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the phenomenal basis of intentionalit y
 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
s e r i e s e d i t o r: David J. Chalmers, Australian National University
and New York University

Thinking Without Words Perceiving the World

José Luis Bermúdez Bence Nanay (editor)

Identifying the Mind The Contents of Visual Experience

U.T. Place (author), George Graham, Susanna Siegel
Elizabeth R. Valentine (editors) The Senses
Fiona Macpherson (editor)
Purple Haze
Joseph Levine Attention is Cognitive Unison
Christopher Mole
Three Faces of Desire
Timothy Schroeder Consciousness and the Prospects of
Physicalism
A Place for Consciousness Derk Pereboom
Gregg Rosenberg
Introspection and Consciousness
Ignorance and Imagination Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (editors)
Daniel Stoljar The Conscious Brain
Jesse J. Prinz
Simulating Minds
Alvin I. Goldman Decomposing the Will
Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein,
Gut Reactions and Tillmann Vierkant (editors)
Jesse J. Prinz
Phenomenal Intentionality
Phenomenal Concepts and Uriah Kriegel (editor)
Phenomenal Knowledge
The Peripheral Mind
Torin Alter, Sven Walter (editors)
István Aranyosi
Beyond Reduction The Innocent Eye
Steven Horst Nico Orlandi
What Are We? Does Perception Have Content?
Eric T. Olson Berit Brogaard (editor)

Supersizing the Mind The Varieties of Consciousness

Andy Clark Uriah Kriegel
Panpsychism
Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion
Edited by Godehard Brüntrup and
William Fish
Ludwig Jaskolla
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind Consciousness and Fundamental Reality
Robert D. Rupert Philip Goff
The Character of Consciousness Seeing and Saying
David J. Chalmers Berit Brogaard
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

The Phenomenal Basis of

Intentionality
Angela Mendelovici

1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–0–19–086380–7

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
To David, Eleni, and Vera
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Contents

Preface xi
Overview xv

part one introduction

1. Fixing Reference on Intentionality 3
1.1. Aboutness and Directedness 3
1.2. The Ostensive Way of Fixing Reference 5
1.3. Other Ways of Fixing Reference 9
1.4. Worries with the Ostensive Definition 14
1.5. Conclusion 19

2. Goals and Methodology 21

2.1. What is a Theory of Intentionality? 21
2.2. Theory-Independent Access to Intentionality 23
2.3. Conclusion 28

part two alternative theories of intentionality

3. The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories 33
3.1. Tracking Theories 33
3.2. Overview of the Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories 35
3.3. Background and Assumptions 36
3.4. A Mismatch Case: Perceptual Color Representations 38
3.5. Other Mismatch Cases 44
3.6. Objections 46
3.7. Reliable Misrepresentation and the Significance of Tracking 57

vii
viii Contents

3.8. Conclusion 59
Appendix A: Objections to the Mismatch Problem 59

4. Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again 70

4.1. The Functional Role Theory 71
4.2. Worries with Short-Arm Functional Role Theories 72
4.3. Worries with Long-Arm Functional Role Theories 76
4.4. The Real Problem with Both Tracking Theories and Functional
Role Theories 79
4.5. Conclusion 80

part three the phenomenal intentionality theory

5. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 83
5.1. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 84
5.2. Arguments for PIT 86
5.3. Identity PIT 93
5.4. Challenging Cases 97
5.5. Conclusion 100
Appendix B: The Extent of Phenomenal Intentionality 101
Appendix C: The Multiple Arisability of Intentional States 104

6. PIT’s Status as a Theory of Intentionality 109

6.1. Is PIT a Theory of Intentionality in Terms of Phenomenal Consciousness? 109
6.2. Is PIT Trivial? 114
6.3. Is PIT Interesting? 115
6.4. Is PIT Naturalistic? 116
6.5. Conclusion 119

part four challenging cases

7. Thought 123
7.1. The Challenge for PIT from Thought 124
7.2. Thoughts’ Phenomenal Contents 127
7.3. Self-Ascriptivism about Thoughts’ Alleged Contents 139
7.4. Is Derived Mental Representation a Type of Intentionality? 152
7.5. Conclusion: PIT about Thought 154
Appendix D: Derived Mental Representation in Perception 154
Appendix E: Attitudes 156
 Contents ix

8. Nonconscious States 160

8.1. The Problem with Nonconscious States 161
8.2. Derivativist Strategies 163
8.3. Standing States 169
8.4. Allegedly Nonconscious Occurrent States 184
8.5. Conclusion 191

part five the aspect view

9. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content? 195
9.1. The Relation View and the Aspect View 196
9.2. Two Worries with the Relation View 200
9.3. The Alleged Virtues of the Relation View 206
9.4. Conclusion 229
Appendix F: The Aspect View and Adverbialism 230
Appendix G: Contents as First- or Second-Order States or Properties 232
Appendix H: An Internal Theory of Truth and Reference 235

part six conclusion

10. Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena 243
10.1. Return to Other Ways of Fixing Reference on Intentionality 244
10.2. Radical Internalism 247

glossary 249
bibliography 255
index 267
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Preface

this project began 15 years ago when, as an undergraduate at McGill, I set

out to write my undergraduate thesis on phenomenal consciousness. After reading
David Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind, I decided that there wasn’t much more for
me to say on phenomenal consciousness and resolved to steer clear of the topic. So I
turned to the problem of intentionality. But I soon came to realize that attempts to
understand intentionality independently of phenomenal consciousness ultimately
fail. What’s more, I came to believe that intentionality is in fact one and the same
thing as phenomenal consciousness. I wrote my undergraduate thesis on precisely
this topic (and the idealist consequences I took to ensue), and then my PhD thesis
on this same topic again (minus the idealism). This book is the culmination of these
efforts.

The ideas presented here have benefited from practically every philosophical inter-
action I have ever had with friends, colleagues, students, and mentors at McGill
University, Princeton University, the Australian National University, the University
of Western Ontario, and elsewhere. I was especially lucky to benefit from the excep-
tionally rich intellectual environment at the Australian National University, where I
spent time as a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for Consciousness and as a visitor.
Many of the ideas in this book have been presented in talks I have given at the
Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference (2008 and 2011), the European
Congress of Analytic Philosophy (2011), the 23rd World Congress of Philosophy at
xi
xii Preface

the University of Athens, the Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting (2013,

2014, and 2017), the Pacific American Association of Philosophy Meeting (2013),
Princeton University, the Australian National University, the University of Toronto,
the University of Melbourne, the University of Western Australia, the Central Eu-
ropean University, the University of Crete, Oakland University, Victoria University
at Wellington, Tulane University, the University of Texas at Austin, the University
of Waterloo, Cornell University, the University of Washington at St. Louis, the
University of Minnesota, CUNY, the University of Wisconsin–Madison, Yeshiva
University, Wellesley College, Wayne State University, Charles Sturt University,
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, and the University of Western Ontario. I thank the
audiences at those talks, and especially my commentators Mike Collins, Tim Crane,
Janette Dinishak, Mark Herr, David Ivy, Charles Siewert, and Brad Thompson for
their helpful and incisive commentaries and our subsequent discussions.
I am especially indebted to the Phenomenal Intentionality Reading Group— Tim
Bayne, David Bourget, Rob Stainton, and Chris Viger—for reading an early version
of this manuscript and providing valuable criticisms and concrete suggestions on
both content and presentation. The final version grew out of our many discussions.
I am also extremely thankful to Charles Siewert, Declan Smithies, Laura Gow, and
Adam Pautz for reading this manuscript in its entirety and providing extremely help-
ful and incisive feedback. Thanks also to Daniel Stoljar and the ANU Philosophy
of Mind Work-in-Progress Group for reading and discussing several chapters of this
work and providing extremely helpful feedback. I am also thankful to those who
read and provided helpful comments on ancestors of various chapters, especially
Frank Jackson, Gilbert Harman, Jack Woods, Adam Pautz, Uriah Kriegel, David Pitt,
Philipp Koralus, Jimmy Martin, Paul Benacerraf, Anthony Appiah, Gideon Rosen,
Jeff Speaks, and David Davies.
This book has also benefited from numerous discussions that have helped me see
many issues in a new light. Thank you to Derek Baker, Sam Baker, John Bengson,
Mark Budolfson, David Chalmers, Tim Crane, Kati Farkas, Bill Fish, Tamar
Gendler, Terry Horgan, Josh Knobe, Dan Korman, Uriah Kriegel, John Maier, Carla
Merino, Matthew Moss, Daniel Nolan, Gurpreet Rattan, Susanna Schellenberg,
Vanessa Schouten, Daniel Stoljar, Jackie Sullivan, and Bas van Fraassen.
I am especially grateful to my dissertation supervisors, Frank Jackson and Gil
Harman, for encouraging me to write the dissertation I wanted to write, which
formed the basis of this book, and to my undergraduate thesis supervisor, David
Davies, for encouraging me to write the undergraduate thesis I wanted to write,
which formed the basis of my dissertation. I owe special thanks to Jeff Speaks, who
raised an objection to my undergraduate thesis in 2004 that inspired the views
 Preface xiii

