries (IKI,
2023).

Germany is the EU member state committed to paying the highest amount

toward the international $100 billion climate finance commitment under the
UNFCCC in 2021, contributing €7,844 million. For reference, France, the
second-highest contributor, committed €5,781 million (Eurostat, 2022).

One example of government contribution is a joint funding project in Kenya

and Senegal by the BMZ, the Green Climate Fund, and partner governments.
Since a majority of the population in Kenya and Senegal cook using biomass
(firewood, charcoal, and plant residues), releasing significant greenhouse
gases, the project aims to provide improved stoves as low-carbon cooking
techniques. The objective is to promote the capacity of a market for efficient
SGI 2024 | 98 Germany Report

cooking technologies and increase the capabilities of both the supply and
demand sides. The BMZ, as a main donor, contributed €1.5 billion from 2020
to 2023 (BMZ, 2023b).

Germany also supports technologies for positive environmental development,

primarily through financial assistance rather than direct transfer and
dissemination of technologies. For example, the German government and the
KfW Group created the PtX Development Fund to promote the use of green
hydrogen in developing countries as an energy carrier, enabling access to that
technology. According to the KAP, the German government plans to invest
€270 million into the fund (Die Bundesregierung, 2023).

As Germany’s first Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy, the KAP has not yet
undergone evaluations to monitor progress in capacity-building in recipient
countries. However, an evaluation of bilateral cooperation is planned for the
end of 2024 to adapt the strategy accordingly. Indicators will assess whether
and how well measures were implemented (Die Bundesregierung, 2023).
Additionally, mandated by the BMZ, the German Institute for Development
Evaluations analyzes development cooperation activities and measures,
including those for global environmental sustainability (DEval, 2023).
SGI 2024 | 99 Germany Report

Citations
Executive Summary
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. 2024. “Politbarometer – Langzeitentwicklung – Wichtigste Probleme in Deutschland I.”
https://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Langzeitentwicklung_-
_Themen_im_Ueberblick/Politik_II/9_Probleme_1_1.xlsx

Free and Fair Political Competition

BPB. 2014. “https://www.bpb.de/system/files/dokument_pdf/Wahlvorschl%C3%A4ge.pdf”
Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat (BMI). 2023. “Parteifinanzierung.”
https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/parteienrecht/parteienfinanzierung/parteienfinanzierung.html
Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat. 2023. “Parteifinanzierung.”
https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/parteienrecht/parteienfinanzierung/parteienfinanzierung.html
Bundeswahlleiterin. 2021. “www.bundeswahlleiterin.de”
OSCE. 2022. Federal Republic of Germany. Elections to the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) 26 September 2021. ODIHR Election Expert
Team Final Report, 16 March. Available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/3/514048.pdf
OSCE. 2023. “Federal Republic of Germany: Re-Run of Elections to the Berlin House of Representatives and District Assemblies.”
9-12 January 2023. Available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/a/536410.pdf
Ruttloff, D. et al. 2023. “Desinformation, Hassrede und Fake News – Wie viel Negativität verbreiteten die Parteien im Wahlkampf auf
Social Media?” In Korte, KR., Schiffers, M., von Schuckmann, A., Plümer, S., eds., Die Bundestagswahl 2021. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35758-0_22-1
Zimmermann, F., and M. Kohring. 2020. “Mistrust, Disinforming News, and Vote Choice: A Panel Survey on the Origins and
Consequences of Believing Disinformation in the 2017 German Parliamentary Election.” Political Communication 37 (2): 215–237.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1686095

Free and Fair Elections

Bundeswahlleiterin. 2021. “Federal Elections Act.” https://bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/dam/jcr/4ff317c1-041f-4ba7-bbbf-
1e5dc45097b3/bundeswahlgesetz_engl.pdf
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2019. “Wahlrechtsausschlüsse für Betreute in allen Angelegenheiten und wegen Schuldunfähigkeit
untergebrachte Straftäter verfassungswidrig.” Pressemitteilung Nr. 13/2019 vom 21. Februar 2019.
BMI, Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat. 2023. “Ablauf der Bundestagswahl.”
https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/wahlrecht/bundestagswahl-ablauf/bundestagswahl-ablauf-node.html
Bundeswahlleiterin. 2021. “Information für Wahlhelfende.” https://bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2021/informationen-
wahlhelfer.html#364debfa-09ab-40a9-913f-dc3b483cf432
Our World in Data. 2022. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/free-and-fair-elections-index?tab=chart&country=~DEU
Varieties of Democracy. 2022. “https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/”

Socially Rooted Party System

Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2017. “Kein Verbot der NPD wegen fehlender Anhaltspunkte für eine erfolgreiche Durchsetzung ihrer
verfassungsfeindlichen Ziele.” Pressemitteilung Nr. 4/2017 vom 17. Januar 2017.
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/bvg17-004.html
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 2021. “Wie funktioniert der Wahl-O-Mat?” https://www.bpb.de/themen/wahl-o-mat/294576/wie-
funktioniert-der-wahl-o-mat/
Deutscher Bundestag. 2013. “Aktueller Begriff Sperrklausel im Wahlrecht, Nr. 48/13.” December 19.
SGI 2024 | 100 Germany Report

Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt. 2023. “Landtagswahlen in Hessen: Vorläufige Ergebnisse.”

https://statistik.hessen.de/presse/landtagswahl-2023-in-hessen-vorlaeufige-ergebnisse
Manifesto Project. 2023. “Manifesto Project Data Dashboard.” https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-
shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/
Niedermayer, O. 2022. “Voraussetzungen, Rechte und Pflichten von Parteien in Deutschland.”
https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/197278/voraussetzungen-rechte-und-pflichten-von-parteien-in-
deutschland/#node-content-title-1
Tagesschau. 2023a. “Abgeordnetenhauswahl 2023.” https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2023-02-12-LT-DE-BE/index.shtml
Tagesschau. 2023b. “Steinmeier unterschreibt Gesetz zur Wahlrechtsreform.” https://www.tagesschau.de/eilmeldung/steinmeier-wahlrecht-
100.html
Tagesschau. 2023. “Bürgerverein klagt gegen Wahlrechtsreform der Ampel.”
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/wahlrechtsreform-sperrklausel-klage-100.html
Statista. 2023. “Ergebnisse der Bundestagswahl am 26. September 2021.” https://de.statista.com/themen/3999/bundestagswahlen-in-
deutschland/#topicOverview
Süddeutsche Zeitung. 2023. “Stimmkreise und Direktmandate: Alle Ergebnisse im Überblick.”
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/landtagswahl-bayern-2023-ergebnisse-csu-afd-die-gruenen-stimmkreise-freie-waehler-1.6278958
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/

Effective Cross-Party Cooperation

Manifesto Project. 2023. “Manifesto Project Data Dashboard.” https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-
shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/
Our World in Data. 2023. “Liberal Democracy Index, Germany, 1789 to 2022.” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/liberal-democracy-
index?tab=chart&yScale=log&country=~DEU
Politbarometer. 2024. “Politbarometer vom 12. Januar 2024.” https://www.zdf.de/politik/politbarometer/240112-politbarometer-video-
100.html
Süddeutsche Zeitung. 2024. “Berliner Grüne fordern Prüfung eines AfD-Verbots.” https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/parteien-berlin-
berliner-gruene-fordern-pruefung-eines-afd-verbots-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-240112-99-585917
Tagesschau. 2023. “AfD in Sachsen ‘gesichert rechtsextremistisch.’” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/verfassungsschutz-afd-
sachsen-rechtsextremistisch-100.html
Tagesschau. 2022. “Ein Urteil und seine möglichen Folgen.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afd-beobachtung-
verfassungsschutz-101.html
Zeit Online. 2023. “Wo es bereits eine Zusammenarbeit mit der AfD gab.” https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2023-07/afd-
zusammenarbeit-kommunaler-ebene-uebersicht#sachsen-anhalt
Zeit Online. 2023. “CDU-Vorstand Mike Mohring ist offen für Gespräche mit der Linken.” https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2023-
07/thueringen-afd-cdu-mike-mohring-linke-koalition-landtag

Transparent Government
BfDI. 2023. Tätigkeitsbericht 2022, 31. Tätigkeitsbericht für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit.
BMI, Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat. 2023. “Informationsfreiheitsgesetz.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/moderne-
verwaltung/open-government/informationsfreiheitsgesetz/informationsfreiheitsgesetz-node.html
Schaar, P. 2019. Freedom of Information and Transparency in Germany. Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit.

