Russia, China and Eurasia: Social, Historical ...

ISSN: 1049-7714
Volume 27, Number 3 © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

CHINA/TAIWAN:
EVOLUTION OF THE “ONE CHINA” POLICY—
KEY STATEMENTS FROM WASHINGTON,
BEIJING, AND TAIPEI*

Shirley A. Kan

ABSTRACT
Despite apparently consistent statements in four decades, the U.S. ―one
China‖ policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject
to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the ―one China‖
policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated
clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S.
interests in security and democracy. In Part I, this CRS Report, updated as
warranted, discusses the ―one China‖ policy since the United States began in
1971 to reach presidential understandings with the People‘s Republic of
China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II records the evolution of policy as
affected by legislation and key statements by Washington, Beijing, and
Taipei. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), celebrating
in 2011 the 100th anniversary of its founding. Policy covers three major issue
areas: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against
Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC
until the end of 1978 and has maintained an official, non-diplomatic
relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The United
States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the U.S.-PRC
Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States
―acknowledged‖ the ―one China‖ position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have
articulated a ―one China‖ policy in understandings with the PRC.
Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift

*
This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of CRS Report RL30341, dated June 24, 2011.
440 Shirley A. Kan

in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing‘s ―one China‖ principle—on

questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC‘s
claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered
Taiwan‘s status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the
Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a
―peaceful resolution‖ with the assent of Taiwan‘s people and without
unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution
of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S.
policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The
TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of Taiwan ―will be
determined‖ by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy,
among the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine
Taiwan‘s future ―a threat‖ to the peace and security of the Western Pacific
and of ―grave concern‖ to the United States; ―to provide Taiwan with arms of
a defensive character;‖ and ―to maintain the capacity of the United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion‖ jeopardizing the
security, or social or economic system of Taiwan‘s people. The TRA
provides a congressional role in determining security assistance ―necessary to
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.‖ President
Reagan also offered ―Six Assurances‖ to Taipei in 1982, partly covering
arms sales.
Policymakers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the
political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since
the 1970s. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well
as peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait have been challenged by the
PRC‘s military buildup (particularly in missiles) and coercion, resistance in
Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to raising defense spending, and
moves perceived by Beijing for de jure independence under Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bian (2000- 2008). After May
2008, KMT President Ma Ying-jeou resumed the cross-strait dialogue (after
a decade)—beyond seeking detente. With President Obama since 2009, a
rhetorical convergence emerged among the three sides about ―peaceful
development‖ of cross-strait engagement, but disagreement has remained
about the PRC‘s opposition to U.S. arms sales for Taiwan‘s defense. On June
16, 2011, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing: ―Why
Taiwan Matters.‖
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 441

PART I: U.S. POLICY ON “ONE CHINA”

Congressional Concerns

Paying particular attention to congressional influence on policy, this CRS

Report discusses the U.S. ―one China‖ policy concerning Taiwan since the United
States (under the Nixon Administration) began in 1971 to reach understandings
with the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) government, which has insisted on its
―one China‖ principle. Based on open sources and interviews, this report also
reviews comprehensively the evolution of the ―one China‖ issue, as it has been
articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.
In the 1990s, Congress pushed for changes in policy toward Taiwan.
Questions about the ―one China‖ policy arose again after Lee Teng-hui, President
of Taiwan (formally called the Republic of China (ROC)), characterized cross-
strait relations as ―special state-to-state ties‖ on July 9, 1999. Beijing responded
vehemently with calls for Lee to retract the perceived deviation from the ―one
China‖ position and reiterated long-standing threats to use force if necessary to
prevent a declaration of independence by Taiwan. The PRC also questioned U.S.
commitment to ―one China‖ and expressed opposition to any U.S. military
intervention. The Clinton Administration responded that Lee‘s statement was not
helpful and reaffirmed the ―one China‖ policy [1] Some questioned whether U.S.
law, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, requires U.S. defense of Taiwan
against an attack from the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA), China‘s military.
Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, at a July
21, 1999 hearing, said that Lee ―created an opportunity to break free from the
anachronistic, Beijing-inspired one- China policy which has imprisoned U.S.
policy toward China and Taiwan for years.‖ Representative Benjamin Gilman,
Chairman of the International Relations Committee, wrote in a September 7, 1999
letter to Clinton that it is a ―common misperception‖ that we conceded officially
that Beijing is the capital of the ―one China‖ that includes Taiwan. He wrote,
―under no circumstances should the United States move toward Beijing‘s version
of ‗one China‘.‖[2]
Since 2001, U.S. policymakers have tended to stress continuity in maintaining
the ―one China‖ policy. During the George W. Bush Administration, leaders of
the House and Senate stressed support for Taiwan as a democracy, rather than its
independent status. Moreover, Members voiced concerns about cross-strait
tension arising from actions taken by both Beijing and Taipei.
442 Shirley A. Kan

Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote

in May 2001 that ―for many years, successive U.S. administrations have affirmed
that there is one China and that the people on Taiwan and the people of China
should work out a plan for peaceful unification.‖ He also referred to a debate on
the nature of the U.S. obligation to ―defend democracy in Taiwan‖ and to prevent
a ―forceful military unification of Taiwan and China.‖[3] Representative Henry
Hyde, Chairman of the International Relations Committee, spoke in Beijing in
December 2002 and dismissed notions that U.S. support for Taiwan is geared
toward containing or dividing China. He said that ―the bedrock of the very strong
support for Taiwan in the U.S. Congress‖ is the shared experience as democracies.
Moreover, Hyde highlighted Taiwan‘s significance as a model of a ―Chinese
democracy‖ that proved democracy is compatible with Chinese culture.[4]
As a focal point in the House for attention on Taiwan, an initial number of 85
Members formed a bipartisan Taiwan Caucus on April 9, 2002, with
Representatives Robert Wexler, Steve Chabot, Sherrod Brown, and Dana
Rohrabacher as co-chairs. Later, 10 Senators were original members of another
Taiwan Caucus formed on September 17, 2003, with Senators George Allen and
Tim Johnson as co-chairs. At two events at the Heritage Foundation in 2003 and
2004, Representatives Robert Andrews and Steve Chabot spoke critically of the
―one China‖ policy.[5]
U.S. views were shaped by developments in Taiwan and concern about cross-
strait tension. On August 3, 2002, President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) gave a speech using the phrase ―one country on each
side‖ of the strait, surprising Washington, even before the first anniversary of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Leading up to the presidential election on
March 20, 2004, Chen advocated holding the first referendums (on the same day
as the election) and drafting a new constitution with a timetable (new draft
constitution by September 28, 2006; a referendum on the constitution on
December 10, 2006; and enactment of the new constitution on May 20, 2008).
Though symbolic steps, Beijing reacted with alarm.
On November 18, 2003, a PRC official on Taiwan affairs who is a PLA major
general issued a threat to use force against what Beijing perceives as the ―open
promotion of Taiwan independence.‖[6] Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage responded by saying that ―there‘s an election and campaign going on in
Taiwan, and I think one shouldn‘t over-emphasize comments that are made in the
heat of an election‖ and that the United States ―has full faith that the question of
Taiwan will be resolved peacefully.‖ He added that the TRA guides policy in
providing Taiwan ―sufficient defense articles for her self-defense‖ and ―also
requires the United States to keep sufficient force in the Asia Pacific area to be
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 443

able to keep the area calm.‖ Armitage reaffirmed that the U.S. commitment to
assist Taiwan‘s self-defense, with no defense treaty, ―doesn‘t go beyond that in
the Taiwan Relations Act, and we have good, competent military forces there.‖[7]
On the eve of his visit to Washington, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao warned on
November 22, 2003, that China would ―pay any price to safeguard the unity of the
motherland.‖[8] On November 29, President Chen surprisingly announced that he
would use one provision in the referendum law passed by the opposition-
dominated legislature two days earlier and hold a ―defensive referendum‖ on
China‘s threats on the day of the presidential election. During his meeting with
Premier Wen in the Oval Office on December 9, 2003, President Bush stated that
he opposed Chen‘s efforts to change the status quo, drawing criticisms that Bush
sided with the PRC‘s belligerence. The four co-chairmen of the Taiwan Caucus in
the House wrote a letter to President Bush, criticizing his stance as a victory for
the authoritarian regime of the PRC at the expense of Taiwan‘s democratic
reforms.[9]
On the TRA‘s 25th anniversary, the House International Relations Committee
held a hearing on April 21, 2004. After congratulating President Chen Shui-bian
on his re-election in March 2004, the Administration further clarified U.S. policy
toward Taiwan and warned of ―limitations‖ in U.S. support for constitutional
changes in Taiwan. At that hearing on the TRA, Representative James Leach,
Chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific, stated that Taiwan has the unique situation in which it can have de facto
self- determination only if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure
sovereignty. He urged Taiwan‘s people to recognize that they have greater
security in ―political ambiguity.‖ He called for continuity, saying that ―together
with our historic ‗one China‘ policy,‖ the TRA has contributed to ensuring peace
and stability in the Taiwan Strait.[10]
In his second inaugural address on May 20, Chen responded to U.S. concerns,
excluding sovereignty issues and a referendum from his plan for a new
constitution by 2008. Leach represented the United States at that inauguration. At
a subcommittee hearing on June 2, 2004, Leach praised Chen‘s words as
―thoughtful, statesmanlike, and helpful‖ as well as ―constructive‖ for dialogue
with Beijing. To mark the 25th anniversary of the TRA on April 10, 2004, the
House voted on July 15, 2004, to pass H.Con.Res. 462 (Hyde) to reaffirm
―unwavering commitment‖ to the TRA.[11]
Congressional also had concerns about challenges to U.S. interests in
reducing tensions and fostering dialogue across the Taiwan Strait. In March 2005,
China adopted an ―Anti-Secession Law.‖ On March 16, the House passed (424-4)
H.Con.Res. 98 (Hyde) to express grave concern about the ―Anti-Secession Law,‖
444 Shirley A. Kan

and the House Taiwan Caucus hosted a briefing by Taiwan‘s Representative

David Lee. On April 6, 2005, the House International Relations Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific held a hearing on China‘s ―Anti-Secession Law.‖ President
Chen announced on February 27, 2006, that he will ―terminate‖ the National
Unification Council and Guidelines. Senator John Warner, Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, told Admiral William Fallon, Commander of the
Pacific Command, at a committee hearing on March 7, 2006, that ―if conflict were
precipitated by just inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the
Taiwanese elected officials, I‘m not entirely sure that this nation would come full
force to their rescue if they created that problem.‖[12] In July 2007,
Representative Tom Lantos, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
said that it was impractical for Taiwan to seek membership in the U.N.
With a rhetorical convergence among the PRC, Taiwan, and United States on
cross-strait ―peaceful development‖ after Ma Ying-jeou became president in
Taiwan in May 2008 and cross- strait tension reduced when dialogue resumed,
Congressional concerns included issues about whether and how the United States
and Taiwan might strengthen bilateral political, security, and economic relations,
to sustain U.S. interests in stability, democracy, and prosperity in Taiwan and its
international roles. On March 24, 2009, to commemorate the TRA‘s 30th
anniversary, the House passed H.Con.Res. 55, and 30 Senators sent a letter to
President Barack Obama. On June 16, 2011, the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, chaired by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, held a hearing on
―Why Taiwan Matters.‖ Broad policy issues include whether to review U.S.
policy in view of significant changes since the last policy review that took place in
1994. Some have said that the improved cross-strait engagement helps U.S.
attention to shift to expanding cooperation from a rising China. Congress also
could conduct oversight of the State Department‘s restrictions on contacts
between Executive Branch officials and Taiwan‘s officials in the ―Guidelines on
Relations with Taiwan‖ to carry out only an ―unofficial‖ relationship.[13] Others
have argued that the self-imposed restrictions go beyond the TRA (which did not
stipulate an ―unofficial‖ relationship), the reality of official contacts, or the U.S.-
PRC communiques. They also have concerns that the restrictions undermine
communication with and denigrate Taiwan. Another issue has been whether to
resume Cabinet-level visits to Taiwan that took place from 1992 to 2000.
In sum, Congress has exercised important roles in legislating and overseeing
the TRA of 1979, as Congress and the President have recalibrated the U.S. ―one
China‖ policy over the decades. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in the military
balance as well as peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait have been challenged
by the PRC‘s military modernization, resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 445

(KMT) party to raising defense spending (including to buy U.S. arms), and moves
perceived by Beijing as promoting de jure independence under the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) (when Chen Shui-bian was President in 2000-2008).
Moreover, since 2000, political polarization in Taiwan has raised the importance
of U.S. policy toward Taiwan for fostering U.S. interests there. These interests
include sustainable peace and security for the people of Taiwan (with a global
impact), Taiwan‘s democracy, and economic ties with a major trading partner—
ultimately a ―peaceful resolution‖ of the dispute over Taiwan. At the same time,
the dominance of domestic politics in Taiwan has reduced U.S. leverage to
advance some U.S. priorities. U.S. policy respects democracies, but U.S. actions
and words could impact those internal politics.

Table 1. Cabinet-Level Visits to Taiwan After 1979

1992 U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills

1994 Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena
1996 Small Business Administrator Phil Lader
1998 Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson
2000 Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater
Source: U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, sponsor of economic conferences.

Key Statements and Ambiguity

Five key documents stand out among U.S. policy statements on Taiwan:

Shanghai Communique of 1972

Normalization Communique of 1979
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) (P.L. 96-8) of 1979
Six Assurances to Taipei of 1982
August 17 Communique (on arms sales) of 1982.
(See excerpts of these and other statements in Part II of this CRS report.)

Despite apparently consistent formal statements and closed-door assurances

since the end of World War II (and the end of Taiwan‘s status as a colony of
Japan that began in 1895), the ―one China‖ question has been left somewhat
ambiguous and subject to different interpretations among Washington, Beijing,
and Taipei. The concept of ―one China‖ has been complicated by the coexistence
446 Shirley A. Kan

of the PRC government ruling the mainland and the ROC government on Taiwan
since 1949. Taiwan was never ruled by the Communist Party of China (CPC) or
as part of the PRC.

Changed Context
The political and strategic context of those key statements also has
experienced significant change. After political liberalization began in 1986,
Taiwan became a democracy, with a new basis for the government‘s legitimacy
and greater say by proponents of a separate status for Taiwan. The PRC‘s
Tiananmen Crackdown of 1989 dramatically proved the limits to liberal change
on the mainland. The original strategic rationale for U.S.-PRC rapprochement
faded with the end of the Cold War. In May 2000, the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP)‘s Chen Shui-bian became President of the ROC, ousting the
Nationalist Party of China, or Kuomintang (KMT), as the ruling party in Taiwan
for the first time in 55 years.

Definitions
There are complications about the language in the key statements. First,
―China‖ was not defined in the three joint communiques. In the Normalization
Communique, the United States recognized the PRC government as the sole legal
government of China, but the PRC has never ruled Taiwan and other islands
under the control of the ROC government. The PRC‘s late paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping‘s 1984 proposal of ―one China, two systems‖ sought to define Taiwan
as a Special Administrative Region under the PRC after unification. On the other
hand, ―Taiwan‖ was defined in Section 15(2) of the TRA essentially to be the
islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, plus the people, entities, and governing
authorities there.

Unsettled Status
Second, there has been disagreement as to whether Taiwan‘s status actually
was resolved or determined. In secret talks in 1972, President Nixon assured PRC
Premier Zhou Enlai that the United States viewed the status of Taiwan as
―determined‖ to be part of one China. The PRC‘s December 1978 statement on
normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States said that the Taiwan
question ―has now been resolved between the two countries.‖ However, the U.S.
statement of December 1978 on normalization stated the expectation that the
Taiwan question ―will be settled‖ peacefully by the Chinese themselves. The TRA
also stipulated the U.S. expectation that the future of Taiwan ―will be determined‖
by peaceful means. President Reagan‘s 1982 statement on arms sales to Taiwan
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 447

declared that ―the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve.‖ Moreover, under U.S. policy, ―settlement‖
or ―resolution‖—not stated as ―unification‖ or ―reunification‖—of the Taiwan
question is left open to be peacefully determined by both sides of the strait. In a
rare public statement on this U.S. stance, in August 2007, a National Security
Council official said that ―the position of the United States Government is that the
ROC—Republic of China—is an issue undecided ... for many, many years.‖[14]

Peaceful Settlement
Third, the questions of the PRC‘s possible use of force, U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan, and possible U.S. help in Taiwan‘s self-defense were left contentious and
critical for U.S. interests. Washington consistently has stated its strong interest
that there be a peaceful settlement, but the PRC has not renounced its claimed
sovereign right to use force if necessary. Washington has not promised to end
arms sales to Taiwan, although the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 was
terminated on December 31, 1979.[15] In the surprise announcements of
December 1978 on diplomatic recognition, the United States stated its interest in a
peaceful resolution, but the PRC countered that Taiwan is China‘s internal affair.
President Reagan agreed to the 1982 Communique on reducing U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan—premised on the PRC‘s declared policy of peaceful unification. In the
early 1990s, the PLA began to build up its theater missile force and to acquire
modern arms, especially from Moscow.
The 1979 TRA states that the United States will provide necessary defense
articles and services to Taiwan for its sufficient self-defense, and will consider
with ―grave concern‖ any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan‘s future. In
deciding on that language in 1979, Members of Congress debated whether the
wording on U.S. military intentions was clear or ambiguous. Since the mid-
1990s, a new debate has arisen over how to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait,
including whether ambiguity or clarity in U.S. statements about a possible
military role serves U.S. interests in preventing conflict or provocations from
either Beijing or Taipei [16] There have been issues about whether and how U.S.
statements of intentions might be clarified to specify the conditions under which
the U.S. military might help to defend Taiwan and the U.S. stance on Taiwan‘s
sovereignty or efforts to change its declared political status.[17] Questions also
have persisted about the extent of the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan, given
President Clinton‘s 1996 deployment of two aircraft carriers near Taiwan and
President Bush‘s initial statement in 2001 of doing ―whatever it took to help
Taiwan defend herself.‖
448 Shirley A. Kan

Has U.S. Policy Changed?

Apart from questions about the language in the key statements on ―one
China,‖ policy questions have arisen about whether successive Administrations
have changed the U.S. position since 1971 to adapt to changing circumstances and
whether such shifts have advanced U.S. interests.[18]
Successive Administrations have generally maintained that ―long-standing‖
U.S. policy has been consistent. Some in Congress and others, however, have
contended that U.S. policy has changed in some important areas. There also are
issues as to whether any elements of the ―one China‖ policy should be reviewed
for modification. The ―one China‖ policy has evolved to cover three issue areas:
sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue.

Issue Area 1: Sovereignty

One issue area for U.S. policy concerns sovereignty, including Taiwan‘s
juridical status, future unification vs. independence, referendums, a new
constitution, and international participation. The U.S. ―one China‖ policy has
differed from the PRC‘s principle on ―one China,‖ and there have been questions
about whether U.S. policy is one of support, non-support, or opposition to
unification or independence. In short, U.S. policy has stressed the process
(peaceful resolution, cross-strait dialogue, with the assent of Taiwan‘s people, and
no provocations or unilateral changes by either side) rather than the outcome (e.g.,
unification, independence, confederation). At the same time, the ROC, or Taiwan,
has continued to assert its sovereignty, seek membership in the United Nations
and other international organizations. Moreover, under the ruling DPP since 2000,
the government in Taipei has made greater use of the name ―Taiwan‖ (vs.
―ROC‖).[19]
Even while recognizing the ROC government and its ―jurisdiction‖ over
Taiwan, on the eve of the Nixon Administration‘s contacts with PRC leaders in
Beijing, the State Department testified to Congress in 1969 and 1970 that the
juridical matter of the status of Taiwan remained undetermined. The State
Department also wrote that

In neither [the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 nor the Treaty of Peace
between the Republic of China and Japan of 1952] did Japan cede this area [of
Formosa and the Pescadores] to any particular entity. As Taiwan and the
Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty
over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution.
Both the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists disagree with this
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 449

conclusion and consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores are part of the sovereign
state of China. The United States recognizes the Government of the Republic of
China as legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan and the
Pescadores [20]

However, accounts of President Nixon‘s secret talks with PRC Premier Zhou
Enlai in China in 1972 reported that Nixon made promises on the question of
Taiwan in return for diplomatic normalization that went beyond the communique
issued at the end. The Carter Administration later called the promises: ―Nixon‘s
Five Points.‖[21] Also, according to Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth‘s
March 1999 testimony, Nixon pledged no U.S. support for Taiwan independence
(second time after Kissinger‘s 1971 promise): ―We have not and will not support
any Taiwan independence movement.‖[22] With the release on December 11,
2003, of declassified memoranda of conversation of the secret talks between
Nixon and Zhou, there was confirmation that Nixon stated as first of Five
Principles that ―there is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be
no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the
status of Taiwan is undetermined.‖
The United States did not explicitly state its own position on the status of
Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques. In 1972, while still
recognizing the ROC, the Nixon Administration declared that it ―acknowledges‖
that ―all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait‖ maintain that there is one
China and Taiwan is a part of China, and that the United States did not challenge
that position. After shifting diplomatic recognition to the PRC, the United States,
in 1979 and 1982, again ―acknowledged the Chinese position‖[23] of one China
and Taiwan is part of China. However, the 1982 communique further stated that
the United States has no intention of pursuing a policy of ―two Chinas‖ or ―one
China, one Taiwan,‖ while President Reagan‘s accompanying statement said that
―the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait, to resolve.‖ The TRA did not discuss the ―one China‖ concept. In
1994, the Clinton Administration stated after its Taiwan Policy Review that the
United States had ―acknowledged‖ the Chinese position on one China and that
―since 1978, each Administration has reaffirmed this policy.‖
Despite these apparent similarities in U.S. policy statements, some contend
that the U.S. position, since originally formulated in 1972, has adopted the PRC‘s
―one China‖ principle—rather than steadily maintaining neutrality and equal
distance from Beijing and Taipei. In 1982, Senator John Glenn criticized both the
Carter and Reagan Administrations:
450 Shirley A. Kan

The ambiguous formulation agreed upon in the 1979 joint communique went
considerably further in recognizing the PRC‘s claim to Taiwan. Although the
word ―acknowledged‖ remained, the object of our acknowledgment shifted
noticeably. We no longer just acknowledged that both Chinas asserted the
principle that there was one China, but instead acknowledged the Chinese
position that there is but one China. By dropping the key phrase ―all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain‖ one could interpret that we had moved
from the position of neutral bystander noting the existence of a dispute, to a party
accepting the Chinese assertion that there is one China. Clearly, this was the
PRC‘s interpretation.... More recently, Peking‘s threats to downgrade relations
with the United States, unless Washington agreed to end all arms sales to
Taiwan, prompted President Reagan to write to China‘s Communist Party
Chairman, Hu Yaobang, in May 1982, and assure him that, ―Our policy will
continue to be based on the principle that there is but one China....‖ We now
assert that it is our policy, U.S. policy, that there is but one China, and although
not stated, indicate implicitly that Taiwan is a part of that one China. The use of
the qualifier ―acknowledged‖ has been dropped altogether.... I do not believe that
anyone can dispute that the U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan has changed
dramatically over the last 10 years. Let me reiterate one more time, in 1972, we
acknowledged that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained that
there was but one China. Today it is U.S. policy that there is but one China.
Despite this remarkable shift over time, the State Department, at each juncture,
has assured us that our policy remained essentially unchanged [24]

Clinton’s Three Noes

In August 1995—earlier than the first public statements showed in 1997—
President Clinton reportedly sent a secret letter to PRC President Jiang Zemin in
which he stated as the U.S. position that we would: (1) ―oppose‖ Taiwan
independence; (2) would not support ―two Chinas‖ or one China and one Taiwan;
and (3) would not support Taiwan‘s admission to the United Nations.[25] The
opposition to Taiwan independence seemed to go beyond the promises made by
former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Nixon in 1971
and 1972 of no U.S. support for Taiwan independence. Later, that wording was
apparently changed from opposition to a neutral stance of non-support. This letter
reportedly formed the basis of what were later known publicly as the ―Three
Noes.‖
At the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit in Washington, the two leaders issued a
joint statement which included a U.S. position: ―the United States reiterates that it
adheres to its ‗one China‘ policy and the principles set forth in the three U.S.-
China joint communiques.‖ While that joint statement did not include the ―Three
Noes,‖ the Administration decided to have a State Department spokesperson say
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 451

two days later that ―we certainly made clear that we have a one-China policy; that
we don‘t support a one-China, one-Taiwan policy. We don‘t support a two-China
policy.
We don‘t support Taiwan independence, and we don‘t support Taiwanese
membership in organizations that require you to be a member state.‖ While in
China for a summit in June 1998, President Clinton chose an informal forum to
declare: ―I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don‘t
support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And
we don‘t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which
statehood is a requirement.‖
Some questioned whether the ―Three Noes,‖ especially as it was publicly
declared by the U.S. President while in the PRC, was a change in U.S. policy [26]
U.S. non-support for a one China, one Taiwan; or two Chinas can be traced to the
private assurances of the Nixon Administration in the early 1970s. However, the
Clinton Administration, beginning with its Taiwan Policy Review of 1994, added
non-support for Taipei‘s entry into the United Nations (U.N.), which became an
issue after Taipei launched its bid in 1993. In response to President Clinton‘s
―Three Noes,‖ concerned Members in both the Senate and the House nearly
unanimously passed resolutions in July 1998, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to
Taiwan.
The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, argued that the ―Three Noes‖ did
not represent a change in policy. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on March 25, 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth stated
that ―every point made there [in the ―Three Noes‖] had been made before by a
previous Administration and there was no change whatsoever.‖ In a written
response to a question from Senator Helms, Roth cited as precedents for the
―Three Noes‖ a 1971 statement by Kissinger, a 1972 statement by Nixon, a 1979
statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and President
Reagan‘s 1982 Communique.