defended in Chapter 7, and to David Chalmers, who suggested that my ideas might
work well as a book.
I owe special gratitude to my parents, Lina and Marius, for exemplifying both
insight and rigor in academic work and for their love, support, and confidence in me.
I am especially grateful to my mother and my family in Greece—especially Giagia,
Maria, and Tryphon—for creating a near utopian work environment for me at our
summer house. Most of this book (as well as the theses it is based on) was written
there.
The editors and production team at OUP have been tremendously helpful
throughout the publication process. Thanks especially to Peter Ohlin, David
Chalmers, Isla Ng, Raj Suthan, Thomas McCarthy, and Sangeetha Vishwanthan.
My greatest debt by far is to David Bourget, my partner, frequent co-author,
and (near) doppelgänger. When I first met David in 2008, I was surprised to find
someone with almost exactly the same philosophical views as me. This book has been
heavily influenced by all our discussions throughout the years, due to which our views
have almost entirely converged (some residual disagreements remain concerning the
material of Chapter 9). David has read every chapter of this book multiple times and
discussed every single idea in it with me, providing helpful criticisms and even more
helpful constructive suggestions, and in many cases spending hours and days helping
me work through key ideas. I am immensely thankful for all his help, as well as for
his unwavering moral support and encouragement.
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Overview

the aim of this book is to defend a radically internalist theory of intentionality,

the aboutness or directedness of mental states, on which intentionality is simply
identical to phenomenal consciousness, which is an intrinsic, non-relational feature
of mental life. This view has been described to me as obviously false, unfashionable,
and flying in the face of everyday intuition and cognitive science. It has also been
described to me as trivially true and uninteresting. I aim to defend a version of this
view that is true but not trivial, interesting but not false, and surprisingly conciliatory
with our intuitive and scientific understanding of the mind.
My target, intentionality, can be understood as the observed “aboutness” or
“directedness” of mental states. We introspectively notice that many mental states in
some way or other seem to “present,” “represent,” or be “about” things. For example,
you might notice that your current visual experiences represent a page before you,
some marks of various shapes and colors, and perhaps the words that these marks
form. You might also notice that your current thoughts represent that there is a page
with marks and words before you, something to do with your own mental states, or
a need for a cup of coffee. Intentionality, roughly, is this phenomenon of aboutness
or directedness that we notice in these and other everyday cases.
My aim is to offer a theory of intentionality, a theory that describes the deep
nature of intentionality, or, in other words, that tells us what intentionality really
is, metaphysically speaking. Examples of theories of intentionality include tracking

xv
xvi Overview

theories, on which the most basic kind of intentionality is a causal or other kind
of tracking relation between internal representations and items in the world (see,
e.g., Dretske 1986 and Fodor 1987), and functional role theories, on which the most
basic kind of intentionality is a matter of internal states’ functional dispositions
with respect to other internal states and perhaps also with respect to items in the
environment (see, e.g., Harman 1987 and Block 1986).
This book proposes a very different kind of theory of intentionality, the phenom-
enal intentionality theory (PIT), which takes the most basic kind of intentionality
to arise from a conceptually distinct mental feature, phenomenal consciousness,
the felt, subjective, or “what it’s like” (Nagel 1974) aspect of mental life. This and
related views have recently been defended by various authors, including Horgan
and Tienson (2002), Loar (2003), Farkas (2008b, 2008a), Strawson (2008), Siewert
(1998), Montague (2010), Bourget (2010a), Mendelovici (2010), Kriegel (2011),
Pitt (2004, 2009), Pautz (2013a), and Mendelovici and Bourget (2014), and have
historical roots in the works of Brentano (1874) and Husserl (1900). This book
proposes a version of PIT that is not only motivated on in-principle grounds but also
empirically adequate in that it can accommodate all cases of intentionality, including
those that are commonly thought to pose problems for PIT.
I proceed as follows: Chapter 1 of Part I fixes reference on our target, intentional-
ity. I argue that while the notions of aboutness and directedness gesture toward this
target, they are too fuzzy to provide us with a firm grip on it. I propose to replace
these notions with an ostensive reference-fixing definition, which can be contrasted
with other candidate definitions that take intentionality to be whatever plays certain
roles, such as roles in folk psychological or scientific theories of behavior, roles in
securing truth and reference, or simply roles in explaining how we get around in
the world. On my approach, intentionality is a phenomenon we observe and want
to explain, rather than a posit in a theory primarily aimed at explaining something
else.
Chapter 2 of Part I specifies the kind of theory of intentionality we are after and
describes two theory-independent ways of knowing about our intentional states:
introspection and consideration of psychological role.
Part II considers and argues against what I take to be the two main competitors
to my favored approach to intentionality, tracking and functional role theories.
Chapter 3 of Part II argues that tracking theories face a mismatch problem: there
are cases in which we represent a content that does not match anything we can
plausibly be said to track. The tracking theory, then, is empirically inadequate, since
it cannot accommodate all the required cases. Chapter 4 of Part II argues that the
mismatch problem also afflicts the best versions of the functional role theory. Now,
while the mismatch problem shows that the tracking theory and the best versions of
 Overview xvii

the functional role theory are false, it does not pinpoint the precise reasons for their
failure. Chapter 4 further argues that the fundamental problem with these theories
is that tracking relations and functional roles simply do not have what it takes to give
rise to intentionality.
Part III turns to my favored approach to intentionality, the phenomenal inten-
tionality theory (PIT), on which the most basic kind of intentionality arises from
phenomenal consciousness. Chapter 5 of Part III presents and motivates PIT. I
argue that, unlike tracking theories and functional role theories, PIT provides the
right kinds of ingredients to account for intentionality and is not clearly empirically
inadequate. I distinguish between different versions of PIT, focusing especially on
my favored version, strong identity PIT, which, roughly, takes every intentional
property to be identical to some phenomenal property. Chapter 6 of Part III
considers and responds to some theoretical worries with PIT, such as that it is not
naturalistic.
Part IV further supports PIT by considering certain challenging cases for the view.
In doing so, it fleshes out my favored version of strong identity PIT and shows
that it is both interesting and tenable. Chapter 7 of Part IV considers the challenge
raised by the case of thoughts, which appear to be rich in intentional content but
poor in phenomenal character. I argue that thoughts have a kind of content that
does indeed arise from their fairly impoverished phenomenal characters, though this
content is correspondingly impoverished. I further argue that, although thoughts do
not phenomenally represent many of their alleged contents, they do the next best
thing: they derivatively represent them. I propose self-ascriptivism, a view on which
we derivatively represent various contents by ascribing them to ourselves, which is a
matter of being disposed to have thoughts accepting ourselves or our phenomenal
contents as representing these further contents. Although, as I argue, the resulting
kind of derived mental representation does not qualify as a kind of intentionality, it
qualifies as a kind of representation on a broad sense of the term.
Another important challenge for PIT is that of accounting for mental states
that we take to be intentional but that appear to have no phenomenal character.
Such states include standing states, like beliefs and desires that we are not currently
entertaining, as well as occurrent states that we are not aware of, such as noncon-
scious states involved in language processing, blindsight, and early visual processing.
Chapter 8 of Part IV addresses these challenges. I argue that standing states are not
genuinely intentional states. However, I also suggest that self-ascriptivism can be
extended to accommodate standing state contents and perhaps even standing states
in their entirety.
xviii Overview

Chapter 8 also argues that many nonconscious occurrent states, such as states
involved in early visual processing, are neither intentional nor derivatively rep-
resentational. While this position might seem fairly extreme, even “flying in the
face of cognitive science,” it is arguably very much in line with the standard view
on the matter. It agrees with the standard view that such occurrent states track
or carry information about various items in the environment and play various
functional roles, and it also agrees that they represent various items, if all we mean
by “representation” is something that boils down to tracking, carrying information,
or having a functional role. The key disagreement with the standard view does not
concern nonconscious occurrent states, but rather conscious occurrent states.
Part V, which consists in only one chapter, Chapter 9, turns to the question of
whether intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing entities that play the role of
content or whether, instead, intentionality is simply an aspect of intentional states
or subjects. I argue in favor of the latter aspect view of intentionality. While it might
be thought that the alternative relation view has various virtues that the aspect view
lacks, such as according with common sense, allowing for public contents, helping us
make sense of structured intentional states, and accounting for conditions of truth
and reference, I argue that the aspect view fares no worse than the relation view when
it comes to these alleged virtues.
The main goal of this book is to offer, flesh out, and defend a theory of
intentionality, but it also has a secondary aim. As I mentioned above, Chapter 1
will argue that it is possible to get a good grip on the phenomenon of intentionality
without defining it in terms of truth and reference, our abilities to get around in
the world, folk psychology, or the scientific study of the mind. Throughout this
book, I return to these alleged roles of intentionality and argue that it turns out that
most of them are not in fact played by intentionality itself but by various closely
related phenomena: The relevant ability to get around in the world is explained by a
combination of factors, including intentionality and tracking relations; the notions
of representation implicit in folk psychology don’t correspond to intentionality but
to some combination of intentionality and derived representation; conditions of
truth and reference might end up requiring something more than merely having
intentional states, like a primitive correspondence relation or our specifications of
how we’d like to be interpreted; and the notions of representation invoked in the
mind-brain sciences are often a matter of tracking relations and functional roles.
The concluding chapter, Chapter 10, returns to the alleged roles of intentionality
and summarizes these findings. The end result is a picture on which intentionality,
as picked out ostensively, is a matter of phenomenal consciousness, and the various
other roles intentionality is sometimes thought to play are in fact often played by
distinct, although sometimes closely related, phenomena.
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