Free Media
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. n.d. “Rundfunkbeitrag.” https://www.bpb.de/themen/medien-
journalismus/medienpolitik/500718/rundfunkbeitrag-rundfunkgebuehren/
Deutscher Bundestag. 2007. Medienpolitik in Deutschland: Übersicht über die föderale Kompetenzverteilung einschließlich der
europäischen Medienkompetenzen, WD 10 - 047/07.
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom on the Net 2023, Germany.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-net/2023
Grimberg, S. 2020. “Wie staatsnah ist unser Rundfunk?” https://www.mdr.de/medien360g/medienpolitik/rundfunkbeitrag-einfluss-politik-
100.html
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Human Rights Watch. 2018. “Germany: Flawed Social Media Law.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-
law
Reporter ohne Grenzen. n.d. “Regulierung sozialer Medien.” https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/themen/internetfreiheit/regulierung-
sozialer-medien
Reporter ohne Grenzen. n.d. “Germany.” https://rsf.org/en/country/germany
Reporter ohne Grenzen. 2023. “Rangliste der Pressefreiheit 2023, Nahaufnahme Deutschland.” https://www.reporter-ohne-
grenzen.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Downloads/Ranglisten/Rangliste_2023/RSF_Nahaufnahme_Deutschland_2023.pdf
Brack, G., and Wolf, G. 2023. “Warum wurde der Pressekontakt der ‘Letzten Generation’ abgehört?”
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/regional/bayern/br-warum-wurde-der-pressekontakt-der-letzten-generation-abgehoert-102.html
V-Dem. 2022. “Varieties of Democracy.” https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/
Whistleblower-Netzwerk. 2023. “Die Enttäuschung überwiegt.” https://www.whistleblower-net.de/online-
magazin/2023/03/30/verabschiedung-hinweisgeberschutzgesetz-pm-von-wbn-und-rsf/

Pluralism of Opinions
AFG. 2023. “TV-Daten.” https://www.agf.de/daten/tv-daten
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2014. “Leitsätze, zum Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 25. März 2014.”
https://www.bverfg.de/e/fs20140325_1bvf000111.html
Holznagel, B., and J. C. Kalbhenn. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the
European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Germany.
European University Institute.
KEK. 2023. “Auftrag.” https://www.kek-online.de/ueber-uns/auftrag
Deutscher Bundestag. 2006. “Der öffentlich-rechtliche Rundfunk im 21. Jahrhundert.”
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/413880/8e316e93e801051f0b69e7d151052fba/WD-10-029-06-pdf-data.pdf
Statista. 2023. “Auflagenstruktur der Tageszeitungen in Deutschland im 2. Quartal 2022 und 2. Quartal 2023.”
https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/382058/umfrage/auflagenstruktur-der-tageszeitungen/
Stark, B., and D. Stegmann. 2021. “Vielfaltssicherung im Zeitalter von Medienintermediären.” bidt Working Paper Nr. 3.
https://www.bidt.digital/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/08/bidt_Working-Paper_Vielfaltssicherung.pdf
ZDF. 2023. “Vertrauen in die Glaubwürdigkeit der Berichterstattung von ARD und ZDF, ZDF-Politbarometer.”
https://www.zdf.de/zdfunternehmen/medienforschung-studien-122.html
V-Dem, Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/

Free Civil Society

Bundesverwaltungsgericht. 2023. “Untersagung von Versammlungen durch die Sächsische Corona-Schutz-Verordnung vom 17. April 2020
war unverhältnismäßig.” Pressemitteilung Nr. 49/2023, 21.06.2023.
BMI. 2023. “Versammlungsrecht.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/staatliche-
ordnung/versammlungsrecht/versammlungsrecht-node.html
Grasnick, B. 2023. “Die Definitionsmacht der Polizei.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/gesellschaft/polizeigewalt-studie-100.html
World Justice Project. 2022. “Germany, Fundamental Rights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-
index/country/2022/Germany/Fundamental%20Rights/

Effective Civil Society Organizations (Capital and Labor)

Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1949. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. n.d. “Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB).” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-
knapp/lexika/politiklexikon/17341/deutscher-gewerkschaftsbund-dgb/
Deutschlandfunk. 2023. “Warum in Deutschland viel weniger gestreikt wird als in Frankreich.”
https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/streikrecht-deutschland-frankreich-warnstreiks-generalstreik-100.html
Die Arbeitgeber. n.d. “Unsere Mitglieder.” https://arbeitgeber.de/Mitglieder/
Hans Böckler Stiftung. 2013. “Was kostet die Mitgliedschaft im Arbeitgeberverband?” Magazin Mitbestimmung 10/2013.
https://www.boeckler.de/de/magazin-mitbestimmung-2744-was-kostet-die-mitgliedschaft-im-arbeitgeberverband-5176.htm
SGI 2024 | 102 Germany Report

INSM. n.d. “Alles über die INSM.” https://www.insm.de/insm/ueber-die-insm/faq

Lesch, H., Bach, H., and Vogel, S. 2023. “Tarifautonomie in der Legalitätskrise.”
https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/policy_papers/PDF/2023/IW-Policy-Paper_2023-Tarifautonomie-
Legitimit%C3%A4tskrise.pdf
Nienhüser, W., Peetz, D., Murray, G., Troup, C. 2022. “Social Media, the Internet and the Crisis of Unionism.” Hans Böckler Stiftung
Working Paper https://www.boeckler.de/de/faust-detail.htm?produkt=HBS-008499.
Rütters, P., and Mielke, S. n.d. “Gewerkschaften.” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. https://www.bpb.de/kurz-
knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202034/gewerkschaften
Stiftung Warentest. 2024. “Geschichte: Sechs Jahrzehnte Verbraucherschutz.” https://www.test.de/unternehmen/stiftung-5017075-5843545/
Strünck, C. n.d. “Tarifpolitik/Tarifautonomie, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-
knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202193/tarifpolitik-tarifautonomie
Verdi. 2022. “Reformvorschlag zum Betriebsverfassungsgesetz.”
https://www.verdi.de/themen/mitbestimmung/betriebsrat/++co++2ab42768-a174-11ed-a51b-001a4a160129
Vereinigte Lohnsteuerhilfe e.V. 2023. “Gewerkschaftsbeitrag von der Steuer absetzen.” https://www.vlh.de/arbeiten-
pendeln/beruf/gewerkschaftsbeitrag-von-der-steuer-absetzen.html

Effective Civil Society Organizations (Social Welfare)

American Express. 2023. “Steuern und Mitgliedsbeiträge: Welche sind steuerlich absetzbar?” https://www.americanexpress.com/de-
de/kampagnen/guide/wirtschaftswissen/steuern/steuern-und-mitgliedsbeitraege-10071
Bundesministerium der Finanzen. n.d. “Gesetze und Gesetzesvorhaben.”
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/DE/Service/Gesetze_Gesetzesvorhaben/Gesetze_Gesetzgebungsvorhaben.html
Bundesregierung. 2019. “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Christoph Meyer, Christian Dürr, Renata
Alt, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP, Drucksache 19/7912.” https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/084/1908448.pdf.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1949. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html
Bundesverband der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege. n.d. “Freie Wohlfahrtspflege – ihre Spitzenverbände.” https://www.bagfw.de/ueber-
uns/mitgliedsverbaende
Bundesverband der Vereine und des Ehrenamts e.V. n.d. “Das sind WIR | die Vereine in Deutschland.”
https://bundesverband.bvve.de/vereine-in-deutschland/
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. n.d. “Wohlfahrtsverbände.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-
system/202214/wohlfahrtsverbaende/
Deutsches Ehrenamt. n.d. “So bekommen Sie Fördermittel für Vereine.” https://deutsches-ehrenamt.de/vereinswissen/foerdertipps/
GlobeOne. 2022. “Purpose Readiness Index Deutschland 2022.” https://globe-one.com/german/lateststudies/purpose-readiness-index-
deutschland-2022/#lateststudy

Effective Civil Society Organizations (Environment)

Bundesamt für Naturschutz. n.d. “Einnahmestruktur großer Natur- und Umweltschutzverbände.” https://www.bfn.de/daten-und-
fakten/einnahmestruktur-grosser-natur-und-umweltschutzverbaende
Bundesregierung. 2023. “Verbände und Stiftungen.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/nachhaltigkeitspolitik/verbaende-
und-stiftungen-418816
Deutscher Naturschutzring. n.d. “https://www.dnr.de/” (accessed January 22, 2024).
Fuchs, T. 2022. “Der Staat ist einer der wichtigsten Geldgeber des WWF Deutschland – wie unabhängig ist die Umweltorganisation?”
Businessinsider August 11. https://www.businessinsider.de/politik/der-staat-ist-einer-der-wichtigsten-geldgeber-des-wwf-deutschland-wie-
unabhaengig-ist-die-umweltorganisation/
Global Nature Fund. n.d. “Deutscher Naturschutzring (DNR).” https://www.globalnature.org/de/deutscher-naturschutzring
LohnsteuerKompakt. “Spenden und Mitgliedsbeiträge.” https://www.lohnsteuer-
kompakt.de/texte/2023/63/spenden_und_mitgliedsbeitraege
NABU. 2023. “Das Bundeswaldgesetz ins 21. Jahrhundert heben.” https://www.nabu.de/natur-und-
landschaft/waelder/waldpolitik/34023.html
NABU. n.d. “Wir sind, was wir tun. Die Naturschutzmacher*innen.” https://www.nabu.de/wir-ueber-uns/index.html
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Polis Gesellschaft für Sozial- und Marktforschung mbH. 2016. Vertrauen der Bevölkerung in die Politik. Deidesheim: Polis Gesellschaft
für Sozial- und Marktforschung mbH.
Umweltbundesamt. 2023. “Fördern und beraten.” https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/das-uba/was-wir-tun/foerdern-beraten