Bush on Taiwan’s Independence, Referendums, Constitution

On April 25, 2001, when President George W. Bush stated the U.S.
commitment to Taiwan as an obligation to use ―whatever it took to help Taiwan
defend herself,‖ he also said that ―a declaration of independence is not the one
China policy, and we will work with Taiwan to make sure that that doesn‘t
happen.‖ Visiting Beijing in February 2002, Bush said that U.S. policy on Taiwan
was unchanged, but he emphasized U.S. commitment to the TRA and a peaceful
resolution, along with opposition to provocations by either Beijing or Taipei.
After Taiwan President Chen Shuibian said on August 3, 2002, that there is ―one
452 Shirley A. Kan

country on each side‖ of the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. National Security Council
(NSC) stated, in a second response, that ―we do not support Taiwan
independence.‖ With Jiang Zemin at his side at a summit in Crawford, TX, in
October 2002, President Bush himself stated that ―we do not support
independence.‖
However, there have been questions about whether the Bush Administration
adjusted U.S. policy after President Chen Shui-bian surprised the United States in
August 2002 with a speech on ―one country on each side‖ and a call for a holding
referendums. Specifically, there was the issue of whether President Bush gave
assurances, at closed meetings starting at that summit in October 2002, to PRC
President Jiang Zemin and later President Hu Jintao that the United States was
―against‖ or ―opposed‖ (vs. non-support of) unilateral moves in Taiwan toward
independence and/or the status of Taiwan independence, in the interest of stability
in the Taiwan Strait.[27] A position in ―opposition‖ to Taiwan independence
would represent a shift in policy focus from the process to the outcome and go
beyond President Nixon‘s ―Five Principles,‖ which expressed the neutral stance of
―non-support‖ for Taiwan independence. But U.S. opposition to Taiwan
independence would be consistent with President Clinton‘s secret letter reportedly
sent in 1995 to PRC leader Jiang Zemin, as the basis for the ―Three Noes.‖ U.S.
opposition would also conflict with the stance of the government of Taiwan,
which, under the DPP, argued that Taiwan is already independent, as evident
since the first democratic presidential election in 1996. [28]
After Chen, during campaigns for Taiwan‘s presidential election in March
2004, advocated holding referendums and adopting a new constitution by 2008—
moves that could have implications for Taiwan‘s sovereignty and cross-strait
stability, the Bush Administration called on Chen to adhere to his pledges (―Five
Noes‖) in his inaugural address of 2000 (including not promoting a referendum to
change the status quo). On September 28, 2003, Chen started his call for a new
constitution for Taiwan (with a draft constitution by September 28, 2006; a
referendum on the constitution on December 10, 2006; and enactment of the new
constitution on May 20, 2008). National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said
on October 14, 2003, that ―nobody should try unilaterally to change the status
quo.‖[29] A White House official said in an interview on November 26, 2003, that
―Taiwan shouldn‘t be moving towards independence; and mainland China
shouldn‘t be moving towards the use of force or coercion.‖[30] Then, Chen
announced on November 29—two days after the opposition-dominated legislature
passed a restrictive law authorizing referendums—that he would still use one
provision to hold a ―defensive referendum‖ on election day.[31] Chen argued that
the referendum would be a way for Taiwan‘s people to express their opposition to
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 453

the PLA‘s missile threat and would have nothing to do with the question of
unification or independence.
Nonetheless, Administration officials had concerns about the volatile course
of current and future political actions in Taiwan (with elections, referendums, and
a new constitution), reforms geared for governance vs sovereignty, and
unnecessary effects on peace and stability, given U.S. commitments to help
Taiwan‘s self-defense. The Bush Administration added a new, clearer stance on
December 1, 2003, when the State Department expressed U.S. ―opposition‖ to any
referendum that would change Taiwan‘s status or move toward independence. On
the same day, the Senior Director of Asian Affairs at the White House‘s National
Security Council, James Moriarty, reportedly was in Taiwan to pass a letter from
Bush to Chen with concerns about ―provocations.‖[32] Apparently needing a
public, stronger, and clearer U.S. message to Taiwan, appearing next to visiting
PRC Premier Wen Jiabao at the White House on December 9, 2003, President
Bush stated opposition to any unilateral decision by China or Taiwan to change
the status quo, as well as opposition to efforts by Taiwan‘s President Chen to
change the status quo, in response to a question about whether Chen should cancel
the referendum.
However, Bush did not make public remarks against the PRC‘s threats toward
democratic Taiwan. Bush also did not counter Wen‘s remarks that Bush reiterated
―opposition‖ to Taiwan independence. Bush raised questions about whether he
miscalculated the willingness of Chen to back down during his re-election
campaign and risked U.S. credibility, since Chen responded defiantly that he
would hold the ―anti-missile, anti-war‖ referendums as planned and that his
intention was to keep Taiwan‘s current independent status quo from being
changed [33].
American opinions were divided on the Bush Administration‘s statements
toward Taiwan. Some saw Chen as advancing a provocative agenda of permanent
separation from China while trying to win votes, and supported Bush‘s forceful
stance against Chen‘s plan for referendums.34 Others criticized President Bush
for being one-sided in appeasing a dictatorship at the expense of Taiwan‘s
democracy while failing to warn against and even possibly inviting aggression
from Beijing [35] The co-chairmen of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus in the
House wrote a letter to President Bush, criticizing his stance as a victory for the
authoritarian regime of the PRC at the expense of Taiwan‘s democratic reforms
[36]Some critics argued for a new approach, saying that the ―one China‖ policy
became ―irrelevant‖ and that there were national security interests in preventing
the ―unification‖ of Taiwan with China.37 In contrast, another opinion advocated
454 Shirley A. Kan

the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan with no position on its independence and
staying out of any conflict in the Taiwan Strait [38]
Still, uncertainty remained about the Bush Administration‘s implementation
of U.S. policy on questions such as options to recalibrate policy in exercising
leverage over Taipei or Beijing; capacity to maintain the delicate balance in
preventing provocations by either side of the strait rather than swerving to one
side or another; perceptions in Taipei and Beijing of mixed messages from
Washington; the U.S. stance on referendums and a new constitution in Taiwan;
definition of ―status quo‖; deference to democracy in Taiwan; Taiwan‘s long-
standing, de facto independence from China; stronger separate national identity in
Taiwan; a proactive U.S. political role (such as urging dialogue, facilitating talks,
or mediating negotiations) in addition to proactive pressures on defense; the
extent of the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan‘s self-defense; the increasing
PLA threat; and U.S. worries about Taiwan‘s defense spending, acquisitions, and
the will to fight [39].
On January 16, 2004, President Chen provided the wording for the two
questions, saying that the referendums will ask citizens (1) whether the
government should acquire more missile defense systems if the Chinese
Communists do not withdraw missiles and renounce the use of force against
Taiwan, and (2) whether the government should negotiate with the Chinese
Communists to establish a framework for cross-strait peace and stability. Chen
also promised that if re-elected, he will maintain ―the status quo of cross-strait
peace.‖[40] On election day on March 20, 2004, the two referendums failed to be
considered valid when 45% of eligible voters cast ballots (less than the 50%
needed).
After the election in March 2004, the White House sent the Senior Director
for Asian Affairs, Michael Green, to Taiwan to urge President Chen to exclude
sovereignty-related issues from constitutional changes. [41] In testimony by
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly on April 21, 2004, the Bush
Administration warned Chen of ―limitations‖ in U.S. support for constitutional
changes in Taiwan. In his inaugural address on May 20, 2004, Chen responded to
a number of U.S. concerns.
In President Chen‘s second term, President Bush did not support Taiwan‘s
independence or membership in the U.N. and opposed unilateral changes to the
―status quo.‖ Leading up to Taiwan‘s presidential election on March 22, 2008,
Bush Administration officials expressed opposition to referendums on Taiwan‘s
membership in the U.N. that were held on the same day.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 455

Visits (or Transits) by Taiwan’s President

One policy question has concerned the appropriate U.S. response to requests
from Taiwan‘s president to enter the United States for official visits, private visits,
or extended transits; to visit Washington, DC; and to meet with officials and
Members of Congress. Congress has expressed strong support for granting such
visits. Since 1994, the U.S. response has evolved from initially denying Lee Teng-
hui entry into the United States to relaxing restrictions on ―transits‖ for visits by
Chen Shui-bian, and back to strict conditions for Chen‘s transits in May 2006.
In May 1994, the Clinton Administration allowed President Lee Teng-hui to
make a refueling stop in Hawaii but denied him a visa. In 1995, Lee received a
visa to visit Cornell University, his alma mater. (Beijing responded with PLA
exercises and missile launches in 1995 and 1996.) Congress‘ view was an
important factor acknowledged by the Administration in its reversal of policy to
grant the visa.
In August 2000, the Clinton Administration granted a visa to the newly-
elected President Chen Shui-bian to transit in Los Angeles on his way to South
America and Africa, but, according to Taiwan‘s Foreign Ministry, Washington
and Taipei had an understanding that Chen would not hold public events.
Representative Sam Gejdenson organized a meeting between Chen and about 15
Members of Congress (some of whom were in town for the Democratic National
Convention), but Chen told them he was ―unavailable.‖[42]
In 2001, in granting President Chen Shui-bian ―private and unofficial‖ transits
through New York (May 2 1-23) and Houston (June 2-3) en route to and from
Latin America, the Bush Administration took a different position on such
meetings. As the State Department spokesperson said, ―we do believe that private
meetings between Members of Congress and foreign leaders advance our national
interests, so [Chen] may have meetings with Members of Congress.‖[43] On the
night of May 21, 2001, 21 Representatives attended a dinner with Chen in New
York, and Representative Tom DeLay later hosted Chen in Houston.
In 2003, while considering his safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity, the
Bush Administration again granted President Chen‘s requests for transits to and
from Panama through New York (October 31-November 2) and Anchorage
(November 4-5).[44] Some Members of Congress personally welcomed Chen,
including 16 Members who were already in New York and met with him. No
Administration officials met with Chen, other than AIT officials based in
Washington. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver reportedly
canceled a planned meeting with Chen in New York, and Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage talked with Chen by phone.[45]
456 Shirley A. Kan

Chen Shui-bian enjoyed extended transits through Honolulu and Seattle in

August-September 2004, though these were less high-profile than that in New
York. In January 2005, Chen stopped in Guam on the way back to Taiwan from
Palau and the Solomon Islands. In September 2005, the Bush Administration
allowed Chen to stop one day in Miami on his way to Latin America and in San
Francisco on his return to Taiwan. The Congressional Human Rights Caucus, via
teleconference, awarded Chen a human rights award while he was in Miami.
However, in May 2006, the Bush Administration was not pleased at repeated
statements from President Chen Shui-bian and responded by tightening
restrictions on his proposed U.S. stops so that they would be strict transits (with
no activities), conditions similar to those for Lee Teng-hui in 1994. Chen
requested stops in San Francisco and New York for his visit to Latin America, but
President Bush countered with transits in Honolulu and Anchorage, and Chen
refused those U.S. cities. Representatives Thomas Tancredo and Dana
Rohrabacher sent a letter on May 5, 2006, to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
questioning the decision‘s consistency with legislation; possible linkage to ties
with Beijing; use of ―humiliating‖ conditions on the transits; reversal of policy
despite President Bush‘s affirmation of a consistent policy; impact on future U.S.
stops; and implication for ―playing politics‖ given the contrast with Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick‘s high-level meeting in Washington with the
opposition KMT chairman, Ma Ying-jeou, two months earlier. In September
2006, the Administration allowed Chen to stop in Guam, but he had to switch to a
civilian aircraft instead of his ―Air Force One‖ that flew him to Palau.
In January 2007, the Administration allowed President Chen to stop overnight
in San Francisco and to refuel in Los Angeles on his way to and from Nicaragua.
In response to restrictions on Chen‘s transits, Representative Dana Rohrabacher
and 14 other Members wrote a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi on January
12, 2007, calling for the removal of all restrictions on bilateral high-level visits
with Taiwan. A week later, Representative Tancredo criticized (in extension of
remarks) Mexico‘s ban of Chen‘s plane from Mexican airspace on his way to Los
Angeles, a move similar to U.S. treatment toward Taiwan. In August 2007, the
Administration restricted Chen‘s transits to 50-minute refueling stops in
Anchorage on his way to and from Central America, with no overnight stays. For
his last U.S. transit in January 2008, the Bush Administration allowed Chen to
stop in Anchorage for two hours to refuel and rest.
After Ma Ying-jeou won the election on March 22, 2008, he expressed a
desire to visit the United States before his inauguration in May (after which U.S.
policy would allow only transits). But the Bush Administration denied his request.
President Ma has sought limited goals in U.S. transits.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 457

World Health Organization (WHO)

The United States, with strong congressional backing, has voiced some
support for Taiwan‘s quest for international space, including ―meaningful
participation‖ in certain international organizations on transnational issues. Some
advocates view such participation as preserving a democratic government‘s
international presence and promoting the interests of Taiwan‘s people, while
others support Taiwan‘s separate identity or independence. The Clinton
Administration‘s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review promised to support Taiwan‘s
membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite and to support
opportunities for Taiwan‘s voice to be heard in organizations where its
membership is not possible.
The focus of Taiwan‘s international participation was at the World Health
Organization (WHO), and the annual meetings in May in Geneva of its governing
body, the World Health Assembly (WHA). On May 11, 2001, President Bush
wrote to Senator Frank Murkowski, agreeing that the Administration should ―find
opportunities for Taiwan‘s voice to be heard in organizations in order to make a
contribution, even if membership is impossible,‖ including concrete ways for
Taiwan to benefit from and contribute to the WHO. On April 9, 2002,
Representatives in the House formed a Taiwan Caucus, and, as its first action, it
wrote a letter on April 19, 2002, to the President, seeking support for Taiwan‘s
participation in the WHO. With worldwide attention on the severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, Secretary of Health and Human Services
Tommy Thompson expressed support for Taiwan in a speech at the WHA on May
19, 2003, saying that ―the need for effective public health exists among all
peoples‖ and ―that‘s why the United States has strongly supported Taiwan‘s
inclusion in efforts against SARS and beyond.‖
By the annual meeting of the WHA in 2005, Taiwan lamented that the United
States did not speak up and that the WHO signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the PRC to govern the WHO‘s technical exchanges
with Taiwan.[46] Still, the Bush Administration ―applauded‖ the WHO and China
for taking steps in 2005 to greatly increase Taiwan‘s participation in WHO
conferences [47].
In March 2007, the State Department submitted a required report to Congress
on Taiwan‘s participation at the WHO, stating support for Taiwan‘s observership
and opposition to its membership. The report noted demarches sent by the United
States and other countries to the WHO to support expanded contacts with Taiwan
[48]. In April 2007, the Administration also issued demarches to the WHO about
political or nomenclature conditions placed on Taiwan‘s participation. In April
458 Shirley A. Kan

2007, Taiwan applied for membership in the WHO [49] and the bid was rejected
in May at the WHA by a vote of 17-148 (including U.S. opposition).
Taiwan did not gain observer status at the WHA in May 2008, even as the
KMT‘s Ma Ying-jeou was inaugurated as President after Chen Shui-bian‘s terms
ended. In January 2009, the WHO included Taiwan in the International Health
Regulations (IHR) which entered into force in 2007. President Ma shifted
Taiwan‘s focus to the WHA meeting (rather than the WHO). In its required report
submitted to Congress on April 1, 2009, the State Department stated that it
supported Taiwan‘s observership in the WHA and welcomed the decrease in
politicization over Taiwan‘s participation in the WHO due to improvements in the
cross-strait relationship over the past year. The State Department also asserted that
U.S. efforts resulted in the attendance of Taiwan‘s experts in some technical
meetings in 2005 and 2006. At the WHA in May 2009, Taiwan‘s Minister of
Health participated for the first time as an observer.
However, some have concerns that the invitation required the PRC‘s
approval, came under the WHO-PRC MOU, and was ad hoc (only for a KMT
President). Indeed, the State Department‘s report to Congress in April 2010
acknowledged that the WHA invited Taiwan in 2009 after the PRC ―agreed to
Taiwan‘s participation.‖ The State Department also expressed support, assessing
that Taiwan‘s participation in the WHA was a ―positive development‖ and could
provide a model for Taiwan‘s participation as an ―observer‖ in other U.N. bodies.
In its report to Congress of April 2011, the State Department stated that it worked
for Taiwan‘s observership at the WHA again in 2010 and has sought regular
invitations from the WHO to Taiwan every year. However, in May 2011, a secret
WHO Memorandum dated September 14, 2010, came to light, showing that the
WHO had an ―arrangement with China‖ to implement the IHR for the ―Taiwan
Province of China.‖ That month in Geneva, Secretary of Health and Human
Services Kathleen Sebelius protested to the WHO that no U.N. body has a right to
determine unilaterally Taiwan‘s status.

Select Legislation (Enacted by Congress)

During the 103rd Congress, the Congress passed and President Clinton signed
(on April 30, 1994) the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and
FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) that, inter alia, directed the State Department to register
foreign-born Taiwanese-Americans as U.S. citizens born in Taiwan (rather than
China); and called for the President to send Cabinet-level officials to Taiwan and
to show clear U.S. support for Taiwan in bilateral and multilateral relationships.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 459

After the Administration denied President Lee Teng-hui a visa in May 1994,
the Senate, from July to October, passed amendments introduced by Senator
Brown to ensure that Taiwan‘s President can enter the United States on certain
occasions. Two amendments (for S. 2182 and H.R. 4606) that passed were not
retained, but the amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994 was enacted. Upon signing it into law (P.L. 103-416) on
October 25, 1994, President Clinton said that he construed Section 221 as
expressing Congress‘ view. Later, Congress overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan
H.Con.Res. 53 expressing the sense of Congress that the President should
promptly welcome a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater,
Cornell University, and a transit stop in Anchorage, Alaska, to attend a
conference. The House passed the resolution by 396-0 on May 2, and the Senate
passed it by 97-1 on May 9, 1995 (with Senator Johnston voting Nay and Senators
Moynihan and Warner not voting).
During the 106th Congress, in 1999, Congress legislated a requirement for
semi-annual reports on such U.S. support, in Section 704 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for FYs 2000 and 2001 (P.L. 106-113). Also in 1999, Congress
passed legislation (P.L. 106-137) requiring a report by the Secretary of State on
efforts to support Taiwan‘s participation in the WHO. In January 2000, the State
Department submitted the report, saying that the United States does not support
Taiwan‘s membership in organizations, such as the U.N. or WHO, where
statehood is a requirement for membership, but that it supports any arrangements
acceptable to the WHO membership to allow for Taiwan to participate in the work
of the WHO [50] In October 2000, the House and Senate passed H.Con.Res. 390,
expressing the sense of Congress that the State Department‘s report failed to
endorse Taiwan‘s participation in international organizations and that the United
States should fulfill the commitment of the Taiwan Policy Review to more
actively support Taiwan‘s participation in international organizations.
In the 107th Congress, on May 17, 2001, Members in the House agreed
without objection to H.Con.Res. 135 to welcome President Chen Shui-bian upon
his visit.
Also, Congress enacted legislation, P.L. 107-10, authorizing the Secretary of
State to initiate a U.S. plan to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the annual
summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2001 in Geneva, Switzerland [51]
Then, Representative Sherrod Brown and Senator Torricelli introduced H.R. 2739
and S. 1932 to amend the law to target the May 2002 meeting. H.R. 2739 was
passed and enacted as P.L. 107-158 on April 4, 2002.
As enacted on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for FY2003 (P.L. 107-228), authorized—at the Bush Administration‘s request—
460 Shirley A. Kan

U.S. departments or agencies (including the Departments of State and Defense) to

assign or detail employees to the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the non-
profit corporation (with offices in Washington and Taipei) that has handled the
U.S.-Taiwan relationship in the absence of diplomatic ties since 1979 under the
TRA. (Personnel at AIT were technically ―separated‖ from government service
for a period of time, raising issues about employment status, benefits, recruitment,
etc.) The legislation also expressed the sense of Congress that AIT and the
residence of its director in Taipei should publicly display the U.S. flag ―in the
same manner as United States embassies, consulates, and official residences
throughout the world.‖ AIT in Taipei has flown the U.S. flag only occasionally.
In the 108th Congress, the House and Senate passed S. 243 to authorize the
Secretary of State to initiate a U.S. plan to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the
World Health Assembly in May 2003. Upon signing the bill as P.L. 108-28 on
May 29, 2003, President Bush stated that ―the United States fully supports the
overall goal of Taiwan‘s participation in the work of the World Health
Organization (WHO), including observership‖ but considered the act to be
consistent with the ―one China‖ policy. On October 30, 2003, the House passed
H.Con.Res. 302 by 416-0 to welcome President Chen to the United States.
On April 21 and May 6, 2004, the House and Senate passed H.R. 4019 and S.
2092 in support of Taiwan‘s efforts to gain observer status in the WHO and to
make it an annual requirement to have an unclassified report from the Secretary of
State on the U.S. plan to help obtain that status for Taiwan. The implication of
this change was the end of annual congressional statements and votes on this
issue. In signing S. 2092 into law (P.L. 108-235) on June 14, 2004, President
Bush stated that the United States fully supported the participation of Taiwan in
the work of the WHO, including observer status. However, he also declared that
his Administration shall construe the reporting requirement by using his authority
to ―withhold information‖ which could impair foreign relations or other duties of
the Executive Branch.

Issue Area 2: Use of Force

The PRC has never renounced its claimed right to use force in what it sees as
an internal problem and, moreover, has voiced more explicitly and demonstrated
clearly its willingness to use force for political if not military objectives—despite
its announced policy of ―peaceful unification‖ since 1979. Since the early 1990s,
the PRC has purchased more advanced arms from the Soviet Union/Russia and
built up its theater missile force. In December 1992 and March 1993, PRC
President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng began to warn of having to use
―drastic‖ or ―resolute‖ measures to prevent Taiwan independence. In 1995-1996,
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 461

the PRC launched provocative military exercises, including missile ―test-firings,‖

to express displeasure with then Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui‘s private visit to
the United States and to intimidate voters before the first democratic presidential
election in Taiwan. The United States believes that the PLA accelerated its
buildup since the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996. President Clinton deployed
two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan in March 1996. The PRC raised
tension again in 1999, after KMT President Lee used the phrase of ―special state-
to-state ties‖ for the cross-strait relationship. President Bush did not support
Taiwan‘s DPP President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) nor Taiwan‘s independence
or membership in the U.N. and opposed referendums on membership in the U.N.
for Taiwan during its presidential election on March 22, 2008. For that election,
President Bush positioned two aircraft carriers near Taiwan, whose largely
symbolic referendums were nonetheless targets of the PRC‘s belligerent
condemnation. The referendums failed to be valid, and KMT candidate Ma Ying-
jeou won as president.

Three Ifs
In February 2000, on the eve of another presidential election in Taiwan, the
PRC issued its second White Paper on Taiwan, reaffirming the peaceful
unification policy but adding a new precondition for the use of force. As one of
―Three Ifs,‖ the PRC officially warned that even if Taiwan indefinitely refuses to
negotiate a peaceful settlement, the PRC would be compelled to use force to
achieve unification. However, no deadline was issued. The White Paper also
warned the United States not to sell arms to Taiwan or pursue any form of alliance
with Taiwan, including cooperation in missile defense.

Commitment to Help Taiwan’s Self-Defense

Since the 1950s, the United States government, with a critical congressional
role, has expressed the consistent position for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
question. Implementation of U.S. policy included the U.S.-ROC Defense Treaty
of 1954 and the Formosa Resolution, P.L. 84-4. [52] After termination of the
treaty, Congress passed and President Carter signed the TRA of 1979, adding U.S.
commitment to assist Taiwan‘s self-defense and a potential U.S. role in
maintaining peace in the strait. The TRA left the U.S. obligation to help defend
Taiwan somewhat ambiguous and did not bind future U.S. decisions. Section
2(b)(4) states that the United States will consider with ―grave concern‖ any non-
peaceful means to determine Taiwan‘s future. The TRA also excluded the islands
off the mainland (e.g., Quemoy and Matsu) in its security coverage over Taiwan.
462 Shirley A. Kan

Nonetheless, the Section 2(b)(6) of the TRA declares it to be policy to maintain

the U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan
[emphasis added].
In 1982, President Reagan signed the Joint Communique on reducing arms
sales to Taiwan, but he also stated in public and internal clarifications that U.S.
arms sales will continue in accordance with the TRA and with the full expectation
that the PRC‘s approach to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be
peaceful. President George H. W. Bush decided in September 1992 to sell 150 F-
16 fighters to Taiwan, citing concerns about the cross-strait military balance.
On March 10 and 11, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced decisions
to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups to waters off Taiwan, after the PRC
announced renewed PLA exercises that would include further missile ―test-
firings‖ toward Taiwan and Congress introduced legislation on helping to defend
the ROC. President Clinton demonstrated that there might be grave consequences,
as well as grave concern, to non-peaceful efforts to determine Taiwan‘s future.
However, the Joint Statement at the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit did not mention
the TRA.
In April 2001, President George W. Bush publicly stated the U.S.
commitment to Taiwan as an obligation to do ―whatever it took to help Taiwan
defend herself‖ [emphasis added].[53] Visiting two allies then China in February
2002, the President, in Tokyo, cited the U.S. commitment to Taiwan in the
context of support for five regional allies (Japan, South Korea, Australia,
Philippines, and Thailand)—to applause from the Diet, or Japan‘s legislature.
Then, in Beijing, Bush emphasized U.S. commitments to the TRA and a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question, while voicing opposition to provocations from
either side.
However, indicating concerns about miscalculations of U.S. views in Taiwan,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless told Taiwan‘s Deputy
Defense Minister Chen Chao-min in February 2003 that, while the President said
we will do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself, Taiwan ―should not
view America‘s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as
a substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense.‖ [54]
In November 2003, with concerns about PRC threats and Taiwan President
Chen Shui-bian‘s efforts to hold referendums, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage said that the TRA is not a defense treaty. Armitage added that the TRA
guides policy in providing Taiwan ―sufficient defense articles for her self-
defense‖ and ―also requires the United States to keep sufficient force in the Asia
Pacific area to be able to keep the area calm.‖ Armitage reaffirmed that the U.S.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 463

commitment to assist Taiwan‘s self-defense, with no defense treaty, ―doesn‘t go

beyond that in the Taiwan Relations Act, and we have good, competent military
forces there.‖[55] President Bush appeared with PRC Premier Wen Jiabao in the
Oval Office on December 9, 2003, and stated U.S. opposition to any unilateral
decisions made by the leader of Taiwan to change the status quo.
In April 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly further clarified U.S.
policy after Chen Shui-bian‘s re-election in March and warned Taiwan not to
dismiss PRC statements as ―empty threats‖ and warned of ―limitations‖ to U.S.
support for constitutional changes in Taiwan. At the same time, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman warned
Beijing that its attempt to use force would ―inevitably‖ involve the United
States.[56]
Aside from the issue of whether the U.S. strategy on assisting Taiwan‘s self-
defense should be ambiguous or clear in a policy seeking deterrence towards
Beijing and Taipei, a third view advocates the removal of any defense
commitment (implicit or explicit) while continuing to sell weapons for Taiwan‘s
self-defense.[57]

Arms Sales and Military Relationship

Despite the absence of diplomatic and alliance relations, U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan have been significant. Moreover, beginning after tensions in the Taiwan
Strait in 1995-1996, the Pentagon under the Clinton Administration quietly
expanded the sensitive military relationship with Taiwan to levels unprecedented
since 1979. These broader exchanges reportedly have increased attention to so-
called ―software,‖ discussions over strategy, logistics, command and control, and
plans in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.[58]
The George W. Bush Administration continued and expanded the closer
military ties at different levels. In April 2001, President Bush announced he
would drop the 20-year-old annual arms talks process used in relations with
Taiwan‘s military in favor of normal, routine considerations of Taiwan‘s requests
on an as-needed basis. Then, the Bush Administration granted a visa for ROC
Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming to visit the United States to attend a private
conference held by the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council on March 10-12, 2002, in
St. Petersburg, FL, making him the first ROC defense minister to come to the
United States on a non-transit purpose since 1979.[59] Tang met with Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who told the conference that the United
States is willing to help Taiwan‘s military to strengthen civilian control, enhance
jointness, and rationalize arms acquisitions.[60] In July 2002, the Pentagon issued
a report to Congress on the PLA, warning that ―the PRC‘s ambitious military
464 Shirley A. Kan

modernization casts a cloud over its declared preference for resolving differences
with Taiwan through peaceful means.‖ The report also stressed that ―Beijing has
developed a range of non-lethal coercive options, including political/diplomatic,
economic, and military measures.‖[61] The assessment has policy implications,
since according to the TRA, it is U.S. policy to maintain the U.S. capacity to resist
any resort to force or other forms of ―coercion‖ against Taiwan‘s security, or
social or economic system.
Also in 2002, the Bush Administration requested legislation be passed to
authorize the assignment of personnel from U.S. departments and agencies to
AIT, with implications for the assignment of active-duty military personnel to
Taiwan for the first time since 1979. (See the discussion below of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY2003.) While allowing military representatives
in Taiwan, the Administration maintained a ban on visits by U.S. general and flag
officers to Taiwan, under the State Department‘s ―Guidelines on Relations with
Taiwan.‖
Although there has been much interest among U.S. academic circles and think
tanks in pursuing talks with China on its military buildup and increased U.S.
security assistance to Taiwan, [62] a catalyst for this debate among policymakers
arose out of the U.S.-PRC summit in Crawford, TX, on October 25, 2002. As
confirmed to Taiwan‘s legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen, and
reported in Taiwan‘s media, PRC leader Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a
freeze or reduction in China‘s deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in
return for restraints in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan [63] President Bush reportedly
did not respond to Jiang‘s linkage. Policy considerations include the TRA (under
which the United States has based its defense assistance to Taiwan on the threat
that it faces), the 1982 Joint Communique (which discussed reductions in U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan premised on the PRC‘s peaceful unification policy), and the
1982 ―Six Assurances‖ to Taiwan (which said the United States did not agree to
hold prior consultations with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). On April 21,
2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly testified to the House International
Relations Committee that if the PRC meets its stated obligations to pursue a
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and matches its rhetoric with a military
posture that bolsters and supports peaceful approaches to Taiwan, ―it follows
logically that Taiwan‘s defense requirements will change.‖

Select Legislation (Enacted by Congress) [64]

Since the 1990s, particularly given the PLA‘s provocative exercises and
missile launches in 1995 and 1996, Congress has asserted its role vis-a-vis the
President in determining arms sales to Taiwan, as stipulated by Section 3(b) of the
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 465

TRA, as well as in exercising its oversight of the TRA, including Section 2(b)(6)
on the U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against
Taiwan.
During the 103rd Congress, the Congress passed and President Clinton signed
(on April 30, 1994) the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and
FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) that, inter alia, declared that Sec. 3 of the TRA (i.e., on
arms sales) takes primacy over policy statements (i.e., the 1982 joint
communique).
During the 104th Congress, in early 1996, Congress became increasingly
concerned about provocative PLA exercises held the previous summer and again
on the eve of Taiwan‘s presidential election in March 1996 (with ―test-firings‖ of
M-9 short-range ballistic missiles to target areas close to the two Taiwan ports of
Kaohsiung and Keelung). Introduced by Representative Chris Cox on March 7,
passed by the House on March 19, and passed by the Senate on March 21, 1996,
H.Con.Res. 148 expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should
assist in defending the ROC. On March 13, 1996, during markup of H.Con.Res.
148 in the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Delegate Eni Faleomavaega noted that House and Senate resolutions prompted the
Clinton Administration to deploy the USS Independence and USS Nimitz carriers.
The resolution cited Section 3(c) of the TRA, which directs the President to
inform Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic
system of the people on Taiwan and to determine the U.S. response along with
Congress. However, on March 14, 1996, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord told the Subcommittee that ―however
serious, the present situation does not constitute a threat to Taiwan of the
magnitude contemplated by the drafters of the Taiwan Relations Act‖ and that ―if
warranted by circumstances, we will act under Section 3(c) of the TRA, in close
consultation with the Congress.‖
In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
105-261) required the Secretary of Defense to study the U.S. missile defense
systems that could protect and could be transferred to ―key regional allies,‖
defined in the conference report as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. [65] In
addition, the conference report (H.Rept. 105-746 of the FY1 999 Defense
Appropriations Act, P.L. 105-262) required a report from the Pentagon on the
security situation in the Taiwan Strait, in both classified and unclassified forms
[66]
In the 106th Congress, the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
106-65) enacted a requirement for the Pentagon to submit annual reports on PRC
military power and the security situation in the Taiwan Strait.
466 Shirley A. Kan

