The traditional criteria for assigning legal personality can generally be divided into the

rationalist, which adheres to the criterion of whether or not a person has rational qualities, and

the humanist, which takes the criterion of whether a person has humanity. First, rationalist holds

that the criterion for distinguishing between persons and non-persons lies in whether the dry-

observation entity possesses the rational qualities underlying humanity. Rational traits are those

traits that are indispensable for discerning self-interest, developing moral values, reasoning in

complex ways, making optimal choices, and assuming responsibility. The criteria for judging

personality are divided into various categories, depending on the point on which they are focused

(Lee and Shapiro 2014). Cognitive ability is the basic starting point for the theory of human

cognition, and neither those who do not have the cognitive ability nor those who do have the

cognitive ability have legal personality. It is believed that the essence of legal personality

depends on human reasoning, and that cognitive ability is the basis of human reasoning so

humans without cognitive ability must not have legal personality. Conversely, moral competence

holds that reason is born of moral self-repression and that law is derived from morality.

Therefore, all legal persons should first be moral persons, and humans without moral capacity

(mentally incapacitated patients) and non-humans (virtual entities such as artificial intelligence,

and non-human animals) should not enjoy legal personality. Because jurisprudence is derived

from morality, and only humans enjoy morality, it necessarily follows that only humans with

morality enjoy legal personality; the ability to mean, which holds that reason is demonstrated

through the expression of meaning, and that those who can achieve their own ends through their

use of meaning are legal persons. A legal person is a subject capable of the capacity to mean, as

an important factor in the realization of autonomy, is inevitably not a legally recognized person.
 According to the humanist school, the difference between a human being and a non-

human being lain in observing whether or not his or her entity possesses the specific

characteristics of humanity. Specifically, they are divided into the sacredness of life, the

perceived suffering, and the fragility of life. The sanctity of life theory holds that only humans

are legally human and that all non-human entities are things (virtual entities such as artificial

intelligence, and non-human animals), both because humans exist based on their innate sanctity

of life over any species and because they are the dominant ones in the world. However, the

fragility of life suggests that the distinction between legally human and non-human is significant

not only because it gives social subjects recognized as subjects of law the right to pursue their

interests and the means to defend them, but also because it complements or enhances the ability

of vulnerable social subjects to defend themselves against external harm. It follows from this that

artificial intelligence is neither a life nor a person. Furthermore, the ability to perceive pain is

said to be superior to that of other species. Although humans are at a more advanced stage of

evolution than other animals, they are not at a higher level than non-human animals. However,

any entity that possesses the ability to perceive pain should be recognized as a human being in

law.

Aishwarya Limaye argues that even the most forward-thinking robot liability policy

legislation does not include autonomous robots as subjects of liability (Scopino 2020). The

reason for this is because the legal status of robots is unclear, and if the liability of robots is to be

determined, the fundamental constitutional rights of robots, such as the Second Amendment right

to bear arms in the US Constitution and the First Amendment right to freedom of expression,

must first be determined. If there is a hierarchy of AI technology at this stage, then in my

personal opinion it is only barely in its infancy. To a certain extent, AI does not yet have a true
philosophical personality. In the era of weak AI today, AI robots are still human tools and do not

have a truly independent legal status, so AI should not be given the right to personhood at this

time.

My identity did change over time. From elementary school student middle school student

high school student to finally an undergraduate student, but I have always been a student until

after work when that identity shifts more completely. However, I can always choose to become a

student again in terms of family as well. I am my parents' daughter and will be the mother of my

children. However, I will always be my parent's daughter, and that will always remain the same.

In my opinion, my upbringing has made me realize what kind of person I am and how my

character is, making me a real person. The way I deal with people has created my character and

how I deal with it, and it keeps me the same.

1. Lee, Tae Kyoung, and Michael A. Shapiro. 2014. "The Interaction of Affective

Dispositions, Moral Judgments, And Intentionality in Assessing Narrative Characters:

Rationalist and Intuitionist Sequences". Communication Theory 24 (2): 146-164.

doi:10.1111/comt.12031.

2. Scopino, Gregory A. 2020. Algo Bots and The Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.