Effective Public Auditing

Bundesrechnungshof. 2023a. “https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/DE/5_ueber_uns/1_wer_wir_sind/wer_wir_sind_node.html”
Bundesrechnungshof. 2023b. “https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/DE/7_presse/presse_node.html” (accessed: 13.11.23)
International Budget Partnership. 2021. “Open Budget Survey 2021.” https://internationalbudget.org/sites/default/files/country-surveys-
pdfs/2021/open-budget-survey-germany-2021-en.pdf
International Budget Partnership. 2021. “Open Budget Survey 2021. 8th Edition.” https://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Open-
budget-survey-2021-1.pdf
Seyfried, M. 2021. “Bundesrechnungshof.” In Handwörterbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, eds. Andersen,
U., Bogumil, J., Marschall, S., and Woyke, W. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Effective Data Protection

BfDI. 2023. “Tätigkeitsbericht 2022, 31. Tätigkeitsbericht für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit.”
BfDI. 2023. “Nicht vollständig umgesetzte Empfehlungen des BfDI aus älteren Tätigkeitsberichte.”
https://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Taetigkeitsberichte/Ausz%C3%BCge/alte-Empfehlungen.html
BfDI. n.d. “Aufgaben und Befugnisse des BfDI.” https://www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/DerBfDI/Inhalte/DerBfDI/AufgabenBFDI.html
Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 2023. “Sollwerte des Haushaltsjahres 2024.” https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/DE/Bundeshaushalt-
digital/bundeshaushalt-digital.html

Effective Judicial Oversight

Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2023a. “Die Richterinnen und Richter des Bundesverfassungsgerichts.”
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/DE/Richter/richter_node.html
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2023b. “How to Lodge a Constitutional Complaint.”
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Homepage/_zielgruppeneinstieg/Merkblatt/Merkblatt_node.html
Deutscher Richterbund. 2018. “Judicial Ethics in Germany.” https://www.drb.de/fileadmin/DRB/pdf/Ethik/1901_DRB-
Broschuere_Richterethik_EN_Judicial_Ethics.pdf
FAZ. 2023. “Karlsruhe bespricht Krisenpolitik mit Bundesregierung.” https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/bundesverfassungsgericht-
redet-mit-bundesregierung-19295577.html
Freedom House. 2023. “Germany.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2023#PR
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/

Universal Civil Rights

Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The State of the World’s Human Rights.”
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/#:~:text=Across%20the%20world%2C%20authorities%20continued,the%20h
ardest%2C%20and%20inequality%20rose
Belling, D. W., A. Herold, and M. Kneis. 2014. “Die Wirkung der Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten zwischen Privaten.”
Rechtsentwicklungen aus europäischer Perspektive im 21. Jahrhundert 2: 53-111. https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/opus4-
ubp/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/7455/file/S53-111_aiup02.pdf
BMFSJ. 2021. Zweites Führungspositionen-Gesetz – FüPoG II. https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/service/gesetze/zweites-
fuehrungspositionengesetz-fuepog-2-164226
Freedom House. 2023. “Germany.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2023#CL
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2023. “Gender Pay Gap 2022: Frauen verdienten pro Stunde 18 % weniger als Männer.”
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/01/PD23_036_621.html#:~:text=Dieser%20unerkl%C3%A4rte%20Teil%20en
tspricht%20dem,%25%2C%20Ostdeutschland%3A%209%20%25
World Justice Project. 2023. “WJP Rule of Law Index, Germany, Civil Justice.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-
index/factors/2023/Germany/Civil%20Justice/
SGI 2024 | 104 Germany Report

Effective Corruption Prevention

Corruption Risk. 2023. “Germany.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=DEU#transparency
EuroPam. 2017. “Germany.” https://www.europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Germany
GRECO. 2022. “Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption, Fifth Evaluation Round, Preventing corruption and promoting
integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies, Compliance Report Germany.”
https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aa89ee
Handelsblatt. 2021. “Millionen aus der Maskenaffäre: Das haben die Unions-Politiker mit ihren Corona-Provisionen gemacht.”
https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/pandemie-profiteure-millionen-aus-der-maskenaffaere-das-haben-die-unions-politiker-
mit-ihren-corona-provisionen-gemacht/27200534.html
Tagesschau. 2022. “Falsche Abrechnungen und fehlerhafte Verträge.” https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/kontraste/rbb-
zwischenbericht-101.html

Sufficient Legislative Resources

Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 2023. “Sollwerte des Haushalts 2024.” https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/DE/Bundeshaushalt-
digital/bundeshaushalt-digital.html
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Der Bundeshaushalt.” https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/haushalt_neu
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023. “Die Verwaltung des Deutschen Bundestages.” https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/verwaltung
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023. “Dokumente, Gutachten und Ausarbeitungen.” https://www.bundestag.de/analysen
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. “Variable Graph.” https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/

Effective Legislative Oversight

Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. “Sachstand, Befugnisse des Untersuchungsausschusses zur Beweiserhebung, WD 3 - 3000 - 265/16.”
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/493600/869bf4ce24e8f566ccc0c5fb4327112d/WD-3-265-16-pdf-data.pdf
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph

Effective Legislative Investigations

Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Untersuchungsausschuss.” https://www.bundestag.de/services/glossar/glossar/U/unters_aussch-245546
Deutscher Bundestag. 2010. “Das schärfste Schwer der Opposition.”
https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2010/29580373_untersuchungsausschuesse-201648
Knelagen, W. 2021. “Untersuchungsausschüsse.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-
system/511480/untersuchungsausschuesse/
Kohnert, N., Kornmeier, C. 2023. “Union treibt Scholz mit Klage vor sich her.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/union-
scholz-warburg-cumex-100.html
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph

Legislative Capacity for Guiding Policy

Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Beschlussempfehlung.” https://www.bundestag.de/services/glossar/glossar/B/beschl_empf-245344
Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. “Ausarbeitung, Struktur und Aufgaben der ständigen Ausschüsse Ein Vergleich zwischen dem Deutschen
Bundestag, der französischen Assemblée nationale und dem britischen House of Commons.”
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/413430/415104a9c385a42db463e68c00b37d92/WD-3-255-14-pdf-data.pdf
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023. “Die Ausschüsse des Deutschen Bundestages, Neuauflage 2023 20. Wahlperiode.” https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/20061000.pdf
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023b. “Die Arbeit der Bundestagsausschüsse – Fragen und Antworten.”
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/881160/681403d8f9c599f696cadb3cb5d737cd/arbeit_ausschuesse-data.pdf
Ismayr, Wolfgang. 2012. Der Deutsche Bundestag. 3rd ed. Wiesbaden: SpringerVS.

Effective Coordination Mechanisms of the GO/PMO

Busse, V., Hofmann, H. 2019. Bundeskanzleramt und Bundesregierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium für Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-
recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
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Zohlnhöfer, Reimut, and Fabian Engler. 2024. “Fortschritt gewagt – und wie weit gekommen? Eine Halbzeitbilanz der Ampel-Koalition
unter Olaf Scholz.” Gesellschaft. Wirtschaft. Politik 73(1): 55-67. https://doi.org/10.10.3224/gwp.v73i1.07

Effective Coordination Mechanisms within the Ministerial Bureaucracy

Busse, V., and H. Hofmann. 2019. Bundeskanzleramt und Bundesregierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium für Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-
recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien. 2020. www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-
internet.de/bsvwvbund_21072009_O11313012.htm

Complementary Informal Coordination

Deutschlandfunk. 2023. “Knatsch-Koalition. Warum die Ampel so oft streitet.” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/koalition-ampel-streit-
100.html
Hebestreit, R., and K.-R. Korte. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German
Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koalitionsvertrag. 2021. www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/koalitionsvertrag-2021-1990800

Effectively Setting and Monitoring National (Minimum) Standards

Hebestreit, R., and Korte, K.-R. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German
Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hegele, Y., and N. Behnke. 2017. “Horizontal Coordination in Cooperative Federalism: The Purpose of Ministerial Conferences in
Germany.” Regional and Federal Studies 27 (5): 529-548.