In asserting its role in decision-making on arms sales to Taiwan, Congress

passed language, introduced by Senator Lott, in the FY2000 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (in Div. B of P.L. 106-113), requiring the Secretary of State to
consult with Congress to devise a mechanism for congressional input in
determining arms sales to Taiwan. Again, in the FY200 1 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (Sec. 581 of P.L. 106-429), Congress passed the Taiwan
Reporting Requirement, requiring the President to consult on a classified basis
with Congress 30 days prior to the next round of arms sales talks. (Those
consultations took place on March 16, 2001.)
In addition to examining defense transfers to Taiwan, Congress also began to
look closer at U.S. military deployments. The Consolidated Appropriations Act
for FY2000 (P.L. 106-113) required a report on the operational planning of the
Defense Department to implement the TRA and any gaps in knowledge about
PRC capabilities and intentions affecting the military balance in the Taiwan
Strait.[67]
In the 107th Congress, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002
(P.L. 107-107), enacted December 28, 2001, authorized the President to transfer
(by sale) the four Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan (Sec. 1011), under Section 21
of the AECA. Also, Section 1221 of the act required a section in the annual report
on PRC military power (as required by P.L. 106-65) to assess the PLA‘s military
acquisitions and any implications for the security of the United States and its
friends and allies. The scope of arms transfers to be covered was not limited to
those from Russia and other former Soviet states, as in the original House
language (H.R. 2586).[68]
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-115), as
enacted on January 10, 2002, brought unprecedented close coordination between
the Executive and Legislative branches on arms sales to Taiwan. Section 573
required the Departments of State and Defense to provide detailed briefings (not
specified as classified) to congressional committees (including those on
appropriations) within 90 days of enactment and not later than every 120 days
thereafter during FY2002. The briefings were to report on U.S.-Taiwan
discussions on potential sales of defense articles or services.
Some Members in the House and Senate called for ensuring regular and high-
level consultations with Taiwan and a role for Congress in determining arms sales
to Taiwan, after President Bush announced on April 24, 2001, that he would drop
the annual arms talks process with Taiwan in favor of normal, routine
considerations on an ―as-needed‖ basis. Enacted as P.L. 107-228, the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 authorized—at the Bush
Administration‘s request—the Department of State and other departments or
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 467

agencies (including the Department of Defense) to detail employees to AIT

(Section 326); required that Taiwan be ―treated as though it were designated a
major non-NATO ally‖ (Section 1206); required consultations with Congress on
U.S. security assistance to Taiwan every 180 days (Section 1263); and authorized
the sale to Taiwan of the four Kidd-class destroyers (Section 1701). Section 326,
amending the Foreign Service Act of 1980, has significant implications for the
assignment of government officials to Taiwan, including active-duty military
personnel for the first time since 1979.
In signing the bill into law on September 30, 2002, President Bush issued a
statement that included his view of Section 1206 (on a ―major non-NATO ally‖).
He said that ―Section 1206 could be misconstrued to imply a change in the ‗one
China‘ policy of the United States when, in fact, that U.S. policy remains
unchanged. To the extent that this section could be read to purport to change
United States policy, it impermissibly interferes with the President‘s
constitutional authority to conduct the Nation‘s foreign affairs.‖ Nonetheless, the
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Michael Wynne, submitted a letter to Congress on August 29, 2003, that
designated Taiwan as a ―major non-NATO ally.‖
The House-passed FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act contained
Section 1202 seeking to require the Secretary of Defense to implement a
comprehensive plan to conduct combined training and exchanges of senior
officers with Taiwan‘s military and to ―enhance interoperability‖ with Taiwan‘s
military. The language was similar to that of Section 5(b) in the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act proposed in the 106th Congress. The Senate‘s version did not
have the language. As enacted on December 2, 2002, the legislation (P.L. 107-
314) contains a revised section (1210) requiring a Presidential report 180 days
after the act‘s enactment on the feasibility and advisability of conducting
combined operational training and exchanges of senior officers with Taiwan‘s
military. (Military exchanges may take place in the United States, but U.S.
flag/general officers may not visit Taiwan.) [69]
In the 110th Congress, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved, on
September 26, 2007, H.Res. 676 (introduced by Representative Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen) that noted the Bush Administration‘s lack of response to Taiwan‘s
interest in buying F-1 6C/D fighters and that urged the Administration to
determine security assistance ―based solely‖ upon the legitimate defense needs of
Taiwan (citing Section 3(b) of the TRA). The House passed H.Res. 676 on
October 2, 2007. The House also passed H.R. 6646 on September 23, 2008. Some
Members suspected that Bush had a ―freeze‖ on arms sales to Taiwan until
notifications to Congress on October 3, 2008.
468 Shirley A. Kan

In the 111th Congress, Senator John Cornyn introduced on July 23, 2009, an
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 to require
President Obama to report on an assessment of Taiwan‘s air force, in examining
Taiwan‘s need for new F-1 6C/D fighters. In conference, the Senate Armed
Services Committee receded on the section to require in the legislation for a
Presidential report on Taiwan‘s air force and U.S. options. Nonetheless, the
conference report (H.Rept. 111-288) directed the Defense Secretary to submit an
unclassified report to Congress on an assessment of Taiwan‘s air defense. The bill
was enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009, and Secretary Gates submitted a
study to Congress in February 2010.

Issue Area 3: Dialogue

President Nixon in 1972, President Carter in 1978, and President Reagan in
1982 publicly stated the U.S. expectation that the Chinese themselves will settle
the Taiwan question. President Reagan also gave ―Six Assurances‖ to Taiwan in
1982. The assurances to Taipei, made just before the United States and the PRC
issued the August 17, 1982 Joint communique, included assurances that
Washington will not mediate between Taipei and Beijing, and will not pressure
Taipei to negotiate with Beijing.

Urging Cross-Strait Dialogue

One policy question concerns the extent of U.S. encouragement of cross-strait
dialogue and the U.S. role in any talks or negotiations to resolve the Taiwan
question. As Taipei and Beijing‘s economic relationship grew to significant levels
by the early 1990s and the two sides began to talk directly through quasi-official
organizations, the Clinton Administration increasingly voiced its support for the
cross-strait dialogue, encouraging Taipei in particular. Like a bystander, the State
Department said in its Taiwan Policy Review of 1994 that ―the United States
applauds the continuing progress in the cross-strait dialogue.‖ After talks broke
off and military tensions flared, however, the Administration, after 1996, privately
and publicly urged both sides to hold this dialogue as an added part of a more
proactive U.S. policy. In July 1996, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake
visited China and planned a meeting (later canceled) with Wang Daohan, head of
the PRC‘s organization for cross-strait talks. At the 1997 U.S.-PRC summit,
President Clinton urged for a peaceful resolution ―as soon as possible‖ and that
―sooner is better than later.‖
In March 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stan Roth raised the possibility of
―interim agreements‖ between Beijing and Taipei, after several prominent former
Clinton Administration officials made similar proposals. Roth‘s mention of
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 469

possible ―interim agreements‖ raised concerns in Taipei that it was a proposal by

the Clinton Administration to pressure Taipei into negotiating with Beijing.
Roth‘s remarks came in the context of suggestions to reduce cross-strait tensions
issued by former or future Clinton Administration officials. In January 1998, a
delegation of former officials led by former Defense Secretary William Perry had
visited Beijing and Taipei, reportedly passing a message from the PRC that it was
willing to resume talks with Taiwan. The February 21, 1998 Washington Post
reported that the delegation was part of the Administration‘s effort to have a
―track two‖ dialogue with Beijing and Taipei and to encourage resumption of
cross-strait talks. At a February 1998 conference in Taipei, Kenneth Lieberthal (a
University of Michigan professor who later joined the NSC as the Senior Director
for Asian Affairs in August 1998) had proposed a 50-year ―interim arrangement‖
in which the PRC (as ―China‖) would renounce the use of force against Taiwan,
and the ROC (as ―Taiwan, China‖) would agree not to declare independence
(Reuters, March 1, 1998).
In the March 8, 1998 Washington Post, Joseph Nye (former Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) had proposed a ―three-part
package‖ that would include a clarification that Washington would not recognize
or defend Taiwan independence but also would not accept the use of force against
Taiwan, and a ―one country, three systems‖ approach. Also in March 1998,
former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake had visited Taiwan and
reportedly encouraged resumption of cross-strait talks. In Foreign Affairs
(July/August 1998), Chas. Freeman (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs) had urged Washington to encourage Beijing and
Washington to defer negotiations on their long-term relationship for a certain
period, such as 50 years, and to reevaluate arms sales to Taiwan. In February-
March 1999, Perry had led another delegation, including retired Admiral Joseph
Prueher (later nominated in September 1999 to be ambassador to Beijing), and the
group made suggestions to the PRC and Taiwan on how to reduce cross-strait
tensions, according to Notes from the National Committee (Winter/Spring 1999).
Later, on September 5, 1999, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk
mentioned ―one country, three systems‖ as a possible approach for ―one China,‖
Taiwan media reported.
In contrast to this stress on dialogue, the George W. Bush Administration
started by emphasizing deterrence and approved Taiwan‘s requests for major arms
in 2001. In 2004, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice did urge Beijing to
resume cross-strait talks and offered a vague U.S. role ―to further dialogue if it is
helpful.‖ [70] Though the Administration repeatedly stated that Beijing should
talk to the duly-elected leaders in Taipei, the Administration continued the
470 Shirley A. Kan

approach of non-mediation in any talks by those two parties. In 2005, in answer to

Representative Leach about a U.S. role as ―facilitator,‖ Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Randall Schriver vaguely responded that good U.S. relations
with Beijing and Taipei allow Washington to ―assist the two sides in getting to the
negotiating table on mutually agreeable terms.‖ [71]
Lamenting a ―graveyard of missed opportunities‖ in cross-strait ties, a former
Chairman of AIT, Richard Bush, thoroughly assessed this question of possible
U.S. roles and concluded that greater U.S. involvement to encourage direct
dialogue makes sense and that the role should be limited to ―intellectual
facilitation‖ to clarify policy stances and objectives of each side. Ken Lieberthal
called again for U.S. encouragement of cross-strait negotiation for an agreed
framework. [72]

Three Pillars and “Assent” of Taiwan’s People

In July 1999, the Clinton Administration‘s stance on cross-strait dialogue
culminated in the President‘s articulation of a new phrase: that U.S. policy has
―three pillars‖ (one China, peaceful resolution, and cross-strait dialogue).
Recognizing Taiwan‘s newly established status as a democracy, however,
President Clinton in February 2000 added the U.S. expectation that the cross-strait
dispute be resolved not only peacefully but also ―with the assent‖ of Taiwan‘s
people.

Bush Administration’s Re-emphasis of the “Six Assurances”

The George W. Bush Administration began after Chen Shui-bian of the DPP
became ROC President in May 2000. The Bush Administration indicated that it
would not pressure Taipei to hold cross-strait dialogue, re-emphasizing the ―Six
Assurances‖ given to Taipei by President Reagan in 1982. At a hearing in March
2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell assured Senator Jesse Helms that the ―Six
Assurances‖ remained U.S. policy and that the Administration would not favor
consulting the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan. [73] On June 12, 2001, Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly testified to the House International Relations
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific that U.S. defensive arms sales to
Taiwan make a peaceful cross-strait resolution more likely. He said that ―the
central question is how cross-strait relations can move from a focus on the
military balance toward a focus on ways to begin resolving differences between
Taipei and Beijing.‖ While calling for a resumption of direct dialogue, economic
cooperation, and mutual understanding, Kelly also said that ―the PRC cannot
ignore the elected representatives of the people of Taiwan.‖ While visiting Taiwan
at about the same time that PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen signaled a new
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 471

receptive policy toward the ruling DPP in Taiwan, Richard Bush, Chairman of
AIT, said on January 28, 2002, that ―the United States favors and encourages
dialogue but has no intention of serving as a mediator in this dispute or of
pressuring Taiwan to negotiate.‖ He added that ―it does not seem constructive for
one side to set pre-conditions for a resumption of dialogue that the other side even
suspects would be tantamount to conceding a fundamental issue before discussion
begins.‖
In March 2002, Assistant Secretary of State Kelly told attendees at a
conference that the Bush Administration would continue to uphold the ―Six
Assurances,‖ meaning no U.S. mediation and no pressure on Taiwan to go to the
bargaining table. [74] In testimony at a hearing in April 2004, after Chen Shui-
bian‘s re-election in the March election, Kelly again reaffirmed the ―Six
Assurances,‖ but explicitly warned that ―a secure and self-confident Taiwan is a
Taiwan that is more capable of engaging in political interaction and dialogue with
the PRC, and we expect Taiwan will not interpret our support as a blank check to
resist such dialogue.‖ He urged both Beijing and Taipei to pursue dialogue ―as
soon as possible‖ and ―without preconditions.‖ [75]

Obama Administration and Convergence on “Peaceful Development”

In 2005, the KMT and CPC agreed on a party-to-party platform of cross-strait
―peaceful development.‖ After the KMT‘s Ma Ying-jeou became president in
Taiwan in 2008, CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao issued a policy toward Taiwan
of ―peaceful development.‖ After President Obama took office, he held a summit
in Beijing in November 2009 with Hu Jintao, and they issued the first U.S.-PRC
Joint Statement in 12 years since the Clinton-Jiang Joint Statement of 1997. In the
2009 Joint Statement, the United States declared that it welcomed the ―peaceful
development‖ of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looked forward to efforts
by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and
other fields, and develop more positive and stable cross-strait relations.
Nonetheless, AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt clarified at a news conference in
Taipei on November 24, 2009, that the Joint Statement should not be interpreted
as putting pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.

Select Legislation (Enacted by Congress)

As enacted on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for FY2003 (P.L. 107-228), reaffirmed President Clinton‘s February 2000
condition for settling Taiwan‘s status and expressed the sense of Congress that
any resolution of the Taiwan question must be peaceful and ―include the assent of
the people of Taiwan.‖
472 Shirley A. Kan

Overview of Policy Issues

In short, since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have

continued to articulate a ―one China‖ policy in understandings with the PRC.
Nonetheless, policymakers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the
political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the
early 1970s. Congressional oversight of successive Presidents has watched for any
new agreements with Beijing and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of
Beijing‘s ―one China‖ principle—on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or
dialogue. Since the 1990s, successive Administrations also have shown more
explicit opposition—through arms sales, force deployments, deeper U.S.-Taiwan
military ties, and public statements—to PRC efforts to use force or coercion to
determine Taiwan‘s future. Not recognizing the PRC‘s claim over Taiwan or
Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan‘s status as
unsettled. U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on
both sides of the strait: a ―peaceful resolution‖ with the assent of Taiwan‘s people
and without unilateral changes. In other words, U.S. policy focuses on the process
of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.
This approach, however, encounters challenges from Taiwan as it denies
being an ambiguous non-entity and asserts a sovereign status, as the ROC under
the KMT or Taiwan under the DPP. Even as the United States has opposed a
unilateral change from Beijing or Taipei to the status quo, the meaning of ―status
quo‖ remains a question. Some say that instead of a ―status quo,‖ the situation in
the Taiwan Strait has changed significantly, including the shifting military
balance to favor the PRC and the rapid rapprochement and extensive
engagement—beyond détente— between the PRC and Taiwan under the CPC and
KMT‘s dialogues, particularly since 2008.
There has been no comprehensive review of U.S. policy since 1994. Some
said that a U.S. strategy or a policy review might be needed to seek positive
objectives and sustain U.S. security, political, and economic interests with Taiwan
or with the PRC. [76] For a hearing on January 13, 2009, on Hillary Clinton‘s
confirmation to be Secretary of State, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
asked a question for the record about whether the Administration would hold
another Taiwan Policy Review, but she did not answer the question. Still, Admiral
Robert Willard, Commander of the Pacific Commander (PACOM) in Honolulu,
initiated in January 2010 reviews of approaches toward the PRC and toward
Taiwan (among other concerns like North Korea) by ―Strategic Focus Groups
(SFGs),‖ narrower efforts than a review by the Obama Administration.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 473

In any examination of U.S. policy or strategy, whether through recalibrations

or review, Congress and the Administration face critical issues under the rubric of
the ―one China‖ policy, including:
How are internal as well as cross-strait political, economic, and military
trends serving or undermining U.S. interests and leverage over Beijing and
Taipei?

What are the implications for U.S. interests and policies of the significant
engagement (including the CPC-KMT cooperation) across the Taiwan
Strait, particularly since May 2008?
What are likely outcomes (e.g., unsettled status, unification,
independence, confederation, commonwealth), and what are impacts on
U.S. interests?
What are the implications of strategies conducted by Beijing and Taipei?
Are policy elements of diplomacy and deterrence balanced?
Should Washington change any assurances or positions?
Should U.S. policy positions (support, non-support, opposition) be
clarified to deter provocations from Beijing or Taipei (e.g., on use of
force or coercion, Taipei‘s moves toward de jure independence)?
Should the United States proactively deepen its role (e.g., facilitation,
mediation) to encourage cross-strait negotiation and/or appoint a special
envoy/coordinator?
How should defense policies (on arms sales, military cooperation, U.S.
force deployments, missile defense) be carried out to increase U.S.
leverage in Taiwan, deter conflict, and counter coercion?
What is the extent of the U.S. commitment to help Taiwan‘s self-
defense?
How might the United States be more supportive of Taiwan in its
preservation of international space—distinct from the PRC?
How well are U.S. policies coordinated with those of our allies, including
European countries in NATO, Japan, South Korea, and Australia?

PART II: HIGHLIGHTS OF KEY STATEMENTS

BY WASHINGTON, BEIJING, AND TAIPEI

In Part II below, this CRS Report provides excerpts from key statements on
―one China‖ as articulated by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, in addition to the
474 Shirley A. Kan

three Joint Communiques and the TRA, since the United States first reached
understandings with the PRC in 1971. [77] Based on unclassified sources and
interviews, the highlights also give a comprehensive look at significant statements
and contexts in Washington, Beijing, as well as Taipei. This compilation
identifies new, major (not all) elements in the policies of the governments. The
statements also include accounts of presidential assurances. The three perspectives
on ―one China‖ are placed in chronological order under successive U.S.
Administrations. The texts are placed in italics.

Statements during Nixon Administration

Kissinger’s Secret Talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai [78]

July 9, 1971

Our military presence in Taiwan at this moment is composed of two

elements, the two-thirds of it which is related to activities in other parts of Asia
[the Vietnam War] and the one-third of it which is related to the defense of
Taiwan. We are prepared to remove that part related to activities other than to
the defense of Taiwan, that’s two-thirds of our force ... within a specified brief
period of time after the ending of the war in Indochina. We are prepared to begin
reducing our other forces on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the
military questions need not be a principal obstacle between us. I may say,
incidentally, that these are personal decisions of President Nixon which have not
yet been discussed with our bureaucracy or with Congress, and so should be
treated with great confidence.

As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a “two Chinas”
solution or a “one China, one Taiwan” solution.

[On Zhou Enlai’s question of whether the United States would support the
Taiwan independence movement]: We would not support this.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 475

Nixon’s “Five Principles” in Secret Talks with Zhou Enlai

February 22, 1972 [79]

Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will
be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that
the status of Taiwan is undetermined.

Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence
movement.

Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage
Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also
discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement. I will only
say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as the U.S. has influence
with Japan—we have in this respect the same interests as the Prime Minister’s
government—we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage
Japan from doing so.

The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue that can be worked out. And related to that point, we will not
support any military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a
military return to the Mainland.

Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People‘s Republic.

We know that the issue of Taiwan is a barrier to complete normalization, but
within the framework I have previously described, we seek normalization and we
will work toward that goal and will try to achieve it.

Nixon on Withdrawing U.S. Military Forces from Taiwan

February 24, 1972 [80]

With regard to Taiwan, I do not believe a permanent American presence—

whatever happens in our meetings—is necessary to American security.... My goal
is the withdrawal of our remaining forces, not just two-thirds, but all forces,
including the remaining one-third.... It must be consistent with ... the so-called
Nixon Doctrine. Under that Doctrine, we are cutting our forces in Korea.... Two-
thirds will go, hopefully as soon as we can finish our Vietnam involvement. My
plan also is one which reduces the one-third and withdraws it during the period I
have the power to act. But I cannot do it before January of next year. It has to be
476 Shirley A. Kan

over a period of four years. Now if someone asks me when I return, do you have
a deal with the Prime Minister that you are going to withdraw all American
forces from Taiwan, I will say “no.” But I am telling the Prime Minister that it is
my plan.... [81]

U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (Shanghai Communique)

February 27, 1972

The Chinese reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial
question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the
United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal
government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been
returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in
which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military
installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly
opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,”
“one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” or
advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges [82] that all
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait [83] maintain there is but one China
and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the
Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms
the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military
installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces
and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

Mao Zedong on Use of Force [84]

November 12, 1973

As for the question of our relations with Taiwan, that is quite complex. I do
not believe in a peaceful transition.... They are a bunch of counter-
revolutionaries [the Nationalists on Taiwan]. How could they cooperate with us?
I say that we can do without Taiwan for the time being, and let it come after “100
years.”
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 477

Statements during Ford Administration

President Ford’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress [85]

August 12, 1974

To the People’s Republic of China, whose legendary hospitality I enjoyed, I

pledge continuity in our commitment to the principles of the Shanghai
communique. The new relationship built on those principles has demonstrated
that it serves serious and objective mutual interests and has become an enduring
feature of the world scene.

Statements during Carter Administration

U.S. Statement on Diplomatic Recognition of the PRC [86]

December 15, 1978

As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the

People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will
maintain commercial, cultural and other relations without official
government representation and without diplomatic relations. The
Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit
the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other non-governmental
relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization.
The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and
prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will
be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves. [87]

PRC Statement on Establishing China-U.S. Diplomatic Relations [88]

December 16, 1978

As is known to all, the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the

sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of
Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between
478 Shirley A. Kan

China and the United States. It has now been resolved between the two countries
in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique and through their joint efforts, thus
enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the
two countries. As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the
motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China’s internal affair.

ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo’s Statement [89]

December 29, 1978

The Republic of China is an independent sovereign state with a legitimately

established government based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. It is
an effective government, which has the wholehearted support of her people. The
international status and personality of the Republic of China cannot be changed
merely because of the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by any
country of the world. The legal status and international personality of the
Republic of China is a simple reality which the United States must recognize and
respect.

PRC’s New Year’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan [90]

January 1, 1979

Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times....

Taiwan’s separation from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial
and against our national interests and aspirations, and this state of affairs must
not be allowed to continue....

Unification of China now fits in with the direction of popular feeling and the
general trend of development. The world in general recognizes only one China,
with the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal
government. The recent conclusion of the China- Japan Treaty of Peace and
Friendship and the normalization of relations between China and the United
States show still more clearly that no one can stop this trend....

We place great hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the
Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of
one China and opposed an independent Taiwan. This is our common stand and
the basis for our cooperation....
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 479

The Chinese Government has ordered the People’s Liberation Army [PLA]
to stop the bombardment of Quemoy and other islands as of today. A state of
military confrontation between the two sides still exists along the Taiwan Strait.
This can only create artificial tension. We hold that first of all this military
confrontation should be ended through discussion between the Government of the
People’s Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the
necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make
contacts and exchanges in whatever area....

U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

(Normalization Communique)

January 1, 1979

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s

Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the
people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges [91] the

Chinese [92] position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8

Enacted April 10, 1979

Section 2(b) It is the policy of the United States

(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural,
and other relations between the people of the United States and the people
on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other
peoples of the Western Pacific area; [93]
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security,
and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international
concern;
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations
with the People‘s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace
480 Shirley A. Kan

and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United
States; [94]
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the people on Taiwan. [95]

Sec. 3(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the
United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b)The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of
such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the
needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such
determination of Taiwan‘s defense needs shall include review by United
States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the
President and the Congress.

(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat
to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and
any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The
President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with
constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response
to any such danger.

Sec. 4(b)(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign
countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall
include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan. [96]

Sec. 15(2) The term ―Taiwan‖ includes, as the context may require, the
islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, [97] the people on those islands,
corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under
the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan
recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1,
1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof). [98]
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 481

Statements during Reagan Administration

PRC Leader Ye Jianying’s Nine-Point Proposal [99]

September 30, 1981

Now, I would take this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the
return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful unification
[proclaimed on New Year’s Day 1979]:

1. In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation

as early as possible, we propose that talks be held between the Communist
Party of China and the Kuomintang [Nationalist Party] of China on a
reciprocal basis so that the two parties will cooperate for the third time to
accomplish the great cause of national unification. The two sides may first
send people to meet for an exhaustive exchange of views.
2. It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities on both sides of the
strait to communicate with each other, reunite with their relatives, develop
trade and increase mutual understanding. We propose that the two sides
make arrangements to facilitate the exchange of mail, trade, air and
shipping services, and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic,
cultural, and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement thereupon.
3. After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy
as a special administration region, and it can retain its armed forces. The
central government will not interfere with local affairs in Taiwan.
4. Taiwan’s current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its
way of life and its economic and cultural relations with foreign countries.
There will be no encroachment on the proprietary rights and lawful right of
inheritance over private property, houses, land and enterprises, or on
foreign investments.
5. People in authority and representative personages of various circles in
Taiwan may take up posts of leadership in national political bodies and
participate in running the state.
6. When Taiwan’s local finance is in difficulty, the central government may
subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.
7. For people of all nationalities and public figures of various circles in
Taiwan who wish to come and settle on the mainland, it is guaranteed that
proper arrangements will be made for them, that there will be no
discrimination against them, and that they will have the freedom of entry
and exit.
482 Shirley A. Kan

8. Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to invest and engage

in various economic undertakings on the mainland, and their legal rights,
interests, and profits are guaranteed.
9. The unification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese. We
sincerely welcome people of all nationalities, public figures of all circles,
and all mass organizations in Taiwan to make proposals and suggestions
regarding affairs of state through various channels and in various ways.

Taiwan‘s return to the embrace of the motherland and the accomplishment

of the great cause of national unification is a great and glorious mission history
has bequeathed on our generation.... We hope that the Kuomintang authorities
will stick to their one-China position and their opposition to ―two Chinas‖ and
that they will put national interests above everything else, forget previous ill will
and join hands with us in accomplishing the great cause of national unification
and the great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for
our ancestors, bring benefit to our posterity, and write a new and glorious page in
the history of the Chinese nation!

Letter from President Reagan to Deng Xiaoping [100]

April 5, 1982

Clearly, the Taiwan issue had been a most difficult problem between our
governments.... The United States firmly adheres to the positions agreed upon in
the Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
United States and China. There is only one China. We will not permit the
unofficial relations between the American people and the people of Taiwan to
weaken our commitment to this principle.

Reagan’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan [101]

July 14, 1982

In negotiating the third Joint Communique with the PRC, the United
States:

1. has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan;
2. has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC on arms sales to
Taiwan;
3. will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing;
4. has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 483

5. has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan;

6. will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.

Message from President Reagan to Taiwan President [102]

July 26, 1982

I want to point out that this decision [on a joint communique] is based on a
PRC decision only to use peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue. On this
point, the U.S. will not only pay attention to what the PRC says, but also will use
all methods to achieve surveillance of PR C military production and military
deployment. The intelligence attained would be brought to your attention. If there
is any change with regard to their commitment to peaceful solution of the Taiwan
issue, the U.S. commitments would become invalidated.

U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales (1982 Communique) [103]

August 17, 1982 [104]

In the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on

January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the United States of America
recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal
government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position [105] that there
is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the
course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic
relations.

The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China’s

internal affair. The Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on
January 1, 1979, promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful
unification of the Motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on
September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental
policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations

with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese
sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or
pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan. ” [106] The
484 Shirley A. Kan

United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of

striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China’s
Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point
Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which
has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable
conditions for the settlement of United States-China differences over the question
of United States arms sales to Taiwan.

Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States
Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms
sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in
qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years
since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and
China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan,
leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States
acknowledges China’s consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of
this issue. [107]

President Reagan’s Statement on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan [108]

August 17, 1982

Regarding future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, our policy, set forth clearly in
the communique [issued on the same day], is fully consistent with the Taiwan
Relations Act. Arms sales will continue in accordance with the act and with the
full expectation that the approach of the Chinese Government to the resolution of
the Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful. We attach great significance to the
Chinese statement in the communique regarding China’s “fundamental” policy,
and it is clear from our statements that our future actions will be conducted with
this peaceful policy fully in mind. The position of the United States Government
has always been clear and consistent in this regard. The Taiwan question is a
matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve. We
will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure
on, the people of Taiwan in this matter. At the same time, we have an abiding
interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful. I shall never waver from
this fundamental position.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 485

Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communique [109]

August 17, 1982

The U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned

absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of
the Taiwan-PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that the linkage
between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy. In
addition, it is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan
be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. Both in quantitative and
qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be
maintained.

PRC’s Statement on the Communique [110]

August 17, 1982

In the joint communique, the Chinese Government reiterates in clear-cut

terms its position that “the question of Taiwan is China’s internal affair.” The
U.S. side also indicates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese
sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or
pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”

Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge and “Six Assurances” [111]

August 18, 1982

[On the August 17, 1982, communique], let me recapitulate and emphasize a
few key features; then I’ll take your questions. First, the document must be read as
a whole, since the policies it sets forth are interrelated [original emphasis].

Second, as I have previously noted, the communique contains a strong Chinese

statement that its fundamental policy is to seek to resolve the Taiwan question
by peaceful means (Para 4) [original emphasis]....

