The Asia Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 22 | Issue 12 | Number 2 | Article ID 5875 | Dec.
28, 2024
Making Sense of South Korea’s Senseless Martial Law
Declaration
Benjamin A. Engel
Abstract: On 3 December 2024, South Korean President (the Gwangju Democracy Movement). On 17 May
Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law, the first time such an 1980, the Chun Doo Hwan-led military govern-
order had been given since the country democratized in ment declared martial law and between 18 and 27
1987. Koreans and international observers alike are puz- May violently repressed democracy protests in the
zled as to why Yoon would take such a drastic measure.
southwestern city of Gwangju. Park Chan-dae, floor
This article argues that competing visions of the history
of South Korea’s military dictatorship era, in which the
leader of the opposition Democratic Party, during
Korean right views the left as pro-North Korea and the his 14 December remarks before the vote on Yoon’s
left views the right as Japanese collaborators and an ob- impeachment, invoked Nobel Laurate Han Kang’s
stacle to democratization, contributed to an atmosphere novel Human Acts about the Gwangju Democracy
in which cooperation among the two major political Movement and declared that the memories of May
parties is near impossible. Within this setting, Yoon in 1980 had safely steered South Korea through De-
particular worked closely with New Right academics who cember 2024 (Kang 2024).
seek to justify previous military dictators and seemingly
became taken with contemporary far-right election fraud By now most are familiar with the course of events
conspiracies. As a result, Yoon came to see martial law as of that night: Yoon declared martial law at rough-
a legitimate means to advance his agenda.
ly 10:30 pm on 3 December; just after 1:00 am on
Keywords: South Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol, Martial law, New 4 December, the National Assembly unanimously
Right, Election fraud conspiracies passed a motion demanding the repeal of martial
law; and at roughly 4:30 am Yoon made a brief tele-
This article is part of an ongoing series providing vised statement saying the martial law order would
expert commentary on the evolving situation in be rescinded (Kim and Park 2024). At first glance
South Korean politics. Yoon’s martial law declaration seemed a clumsy at-
tempt at a self-coup, but as more details emerge it is
becoming clear that South Korea’s democracy barely
The Unthinkable Happened survived. Troops of South Korea’s Special Warfare
Command were deployed to the National Assem-
On 3 December 2024, South Korean President Yoon bly and told by Yoon himself to block the National
Suk Yeol did something most Koreans thought was Assembly vote to lift martial law. The Speaker of the
no longer possible: declared martial law. While National Assembly, Woo Won-shik, had to climb a
thankfully there was no bloodshed, many worried wall just to enter the building. Leaders of both major
that the outcome would be messy as South Kore- political parties, including Yoon’s own People Power
ans recalled other infamous dates in their history Party (PPP), were supposed to be arrested. Soldiers
such as 4.3 (Jeju Uprising), 5.16 (Park Chung Hee’s and police with weapons drawn confronted angry
military coup), 12.12 (Chun Doo Hwan’s military but unarmed citizens and staff of the National As-
insurrection), and, perhaps most pointedly, 5.18 sembly. Seemingly the self-restraint exercised by the
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military is the only thing that prevented Yoon from over test” of democratic consolidation when Kim
securing a wholesale take over. Dae Jung became the first opposition party candi-
date to win the presidency in 1997 and then power
Yet the brevity of martial law and its relative- was returned to the conservatives in 2007. And
ly peaceful passing does not mean the shock and Yoonkyung Lee (2017) was certainly not alone in
anxiety has subsided in South Korea. Nor does the thinking, or at least hoping, that the impeachment of
narrow margin by which impeachment passed on 14 Park Geun-hye in 2017 displayed “dramatic peo-
December (204 out of 300 members voted in favor; ple power” which would “undergird South Korean
a two-thirds majority is required) reflect the near democracy in the future and mark a departure from
universal disapproval of Yoon’s actions (85 percent previous politics.”