Effective Multilevel Cooperation

Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium der Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-
recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html

Effective Involvement of Civil Society Organizations (Capital and Labor)

Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund. 2023. “Mindestlohnkommission: Aufgaben und Mitglieder.”
https://www.dgb.de/schwerpunkt/mindestlohn/++co++916083ea-bd10-11e4-93f3-52540023ef1a
Lesch, H., Bach, H., and Vogel, S. 2023. “Tarifautonomie in der Legalitätskrise.”
https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/policy_papers/PDF/2023/IW-Policy-Paper_2023-Tarifautonomie-
Legitimit%C3%A4tskrise.pdf
Lesch, H., Schneider, H., and Schröder, C. 2021. “Anpassungsverfahren beim gesetzlichen Mindestlohn: Argumente gegen eine politische
Lohnfindung.” List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 47 (2-4): 193-217.
Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk. 2022. “Entlastungen: Scholz trifft sich mit Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften.”
https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/kampf-gegen-inflation-scholz-treffen-arbeitgeber-100.html
Rütters, P., and Mielke, S. n.d. “Gewerkschaften.” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. https://www.bpb.de/kurz-
knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202034/gewerkschaften
Strünck, C. n.d. “Tarifpolitik/Tarifautonomie.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-
system/202193/tarifpolitik-tarifautonomie/

Effective Involvement of Civil Society Organizations (Social Welfare)

Bundesministerium für Finanzen. n.d. “Gesetze und Gesetzesvorhaben.”
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/DE/Service/Gesetze_Gesetzesvorhaben/Gesetze_Gesetzgebungsvorhaben.html
Bundesregierung. 2019. “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Christoph Meyer, Christian Dürr, Renata
Alt, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP, Drucksache 19/7912.” https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/084/1908448.pdf
Bundesregierung. 2020. “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Otto Fricke, Christian Dürr, Grigorios
Aggelidis, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP, Drucksache 19/17329.” https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/177/1917764.pdf.
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Öffentliche Petitionen, Mitzeichnung und Quorum.”
https://epetitionen.bundestag.de/epet/service.$$$.rubrik.oeffentlichePetition.html
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Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland. n.d. “Kirchendiplomatin” der EKD. https://www.ekd.de/Bevollmaechtigter-der-EKD-14070.htm

Hummel, S., Pfirter, L., and Strachwitz, R. G. 2022. Zur Lage und den Rahmenbedingungen der Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland: ein
Bericht. Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-76997-7
RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland. 2023. “Ärger über die Ampel: Verbände wehren sich gegen Turbogesetze.”
https://www.rnd.de/wirtschaft/kritik-an-der-ampelregierung-verbaende-wehren-sich-gegen-turbo-gesetze-
4LC5PYFG6NDBZGUS4NXDEZTY6Q.html
Schmid, J. n.d. “Wohlfahrtsverbände.” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-
politisches-system/202214/wohlfahrtsverbaende/
https://www.bagfw.de/

Effective Involvement of Civil Society Organizations (Environment)

Bundesregierung. 2023. “Die Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, Ein Kompass für die Zukunft.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/themen/nachhaltigkeitspolitik/deutsche-nachhaltigkeitsstrategie-318846
Hummel, S., Pfirter, L., and Strachwitz, R. G. 2022. Zur Lage und den Rahmenbedingungen der Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland: Ein
Bericht. Berlin: Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-76997-7
Bundesministerium der Justiz. 2024. “Bundesregierung und Bundesministerien im Gesetzgebungsverfahren.”
https://www.bmj.de/DE/rechtsstaat_kompakt/entstehung_gesetz/regierung_ministerien/regierung_ministerien_node.html
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Öffentliche Petitionen, Mitzeichnung und Quorum.”
https://epetitionen.bundestag.de/epet/service.$$$.rubrik.oeffentlichePetition.html
Expertenrat für Klimafragen. n.d. “Expertenrat für Klimafragen.” https://www.expertenrat-klima.de/ueber-uns/
Energiezukunft. 2023. “Klimaschutzprogramm der Bundesregierung ungenügend.”
https://www.energiezukunft.eu/politik/klimaschutzprogramm-der-bundesregierung-ungenuegend/

Open Government
Bundeskanzleramt. 2023. “Vierter Nationaler Aktionsplan 2023–2025 im Rahmen der Teilnahme an der Open Government Partnership
(OGP).” https://www.open-government-deutschland.de/resource/blob/1567548/2216312/7847417a225b1837793b9525e673030e/vierter-
nap-data.pdf?download=1
Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat. 2023. “Open Data.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/moderne-verwaltung/open-
government/open-data/open-data-node.html
Die Bundesregierung. 2023. “Fortschritt durch Datennutzung Strategie für mehr und bessere Daten für neue, effektive und
zukunftsweisende Datennutzung.” https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Digitale-Welt/fortschritt-durch-
datennutzung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=10
Federal Chancellery. 2021. “Third National Action Plan (NAP) 2021–2023 in the Framework of Germany’s Participation in the Open
Government Partnership (OGP), Summary Version.” https://www.open-government-
deutschland.de/resource/blob/1687030/1954570/799e145dc406326630493762ec65e37f/summary-en-3rd-national-action-plan-
data.pdf?download=1
Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport. 2022. “Open Data.” https://bmdv.bund.de/SharedDocs/EN/Articles/DG/open-data.html
OECD. 2020. “OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable Data (OURdata) Index: 2019.” https://www.oecd.org/governance/digital-
government/ourdata-index-policy-paper-2020.pdf#page=44&zoom=100,84,121
Sachverständigenrat. 2023a. “Pressemitteilung, Deutschland muss in die Zukunft investieren, um seine Wachstumsschwäche zu
überwinden.” https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/jahresgutachten-2023-pressemitteilung.html
Sachverständigenrat. 2023. “Wachstumsschwäche überwinden – in Zukunft investieren, Jahresgutachten 2023/24.”
https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/gutachten/jg202324/JG202324_Kurzfassung.pdf
World Justice Project. 2023. “Germany, Open Government.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-
index/country/2023/Germany/Open%20Government

Capacity for Strategic Foresight and Anticipatory Innovation

Bovenschulte, Marc, Simone Ehrenberg-Silies, Kerstin Goluchowicz, and Christoph Bogenstahl. 2021. “Regierungs-Foresight – Stand und
Perspektiven.” Working Paper des Instituts für Innovation und Technik in der VDI/VDE-IT, Nr. 59.
Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik. 2024. “Über uns.” www.baks.bund.de/de/die-baks/auftrag-und-aufgaben-der-bundesakademie-fuer-
sicherheitspolitik
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DGAP. 2024. “Strategic Foresight, Programs, Alfred von Oppenheim Center for the Future of Europe.”
https://dgap.org/en/research/programs/alfred-von-oppenheim-center-future-europe/strategic-foresight

Effective Regulatory Impact Assessment

OECD. 2022. Better Regulation Practices across the European Union. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Effective Sustainability Checks

Bundesregierung. 2021. Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, Weiterentwicklung 2021. Berlin.
Bundesregierung. 2023. “Die Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, Ein Kompass für die Zukunft.” www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/themen/nachhaltigkeitspolitik/deutsche-nachhaltigkeitsstrategie-318846
Bundesministerium der Justiz. 2023. “Nachhaltige Gesetzgebung.”
www.bmj.de/DE/ministerium/nachhaltigkeit/gesetzgebung/gesetzgebung_node.html

Effective Ex Post Evaluation

Bundeskanzleramt. 2021. Bessere Rechtsetzung: Beschlüsse zu Verfahrens- und Methodenfragen im Bereich Besserer Rechtsetzung und
Bürokratieabbau – Staatssekretärausschuss Bessere Rechtsetzung und Bürokratieabbau – Staatssekretärausschuss Europäische Union.
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz. 2023. “Evaluation von Fördermaßnahmen.”
https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Ministerium/evaluation-von-foerdermassnahmen.html
Deutscher Bundestag. 2020. Zur praktischen Umsetzung und Evaluierung von Gesetzen, Sachstand, Wissenschaftliche Dienste, WD 3 -
3000 - 298/19.

Circular Economy Policy Efforts and Commitment

BMUV. 2020. “Product Responsibility.” https://www.bmuv.de/en/topics/water-management/circular-economy-overview/overview-waste-
policy/product-responsibility
BMUV. 2020. “Deutsches Ressourceneffizienzprogramm III – 2020 bis 2023 Programm zur nachhaltigen Nutzung und zum Schutz der
natürlichen Ressourcen.” https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Pools/Broschueren/ressourceneffizienz_programm_2020_2023.pdf
BMUV. 2021. “Marktüberwachung.” https://www.bmuv.de/themen/kreislaufwirtschaft/marktueberwachung
BMUV. 2022. “Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetz.” https://www.bmuv.de/gesetz/kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetz
BMUV. 2023. “Die Nationale Kreislaufwirtschaftsstrategie (NKWS), Grundlagen für einen Prozess zur Transformation hin zu einer
zirkulären Wirtschaft.” https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Abfallwirtschaft/nkws_grundlagen_bf.pdf
Eurostat. 2024a. “Resource Productivity.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/CEI_PC030/default/table?lang=en
Eurostat. 2024b. “Circular Material Use Rate.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/cei_srm030/default/bar?lang=en

Policy Efforts and Commitment to a Resilient Critical Infrastructure

BMI. 2009. “Nationale Strategie zum Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen (KRITIS-Strategie).”
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/bevoelkerungsschutz/kritis.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
BMI. 2021. “Cyber Security Strategy for Germany 2021.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/themen/it-digital-
policy/cyber-security-strategy-for-
germany2021.pdf;jsessionid=73F6C4FB9C3B6FEBB37E3D5EE960D2C4.live892?__blob=publicationFile&v=4
BMI. 2023a. “Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der CER-Richtlinie und zur Stärkung der Resilienz kritischer Anlagen.”
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/gesetzgebungsverfahren/DE/KRITIS-DachG.html
BMI. 2023. “Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/bevoelkerungsschutz/schutz-kritischer-
infrastrukturen/schutz-kritischer-infrastrukturen-node.html