Third, the U.S. statements concerning future arms sales to Taiwan (Para
6) are based on China’s statements as to its fundamental peaceful policy for
seeking a resolution to the Taiwan question and on the “new situation” created
by those statements (Para 5) [original emphasis]....
486 Shirley A. Kan

Fourth, we did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to
Taiwan and the statements of future U.S. arms sales policy embodied in the
Communique do not provide either a time frame for reductions of U.S. arms
sales or for their termination....We see no mediation role for the U.S. nor will
we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the

PRC.... There has been no change in our long-standing position on the issue of
sovereignty over Taiwan. The communique (Para 1) in its opening paragraph simply
cites that portion of the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. in which the U.S. “acknowledged
the Chinese position on this issue” (i.e., that there is but one

China and Taiwan is a part of China).... It has been reported in the press that
the Chinese at one point suggested that the Taiwan Relations Act be revised. We
have no plans to seek any such revisions.... [Para 9] should not be read to imply
that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms
sales to Taiwan. [original emphasis]

PRC Leader Deng Xiaoping on “One China, Two Systems” [112]

February 22, 1984

There are many disputes in the world that always require solutions. I have
had the belief for many years that, no matter what solutions are used to solve
these problems, don’t use means of war, but use peaceful ways. Our proposal for
unification between the mainland and Taiwan is fair and reasonable. After
unification, Taiwan will still be allowed to engage in its capitalism, while the
mainland implements socialism, but there will be one unified China. One China,
two systems. The Hong Kong problem will also be treated the same: one China,
two systems. [113]

Deng Xiaoping on Use of Force and Unification in “1,000 Years” [114]

June 22, 1984

If we cannot resolve peacefully [the Hong Kong and Taiwan questions], then
can only use force to resolve, but this would be disadvantageous to all sides.
Achieving national unification is the nation’s wish, if not unified in 100 years,
then unified in 1,000 years. In how to resolve this problem, I think it would only
be through “one country, two systems.”
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 487

Deng Xiaoping on “Peaceful Coexistence” and Taiwan’s Military [115]

October 31, 1984

We proposed “one country, two systems” to resolve the problem of national

unification, and that is a kind of peaceful coexistence. We resolved the Hong
Kong problem, permitting Hong Kong to preserve the capitalist system with no
change for 50 years. This principle also applies to the Taiwan problem. Taiwan
differs from Hong Kong and would be able to keep its military. ... Taiwan could
keep its capitalism, and Beijing would not assign people to Taiwan.

Statements during George H. W. Bush Administration

Toast at the Welcoming Banquet in Beijing [116]

February 25, 1989

We remain firmly committed to the principles set forth in those three joint
communiques that form the basis of our relationship. And based on the bedrock
principle that there is but one China, we have found ways to address Taiwan
constructively without rancor. We Americans have a long, historical friendship
with Chinese people everywhere. In the last few years, we’ve seen an
encouraging expansion of family contacts and travel and indirect trade and other
forms of peaceful interchange across the Taiwan Strait, reflecting the interests of
the Chinese people themselves. And this trend, this new environment, is
consistent with America’s present and longstanding interest in a peaceful
resolution of the differences by the Chinese themselves.

Taiwan’s National Unification Guidelines; Policy on the PRC [117]

March 14, 1991

[Unification is] to establish a democratic, free, and equitably prosperous

China.... It should be achieved in gradual phases under the principles of reason,
peace, parity, and reciprocity.... [In the short term,] to enhance understanding
through exchanges between the two sides of the Strait and eliminate hostility
through reciprocity; and to establish a mutually benign relationship by not
endangering each other’s security and stability while in the midst of exchanges
and not denying the other’s existence as a political entity while in the midst of
effecting reciprocity.
488 Shirley A. Kan

Taiwan on the Meaning of “One China” [118]

August 1, 1992

Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China. However,
the two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of “one
China.” To Peking, “one China” means the “People’s Republic of China (PRC),
” with Taiwan to become a “Special Administration Region” after unification.
Taipei, on the other hand, considers “one China” to mean the Republic of China
(ROC), founded in 1911 and with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The
ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen,
and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China
as well.

President Bush on the Sale of F-16s to Taiwan [119]

September 2, 1992

I’m announcing this afternoon that I will authorize the sale to Taiwan of 150
F-16A/B aircraft, made right here in Fort Worth.... This sale of F-1 6s to Taiwan
will help maintain peace and stability in an area of great concern to us, the Asia-
Pacific region, in conformity with our law. In the last few years, after decades of
confrontation, great strides have been made in reducing tensions between Taipei
and Beijing. During this period, the United States has provided Taiwan with
sufficient defensive capabilities to sustain the confidence it needs to reduce those
tensions. That same sense of security has underpinned Taiwan’s dramatic
evolution toward democracy.

My decision today does not change the commitment of this Administration

and its predecessors to the three communiques with the People’s Republic of
China. We keep our word: our one-China policy, our recognition of the PRC as
the sole legitimate government of China. I’ve always stressed that the importance
of the 1982 communique on arms sales to Taiwan lies in its promotion of
common political goals: peace and stability in the area through mutual restraint.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 489

“One China, Different Interpretations” (“1992 Consensus”) [120]

November 3, 1992

Taipei’s SEF: On November 3, a responsible person of the Communist

Chinese ARATS said that it is willing to “respect and accept” SEF’s proposal
that each side “verbally states” its respective principles on “one China. ” [121]

Beijing’s ARATS: At this working-level consultation in Hong Kong, SEF

representatives suggested that each side use respective verbal announcements to
state the one China principle. On November 3rd, SEF sent a letter, formally
notifying that “each side will make respective statements through verbal
announcements.” ARATS fully respects and accepts SEF’s suggestion. [122]

Statements during Clinton Administration

PRC Premier Li Peng Warns Taiwan [123]

March 15, 1993 [124]

We advocate that both sides hold talks as soon as possible on bringing

hostility between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to an end and gradually
fulfilling peaceful unification.... The forces advocating Taiwan independence on
and off the island have resurged in recent years. Certain international forces
have also deliberately created obstacles to impede China’s peaceful unification.
They cannot but arouse serious concern by the Chinese Government and all the
Chinese people. We are resolutely opposed to any form of two China’s or one
China and one Taiwan; and we will take all necessary drastic measures to stop
any activities aimed at making Taiwan independent and splitting the motherland.

Mainland-Taiwan “Koo-Wang” Talks (Singapore) [125]

April 27-29, 1993

PRC (Wang Daohan): There are many questions that need to be solved
because contacts between the two sides of the strait began only after a separation
of more than 40 years. We have said repeatedly that as long as both sides sit
down to talk, we can discuss any question. Proper methods for solving problems
will be found as long as the two organizations observe the spirit of mutual
490 Shirley A. Kan

respect, consult on equal footing, seek truth from facts, and seek common ground
while reserving differences. [126]

Taiwan (Koo Chen-fu): There exist not only the same geographical,
historical, and cultural origins between the two sides, but also a ―blood is thicker
than water‖ sentiment shared by our people. President Lee Teng-hui‘s
proclamation that: ―Taiwan‘s relationship with the entire Chinese people cannot
be severed‖ could not have said it more clearly. [127]

Taiwan: The subjects discussed in the Koo-Wang Talks were planned by the
government in accord with the goals of the short-term phase in the Guidelines for
National Unification.... The KooWang Talks were obviously in no way
political.... During the talks, SEF delegates steadfastly upheld the principle of
parity in such matters as meeting procedures, conference site, seating, as well as
the topics and scope of discussion. This made it impossible for the other side to
slight the fact that the ROC is an equal political entity. [128]

ROC (Taiwan)’s Bid to Gain Parallel Representation at the U.N. [129]

August-September 1993 [130]

[In 1991], we accepted the fact that the nation was divided and that, prior to
the unification of China, the political authority of both the ROC government and
the Chinese communists exist. Both the ROC government and the Chinese
communists exercise political authority in the areas under their de facto control.
Each is entitled to represent the residents of the territory under its de facto
control and to participate in the activities of the international community.... It is
now the fixed policy and goal of the government and the opposition parties in the
ROC to participate in the United Nations....

PRC’s White Paper on Taiwan and on Military Option [131]

August 31, 1993

There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of

China, and the seat of China’s central government is in Beijing. This is a
universally recognized fact as well as the premise for a peaceful settlement of the
Taiwan question. The Chinese government is firmly against any words or deeds
designed to split China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It opposes “two
Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” “one country, two governments,” or any
attempt or act that could lead to “independence of Taiwan.” The Chinese people
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 491

on both sides of the strait all believe that there is only one China and espouse
national unification. Taiwan’s status as an inalienable part of China has been
determined and cannot be changed. “Self- determination” for Taiwan is out of
the question.

Peaceful unification is a set policy of the Chinese Government. However,

any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including
military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese
Government is under no obligation to undertake any commitment to any foreign
power or people intending to split China as to what means it might use to handle
its own domestic affairs.

It should be pointed out that the Taiwan question is purely an internal affair
of China and bears no analogy to the cases of Germany and Korea which were
brought about as a result of international accords at the end of the Second World
War.

Taiwan’s White Paper on Cross-Strait Relations [132]

July 5, 1994

It is an incontrovertible historical fact that the ROC has always been an

independent sovereign state in the international community since its founding in
1912. However, relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not
those between two separate countries, neither are they purely domestic in nature.
In order to ensure that cross-strait relations develop toward benign interaction,
the ROC government has formulated the concept of a “political entity” to serve
as the basis of interaction between the two sides. The term “political entity” has
extensive meaning, it can refer to a country, a government, or a political
organization. At the current stage of cross- Strait interaction, only when we set
aside the “sovereignty dispute” will we untie the knots that have bound us for
more than the past 40 years and progress smoothly toward unification....

The ROC Government is firm in its advocacy of “one China” and is opposed
to “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” But at the same time, given that
division and divided rule on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is a long-standing
political fact, the ROC Government also holds that the two sides should be fully
aware that each has jurisdiction over its respective territory and that they should
coexist as two legal entities in the international arena. As for their relationship
with each other, it is that of two separate areas of one China and is therefore
“domestic” or “Chinese” in nature....
492 Shirley A. Kan

The ROC Government takes “one China, two equal political entities” as the
structure for handling cross-strait relations and hopes that cross-strait relations
will develop in the direction of being peaceful, pragmatic, and sensible. .. The
CPC [Communist Party of China] should dismiss any misgivings it has
concerning the ROC Government’s determination to achieve unification. What
the CPC authorities should give urgent consideration to is how, given the fact
that the country is divided under two separate governments, we can actively
create favorable conditions for unification and gradually bring the two different
“political entities” together to form “one China.” ... At the same time, the
Chinese people cannot strive for unification just for the sake of unification;
instead, unification should be realized under a reasonable and benign political,
economic, and social system and way of living. Therefore, we hold that the two
sides of the strait should go all out to build a democratic, free, equally wealthy,
and united China....

Washington’s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review [133]

September 7, 1994 [134]

U.S. policy toward Taiwan is governed, of course, by the Taiwan Relations

Act of 1979. Three communiques with the People’s Republic of China (the
Shanghai Communique of 1972, the Normalization Communique of 1979, and the
Joint Communique of 1982) also constitute part of the foundation. In the joint
communique shifting diplomatic relations to the PRC 15 years ago, the United
States recognized “the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole
legal Government of China.” The document further states that “Within this
context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and
other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” The United States also
acknowledged “the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is
part of China.” These formulations were repeated in the 1982 communique.
Since 1978, each Administration has reaffirmed this policy.

The policy has been essential in maintaining peace, stability, and economic
development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and throughout the region.... We
have made absolutely clear our expectation that cross-strait relations will evolve
in a peaceful manner. We neither interfere in nor mediate this process. But we
welcome any evolution in relations between Taipei and Beijing that is mutually
agreed upon and peacefully reached....

In the end, it is only the two parties themselves, Taiwan and the PRC, that
will be able to resolve the issues between them. In this regard, the United States
applauds the continuing progress in cross-strait dialogue....
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 493

We will continue to provide material and training to Taiwan to enable it to

maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, as mandated by the Taiwan
Relations Act....

Within this framework, the President has decided to enhance our unofficial
ties with Taiwan.... the Administration strongly opposes Congressional attempts
to legislate visits by top leaders of the “Republic of China” to the U.S....

Recognizing Taiwan’s important role in transnational issues, we will

support its membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite,
and will support opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations
where its membership is not possible.

We do not seek and cannot impose a resolution of differences between

Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. Nor should we permit one to
manipulate us against the other.

PRC President Jiang Zemin’s “Eight Points” [135]

January 30, 1995

1. We must firmly oppose any words or actions aimed at creating an

“independent Taiwan” and the propositions “split the country and rule
under separate regimes,” two Chinas over a certain period of time,” etc.,
which are in contravention of the principle of one China.
2. We do not challenge the development of non-governmental economic and
cultural ties by Taiwan with other countries.... However, we oppose
Taiwan’s activities in “expanding its living space internationally,” which
are aimed at creating “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” ...
3. It has been our consistent stand to hold negotiations with the Taiwan
authorities on the peaceful unification of the motherland.... I suggest that, as
the first step, negotiations should be held and an agreement reached on
officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides in accordance
with the principle that there is only one China....
4. We should strive for the peaceful unification of the motherland, since
Chinese should not fight fellow Chinese. Our not undertaking to give up the
use of force is not directed against our compatriots in Taiwan but against
the schemes of foreign forces to interfere with China’s unification and to
bring about the “independence of Taiwan.” ...
5. Great efforts should be made to expand the economic exchanges and
cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait...
494 Shirley A. Kan

People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should inherit and carry forward
the fine traditions of Chinese culture.

6. The 21 million compatriots in Taiwan, whether born there or in other

provinces, are all Chinese... We also hope that all political parties in
Taiwan will adopt a sensible, forward- looking, and constructive attitude
and promote the expansion of relations between the two sides....
7. Leaders of Taiwan authorities are welcome to pay visits in appropriate
capacities. We are also ready to accept invitations from the Taiwan side to
visit Taiwan.... The affairs of the Chinese people should be handled by
ourselves, something that does not take an international occasion to
accomplish....

Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s “Six Point” Response [136]

April 8, 1995

1. The fact that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have been ruled by two
political entities in no way subordinate to each other had led to a state of
division between the two sides and separate governmental jurisdictions,
hence, the issue of national unification.... Only by facing up to this reality
can both sides build greater consensus on the “one China” issue and at the
earliest possible date.
2. In Taiwan, we have long taken upon ourselves the responsibility for
safeguarding and furthering traditional Chinese culture, and advocate that
culture be the basis for exchanges between both sides to help promote the
nationalistic sentiment for living together in prosperity and to foster a
strong sense of brotherliness....
3. We will continue to assist the mainland in developing its economy and
upgrading the living standards of its people based upon our existing
investments and trade relations. As for trade and transportation links with
the mainland, the agencies concerned have to make in-depth evaluations as
well as careful plans since these are very complicated issues....
4. I have indicated on several occasions that if leaders on both sides could
meet with each other on international occasions in a natural manner, this
would alleviate the political confrontation between both sides and foster a
harmonious atmosphere for developing future relations.... It is our firm
belief that the more international organizations both sides join on an equal
footing, the more favorable the environment will become for the growth of
bilateral relations and for the process of peaceful unification....
5. We believe the mainland authorities should demonstrate their goodwill by
publicly renouncing the use of force and refrain from making any military
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 495

move that might arouse anxiety or suspicion on this side of the Taiwan
Strait, thus paving the way for formal negotiations between both sides to put
an end to the state of hostility....
6. Hong Kong and Macau are integral parts of the Chinese nation ... Post-
1997 Hong Kong and post-1999 Macau are naturally a matter of great
concern to us. In this regard, the ROC government has reiterated its
determination to maintain normal contact with Hong Kong and Macau,
further participate in affairs related to Hong Kong and Macau, and provide
better services to our compatriots there....

U.S. Visa For Lee Teng-hui’s Private Visit to Cornell University [137]

May 22, 1995

President Clinton has decided to permit Lee Teng-hui to make a private visit
to the United States in June for the express purpose of participating in an alumni
reunion event at Cornell University, as a distinguished alumnus. The action
follows a revision of Administration guidelines to permit occasional private visits
by senior leaders of Taiwan, including President Lee.

President Lee will visit the U.S. in a strictly private capacity and will not
undertake any official activities. It is important to reiterate that this is not an
official visit. The granting of a visa in this case is consistent with U.S. policy of
maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan. It does not convey any change
in our relations with or policies towards the People’s Republic of China, with
which we maintain official relations and recognize as the sole legal government
of China.

We will continue to abide by the three communiques that form the basis of
our relations with China. The United States also acknowledges the Chinese
position that there is but one China, and Taiwan is a part of China....

Clinton’s Secret Letter to Jiang Zemin and “Three Noes” [138]

August 1995

At a meeting in Brunei in August 1995, Secretary of State Warren

Christopher reportedly delivered a letter from President Clinton to Chinese
President Jiang Zemin. In the letter, which has not been made public, Clinton is
said to have assured Jiang that the United States would (1) “oppose” Taiwan
496 Shirley A. Kan

independence; (2) would not support “two Chinas,” or one China and one
Taiwan; and (3) would not support Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations.

U.S. State Department and 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis [139]

March 14, 1996

Our fundamental interest on the Taiwan question is that peace and stability
be maintained and that the PRC and Taiwan work out their differences
peacefully. At the same time, we will strictly avoid interfering as the two sides
pursue peaceful resolution of differences.

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 forms the legal basis of U.S.
policy regarding the security of Taiwan.... However serious, the present situation
does not constitute a threat to Taiwan of the magnitude contemplated by the
drafters of the Taiwan Relations Act. The PRC pressure against Taiwan to date
does not add up to a ―threat to the security or the social or economic system‖ of
Taiwan....We will continue to work closely with you, and if warranted by
circumstances, we will act under Section 3(c) of the TRA, in close consultation
with the Congress.

Overall U.S. China policy, including the Taiwan question, is expressed in

the three joint communiques with the PRC as follows:

The United States recognizes the Government of the PRC as ―the sole legal
Government of China.‖
The U.S. acknowledges the Chinese position that ―there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China.‖ In 1982, the U.S. assured the PRC that it has no
intention of pursuing a policy of ―two Chinas‖ or ―one China, one Taiwan.‖
Within this context, the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural,
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
The U.S. has consistently held that resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter
to be worked out peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

President Clinton’s Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister [140]

April 17, 1996

Clinton: Yes, we discussed Taiwan and China extensively, as well as the

recent tension in the strait. It is obvious that our partnership is designed to try to
preserve the peace for all peoples in this region. And I believe that I can say we
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 497

both agree that, while the United States clearly observes the so-called one China
policy, we also observe the other aspects of the agreement we made many years
ago, which include a commitment on the part of both parties to resolve all their
differences in a peaceable manner. And we have encouraged them to pursue that.
Therefore, we were concerned about those actions in the Taiwan Strait.

Secretary of State Christopher on Relations with China [141]

May 17, 1996

Since 1972, the foundation for deepening engagement between our nations
has been the “one China” policy that is embodied in the three joint communiques
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China....

The United States strongly believes that resolution of the issues between the
PRC and Taiwan must be peaceful. We were gravely concerned when China’s
military exercises two months ago raised tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Our
deployment of naval forces to the region was meant to avert any dangerous
miscalculations. We are encouraged that both sides have now taken steps to
reduce tensions.

On the eve of the inauguration next Monday of Taiwan’s first democratically

elected President, it is timely to reflect on the enduring value of our “one China”
policy for both the PRC and Taiwan and on our common interest and
responsibility to uphold it. I want to tell you publicly today what we have been
saying privately to the leaders in Beijing and Taipei in recent weeks.

To the leadership in Beijing, we have reiterated our consistent position that

the future relationship between Taiwan and the PRC must be resolved directly
between them. But we have reaffirmed that we have a strong interest in the
region’s continued peace and stability and that our “one China” policy is
predicated on the PRC’s pursuit of a peaceful resolution of issues between Taipei
and Beijing.

To the leadership in Taiwan, we have reiterated our commitment to robust

unofficial relations, including helping Taiwan maintain a sufficient self-defense
capacity under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. We have stressed that
Taiwan has prospered under the “one China” policy. And we have made clear
our view that as Taiwan seeks an international role, it should pursue that
objective in a way that is consistent with a “one China” policy.
498 Shirley A. Kan

We have emphasized to both sides the importance of avoiding provocative

actions or unilateral measures that would alter the status quo or pose a threat to
peaceful resolution of outstanding issues. And we have strongly urged both sides
to resume the cross-strait dialogue that was interrupted last summer.

Taiwan’s First Direct Presidential Election and Inaugural Address [142]

May 20, 1996

The Republic of China has always been a sovereign state. Disputes across
the Strait center around system and lifestyle; they have nothing to do with ethnic
or cultural identity. Here in this country, it is totally unnecessary or impossible
to adopt the so-called course of “Taiwan independence.” For over 40 years, the
two sides of the Strait have been two separate jurisdictions due to various
historical factors, but it is also true that both sides pursue eventual national
unification....

Taiwan’s Multi-Party National Development Conference [143]

December 23-28, 1996

The Republic of China has been a sovereign state since 1912. Following the
establishment of the Chinese communist regime in 1949, both sides of the Taiwan
Strait became co-equal political entities....

The development of relations with the mainland must be based on

safeguarding the survival and development of the Republic of China....

The Republic of China is a sovereign state that must actively promote

foreign relations and raise its profile at international activities in its pursuit of
national survival and development. Taiwan is not a part of the “People’s
Republic of China,” and the ROC government opposes dealing with the cross-
strait issue through the “one country, two systems” scheme.

The government should reduce the possibility of confrontation with the

mainland by establishing sound mainland policies, and should actively make use
of regional and global security and cooperation mechanisms to assure the
security of Taiwan.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 499

At this point, ROC accession to such international bodies as the World

Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank,
should continue to be actively pursued.

ROC admission to the United Nations should be actively pursued as a long-

term objective through flexible responses to changes in the international
situation.

President Clinton’s Statements at the 1997 Summit

October 29, 1997

A key to Asia’s stability is a peaceful and prosperous relationship between

the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. I reiterated America’s longstanding
commitment to a one China policy. It has allowed democracy to flourish in
Taiwan and provides a framework in which all three relationships can prosper—
between the United States and the PRC, the United States and Taiwan, and
Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. I told President Jiang that we hope
the People’s Republic and Taiwan would resume a constructive cross-strait
dialogue and expand cross-strait exchanges. Ultimately, the relationship between
the PRC and Taiwan is for the Chinese themselves to determine—peacefully.
[144]

First of all, I think the most important thing the United States can do to
facilitate a peaceful resolution of the differences is to adhere strictly to the one
China policy we have agreed on, to make it clear that within the context of that
one China policy, as articulated in the communiques and our own laws, we will
maintain friendly, open relations with the people of Taiwan and China; but that
we understand that this issue has to be resolved and resolved peacefully, and that
if it is resolved in a satisfactory way, consistent with statements made in the past,
then Asia will be stronger and more stable and more prosperous. That is good
for the United States. And our own relations with China will move on to another
stage of success. I think the more we can encourage that, the better off we are.
But I think in the end, since so much investment and contact has gone on in the
last few years between Taiwan and China, I think the Chinese people know how
to resolve this when the time is right, and we just have to keep saying we hope the
time will be right as soon as possible. Sooner is better than later [145]
500 Shirley A. Kan

1997 Clinton-Jiang Summit and U.S.-China Joint Statement [146]

October 29, 1997

China stresses that the Taiwan question is the most important and sensitive
central question in China-U.S. relations, and that the proper handling of this
question in strict compliance with the principles set forth in the three China-U.S.
joint communiques holds the key to sound and stable growth of China-U.S.
relations. The United States reiterates that it adheres to its “one China” policy
and the principles set forth in the three U.S.-China joint communiques.

1997 Summit and the State Department on the “Three Noes” [147]

October 31, 1997

We certainly made clear that we have a one-China policy; that we don’t

support a one-China, one-Taiwan policy. We don’t support a two-China policy.
We don’t support Taiwan independence, and we don’t support Taiwanese
membership in organizations that require you to be a member state. We certainly
made that very clear to the Chinese.

1998 Clinton-Jiang Summit in Beijing [148]

June 27, 1998

President Jiang: The Taiwan question is the most important and the most
sensitive issue at the core of China-U.S. relations. We hope that the U.S. side will
adhere to the principles set forth in the three China-U.S. joint communiques and
the joint China-U.S. statement, as well as the relevant commitments it has made
in the interest of a smooth growth of China-U.S. relations.

President Clinton: I reaffirmed our longstanding one China policy to

President Jiang and urged the pursuit of cross-strait discussions recently
resumed as the best path to a peaceful resolution. In a similar vein, I urged
President Jiang to assume a dialogue with the Dalai Lama in return for the
recognition that Tibet is a part of China and in recognition of the unique cultural
and religious heritage of that region.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 501

1998 Summit and Clinton’s Statement on the “Three Noes” [149]

June 30, 1998 [150]

I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t

support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And
we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which
statehood is a requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy. Our only
policy has been that we think it has to be done peacefully. That is what our law
says, and we have encouraged the cross-strait dialogue. And I think eventually it
will bear fruit if everyone is patient and works hard.

Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui on “One Divided China” [151]

August 3, 1998

The path to a democratic China must begin with a recognition of the present
reality by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. And that reality is that China is
divided, just as Germany and Vietnam were in the past and as Korea is today.
Hence, there is no “one China” now. We hope for this outcome in the future, but
presently it does not exist. Today, there is only “one divided China,” with
Taiwan and the mainland each being part of China. Because neither has
jurisdiction over the other, neither can represent the other, much less all of
China.

Second “Koo-Wang Talks” (Shanghai) [152]

October 14, 1998

Taiwan: It has been nearly 50 years since the two sides of the Taiwan Strait
became two equal entities under divided rule and not subordinate to each other. A
―divided China‖ is not only a historical fact, but also a political reality. [153]

Taiwan: China‘s unification hinges upon the democratization of the Chinese

mainland. Only when the Chinese mainland has achieved democracy can the two
sides of the Taiwan Strait talk about unification. [154]

PRC: Mr. Wang said that Taiwan‘s political status can be discussed under
the one China principle. On this point, both Mr. Jiang Zemin and Mr. Qian
Qichen had similar comments to the effect that anything can be put on the table
under the one China principle. Therefore, on the question of one China, this will
502 Shirley A. Kan

be our consistent stand before the two sides across the strait are reunified: there is
only one China across the strait, Taiwan is part of China, and Chinese
sovereignty and territorial integrity are indivisible.... Now, the Government of the
People‘s Republic of China is universally acknowledged internationally as the
only legitimate government representing China. In spite of this, the two sides
should still negotiate on equal footing under the principle that there is but one
China. The issue of whether the talks are between central or local authorities can
be left aside. [155]

U.S. Assistant Secretary Stan Roth on “Interim Agreements” [156]

March 24, 1999

Insisting on peaceful resolution of differences between the PRC and Taiwan

will remain U.S. policy in the future just as surely as it has been our policy over
the past twenty years. Our belief, which we have stated repeatedly, is that
dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan fosters an atmosphere in which tensions
are reduced, misperceptions can be clarified, and common ground can be
explored. The exchange of visits under the SEF/ARATS framework, currently rich
in symbolism but still nascent in substance, has the potential to contribute to the
peaceful resolution of difficult substantive differences.

Clearly, this will not be easy, but this Administration has great confidence in
the creativity of the people of Taiwan and the people of the mainland, working
together, to identify the necessary human contacts and the most comfortable
processes to give the dialogue real meaning. Using a phrase that has garnered
much favor in Washington of late, I could imagine that “out of the box” thinking
within this dialogue might contribute to interim agreements, perhaps in
combination with specific confidence building measures, on any number of
difficult topics. But, as the U.S. has steadfastly held, we will avoid interfering as
the two sides pursue peaceful resolution of differences, because it is only the
participants on both sides of the strait that can craft the specific solutions which
balance their interests while addressing their most pressing concerns.

Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui on “Special State-to-State” Relations [157]

July 9, 1999 [158]

The fact that disregarding the reality that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait
are under separate administrations of different governments, the Chinese
communist authorities have been threatening us with force is actually the main
reason why cross-strait ties cannot be improved thoroughly.... Since the PRC’s
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 503

establishment, the Chinese communists have never ruled Taiwan, Penghu,

Kinmen, and Matsu, which have been under the jurisdiction of the Republic of
China.... Since our constitutional reform in 1991, we have designated cross-strait
ties as nation-to-nation, or at least as special state-to-state ties, rather than
internal ties within “one China” between a legitimate government and a
rebellion group, or between central and local governments....

President Clinton on the “Three Pillars” of Policy Toward Taiwan [159]

July 21, 1999

Clinton [on whether the United States is obligated to defend Taiwan

militarily if it abandons the one China policy and would continue to provide
military aid if Taiwan pursues separatism]: Well, let me say first of all, a lot of
those questions are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, which we intend to
honor. Our policy is clear: We favor the one China policy; we favor the cross-
strait dialogues. The understanding we have had all along with both China and
Taiwan is that the differences between them would be resolved peacefully. If that
were not to be the case, under the Taiwan Relations Act we would be required to
view it with the gravest concern....