according to a poll released on 13 December) (Korea
Times 2024). In hindsight, there were warning signs. Political
scientists have lamented South Korea’s weak par-
Most people in South Korea on 3 December, in- ty system (Shin 2020) and deepening polarization
cluding myself, were completely shocked when our (Cheong and Haggard 2023). Aram Hur and Andrew
smartphones lit up with news alerts that the presi- Yeo (2024) argue that South Korea’s polarization is
dent had declared martial law. Why? What does this characterized by competing nationalisms embodied
mean for our futures? How could he do this? These in the conservative and progressive political parties,
questions, and a variety of derogatory epithets, were respectively, resulting in a competition to capture the
on the lips of many South Koreans as the events un- state by whatever means necessary and, consequent-
folded, save those who luckily slept through martial ly, a ceiling to democratic consolidation. The na-
law that night. Now that the immediate danger is tionalisms of the Korean left and right were defined
(hopefully) behind us, Korean friends, colleagues, during the Cold War era in which consecutive right-
and students have mostly been expressing a sense of wing authoritarians justified their rule in the name of
embarrassment. Several times I have heard various anti-communism whereas the Korean left challenged
versions of, “It’s 2024. How could this happen in the right by highlighting its legacy as collaborators
South Korea today? I’m so embarrassed.” Yet we with Japanese colonialism and role in perpetuating
are still left grappling with the questions of: why did the division of the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s
this happen, and what does it mean for the future of negotiated, elite-led democratization process in the
Korean democracy and politics? late 1980s resulted in a “conservative democracy”
with neither side’s nationalism being universally
Stage Set before Yoon Takes Office accepted (Choi 2012).
Almost no one in South Korea, not this author nor Time has certainly not tamed the mutual hostility be-
international observers of the country, saw martial tween the left and right in Korea. After the Asian Fi-
law coming. In August 2024, Democratic Party law- nancial Crisis of 1997 wrecked the Korean economy,
maker Kim Min-seok’s warning that a martial law a wave of authoritarian nostalgia known as the “Park
declaration was imminent was mostly pushed aside Chung Hee syndrome” washed through South Korea
as partisan banter (Yoon 2024). And for good reason. as older South Koreans remembered fondly the years
South Korea displayed, and arguably still displays, of rapid economic growth during Park’s develop-
many indicators of an established and consolidated mental dictatorship (Kang 2010). This syndrome
democracy. Since democratization in 1987, Freedom helped elevate Park’s daughter, Park Geun-hye, into
House (2024) has consistently ranked South Ko- the presidency in 2012. Simultaneously, an academic
rea among the “free” countries of the world. South and political movement known as the “New Right”
Korea passed the Huntington (1991: 266) “two-turn- emerged. New Right scholars sought to redefine
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South Korea’s contemporary history by portraying declaration (Kim N. 2024). However, this historical
authoritarians Park Chung Hee and Syngman Rhee context only set the stage; Yoon’s unique political
as the fathers of South Korea’s economic and politi- vulnerability combined with an apparent taste for
cal success rather than tyrants that were overthrown. right-wing conspiracy theories seem to be the imme-
Nuance was pushed aside for simplified clarity and diate catalysts.
choosing a “side.”
Yoon Suk Yeol and the Korean Far Right
To be certain, there were policy differences between
the left and right, particularly when it came to North Yoon Suk Yeol bested Lee Jae-myung in the 2022
Korea. But this Manichean view of history led the presidential election by a mere 247,000 votes. Fol-
two major parties to view the other as illegitimate lowing Yoon’s inauguration on 10 May 2022, his
and compromise became increasingly difficult. approval rating dipped below 50 percent in mid-June
During her presidency, Park Geun-hye sought to na- and then below 40 percent in mid-July and would
tionalize the writing of history textbooks to make the never recover. His approval rating has not topped 30
New Right and conservative perceptions of history percent since March 2024 (Gallup Korea 2024).
the official position (Choe 2015), a move seen by
the opposition Democratic Party as an attack against In short, Yoon has never had a strong mandate, but
their founding political narrative. Following Park’s you would not know it from his ruling style. Yoon
impeachment, Moon Jae-in adopted the phrase has been described by many as an obstinate political
“eradication of deep-rooted evils” (적폐청산) as a novice who is out of touch with the people (Park
campaign pledge. First used by Park Geun-hye in 2024). He was famously mocked by voters bringing
2014, the phrase originally connotated rooting out spring onions to polling stations during the 2024
corruption in South Korean society such as the loose general election, a nod to his clueless remark about
enforcement of regulations that led to the sinking of the price of groceries (Mackenzie 2024). Until he
the Sewol in April 2014. However, Moon’s contin- declared martial law, the most significant political
ued use of the phrase in conjunction with prosecu- battle was over his wife, Kim Keon Hee, who has
tion and imprisonment of both former presidents Lee been accused of plagiarizing her doctoral disserta-
Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye during his term led tion, stock manipulation, and accepting a bribe in
to the impression he was persecuting or seeking to the form of a Dior handbag. Yoon tried to stem the
“eradicate” the conservative party rather than part- criticism with an apology and lengthy press con-
ner with them as a legitimate opposition party. As ference in early November 2024, but to no avail.
