J.

Paul Peter

Realism or Relativism for

Marketing Theory and Research:
A Comment on Hunt's "Sclentlfic
Realism"
Hunt's 1990 interpretation of scientific realism is compared with the relativistic/constructionist view pre-
viously introduced in this journal. Though some similarities are found, the two views differ most strikingly
in terms of the nature of reality, the nature of truth, and the value of the concept of incommensurability.
Several implications are offered for marketing scientists about what difference it makes which view they
accept. However, the author concludes that philosophically oriented marketing theorists need to further
demonstrate the value of their work for practicing marketing scientists.

On the level of empirical investigation-and concen- sophical positions in marketing theory, several simi-
trating on the practice of investigators rather than the larities can be found between scientific realism and
theoretical commentary they may provide-there is
the relativistic views. For example, scientific realism
more evidence to be cited for relativism than against
it. rejects logical positivism, logical empiricism, and fal-
sification as acceptable philosophies for marketing
-Barnes and Bloor (989) theory and research (Hunt 1990, p. 11). Relativists in

S
marketing have long rejected those philosophies. Sci-
CIENTIFIC realism recently was presented in this
entific realism argues that "there is no grand theory
journal as an appropriate philosophy of science
to guide marketing theory and research (Hunt 1990). of science" (Hunt 1990, p. 8). Relativists have long
That view rejects all forms of relativism, including argued that there is no single method or approach to
those proposed in marketing, which include critical science.
relativism (e.g., Anderson 1983, 1986) and the rela- However, several points of divergence also can be
tivistic/constructionist perspective (e.g., Peter and noted between scientific realism and the relativistic
Olson 1983, 1989). Scientific realism argues that truth views. The two philosophies diverge on the nature of
is the appropriate goal for marketing theory and re- reality, the nature of truth, and the value of the con-
search and that science can come to know the real cept of incommensurability. Those issues are critical
world, though not with certainty. for marketing theory and research, as for any field
For scholars seeking a reconciliation of philo- that seeks to develop knowledge.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate scientific
realism's position on those issues and to compare it
J. Paul Peter is James R. McManus-Bascom Professor in Marketing at with' the relativistic/constructionist view. Such a
the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author thanks Gil Churchill, comparison enables marketing theorists and research-
Peter Dacin, Chris Moorman, and Dan Smith as well as the JM editor ers to judge better which approach to science makes
and anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and suggestions.
more sense to them and which offers a better guide

Journal of Marketing
72 / Journal of Marketing, April 1992 Vol. 56 (April 19921, 72-79
for their work. In addition, such a comparison may Surely such a view of science seems plausible and
help determine what future work needs to be done in inviting. Science is viewed as being capable of judg-
the area. ing knowledge claims and ruling on whether or not
they conform to the real world. If science could be
conducted that way, many relativists would likely be
Views on the Nature of Reality converted to accepting scientific realism.
However, there is a problem with this view that
The major difference between scientific realism and reduces its apparent value-unless science can know
the relativistic/constructionist view is in the nature of with certainty what truly is the real world, it is im-
scientific reality. Realism views science as being ca- possible to judge the extent to which knowledge claims
pable of knowing reality, though not with certainty. truly represent or correspond to that world. In other
The relativistic perspective views science as con- words, without independent knowledge of a standard
structing various views of reality. (i.e., what reality truly is), how can scientists know
how close they are to reaching the standard? It is like
Realist View of Reality
arguing that a football team can know that it is 10
Scientific realism is based on four propositions; three yards from scoring a touchdown without knowing where
are investigated here and the fourth is examined in a the goal line is. This is the fallacy of realism, that the
subsequent section. The first three are: "(1) the world extent to which knowledge claims truly represent real-
exists independently of its being perceived (classical ity can be known without knowing what reality truly
realism), (2) the job of science is to develop genuine is.
knowledge about that world, even though such knowl- The relativistic / constructionist view avoids this
edge will never be known with certainty (fallibilistic fallacy by recognizing that standards for accepting
realism), and (3) all knowledge claims must be crit- knowledge are developed by the scientific commu-
ically evaluated and tested to determine the extent to nity. For example, in many areas of marketing, the
which they do, or do not, truly represent or corre- primary empirical hurdle for a theory is that tests of
spond to that world (critical realism)" (Hunt 1990, its hypotheses must produce statistically significant
p.9). effects. Though there are good reasons why that stan-
Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the realist dard is weak (see Sawyer and Peter 1983), many stud-
view of science. Basically, scientists through their ies published in marketing use it.
processes of evaluation and testing produce genuine A second problem with the realist view may be
knowledge about the world. Those knowledge claims more evident in Figure I-nothing in scientific real-
cannot be known with certainty and are fallible, but ism indicates the processes by which theories are con-
apparently, according to Hunt's third proposition, the structed or created. No account is offered for where
extent to which they truly do or do not represent or the theories come from that scientists test and evalu-
correspond to the world can be determined. ate. In some ways, this is a retreat to logical empir-
icism's insistence that philosophy of science address
only the justification of knowledge claims and avoid
the difficult issues involved in explaining how theo-
ries are created. Because an adequate philosophy of
FIGURE 1
Scientific Realism's View of Reality science for marketing should include an account of
not only the processes involved in testing and evalu-
ating theories but also the creation and diffusion of
...- - - - -....-_ ...I External World I theories in scientific communities, scientific realism
is at best incomplete.
It has been argued previously in marketing that
"science creates many realities" (Peter and Olson 1983,
p. 119), a position rejected by scientific realism (Hunt
1990, p. 2). An explanation of that statement follows
I Scientific Evaluation and Testing
I so that readers can judge which view of reality makes
more sense.
Relativistic View of Reality
" The relativistic/constructionist position on the nature
I
I
Genuine Knowledge
I of reality is depicted in Figure 2. Unlike scientific re-
alism's interpretation of relativism, the relativistic view
has no problem with the possibility of an external world