Clinton [on delaying a Pentagon delegation’s visit to Taiwan]: I didn’t think

this was the best time to do something which might excite either one side or the
other and imply that a military solution is an acceptable alternative. If you really
think about what’s at stake here, it would be unthinkable. And I want—I don’t
want to depart from any of the three pillars. I think we need to stay with one
China; I think we need to stay with the dialogue; and I think that no one should
contemplate force here.

Taiwan’s Position Paper on “Special State-to-State Relationship” [160]

August 1, 1999

President Lee’s remarks concerning the nature of the cross-strait

relationship were based on the necessity of protecting national interests and
dignity. From the political, historical, and legal perspectives, he merely clarified
an existing fact. He by no means twisted or exaggerated the truth, nor did he
exclude the goal of unifying both sides of the Strait as a new, democratic
China....
504 Shirley A. Kan

Taiwan and the Chinese mainland have always differed in their definition of
“one China.” Thus, in 1992, ... the two sides eventually reached an agreement on
“one China, with each side being entitled to its respective interpretation.” ...
However, Beijing has unilaterally abandoned this agreement in recent years.... In
the framework of the 1992 agreement, whereby each side is entitled to its
respective interpretation, we have always maintained that the “one China”
concept refers to the future rather than the present. The two sides are not yet
unified, but are equals, ruled separately. We both exist concurrently. Therefore,
the two sides can be defined as sharing a “special state-to-state relationship,”
prior to unification....

Presidents Clinton and Jiang at APEC Meeting [161]

September 11, 1999 [162]

Clinton [on his message concerning Taiwan]: My message is that our policy
has not and will not change. We favor one China. We favor a peaceful approach
to working out the differences. We favor the cross-strait dialogue. Our policy has
not changed and it will not change.

Jiang [on whether the PRC will maintain its threat to use military force
against Taiwan]: Our policy on Taiwan is a consistent one. That is, one, peaceful
unification, one country-two systems.

However, if there were to be any foreign intervention, or if there were to be

Taiwan independence, then we would not undertake to renounce the use of force.

PRC’s Second Taiwan White Paper and “Three Ifs” [163]

February 21, 2000 [164]

On October 1, 1949, the Central People’s Government of the PRC was

proclaimed, replacing the government of the Republic of China to become the
only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in
the international arena, thereby bringing the historical status of the Republic of
China to an end.... so the government of the PRC naturally should fully enjoy and
exercise China’s sovereignty, including its sovereignty over Taiwan....

The Chinese government is actively and sincerely striving for peaceful

unification. To achieve peaceful unification, the Chinese government has
appealed time and again for cross-strait negotiations on the basis of equality and
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 505

the One China principle.... The Chinese government has also proposed that
dialogue (that includes political dialogue) may start first, which may gradually
move on to procedural consultations for political negotiation (to resolve issues
for formal negotiation, such as the name, topics for discussion, and format), then
political negotiation may begin. Political negotiation may be carried out step-by-
step....

However, since the early 1990s, Lee Teng-hui has gradually deviated from
the One China principle... In military affairs, the Taiwan authorities have bought
large quantities of advanced weapons from foreign countries and sought to join
the TMD system, attempting to covertly establish certain forms of military
alliance with the United States and Japan....

Facts prove that a serious crisis still exists in the situation of the Taiwan
Strait. To safeguard the interests of the entire Chinese people, including
compatriots in Taiwan, and maintain the peace and development of the Asia-
Pacific region, the Chinese government remains firm in adhering to “peaceful
unification, one country/two systems;” upholding the eight propositions put
forward by President Jiang Zemin for the development of cross-strait relations
and the acceleration of the peaceful unification of China; and doing its utmost to
achieve the objective of peaceful

unification. However, if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the

separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if there is foreign invasion and
occupation of Taiwan, [165] or if Taiwan authorities indefinitely refuse to
peacefully resolve the cross-strait unification problem through negotiations, then
the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all possible drastic
measures, including the use of force, to safeguard China’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and fulfill the great cause of China’s unification....

Countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China must not sell arms to
Taiwan or enter into any forms of military alliance with Taiwan ... or help
Taiwan to produce weapons....

President Clinton on Resolution with “Assent” of Taiwan’s People [166]

February 24, 2000

We’ll continue to reject the use of force as a means to resolve the Taiwan
question. We’ll also continue to make absolutely clear that the issues between
Beijing and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people
of Taiwan.
506 Shirley A. Kan

Taiwan President Chen’s Inauguration Speech and “Five Noes” [167]

May 20, 2000 [168]

Today, as the Cold War has ended, it is time for the two sides to cast aside
the hostilities left from the old era. We do not need to wait further because now is
a new opportunity for the two sides to create an era of reconciliation together.

The people across the Taiwan Strait share the same ancestral, cultural, and
historical background. While upholding the principles of democracy and parity,
building upon the existing foundations, and constructing conditions for
cooperation through goodwill, we believe that the leaders on both sides possess
enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal with the question of a future “one
China.”

I fully understand that as the popularly elected 10th-term President of the

Republic of China, I must abide by the Constitution, maintain the sovereignty,
dignity, and security of our country, and ensure the well-being of all citizens.
Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force
against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare
independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the
inclusion of the so-

called “state-to-state” description in the Constitution, and I will not

promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of
independence or unification. Furthermore, the abolition of the National
Unification Council or the Guidelines for National Unification will not be an
issue.

PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s New Formulation [169]

July-August 2000 [170]

With regard to cross-strait relations, the one China principle we stand for is
that there is only one China in the world; the mainland and Taiwan all belong to
one China; and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are indivisible.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 507

Taiwan President Chen on “Integration” [171]

December 31, 2000

I have always felt that the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait came
from the same family and that they all pursue the same goals of peaceful
coexistence and mutual prosperity. Since both sides with to live under the same
roof, we should be more understanding and helpful rather than harming or
destroying each other.... The integration of our economies, trade, and culture can
be a starting point for gradually building faith and confidence in each other.
This, in turn, can be the basis for a new framework of permanent peace and
political integration.

Statements during George W. Bush Administration

President Bush on “Whatever It Takes” [172]

April 25, 2001

On ABC: [If Taiwan were attacked by the PRC, the United States has an
obligation to use] whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.

On CNN: Well, I think that the Chinese must hear that ours is an
administration, like other administrations, that is willing to uphold the spirit of
the ... Taiwan Relations Act. And I’ll do so. However, I think it’s important for
people to also note that mine is an administration that strongly supports the one
China policy, that we expect any dispute to be resolved peacefully. And that’s the
message I really want people to hear. But as people have seen, that I’m willing to
help Taiwan defend herself, and that nothing has really changed in policy, as far
as I’m concerned. This is what other presidents have said, and I will continue to
say so.... I have said that I will do what it takes to help Taiwan defend herself,
and the Chinese must understand that. Secondly, I certainly hope Taiwan
adheres to the one China policy. And a declaration of independence is not the
one China policy, and we will work with Taiwan to make sure that that doesn’t
happen. We need a peaceful resolution of this issue.
508 Shirley A. Kan

PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s Invitation to the DPP [173]

January 24, 2002 [174]

The refusal to accept the principle of one China and recognize the “1992
consensus” by the leader of the Taiwan authorities is the crucial reason leading
to a deadlock in cross-strait relations and also the root cause of instability of the
situation and possible danger in the Taiwan Strait.... We hold that political
differences must not interfere with economic and trade exchanges between the
two sides of the strait.... We are willing to hear opinions from people in Taiwan
on the establishment of a mechanism for economic cooperation and the
promotion of economic relations between the two sides.... The Democratic
Progressive Party should think more about the welfare of the people in Taiwan,
thoroughly discard its “Taiwan independence party platform,” and develop
cross-strait relations with a sincere attitude. We believe that the broad masses of
the DPP are different from the minority of stubborn “Taiwan independence”
elements. We welcome them to come, in appropriate capacities, to sightsee, visit,
and increase their understanding. [175]

Bush-Jiang Press Conference in Beijing [176]

February 21, 2002

Jiang: President Bush emphasized that the United States upholds the one
China policy and will abide by the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques.

Bush: As [President Jiang] mentioned, we talked about Taiwan. The

position of my government has not changed over the years. We believe in the
peaceful settlement of this issue. We will urge there be no provocation. The
United States will continue to support the Taiwan Relations Act.

Taiwan President Chen on “One Country on Each Side” [177]

August 3, 2002

(1) I would like to take a moment here to make a few calls for your
consideration: (1) During these past few days, I have said that we must
seriously consider going down Taiwan’s own road.... What does “Taiwan’s
own road” mean? ... Taiwan’s own road is Taiwan’s road of democracy,
Taiwan’s road of freedom, Taiwan’s road of human rights, and Taiwan’s
road of peace.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 509

(2) Taiwan is our country, and our country cannot be bullied, diminished,
marginalized, or downgraded as a local entity. Taiwan does not belong to
someone else, nor is it someone else’s local government or province. Taiwan
also cannot become a second Hong Kong or Macau, because Taiwan is a
sovereign independent country. Simply put, it must be clear that Taiwan and
China are each one country on each side [yibian yiguo] of the strait.
(3) China has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan and continues to
suppress Taiwan in the international community.... China’s so-called “one
China principle” or “one country, two systems” would change Taiwan’s
status quo. We cannot accept this, because whether Taiwan’s future or
status quo should be changed cannot be decided for us by any one country,
any one government, any one political party, or any one person. Only the 23
million great people of Taiwan have the right to decide Taiwan’s future,
fate, and status. If the need arises, how should this decision be made? It is
our long-sought ideal and goal, and our common idea: a referendum.... I
sincerely call upon and encourage everyone to seriously consider the
importance and urgency of legislation for holding referendums.

Bush-Jiang Summit in Crawford, Texas [178]

October 25, 2002

Bush: On Taiwan, I emphasized to the President that our one China policy,
based on the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, remains
unchanged. I stressed the need for dialogue between China and Taiwan that leads
to a peaceful resolution of their differences.... The one China policy means that
the issue ought to be resolved peacefully. We‘ve got influence with some in the
region; we intend to make sure that the issue is resolved peacefully and that
includes making it clear that we do not support independence. [179]

Jiang: We have had a frank exchange of views on the Taiwan question,

which is of concern to the Chinese side. I have elaborated my government‘s basic
policy of peaceful unification and one country, two systems, for the settlement of
the Taiwan question. President Bush has reiterated his clear-cut position, that the
U.S. government abides by the one China policy. [180]
510 Shirley A. Kan

Bush’s Meeting with PRC President Hu Jintao in France

June 1, 2003 [181]

U.S.: On Taiwan, the President repeated our policy of a one-China policy,

based on the three communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, no support for
Taiwan independence. The Chinese basically accepted that, and said, okay, that‘s
positive. They did say that they have concerns about forces on Taiwan moving
towards independence. The President said, we don‘t support independence. [182]

PRC: President Hu reiterated China‘s principled stand on the Taiwan

issue.... Bush said that the U.S. government will continue to follow the ―one
China‖ policy, abide by the three U.S.-China joint communiques, oppose
―Taiwan independence,‖ and that this policy has not changed and will not
change. [183]

President Chen Shui-bian on a New Constitution [184]

September 28, 2003 [185]

If we consider the 1996 direct presidential election as the most significant

symbol of Taiwan becoming a sovereign, democratic country, then, in 2006, this
“complete” country will be 10 years old. Going through 10 years of practical
experience, we must consider what we should seek next as a sovereign,
democratic country. I must say that, in the next phase, we should further seek the
deepening of democracy and a more efficient constitutional system, in order to
lead Taiwan’s people to face the rigorous challenges of the new century. [186]

Bush’s Meeting with Hu Jintao in Thailand [187]

October 19, 2003 [188]

Bush: President Hu and I have had a very constructive dialogue....

Hu: President Bush reiterated his government‘s position of adhering to the

one China policy, the three China-U.S. joint communiques, and his opposition to
Taiwan independence.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 511

Chen Shui-bian’s Speech in New York [189]

October 31, 2003 [190]

The hastening of a new Taiwan constitution will determine whether or not

our democracy can come into full bloom. This, strengthened and supplemented
by the institutions of direct democracy, such as referendums, will be a necessary
step in advancing Taiwan’s human rights and the deepening of its democracy.
One must not be misled by the contention that holding referendums or re-
engineering our constitutional framework bears any relevance to the “Five
Noes” pledge presented in my inaugural speech. Neither should matters
concerning Taiwan’s constitutional development be simplistically interpreted as
a political debate of unification versus independence.

U.S. “Opposition” to Change in Taiwan’s Status [191]

December 1, 2003 [192]

We oppose any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the status quo
in the Taiwan Strait. We also urge both sides to refrain from actions or
statements that increase tensions or make dialogue more difficult to achieve.
Therefore, we would be opposed to any referenda that would change Taiwan’s
status or move toward independence. The United States has always held, and
again reiterates, that cross-strait dialogue is essential to peace and stability in
the Taiwan Strait area. President Chen pledged in his inaugural address in the
year 2000 not to declare independence, not to change the name of Taiwan’s
government, and not to add the “state-tostate” theory to the constitution, and not
to promote a referendum to change the status quo on independence or
unification. We appreciate President Chen’s pledge in 2000, and his subsequent
reaffirmations of it, and we take it very seriously.

President Bush’s Meeting with PRC Premier Wen Jiabao [193]

December 9, 2003

Bush [on whether Taiwan’s President should cancel the referendum planned
for March 20, 2004]: The United States Government‘s policy is one China, based
upon the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. We oppose any
unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the
comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be
willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.
512 Shirley A. Kan

Wen: On many occasions, and just now in the meeting as well, President
Bush has reiterated the U.S. commitment to the three Sino-U.S. Joint
Communiques, the one China principle, and opposition to Taiwan independence.
We appreciate that. In particular, we very much appreciate the position adopted
by President Bush toward the latest moves and developments in Taiwan— that is,
the attempt to resort to referendums of various kinds as an excuse to pursue
Taiwan independence. We appreciate the position of the U.S. government.

State Department’s Testimony After Chen’s Re-election [194]

April 21, 2004

The United States does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral
moves that would change the status quo as we define it. For Beijing, this means
no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it means
exercising prudence in managing all aspects of cross- strait relations. For both
sides, it means no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan’s
status....

The President’s message on December 9 of last year during PRC Premier

Wen Jiabao’s visit reiterated the U.S. Government’s opposition to any unilateral
moves by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo.... The United States
will fulfill its obligations to help Taiwan defend itself, as mandated in the Taiwan
Relations Act. At the same time, we have very real concerns that our efforts at
deterring Chinese coercion might fail if Beijing ever becomes convinced Taiwan
is embarked on a course toward independence and permanent separation from
China, and concludes that Taiwan must be stopped in these efforts....

The United States strongly supports Taiwan’s democracy, ... but we do not
support Taiwan independence. A unilateral move toward independence will avail
Taiwan of nothing it does not already enjoy in terms of democratic freedom,
autonomy, prosperity, and security....

While strongly opposing the use of force by the PRC, we must also
acknowledge with a sober mind what the PRC leaders have repeatedly conveyed
about China’s capabilities and intentions.... It would be irresponsible of us and
of Taiwan’s leaders to treat these statements as empty threats.... We encourage
the people of Taiwan to regard this threat equally seriously. We look to President
Chen to exercise the kind of responsible, democratic, and restrained leadership
that will be necessary to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for Taiwan....
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 513

As Taiwan proceeds with efforts to deepen democracy, we will speak clearly

and bluntly if we feel as though those efforts carry the potential to adversely
impact U.S. security interests or have the potential to undermine Taiwan’s own
security. There are limitations with respect to what the United States will support
as Taiwan considers possible changes to its constitution....

Our position continues to be embodied in the so-called “Six Assurances”

offered to Taiwan by President Reagan. We will neither seek to mediate between
the PRC and Taiwan nor will we exert pressure on Taiwan to come to the
bargaining table. Of course, the United States is also committed to make
available defensive arms and defensive services to Taiwan in order to help
Taiwan meet its self-defense needs. We believe a secure and self-confident
Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more capable of engaging in political interaction and
dialogue with the PRC, and we expect Taiwan will not interpret our support as a
blank check to resist such dialogue....

War in the Strait would be a disaster for both sides and set them back
decades, and undermine everything they and others in the region have worked so
hard to achieve. We continue to urge Beijing and Taipei to pursue dialogue as
soon as possible through any available channels, without preconditions....

The United States is committed to make available defensive arms and

defensive services to Taiwan in order to help Taiwan meet its self-defense
needs.... The PRC has explicitly committed itself publicly and in exchanges with
the United States over the last 25 years to a fundamental policy “to strive for a
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.” If the PRC meets its obligations,
and its words are matched by a military posture that bolsters and supports
peaceful approaches to Taiwan, it follows logically that Taiwan’s defense
requirements will change....

Chen Shui-bian’s Second Inaugural Address [195]

May 20, 2004 [196]

The constitutional re-engineering project aims to enhance good governance

and increase administrative efficiency, to ensure a solid foundation for
democratic rule of law, and to foster long-term stability and prosperity of the
nation.... By the time I complete my presidency in 2008, I hope to hand the people
of Taiwan and to our country a new constitution [197]—one that is timely,
relevant, and viable—as my historic responsibility and my commitment to the
people. In the same context, I am fully aware that consensus has yet to be
reached on issues related to national sovereignty, territory, and the subject of
514 Shirley A. Kan

unification/independence; therefore, let me explicitly propose that these

particular issues be excluded from the present constitutional re-engineering
project. Procedurally, we shall follow the rules set out in the existing
Constitution and its amendments....

If both sides are willing, on the basis of goodwill, to create an environment

engendered upon “peaceful development and freedom of choice,” then in the
future, the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China—or Taiwan
and China—can seek to establish relations in any form whatsoever. We would
not exclude any possibility, so long as there is the consent of the 23 million
people of Taiwan....

Today, I would like to reaffirm the promises and principles set forth in my
inaugural speech in 2000. Those commitments have been honored. They have not
changed over the past four years, nor will they change in the next four
years....[198]

Colin Powell on Taiwan’s Lack of Sovereignty [199]

October 25, 2004

There is only one China. Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy
sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy, our firm policy. And it is a
policy that has allowed Taiwan to develop a very vibrant democratic system, a
market economic system, and provided great benefits to the people of Taiwan.
And that is why we think it is a policy that should be respected and should remain
in force and will remain in force, on the American side, it is our policy that
clearly rests on the Three Communiques. To repeat it one more time: we do not
support an independence movement in Taiwan.

Richard Armitage on the TRA and Mis-statement on Taiwan’s Status [200]

December 10, 2004

We have the requirement with the Taiwan Relations Act to keep sufficient
force in the Pacific to be able to deter attack; we are not required to defend. And
these are questions that actually reside with the U.S. Congress, who has to
declare an act of war. But I think we have to manage this question appropriately.
We all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 515

U.S.-Japan “2+2 Statement” [201]

February 19, 2005

[A common strategic objective is] “to encourage the peaceful resolution of

issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.”

PRC’s Hu Jintao on “Four-Point Guideline” [202]

March 4, 2005

(1) Never sway in adhering to the one China principle.

(2) Never give up efforts to seek peaceful reunification.
(3) Never change the principle of placing hope on the Taiwan people.
(4) Never compromise in opposing ―Taiwan independence‖ secessionist
activities.

PRC’s “Anti-Secession Law” of 2005 [203]

March 14, 2005 [204]

If the separatist forces of “Taiwan independence” use any name or any

means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s separation from China, or a major incident
occurs that would lead to Taiwan’s separation from China, or the possibilities of
peaceful unification are completely exhausted, the country may adopt non-
peaceful means and other necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty
and territorial integrity.

KMT-CPC Joint Statement of 2005 on “Peaceful Development”

April 29, 2005 [205]

Hu Jintao and Lien Chan issued a joint press statement to summarize their
agreement on goals: (1) resume cross-strait negotiation on the basis of the “1992
Consensus;” (2) cease hostilities, conclude a peace agreement, and launch
military confidence building measures (CBMs); (3) comprehensively expand
economic engagement; (4) negotiate Taiwan’s international participation
including in the WHO; (5) set up party-to-party platform.
516 Shirley A. Kan

Bush on U.S. Response to Provocations [206]

June 8, 2005

If China were to invade unilaterally, we would rise up in the spirit of the

Taiwan Relations Act. If Taiwan were to declare independence unilaterally, it
would be a unilateral decision, that would then change the U.S. equation, the
U.S. look at what the ... the decision-making process. My attitude is, is that time
will heal this issue. And therefore we’re trying to make sure that neither side
provokes the other through unilateral action.

Chen Terminates the National Unification Guidelines [207]

February 27, 2006 [208]

The National Unification Council will cease to function. No budget will be

earmarked for it, and its personnel must return to their original posts. The
National Unification Guidelines will cease to apply.

Bush-Hu Summit and “Peace and Stability” [209]

April 20, 2006

Bush: We spent time talking about Taiwan, and I assured the President my
position has not changed. I do not support independence for Taiwan.

Hu: During the meeting, I stressed the importance of the Taiwan question to
Mr. President. Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and we maintain
consistently that under the basis of the one China principle, we are committed to
safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and to the promotion of the
improvement and development of cross-strait relations.... We will by no means
allow Taiwan independence. President Bush gave us his understanding of
Chinese concerns. He reiterated the American positions and said that he does not
hope that the moves taken by the Taiwan authorities to change the status quo will
upset the China-U.S. relationship, which I am highly appreciative.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 517

State Department on a “Second Republic” in Taiwan [210]

October 17, 2006

The United States does not support Taiwan independence. We oppose

unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.

State Department on “Name Rectification” in Taiwan [211]

February 9, 2007 [212]

We do not support administrative steps by the Taiwan authorities that would

appear to change Taiwan’s status unilaterally or move toward independence.
The United States does not, for instance, support changes in terminology for
entities administered by the Taiwan authorities. President Chen’s fulfillment of
his commitments will be a test of leadership, dependability, and statesmanship,
as well as ability to protect Taiwan’s interests, its relations with others, and to
maintain peace and stability in the Strait.

U.S. Opposition to Taiwan’s Referendum on Joining U.N.

June 19, 2007 [213]

The United States opposes any initiative that appears designed to change
Taiwan’s status unilaterally. This would include a referendum on whether to
apply to the United Nations under the name Taiwan. While such a referendum
would have no practical impact on Taiwan’s U.N. status, it would increase
tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Maintenance of peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait is of vital interest to the people of Taiwan and serves U.S. security
interests as well. Moreover, such a move would appear to run counter to
President Chen’s repeated commitments to President Bush and the international
community. We urge President Chen to exercise leadership by rejecting such a
proposed referendum.

U.S. Non-Support for “Taiwan’s” Membership in the U.N.

September 21, 2007 [214]

The United States supports Taiwan’s meaningful participation in

international organizations whenever appropriate. Such involvement is in the
interest of the 23 million people of Taiwan and the international community, and
518 Shirley A. Kan

we urge all UN members to set aside preconditions and work creatively toward
this goal. Consistent with our long-standing One China policy, the United States
does not support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations where
statehood is a requirement, so it cannot support measures designed to advance
that goal. We believe that efforts to urge UN membership for Taiwan will detract
from our goal of advancing Taiwan’s involvement in international society.

KMT President Ma Ying-jeou’s Inaugural Address and “3 Noes”

May 20, 2008 [215]

I sincerely hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can seize this historic
opportunity to achieve peace and co-prosperity. Under the principle of “no
unification, no independence, and no use of force,” as Taiwan’s mainstream
public opinion holds it, and under the framework of the ROC Constitution, we
will maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In 1992, the two sides reached
a consensus on “one China, respective interpretations.” Many rounds of
negotiation were then completed, spurring the development of cross-strait
relations. I want to reiterate that, based on the “1992 Consensus,” negotiations
should resume at the earliest time possible.... We will also enter consultatons
with mainland China over Taiwan’s international space and a possible cross-
strait peace accord.... In resolving cross-strait issues, what matters is not
sovereignty but core values and way of life.

PRC Leader Hu Jintao on “Peaceful Development”

December 31, 2008 [216]

Hu Jintao made six proposals: (1) Abide by the “one China” principle and
enhance political mutual trust; (2) advance economic cooperation and common
development; (3) promote Chinese culture and strengthen the spiritual bond; (4)
strengthen people-to-people exchanges, with the DPP putting an end to “Taiwan
independence” separatist activities; (5) safeguard national sovereignty and
consult on foreign affairs, including Taiwan’s participation in the activities of
international organizations; (6) end the state of hostility and reach a peace
agreement, including exploring the establishment of a mechanism of mutual trust
for military security.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 519

Statements during Obama Administration

President Obama Reiterated “One China” Policy, including TRA

November 17, 2009

We also applauded the steps that the People’s Republic of China and
Taiwan have already taken to relax tensions and build ties across the Taiwan
Strait. Our own policy, based on the three U.S.- China communiqués and the
Taiwan Relations Act, supports the further development of these ties—ties that
are in the interest of both sides, as well as the broader region and the United
States. [217]

U.S.-PRC Joint Statement of 2009 on “Peaceful Development”

November 17, 2009

The United States and China underscored the importance of the Taiwan
issue in U.S.-China relations. China emphasized that the Taiwan issue concerns
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and expressed the hope that the
United States will honor its relevant commitments and appreciate and support
the Chinese’s side position on this issue. The United States stated that it follows
its One China policy and abides by the principles of the three U.S.-China Joint
Communiques. The United States welcomes the peaceful development of relations
across the Taiwan Strait and looks forward to efforts by both sides to increase
dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and other fields, and develop
more positive and stable cross-strait relations. [218]

Ma Ying-jeou on Never Asking for U.S. Defense of Taiwan

April 30, 2010

We will continue to reduce the risks so that we will purchase arms from the
United States, but we will never ask the Americans to fight for Taiwan. [219]
520 Shirley A. Kan

Robert Gates on Arms Sales and “Opposition” to Taiwan’s Independence

June 2010

From the time of normalization on, the United States, as a result of the
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, has been obligated to provide minimal levels of
defensive capability for Taiwan. Having been through this in 2007 with the Bush
administration and last year with the Obama administration, I can tell you that in
both administrations the items that were considered for sale were carefully
thought-through with a focus on ensuring that we were providing defensive
capabilities and, at the same time, underscoring, as I said in my remarks, our
continued opposition to independence for Taiwan. [220]

U.S.-PRC Joint Statement of 2011

January 19, 2011 [221]

Both sides underscored the importance of the Taiwan issue in U.S.-China

relations. The Chinese side emphasized that the Taiwan issue concerns China’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and expressed the hope that the U.S. side
will honor its relevant commitments and appreciate and support the Chinese
side’s position on this issue. The U.S. side stated that the United States follows its
one China policy and abides by the principles of the three U.S.-China Joint
Communiqués. The United States applauded the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and welcomed
the new lines of communications developing between them. The United States
supports the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait and
looks forward to efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in
economic, political, and other fields, and to develop more positive and stable
cross-Strait relations.