a result, numerous analyses argued democracy was Yoon himself has claimed in his speeches regarding
deteriorating under Moon’s watch (Shin 2022; Shin martial law that he has been under constant political
and Kim 2022). attack from the opposition Democratic Party. Being
backed into a political corner does not justify de-
Seen with this long yardstick, Yoon’s declaration of claring martial law, but it does help us to understand
martial law was extreme, but not completely out of Yoon’s perspective.
character in South Korea’s contentious democracy.
In fact, it was not even the first time South Korea Still, why would Yoon make such a drastic de-
has had a brush with martial law since democra- cision? Yoon was not always seen as a far-right,
tization in 1987. During the final days of the Park authoritarian president. During his campaign for
Geun-hye administration, a plan for martial law was the presidency, Yoon emphasized “pragmatism”
drafted and it included similar points emphasized by and established a “Saesidae (New Era) Preparato-
Yoon during his plot such as preventing the Nation- ry Committee” (Noh 2021). Immediately after his
al Assembly from reaching a quorum to nullify the inauguration, Yoon took nearly all members of the
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ruling PPP to Gwangju to participate in a ceremony interest of the nation. Yoon seemingly drew upon
commemorating the May 18 Gwangju Democracy these arguments in his declaration justifying martial
Movement of 1980, a significant signal that Yoon law on 3 December:
was aiming to move beyond the authoritarian legacy
of the conservative party (Kim 2022). Yoon seemed Our National Assembly has become a den of crim-
to be signaling he wanted to build a new legacy for inals, paralyzing the nation’s judicial and adminis-
conservatives. He famously repeated his belief in trative systems through legislative dictatorship and
the universal values of liberal democracy and human planning for the overthrow of our liberal democra-
rights. But two and a half years later, Yoon had not cy…I declare martial law to protect the Republic of
only failed to move beyond the politics of the past Korea from the threats of North Korean communist
but had seemingly dragged Korea back to 1980. forces, to immediately eradicate the unscrupulous
pro-Pyongyang anti-state forces that pillage the
Despite these early signs Yoon would take the freedom and happiness of our people and to protect
conservative party in a new direction, there were the free constitutional order…[Martial law] is an in-
numerous counter signals that conservative politics evitable measure to guarantee the people’s freedom,
were still trapped in the past. In December 2022, safety and national sustainability against the actions
Yoon appointed Kim Kwang-dong to lead the Truth of anti-state forces seeking to overthrow the system.
and Reconciliation Commission, an independent (Chea 2024)
body that investigates human rights violations
associated with various periods of Korean modern Yoon was reaching back to the authoritarian tradition
history including the Japanese colonial era, Kore- of justifying his actions in the name of the greater
an War, and democratization movement. Kim is a good. The speech echoes closely that given on 17
New Right academic who participated in writing of May 1980 by Choi Kyu Ha, the acting president af-
the Park Geun-hye administration’s official histo- ter Park Chung Hee’s assassination who was quietly
ry textbook and has dabbled in history conspiracy controlled by Chun Doo Hwan after his military
theories such as North Korean involvement in the insurrection in December 1979:
May 18 Gwangju Democracy Movement (Engel
2023). In June 2023, Yoon appointed another New It is expected that armed agents of the North Korean
Right figure Kim Yung-ho to be his new Minister of communist group will continue to infiltrate our coun-
Unification (Lee 2023). Kim also moonlighted as a try for the purpose of creating social chaos in our
far-right YouTuber, a detail that has recently grown society to advance the goal of communizing South
in importance. Korea, and this danger is increasing day by day as
social unrest continues… Social unrest is growing
Yoon’s decision to draw upon New Right academics worse as leading politicians, who should be taking
to fill political posts was initially a curious oddi- the lead in restoring order are instead instigating
ty to those who monitored Korea’s history wars, social instability, and turning a blind eye to the
but in hindsight it was a harbinger of what was to government’s efforts to maintain order…As a result,
come. Borrowing ideas from modernization theory, the government was forced to take significant action
the core of the New Right argument is that author- to protect the country and the right of the survival
itarian rule was justified in that it produced South of the 37 million Korean citizens after considering