I Introduction

my aim is to provide a theory of intentionality. Before comparing com-

peting theories of intentionality, it is important to fix firmly on our target
and to get clear on what kind of theory we are after. Chapter 1 proposes
an ostensive way of fixing reference on intentionality, while Chapter 2
specifies what kind of theory we want and overviews two sources of
theory-independent knowledge of intentionality that we can use to test our
theories: introspection and considerations of psychological role.
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

1 Fixing Reference on Intentionality

the aim of this book is to provide a theory of intentionality. The aim of this
chapter is to clarify just what a theory of intentionality is a theory of. It is important to
get clear on this before we start. A theory of intentionality is a theory that tells us that
intentionality has a particular nature, but if it is unclear just what “intentionality”
refers to, then it is unclear what it is that such a theory says has that nature.
I propose to get clear on our target by defining it ostensively using introspectively
accessible paradigm cases. My ostensive definition can be contrasted with alternative
definitions that may or may not end up picking out the same thing. I will suggest
that the ostensive definition does a better job of capturing the core notion we are
interested in. But first, I will say something about why common characterizations
of intentionality in terms of “aboutness” and “directedness,” though they succeed
in gesturing toward our target, do not provide a satisfactory way of fixing firmly
upon it.

1.1 Aboutness and Directedness

.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Intentionality is sometimes characterized, at least as a first pass, as the “aboutness” or

“directedness” of mental states (and perhaps other items) to things that may or may
3
4 Part I: Introduction

not exist. We might say that a perceptual experience of a cup is “directed” at a cup,
that a thought that it is raining is “about” the putative fact that it is raining, and that
a belief in Santa Claus is “about” Santa Claus or the putative fact that Santa Claus
exists.
This characterization of intentionality has roots in an oft-cited passage from
Brentano, who is often credited with introducing the notion of intentionality to
contemporary discussions:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the

Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object,
and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a
content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here
as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon
includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the
same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is
affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.
(Brentano 1874, p. 88)

There are many examples of contemporary characterizations of intentionality in

terms of “aboutness” and “directedness.” For instance, Siewert (2006) writes: “In-
tentionality has to do with the directedness or aboutness of mental states—the fact
that, for example, one’s thinking is of or about something” (p. 1). Similarly, Speaks
(2010b) writes: “The closest thing to a synonym for intentionality is ‘aboutness’;
something exhibits intentionality if and only if it is about something” (p. 398).1
In light of the widespread acceptance of such characterizations of intentionality
in terms of aboutness and related notions, I will take it as given that such charac-
terizations at least gesture toward the phenomenon of interest. However, despite
this, the characterization of intentionality in terms of aboutness or directedness
would not make a good definition, not even a good reference-fixing definition, of
“intentionality.” As a definition of “intentionality,” it is too fuzzy and metaphorical
to give us a firm grip on our target. It is simply not clear what is being said when we
say that a mental state is “directed at” or “about” something, especially if this thing
need not exist. An experience of a cup is not literally pointed in the direction of a
cup (which may not even exist), in the way that a finger or an arrow might point to
a cup, and a thought is not literally pointed in the direction of a proposition, which
might be an abstract entity having no spatial location at all. If we take “aboutness”

1
For additional representative examples of this way of characterizing intentionality, see Jacob 2003,
Byrne 2006, Kim 1998, p. 21, Searle 2004, p. 112, and O’Madagain 2014.
 Chapter 1: Fixing Reference on Intentionality 5

and “directedness” talk to supply a definition of “intentionality,” it is simply not clear

what this definition says.2

1.2 The Ostensive Way of Fixing Reference

.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Although “aboutness” and “directedness” talk do not provide us with a satisfactory

definition of “intentionality,” they do gesture toward the phenomenon of interest. I
want to suggest that what is doing the work when we use “aboutness” and “direct-
edness” talk to fix on intentionality is a prior grasp we have on the phenomenon.
My suggestion for defining “intentionality,” then, is to look past our descriptions of
this phenomenon in terms of aboutness and related notions and focus instead on
the phenomenon thus described. This is possible because we have a special access
to this mental feature independent of any fuzzy or metaphorical descriptions: We
can directly notice it through introspection, at least in some cases. This allows us
to ostensively define “intentionality” as this feature, whatever it is, that we at least
sometimes notice in ourselves and are tempted to describe using representational
terms like “aboutness” and “directedness.”
In order to flesh out this suggestion, let us begin by considering some cases of
mental states that we are tempted to describe using representational terms like
“aboutness” and “directedness.” Take your present perceptual experiences: You might
be visually experiencing some marks on a page, pens on your desk, or parts of your
body. Likewise, you might be enjoying auditory experiences of voices, music, or
various noises. These experiences have a certain feature, a feature we are tempted
to describe using representational terms like “aboutness,” “directedness,” “ofness,” or
“saying something.” We might describe these experiences as being “of ” or “about”
things or ways things are or might be, or as “saying” that things are a particular way.
We might say they are “about” some marks on a page, that they “say” that these marks
are in front of you, and so on.
Now consider the thoughts you are currently having. You might be thinking
about your experiences, desiring another cup of coffee, or judging that I am pointing
out the obvious. Like perceptual experiences, these thoughts have a feature that it is
tempting to describe using representational terms. We might describe these thoughts
as being “about” things or as “saying” that things are a certain way. We might say that

2
Chisholm (1957a) criticizes Brentano’s definition as being too fuzzy and suggests instead a linguistic
criterion of intentionality. Speaks (2010b) also argues that we should not define “intentionality” in terms
of aboutness; see also n. 5.
6 Part I: Introduction

they are “about” our experiences, that they “say” that I am pointing out the obvious,
etc.3
The above examples show that we have mental states that have a certain feature
that we at least sometimes introspectively notice and are tempted to describe
using representational terms, such as “about,” “of,” “represent,” “present,” and “saying
something.” That feature, whatever it is, is intentionality.
We can put things more precisely as follows: Call the mundane, everyday cases
such as those described above our paradigm cases of intentionality. These are the
cases that will form our initial sample of cases of intentionality for the purposes of
our ostensive definition. Then we can fix reference on our target as follows:

Intentionality The feature that in paradigm cases we sometimes both (i) notice
introspectively in ourselves and (ii) are tempted to describe using representa-
tional terms, such as “about,” “of,” “represent,” “present,” or “saying something.”4

It is important to emphasize that the feature picked out by my definition is

the feature of paradigm cases that we at least sometimes both introspectively
notice and are tempted to describe representationally. This allows that there are
features of paradigm cases that we either introspectively notice or are tempted to
describe representationally, but not both, and that do not qualify as intentional. For
example, the definition does not by itself rule out the view that paradigm cases have
introspectively accessible phenomenal features that are distinct from intentionality.
It is also important to emphasize that, although we are using introspection to fix
reference on intentionality, the ostensive definition does not rule out the possibility
of instances of intentionality that are not introspectively accessible, or even instances
of intentionality that are not mental. Such cases would not be paradigm cases of
intentionality, but they would nonetheless be cases of intentionality so long as
they had the relevant feature exemplified by paradigm cases. For example, as far
as my definition is concerned, it could turn out that nonconscious beliefs and
the nonconscious states posited by cognitive science, which, presumably, are not
introspectively accessible, are instances of intentionality. For the same reasons, the
ostensive definition does not rule out the possibility of instances of intentionality
that we are not tempted to describe representationally. For example, it does not rule
out the possibility of moods and afterimages being instances of intentionality, even
though we (arguably) are not tempted to describe them representationally.