Note: This study was originally prepared at the request of Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott in the 106th Congress and is made available for general
congressional use with permission.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 521

REFERENCES
[1] Department of State, Press Briefing by James Rubin, July 15, 1999;
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright‘s remarks on visit of Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak, July 20, 1999.
[2] Dalrymple, Mary, ―Taiwanese President‘s Comment Inspires GOP to
Renew Attack on Clinton‘s ‗One China‘ Policy,‖ Congressional Quarterly,
July 24, 1999; Letter from Representative Benjamin Gilman to President
Clinton, September 7, 1999.
[3] Richard Lugar, ―Timely Exit for Ambiguity,‖ Washington Times, May
17, 2001.
[4] Henry Hyde, ―Remarks at Tsinghua University,‖ Beijing, December 10,
2002.
[5] ―Two Congressmen Look at ‗One China‘,‖ Heritage Foundation,
September 16, 2003; Symposium on ―Rethinking ‗One China‘,‖ Heritage
Foundation, February 26, 2004.
[6] ―Taiwan Office‘s Wang Zaixi: Taiwan Independence Means War, Use of
Force is Difficult to Avoid,‖ Xinhua and China Daily, November 18, 2003.
[7] Richard Armitage, press availability, Exhibit Hall, Washington, DC,
November 18, 2003.
[8] Interview with the Washington Post, published November 23, 2003.
[9] Sherrod Brown, Steve Chabot, Dana Rohrabacher, and Robert Wexler,
―Congressional Taiwan Caucus Urges President Bush to Reconsider
Position on Taiwanese Referendum,‖ December 11, 2003.
[10] House International Relations Committee, hearing, ―The Taiwan
Relations Act: the Next 25 Years,‖ April 21, 2004.
[11] The vote was 400 yeas, 18 nays, 4 present, and 11 not-voting.
[12] Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the FY2007 Defense
Department Budget, March 7, 2006.
[13] State Department, memorandum, ―Guidelines on Relations with
Taiwan,‖ March 4, 2011
[14] Dennis Wilder, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, NSC, White House, ―Press
Briefing on the President‘s Trip to Australia and the APEC Summit,‖
August 30, 2007.
[15] Article 10 of the Mutual Defense Treaty allowed for its termination one
year after notice is given by either side (on January 1, 1979).
[16] In the 106th Congress, the House International Relations Committee debated
this issue of ―ambiguity‖ and other issues in the markup of H.R. 1838,
―Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,‖ October 26, 1999.
522 Shirley A. Kan

[17] See for example: Joseph Nye, Jr., ―A Taiwan Deal,‖ Washington Post,
March 8, 1998; Heritage Foundation and Project for the New American
Century, ―Statement on the Defense of Taiwan‖ by 23 conservatives,
including Richard Armitage and Paul Wolfowitz, August 20, 1999; Thomas
Christensen, ―Clarity on Taiwan,‖ Washington Post, March 20, 2000;
Richard Bush, ―American Ambiguity on Taiwan‘s Sovereignty Increases
the Island‘s Safety,‖ Insight Magazine, December 10, 2002.
[18] While this report discusses U.S. policy since the first understanding with the
PRC in 1971, some say that the U.S. position on ―one China‖ dates back to
World War II. (See Henry Kissinger, ―Storm Clouds Gathering,‖
Washington Post, September 7, 1999.) In Taiwan after World War II,
October 25, 1945, or ―Retrocession Day,‖ marked the Republic of China
(ROC)‘s claim of ―recovering‖ Taiwan (then called Formosa) from
Japan. However, that was the first time that the ROC‘s forces had been on
Formosa to occupy it, upon Japan‘s surrender. When the Qing Empire
ceded in perpetuity Formosa to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki of
1895, the ROC was not in existence. Moreover, Formosa‘s people did not
have a say in determining their status. The Kuomintang (KMT), or
Nationalist Party of China, has contended that the ROC claimed Formosa at
Japan‘s surrender in August 1945, with no country challenging the island‘s
status (see Stephen Chen, former ROC representative to Washington in
1997-2000, ―Taiwan Belongs to the Republic of China,‖ paper given to
author in March 2008). Following the ROC government‘s retreat to Taiwan
in 1949 and the start of the Korean War, the U.S. stance shifted on
sovereignty over Taiwan. On January 5, 1950, President Truman stated that
the United States would not get involved in the civil conflict in China. After
the Korean War started, however, President Truman declared on June 27,
1950, that ―the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a
direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces
performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.‖ The
President said that he ordered the 7 th Fleet to prevent any attack on
Formosa and also called upon the ROC government on Formosa to cease all
air and sea operations against the mainland. President Truman added that
―the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration
of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by
the United Nations.‖ (Quoted in: Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, record of hearing
on November 24, 1969; and Alan Romberg, Rein in at the Brink of the
Precipice, Stimson Center, 2003).
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 523

[19] Such as: the addition of ―Taiwan‖ in the title of the ROC Yearbook; the
addition of ―Taiwan‖ in English on ROC passports beginning on September
1, 2003; changing the title of a government publication, Taipei Review, to
Taiwan Review beginning with the March 2003 issue; and requests to use
―Taiwan‖ instead of ―Taipei‖ in the names of representative offices in the
United States and other countries. In April 2007, Taiwan unsuccessfully
applied for membership in the World Health Organization under the name
―Taiwan.‖
[20] Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and
Commitments Abroad, hearings on the Republic of China, November 24,
25, 26, 1969, and May 8, 1970. Also: State Department memorandum on
the legal status of Taiwan, July 13, 1971, a copy of which Nat Bellochi,
former chairman of AIT, provided.
[21] James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship
with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p.
46; Harding, Harry, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China
Since 1972 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 43-44. According to
Holdridge, Nixon reiterated the position against an independent Taiwan that
Kissinger told Zhou in July 1971.
[22] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on United States-Taiwan
Relations: The 20th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, March 25,
1999, written response to Senator Helms‘ question about precedents for
President Clinton‘s June 1998 ―Three Noes‖ statement, citing a
Memorandum of Conversation, Tuesday, February 22, 1972, 2:10 pm-
6:00 pm (declassified version).
[23] The Chinese text said ―recognized China‘s position.‖
[24] Statement of Hon. John Glenn, U.S. Senator from Ohio, on China-Taiwan
Policy, July 22, 1982, in: Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon, Legislative
History of the Taiwan Relations Act (New York: American Association for
Chinese Studies, 1982), p. 306-307.
[25] Garver, John W., Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s
Democratization (University of Washington Press, 1997); James Mann,
About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China,
From Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999)
[26] For example: Stephen J. Yates, ―Clinton Statement Undermines Taiwan,‖
Heritage Foundation, July 10, 1998; Ted Galen Carpenter, ―Let Taiwan
Defend Itself,‖ Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, August 24, 1998; Stephen J.
Yates, ―Promoting Freedom and Security in U.S.-Taiwan Policy,‖ Heritage
Foundation, October 13, 1998; James Lilley and Arthur Waldron, ―Taiwan
524 Shirley A. Kan

is a ‗State,‘ Get Over It,‖ Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1999; Harvey J.
Feldman, ―How Washington Can Defuse Escalating Tensions in the
Taiwan Strait,‖ Heritage Foundation, August 19, 1999.
[27] According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (April 22, 2004), President
Bush met with his AIT officials, Therese Shaheen and Douglas Paal, in the
summer of 2003 on policy toward Taiwan, and Bush said ―I‘m not a nuance
guy— ‘Do not support.‘ ‗Oppose.‘ It‘s the same to me.‖
[28] Chen Ming-tong, a Vice Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in
Taiwan, spoke at a conference of the Global Alliance for Democracy and
Peace in Houston, TX, on October 31, 2003, and contended that Taiwan is
already a sovereign, democratic country that is in a ―post-independence
period‖ and does not need to declare independence. Joseph Wu, Deputy
Secretary General of the Presidential Office of Chen Shui-bian, wrote in
Taipei Times on January 6, 2004, that Taiwan‘s independence is the
―new status quo.‖
[29] Previously, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in May 1996—two
months after President Clinton deployed two aircraft carriers near Taiwan
and days before an inauguration address by Taiwan‘s President Lee Teng-
hui—that ―we have emphasized to both sides the importance of avoiding
provocative actions or unilateral measures that would alter the status quo or
pose a threat to peaceful resolution of outstanding issues.‖
[30] Background interview with Senior White House Official, Phoenix TV,
November 26, 2003.
[31] Article 17 of the referendum law passed on November 27, 2003, in the
Legislative Yuan authorizes the president to initiate a referendum on
national security issues ―if the country suffers an external threat that causes
concern that national sovereignty will change.‖
[32] Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News], Taipei, December 1, 2003; New York
Times, December 9, 2003.
[33] Chen Shui-bian responded to Bush in a meeting with visiting Representative
Dan Burton on December 10, 2003, reported Taipei Times, December 11,
2003; and Chen‘s meeting with author and others at the Presidential
Palace, Taipei, December 11, 2003.
[34] See Wall Street Journal, ―The End of Ambiguity,‖ editorial, December 10,
2003; Ross Munro, ―Blame Taiwan,‖ National Review, December 18,
2003; Peter Brookes (Heritage Foundation), ―Why Bush Acted on
Taiwan,‖ Far Eastern Economic Review, December 25, 2003; Michael
Swaine, ―Trouble in Taiwan,‖ Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 525

[35] For example, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Gary Schmitt (Project for the
New American Century), ―U.S.-ChinaTaiwan Policy,‖ December 9, 2003;
Washington Post, ―Mr. Bush‘s Kowtow,‖ editorial, December 10, 2003;
and Robert Kagan and William Kristol, ―Stand by Taiwan,‖ Weekly
Standard, December 22, 2003.
[36] Sherrod Brown, Steve Chabot, Dana Rohrabacher, and Robert Wexler,
―Congressional Taiwan Caucus Urges President Bush to Reconsider
Position on Taiwanese Referendum,‖ December 11, 2003.
[37] For example, conference at the Heritage Foundation, ―Rethinking ‗One
China‘,‖ February 26, 2004; and Thomas Donnelly, ―Taiwan: Test Case of
the Bush Doctrine,‖ AEI, National Security Outlook, April 2004.
[38] Ted Galen Carpenter, ―President Bush‘s Muddled Policy on Taiwan,‖
CATO Institute, Foreign Policy Briefing, March 15, 2004.
[39] Based in part on the author‘s visit to Taiwan, December 5-13, 2003.
Also, for critiques in a longer-term context, see for example: Bates Gill
(Center for Strategic and International Studies), ―Bush Was Correct but
Clumsy on Taiwan Policy,‖ Financial Times, December 12, 2003; Kenneth
Lieberthal (University of Michigan), ―Dire Strait: The Risks on Taiwan,‖
Washington Post, January 8, 2004.
[40] President of the Republic of China, news releases (in Chinese and English),
January 16, 2004. Chen‘s use of the phrase ―the status quo of cross-strait
peace‖ was translated simply as ―status quo‖ in the official English version.
[41] Susan Lawrence, ―Bush to Taiwan: Don‘t Risk It,‖ Far Eastern Economic
Review, May 20, 2004.
[42] Central News Agency (Taipei), August 9, 2000; ―Taiwan Leader Stops in
Los Angeles,‖ Washington Post, August 14, 2000; Sam Gejdenson,
―Taiwan Deserves Better: Why We Should Have Met with President Chen,‖
Washington Times, August 21, 2000.
[43] Department of State, press briefing by Richard Boucher, May 14, 2001.
[44] Department of State, press briefing by Richard Boucher, October 7, 2003.
[45] Susan Lawrence, ―Diplomatic But Triumphal Progress,‖ Far Eastern
Economic Review, November 13, 2003.
[46] In May 2007, the Formosan Association of Public Affairs (FAPA) released
the ―Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between the
WHO Secretariat and China.‖
[47] Melody Chen, ―Support for WHO Bid Dries Up,‖ Taipei Times, May 18,
2005; State Department, ―Taiwan: The World Health Assembly,‖ May 19,
2006. In November 2005, Taiwan‘s Center for Disease Control participated
in a WHO conference on bird flu.
526 Shirley A. Kan

[48] State Department, ―United States Support for Taiwan‘s Participation as an

Observer at the 60th World Health Assembly and in the Work of the World
Health Organization,‖ 2007.
[49] Chen Shui-bian, ―The Shunning of a State,‖ Washington Post, May 11,
2007.
[50] Department of State, ―Report Required by P.L. 106-13 7, Fiscal Year 2000,
Taiwan Participation in the World Health Organization (WHO),‖ January 4,
2000.
[51] The Vatican, Order of Malta, and Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) have observed the WHA‘s meetings.
[52] Congress, in the 1950s, started to debate critical issues about whether to use
U.S. military forces to defend the ROC government on the island of Taiwan,
whether to include the small off-shore islands close to the mainland in any
security coverage, and the role of Congress in such decision-making. After
KMT forces, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, retreated to Taiwan in 1949,
President Truman stated in January 1950 that the United States would not
interfere in China‘s civil war to defend Taiwan. After North Korea‘s
attack on South Korea in June 1950, however, Truman ordered the 7th
Fleet to prevent attacks by both sides across the Taiwan Strait. In March
1953, the ROC asked for a mutual defense treaty, but the United States was
concerned about extending any defense commitment to the off-shore
islands, changing the ―no-defense policy.‖ PLA forces increased activities
around the off-shore islands in mid-1953, seizing some small islands. In
August 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that there
would be a U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (signed on December 2,
1954), and PRC bombardment and attacks on off-shore islands started the
Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-1955. (See Ralph Clough, Island China,
Harvard University Press, 1978; Robert Accinelli, Crisis and
Commitment, University of North Carolina Press, 1996.) On January 24,
1955, President Eisenhower, in a message to Congress, requested a
resolution to authorize the use of force to protect Formosa, the Pescadores,
and ―related positions and territories.‖ He said that he did not suggest that
―the United States enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the
Pescadores as provided by the treaty now awaiting ratification.‖ He also
argued that it was important that Formosa remained in friendly hands and if
in unfriendly hands, the situation would create a breach in the ―island
chain‖ of the western Pacific for U.S. and allied security. The President
cited Communist firing of heavy artillery on Quemoy island that started in
September 1954, followed by air attacks against the Tachen islands and
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 527

seizure of Ichiang island. After significant debate, Congress passed H.J.Res.

159 on January 29, 1955. The Formosa Resolution was enacted as P.L. 84-
4. The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad held extensive hearings on
November 24, 25, 26, 1969, and May 8, 1970, to review ―United States
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad with the Republic of
China.‖
[53] Assessments differed on the implications of Bush‘s interpretation of the
U.S. commitment. Congress expressed mixed reactions. Senator Joseph
Biden wrote that ―we now appear to have a policy of ambiguous strategic
ambiguity. It is not an improvement.‖ (Washington Post, May 2, 2001.)
Senator Richard Lugar contended that the President‘s statement ―reflected a
common-sense appraisal of the strategic situation in Asia.‖ (Washington
Times, May 17, 2001.) The Wall Street Journal (April 26, 2001) wrote
that Bush sent a message to Beijing that Washington has a ―strong
national interest in preserving Taiwan‘s democracy‖ and there is ―now less
chance of a miscalculation by China‘s leaders.‖ Others, including Michael
O‘Hanlan (New York Times, April 27, 2001), said Bush departed from
ambiguity, which serves U.S. interests in preserving all options and in
discouraging provocations by Taipei. A third argument was that the U.S.
defense commitment to Taiwan should be limited to arms sales and that
―preserving Taiwan‘s de facto independence‖ is not a vital U.S. security
interest (Ted Galen Carpenter, ―Going Too Far: Bush‘s Pledge to Defend
Taiwan,‖ CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, May 30, 2001).
[54] U.S.-Taiwan Business Council conference, San Antonio, TX, February
2003.
[55] Richard Armitage, press availability, Exhibit Hall, Washington, DC,
November 18, 2003.
[56] Hearing on ―The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,‖ held by the
House International Relations Committee, April 21, 2004.
[57] Ted Galen Carpenter (Cato Institute), America’s Coming War with
China: A Collision Course over Taiwan, 2005.
[58] See CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,
by Shirley A. Kan.
[59] In December 2001, the previous ROC Defense Minister, Wu Shih-wen, made
a U.S. transit on his way to the Dominican Republic.
[60] Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, ―Remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan
Business Council,‖ March 11, 2002.
528 Shirley A. Kan

[61] Department of Defense, ―Annual Report on the Military Power of the

People‘s Republic of China,‖ July 12, 2002.
[62] See David Lampton and Richard Daniel Ewing, ―U.S.-China Relations in a
Post-September 11th World,‖ Nixon Center, August 2002; David
Shambaugh‘s remarks at conference held by the Carnegie Endowment,
Stanford University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, on ―Taiwan and U.S. Policy:
Toward Stability or Crisis?,‖ October 9, 2002; Michael Swaine, ―Reverse
Course? The Fragile Turnaround in U.S.-China Relations,‖ Carnegie
Endowment Policy Brief, February 2003; and David Lampton, ―The
Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations,‖ National Interest, Fall
2003.
[63] Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], November 22, 2002; Taipei
Times, November 23, 2002.
[64] Also see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since
1990, by Shirley A. Kan.
[65] Department of Defense, ―Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense
Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region,‖ May 1999; CRS Report
RL30379, Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: A
Review of the Defense Department Report to Congress, by Robert D.
Shuey, Shirley A. Kan, and Mark Christofferson.
[66] Department of Defense, ―Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99
Appropriations Bill, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,‖ February
1, 1999; CRS Report RS20187, Taiwan's Defense: Assessing The U.S.
Department of Defense Report, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan
Strait", by Robert G. Sutter.
[67] Department of Defense, ―Report to Congress on Implementation of the
Taiwan Relations Act,‖ December 2000.
[68] Still, the Pentagon‘s report, issued on July 12, 2002, discussed China‘s
military acquisitions from states of the former Soviet Union, and not other
countries (e.g., Israel).
[69] Department of State, ―Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan,‖ memo,
February 2, 2001.
[70] Philip Pan, ―Rice Rebuffs China on Taiwan Arms Sales,‖ Washington
Post, July 9, 2004.
[71] Responses for the record of a hearing on China‘s ―Anti-Secession Law‖ and
developments across the Taiwan Strait held by the House International
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, April 6, 2005.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 529

[72] Richard Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait,
Brookings Institution: 2005; Kenneth Lieberthal, Professor at University of
Michigan, ―Preventing a War Over Taiwan,‖ Foreign Affairs, March/April
2005.
[73] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on U.S. Foreign Policy,
March 8, 2001
[74] U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, defense industry conference, St.
Petersburg, FL, March 10-12, 2002.
[75] House International Relations Committee, ―The Taiwan Relations Act:
The Next 25 Years,‖ April 21, 2004
[76] See Randall Schriver, ―Taiwan Needs Six New Assurances,‖ Taipei
Times, August 22, 2007, and ―In Search of a Strategy,‖ Taiwan Business
Topics, American Chamber of Commerce-Taipei, September 2007. On a
debate over whether a policy review is needed, particularly after the
KMT‘s Ma Ying-jeou became president in May 2008, and whether to
reduce or strengthen the relationship with Taiwan, see Robert Sutter,
―Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—Policy Adjustments
Needed,‖ PacNet Newsletter #17, March 5, 2009; and Richard Bush and
Alan Romberg, ―Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States – A
Response to Robert Sutter,‖ PacNet Newsletter #17A, March 12, 2009
(Pacific Forum CSIS); Robert Sutter, ―Taiwan‘s Future: Narrowing
Straits,‖ NBR Analysis, May 2011; controversial academic articles with
a theme of abandoning Taiwan in Foreign Affairs by Bruce Gilley, ―Not
So Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security,‖
January/February 2010; responses in May/June 2010; Charles Glaser,
―Will China‘s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean
Pessimism,‖ March/April 2011; and a response by Daniel Blumenthal,
―Rethinking U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Taiwan,‖ Foreign Policy‘s
Shadow Government blog, March 2, 2011; Joseph Prueher, Charles
Freeman III, Timothy Keating, David Michael Lampton, James Shinn, et
al., ―A Way Ahead with China,‖ University of Virginia, January 2011
[77] Following the ROC government‘s retreat to Taiwan in 1949 and the start
of the Korean War, the U.S. stance shifted on sovereignty over Taiwan. On
January 5, 1950, President Truman stated that the United States would not
get involved in the civil conflict in China. After the Korean War started,
however, President Truman declared on June 27, 1950, that ―the
determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of
security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by
530 Shirley A. Kan

the United Nations.‖ (Quoted by Alan Romberg, Rein in at the Brink of

the Precipice, Stimson Center, 2003).
[78] Holdridge, John, Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of
Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 1997), p. 90. See also: James Mann, About Face: A History of
America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 33 (citing a declassified chronology
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by Richard Solomon, U.S.-PRC
Political Negotiations, 1967-84, An Annotated Chronology, December 1985,
released to Mann (a Los Angeles Times reporter) under the Freedom of
Information Act). Mann reports that what Kissinger pledged to Zhou went
beyond previous U.S. promises and contradicted the official U.S. position
that sovereignty over Taiwan was ―an unsettled question subject to future
international resolution.‖ At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing
on March 25, 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth also cited
Kissinger‘s promise as recorded in the CIA‘s chronology in his written
response to Senator Helms‘ question about precedents for President
Clinton‘s June 1998 ―Three Noes‖ statement. Also see Patrick Tyler, A
Great Wall (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), p. 98. On February 27,
2002, the National Security Archive released declassified copies of U.S.
documents on U.S.-PRC rapprochement in 1970-1971, including transcripts
of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger‘s secret meetings in China.
Quotations are from the White House Memorandum, dated July 29, 1971,
written by Winston Lord for Kissinger on his conversations with Zhou on
July 9.
[79] White House, Memorandum of Conversation, February 22, 1972, 2:10pm-
6:00pm. On December 11, 2003, the National Security Archive, an
organization in Washington, DC, was able to release the declassified Top
Secret Memoranda of Conversation on President Nixon‘s meetings in
Beijing in February 1972, which led to the Shanghai Communique. On the
American side, only President Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger, and two NSC staff, John Holdridge and Winston Lord, were in
the meetings.
[80] White House, Memorandum of Conversation, February 24, 1972, 5:15pm-
8:05pm, classified as Top Secret until release as declassified documents on
December 11, 2003.
[81] As part of his response, Zhou Enlai remarked to Nixon that ―you hope for
and will not hinder a peaceful liberation [of Taiwan].‖ Nixon did not correct
Zhou.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 531

[82] The Chinese text used ―ren shi‖ (―to acknowledge‖). The Chinese term was
changed in the 1979 communique to ―recognize.‖
[83] Holdridge (p. 89), then a senior staff member for East Asia at the National
Security Council under Henry Kissinger, wrote that ―it was helpful that
both the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] and the Kuomintang [(KMT)
or Nationalist Party] regarded Taiwan as part of China, for by accepting this
point and affirming our interest in the settlement of the sovereignty question
‗by the Chinese themselves‘ we would affront neither side.‖ Holdridge (p.
93) also recounted that the wording of ―all Chinese‖ was originally
formulated as ―all people,‖ and the State Department objected to the word
―people,‖ because some on Taiwan regarded themselves as ―Taiwanese‖
and did not agree that Taiwan was a part of China.
[84] Tyler, p. 172, citing Henry Kissinger, Memorandum of Conversation with
Mao Zedong, Chairman Mao‘s residence, November 12, 1973. One year later,
in a meeting with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, Tyler writes that Kissinger stated
his understanding that Mao had said that the leadership would ultimately
have to solve the Taiwan question by force and it could take 100 years.
Deng said that ―100 years‖ was symbolic. Kissinger was concerned
about a military solution to the Taiwan question shortly after U.S.-PRC
normalization.
[85] Public Papers of the Presidents, Gerald Ford, 1974.
[86] In great secrecy, the Carter White House made its final decision to
normalize relations with the PRC. President Carter, along with National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and his aide, Michel Oksenberg, did
not consult with Congress on the timing and final wording of the
communique. Congress was surprised to be informed hours before the
December 15, 1978 announcement. See Patrick Tyler, ―The
(Ab)normalization of U.S.-Chinese Relations,‖ Foreign Affairs,
September/October 1999; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1983); Robert G. Sutter (CRS), ―Executive-Legislative
Consultations on China Policy, 1978-79,‖ Foreign Affairs Committee Print,
June 1980. In a speech at Stanford University in honor of Michel Oksenberg
on May 6, 2002, Carter said he became president in 1977 determined to
establish full diplomatic relations with China. He said he kept negotiations
instructions to his envoy, Leonard Woodcock, secret from the State
Department, and only Secretary of State Cyrus Vance went to the White
House, which sent direct communications to Woodcock.
[87] President Carter announced the new policy, despite the International
Security Assistance Act (P.L. 95-3 84) enacted on September 26, 1978.
532 Shirley A. Kan

Congress passed it with Senator Robert Dole‘s amendment, saying that it is

the sense of Congress that it be consulted on any proposed policy changes
affecting the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. Senator Jacob Javits later
wrote that the President made his announcement ―with only the briefest
notice to congressional leaders,‖ and regarding the abrogation of the defense
treaty, ―the President‘s action ignored a specific amendment adopted by the
Congress only two months before, in the International Security Assistance
Act of 1978, calling for ‗prior consultation‘ on ‗any proposed policy
changes affecting the continuation in force‘ of that treaty.‖ (―Congress and
Foreign Relations: the Taiwan Relations Act,‖ Foreign Affairs, Fall 1981).
[88] ―Statement of the Government of the People‘s Republic of China in
Connection with the Establishment of China-U.S. Diplomatic Relations,‖
printed in Harding.
[89] ―President Chiang Ching-kuo‘s Five Principles on U.S.-ROC Relations
in the Post-Normalization Period,‖ December 29, 1978, printed in Martin
L. Lasater, The Taiwan Issue in Sino-Ameri can Strategic Relations
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). Lasater notes that Chiang informed U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher that future U.S.- ROC ties
must rest on five underlying principles of reality, continuity, security,
legality, and governmentality. The statement was summarized by James
Soong, Deputy-Director of the ROC‘s Government Information Office.
[90] ―Text of NPC Standing Committee Message to Taiwan Compatriots,‖
New China News Agency, December 31, 1978. This policy of
―unification‖ replaced the earlier one of ―liberation‖ of Taiwan. The PRC
later elaborated on this policy of peaceful unification in Marshal Ye
Jianying‘s ―Nine-Point Proposal‖ of September 30, 1981.
[91] In the Chinese text, the word for ―acknowledge‖ is ―cheng ren‖
(recognize), a change from ―ren shi‖ (acknowledge), used in the 1972
Shanghai Communique. During debate on the TRA in February 1979,
Senator Jacob Javits noted the difference and said that ―it is very important
that we not subscribe to [the Chinese position on one China] either way.‖
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher responded that ―we regard
the English text as being the binding text. We regard the word
‗acknowledge‘ as being the word that is determinative for the U.S.‖ (Wolff
and Simon, p. 310-311).
[92] Instead of the phrase ―all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait‖ in the
1972 Shanghai communique, the 1979 Normalization communique used
―the Chinese position‖ (in the English text) and ―China‘s position‖ (in the
Chinese text).
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 533

[93] A key issue for Congress was to consider the character of the relationship
with Taiwan. While the ―Normalization Communique‖ and the
Administration called for ―unofficial‖ U.S. relations with Taiwan,
Members objected to the use of that word. Congress omitted any adjective
for the relationship and AIT, and the TRA does not specify the relationship
as official or unofficial. In discussing the legislative history of the
unprecedented law, Senator Jacob Javits wrote that ―no one really knew
what the limits of ‗officiality‘ were.‖ (―Congress and Foreign Relations:
the Taiwan Relations Act,‖ Foreign Affairs, Fall 1981).
[94] On this language in the TRA, the House report and statements of key
Members of Congress (such as Rep. Zablocki, chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee) clarified the expectation that there would be a
―prompt response‖ by the United States to a use of force against Taiwan,
but the TRA would not specify in advance what the situation or response
might be. Members also stated the expectation that the President would
promptly inform Congress of anticipated dangers to Taiwan, and the
President and the Congress would both determine the appropriate U.S.
response according to the Constitution. Some Members, such as Rep. Dodd,
considered the language on ―grave concern‖ to be ―strong‖ and
―unambiguous,‖ but Rep. Quayle noted that ―of grave concern‖ is a ―very
ambiguous term we read every day in the newspapers.‖ Thus, he added
language that became section 2(b)(6) of the TRA. (Wolff and Simon, p. 77-
91).
[95] Senator Jacob Javits wrote that Members of Congress debated the appropriate
characterization of U.S. concern for Taiwan‘s security. Congress ―did not
seek to reconstruct a defense agreement with Taiwan,‖ and majorities in
the House and Senate agreed with the Administration in opposing Senator
Charles Percy‘s amendment to characterize ―coercion‖ against Taiwan as a
threat to the ―security interests‖ of the United States, because such language
would ―unnecessarily convey an intention to reenact the security agreement
itself, thus violating one of the understandings with Beijing.‖ Nonetheless,
Javits wrote that Congress legislated a broad definition of the threats that
Taiwan could face, going beyond language for resisting ―armed attacks‖
generally put into defense treaties. He was ―particularly concerned with
other dangers which in fact seemed more realistic than an outright invasion
from across the straits.‖ (―Congress and Foreign Relations: the Taiwan
Relations Act,‖ Foreign Affairs, Fall 1981).
[96] According to an author of the language, Section 4(B)(1) treats Taiwan as a
state for purposes limited to domestic U.S. laws (not international law), and
534 Shirley A. Kan

without it, the United States could not sell Taiwan weapons or enriched
uranium for nuclear power reactors, for example. (Author‘s consultation
with Harvey Feldman, who wrote ―President Reagan‘s Six Assurances to
Taiwan and Their Meaning Today,‖ Heritage Foundation, October 2, 2007.)
[97] Congress considered the security implications for the United States of
whether the definition of ―Taiwan‖ includes the offshore islands of Quemoy
and Matsu (only a few miles off the mainland). The House report (p. 16) on
the TRA noted that the definitions are ―illustrative, not limiting.‖
Nonetheless, Rep. Zablocki (chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee) explained that his committee excluded Quemoy and Matsu
from the definition. He noted that these islands had been ―deliberately left
out of the mutual defense treaty,‖ and ―we should not be expanding the U.S.
security commitment beyond what was in the treaty.‖ He noted that
―Quemoy and Matsu are considered by both Taipei and by Peking to be part
of mainland China.‖ He concluded that ―as far as the reference in the
committee report is concerned, it does not extend our security commitment
in its referral to Quemoy and Matsu.‖ (Wolff and Simon, p. 282-283).
[98] On the legislative history of the TRA, see also commentaries by
Representative Dante Fascell and Senators Alan Cranston, John Glenn,
Jesse Helms, Richard Lugar, John McCain, and Claiborne Pell, in William
Bader and Jeffrey Bergner (editors), The Taiwan Relations Act: A Decade
of Implementation, Hudson Institute and SRI International, 1989. Bader
was the Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1978-
1981. See also: William Bader, ―U.S. Has Law That Governs Relations
with Taiwan,‖ Financial Times, April 7, 2011.
[99] ―Ye Jianying Explains Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland
and Peaceful Unification,‖ Xinhua [New China News Agency], September
30, 1981, in FBIS. According to the Chinese report, Ye spoke as the
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People‘s Congress
(the PRC‘s legislature). However, Ye enjoyed significant stature in the
Chinese leadership largely because he was a Marshal, the highest rank in
the PLA. Harding (p. 113, 155) wrote that Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang
later described the plan to President Reagan at a meeting in Cancun in
October 1981, seeking reductions in and an end to U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan.
[100] Printed in Lasater.
[101] ―ROC Statement on the August 17 Communique,‖ August 17, 1982. A
slightly different version of the Six Assurances was reported by Steve
Lohr, ―Taiwan Expresses Regret Over Communique,‖ New York Times,
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 535