Korea’s rapid economic rise, laying the foundation the wishes of the majority of people. (Kyunghyang
for democratization, and also protected South Ko- Shinmun 1980)
rea from being consumed by the communist North
(Yang 2021). In other words, authoritarianism or Both speeches highlight how political groups in
authoritarian acts are justified if it is in the long-term South Korea opposing government policies or ac-
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tions are both a minority and associated with North But that has not stopped the Korean media and peo-
Korea, and that martial law is justified in the name ple from speculating that Yoon was swallowed by
of protecting the majority. Although it is difficult to the YouTube algorithm and became a binge watch-
know at this time, hopefully the ongoing investiga- er of far-right YouTube videos. “Producer’s Note”
tion into Yoon’s martial law declaration will reveal (PD수첩), an investigative journalism program on
more about whether Yoon was influenced into adopt- MBC, aired a review of Yoon’s relationship with
ing this position by advisors in his administration or far-right YouTube and the election fraud conspira-
if it was a belief he carried into the presidency. cy theories on 9 December. Yoon’s former head of
policy coordination during his presidential election
However, it is important to note that this de- campaign revealed a document from 29 December
cades-long ideological battle between Korea’s 2021 which showed Yoon and his advisors had been
left and right was not the only far-right influence concerned about electoral fraud in the 2020 general
weighing on Yoon during his decision to implement election since before Yoon took office. And a former
martial law. Understandably ignored amid the battle colleague of Yoon’s at the prosecutors’ office stated
over the National Assembly on 3–4 December was Yoon participated in far-right political protests and
the fact that troops had been deployed to the Nation- consumed large amounts of far-right YouTube con-
al Election Commission (NEC). Not only that, but tent (Kim S. 2024).
more troops in total were deployed to three NEC
buildings than to the National Assembly building to Whether or not Yoon came into the office a secret
stop the vote on martial law.1 consumer of right-wing media or was influenced by
it later is less important than the clear impact elec-
It was quickly revealed that troops had been ordered tion fraud conspiracies are having on South Korean
to the NEC by Yoon to secure evidence of election politics. Nor should we assume that these new right-
fraud in previous elections (Yang 2024). Far-right wing conspiracies will remain distinct from the New
accusations of election fraud have been stirring in Right and the old ideological battle described above.
South Korea since the 2020 general election, but In August 2024, a banner promoting the conspiracy
they had been limited to the fringes of the political theory that North Korea had been the force behind
world with sitting lawmakers refusing to dabble in the May 18 Gwangju Democracy Movement of 1980
conspiracy. Yoon had never publicly endorsed base- was reported to the police. This banner was hung by
less rumors of election fraud, but, in his televised a group led by former National Assembly lawmak-
30-minute speech on 12 December justifying his er Min Kyung-wook who has been a leader in the
martial law declaration, Yoon leaned into the con- election fraud conspiracy circles since 2020 (Kim
spiracy theory stating he had received evidence the Y. 2024). In other words, Yoon seems to be bridging
NEC was hacked by North Korea and was unable various facets of Korean far-right politics from the
to conduct a proper investigation due to the NEC’s academic movement of the New Right to far-right
independent nature (Choi 2024). election fraud conspiracy theories.
Where did Yoon get the idea that the NEC was Future of Korean Democracy
corrupt or that elections were fraudulent? Was it a
real concern based on intelligence? It’s impossible to The resistance to Yoon’s declaration of martial law
answer these questions definitively at the moment. on 3 December has reaffirmed the Korean people’s
1 Some have argued that the small number of troops deployed to the
passion for democracy. The few who rushed to the
National Assembly is evidence that Yoon never intended to subvert democracy National Assembly that night were reinforced by
and he was merely giving a “warning” to the country about the threat posed by
the opposition party to South Korea’s democracy and livelihood. I do not find
hundreds of thousands of protesters on 7 December
such arguments valid, however, given testimony that Yoon ordered the arrest of and 14 December when the votes on the impeach-
leading politicians and instructed military commanders to halt the vote.