3
I take the category of thoughts to include occurrent beliefs, occurrent desires, and other occurrent
“cognitive” states but not standing beliefs, standing desires, or other standing states. See §1.4.2.
4
Definitions of key terms can be found in the glossary on p. 249.
 Chapter 1: Fixing Reference on Intentionality 7

The ostensive definition arguably both does justice to the intuition behind
the characterization of intentionality in terms of “aboutness” and “directedness”
and is an improvement over a definition of “intentionality” in terms of this
characterization. If I am right, “aboutness” talk aims to characterize a phenomenon
that we have an antecedent grasp on. My ostensive definition picks out precisely
that phenomenon, so it does justice to the intuition behind characterizations of
intentionality in terms of “aboutness” and “directedness.” It offers an improvement
over a definition of “intentionality” in terms of such characterizations, since it fixes
firmly on our target. Unlike a definition of “intentionality” simply as aboutness or
directedness, it avoids being fuzzy or metaphorical, since it merely mentions our fuzzy
and metaphorical representational terms rather than use them. (Of course, it uses the
term “representational term,” but this is a term picking out a class of terms rather than
a representational term itself.)5
We can use this ostensive definition of “intentionality” to define some related
notions: Intentional properties are ways things are or might be with respect to their
intentionality, or intentional ways things are or might be, and intentional states are
instantiations of intentional properties. As I am using the terms, intentional states
are not the same thing as intentional mental states, which are mental states that
include, but may not be exhausted by, the instantiation of intentional properties.
For example, a judgment that grass is green might involve the instantiation of the
intentional property of representing that grass is green together with a particular
non-intentional “judgment” component. So, it is an intentional mental state but not
an intentional state.6
What intentional properties and intentional states “say” or are “directed at” are
their intentional contents. More precisely, we can think of intentional content as

5
One might object that “aboutness” talk gestures at reference rather than at the ostensively defined
phenomenon (but see Crane 2013, pp. 8–9, for a convincing argument against this). After all, one might
argue, we sometimes say that mental states that fail to refer, like a thought that Santa Claus exists, are
not really about anything at all.
Now, we might agree that “aboutness” talk is sometimes used to pick out reference but disagree that
this means that “aboutness” talk, when used to characterize intentionality, gestures at reference, since
whatever “aboutness” talk is supposed to gesture at is normally taken to include mental states in which
there is a failure of reference, such as the thought that Santa Claus exists. In any case, if “aboutness”
talk is normally used to pick out reference, this only further supports my claim that characterizations of
intentionality in terms of “aboutness” would not provide an adequate definition of intentionality. Speaks
(2010b) makes a similar point, arguing that for such reasons the “characterization of intentionality as
aboutness is only true to a first approximation” (p. 398).
6
The term “intentional state” is often used to mean what I mean by “intentional mental state.” I deviate
from this usage because my discussion focuses on instantiations of intentional properties, so it is useful
for me to reserve the term “intentional state” for them.
8 Part I: Introduction

follows: When we introspectively notice intentional states, we notice the general

phenomenon that we are tempted to describe as “directedness” or “saying some-
thing.” But we also notice something we are tempted to describe as what our mental
states are “directed at” or what they “say”; this is their (intentional) content.7 When
a state, property, or other item has a certain intentional content, we can say that it
(intentionally) represents that content.8 For example, the judgment that grass is
green represents the content <grass is green>.9
It is worth emphasizing that my starting point is fairly noncommittal in that
my definition of “intentionality” and the introspective observations it is based
on do not prejudge questions concerning the nature of intentionality. As far as
they are concerned, intentionality might end up being a causal or other tracking
relation, a matter of the functional roles of internal states, or a matter of phenomenal
consciousness. My starting point is neutral on these and other possible views of
intentionality. Likewise, my starting point does not prejudge questions concerning
the nature of contents. Contents might turn out to be ordinary objects and proper-
ties, propositions, facts, sense data, ideas in a world of forms, ways of representing,
properties of intentional states, or even intentional states or properties themselves.
Relatedly, my starting point does not prejudge any issues regarding the vehicles
of intentionality, which are the bearers of intentional properties. The vehicles of
intentionality could turn out to be, for example, subjects, symbols in a language of
thought, brain states, internal states, or immaterial souls.
For simplicity, however, I will assume that the vehicles of intentionality are
internal items that I will call (mental) representations. Since different intentional
states involve different vehicles of representation, this way of speaking allows us to
talk about intentional states while remaining noncommittal on their contents, which
is useful when the content of a particular intentional state is under dispute.10

7
When we introspectively notice intentionality, we do so at least in part by introspectively noticing our
contents. Indeed, it might be that there is nothing more to notice when we notice intentionality than
these intentional contents.
8
I sometimes use “represent” more broadly to describe representation-like phenomena that are not
instances of intentionality, but context should disambiguate. The alternative would be to use a special
term, like “intend,” for having an intentional content, but this would be too awkward.
9
Contents might include propositional contents, like <grass is green>, but might also include proprietal
or objectual contents, like <green> and <George> (see Montague 2007, Grzankowski 2013, and
Mendelovici 2018, MS). (The notions of objectual and proprietal contents are something like Crane’s
(2013) notions of contents and objects, respectively, though not equivalent.)
10
In what follows, I will also sometimes assume something like a language of thought view (Fodor 1975),
on which there are subpropositional vehicles of representation, like red and cat, which come together
to constitute complex vehicles of representation representing complex contents. Apart from, I think,
being largely correct, this assumption provides a useful way of talking about our particular representa-
 Chapter 1: Fixing Reference on Intentionality 9

1.3 Other Ways of Fixing Reference

.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

I have recommended an ostensive way of fixing firmly upon the phenomenon that
the fuzzy and metaphorical notions of aboutness and directedness merely gesture
toward. This section considers some alternative ways of defining “intentionality”
and shows that they might not pick out the same thing as the ostensive definition
(§§1.3.1–1.3.4). It then argues that if what we are interested in is the phenomenon that
“aboutness” talk gestures at, the ostensive definition is preferable to these alternatives
(§1.3.5).

1.3.1 folk psychology

One approach to intentionality defines it in terms of its role in a third-personal folk

psychological, or common sense, theory of mind and behavior. We attribute beliefs,
desires, and other mental states to each other, and we take these states to be related
to one another in various ways and to have various other features. A definition of
“intentionality” in terms of folk psychology takes intentionality to be whatever plays
a particular role in such a folk psychological theory.11
Such a definition might not pick out the same thing as the ostensive definition.
For instance, it could turn out that what the ostensive definition picks out lacks
some of the extra features attributed to it by folk psychology. If these features are
considered crucial by folk psychology, then the folk psychological notion will not
pick out the ostensively defined phenomenon. For example, it could turn out that
the ostensively defined phenomenon does not play certain causal roles considered
crucial by folk psychology.
The folk psychological definition and the ostensive definition might also pick
out different things if the folk psychological definition fails to pick out anything
at all. Suppose that folk psychology is hopelessly false. Then its theoretical terms,
including those putatively referring to intentional states, will fail to refer, and it will
turn out that what it calls “intentionality” does not exist.12 But the ostensively defined

tional capacities via their alleged vehicles. However, this assumption, along with the assumption that
vehicles are internal items, can be discharged by replacing talk of mental representations with the more
awkward talk of intentional capacities and amending my discussion appropriately. See Ryder 2009 for
a useful overview of different views of the structure of representations.
11
See Sellars 1956, Lewis 1974, Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, and Fodor 1987 for this way of fixing
reference on intentionality.
12
Paul and Patricia Churchland argue that folk psychology is false and hence that its posits fail to refer
(see, e.g., Churchland 1981). If they are right, and if we take intentionality to be merely a posit in folk
10 Part I: Introduction

phenomenon might still exist. So, the folk psychological notion might fail to pick
out the same thing as the ostensive definition.

1.3.2 the mind-brain sciences

Another approach to intentionality takes it to be a posit in scientific approaches

to the mind and brain. For instance, some approaches in cognitive science aim to
explain mental processes and behavior in terms of operations over internal states that
are described as carrying information or “representing” various contents, and it is
not uncommon for neuroscientific theories to speak of neural structures as carrying
information about or “representing” their causes. A suggestion for an alternative way
of picking out our target, then, takes intentionality to be a posit in the mind-brain
sciences.13
There are interesting questions in the philosophy of science surrounding the
notions of representation operative in various disciplines and research programs.
What are these notions of representation? What roles do they play? Do different
research programs use the same notion of representation? Some philosophers
explicitly claim to be trying to answer these types of questions and not the types
of questions I’m concerned with.14
It could turn out that this approach picks out the same thing as the phenomenon
we noticed introspectively in ourselves. But it also might turn out that the best
elucidations of the notions implicit in the mind-brain sciences pick out different
features of internal states than the one we ostensively picked out through introspec-
tive observation. One prima facie reason to think this might be the case is that it
makes sense to ascribe at least some of the kinds of representational states operative
in the mind-brain sciences to artifacts that we might not really believe to have
genuine intentional powers, such as calculators and computers. This suggests that, at
best, the ostensively defined phenomenon is a species of whatever representational
phenomenon is picked out by the mind-brain sciences. At worst, it is something else
entirely.