Realism or Relativism / 73
 FIGURE 2 bear on a particular research problem. This level may
Relativistic/Constructionist View of Reality or may not be totally consistent with the general
worldview as it may contain special language, math-
ematical analyses, and arguments not commonly em-
Uninterpreted Reality
I ployed in everyday experience. Some researchers are
knowledgeable of multiple research paradigms and may
1~ apply them at different times to different problems in
fruitful ways. However, it is more likely that re-
Scientist's Worldview searchers have a favored paradigm, possibly from
training in their formal introduction to a field, that
dominates the perspective taken and the tools used in
Research Paradigm
research. For example, various types of psycholo-

~ Mental Interpretation
of Reality I gists, such as cognitivists, behaviorists, and environ-
mentalists, may believe in different theories and use
different methods in their research. Similarly, in mar-
keting, mathematical modelers, experimentalists, sur-
vey researchers, and interpretivists commonly take
different approaches to construct and investigate their
views of reality.
,~ The process of constructing a theory or interpre-
tation of reality may involve many events. The sci-
Public Construction entist may observe and interpret phenomena, read and
of Reality interpret a variety of other scientists' views, discuss
the issues with others, construct and examine data,
and invent new words or symbols to describe her or
his ideas. Eventually, conclusions may be drawn about
how she or he thinks the phenomena work. As shown
that is independent of the scientist. However, the dif- in Figure 2, the interpretation is encapsulated in the
ference in the relativistic perspective is that no inter- scientist's worldview and research paradigm, which
pretation of that world can be made independently of limit the interpretation to a particular perspective. At
human sensations, perceptions, information process- this stage, it is a private, mental interpretation of real-
ing, feelings, and actions. No meaningful interpreta- ity.
tion of that world can be made that does not involve Mental interpretations are made public in science
some form of human processing, typically in the form by their transformation into written papers and oral
of symbols. Those symbols usually involve language presentations. For other scientists, including editors
and reviewers, to share an interpretation of reality,
and mathematics, two examples of useful construc-
they must go through the processes involved in com-
tions of the human species.
prehending words and meanings in the arguments, de-
An adequate philosophy of science must not only
veloping an understanding of the interpretation of
recognize that human sensations and perceptions are
reality, and deciding whether they believe in it or not.
part of science, but also account for their role in the
Many problems complicate these processes. For ex-
development of scientific knowledge. Hunt's inter-
ample, scientists may infer meanings other than those
pretation of scientific realism fails to do so. However,
intended by the proposer of the theory. Differences in
the relativistic view accounts for those factors at sev- denotative and connotative meanings for terms may
eral levels. lead to misinterpretation. There may be differences in
One level of analysis involves the individual sci- beliefs about whether the empirical evidence supports
entist's general worldview. This level includes all of the theory or is the result of other factors.
the scientist's previous experiences, training, beliefs A critical part of the evaluation involves whether
about the world, knowledge of language and mean- or not the theory is consistent with other scientists'
ings, and skills. The consistency of a proposed theory worldviews and research paradigms and their personal
with a scientist's everyday view of the world can pro- interpretations of the phenomena. In addition, other
vide one type of "good reason" for believing in it. scientists may be influenced by the putative insights
A next level may include a research paradigm or in the theory, the apparent rigor of the supporting re-
scientific view of the world that a person brings to search, the cleverness of the research design, or the