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ment motion were held. I have no doubt that had Korea JoongAng Daily, 4 December. https://korea-
Yoon succeeded in stopping the National Assembly joongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-12-04/national/
from voting on 3 December that the people would politics/Transcript-President-Yoon-Suk-Yeols-
have forced an end to martial law in the following speech-to-declare-emergency-martial-law-/2191990.
days or weeks.
Cheong, Yeilim, and Stephan Haggard. 2023. “Polit-
But we should be careful not to declare a victory for ical Polarization in Korea.” Democratization 30, no.
people power as may have been done by too many 7: 1215–1239.
after Park Geun-hye’s impeachment. The forces and
institutions that led us to 12.3 remain in place. Ko- Choe, Sang-Hun. 2015. “South Korea to Issue State
rean politics are still polarized. YouTube algorithms History Textbooks, Rejecting Private Publishers.”
will continue to funnel viewers into echo chambers. New York Times, 12 October. https://www.nytimes.
And it is unclear if this will finally be the moment com/2015/10/13/world/asia/south-korea-to-is-
that the Korean Constitution is amended to weaken sue-state-history-textbooks-rejecting-private-pub-
the imperial presidency. lishers.html.
Is there hope for a better tomorrow? I think so. On Choi, He-suk. 2024. “Full Text of South Ko-
7 December, as the National Assembly held the rean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Address to the
first vote on impeachment which ultimately failed Nation on Thursday.” Korea Herald, 12 De-
to reach a quorum, PPP lawmaker Kim Sangwook, cember. https://news.koreaherald.com/view.
seemingly on the verge of tears, gave a passionate php?ud=20241212050073.
speech calling for his colleagues to vote on impeach-
ment to fulfill their duty to the people (YTN 2024). Choi, Jang-Jip. 2012. Democracy after Democratiza-
After Yoon had been impeached a week later, Kim tion: The Korean Experience. Stanford, CA: Walter
gave a damning indictment of his party: “Within H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.
the PPP there is a mix of rational conservatives and
far-right members who defend military dictatorship Engel, Benjamin A. 2023. “Reframing South Ko-
and the emergency martial law declaration and who rea’s History: Yoon’s Dance with the New Right.”
only seek opportunities to seize power.” He went KoreaPro, 18 August. https://koreapro.org/2023/08/
on to call for his party to embrace a political base of reframing-south-koreas-history-yoons-dance-with-
moderate “rational” conservatives rather than “vio- the-new-right/.
lent” extremists.
Freedom House. 2024. “Freedom in the World.”
Kim is only a single lawmaker, but his message is Accessed 16 December. https://freedomhouse.org/
a clear and powerful call for the main conservative report/freedom-world#Data.
party of Korea to finally sever its linkage with the
military dictators of a bygone era, just as the Korean Gallup Korea. 2024. “데일리 오피니언 제606호
people have done. If they do not, the “liberal democ- (2024년 12월 2주)” [Daily Opinion Number 606
racy” they claim to be defending will cease to exist. (Week 2 of December 2024). 12 December. https://
www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seq-
No=1525.
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About the Author
Park, Chan-kyong. 2024. “He Won’t Budge an
Inch’: South Korea’s Humbled yet Defiant Yoon Benjamin A. Engel is a Visiting Professor at Dan-
Ploughs on Despite Electoral Drubbing.” South kook University. He received his Ph.D. in Interna-
China Morning Post, 16 April. https://www.scmp. tional Studies from the Graduate School of Interna-
com/week-asia/politics/article/3259163/he-wont- tional Studies, Seoul National University. His recent
budge-inch-south-koreas-humbled-yet-defiant-yoon- academic publications include “Koreagate Revis-
ploughs-despite-electoral-drubbing. ited: ROK Government Lobbying on the Human
Rights Issue” in Cold War History and “Aiding and
Shin, Gi-wook. 2022. “In Troubled Waters: Abetting: Role of Foreign Missionaries in the South
South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis.” Walter H. Korean Democracy Movement” in Korea Observer.
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 3 May. Originally from the United States, he has been living
https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/news/troubled-wa- and researching in South Korea since 2010.
ters-south-korea%E2%80%99s-democracy-crisis.
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