Policy Efforts and Commitment to Achieving a Decarbonized Energy System by 2050

BMU. 2019. “Klimaschutzprogramm 2030 der Bundesregierung zur Umsetzung des Klimaschutzplans 2050.”
https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/974430/1679914/c8724321decefc59cca0110063409b50/2019-10-09-klima-massnahmen-
data.pdf?download=1
BMWK. 2023. “Zwischenbericht der Systementwicklungsstrategie.”
https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Energie/20231122-zwischenbericht-der-
systementwicklungsstrategie.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11
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BMWK. 2024. “Das steckt im Osterpaket.” https://www.bmwk-

energiewende.de/EWD/Redaktion/Newsletter/2022/04/Meldung/topthema.html
Eurostat. 2024a. “Electricity production capacities for renewables and wastes.”
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/NRG_INF_EPCRW/default/table?lang=en
Umweltbundesamt. 2023. “Treibhausgasminderungsziele Deutschlands.”
https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/daten/klima/treibhausgasminderungsziele-deutschlands#nationale-treibhausgasminderungsziele-und-
deren-umsetzung
World Economic Forum. 2021. “Fostering Effective Energy Transition 2021 Edition.” https://www.weforum.org/publications/fostering-
effective-energy-transition-2021/in-full/rankings

Policies Targeting an Adaptive Labor Market

Destatis. 2023. “Weiterbildung: Teilnahmequote in Deutschland mit 8 % unter dem EU-Durchschnitt, Zahl der Woche Nr. 42 vom 17.
Oktober 2023.”
DGB. 2022. “Bildungsurlaub: Wie beantragen? Wer hat Anspruch? Wer zahlt?” www.dgb.de/urlaub/++co++fe6281e0-b9eb-11e5-a576-
52540023ef1a#uuid-b23937a4-66a0-11ee-8b49-001a4a160123
Iwd. 2022. “Betriebszugehörigkeit: Lange im Betrieb.” Informationsdienst des Instituts der deutschen Wirtschaft, February 17.

Policies Targeting an Inclusive Labor Market

Destatis. 2024. “Erwerbstätige, die von zu Hause aus arbeiten.” www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Arbeit/Arbeitsmarkt/Qualitaet-
Arbeit/Dimension-3/home-office.html
GIB. 2020. “Arbeitsmarktpolitische Maßnahmen.” G.I.B. Kurzbericht 1/2020: Statistik zum Arbeits- und Ausbildungsmarkt.
Ifo and ZEW. 2023. “Bürgergeld: Mehr Netto vom Brutto erhöht Beschäftigung.” www.zew.de/das-zew/aktuelles/buergergeld-mehr-netto-
vom-brutto-erhoeht-beschaeftigung
MDR. 2023. “Union und FDP wollen Bürgergeld-Erhöhung stoppen.” www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/buergergeld-haushalt-
debatte-finanzierung-100.html

Policies Targeting Labor Market Risks

IAB. 2023. “Tarifbindung und Mitbestimmung: Keine Trendumkehr in Westdeutschland, Stabilisierung in Ostdeutschland.” IAB-Forum,
July 20. www.iab-forum.de/tarifbindung-und-mitbestimmung-keine-trendumkehr-in-sicht/
Statista. 2024. “Anzahl der Mitglieder des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbunds (DGB) von 1994 bis 2022.”
https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/3266/umfrage/mitgliedszahlen-des-dgb-seit-dem-jahr-1994/

Policies Targeting Adequate Tax Revenue

BMF. 2023a. Datensammlung zur Steuerpolitik. Berlin: Bundesministerium der Finanzen.
BMF. 2023b. “Ergebnisse der Steuerschätzung vom 24. bis 26. Oktober 2023.” Monatsbericht des BMF, November.
Hassan, M., and F. Schneider. 2016. “Size and Development of the Shadow Economies of 157 Worldwide Countries: Updated and New
Measures from 1999 to 2013.” Journal of Global Economics 4 (3): 1–14.
OECD. 2023. Taxing Wages, Indexation of Labour Taxation and Benefits in OECD Countries. Paris: OECD Publishing.
ZEW. 2023. “Mannheim Tax Index.” www.zew.de/mannheim-tax-index

Policies Targeting Tax Equity

Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. 2019. Den Strukturwandel meistern, Jahresgutachten
19/20. Wiesbaden: Sachverständigenrat.

Policies Aimed at Minimizing Compliance Costs

World Bank. 2020a. “Doing Business, Paying Taxes: Time (Hours per Year) [PAY.TAX.TM].”
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/doing-business

Policies Aimed at Internalizing Negative and Positive Externalities

BMF. 2023. Subventionsbericht des Bundes 2021-2024. Berlin: Bundesministerium der Finanzen.
Bundesregierung. 2024. “CO2-Preis steigt auf 45 Euro pro Tonne.” Pressemitteilung 1. Januar. www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/aktuelles/co2-preis-kohle-abfallbrennstoffe-2061622
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Sustainable Budgeting Policies

BMF. 2020. Tragfähigkeitsbericht 2020, Fünfter Bericht Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen. Berlin.
Ifo. 2023. “The German Debt Brake – Anchor of Stability or Blocker of Investments?” www.ifo.de/en/facts/2023-12-08/german-debt-
brake-anchor-stability-or-blocker-investments

Research and Innovation Policy

BMBF. 2022. Bundesbericht Forschung und Innovation 2022. Berlin: BMBF.
Bundestag. 2023. Steuerliche Förderung von Forschung und Entwicklung, Wissenschaftliche Dienste Deutsche Bundestag, WD 4 - 3000 -
074/23.
Statista. 2023. “Volume of venture capital investments in Germany from 2012 to 2022.” www.statista.com/statistics/1332187/venture-
capital-investments-germany/

Global Financial Policies

BMF. 2022. “Fragen und Antworten zur Sondereinheit gegen Steuerhinterziehung und Steuerumgehung.”
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/FAQ/sondereinheit-gegen-steuerhinterziehung-und-steuerumgehung.html
BMF. 2023. “Stepping up the Fight Against Financial Crime.”
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/Priority-Issues/Financial-Crime/fight-against-financial-
crime.html
BMF. 2024. “Auf dem Weg zu einer fairen internationalen Besteuerung.”
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Steuern/Internationales_Steuerrecht/BEPS/schaedlichen-
steuerwettbewerb-bekaempfen.html
FATF. 2022. “Germany’s Measures to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.” https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mer-germany-2022.html
FATF. 2023. “Germany’s progress in strengthening measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing.” https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/germany-fur-2023.html
FSB. 2020. “About the FSB.” https://www.fsb.org/about/
Tax Justice Network. 2022. “Country Detail, Germany.” https://fsi.taxjustice.net/country-detail/#country=DE&period=22
Tax Justice Network. 2023. “Germany, Country Profile.” https://taxjustice.net/country-profiles/germany/
OECD. 2021. “Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy.”
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/brochure-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-
october-2021.pdf

Policies Targeting Quality Education

Destatis. 2023. “Ausgaben für öffentliche Schulen 2021 bei 9 200 Euro je Schülerin und Schüler.”
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/03/PD23_082_217.html
Destatis. 2023. “Budget für Bildung, Forschung und Wissenschaft nach Bereichen.” https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-
Umwelt/Bildung-Forschung-Kultur/Bildungsfinanzen-Ausbildungsfoerderung/Tabellen/budget.html
Deutsches Schulportal. 2024. “Bildung für nachhaltige Entwicklung (BNE) an Schulen – Umsetzung oft halbherzig.” https://deutsches-
schulportal.de/unterricht/bildung-fuer-nachhaltige-entwicklung-bne-an-schulen-wie-gelingt-das/
Eurostat. 2023. “Ratio of pupils and students to teachers and academic staff by education level and programme orientation.”
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/educ_uoe_perp04__custom_8840090/default/table?lang=en
Hepp, G. 2013. “Wie der Staat das Bildungswesen prägt.” https://www.bpb.de/themen/bildung/dossier-bildung/145238/wie-der-staat-das-
bildungswesen-praegt/
Hessisches Kultusministerium. n.d. “Curriculare Vorgaben, Kerncurricula.” https://kultusministerium.hessen.de/unterricht/kerncurricula-
und-lehrplaene/kerncurricula
Kultusministerkonferenz. n.d. “Berufliche Ausbildung im Dualen System – ein international beachtetes Modell.”
https://www.kmk.org/themen/berufliche-schulen/duale-berufsausbildung.html
OECD. 2021. OECD Skills Outlook 2021. https://www.oecd.org/germany/Skills-Outlook-Germany-DE.pdf
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Schrooten, M. 2021. “Bildungsfinanzierung – Fokus Schule.”

https://www.gew.de/index.php?eID=dumpFile&t=f&f=106614&token=9a86a96ee9ecf90cc43c30a1e6a328e20ca5d813&sdownload=&n=2
021-05-Bildungsfinanzierung-Fokus-Schule.pdf
Stifterverband. 2023. “Empfehlungen an Bund und Länder für die Lehrkräftebildung.”
https://www.stifterverband.org/sites/default/files/lehrkraeftebildung_empfehlungen_an_bund_und_laender.pdf