74/ Journal of Marketing, April 1992

clarity of the written report. They also may be influ- there is no pure observational language, that data are
enced by psychological and social factors in forming theory-laden, and that "data never speak for them-
their beliefs about the theory. For example, they may selves" (Peter and Olson 1983, p. 122). Hence, em-
be influenced by the professional status and affiliation pirical data are not independent criteria for judging the
of the proposer of the theory, the perceived quality of closeness of a theory to reality because they are en-
the journal in which it is published, comments about tirely dependent on theory for their meaning and inter-
the theory from respected colleagues, and the sheer pretation. Without a theory that describes, among other
number of other researchers who accept the theory and things, what concepts are putatively measured, em-
begin to study it in their research. pirical data are merely numbers.
A construction of reality is not equivalent to un- Human constructions in the form of language,
interpreted reality. The reason is that the meanings mathematics, and other symbols are the "reality" sci-
given to phenomena are humanly constructed and entists analyze, evaluate, debate, and compare with
bounded by cultural, historical, and theoretical limi- their own beliefs. As stated previously, these con-
tations. Some such meanings are well engrained in a structions of reality are in no sense equivalent to un-
society and are easily shared, such as labels put on interpreted reality nor is there any method to evaluate
particular objects (e.g., apples, chairs, etc.). How- whether they truly capture uninterpreted reality.
ever, there are clearly differences in the naming and When scientists share an understanding and beliefs
meaning of even simple objects across languages and about a given interpretation, consensus emerges.
cultures. The meanings of more complicated terms, However, it is common in science to have more than
such as "attitude," "brand loyalty," or "brand eq- one interpretation of various aspects of uninterpreted
uity," differ across theories and research paradigms, reality. Each of the views is a construction, a set of
even within the same culture and language. The rec- words and perhaps numbers (data) that scientists have
ognition that meanings are socially and culturally de- created. To the degree that the theories compete for
termined does not equate relativism with nihilism, so- belief by a scientific community and account for phe-
lipsism, or incoherence as charged by Hunt. nomena in different ways, they are alternative con-
An important point of this discussion is that even structions of reality. This point is what is meant by
for simple objects, the labels placed on them and the the statement that "science creates many realities" (Peter
meanings given to them are human constructions in and Olson 1983, p. 119). Even at a philosophical level,
the form of language, mathematics, or other symbols; the reason why there are so many alternative views of
they are not the objects themselves. However, con- science, including many types of realism and relativ-
cepts are easily confused with the phenomena they are ism, is that different writers interpret and describe it
intended to represent. For example, Hunt (p. 10) ar- in different ways ..
gues that the history of Newtonian mechanics gives
us reason to believe that something like apples, trees,
planets, and stars actually exist. However, though the
Views of the Nature of Truth
words are useful for communication in English-speak- There are several different but related meanings for
ing cultures, they are concepts whose meaning de- the term "truth" in scientific realism. Two suggested
pends on theory. For example, the meanings and dif- by Hunt are described and evaluated here to determine
ferences between the concepts of "star" and "planet" whether "truth" is the appropriate goal for marketing
depend on one theory; the meanings and differences theory and research. A relativistic view of truth then
between "star" and "cash cow" depend on another. is explained.
In sum, there is no theory-independent way to know
Realist Views of Truth
what an object is or, indeed, whether it is an object.
Similarly, empirical data are not equivalent to un- The first meaning is that a theory is true if it accu-
interpreted reality. Empirical data are constructed by rately represents reality. For example, Hunt states (p.
scientists through processes such as measurement and 12):
sampling; they are not the phenomena themselves. In conclusion, with respect to truth and scientific re-
Measures cannot be constructed meaningfully unless alism, the perspective of Siegel (1983, p. 82) seems
one has at least an implicit theory of what is to be a fair summary statement: "To claim that a scientific
measured, that is, an interpretation to guide measure proposition is true is not to claim that it is certain;
rather, it is to claim that the world is as the propo-
development. The meaning of data derived from mea- sition says it is."
sures also depends entirely on the interpretations sci-
entists give to them concerning what was measured, Surely, "to claim that the world is as the propo-
how well, and from what theoretical perspective. This sition says it is" appears to suggest that the world is
point is what is meant when philosophers state that unequivocally or certainly as the proposition says it