psychology, then it will turn out that there is no intentionality. (Note that the Churchlands do not think
there are no intentional states of any sort; see Churchland 1989b.)
13
See, e.g., Fodor 1987, Millikan 1984, and Cummins 1994. Note that Fodor takes intentionality to be a
posit in computational cognitive science, as well as a posit in folk psychology; on his view, cognitive
science and folk psychology point to the same thing.
14
Cummins (1994, pp. 278–279), for instance, specifically claims to be describing a notion of repre-
sentation that is useful for computational theories of cognition but not necessarily for the kinds of
representation implicit in folk psychology.
Other documents randomly have
different content
 TO W TV SEND 1359 Elizabeth Barnard Price, the mother of
the subject of this sketch, was a daughter of John Richards Price, of
Chichester, Delaware county, and his wife, Elizabeth (Barnard) Price,
a descendant of Richard Barnard, who with his wife Frances, came
from Sheffield, England, in 1682, and settled in Middletown
township, Chester county, on a plantation surveyed to him in 1683.
Mrs. Townsend's parents died when she was a child and she was
reared in the family of her maternal uncle, General Isaac D. Barnard,
of West Chester, captain in the Fourteenth United States Infantry, in
1812, promoted to major United States Army, June 26, 1813, and
served with distinction during the War of 1812, later brigadier-
general of Pennsylvania Militia, and state senator from Chester
county. Samuel Price, father of John Richards Price, and maternal
great-grancrfather of the subject of this sketch, was a son of John
and Mary (Alricks) Price, and was born in Lower Chichester
township, Chester, now Delaware, county, August 30, 1750. He was
one of the active patriots of Chester county during the Revolution,
being named as the representative of his section of the county as a
member of the Committee of Observation, named at a meeting of
the inhabitants of the county held December 20, 1774, to carry out
the resolve of the Continental Congress held at Carpenters' Hall. He
also rendered active military service in the field as a private in the
company of Captain William Price, in the First Battalion of Chester
County Militia, entering the service of the United States, June 12,
1777, his company being stationed at Chester until July 11, 1777. He
married Ann Richards, and they had a son, John Richards Price.
Washington and Elizabeth Barnard (Price) Townsend had three
children: Rebecca, born August 3, 1840, married, in 1868,
Lieutenant Colonel W. Harvey Brown, United States Army, son of
William and Lydia (Townsend) Brown, the latter a sister to David
Townsend, before mentioned ; Frank Evans Townsend, the subject of
this sketch ; and Harriet E., who, with her two surviving half-sisters,
resides in the old family mansion at West Chester. Frank Evans
Townsend, only son of Hon. Washington and Elizabeth Barnard
(Price) Townsend, was born in West Chester, Pennsylvania, May 13,
1843. He was a student at the West Chester Academy until 1859,
then entered the Preparatory School of Williston Seminary, East
Hampton, Massachusetts, and in 1861 entered the Pennsylvania
Military Academy at West Chester. While a student at the Academy
he enlisted in Company A, Tenth Regiment, Pennsylvania Militia, was
sworn in September 10, 1862, and discharged September 26, 1862.
On his discharge he returned to the Academy, but in response to the
call of Governor Andrew G. Curtin, the war governor of Pennsylvania,
in June, 1863, for the enrollment of sixty thousand additional militia,
on account of General Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, Mr. Townsend
again left the Academy with six other cadets, and in two days
recruited a company of one hundred and twenty-four men,
composed of some of the most prominent citizens of West Chester,
to man the Academy battery of six pieces, and enter the service in
defense of the state. The company was accepted by the governor
and was mustered into service, July 1, 1863, as the "Independent
Artillery of Pennsylvania", officered by Cadet George R. Guss, as
captain, Cadet Frank E. Townsend, as senior first lieutenant; William
E. Barber, as
 1360 TOWN SEND junior first lieutenant, and Rev. William
E. Moore, as senior second lieutenant. The company served under
the command of Major General Couch, in the Cumberland Valley,
until mustered out, August 24, 1863. On completing his education,
Mr. Townsend engaged in business in Philadelphia where he has
since resided, and is a general insurance broker with offices in the
Real Estate Trust Building at Broad and Chestnut streets. He is a
member of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, and of the Pennsylvania
Society of Sons of the Revolution, in right of his great-grandfather,
Samuel Price. He is also a member of the Masonic fraternity, and of
various social and semi-political organizations. Mr. Townsend
married, October 14, 1869, Mary Tindall, daughter of Charles and
Louise (Tindall) Heller, and a great-granddaughter of Jacob Heller,
(born March 6, 1750, died October 8, 1822) who served as
lieutenant of the Seventh Company, Fifth Battalion, Northampton
County Militia, in the Revolutionary War, and afterwards as a captain
in the Second Battalion of the same county, in whose right Mrs.
Townsend is a Daughter of the American Revolution. Mr. and Mrs.
Townsend have one daughter, Marie Louise Townsend.
 WILLIAM RIGHTER FISHER William Righter Fisher, of the
Philadelphia Bar, is of German, Welsh and Scotch-Irish descent, and
his ancestors on different lines were early settlers within the limits of
what was originally Philadelphia county and adjoining parts of
Chester county. He is a great-grandson of Francis Fisher, who served
in the Pennsylvania Navy during the Revolutionary War ; grandson of
William Cornog and Elizabeth (Righter) Fisher, and son of William A.
and Sarah Pennypacker (Anderson) Fisher, of Lower Merion
township, Montgomery county, Pennsylvania. His mother, Sarah
Pennypacker (Anderson) Fisher, was a daughter of Dr. James
Anderson, of Lower Merion, and Sarah Thomas, his wife ;
granddaughter of Hon. Isaac Anderson, and Mary Lane, his wife;
great-granddaughter of Major Patrick Anderson, of the Revolution,
and great-great-granddaughter of James Anderson, a native of
Scotland, who settled in Chester Valley, near Valley Forge, in the
early part of the eighteenth century, and married Elizabeth Jarman,
daughter of John Jarman, a well-known preacher of the Society of
Friends in Chester county, who had come from Wales in 1685. Major
Patrick Anderson, son of James and Elizabeth (Jarman) Anderson,
was born in Tredyffrin township, Chester county, Pennsylvania, July
14, 1719, and was reared on his father's farm, about two miles from
Valley Forge. He was a captain in the Provincial forces of
Pennsylvania during the French and Indian wars, and at the
beginning of the protest against the oppressive measures of the
British Ministry, was one of the foremost of the public-spirited
patriots of his section, and was selected at the public meeting of the
citizens of Chester county, held at Chester, December 20, 1774, as
one of the first Committee of Observation for the county. When,
however, it was decided to resort to arms to enforce the rights of the
Colonies, Captain Anderson's military training and experience called
him at once to the military branch of the service and he became
major of Chester County Militia, under Colonel Anthony Wayne, and
was commissioned, March 15, 1776, captain in the Pennsylvania
Musketry Battalion commanded by Colonel Samuel J. Atlee, which
after the disastrous campaign on Long Island, when Colonel Atlee
and a large part of his battalion were taken prisoners, was
consolidated with other troops into the State Regiment of Foot, and
on November 12, 1777, into the Thirteenth Pennsylvania Regiment,
Continental Line. Major Anderson was in the battle of Long Island,
and the subsequent engagements about New York, participated in
the retreat across New Jersey, and was with Washington's army
when it marched to intercept Howe's invasion of Philadelphia which
resulted in the battle of Brandywine and the subsequent battle of
Germantown. His term of enlistment having expired, he retired from
the military service, January 1, 1778, while Washington and his army
were encamped near his home at Valley Forge, and took his seat in
the General Assembly of Pennsylvania to which he had been elected
in October preceding, and was regularly reelected to that
 1362 FISHER body until 1780, taking an active part in
legislation and the work of the Committee of Safety, and in providing
means for carrying on the war. In 1781 he was one of the
commissioners appointed to improve the navigation of the river
Schuylkill and filled many other important positions. Honorable Isaac
Anderson, son of Major Patrick Anderson, was a lieutenant of
Chester County Militia during the Revolution, and represented that
county in the General Assembly of Pennsylvania for several years
after the close of the Revolution. He was elected to the United
States Congress in 1806, and reelected in 1808, serving in the
Eighth and Ninth Congresses and was a presidential elector in 1816.
He died October 27, 1838. Hon. Isaac Anderson married Mary Lane,
born in Providence township, Philadelphia, now Montgomery county,
May 22, 1762, daughter of Edward and Sarah (Richardson) Lane,
granddaughter of Samuel Lane, great-granddaughter of Edward and
Anne (Richardson) Lane, and great-great-granddaughter of William
and Cecilia (Love) Lane, of Bristol, England. Edward Lane was the
first settler in Providence township, taking up a large tract of land
lying between the Manor of Gilberts and Van Bebber's township,
Philadelphia, now Montgomery county, where he died in 1710. He
was the founder of St. James Episcopal Church, of Providence.
Edward Lane married Anne Richardson, daughter of Samuel
Richardson, who with his wife Eleanor came from Barbadoes in
1684, and located in Philadelphia, where he died June 10, 1 719. He
was a member of Provincial Council and one of the most prominent
men of his day. Samuel Lane, eldest son of Edward and Anne
(Richardson) Lane, born April 17, 1690, inherited a portion of his
father's land in Providence township and lived there all his life, dying
December 17, 1771. He was a warden of St. James Episcopal
Church, and prominent in local affairs. Edward Lane, son of Samuel
Lane, was born in Providence township, Philadelphia county,
removed shortly prior to the Revolution to Charlestown township,