Policies Targeting Equitable Access to Education

BMFSFJ. 2023. “92 Prozent der Kinder von 3 Jahren bis zum Schuleintritt besuchten 2022 eine Kita.”
https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/aktuelles/presse/pressemitteilungen/92-prozent-der-kinder-von-3-jahren-bis-zum-schuleintritt-besuchten-
2022-eine-kita-228528
Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung. 2023. “Weiterhin Ungleichheiten bei der Kita-Nutzung.” Bevölkerungsforschung Aktuell 2.
https://www.bib.bund.de/Publikation/2023/pdf/Bevoelkerungsforschung-Aktuell-2-2023.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
Deutscher Bundestag. 2019. “Schulpflicht und Gestaltung des Schulwesens Zulässigkeit der Verpflichtung von Schülern zu
gesellschaftlichem oder sozialem Engagement.”
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/678442/22ae33f7a7612a3560dfba57dd5a4549/WD-3-259-19-pdf-data.pdf
Edelstein, B. 2013. “Das Bildungssystem im Deutschland.” https://www.bpb.de/themen/bildung/dossier-bildung/163283/das-
bildungssystem-in-deutschland
Käpplinger, B., Reuter, M., and P. Pfeil. 2020. “Der Zweite Bildungsweg in den Bundesländern –Strukturen und Perspektiven.”
https://www.gew.de/fileadmin/media/publikationen/hv/GEW/GEW-Stiftungen/MTS_-_Gefoerderte_Projekte/20200923-Der-Zweite-
Bildungsweg-in-den-Bundesl–ndern-MTS.pdf
OECD. 2023. “Education at a Glance 2023: OECD Indicators.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/e13bef63-
en/1/3/3/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/e13bef63-
en&_csp_=a4f4b3d408c9dd70d167f10de61b8717&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2023. “Betreuungsquote von Kindern unter 6 Jahren nach Bundesländern.”
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Soziales/Kindertagesbetreuung/Tabellen/betreuungsquote.html
Stifterverband. 2022. “Hochschul-Bildungs-Report 2020, Abschlussbericht, Hochschulbildung in der Transformation.”
https://www.hochschulbildungsreport.de/sites/hsbr/files/hochschul-bildungs-report_abschlussbericht_2022.pdf
Wößmann, L., Schoner, F., Freudl, V., and Pfaehler, F. 2023. “Der ifo-„Ein Herz für Kinder“- Chancenmonitor: Wie (un-)gerecht sind die
Bildungschancen von Kindern aus verschiedenen Familien in Deutschland verteilt?” ifo Schnelldienst 76: 1-47.
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/sd-2023-04-freundl-et-al-chancenmonitor.pdf

Policies Targeting Equal Access to Essential Services and Basic Income Support
Arbeitslosenhilfe. 2023. “Sozialticket: Günstig mit den Öffis unterwegs.” https://www.arbeitslosenselbsthilfe.org/sozialticket/
BMAS. 2021. “Grundsätze der Sozialhilfe.” https://www.bmas.de/DE/Soziales/Sozialhilfe/Grundsaetze-der-Sozialhilfe/grundsaetze-der-
sozialhilfe-art.html
BMAS. 2023. “Bürgergeld.” https://www.bmas.de/DE/Arbeit/Grundsicherung-Buergergeld/grundsicherung-buergergeld.html
BMWSD. 2023. “Wohngeld.” https://www.bmwsb.bund.de/Webs/BMWSB/DE/themen/stadt-
wohnen/wohnraumfoerderung/wohngeld/wohngeld-node.html
Bundesagentur für Arbeit. 2023a. “Voraussetzungen für Bürgergeld.” https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/arbeitslos-arbeit-
finden/buergergeld/finanziell-absichern/voraussetzungen-einkommen-vermoegen
Bundesagentur für Arbeit. 2023. “Wohnen zur Miete.” https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/arbeitslos-arbeit-finden/buergergeld/wohnen
Die Bundesregierung. 2023a. “Energiekosten: Zuschuss von bis zu 300 Euro.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/schwerpunkte/entlastung-fuer-deutschland/energiepreispauschale-
2124992#:~:text=Aufgrund%20der%20Energiekrise%20in%20Deutschland,in%20H%C3%B6he%20von%20300%20Euro
Die Bundesregierung. 20233b. “Regelsätze steigen 2024 deutlich.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/arbeit-und-
soziales/regelsaetze-erhoehung-2222924
Die Bundesregierung. 2023. “Ein Ticket für ganz Deutschland.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/deutschlandticket-
2134074
Hanesch, W. 2020. ESPN Thematic Report on Access to Essential Services for Low-Income People – Germany. Brussels: European
Commission.
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Policies Targeting Quality of Essential Services and Basic Income Support

European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Baptista, I., Marlier, E. 2020. Access to
Essential Services for People on Low Incomes in Europe: An Analysis of Policies in 35 Countries. Publications Office.
Eurostat. 2023a. “Housing Cost Overburden Rate by Poverty Status – EU-SILC Survey.”
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tessi163/default/table?lang=en
Eurostat. 2023b. “Population Unable to Keep Home Adequately Warm by Poverty Status.”
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/SDG_07_60/default/table?lang=en
Eurostat. 2023c. “Persons Who Cannot Afford Internet Connection for Personal Use at Home by Employment Status and Income Quintile.”
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_mddu07b/default/table?lang=en
Handelsblatt. 2022. “Sozialverband kritisiert neue Regelsätze als zu gering.” https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/buergergeld-
sozialverband-kritisiert-neue-regelsaetze-als-zu-gering/28675686.html

Policies Targeting Health System Resilience

Betanet. n.d. “Früherkennung von Krankheiten.” https://www.betanet.de/frueherkennung-von-krankheiten.html
Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft. 2023. “Mehr Kinderschutz in der Werbung: Pläne für klare Regeln zu an Kindern
gerichteter Lebensmittelwerbung.” https://www.bmel.de/DE/themen/ernaehrung/gesunde-ernaehrung/kita-und-schule/lebensmittelwerbung-
kinder.html
Bundesministerium für Gesundheit. n.d. “Prävention.” https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/service/begriffe-von-a-
z/p/praevention
Finkenstädt. 2017. Zugangshürden in der Gesundheitsversorgung – Ein europäischer Überblick. https://www.wip-
pkv.de/fileadmin/DATEN/Dokumente/Studien_in_Buchform/WIP_Zugangshuerden_in_der_Gesundheitsversorgung.pdf
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 2023. Germany: Country Health Profile 2023, State of Health in the EU.
Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/21dd4679-en
Stiftung Gesundheitswesen. 2021. “Prävention: Der Mix macht’s.” https://stiftung-gesundheitswissen.de/gesundes-leben/kompetenz-
gesundheit/praevention-der-mix-machts
Pharma Fakten. 2023. “Große Unterschiede in europäischer Arzneimittelversorgung: ‘Kein tragbarer Zustand’.” https://pharma-
fakten.de/news/grosse-unterschiede-in-europaeischer-arzneimittelversorgung/

Policies Targeting High-Quality Healthcare

Betanet. n.d. “Früherkennung von Krankheiten.” https://www.betanet.de/frueherkennung-von-krankheiten.html
Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft. 2023. “Mehr Kinderschutz in der Werbung: Pläne für klare Regeln zu an Kindern
gerichteter Lebensmittelwerbung.” https://www.bmel.de/DE/themen/ernaehrung/gesunde-ernaehrung/kita-und-schule/lebensmittelwerbung-
kinder.html
Bundesministerium für Gesundheit. n.d. “Prävention.” https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/service/begriffe-von-a-
z/p/praevention
Finkenstädt. 2017. “Zugangshürden in der Gesundheitsversorgung – Ein europäischer Überblick.” https://www.wip-
pkv.de/fileadmin/DATEN/Dokumente/Studien_in_Buchform/WIP_Zugangshuerden_in_der_Gesundheitsversorgung.pdf
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 2023. Germany: Country Health Profile 2023, State of Health in the EU.
Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/21dd4679-en
Stiftung Gesundheitswesen. 2021. “Prävention: Der Mix macht’s.” https://stiftung-gesundheitswissen.de/gesundes-leben/kompetenz-
gesundheit/praevention-der-mix-machts

Policies Targeting Equitable Access To Healthcare

Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für die Belange von Menschen mit Behinderungen. n.d. “Gesundheit – gute Versorgung für alle.”
https://www.behindertenbeauftragter.de/DE/AS/schwerpunkte/gesundheit/gesundheit-node.html
Bundesministerium für Gesundheit. 2023. “Startschuss: Aktionsplan für ein diverses, inklusives und barrierefreies Gesundheitswesen.”
https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/startschuss-aktionsplan-fuer-diverses-inklusives-barrierefreies-
gesundheitswesen
Deutschlandfunk. 2022. “Wie Länder und Kommunen Landärzte für sich gewinnen wollen.” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/landaerzte-
verzweifelt-gesucht-100.html
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European Parliament. 2015. “The Policy on Gender Equality in Germany.”