Realism or Relativism / 75
is. The quotation sounds as though the second part of of belief held in a particular context. To state that a
the statement is not a refutation of the first but a state- proposition is true is to state a subjective belief that
ment of agreement with it. In other words, literally one holds about the proposition. The idea that truth
interpreted, this is a statement of complete knowledge can be determined universally and independently of
about the world rather than uncertain knowledge about human constructions and beliefs about uninterpreted
it. reality is viewed as impossible. In sum, "Truth is a
Even if one grants that the statement means truth subjective evaluation that cannot be properly inferred
is uncertain, it is difficult for relativists to accept that outside the context provided by the theory" (Peter and
meaning of truth. The reason is that it is based on the Olson 1983, p. 119).
assumption that science can judge the extent to which Overall, then, there seems to be no reason why
theories correspond to the real world without knowing taking a relativistic view of reality or truth makes the
independently what the real world is-that is, this view success of science over the last 400 years "totally in-
of truth suffers from the fallacy of realism. explicable" or a "miracle" as argued by scientific
A second definition of truth in scientific realism realists (Hunt 1990, p. 3, 9). Rather, it is the useful-
is different, but related to the first (Hunt 1990, p. 9): ness of the theories that accounts for the success of
McMullin (1984, p. 26) succinctly states the fourth science over the last 400 years. Because a theory is
and final tenet: "The basic claim made by scientific believed to be useful, however, does not prove that it
realism . . . is that the long term success of a sci-
entific theory gives reason to believe that something
is true in the sense that it captures reality.
like the entities and structure postulated by the theory
actually exists" [emphasis added].
Hunt restates it in terms of marketing (p. 11): The Incommensurability Issue
Applied to marketing and social science, scientific Incommensurability is the idea that the choices be-
realism maintains that, to the extent that there are tween competing paradigms are not made purely on
theories that have long-run success in explaining the basis of formal logic and empirical data. Rather,
phenomena, predicting phenomena, or assisting in the other factors such as the training and experiences of
solution of pragmatic problems in society, we are
warranted in believing that something like the pos- researchers, their beliefs about the world, the persua-
tulated entities and their structure of relationships ex- siveness of those arguing for the various theories, the
ists, that is, they truly represent or correspond to real- status and number of other scientists who believe a
ity external to the theorist [emphasis added]. theory, and a variety of other psychological and social
Here the argument is that to the extent that a the- factors are needed to explain why research commu-
ory has "long-term success" in explaining and pre- nities accept different paradigms. Scientific realism
dicting phenomena and solving pragmatic problems, rejects incommensurability as "incoherent" and "re-
we are warranted in believing that "something like" lativistic" (Hunt 1990, p. 4, 5). Several reasons can
the postulated entities truly exist and that the theory be offered for why relativists value the concept of in-
is true. However, if a theory is successful in predic- commensurability, three of which are historical evi-
tion, explanation, and solving practical problems, the dence, the philosophers' fallacy, and practical value.
proper inference seems to be that the theory is useful,
not that it is true or that the entities contained in the Historical Evidence for Incommensurability
theory truly exist. The fact that a theory, such as
The history of science indicates that there are occa-
Newtonian physics, works well does not make it true;
sions when researchers shift beliefs from one view to
it makes it useful. The relativistic view of science has
another for reasons other than formal logic and em-
argued consistently that several different types of use-
fulness are more appropriate goals for marketing than pirical data (e.g., see Kuhn 1962, 1970). Though many
truth (e.g., Olson 1982; Peter 1991; Peter and Olson philosophers disagree with Kuhn's views, others, as
1983, 1989). The standards for what type of useful- well as many historians, sociologists, and psycholo-
ness is judged important are set by the scientific com- gists of science, find the idea useful for describing
munity. For example, some academic researchers be- changes in scientific beliefs. However, this relativistic
lieve their work should be useful for helping marketing view recognizes that multiple paradigms can coexist
managers develop successful strategies, whereas oth- in a field because one paradigm does not necessarily
ers seek knowledge of marketing phenomena for its replace another. The reason is that there are multiple
own sake. constructions of uninterpreted reality that different
scientists find useful for describing events, predicting
Relativistic View of Truth events, and solving problems. Anderson (1986) pro-
From the relativistic perspective, truth is a construc- vides several examples of incommensurable para-
tion, a concept designed to refer to a particular type digms in marketing and consumer research.