Chester county, where he died July 8, 181 8, and is buried in the
Anderson burial lot in Schuylkill township. He married, at Christ
Church, Philadelphia, October 14, 1754, his second cousin, Sarah
Richardson, born at Olethgo, Providence township, January 14,
1732, daughter of Edward Richardson of Olethgo, and his wife, Ann
Jones; granddaughter of Joseph and Elizabeth (Bevan) Richardson,
and great-granddaughter of Samuel Richardson, the Provincial
Councilor, before mentioned, and his wife Eleanor. Joseph
Richardson, the son of Samuel and Eleanor Richardson, and paternal
grandfather of Sarah (Richardson) Lane, settled, in 1710, on a tract
of one thousand acres of land called "Olethgo" in Providence
township, adjoining the Lane homestead, purchased in that year of
his brother-in-law, Abraham Bickley. He married Elizabeth, daughter
of John Bevan, and Barbara Aubrey, his wife, who had come from
Treverigg, Glamorganshire, Wales, in 1683, the ancestry of both of
whom has been traced by ex-Governor Samuel W. Pennypacker, back
to Edward III, king of England, and that of John Bevan twelve
generations farther, through several royal lines to the Duke of
Aquitaine. Joseph Richardson died at "Olethgo", December, 175 1,
and his wife, Elizabeth Bevan, died February 27, 1740. They had six
sons and three daughters and have left numerous descendants.
Colonel Josiah Harmer of the Revolution, and
 FISHER 1363 first commander-in-chief of the United States
Army, after Washington, was a great-grandson, through their
daughter Eleanor who married William Harmer. Hon. Isaac Anderson
and his wife Mary Lane had several children, among them Sarah,
born February 9, 1784, died September 13, 1833, who married
Matthias Pennypacker, and for her, Sarah Pennypacker Anderson, the
mother of William Righter Fisher, was named. Dr. James Anderson,
son of Honorable Isaac Anderson and his wife, Mary Lane, and
father of Sarah Pennypacker (Anderson) Fisher, was born in the
Chester Valley, and was for many years a practicing physician in
Lower Merion, Montgomery county. He married Sarah, daughter of
William and Naomi (Walker) Thomas, of Merion township,
Philadelphia county, and a descendant of Rees Thomas, a cousin of
Barbara (Aubrey) Bevan, whose mother, the wife of William Aubrey,
of Pencoed, Wales, was a sister to his father, Rees Thomas. He was
also a nephew of John Bevan, of Treverigg, his mother being a sister
of Bevan. Rees Thomas came to Pennsylvania from Wales prior to
June 18, 1692, on which date he married, at Haverford Meeting, in
the Welsh tract, just over the Philadelphia line in Chester county,
Martha Aubrey, born in Llanelyw, Wales, who came to Pennsylvania
with her relatives, John and Barbara (Aubrey) Bevan, of Treverigg,
Glamorganshire, in 1683. She was a sister to William Aubrey, who
married Letitia, the daughter of William Penn, and a daughter of
William Aubrey, who died December 14, 1716, at the age of ninety
years and is buried at Llanelyw Church, by his wife, Elizabeth
Aubrey, his first cousin, and a descendant of Lord Aubrey, Earle of
Bullen and Marechal of France, who came to England with William of
Normandy in 1066, and whose descendant in the eleventh
generation, William Aubrey, of Aberknfrig, Montgomeryshire, Wales,
who died June 27, 1547, married Jane, daughter of Sir Richard
Herbert, of Montgomery Castle, gentleman usher of Henry VIII, etc.
William Aubrey, he nonogenarian above mentioned, being a great-
greatgrandson of William and Jane (Herbert) Aubrey. Rees Thomas
purchased by deed dated August 15, 1692, three hundred acres in
Merion township, and subsequently purchased other land adjoining,
making a fine plantation, about ten miles west of Philadelphia, the
greater part of which remained in the family four generations, the
original homestead passing to his great-greatgranddaughter, Jane
Cleaver, on the death of her father, William Penn Thomas, in 1840,
other branches of his descendants also retaining parts of the original
tract for a like period. Rees Thomas was a prominent man in the
community, serving several terms in the Colonial Assembly of
Pennsylvania, the first in 1702 and the last in 1720. He was also
commissioned a justice of Philadelphia county, June 14, 1722, and
subsequently recommissioned. His will dated September 10, 1742,
was proven February 12, 1742-43. His wife, Martha Aubrey, whose
ancestry has been already referred to, was a woman much loved
and respected in the community for her benevolent and charitable
works — many years an elder of Haverford Monthly Meeting of
Friends, and a real "mother in Israel" in that community. She died
March 7, 1726-27. She was possessed of considerable poetic and
literary ability, and a quaint little volume of her poems, with a
poetical memorial of her, published in 1727, is still in existence. A
reprint of this volume was
 1364 FISHER issued in 1837, under the supervision of her
great-great-granddaughter, Mary (Thomas) Jones, wife of Jonathan
Jones, of Wynnewood. Rees and Martha (Aubrey) Thomas had five
sons, and one daughter. The eldest son Rees married a daughter of
Dr. Edward Jones, the pioneer of the Welsh Tract in Merion and
Haverford townships. Aubrey Thomas, the second son, married
Guliehna, daughter of William Penn Jr., and granddaughter of the
great Founder of Pennsylvania. William Thomas, the fourth son of
Rees and Martha (Aubrey) Thomas, inherited a portion of the
homestead in Merion, and erected thereon a substantial stone house
near the present Rosemont Station on the Pennsylvania Railroad,
where he lived until his death, June 13, 1776. He married, May 12,
1724, Elizabeth, daughter of David Harry, a Colonial justice of
Chester county, and member of Provincial Assembly from that
county, 1716-17. They had eight children, several of whom have left
descendants. William Thomas is described as "a mild tempered man,
very constant in his attendance of religious meeting". Reese
Thomas, eldest son of William and Elizabeth (Harry) Thomas,
inherited his father's homestead, and erected the old "Mansion
House," which was occupied by his son, William Penn Thomas, until
his death in 1840, and then passed to the latter's daughter, Jane
Cleaver. Reese Thomas married, November 3, 1758, Priscilla Jarman,
or Jermon, as the name is sometimes spelled, only daughter and
heiress of John and Mary Jarman, of Radnor township, and
granddaughter of John Jarman, of Llangerigg, Montgomeryshire,
Wales, who with his wife Margaret brought a certificate dated July
20, 1685, from the Friends Meeting in Radnorshire, which they
deposited at Haverford Meeting. His son John, the father of Priscilla.
was born in Wales, November 12, 1684. His daughter Elizabeth, born
in 1687, became the wife of James Anderson and the mother of
Major Patrick Anderson before mentioned, and his youngest
daughter Sarah, born February 14, 1695-96, married Thomas
Thomas. Edward Jarman, of Philadelphia, the father of Sarah, wife of
Isaac Walker, hereafter mentioned, was probably also a son of John
and Margaret. Sarah (Jarman) Thomas died July 6, 1769, and her
husband, Reese Thomas, did not long survive her, dying in his forty-
fifth year. They had seven children : Mary, married Anthony Tunis, a
descendant of One of the German pioneers of Germantown ;
William, of whom presently ; John, who died without issue ; Hannah,
who lived to old age with her brother William on the homestead ;
Priscilla, who died unmarried ; Reese and Jonathan, who removed to
Kentucky while it was yet a wilderness and reared families there.
William Thomas, the father of Sarah (Thomas) Anderson, and the
maternal great-grandfather of the subject of this sketch, was the
second child and eldest son of Reese and Priscilla (Jarman) Thomas,
and was born in the old Thomas "Mansion House"erected by his
father, July 8, 1762, and lived there all his life. He married, April 5,
1786, Naomi Walker, born February 17, 1765, died May 4, 181 7,
daughter of Joseph and Sarah (Thomas) Walker, granddaughter of
Isaac and Sarah (Jarman) Walker, and great-granddaughter of Lewis
Walker, who had come from Merionethshire, Wales, in 1687, and
settled first in Radnor township, but removed to Tredyffrin township,
Chester
 FISHER 1365 county, where he purchased a plantation
which he named "Rehoboth," and erected the first house thereon, in
which the earliest Friends Meetings of that section were held, by a
dispensation from Haverford Meeting of which Lewis Walker was
long an elder. Here Lewis Walker died in the winter of 1728-29, his
will dated December 14, 1728, being proven January 24, 1728-29.
He had married at Haverford Meeting, April 27, 1693, Mary Morris, a
native of Wales, who is said to have crossed the ocean in the same
ship with him. She survived him and died at "Rehoboth" in 1747.
Isaac Walker, the seventh of the eight children of Lewis and Mary
(Morris) Walker, was born in Radmor, Chester county, March 7, 1705,
and was reared at "Rehoboth," Tredyffrin township, which he
inherited at the death of his mother in 1747, having previously lived,
from the date of his marriage, on an adjoining tract inherited from
his father. He died at "Rehoboth," February 23, 1755. He married,
November 11, 1730, at the house of Hannah Jones, in Tredyffrin,
Sarah Jarman, born in Philadelphia, October 25, 1713, a daughter of
Edward Jarman, who was a resident of Philadelphia, as early as
1703, and who died there September 10, 1714, possibly a son of
John and Elizabeth Jarman before referred to. She married (second),
January 25, 1759, Jacob Thomas, of Willistown, and lived to almost
reach her ninetieth year, dying April 26, 1802. Joseph Walker, the
eldest of the eleven children of Isaac and Sarah (Jarman) Walker,
was born at "Rehoboth," July 25, 1731. He acquired the homestead
on the remarriage of his mother and resided there the remainder of
his life, dying there November 1, 1818, having been totally blind for
several years prior to that date. He married (first) in 1752, Sarah
Thomas, born May 25, 1734, died March 12, 1792, daughter of
Thomas Thomas, born May 12, 1690, died July 13, 1744, and his
wife, Sarah Jarman, born February 14, 1695-96, daughter of John
and Margaret Jarman, the Welsh emigrants of 1685, before
mentioned, and granddaughter of William and Elizabeth Thomas,
also of Welsh ancestry, who were early settlers at Newton, Chester,
(now Delaware) county, Pennsylvania. "Rehoboth," the home of
Joseph and Sarah (Thomas) Walker, was for six months the
headquarters of General Anthony Wayne, while Washington's army
was encamped at the historic Valley Forge, located only a few miles