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/510025/IPOL_IDA(2015)510025_EN.pdf
Gesundheitsberichterstattung des Bundes. 2023. “Betten in Krankenhäusern.” https://www.gbe-
bund.de/gbe/pkg_isgbe5.prc_menu_olap?p_uid=gastd&p_aid=3426115&p_sprache=D&p_help=0&p_indnr=115&p_indsp=5077&p_ityp=
H&p_fid
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 2023. Germany: Country Health Profile 2023, State of Health in the EU.
Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/21dd4679-en
Statistisches Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz. 2017. “Vergleich des Gesundheitswesen für alle Bundesländer seit 2017 möglich.” Statistische
Monatshefte Rheinland-Pfalz 12/2017. https://www.statistik.rlp.de/fileadmin/dokumente/monatshefte/2017/Dezember/12-2017-748.pdf

Policy Efforts and Commitment to Achieving Gender Equality

BMFSFJ. 2020. “Gleichstellungsstrategie der Bundesregierung.”
https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/158356/b500f2b30b7bac2fc1446d223d0a3e19/gleichstellungsstrategie-der-bundesregierung-data.pdf
BMFSFJ. 2021. “Neunter Bericht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zum Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen zur Beseitigung jeder
Form von Diskriminierung der Frau (CEDAW).”
https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/181362/684a2a98e6aa2486657e25923d60ca47/neunter-staatenbericht-cedaw-data.pdf
BMFSFJ. 2021. “Zweites Führungspositionen-Gesetz – FüPoG II.” https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/service/gesetze/zweites-
fuehrungspositionengesetz-fuepog-2-164226
BMFSFJ. 2023a. “Frauen vor Gewalt schützen.” https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/gleichstellung/frauen-vor-gewalt-schuetzen
BMFSFJ. 2023. “Bundesregierung beginnt Arbeit an Gewaltschutzstrategie.” https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/aktuelles/alle-
meldungen/bundesregierung-beginnt-arbeit-an-gewaltschutzstrategie-232658
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2021. “Unzulässige Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen Urteil betreffend die Einführung paritätischer Listen bei der
Landtagswahl in Thüringen.” Pressemitteilung Nr. 3/2022.
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2022/bvg22-003.html
EIGE. 2023. “Gender Equality Index, Violence in Germany in 2023 edition.” https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-
index/2023/domain/violence/DE
UNDP. 2023. “Gender Inequality Index (GII).” https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/thematic-composite-indices/gender-inequality-
index#/indicies/GII
World Bank. 2023. “Labor Force, Female (% of Total Labor Force).” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS
Zeit. 2023. “Lisa Paus fordert mehr Schutz für Frauen.” https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2023-11/gewalt-frauen-lisa-paus-
frauenrat

Family Policies
BMFSFJ. 2019. “Better Reconciliation of Family, Care and Work.”
https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/93366/d49d4b8cdb3824e28c89cac6473145dc/bessere-vereinbarkeit-von-familie-pflege-und-beruf-
flyer-englisch-data.pdf
BMFSFJ. 2020. “Guide to Maternity Protection.”
https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/191576/beddabe131e1d1c8e67c55b2c44b73f7/leitfaden-zum-mutterschutz-englisch-data.pdf
BMFSFJ. 2023. “Elterngeld.” https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/familie/familienleistungen/elterngeld/elterngeld-73752
BMFSFJ. 2023b. “Mehr Qualität in der frühen Bildung.” https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/familie/kinderbetreuung/mehr-qualitaet-in-
der-fruehen-bildung/mehr-qualitaet-in-der-fruehen-bildung-133712
BMFSFJ. 2023. “Kindergeld.” https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/familie/familienleistungen/kindergeld/kindergeld-73892
BMFSFJ. 2023. “Kinderzuschlag und Leistungen für Bildung und Teilhabe.”
https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/familie/familienleistungen/kinderzuschlag-und-leistungen-fuer-bildung-und-teilhabe-73906
Deutsches Jugendinstitut. 2018. “Gebührenfreie Kitas verstärken ungleiche Belastung von Familien.”
https://www.dji.de/themen/kinderbetreuung/gebuehrenfreie-kitas-verstaerken-ungleiche-belastung-von-familien.html
Eurostat. 2023. “Social protection statistics – family and children benefits.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Social_protection_statistics_-_family_and_children_benefits
OECD. 2023. “PF2.1. Parental leave systems.”
https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF2_1_Parental_leave_systems.pdf?_ga=2.230565407.202068049.1704633135-1424590795.1700750548
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Statistisches Bundesamt. 2021. “Kinderbetreuung: Eltern bezahlen im Schnitt 1 310 Euro pro Jahr.”
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2021/10/PD21_483_73.html.
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2023. “Betreuungsquote von Kindern unter 6 Jahren nach Bundesländern.”
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Soziales/Kindertagesbetreuung/Tabellen/betreuungsquote.html
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2024. “Elternzeit.” https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Arbeit/Arbeitsmarkt/Qualitaet-Arbeit/Dimension-
3/elternzeit.html
WHO. 2023. “Maternity Protection: Compliance with International Labour Standards.”
https://www.who.int/data/nutrition/nlis/info/maternity-protection-compliance-with-international-labour-standards

Policies Aimed at Old-Age Poverty Prevention

Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales. 2017. “Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung.” https://www.bmas.de/DE/Soziales/Rente-und-
Altersvorsorge/Gesetzliche-Rentenversicherung/gesetzliche-rentenversicherung-art.html
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales. 2023. “Rentenversicherungsbericht 2023.”
https://www.bmas.de/DE/Service/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/bundeskabinett-beschliesst-rentenversicherungsbericht-2023.html
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales. 2023b. “Grundsicherung im Alter.” https://www.bmas.de/DE/Soziales/Rente-und-
Altersvorsorge/Fakten-zur-Rente/Grundsicherung-im-Alter/grundsicherung-im-alter.html
Bundesregierung. 2023. “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Gerrit Huy, René Springer, Ulrike
Schielke-Ziesing, Norbert Kleinwächter und der Fraktion der AfD: Deutsche Altersarmut und Armutsgefährdung im europäischen
Vergleich.” Drucksache 20/6064.
Deutsche Rentenversicherung. n.d.A. “Kindererziehung: Ihr Plus für die Rente.” https://www.deutsche-
rentenversicherung.de/DRV/DE/Rente/Familie-und-Kinder/Kindererziehung/kindererziehung_node.html
Deutsche Rentenversicherung. n.d. “Pflege von Angehörigen lohnt sich auch für die Rente.” https://www.deutsche-
rentenversicherung.de/DRV/DE/Rente/Familie-und-Kinder/Angehoerige-pflegen/angehoerige-pflegen_node.html
Deutsche Rentenversicherung Oldenburg-Bremen. 2018. “Kinderberücksichtigungszeiten.” https://www.deutsche-
rentenversicherung.de/OldenburgBremen/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Rententipps/rententipp_monat_2018_11.html
Eurostat. 2023. “Social protection statistics – pension expenditure and pension beneficiaries.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Social_protection_statistics_-_pension_expenditure_and_pension_beneficiaries