76 / Journal of Marketing, April 1992

The Philosophers' Fallacy Applied to haviorism represent different paradigms. In general,
Incommensurability cognitive theories view behavior as being controlled
by internal cognitive and affective states and pro-
A second reason for belief in the value of the concept
cesses. Behavior theories view behavior as being con-
of incommensurability results from the philosophers'
trolled by the environment. Though both perspectives
fallacy. As Hunt (1990, p. 7) notes, "Basically, the
can be valuable when applied to particular marketing
philosophers' fallacy is to take a perfectly good term
problems, they are, in a word, incommensurable be-
... and subject it to such 'high redefinition' that the
cause both try to explain behavior, but in much dif-
term no longer can be applied to anything." Surely,
ferent ways. I Similarly, realism and relativism are in-
if any concept in philosophy of science has been the
commensurable in that they both try to explain science,
subject of the philosophers' fallacy it is incommen-
but do so in much different ways.
surability. Why would some philosophers of science
be so threatened by a concept and subject it to such
ridicule that even Kuhn at one time retreated from it Conclusions and Implications
to a "neo-positivistic view" (Suppe 1977, p. 647)?
One likely reason for such concern about incom- Comparison of scientific realism and a relativistic view
mensurability is the impact that acceptance of the con- of science shows that both perspectives reject logical
cept could have on philosophy of science. Note that positivism, logical empiricism, and falsification as ac-
philosophy of science was considered to be at a "crisis ceptable philosophies of science for marketing. The
state" during the period in which Kuhn's work was two perspectives agree that no single approach to sci-
being debated. The proceedings from a conference held ence guarantees scientific progress. Both perspectives
in 1969 portraying the chaos in philosophy of science also view the long-term success of theories as an im-
is the major contribution of Suppe (1977). At that time, portant criterion for judging them. However, scien-
the "received view" had been rejected and philoso- tific realism considers long-term success as a measure
phers were searching for and evaluating other alter- of truth and contact with reality, whereas the relativ-
natives. istic perspective views it as one type of usefulness.
The major problem with accepting the idea of in- The major disagreements between the two views
commensurability for some philosophers of science, pertain to the nature of reality, the nature of truth, and
then and now, is that such acceptance drastically re- the value of the concept of incommensurability. Sci-
duces the importance of philosophy of science in so- entific realism suggests that the extent to which
ciety as well as that field's ability to attain its objec- knowledge claims truly correspond to the real world
tives. The reason is that accepting incommensurability can be determined, though not with certainty. The re-
requires philosophers to admit that other factors, such lativistic view suggests that science can create useful
as sociological and psychological processes, are needed theories or interpretations of reality, but has no in-
to give a complete account of the development and dependent method for evaluating the closeness of the-
meaning of scientific theories and the growth of sci- ories to reality. Scientific realism argues that truth is
entific knowledge. an appropriate goal for marketing science, though ab-
The methods of philosophy of science are not fully solute truth is unattainable. Relativists argue for the
adequate for analyzing factors such as the sociological attainable goals of various forms of usefulness as de-
processes by which scientists create consensus about termined by the scientific community. Scientific re-
knowledge and the psychological processes by which alism rejects incommensurability whereas the relativ-
scientists form beliefs about knowledge. Acceptance istic view accepts it as a useful concept.
of incommensurability by philosophers would leave Overall, considerable progress has been made in
their field with, at best, incomplete accounts of sci- the development and updating of marketing's views
ence, such as scientific realism. Their way out of that of science since the "early" crisis literature. Instead
dilemma is to label incommensurability as "incoher- of debating long-abandoned views of science, mar-
ent" and any reasons for accepting a theory, other than keting scholars are now concerned with more current
formal logic and empirical data, as "irrational." views and creating new views of science. In addition,
by challenging traditional views of science, the early
Practical Value of Incommensurability crisis literature helped establish a valuable interpretive
research tradition in marketing and consumer behav-
A third reason for the acceptance of incommensura- ior. The debate over views of science has been a healthy
bility is a practical one-the concept encourages de- one for marketing in that it has forced marketing the-
velopment of multiple views and affords researchers
the freedom to use information from a variety of par-
'The discussion here involves behaviorism as a technology rather
adigms rather than to have to judge one as true and than as a philosophy of science. For further discussion, see Peter and
the rest as false. For example, cognitivism and be- Olson (1990).