August 18, 1982. Also see Alan Romberg, Rein In At the Brink of the
Precipice (Stimson Center, 2003). James Lilley, as Director of AIT,
conveyed the Six Assurances in the form of a blind memo with no
letterhead or signature to President Chiang Ching-kuo through ROC Vice
Foreign Minister Fredrick Chien, who translated them from English to a
Chinese text. Lilley explained that the Six Assurances were a sign to
Taiwan that it was not being abandoned by the Reagan Administration.
(James Lilley, China Hands, Public Affairs, 2004.) Chien wrote his
translated Chinese version in Chien Fu ’s Memoirs, Volume II (Taipei,
2005). He wrote the fifth assurance as ―the United States cannot support the
PRC‘s position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.‖ Also: author‘s
consultation with a U.S. official, June 2007.
[102] Feldman, Harvey, ―Reagan‘s Commitment to Taiwan: the Real Meaning of
the Taiwan Communique,‖ Washington Times, April 24, 2001; ―Taiwan,
Arms Sales, and the Reagan Assurances,‖ American Asian Review, Fall
2001. According to Feldman, James Lilley, Director of AIT, delivered a
―non-paper‖ from President Reagan to ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo,
which included this clarification of U.S. commitments. Lilley delivered this
message in addition to the ―Six Assurances‖ given on July 14, 1982.
Feldman noted to CRS that he obtained the wording from Chien Fu, then
the ROC‘s Vice Foreign Minister, who translated from a Chinese translation
of an English text.
[103] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan.
Also, in The Reagan Diaries (published in 2007), President Reagan wrote
in his entry for August 17, 1982, that ―Press and TV with a leak from
State Dept. has gone crazy declaring our joint communique with P.R.C. of
China is a betrayal of Taiwan. Truth is we are standing with Taiwan and the
P.R.C. made all the concessions.‖ Earlier, on January 11, 1982, Reagan had
written in his diary that ―press running wild with talk that I reversed myself
on Taiwan because we‘re only selling them F5Es and F104s [fighters]. I
think the China Lobby in State Dept. is selling this line to appease the PRC
which doesn‘t want us to sell them anything. The planes we‘re offering are
better than anything the PRC has. Later on if more sophistication is needed
we‘ll upgrade and sell them F5Gs.‖
[104] The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers held hearings
on September 17 and 27, 1982, and subsequently communicated with the
State Department to investigate ―apparent conflicts‖ between the Reagan
Administration‘s 1982 Communique and the TRA, and to seek clarifications
on policy toward Taiwan from Secretary of State George Shultz. He
536 Shirley A. Kan

answered that ―a determination of Taiwan‘s defense needs and of the

sufficiency of its self- defense capability requires an assessment of the
nature of the military threat confronting it. This necessarily requires an
assessment of the military capacity of the PRC and its policy towards
Taiwan.‖ Among extensive responses, Shultz also replied that U.S. arms
sales do not violate China‘s sovereignty; that the United States takes no
position on the question of Taiwan‘s sovereignty; and that the communique
is not an international agreement. Lawyers for the Departments of State and
Justice testified that the August 17, 1982 communique ―sets forth parallel
and interrelated statements of policy by the United States and China.‖
Moreover, they stated that ―it is not an international agreement and thus
imposes no obligations on either party under international law. Its status
under domestic law is that of a statement by the President of the United
States of a policy which he intends to pursue. Like any other Presidential
policy, it must be executed in full compliance with all relevant laws.‖
[105] The Chinese text says that the United States ―recognized‖ (―cheng ren‖)
―China‘s‖ (―zhongguo de‖) position, repeating the formulation of the 1979
communique.
[106] In response to a question at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing of March 25, 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth cited
this phrase as a precedent for President Clinton‘s June 1998 statement in
China that the United States does not support Taiwan independence, as part
of the ―Three Noes.‖
[107] U.S. arms sales to Taiwan was an unresolved issue. James Lilley wrote
that President Reagan refused to end arms sales, while he agreed to concede
a limit on such sales. The final wording vaguely referred to a ―final
resolution‖ of the issue. (See James Lilley, China Hands, Public Affairs:
2004.) Later, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236, enacted on April 30, 1994), affirming
that Sec. 3 of the TRA (on arms sales) takes primacy over policy statements
(1982 Joint Communique), among other stipulations.
[108] ―Statement on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan,‖ August 17, 1982,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan.
[109] First publicly disclosed by James Mann, in About Face (Alfred Knopf,
1999). According to Mann, President Reagan‘s secret memorandum (on
the August 17, 1982 communique) clarified U.S. policy as maintaining the
military balance between the PRC and Taiwan. A version of the text, as
provided by an unnamed former U.S. official, was published in Robert
Kaiser, ―What We Said, What They Said, What‘s Unsaid,‖ Washington
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 537

Post, April 15, 2001. According to Alan Romberg‘s Rein In at the Brink
of the Precipice (Stimson Center, 2003), Charles Hill, then Executive
Secretary of the State Department, confirmed that Secretary of State George
Shultz was told by President Reagan that his intention was to solidify the
stress on a peaceful resolution and the importance of maintaining the cross-
strait military balance for that objective. Reagan also intended his written
clarification to reassure Republicans in Congress, such as Senator Jesse
Helms, that Taiwan would not be disadvantaged by the communique. Partial
text of the memo was published by James Lilley, in China Hands (Public
Affairs, 2004). Also, author‘s consultation with Lilley.
[110] Harding.
[111] U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on China-Taiwan:
United States Policy, ―Prepared Statement of John H. Holdridge,
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,‖ August 18,
1982. On July 15, 1998, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth submitted
answers to questions posed at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on May 14, 1998, concerning ―U.S. Interests at the June U.S.-
China Summit.‖ Roth responded to Senator Craig Thomas‘ question on
abiding by the ―Six Assurances‖ by stating a reaffirmation of the
Administration‘s ―commitment to the principles articulated by then-
Assistant Secretary Holdridge in his 1982 testimony to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee.‖
[112] Deng‘s talk on ―A New Way to Stabilize the World Situation,‖ translated
from Deng Xiaoping Lun Guofang He Jundui Jianshe [Deng Xiaoping
Discusses National Defense and Military Construction], Junshi Kexue
Chubanshe [Military Science Press], May 1992. During PRC-British talks
on the future of Hong Kong, Deng conveyed his proposal for a ―one
country, two systems‖ formula in a meeting with former U.S. National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who visited China as part of a
delegation from Georgetown University‘s Center for Strategic and
International Studies. The meeting and Deng‘s decision of ―effecting two
systems within one country‖ was reported in Wen Wei Po (a PRC
newspaper in Hong Kong), February 24, 1984; translated in FBIS,
February 28, 1984. Deng‘s formula has been often translated as ―one
country, two systems,‖ rather than the original ―one China, two systems.‖
Deng‘s remarks were also published in Chinese in Deng Xiaoping’s
Selected Works.
[113] Mann (p. 153-154) writes that after the conclusion of negotiations over
Hong Kong, Deng launched a secret, intensive effort to settle with the
538 Shirley A. Kan

Reagan Administration on the future of Taiwan. When British Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher signed the Hong Kong agreement in December
1984, Deng passed a message through her to Reagan, asking that the same
formula of ―one country, two systems‖ be applied to Taiwan. However, the
message was not conveyed, but some Americans lobbied for the proposal.
In the end, the Administration decided not to settle on Taiwan‘s future.
[114] Deng‘s remarks in Chinese published in Deng Xiaoping’s Selected Works.
[115] Deng‘s remarks in Chinese published in Deng Xiaoping’s Selected Works.
[116] Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush.
[117] Text published in: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of
China, ―Consensus Formed at the National Development Conference on
Cross-Strait Relations,‖ February 1997. The Guidelines were adopted by the
National Unification Council on February 23, 1991, and by the Executive
Yuan (Cabinet) on March 14, 1991. These guidelines asserted the principle
of ―one China, two political entities,‖ recognized the PRC‘s jurisdiction
over the mainland, and called for eventual unification on the basis of
―parity‖ between the two sides. Then, on May 1, 1991, Taiwan terminated
the 1948 National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist
Rebellion, thus ending the civil war against the Communists and
recognizing the political authority of the PRC on the mainland.
[118] Text published in: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of
China, ―Consensus Formed at the National Development Conference on
Cross-Strait Relations,‖ February 1997. ―The Meaning of ‗One China‘‖ was
adopted by the National Unification Council.
[119] Remarks to General Dynamics Employees in Fort Worth, Texas,
September 2, 1992, Administration of George Bush, 1992 (Public Papers
of the Presidents). In addition to this arms sale decision, the Bush
Administration also broke new ground in high-level exchanges with
Taiwan. In Taiwan from November 30-December 3, 1992, U.S. Trade
Representative Carla Hills was the first U.S. cabinet official to visit since
de-recognition in 1979.
[120] Beijing‘s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)
and Taipei‘s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) met in Hong Kong,
October 28-30, 1992. Through these quasi-official organizations, the two
sides agreed to disagree on the meaning of ―one China,‖ namely, ―PRC‖ in
Beijing and ―ROC‖ in Taipei. However, years later, it became a semantic
dispute. The CPC in Beijing and KMT in Taipei have argued that the two
sides reached a ―1992 Consensus,‖ re-phrased by KMT official Su Chi for
more ambiguity. The DPP has disagreed. On August 28, 2001, AIT Director
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 539

Raymond Burghardt said that the two sides had exchanged faxes which
constituted an agreement to hold talks, adding ―I‘m not sure why you
could call that a consensus. I call it an agreement.‖ In his National Day
address of October 10, 2004, Chen suggested that the ―1992 meeting‖ be
the basis to resume cross-strait dialogue. On March 26, 2008, according
to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, CPC General Secretary and
PRC President Hu Jintao talked with President Bush on the phone, and Hu
agreed to restore cross-strait ―consultation‖ on the basis of the ―1992
Consensus,‖ explicitly entailing both sides recognizing one China but agree
to differ on its definitions. Xinhua‘s report in English also used this
detailed phrase, but Xinhua‘s report in Chinese referred only to the ―1992
Consensus.‖ In an interview reported in Chinese by United Daily News in
Taipei on December 23, 2010, KMT President Ma Ying-jeou said that
the CPC ―recognized‖ the ―1992 Consensus‖ and challenged the DPP to
do so. Ma repeatedly used ―1992 Consensus‖ rather than ―One China,
Different Interpretations.‖ Ma went further to say that the DPP was the
only one of four parties (which he called the ROC, mainland, the United
States, and the DPP) not to accept the ―1992 Consensus.‖ However, the
CPC‘s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) said on December 29 that both sides
reached the ―1992 Consensus,‖ and the TAO did not refer to ―one China,
different interpretations.‖ Moreover, the TAO still welcomed DPP members
to visit the PRC. Also, contrary to Ma‘s characterization of U.S. policy as
recognizing the ―1992 Consensus,‖ the State Department told Taiwan‘s
Liberty Times on December 28 that: ―Questions relating to establishing
the basis for dialogue between Taiwan and the People‘s Republic of
China are matters for the two parties to resolve. The U.S. takes no position
on the substance of such questions. Our interest is that any resolution of
cross-strait issues be peaceful.‖
[121] Press release in Chinese by the SEF, Taipei, November 3, 1992, printed in a
book by a KMT politician: Su Chi, The Historical Record of the
Consensus of “One China, Different Interpretations” (Taipei: National
Policy Foundation, 2002). Also in ―Strait Group Agrees to State
Positions ‗Orally‘,‖ Central News Agency, Taipei, November 18, 1992.
[122] Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], Beijing, November 6, 1992. ARATS sent
a letter to the SEF on November 16, 1992, reiterating this agreement. The
letter also stated that ―both sides of the strait support the one China principle
and seek national unification. However, negotiations on routine matters
across the strait do not involve the political meaning of ‗one China‘.‖ The
letter in Chinese is printed in a book by a KMT politician: Su Chi, The
540 Shirley A. Kan

Historical Record of the Consensus of “One China, Different

Interpretations” (Taipei: National Policy Foundation, a KMT think tank,
2002). Also reported in Renmin Ribao, November 21, 1992.
[123] PRC Premier Li Peng, Government Work Report to the First Session of the
8th National People‘s Congress, Beijing, Central Television Program,
March 15, 1993; translated in FBIS, March 15, 1993. According to
analysis by FBIS Trends (March 31, 1993), by saying ―both sides‖ (not the
Communist Party and the Nationalist Party), Li changed the formulation in
his report from previous years, signaling greater PRC concern about pro-
independence activities in Taiwan and urgency to hold unification talks, ―as
soon as possible.‖ The analysis also noted that, when warning of ―all
necessary drastic measures,‖ Li echoed the ―unusually harsh language‖ used
by General Secretary Jiang Zemin in December 1992. According to
Beijing Review (January 4-10, 1993), Jiang warned that Beijing would
take ―resolute measures‖ to prevent Taiwan independence, while reiterating
a policy of peaceful unification.
[124] PRC concern apparently increased after the first fully democratic
legislative election was held in Taiwan on December 19, 1992. The ruling
Nationalist Party (KMT) won 96 out of 161 seats, while the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) gained 50 seats. The DPP has advocated a
―Republic of Taiwan,‖ instead of ―Republic of China.‖
[125] Mainland Chinese and Taiwan authorities held their first talks and signed
their first agreements since 1949. Represented by ―authorized
nongovernmental organizations,‖ the PRC‘s Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan‘s Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF) met in Singapore and agreed to institutionalize contacts.
ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan and SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu agreed
that the talks were not political, but were nongovernmental, economic,
practical, and functional.
[126] Xinhua (New China News Agency), Beijing, April 27, 1993, translated in
FBIS, April 27, 1993.
[127] Dr. Koo‘s Arrival Address at Singapore Airport, April 26, 1993, ―A Resume
of the Koo-Wang Talks,‖ Straits Exchange Foundation, December 1993.
[128] Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, ―Our Views on the Koo-Wang Talks,‖
May 1993.
[129] Jason Hu, Director of the ROC‘s Government Information Office, ―The
Case For Taipei‘s U.N. Representation,‖ speech at the Atlantic Council on
September 17, 1993. Hu said that Taiwan‘s bid was submitted in a letter
sent by seven South American countries to the U.N. Secretary General on
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 541

August 6, 1993. He said that the bid was flexible on the name to use at the
U.N. See also: Fredrick F. Chien (ROC Foreign Minister), ―UN Should
Welcome Taiwan,‖ Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 1993;
―Divided China in the United Nations: Time for Parallel Representation‖
(advertisement), New York Times, September 17, 1993; and ―Republic of
China on Taiwan Observes 82nd Anniversary: New Goals Include
Participation in the United Nations‖ (advertisement), Washington Post,
October 7, 1993.
[130] On April 27-29, 1993, the landmark ―Koo-Wang‖ talks had been held in
Singapore between Koo Chen-fu (chairman of Taiwan‘s Strait Exchange
Foundation (SEF)) and Wang Daohan (chairman of the PRC‘s
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)), the first
meeting between the heads of the two organs set up for cross-strait dialogue.
Later in 1993, according to Mann (p. 290), the State Department drafted a
policy review to restore high-level dialogue with Beijing and submitted it to
the White House in July 1993. As part of the new policy of engagement
toward China, President Clinton invited PRC President Jiang Zemin to
attend the first summit of leaders in the Asia Pacific Economic (APEC)
Forum in Seattle, Washington, in November 1993. The Far Eastern
Economic Review (October 7, 1993) reported that Taipei was concerned
that Washington agreed with Beijing that Taiwan, despite its status in
APEC equal to other members, would not be represented by Lee Teng-hui,
but by Vincent Siew, head of economic planning.
[131] ―The Taiwan Question and the Unification of China,‖ Xinhua [New China
News Agency], August 31, 1993, translated in FBIS, September 1, 1993.
[132] Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan (Cabinet), Republic of China,
―Explanation of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait,‖ July 5, 1994,
translated in FBIS, July 11, 1994.
[133] Announced on September 7, 1994 and described in the Clinton
Administration‘s only public statement on the Taiwan Policy Review,
which was given by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Winston Lord, ―Taiwan Policy Review,‖ Testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 27, 1994 (in U.S.
Department of State Dispatch, October 17, 1994). Lord noted that ―the
lengthy, detailed inter-agency policy review that we have conducted is the
first of its kind launched by any Administration of either political party
since we shifted recognition to Beijing in 1979.‖ While opposing legislation
to specifically allow visits by top leaders of Taiwan, the Administration
decided to send high-level economic and technical officials to visit Taiwan,
542 Shirley A. Kan

establish a sub-cabinet level economic dialogue with Taiwan, allow

Taiwan‘s office in the United States to change its name to Taipei Economic
and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), and support Taiwan‘s
membership in international organizations where statehood is not a
requirement and Taiwan‘s voice to be heard in organizations where its
membership is not allowed.
[134] The review came after the Congress passed and the President signed (on
April 30, 1994) the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and
FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) which directed the State Department to register
foreign- born Taiwanese-Americans as U.S. citizens born in Taiwan
(rather than China); called for the President to send Cabinet-level
officials to Taiwan and to show clear U.S. support for Taiwan in
bilateral and multilateral relationships; and declared that Sec. 3 of the TRA
(on arms sales) takes primacy over statements of U.S. policy (the 1982
communique). In addition, in May 1994, the State Department had allowed
Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to make a refueling stop in Hawaii but
denied him a visa to enter the United States. In response, the Senate, from
July to October, passed amendments introduced by Senator Brown to ensure
that Taiwan‘s President can enter the United States on certain occasions.
Two amendments (for S. 2182 and H.R. 4606) that passed were not
retained, but the amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994 was enacted. Upon signing the bill into law (P.L.
103-416) on October 25, 1994, President Clinton, nonetheless, said that he
would construe Sec. 221 as expressing Congress‘ view.
[135] Jiang Zemin, ―Continue to Promote the Unification of the Motherland,‖
January 30, 1995. As part of the context of his speech, Jiang looked to the
100th anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed between China and
Japan on April 17, 1895, which ceded Taiwan to Japan as a colony until the
end of World War Two. Jiang also cited the transfer of control to the PRC
of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999, and said that ―now it is high
time to accomplish the unification of the motherland.‖
[136] Lee Teng-hui, ―Address to the National Unification Council,‖ April 8,
1995.
[137] Department of State‘s announcement by spokesperson, Nicholas Burns,
May 22, 1995. Congress‘ view was an important factor acknowledged by
the Administration in its reversal of policy to grant the visa. Congress had
overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan H.Con.Res. 53 expressing the
sense of Congress that the President should promptly welcome a visit by
Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater, Cornell University, and a transit stop in
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 543

Anchorage, Alaska, to attend a conference. The House passed the

resolution by 3 96-0 on May 2, and the Senate passed it by 97-1 on May
9, 1995. Some analysts believe that another factor was the contrast posed by
the Administration‘s March 1995 decision to grant visits to Gerry Adams
(leader of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army
(IRA)), to the United States, including meetings with Clinton in the White
House—despite objections from London.
[138] Garver, p. 79; Mann, p. 330. These promises apparently formed the basis
for the Administration‘s later public statements issued in 1997 and 1998,
including one by President Clinton in China, that became known as the
―Three Noes.‖ However, ―opposing‖ Taiwan independence was changed to
a more neutral stance of ―not supporting‖ it. Clinton‘s letter was sent after
the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) launched its first test-firing of M-9
short-range ballistic missiles toward Taiwan in July 1995, as part of the
PRC‘s reaction to Lee Teng-hui‘s visit to Cornell University in June 1995.
[139] Department of State, Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony before the House International
Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, March 14, 1996.
The PRC followed its July 1995 missile test-firings with more military
exercises and additional missile test-firings in March 1996—to intimidate
voters in Taiwan on the eve of their first democratic presidential election.
After introduction of H.Con.Res. 148 on March 7, 1996, the Clinton
Administration announced on March 10 and 11 the decisions to deploy two
carrier battle groups east of Taiwan to underscore the American
commitment to regional peace and stability. However, the Administration
did not agree with Congress on the need to formally consult with Congress
on the U.S. response to the PLA actions, under Section 3(c) of the TRA.
[140] ―The President‘s News Conference with Prime Minister Ryutaro
Hashimoto of Japan in Tokyo,‖ April 17, 1996, Public Papers of United
States Presidents, William Clinton. The two leaders issued a Joint Declaration
on Security to strengthen the alliance.
[141] Department of State, ―American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship,‖
Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the Asia Society, the
Council on Foreign Relations, and the National Committee on U.S.-China
Relations, New York, May 17, 1996. Christopher ended with a signal of
President Clinton‘s new willingness to hold regular summits with the
PRC President. Then in July 1996, National Security Advisor Anthony
Lake traveled to China to pursue the ―strategic dialogue.‖ Briefing reporters
on July 3, 1996, a National Security Council official said Lake was
544 Shirley A. Kan

scheduled to meet Wang Daohan, chairman of the Association for Relations

Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), in order to do ―what we can there to
advance the resumption and to promote the resumption of cross-strait
dialogue and to reinforce our position that the differences between Taiwan
and China need to be resolved peacefully.‖ This item on Lake‘s agenda
signaled a new, proactive U.S. stance on cross-strait relations and raised
questions in Beijing and Taipei of U.S. involvement. The meeting was
canceled after Lake‘s arrival in China.
[142] ―The President [Lee Teng-hui‘s] Inaugural Speech (Excerpt),‖May 20,
1996, printed in Consensus Formed at the National Development
Conference on Cross-Strait Relations, Mainland Affairs Council, Executive
Yuan, Republic of China, February 1997. With a tense military environment
brought by China‘s military exercises that included missile test-firings, Lee
Teng-hui won a landslide victory of 54 percent of the votes in Taiwan‘s first
democratic presidential election on March 23, 1996. Pro-independence
candidate Peng Ming-min received 21 percent, and pro-unification Lin
Yang-kang won 15 percent of the votes.
[143] Consensus Formed at the National Development Conference on Cross-Strait
Relations, Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China,
February 1997. Also see CRS Report 97-268, Taiwan's National
Development Conference: Proposed Policy Changes and Implications for
the United States, by Robert G. Sutter. Called by President Lee Teng-hui in
his inaugural speech in May 1996, delegates from the three major political
parties (Nationalist Party, Democratic Progressive Party, and New China
Party) attended the conference. The conference took place as Taiwan
looked to the transfer of Hong Kong as a British colony to a Special
Administration Region of the PRC in July 1997
[144] President Clinton‘s opening statement, Press Conference by President Clinton
and President Jiang Zemin, Old Executive Office Building, Washington,
DC, October 29, 1997.
[145] President Clinton‘s answer to a question about whether he sees any U.S.
role in securing a permanent peaceful environment in the Taiwan Strait
(after reference to U.S. roles in brokering peace in Bosnia and the Middle
East), Press Conference by President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin,
Old Executive Office Building, Washington, DC, October 29, 1997.
[146] White House, ―Joint U.S.-China Statement,‖ October 29, 1997. In preparing
for the summit, the PRC desired to have a ―fourth communique‖ with
further U.S. assurances on Taiwan. Also, Mann wrote that the PRC wanted
the joint statement to make public the ―Three Noes‖ that President Clinton
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 545

had promised President Jiang in a private letter in 1995. The Joint Statement
did not mention the TRA.
[147] Department of State, Press Briefing by James Rubin, October 31, 1997. For
the first time, the Administration publicly stated the ―Three Noes,‖ which
were not put in writing in the U.S.-China Joint Statement. Rubin made that
statement in response to a question about specific assurances on Taiwan that
President Clinton gave to President Jiang during the 1997 summit. Clinton
reportedly had passed a secret letter to Jiang in August 1995 with an earlier
version of the ―Three Noes.‖
[148] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ―Press Availability by President
Clinton and President Jiang,‖ Beijing, PRC, June 27, 1998.
[149] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ―Remarks by the President and
the First Lady in Discussion on Shaping China for the 21st Century,‖
Shanghai, China, June 30, 1998. The Administration maintains that the
―Three Noes‖ represented no change in U.S. policy. Nonetheless, President
Clinton chose to issue this statement verbally and at an informal ―roundtable
discussion,‖ rather than at the summit in Beijing with President Jiang on
June 27, 1998. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
March 25, 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth cited Kissinger‘s
1971 promise as the origins of U.S. policy of non-support for Taiwan‘s
independence and argued that President Clinton‘s June 1998 ―Three Noes‖
statement represented no change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
[150] On the eve of President Clinton‘s trip to China, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Susan Shirk testified before the House International Relations
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on May 20, 1998, stating that ―there
will be no fourth communique; nor will our relationship with Taiwan be
diluted or sacrificed in any way.‖ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Kurt Campbell also assured Congress that ―there will be no fourth
communique and there will be no document that harms Taiwan‘s interest.‖
The House, on June 9, 1998, passed (411-0) H.Con.Res. 270 (Solomon),
resolving that it is the sense of Congress that ―the United States abides by
all previous understandings of a ‗one China‘ policy and its abiding interest
in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue.‖ The House also resolved
that the President should seek at the summit a public renunciation by the
PRC of any use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. After the
President stated the ―Three Noes‖ in China, the Senate passed (92-0)
S.Con.Res. 107 (Lott) on July 10, 1998, affirming its expectation that the
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, but did not include
language on the people of both sides of the strait determining their own
546 Shirley A. Kan

future. The House, on July 20, 1998, passed (390-1) H.Con.Res. 301
(DeLay) affirming its expectation that the ―future status of Taiwan will be
determined by peaceful means, and that the people of both sides of the
Taiwan Strait should determine their own future ... ‖ Also see CRS Report
98-837, Taiwan: The "Three No's, " Congressional-Administration
Differences, and U.S. Policy Issues, by Robert G. Sutter.
[151] Lee Teng-hui, ―U.S. Can‘t Ignore Taiwan,‖ Wall Street Journal, August
3, 1998.
[152] ARATS and SEF agreed on a four-point common understanding: (hold all
kinds of dialogue, including political and economic dialogue; strengthen
exchanges, including those at all levels; strengthen mutual assistance in
cases involving lives and property; acceptance of an invitation for Wang
Daohan to visit Taiwan at an appropriate time), according to Xinhua Hong
Kong Service, October 15, 1998, in FBIS.
[153] Koo Chen-fu, ―Key Points From Remarks Made at a Meeting with ARATS
Chairman Wang Daohan,‖ Shanghai, October 14, 1998 (issued by SEF,
Republic of China).
[154] Opening remarks of Taiwan‘s SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu at a press
conference after his meeting with PRC President Jiang Zemin in Beijing,
October 18, 1998.
[155] Statement of Tang Shubei, executive vice chairman of the PRC‘s ARATS,
denying inconsistency between comments of ARATS chairman Wang
Daohan and Vice Premier Qian Qichen, ―Tang Shubei Explains ‗One
China‘ Principle,‖ Zhongguo Xinwen She (China News Agency), Beijing,
October 18, 1998; translated in FBIS.
[156] Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, ―The Taiwan Relations Act at Twenty—and Beyond,‖ address to
the Woodrow Wilson Center and the American Institute in Taiwan,
Washington, DC, March 24, 1999. On the next day, Roth testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S.-Taiwan relations, but he did
not discuss the possibility of cross-strait ―interim agreements.‖ He also
assured the committee that ―the future of cross-strait relations is a matter for
Beijing and Taipei to resolve. No Administration has taken a position on
how or when they should do so.‖
[157] President Lee Teng-hui‘s interview with the Voice of Germany, Taipei, July
9, 1999, reported in Chung-Yang JihPao, July 10, 1999, in FBIS. Lee was
responding to a question about Beijing viewing Taiwan as a ―renegade
province.‖ Some observers note that Lee may have specifically chosen
German media, because Germany was once a divided country.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 547

[158] Three days later, Taiwan‘s Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su Chi
added that ―While we continue to show our goodwill, Mainland China
continues to tighten its ‗one China principle.‘ Therefore, it is unnecessary
for us to stick to our previous position. We shall clearly define equal footing
in order to usher in better cross-strait relations toward the next century.‖
From: ―MAC Chairman Su Chi at July 12, 1999 Press Conference,‖ Taipei
Speaks Up: Special State-toState Relationship, Republic of China’s Policy
Documents, Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of
China, August 1999.
[159] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ―Press Conference by the
President,‖ Washington, DC, July 21, 1999.
[160] ―Parity, Peace, and Win-Win: The Republic of China‘s Position on the
‗Special State-to-State Relationship‘,‖ Mainland Affairs Council,
Executive Yuan, Republic of China, August 1, 1999.
[161] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ―Remarks by the President and
President Jiang Zemin of the People‘s Republic of China in Photo
Opportunity,‖ Auckland, New Zealand, September 11, 1999. In a press
briefing just after President Clinton‘s meeting with Jiang, National Security
Advisor Sandy Berger said that Clinton told Jiang that if he were to resort
to military force, ―there would be grave consequences in the United
States.‖ Berger said Clinton also stated that U.S. policy would continue ―as
it has been since the presidency of Richard Nixon,‖ to be based on the ―three
fundamental pillars‖ of the one China policy, a peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue, and the cross-strait dialogue.
[162] A few days, later, on September 15, 1999, the United States spoke out, for
the first time, against the ROC‘s bid for re-entering the United Nations,
reported Reuters. Previously, the United States remained outside the
debate on whether to place the issue of the ROC‘s membership on the
General Assembly‘s agenda. This year, an unnamed U.S. official was
quoted: ―we wanted to make clear that our ‗one-China‘ policy is
unchanged.‖ The annual outcome, since Taiwan‘s effort began in 1993, has
been a failure to get the issue of its membership on the agenda.
[163] The PRC‘s Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State
Council, ―The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,‖ February 21,
2000, the English version as published by Xinhua [New China News
Agency] and translated in FBIS, and the Chinese version as published by
People’s Daily Online.
[164] The PRC issued this white paper just after a U.S. delegation left Beijing.
The delegation included Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg,
548 Shirley A. Kan

Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe, Vice Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Ralston, and Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott, who were given no indication that the white paper would be
issued. The white paper was also issued on the eve of Taiwan‘s presidential
election scheduled for March 18, 2000, with the possibility that Chen Shui-
bian would win. Moreover, the House had passed (34 1-70) H.R. 1838, ―the
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,‖ on February 1, 2000, which was still
pending in the Senate and opposed by Beijing and the Clinton
Administration. News reports also said that Taipei and Washington were
discussing Taiwan‘s possible procurement of Aegis-equipped destroyers,
missile defense systems, and other advanced U.S. weapons, leading to
annual arms sales talks in April. In his response to the PRC‘s White Paper
on Taiwan, Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe, who just returned
from Beijing, warned on February 22 that the PRC would face ―incalculable
consequences‖ if it used force against Taiwan as the White Paper
threatened (Washington Post, February 23, 2000). On the same day,
Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth testified to the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs that ―the threat
of the use of force to resolve the Taiwan question is contrary to the
commitments contained in the communiques that are the bedrock of U.S.
policy.‖ In his comments about the White Paper, Roth also reiterated the
Administration‘s ―three principles‖ (peaceful resolution, cross-strait
dialogue, and one China)
[165] This second phrase can be interpreted to mean U.S. involvement in
Taiwan‘s defense.
[166] Remarks by the President to the Business Council, February 24, 2000.
Later, Clinton added a third point, saying also that ―there must be a shift
from threat to dialogue across the Taiwan Strait, and we will continue to
encourage both sides to seize this opportunity after the Taiwan election‖
(Remarks by the President on China, March 8, 2000).
[167] ROC, Office of the President, ―Taiwan Stands Up: Toward the Dawn of a
Rising Era,‖ May 20, 2000 (English and Chinese versions via the
Government Information Office).
[168] On March 18, 2000, Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) won the presidential election in Taiwan with 39 percent of the vote.
Independent candidate James Soong won 37 percent. The ruling
Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party‘s, Lien Chan won 23 percent. The
DPP has leaned toward favoring Taiwan‘s independence. Chen‘s DPP
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 549

administration brought Taiwan‘s first democratic transfer of power from

one party to another, after 55 years of KMT rule.
[169] Xinhua [New China News Agency], August 25, 2000, in FBIS.
[170] In July 2000, while meeting with visiting Taiwan lawmakers and
journalists, Qian Qichen began to articulate this more flexible
formulation of the ―one China‖ principle, particularly in saying that the
mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China (vs. that Taiwan is a part of
the PRC or China), according to Taiwan media (e.g., Central News
Agency, July 18, 2000). Later, looking towards an incoming Bush
Administration, Qian granted an interview at Zhongnanhai (the leadership
compound) to the Washington Post to reiterate what he described as a new
flexibility on Taiwan to the United States (John Pomfret, ―Beijing Signals
New Flexibility on Taiwan,‖ Washington Post, January 5, 2001). In a
speech on January 11, 2001, outgoing Assistant Secretary of State Stanley
Roth praised the ―significant formulation by Vice Premier Qian Qichen to
the effect that the PRC and Taiwan are both parts of China.‖ In an interview
with the Washington Post (March 24, 2001), however, President Jiang
Zemin ruled out applying the models of confederation or federation.
[171] Chen Shui-bian, President of the Republic of China, ―Bridging the New
Century: New Year‘s Eve Address,‖ December 31, 2000. For
―integration,‖ Chen used ―tong he.‖
[172] President‘s interview on ABC‘s ―Good Morning America‖ program,
April 25, 2001; followed by interview on ―CNN Inside Politics,‖ April 25,
2001. The interviews took place one day after the annual arms sales talks
with Taiwan authorities in Washington. Elaborating on the President‘s
statements, Vice President Dick Cheney said that ―the kind of diplomatic
ambiguity people talk about may be OK in diplomacy sometimes. But when
we get into an area where one side is displaying increasingly aggressive
posture, if you will, toward the other, then it‘s appropriate to clarify here
that in fact we‘re serious about this. It is an important step for the United
States, and we don‘t want to see a misjudgment on the part of the Chinese‖
(interview on ―Fox News Sunday,‖ April 29, 2001).
[173] The adjustment in PRC policy came after Taiwan‘s elections on
December 1, 2001, in which the DPP made significant gains in the
legislature. The DPP won 87 seats, compared with the KMT‘s 68 seats,
the People First Party (PFP)‘s 46 seats, the Taiwan Solidarity Union
(TSU)‘s 13 seats, and the New Party‘s 1 seat. Independents make up the
other 10 seats of the 225-seat Legislative Yuan. Also, the speech was given
550 Shirley A. Kan

as the United States and the PRC prepared for President Bush‘s visit to
Beijing on February 2 1-22, 2002.
[174] People’s Daily (in Chinese and English) and Xinhua as translated by
FBIS. The occasion for Vice Premier Qian Qichen‘s speech was the 7th
anniversary of Jiang Zemin‘s ―Eight Points.‖ Also, the People’s Daily
published a related editorial on January 25, 2002.
[175] While saying that its fundamental policy was unchanged, the PRC signaled
a new receptive policy toward the ruling DPP and a change in tone
(without reiterating the threat to use force). But, a week later, a spokesman
for the PRC‘s Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhang Mingqing, excluded Chen
Shui-bian and his vice president, Annette Lu, from the invitation to visit.
While visiting Taiwan at about the same time, the Chairman and Managing
Director of AIT, Richard Bush, spoke on January 28, 2002, saying that ―it
does not seem constructive for one side to set pre-conditions for a
resumption of dialogue that the other side even suspects would be
tantamount to conceding a fundamental issue before discussion begins.‖
[176] White House, ―President Bush Meets with Chinese President Jiang Zemin,‖
Great Hall of the People, Beijing, February 21, 2002. The visit to China was
the President‘s second in four months, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said that, in his
meeting with Jiang, Bush restated the U.S. policy on Taiwan as a consistent
policy and said that he hoped for a peaceful resolution and no provocations
by either side, and that the United States will live up to the TRA. Bush also
talked with students at Tsinghua University on February 22, and he
explicitly mentioned the ―one China policy‖ as one he has not changed.
Nonetheless, Bush emphasized the U.S. defense commitment in the TRA
and warned both Beijing and Taipei against provocations.
[177] Office of the President of the Republic of China, ―Chen Shui-bian‘s
Opening Address to the 29th Annual Meeting of the World Federation of
Taiwanese Associations (in Tokyo, Japan) via Live Video Link,‖ Chinese
version (basis of the translation here) issued on August 3, and English
version issued on August 7, 2002. Chen‘s remarks raised questions about
whether he was changing policy to seek an independent Taiwan, whether
there was coordination within his government, whether the speech would
provoke tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and whether U.S. policy needed
adjustment. On August 4, 2002, the NSC spokesman responded briefly that
U.S. policy has not changed, and added on August 7, that ―we have a one-
China policy, and we do not support Taiwan independence‖ and that the
United States ―calls on all parties to avoid steps with might threaten cross-
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 551

strait peace and stability, and urges a resumption of dialogue between

Beijing and Taiwan.‖ On August 8, the Chairwoman of Taiwan‘s Mainland
Affairs Council, Tsai Ing-wen, visited Washington to tell the Administration
and Congress that Taiwan‘s policy on cross-strait relations has not changed,
remaining consistent with Chen‘s inauguration address. While in Beijing on
August 26, 2002, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage responded to
a question about Chen‘s speech, saying that ―the United States does not
support Taiwan independence.‖ He later explained that ―by saying we do
not support, it‘s one thing. It‘s different from saying we oppose it. If people
on both sides of the strait came to an agreeable solution, then the United
States obviously wouldn‘t inject ourselves. Hence, we use the term we
don‘t ‗support‘ it. But it‘s something to be resolved by the people on both
sides of the question.‖
[178] White House, ―Remarks by the President and Chinese President Jiang
Zemin in Press Conference,‖ Bush Ranch, Crawford, TX, October 25, 2002.
This summit was the third meeting between the two presidents.
[179] In contrast, PRC media reported that President Bush expressed to Jiang that
the United States ―opposes‖ (fandui) Taiwan independence. See ―During
Talks with Jiang Zemin, Bush Explicitly States for the First time
‗Opposition to Taiwan Independence‘,‖ Zhongguo Xinwen She, October 26,
2002; People’s Daily editorial (considered authoritative statement of PRC
leadership views), ―New Century, New Situation, New Actions,‖
October 30, 2002. When asked about Bush‘s comments to Jiang, Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly maintained, at a November 19, 2002 press
briefing, that ―there has been no change in American policy and there was
no change in the meeting or out of the meeting with respect to our position
on Taiwan.‖ Still, in a meeting with Rep. Henry Hyde, Chairman of the
House International Relations Committee in Beijing on December 10, 2002,
Jiang said he appreciated President Bush‘s ―opposition‖ (fandui in Chinese
version) to Taiwan independence, according to People’s Daily. PRC experts
on U.S.- China relations have reported since the meeting that Bush said
that he was ―against‖ Taiwan independence.
[180] As confirmed to Taiwan‘s legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J.
Chen, and reported in Taiwan‘s media (Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China
Times], November 22, 2002), President Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a
freeze or reduction in China‘s deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in
return for restraints in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. President Bush reportedly
did not respond to Jiang‘s linkage.
552 Shirley A. Kan

[181] After the PRC blocked Taiwan‘s efforts to participate in the World
Health Organization (WHO) in May 2003, despite the SARS epidemic,
President Chen Shui-bian announced in a May 20, 2003 speech to the DPP,
that he would promote a referendum on whether Taiwan should join the
WHO. He called for that referendum and one on construction of a
nuclear power plant to coincide with the presidential election in March
2004.
[182] In a background briefing released by the White House on June 1, 2003, an
unnamed senior administration official volunteered to reporters this version
of Bush‘s discussions on Taiwan in his first meeting with Hu Jintao after he
became PRC president, in Evian, France.
[183] People’s Daily, June 2, 2003. The official report in Chinese used fandui
(oppose).
[184] On September 22-23, 2003, PRC Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited
Washington and met with President George Bush, Vice President Dick
Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Li reportedly
complained about U.S. handling of the Taiwan issue.
[185] Central News Agency, Taipei, September 28, 2003; Taipei Times, September
29, 2003; World Journal, New York, September 30, 2003. Leading up to the
next presidential election in March 2004, Chen Shui-bian announced a goal
of enacting a new constitution for the people of Taiwan in time for the 20th
anniversary of the founding of the DPP on September 28, 2006. Chen
elaborated on his proposal in a speech on September 30, 2003, at a meeting
of the Central Standing Committee of the DPP (translated from Chinese
text). In response, on September 29, 2003, the State Department‘s
spokesman called Chen‘s announcement an ―individual campaign
statement‖ and declined to take a position on Taiwan‘s domestic politics.
Nonetheless, the U.S. response stressed ―stability in the Taiwan Strait‖ and
reminded Chen of his pledges in his inauguration speech of May 2000,
saying that the United States ―take them seriously and believe they should
be adhered to.‖
[186] On November 11, 2003, Chen Shui-bian also issued a timetable: a new draft
constitution by September 28, 2006; a referendum on the constitution on
December 10, 2006; and enactment of the new constitution on May 20,
2008.
[187] In briefing the press on President Bush‘s trip to Asia, National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice said on October 14, 2003, that ―nobody should
try unilaterally to change the status quo... There must be a peaceful
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 553

resolution of the cross-strait issue,‖ in response to a question about Taiwan

President Chen Shui-bian‘s statements regarding ―one country on each side‖
of the Taiwan Strait.
[188] White House, ―Remarks by President Bush and President Hu Jintao of
China,‖ Bangkok, Thailand, October 19, 2003. In making their joint public
appearance, President Bush did not address the U.S. position on the Taiwan
issue and did not correct President Hu‘s characterization of the U.S.
position, including ―opposition‖ to Taiwan independence.
On October 20, 2003, People’s Daily gave the PRC‘s official version of the
meeting, reporting that Bush told Hu that the U.S. government upholds the
one China policy, abides by the three communiques, and ―opposes‖ (fandui)
Taiwan independence, and that this policy will not change. An unnamed
senior administration official briefed the press on the U.S. version of the
meeting, according to a White House press release on October 19, 2003.
When asked about Hu Jintao‘s characterization of Bush‘s ―opposition‖ to
Taiwan independence, the U.S. official said that U.S. policy on ―one China‖
has not changed and that ―we don‘t support Taiwan moving toward
independence.‖ When asked whether Hu Jintao misrepresented the U.S.
view, the U.S. official replied, ―I don‘t know‖ and reiterated Rice‘s
message as one of not wanting either party to change the status quo
unilaterally in the Taiwan Strait in a way that would upset peace and
stability. ―We‘re trying to make that clear,‖ the official said.
[189] Central News Agency, Taipei, ―Taiwan Never Slows Its Pace of Human
Rights Reform: President,‖ October 31, 2003. The United States allowed
Chen Shui-bian to transit through New York on his way to Panama. While
in New York, Chen received an award from the International League for
Human Rights and gave this speech. At the Heritage Foundation, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver told reporters that the
Administration ―appreciated‖ Chen‘s reiteration of his pledges in the
inauguration speech of 2000 and that the transit ―went very well.‖
(Central News Agency, November 3, 2003). He also said that the
Administration supported Chen‘s attendance at the ―private event‖ and
received an advance copy of Chen‘s speech ―as a courtesy‖ (Taipei
Times, November 5, 2003).
[190] On the same day, Chen Ming-tong, a vice chairman of Taiwan‘s Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC), gave a speech at the 2nd World Convention of the
Global Alliance for Democracy and Peace held in Houston, TX. He
contended that Taiwan is already a sovereign, democratic country that is in
a ―post-independence period‖ and that the proposals for referendums and a
554 Shirley A. Kan

new constitution are not meant to declare independence. He also said

that Chen Shui-bian instructed Lee Yuan-tse, Taiwan‘s envoy to the
APEC summit in Thailand in October 2003, to tell President Bush that the
referendums have nothing to do with promoting Taiwan‘s independence.
[191] On November 27, 2003, Taiwan‘s legislature passed legislation favored by
the opposition parties (KMT and PFP) governing referendums while
excluding a DPP proposal for referendums on the national name, flag, and
other sovereignty issues. The law did authorize the president to hold a
referendum on national security issues if Taiwan‘s sovereignty faced an
external threat. President Chen then announced on November 29 that he
would indeed hold a ―defensive referendum‖ on the day of the election, on
March 20, 2004.
[192] State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, press briefing,
December 1, 2003. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated
on October 14, 2003, that ―nobody should try unilaterally to change the
status quo,‖ but this was the first time the Bush Administration publicly
stated ―opposition‖ to any referendum that would change Taiwan‘s status.
On the same day, the Senior Director of Asian Affairs at the National
Security Council, James Moriarty, secretly met with President Chen in
Taiwan and expressed U.S. concerns about ―provocations,‖ the United
Daily News reported on December 1, 2003.
[193] White House, Remarks by President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao in Photo
Opportunity, the Oval Office, December 9, 2003. Bush did not make public
remarks against the PRC‘s military threats toward Taiwan. On December
11, 2003, Representatives Brown, Chabot, Rohrabacher, and Wexler, the
four co-Chairs of the Taiwan Caucus, wrote to President Bush, criticizing
his remarks with Wen and urging him to support Taiwan‘s referendums. On
March 17, 2004, 36 Members of the House, led by Representatives Peter
Deutsch and Dana Rohrabacher, signed a letter to Taiwan‘s people in
support of their right to hold referendums and to self-determination.
[194] Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
James Kelly at hearing held by the House International Relations
Committee on ―The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,‖ April 21,
2004.
[195] Presidential Office of the Republic of China, ―President Chen‘s Inaugural
Address: Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan,‖ May 20, 2004, in
Chinese with English version.
[196] On March 20, 2004, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP won re-election with 50.1
percent of the votes, while Lien Chan of the KMT received 49.9 percent.
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 555

The opposition disputed the result of the election, in which Chen won with a
margin of 0.2 percent, after surviving an assassination attempt the day
before the election. The White House did not congratulate Chen Shui-bian
on his victory until March 26, 2004, after official certification in Taiwan.
[197] While President Chen said ―new constitution‖ in Chinese, the official
English translation used ―a new version of our constitution.‖
[198] The speech showed Chen Shui-bian responding positively to U.S. concerns
after his re-election in March 2004 as to whether he would be pragmatic,
predictable, and non-provocative. He did not repeat what Beijing perceives
as antagonistic phrases such as ―one country on each side‖ or ―the status
quo is Taiwan as an independent state.‖ Chen did not rule out options for
Taiwan‘s future. He also promised to seek constitutional changes using the
process under the existing constitution and did not reiterate his call to use a
referendum instead. Chen promised to exclude sovereignty issues from the
constitutional changes. He reaffirmed the commitments in his inaugural
address of 2000, while not explicitly re-stating the ―Five Noes.‖ The White
House responded that the speech was ―responsible and constructive‖ and
presented another opportunity to restore cross-strait dialogue.
[199] Secretary of State Colin Powell, Interview with Phoenix TV, Beijing,
October 25, 2004.
[200] Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Interview with PBS,
December 10, 2004. Armitage‘s note that ―Taiwan is a part of China‖
was contrary to U.S. policy, which ―acknowledged‖ the ―one China‖
position of both sides. The TRA stipulates that Taiwan‘s status will be
determined with a peaceful resolution. The State Department clarified at a
news conference on December 22 that Armitage meant to simply re-state
consistent U.S. policy.
[201] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice along with counterparts from Japan issued a Joint Statement of the
U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. China strongly objected to the
alliance‘s mere mention of Taiwan.
[202] Right before adoption of the ―Anti-Secession Law,‖ Hu declared his ―Four-
Point Guidelines‖ before the Chinese People‘s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC).
[203] Translation of Article 8 of China‘s ―Anti-Secession Law,‖ adopted on
March 14, 2005.
[204] At the February 15, 2005 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the nomination of Robert Zoellick to be Deputy Secretary
of State, Zoellick responded to a question from Senator Lisa Murkowski on
556 Shirley A. Kan

the Anti-Secession Law by publicly criticizing it as an action that would run

counter to a peaceful resolution and dialogue. On March 16, the House
passed (424-4) H.Con.Res. 98 (Hyde) to express grave concern about the
―Anti-Secession Law,‖ and the House Taiwan Caucus hosted a briefing by
Taiwan‘s Ambassador David Lee. On April 6, 2005, the House
International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific held a
hearing on China‘s ―Anti-Secession Law.‖
[205] 205 Despite the PRC‘s ―Anti-Secession Law,‖ KMT Chairman Lien Chan
flew to Beijing for a historic meeting with CPC General-Secretary Hu
Jintao. Some say, this first KMT-CPC meeting in 60 years began their 3rd
United Front.
[206] George W. Bush, Interview with Fox News, June 8, 2005
[207] Despite his ―Five Noes,‖ on January 29, 2006, Chen Shui-bian called for
consideration of whether to ―abolish‖ the largely symbolic National
Unification Council (NUC) and National Unification Guidelines (NUG).
President Bush sent NSC official Dennis Wilder to Taipei with U.S.
concerns. Representatives Dana Rohrabacher and Steve Chabot wrote a
supportive commentary, ―Principled Defense of Freedom,‖ Washington
Times, February 17, 2006. On February 27, Chen chaired a national
security meeting and announced he would ―terminate‖ (vs. ―abolish‖)
the NUC and NUG.
[208] Senator John Warner, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, told
Admiral William Fallon, Commander of the Pacific Command, at a
committee hearing on March 7, 2006, that ―if conflict were precipitated by
just inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the Taiwanese elected
officials, I‘m not entirely sure that this nation would come full force to their
rescue if they created that problem.‖
[209] White House, ―President Bush Meets with President Hu of the People‘s
Republic of China,‖ Oval Office, April 20, 2006.
[210] State Department, question taken at the press briefing, October 17, 2006.
On October 15, President Chen Shui-bian called for consideration of a
proposal for a ―second republic‖ made by former presidential advisor Koo
Kwang-ming. Later, Chen elaborated on the concept of a constitution for
a ―second republic‖ by saying: ―The current constitution would be frozen,
and a new Taiwan constitution would be written. Freezing the [Republic of
China] constitution also means keeping some kind of a link to the [old]
ROC constitution and not cutting if off completely. The preamble to a new
constitution could address the territory of Taiwan, but the relevant sections
of the old constitution defining the territory would not be touched, thus
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 557

avoiding a change to the status quo.‖ (Interview with Kathrin Hille,

―Taiwan Set for New Clash With Beijing,‖ Financial Times, November 1,
2006). Shortly before he became Chairman of the Mainland Affairs
Commission, Chen Ming-tong released such a draft constitution on March
18, 2007.
[211] State Department, question taken at the press briefing, February 9, 2007. On
February 8, President Chen Shui-bian supported DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-
kun‘s proposal to promote a ―name rectification‖ campaign, by renaming
three state-owned entities: China Petroleum Corporation to CPC
Corporation Taiwan; China Shipbuilding Corporation to CSBC Corporation
Taiwan; and Chunghwa Postal Company‖ to ―Taiwan Postal Company.‖
But people in Taiwan at the time did not voice major concern about the
changes in name.
[212] On February 20, 2007, Representative Tom Tancredo wrote a letter to
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to criticize her department‘s rebuke
of Chen over ―trivial things‖ and to question how changing the names of
local businesses would change Taiwan‘s status. On April 24, 2007, at a
hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John Warner said
to the Pacific Command‘s commander, Admiral Timothy Keating, that the
U.S. military is heavily engaged worldwide and that Taiwan should not play
the ―TRA card.‖
[213] State Department, daily press briefing, June 19, 2007. On June 18, President
Chen Shui-bian called for a referendum on whether to join the U.N. using
the name ―Taiwan‖ to be held at the time of the presidential election in
March 2008. Chen contended that Taiwan long participated in various
international gatherings using different designations. Representative Tom
Lantos, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, met with
Taiwan‘s Vice President Annette Lu during her transit in San Francisco on
July 2, 2007, and said in an interview that it is impractical for Taiwan to
seek membership in the U.N. and that neither the Bush Administration nor
Congress supported a referendum on Taiwan‘s membership in the U.N.
(Central News Agency, July 4, 2007). Later, Representative Tom
Tancredo wrote a letter on August 30, 2007, to Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice to criticize Deputy Secretary of State John
Negroponte‘s comments opposing the referendum as ―a step towards a
declaration of independence of Taiwan‖ (in interview by pro-PRC
Phoenix TV of Hong Kong on August 27, 2007). On September 6, PRC
ruler Hu Jintao told President Bush in Sydney, Australia, that the situation
in Taiwan entered a ―highly dangerous period.‖ Deputy Assistant Secretary
558 Shirley A. Kan

of State Thomas Christensen followed with a strongly-worded speech on

September 11, that stressed U.S. opposition to this referendum as ―an
apparent pursuit of name change.‖ On September 30, the DPP passed a
―Resolution on a Normal Country.‖ On December 6, Christensen criticized
the referendum as intended to pursue a ―unilateral change in the status quo.‖
On December 19, Representatives Tom Tancredo and Dana Rohrabacher
wrote a letter to Secretary of State Rice asking her department to ―cease its
repeated efforts to affect the outcome of the upcoming elections in Taiwan,
and specifically, the outcome of the planned referendum on membership in
the United Nations.‖ But at a press conference two days later, Rice attacked
the referendum as ―provocative.‖
[214] Departing from previous applications since 1993 to join the U.N. under
the formal name of Republic of China, President Chen Shui-bian wrote
letters in July 2007 to apply for membership for ―Taiwan.‖ At a press
conference at the White House on August 30, 2007, NSC official Dennis
Wilder said that ―membership in the United Nations requires statehood.
Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a state in the
international community.‖ The United States did not agree with Taiwan or
with the PRC, which claimed that U.N. Resolution 2758 of October 25,
1971, recognized Taiwan as a part of China. The PRC‘s interpretation was
used by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon of South Korea. In fact, that
resolution restored the legal rights of the PRC in the U.N. and expelled ―the
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek‖ but did not address the status of or
mention Taiwan. Three of the co-chairs of the House Taiwan Caucus
wrote to criticize Ban‘s ―diplomatic error‖ and to urge U.S. support for
―Taiwan‘s right to apply for a meaningful U.N. role‖ (Representatives Steve
Chabot, Shelley Berkley, and Dana Rohrabacher, ―Don‘t Abandon Taiwan,‖
Washington Times, September 17, 2007). While the State Department did
not speak at the General Assembly on Taiwan‘s application to join the
U.N., the U.S. Mission to the U.N. issued a statement on September 21,
2007.
[215] For Taiwan‘s second democratic turnover of power, the KMT‘s Ma Ying-
jeou won the presidential election on March 22, 2008, with a surprising,
solid margin of victory (by 17% points; 2.2 million votes), against DPP
candidate Frank Hsieh. Ma won 58.5% of the votes, while Hsieh won
41.5%. The KMT and DPP referendums on membership in the U.N., targets
of U.S. and PRC condemnation, failed to become valid after only 36% of
voters participated in both referendums (50% participation was required for
validity). On author‘s observation at the election, see CRS Report
 China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy 559

RL34441, Security Implications of Taiwan’s Presidential Election of

March 2008, by Shirley A. Kan.
[216] Responding to Ma Ying-jeou‘s overtures, Hu Jintao apparently authorized
potential cross-strait military negotiations that could include confidence
building measures (CBMs), a goal also raised in the CPC-KMT
statement of 2005.
[217] White House, ―Joint Press Statement by President Obama and President Hu
of China,‖ Beijing, November 17, 2009. The two leaders issued statements
rather than offer a news conference during their summit. President Obama
reiterated his commitment to the TRA and continuity in policy, but the day
before, he neglected to include the TRA as part of U.S. policy on Taiwan.
At a town hall in Shanghai on November 16, President Obama answered a
question on arms sales to Taiwan by saying that ―I have been clear in the
past that my administration fully supports a one China policy, as reflected in
the three joint communiqués that date back several decades, in terms of our
relations with Taiwan as well as our relations with the People‘s Republic of
China. We don‘t want to change that policy and that approach.‖
[218] White House, ―U.S.-China Joint Statement,‖ November 17, 2009, issued
during Obama‘s summit with Hu Jintao in Beijing as the first such joint
statement in 12 years. After that paragraph on Taiwan, a question arose
about whether the next one applied to Taiwan: ―The two countries reiterated
that the fundamental principle of respect for each other‘s sovereignty and
territorial integrity is at the core of the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques
which guide U.S.-China relations. Neither side supports any attempts by any
force to undermine this principle. The two sides agreed that respecting each
other‘s core interests [emphasis added] is extremely important to ensure
steady progress in U.S.-China relations.‖ However, AIT Chairman Ray
Burghardt clarified at a news conference in Taipei on November 24, 2009,
that in the negotiating history of the Joint Statement, only one paragraph
was relevant to Taiwan, while the next paragraph on ―core interests‖ was
negotiated to cover Tibet and Xinjiang. Burghardt also stated that the Joint
Statement should not be interpreted as putting pressure on Taiwan to
negotiate with the PRC. He concluded that the TRA remained ―the core
document that guides relations between the people of the United States and
Taiwan.‖
[219] President Ma‘s interview with CNN, published on May 1, 2010; author‘s
consultation, Taipei, June 2010. In addition, Ma reiterated this stance in an
attempt to assure visiting Senator Dianne Feinstein the next month.
560 Shirley A. Kan

[220] Defense Department, ―Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Shangri-La

Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic Studies,‖ Singapore, June 4,
2010. Contrary to U.S. policy, Gates repeated this ―opposition‖ to Taiwan‘s
independence in testimony at a hearing of the Senate Appropriations
Committee on June 16, 2010.
[221] Presidents Obama and Hu issued their second U.S.-PRC Joint Statement,
during Hu‘s state visit in Washington. While a joint statement would not
refer to the TRA, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a speech five
days prior that explicitly stated U.S. policy as guided by the three Joint
Communiqués as well as the TRA and added a call for China to reduce
military tension and deployments affecting Taiwan. President Obama cited
the TRA in his remarks at the joint press conference. On January 25, AIT
Chairman Ray Burghardt visited Taipei and discussed Hu‘s visit and the
Joint Statement with President Ma Ying-jeou. President Ma noted that U.S.
policy has been consistent with the TRA as well as the Six Assurances. In
his press conference, Burghardt also reaffirmed aspects of the Six
Assurances, assured that the United States was mindful of Taiwan, and
clarified that the United States did not agree to issue the statement if China
insisted on calling it another ―communique‖ or including ―core interests.‖ In
contrast to the Joint Statement of 2009, this Joint Statement did not repeat
a reference to China‘s ―core interests.‖ The Joint Statement of 2011 added a
new reference to the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA) of 2010, which was pushed by the ruling KMT and
President Ma but criticized by the opposition DPP. (PRC State Councilor
Dai Bingguo issued an article in December 2010 that re-affirmed China‘s
―core interests‖ as leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC);
sovereignty and territorial integrity; and economic and social development).
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