Policies Targeting Intergenerational Equity

BMF (Federal Ministry of Finance). 2023. “Statistische Auswertungen zur Riester-Förderung.”
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Steuern/Steuerliche_Themengebiete/Altersvorsorge/2023-
11-15-Statistische-Auswertungen-Riester-Foerderung-bis-2022.html
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 2022. “Einnahmen und Ausgaben der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung (GRV).”
https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61857/einnahmen-und-ausgaben-der-gesetzlichen-
rentenversicherung-grv/
Deutsche Rentenversicherung. 2023. “Altersrente. Unbegrenzt hinzuverdienen.” 34. Auflage [7/2023], Nr. 206.
Deutsche Rentenversicherung. n.d.A. “Altersrenten für langjährig und besonders langjährig Versicherte.” https://www.deutsche-
rentenversicherung.de/DRV/DE/Rente/Allgemeine-Informationen/Rentenarten-und-Leistungen/Altersrente-fuer-langjaehrig-
Versicherte/altersrente-fuer-langjaehrig-versicherte_node.html
Deutsche Rentenversicherung. “Zahlt sich aus: Arbeiten über die Rentenaltersgrenze hinaus.” https://www.deutsche-
rentenversicherung.de/DRV/DE/Rente/Allgemeine-Informationen/Wissenswertes-zur-
Rente/FAQs/Gesetzesaenderungen/Flexirente/Flexirente_Regelaltersgrenze.html#d57d5c7c-e685-4db9-ae58-7b199086b245
Deutsche Rentenversicherung. n.d. “Erwerbsminderungsrenten.” https://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/DRV/DE/Rente/Allgemeine-
Informationen/Rentenarten-und-Leistungen/Erwerbsminderungsrente/erwerbsminderungsrente_node.html
Deutschlandfunk. 2022. “Wie können die Renten finanzierbar bleiben?” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/reform-der-altersvorsorge-rente-
deutschland-100.html
Deutschlandfunk. 2023. “Wie Christian Lindner mit Aktien die Rente sichern will.” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/-rente-altersvorsorge-
aktienrente-christian-lindner-fdp-risiken-kritik-100.html
Sachverständigenrat. 2023. “Kein Weiter so bei der Rente: Eine Kombination mehrerer Reformmaßnahmen ist unverzichtbar.”
https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/jahresgutachten-2023-pressemitteilung/kapitel-5.html
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Integration Policy
BMBF. 2023. “Career Orientation for Immigrants.”
https://www.bmbf.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/de/bmbf/FS/31572_Berufliche_Orientierung_fuer_Zugewanderte_en.pdf?__blob=publicat
ionFile&v=9
BMI. 2021. “Welcome to Germany, Information for Immigrants.”
https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Integration/WillkommenDeutschland/willkommen-in-
deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=21
BMI. 2023a. “Arbeitsmigration.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/migration/zuwanderung/arbeitsmigration/arbeitsmigration-
node.html
BMI. 2023. “Anreize schaffen für Integration.”
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/schwerpunkte/DE/einwanderungsland/staatsangehoerigkeitsrecht.html
Die Bundesregierung. 2022. “Mehr Chancen für gut integrierte Geflüchtete.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/erstes-
migrationspaket-2059774
Eurostat. 2023. “Foreign-born population by main obstacle to get a suitable job, sex, age, citizenship and labour status.”
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/LFSO_21OBST02__custom_6269492/default/table?lang=en
Eurostat. 2023b. “Migrant Integration Statistics – Active Citizenship.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_active_citizenship#Naturalisation_rate
MIPEX. 2020. “Germany.” https://www.mipex.eu/germany
OECD. 2023. International Migration Outlook 2023. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-
health/international-migration-outlook-2023_b0f40584-en
Staatliche Schulämter in Hessen. n.d. “Schulische Integration.” https://schulaemter.hessen.de/schulen-und-lehrkraefte/paedagogische-
unterstuetzung-von-schulen/schulische-integration
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2022. “Gut jede vierte Person in Deutschland hatte 2021 einen Migrationshintergrund.”
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2022/04/PD22_162_125.html
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2024. “28% mehr Einbürgerungen im Jahr 2022.”
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/05/PD23_205_125.html
The Federal Government. 2019. “Immigration from EU member states.” https://www.make-it-in-germany.com/en/immigration-from-eu-
member-states

Management of Development Cooperation by Partner Country

BMZ. 2021. “Sustainable Agri-Food Systems, A World without Hunger, BMZ Strategies, BMZ Paper 5.”
https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/100758/bmz-core-area-strategy-a-world-without-hunger.pdf
BMZ. 2023a. “Evaluating German Development Cooperation, BMZ Evaluation Policy.”
https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/194630/bmz193-strategiepapier-evaluierung-en.pdf
BMZ. 2023b. “Transformation der Agrar- und Ernährungssysteme.” https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/ernaehrungssicherung/transformation-
der-agrar-und-ernaehrungssysteme
DAAD. 2023. “SDG Partnerships.” https://www.daad.de/en/information-services-for-higher-education-institutions/further-information-on-
daad-programmes/sdg-partnerschaften/
Bundesregierung. 2021. “Bericht über die Umsetzung der Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung.”
https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/86824/staatenbericht-deutschlands-zum-hlpf-2021.pdf
OECD. 2024. “Net ODA (indicator).” https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm#indicator-chart
SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, FDP. 2021. “Mehr Fortschritt wagen, Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit,
Koalitionsvertrag 2021-2025.” https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf
Federal Government. 2020. “German Sustainable Development Strategy, Update 2021, Summary Version.”
https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/998194/1942596/41a46a8f935a9b2945ee26d7593801ca/deutsche-nachhaltigkeitsstrategie-
2021-kurzfassung-englisch-bf-download-bpa-data.pdf?download=1
The Global Fund. 2023. “Germany and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.”
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/13432/donor_germany_report_en.pdf
United Nations. 2015. “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/291/89/PDF/N1529189.pdf?OpenElement
SGI 2024 | 115 Germany Report

Policy Efforts and Commitment to Achieving Climate Neutrality by 2050

BMUB. 2016. “Klimaschutzplan 2050, Klimaschutzpolitische Grundsätze und Ziele der Bundesregierung.”
https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Industrie/klimaschutzplan-2050.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4
BMUV. 2023. “Federal Action Plan on Nature-based Solutions for Climate and Biodiversity.”
https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Pools/Broschueren/ank_publikation_en_bf.pdf
BMWK. 2023. “Nationale Klimaschutzpolitik.” https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Dossier/nationale-klimaschutzpolitik.html
BMWK. 2023b. Die Systementwicklungsstrategie: Ein Rahmen für die Transformation zum klimaneutralen Energiesystem.
https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Dossier/ses.html
BMWK. 2023. “Das Klimaschutz-Programm 2023.” https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/U/ueberblickspapier-
klimaschutzprogramm.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
CCPI. 2023. “CCPI 2024: Ranking and Results.” https://ccpi.org/
CCPI. 2023b. “Germany.” https://ccpi.org/country/deu/
Die Bundesregierung. 2019. “CO2-Ausstoß verbindlich senken.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/schwerpunkte/klimaschutz/kimaschutzgesetz-beschlossen-1679886
NKI. 2021. “The National Climate Initiative.” https://www.klimaschutz.de/sites/default/files/NKI_Praesentation_Feb_2021_EN.pdf

Policy Efforts and Commitment to Minimizing Environmental Health Risks

BMUV. 2019. “Nationales Luftreinhalteprogramm der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.”
https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Luft/luftreinhalteprogramm_bericht_bf.pdf
BMUV. 2023. “National Water Strategy, Cabinet Decision of 15 March 2023.”
https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Pools/Broschueren/nationale_wasserstrategie_2023_en.pdf
European Commission. 2021. “EU Soil Strategy for 2030, Reaping the Benefits of Healthy Soils for People, Food, Nature and Climate.”
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0699
European Environment Agency. 2023. “Germany – Air Pollution Country Fact Sheet.” https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/air/country-fact-
sheets/2023-country-fact-sheets/germany-air-pollution-country
Kaar, A., and H. Mendadue. 2020. “Review of the National Air Pollution Control Programme – Germany, Final Report for European
Commission – DG Environment Specific contract 070201/2018/791186/SER/ENV.C.3.” Ricardo Energy and Environment 11495 (5).
file:///Users/joanalefevre/Downloads/German%20NAPCP%20review%20report.pdf
Tagesschau. 2022. “Großstädter klagen für sauberere Luft.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundesverfassungsgericht-klage-saubere-
luft-101.html.

Policy Efforts and Commitment to Preserving Ecosystems and Protecting Biodiversity

BMEL. 2023. “Bio-Strategie 2030, Nationale Strategie für 30 Prozent ökologische Land- und Lebensmittelwirtschaft bis 2030.”
https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Broschueren/bio-strategie-2030.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7
BMEL. 2023. “Boosting Organic Farming: Developing the 2030 Organic Farming Strategy.”
https://www.bmel.de/EN/topics/farming/organic-farming/strategy-future-organic-farming.html
BMUV. 2023. “Federal Action Plan on Nature-based Solutions for Climate and Biodiversity.”
https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Pools/Broschueren/ank_publikation_en_bf.pdf
BMUV. 2023. “Nationale Strategie zur Biologischen Vielfalt.” https://www.bmuv.de/themen/naturschutz/allgemeines-/-
strategien/nationale-strategie
Ocean Health Index. 2020. “Global Ocean Health Index Scores.” https://ohi-science.org/ohi-global/scores
Umweltbundesamt. 2023. “Indicator: Species Diversity and Landscape Quality.” https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/data/environmental-
indicators/indicator-species-diversity-landscape-quality#at-a-glance

Policy Efforts and Commitment to a Global Environmental Policy

BMUV. 2023. “Emissionen senken, global handeln, Chancen ergreifen: Die Klimaaußenpolitikstrategie der Bundesregierung.”
https://www.bmuv.de/pressemitteilung/emissionen-senken-global-handeln-chancen-ergreifen-die-klimaaussenpolitikstrategie-der-
bundesregierung
BMZ. 2023a. “NDC-Partnerschaft.” https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/klimawandel-und-entwicklung/ndc-partnerschaft
SGI 2024 | 116 Germany Report

BMZ. 2023. “Optimised Stoves Reduce Carbon Footprints.” https://www.bmz.de/en/issues/climate-change-and-development/climate-

financing/example-kenya-senegal-79816
DEval. 2023. “Goals and Functions.” https://www.deval.org/en/about-us/the-institute/goals-and-functions
Die Bundesregierung. 2023. “Die Klimaaußenpolitik-Strategie der Bundesregierung.” https://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/blob/2633110/7d086ff77b692c97eb0ea82d689d6bd9/kap-strategie-data.pdf
Eurostat. 2022. “Contribution to the International 100bn USD Commitment on Climate Related Expenditures.”
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg_13_50/default/table?lang=en
IKI. 2023. “About the IKI.” https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/en/about-iki/
KfW. 2024. “Integrated Financing for Green Hydrogen – A Perfect Fit and from a Single Source.” https://www.kfw-
entwicklungsbank.de/Our-topics/PtX/
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