Realism or Relativism / 77
orists to think carefully about what they believe and phasis on traditional empirical research. Rather, mar-
why they do so. keting scholars should invest more of their time and
Given the difference in basic assumptions about effort in the creation and development of new, useful
the nature of reality, scientific realism and relativism theories for the field. Work by Wicker (1985) and
are unlikely ever to be fully integrated. Holders of Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heffring (1982) provides
both views have good reasons for believing what they useful ideas on creating new theories and concepts.
do, and support for aspects of both views can be found The emphasis of scientific realism on seeking truth
in the science studies literature. There are simply hon- may also account for why many academic marketing
est differences in beliefs about science and about which researchers place such heavy emphasis on doing basic
approach offers greater promise for the development theory-testing research that seeks general truths. In fact,
of marketing knowledge. scientific realism may be attractive to many marketing
Integration of philosophical views is not the most researchers because it supports and reinforces current
critical task facing marketing theorists, however. research practices and prejudices rather than encour-
Rather, philosophically oriented marketing theorists aging change in the field.
now need to focus greater attention on what insights The relativistic view recognizes that basic research
their views offer for the construction and evaluation can be useful in influencing the beliefs of a research
of marketing theories and what implications they have community. However, because this view does not
for developing a more useful marketing science. support the idea that basic research can produce uni-
For instance, Hunt (1990, p. 13) argues that many versal truth (truth as correspondence to reality), it ar-
gues for academic marketing researchers to place greater
marketing researchers already have accepted scientific
emphasis on finding useful solutions to specific prob-
realism. Perhaps that explains why marketing re-
lems. Even a partial, tentative solution to problems
searchers place such heavy emphasis on empirically
such as the distribution of food to starving Third World
testing extant theories, often theories borrowed from people, the delivery of a reasonable standard of living
other fields. Scientific realism encourages such be- to the poor and homeless, the misuse of drugs, and
havior because it offers no guidance on theory crea- the spread of AIDS could far outweigh a consensus
tion for marketing researchers and leads researchers solution to many of the basic research issues currently
to believe that empirical research can truly determine examined in the field that seek generalizations.
reality. However, if that were the case, we would ex- The preceding ideas are but a few of the ones rel-
pect marketing research to have produced a number evant to what difference it could make which philo-
of strong empirical generalizations, something it has sophical approach marketing scholars accept. Greater
failed to do. attention by scientific realists and relativists to the im-
Because empirical testing cannot determine truth plications of their views for practicing scientists would
as correspondence to reality, the relativistic view ar- greatly enhance the value of their work for the field
gues that marketing scholars should place less em- of marketing.

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Marketing Channels" (O'Callaghan, Kaufmann, & Konsynski)
"Servicescapes: The Impact of Physical Surroundings on Customers and 57 JM562104
Employees" (Bitner)
"Realism or Relativism for Marketing Theory and Research: A Comment on Hunt's 72 JM562105
"Scientific Realism" , (Peter)
''Truth in Marketing Theory and Research: An Alternative Perspective" (Zinkhan & 80 JM5621 06
Hirschheim)
"For Reason and Realism in Marketing" (Hunt) 89 JM562107
legal Developments in Marketing 103 JM562108
Marketing Uterature Review 110 JM562109
Book Reviews 125 JM562110

To order REPRINTS, contact the American Marketing Association Publications

Group, 250 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL 60606. Prices for reprints may be
found on page 17 of this issue.

Realism or Relativism / 79