distant, and General Lafayette and Washington himself were
frequent visitors there. Joseph Walker and his wife were
conscientious and consistent members of the Society of Friends,
and, while he was a man of affairs in the community in which he
lived, he refrained from taking any part in the sanguinary struggle,
though contributing to the best of his ability to the relief of those
suffering privations by reason thereof, without reference to party,
sect or nationality. He suffered considerably from the depredations
of the soldiers until given a guard to protect his property. Mary
(Thomas) Jones, of Wynnewood, writing in 1829 of the life of her
grandparents, Joseph and Sarah (Thomas) Walker, at "Rehoboth"
during the Revolutionary period says, "I have heard many testify in
an uncommon manner of the affectionate and grateful remembrance
they had of the noble and generous acts of kindness and hospitality
extended by my dear grandfather to themselves and others during
the Revolutionary War, and since.
 1366 FISHER They, being members of the Society of
Friends, whose principles would not permit my grandfather to take
an active part, either offensive or defensive in the struggle of that
time, therefore united their efforts to do all in their power to relieve
those that were in trouble or distress, without respect to person or
party, and many were the opportunities for the exercise of the law of
kindness and acts of charity to the poor half clad and shivering
soldiers as well as private individuals, General Wayne having chosen
their house for his headquarters for six months during the winter
that Washington had his army at Valley Forge which was but a few
miles from my grandfather's dwelling. They were of course
surrounded by the American Army and consequently witnessed a
great portion of the distress and suffering of that eventful period".
Joseph Walker married (second) in his old age, Jane, widow of
William Rankin. William and Naomi (Walker) Thomas had nine
children, of whom Sarah, the wife of Dr. James Anderson, was the
third. Mary, the eldest child, became the second wife of Jonathan
Jones, of Wynnewood, a greatgrandson of Dr. Edward Jones, before
mentioned, and was the Mary Jones who wrote the above quoted
account of her maternal grandparents, Joseph and Sarah (Thomas)
Walker, during the Revolution, and who also published, in 1829, a
second edition of the little volume of poems and a memorial of
Martha (Aubrey) Thomas. She also prepared a narrative history of
her family from their arrival in Pennsylvania down to 1829, from
which much of the information given in this sketch is obtained.
Reese Thomas, the eldest son of William and Naomi (Walker)
Thomas, was the father of William Brooke Thomas, (181 1-87) the
prominent miller, merchant and business man of Philadelphia, one of
the chief founders and first president of the Corn Exchange. Dr.
James and Sarah (Thomas) Anderson resided near the present site
of Ardmore, in Lower Merion township, Montgomery county, where
their nine children were born. Their eldest daughter Mary became
the wife of John Buckman, of Burlington, New Jersey, and beside
their daughter, Sarah Pennypacker Anderson, they had sons, Isaac,
Patrick and Rev. James Rush Anderson, and four children who died
unmarried. Sarah Pennypacker Anderson, daughter of Dr. James and
Sarah (Thomas) Anderson, married, in 1845, William Anderson
Fisher, of Lower Merion, born March 24, 1824, died March 27, 1903,
son of William Cornog and Elizabeth (Righter) Fisher, and grandson
of Francis Fisher. Francis Fisher was a farmer and cooper in West
Marlborough township, Chester county, from 1765 to the outbreak of
the Revolution, when he enlisted in Captain Henry Christ's company,
April, 1776, in the Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment, Colonel Samuel
Miles, and served in the New Jersey and Long Island campaign of
1776, being stationed at Perth Amboy from July 1, to August 1,
1776. He next enlisted in the company of Captain Patrick Anderson,
or was transferred to that company, in the formation of the State
Regiment of Foot from the remnants of Colonel Mile's and Colonel
Atlee's battalions, at Red Bank, New Jersey, March 1, 1777, and his
name appears on the roll of that company at Red Bank, March 1, to
May 1, 1777. William Righter Fisher was born in Lower Merion
township, Montgomery county, Pennsylvania, June 24, 1849. He
received his preliminary education and prepared for college at
private schools, and in 1867 entered Dickinson College, Carlisle,
Pennsylvania, from which he graduated in 1870. He was for one year
a member of the faculty of Dickinson Seminary, Williamsport, Penn 
 FISHER 1367 sylvania, and later went abroad where for two
years he pursued his studies at the Universities of Heidelberg and
Munich, in Germany. Shortly after his return to America he became a
member of the faculty of Dickinson College, where he remained for
two years. He studied law in Philadelphia and was admitted to the
Philadelphia bar in 1877, an
 WILLIAM CHURCHILL HOUSTON The Houston family
derived its name from the parish of Houston in Renfrewshire,
Scotland, and is of great antiquity, deriving its descent from Hugo de
Padvinan, who obtained the grant of the barony of Kilpeter, later
Houston, from Baldwin of Bigger, Sheriff of Lanark, in the reign of
Malcolm IV, (11531165). He was a witness to the foundation charter
from Walter, High Steward of Scotland, to the Abbey of Paisley, in
1160. His son Reginald, obtained a charter for the lands of Kilpeter
and was succeeded by his son Hugh, who was living in 1228. From
these ancient barons of Houston descended Sir Patrick Houston, of
that ilk, who died in 1450 and was buried in the chapel at Houston,
Renfrewshire, where there is a monument to his memory and that of
his wife Mary Colquhown, who died in 1456. Sir Patrick Houston,
grandson of this couple, was killed at the battle of Flodden. He
married Helen, daughter of Sir John Schaw, of Sauchy, and had
numerous issue. Sir Lodovick Houston of this family, who died in
1662, married Margaret, daughter of Patrick Maxwell, of Newark,
and had sons, Patrick and George, and several daughters. Patrick,
the eldest son, died in 1696; he had married Anne, daughter of Lord
Bregany, and had issue : Sir John, Patrick, William, James, Archibald
and three daughters. He is supposed to have been the ancestor of
the Houstons who settled in the Carolinas in the early part of the
eighteenth century. Archibald Houston, was for a time resident in the
Sumter District, South Carolina, and was a kinsman of Dr. William
Houston, of Bull Creek, in that district, a man of considerable
prominence and influence, and interested in large land and
colonization schemes. Archibald Houston was, however, one of the
earliest settlers of Anson now Mecklenburg, North Carolina, where
originated the famous "Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence",
which was carried to the Continental Congress then sitting at
Philadelphia, by Captain James Jack, a son-in-law of Archibald
Houston. Archibald Houston received his first patent for land at
Anson, North Carolina in 1753. He was a planter of standing and
influence in the colony of sturdy Scotch covenanters on the extreme
margin of the frontier, who unlike most frontier settlers were
extremely pious God-fearing people, founding Presbyterian churches,
on their first settlement, in which was taught, not only the iron creed
of John Knox, but the rudiments of an English education, followed
closely by classical schools, that fitted their sons for entrance in the
colleges and universities further north and east. Joseph Alexander,
reared in this primitive settlement, graduated at Princeton in 1760,
returned to his home in Mecklenburg county, North Carolina, and
established an academy at Sugar Creek, carrying letters of
recommendation to the Presbyterian elders and ministers from
President Samuel Finley, of Princeton. This and the academy at
Poplar Tent, and other classical schools on the frontier of North
Carolina owed their establishment and support to the Presbyterian
Church, and its pious Scotch supporters in these primitive colonies,
many of whose sons became distinguished
 HOUSTON 1369 scholars and professional men, as well as
eminent Presbyterian divines. Ephraim Brevard, M. D., the author of
the "Mecklenburg Declaration", was a classmate of William Churchill
Houston at Princeton. This declaration was the natural product of
the sturdy independence of these hardy Scotch settlers, who like
practically all their race in all parts of the American Colonies were
the first to espouse the patriot cause. Archibald Houston died in
Cabarrus county, North Carolina, (formed out of Mecklenburg, as the
latter had been formed out of Anson) in 1805, at a very advanced
age. He married first Margaret , and second, Agnes . The records of
these marriages are supposed to have perished during the Civil War,
but from various researches strong probability exists that his first
wife, Margaret, (mother of William Churchill) was a descendant of
Colonel William Churchill, of Virginia, whose name her son bore with
pride and was most particular to use in signing public documents.
William Churchill Houston, the distinguished patriot of the American
Revolution, was a son of Archibald and Margaret Houston, and was
born in Sumter District, South Carolina, in the year 1746. His parents
removed to Mecklenburg county, North Carolina, as above shown
when he was a small child, and his youth was spent under the
austere tutelage of the early Scotch masters in the rude school
houses on the extreme frontier of civilization, where the Cherokee,
Creek, and Choctaw Indians were still near and dangerous
neighbors, being almost constantly at war with each other or with
the white settlers. His early education was acquired in the log-cabin
academy at Polar Tent, near his home, and at Sugar Creek, under
Joseph Alexander, before mentioned, himself a native of
Mecklenburg county. To the latter he doubtless owed the superior
knowledge, for one of his age, that fitted him to become a teacher in
the Grammar School at Princeton, New Jersey, when he matriculated
at the College of New Jersey, there in 1764. There is a tradition
among his descendants of an estrangement between William
Churchill Houston, and his father, owing to the former's
determination to seek a college education at the North, and that he
was given a horse and sufficient funds to carry him to his destination
as his sole inheritance. Color is given to this theory from the fact
that he never returned to his native home, though he had started to
make the journey when taken with his fatal sickness at Frankford,
Philadelphia, in 1788. The exigencies of the times however, in the
Revolutionary War, which soon succeeded his graduation, and his
prompt appointment as an instructor in his alma mater, furnish
sufficient reason for the delay of what was an arduous journey at
that date. William Churchill Houston graduated with the highest
honors at the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University, in the
class of 1768, and was at once appointed senior tutor. He received
on his graduation, a silver medal, which is still a prized possession
by his descendants. Dr. Witherspoon came to Princeton as president
of that College in the year of Mr. Houston's graduation, and the latter
was for many years his most active assistant, counsellor and friend.
He assisted Witherspoon in the introduction and arrangement of new
courses, and raising the college to a higher plane, and when Dr.
Witherspoon was called to active political duties in connection with
the framing of the first constitution of New Jersey, and as a member
of the
 1370 HOUSTON Continental Congress it was to Mr. Houston
he delegated the important affairs of the college. Mr. Houston was
appointed professor of the department of mathematics and natural
philosophy, on its creation as a separate department, September 25,
1771, and filled that position until 1779. With the outbreak of the
Revolutionary struggle, he became at once prominently identified
with the patriot cause, seconding and assisting Dr. Witherspoon, in
the measures and correspondence leading up to the establishment
of State and National self-government, and the preparation for
prosecuting the war. Mr. Houston was commissioned captain of a
company in the Second New Jersey Regiment of Foot, from
Somerset county, under Colonel Abraham Quick, and served for
some months with this organization prior to his resignation on
August 17, 1776, when he alleged that duties in connection with the
college, in the absence of Dr. Witherspoon, prevented his active
attendance on military affairs. He was a member of the Provincial
Council of Safety, its treasurer, and one of the most regular in
attendance at its meetings. He, however, resumed his commission as
captain in the New Jersey Militia, in November, 1776, and saw
considerable active and arduous service. His company, in which were
a number of Princeton students, as shown by the journal of one of
them, was largely employed on scouting expeditions, and frequently
in armed conflict with marauding parties of the enemy, as well as
participating in the battles of Trenton, Princeton and Monmouth. It
also served as part of the guard of Washington's headquarters at
Morristown, New Jersey. Captain Houston's term of enlistment
expired March 6, 1777, and he did not again enter the military
service, his service being required in other positions which his
eminent abilities, ardent patriotism and untiring industry, fitted him
to fill. On March 25, 1777, William Churchill Houston, was
unanimously chosen Deputy Secretary of Continental Congress, and
he immediately took charge of a large part of the correspondence,
the transmission of resolutions of Congress to the different
departments and states, the printing of the journals, and ably
assisted the Secretary, Charles Thompson, in the administration of
that most important office. In the winter of 1778, William Churchill
Houston returned to his duties as professor of mathematics and
natural philosophy at Princeton, but still retained his position as
Deputy Secretary of State. He was however elected to the New
Jersey assembly in the fall of 1778, and reelected the following year.
In this position he exhibited the same energy, patriotism, and
industrious application to his duties that characterized his whole
career. On July 9, 1779, he took his seat in the Continental
Congress, alternating with Dr. John Witherspoon, with whom he had
so long been closely associated. From that date he wa» most regular
in his attendance and took a leading part in the proceedings of
Congress ; serving on the important committees of War, Foreign
Affairs, Postal Service, and Finance. In the latter department, — a
most trying one, — he was especially interested, and his
correspondence, with Governor Livingston of his own state of New
Jersey, among others, shows his activity in devising means of raising
funds for the support and equipment of the army. In one of these
letters he says, "A treasury without money, and an army without
bread, is really alarming." The expression of his views as to means
of raising funds, shows that he had given the subject of national
finances much thought and con 
 HOUSTON 1371 cern. In December, 1779, with Governor
Livingston and Robert Morris, he made himself responsible to the
treasurer of the State of New Jersey, for seven thousand pounds, to
be used for clothing Continental troops, should the legislature, when
convened, fail to appropriate the amount. He was active in the public
discussion of financial questions, and wrote in January, 1781, a
paper entitled, "Detached Thoughts on the Subject of Money and
Finance." He also prepared the 1781 budgets of appropriations for
Army and Navy Affairs. On September 24, 1781, he was elected by
Congress, Comptroller of the Treasury, but declined the position in a
letter dated October 13th. He retired from Congress in 1781, and
devoted himself assiduously to the practice of law; and on
September 28, 1781, was appointed clerk to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, a position he held until his death. He then returned to
the duties of the professorship at the College of New Jersey,
resigning in 1783, to devote his whole attention to political duties
and the practice of law ; was also receiver of continental taxes, from
1782 to 1785. He always kept up his interest in the College of New
Jersey, serving as its treasurer until his death, and was one of the
founders and first stockholders of the Trenton Academy. He was
selected as one of the commissioners appointed by Congress to
settle the dispute between the states of Pennsylvania and
Connecticut, in reference to the lands and jurisdiction at Wyoming,
and one of those who signed the final decree of adjudication, called
the "Trenton Decree", after a session of the commission lasting from
November 12, to December 30, 1782. He was again elected to
Congress in October, 1784, and reelected in October, 1785. He was
one of the delegates named from the State of New Jersey to the
convention that framed the first United States Constitution in 1787,
and took an active part in its deliberations. He was the author of the
motion to strike out the clause making the president ineligible to
reelection. When the question of adopting a national constitution
was first agitated, and a call for a convention to be held at
Annapolis, Maryland, was issued, New Jersey was the first to name
delegates, one of whom was William Churchill Houston, but only a
few states sending delegates, nothing was accomplished, and he
was again named as a delegate to the later successful convention
held at Philadelphia. As a lawyer Mr. Houston was learned and able,
and would never become engaged in a cause he believed unjust. He
delivered a number of lectures on law at Princeton, which showed
exhaustive research. Mr. Houston, was one of those who seured for
John Fitch, the inventor of the steamboat, the office of Deputy
Surveyor, and was one of a company interested in vast tracts of land
in Kentucky. To secure the assistance of Congress in perfecting and
launching the invention in a practical way, Fitch and his friends
applied to Mr. Houston, who (not then a member of Congress)
transmitted the application to Lambert Cadwallader, then in
Congress, on August 23, 1785, with this statement of his
impressions of the merits of the invention : "Sir: — I have examined
the principles and construction of Mr. Fitch's Steamboat, and though
not troubled with a penchant for projects, cannot help approving the
simplicity of the plan." Too close application to professional and
political duties impairing his health, Mr. Houston, decided to seek
rest in a long deferred visit to his old home and
 1372 HOUSTON kindred in North Carolina, and started on
the journey, but was taken seriouslyill at an inn on Frankford Road,
in Philadelphia, kept by a Mr. Geisse, and died there, August 12,
1788, and was buried in the church-yard of the Second Presbyterian
Church, at the northwest corner of Arch and Third Streets,
Philadelphia. William Churchill Houston married Jane, daughter of
Rev. Caleb Smith, of St. George's Manor, Long Island, by his wife
Martha, daughter of Jonathan Dickinson, of Elizabethtown, New
Jersey, the first president of the College of New Jersey. Mrs.
Houston, died in 1796, at the age of forty-one years and was buried
at Lawrenceville Cemetery. William Smith, the grandfather of Rev.
Caleb Smith, and the founder of St. George's Manor, near
Brookhaven, Long Island, was in his youth a page of Charles II, who
appointed him Governor of Tangier, the English sea-port of Morocco,
in the Straits of Gibraltar, and came to New York about 1688. He was
one of the prominent Landgraves of New York Colony ; is said to
have owned fifty miles of sea coast, his land extending the whole
breadth of Long Island at one point. He was appointed to Council of
State by Governor Sloughter on his arrival in 1691, and was one of
the judges before whom Leisler was tried and condemned. He was
also Chief Justice of New York. He retained his seat in Council during
the administration of Lord Bellmont, who said of him that he "had
more sense and was more gentlemanlike than any man he had seen
in the Province." At the death of Lord Bellmont he was senior
member of Council and acting Governor. Jonathan Dickinson, the
maternal grandfather of Jane (Smith) Houston was of early New
England ancestry. He was born at Hatfield, Massachusetts, April 22,
1688; graduated at Yale in 1706, and in 1709, was installed as
pastor of the Presbyterian Church at Elizabethtown, New Jersey,
where he served as pastor, physician, and "father of his flock" in
temporal as well as religious affairs. He was elected president of the
College of New Jersey, (which had its birth in Elizabethtown),
October 22, 1746, but died less than a year later, October 7, 1747.
He was the author of a number of works of a religious and
controversial character. William Churchill and Jane (Smith) Houston
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