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PREFACE

This Seventh Edition of Doing Ethics contains new and substantially revised chapters, new
readings, updates, and a framework for making moral decisions. The aims that have shaped this
text from the beginning have not changed: to help students (1) see why ethics matters to society
and to themselves; (2) understand core concepts (theories, principles, values, virtues, and the
like); (3) become familiar with the background (scientific, legal, and otherwise) of contemporary
moral problems; and (4) know how to apply critical reasoning to those problems—to assess
moral judgments and principles, construct and evaluate moral arguments, and apply and critique
moral theories. This book, then, tries hard to provide the strongest possible support to teachers of
applied ethics who want students, above all, to think for themselves and competently do what is
often required of morally mature persons—that is, to do ethics .

These goals are reflected in the book’s extensive introductions to concepts, cases, and issues; its
large collection of readings and exercises; and its chapter-by-chapter coverage of moral
reasoning—perhaps the most thorough introduction to these skills available in an applied ethics
text. This latter theme gets systematic treatment in five chapters, threads prominently throughout
all the others, and is reinforced everywhere by “Critical Thought” boxes prompting students to
apply critical thinking to real debates and cases. The point of all this is to help students not just
study ethics but also to become fully involved in the ethical enterprise and the moral life.

NEW FEATURES
A new chapter, A Framework for Moral Decision-Making ( Chapter 9 ), introduces the
author’s principlism , a theory based on prima facie moral principles, and shows how to
apply those principles to decide on morally right actions and resolve moral dilemmas.
A new chapter, Pandemic Ethics ( Chapter 13 ), covers the moral challenges of dealing
with the threats posed by pandemics. Topics include (1) medical triage—the sorting and
allocating of medical resources to patients when the resources are scarce; (2) remedying
inequalities in health care for racial and ethnic minorities; (3) the refusal of some to
vaccinate or wear a mask; and (4) widespread pandemic-related misinformation.
An extensively revised chapter, Climate Change ( Chapter 14 ), examines the just
distribution of the burdens and benefits of living with, trying to mitigate, and adapting to the
dire effects of global warming. It asks what our moral responsibilities are to people living
now and to future generations who will be affected by what we do.
A substantially revised chapter, Sexual Assault and Harassment ( Chapter 16 ), probes the
causes and prevalence of sexual assault on college campuses, examines whether and how

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 justice is served after an assault occurs, and dismantles moral arguments based on popular
sexual assault myths. The chapter explores the two types of sexual harassment (quid pro
quo and hostile work environment) and explains why every moral theory condemns both.
A new appendix on the ethical questions raised by artificial intelligence.
Five new readings supplement the already extensive collection of essays (including an
interview with the philosopher Bonnie Steinbock on abortion and the Supreme Court’s
Dobbs decision).
Several new boxes examine a range of topics: “Self-Evidence”; “Fighting Viral
Falsehoods”; “Is It Too Late to Do Anything about Climate Change?”; “Are Lots of Young
Men Being Falsely Accused of Sexual Violence?”; and “How to Deal with Sexual
Harassment.”
•New readings bring the total number of essays by women writers to eighteen.

ORGANIZATION
Part 1 (Fundamentals) prepares students for the tasks enumerated above. Chapter 1 explains why
ethics is important and why thinking critically about ethical issues is essential to the examined
life. It introduces the field of moral philosophy, defines and illustrates basic terminology,
clarifies the connection between religion and morality, and explains why moral reasoning is
crucial to moral maturity and personal freedom. Chapter 2 investigates a favorite doctrine of
undergraduates—ethical relativism—and examines its distant cousin, emotivism.

Part 2 (Moral Reasoning) consists of Chapters 3 and 4 . Chapter 3 starts by reassuring students
that moral reasoning is neither alien nor difficult but is simply ordinary critical reasoning applied
to ethics. They’ve seen this kind of reasoning before and done it before. Thus, the chapter
focuses on identifying, devising, diagramming, and evaluating moral arguments and encourages
practice and competence in finding implied premises, testing moral premises, assessing
nonmoral premises, and dealing with common argument fallacies.

Chapter 4 explains how moral theories work and how they relate to other important elements in
moral experience: considered judgments, moral arguments, moral principles and rules, and cases
and issues. It reviews major theories and shows how students can evaluate them using plausible
criteria.

Part 3 (Theories of Morality, Chapters 5–9 ) covers key theories in depth—utilitarianism, ethical
egoism, social contract theory, Kant’s theory, natural law theory, virtue ethics, feminist ethics,
the ethics of care, and principlism. Students see how each theory is applied to moral issues and
how its strengths and weaknesses are revealed by applying the criteria of evaluation.

In Part 4 (Ethical Issues), each of thirteen chapters explores a timely moral issue through
discussion and relevant readings: abortion; euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; health
care; pandemic ethics; climate change; racism, equality, and discrimination; sexual assault and
harassment; tolerance, civility, and free speech; drug use, gun ownership, and personal liberty;
capital punishment; war, terrorism, and torture; immigration; and global economic justice. Every
chapter supplies legal, scientific, and other background information on the issue; discusses how
major theories have been applied to the problem; examines arguments that have been used in the

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debate; and includes additional cases for analysis with questions. The readings are a mix of well-
known essays and surprising new voices, both classic and contemporary.

PEDAGOGICAL
In addition to the “Critical Thought” boxes, “Ethical Dilemmas,” end-of-chapter questions, and
key terms, there are other pedagogical devices:

“Quick Review” boxes that reiterate key points or terms mentioned in previous pages
Topical boxes that discuss additional issues or topics related to the main material of the
chapter
Chapter summaries
Suggestions for further reading for each of the “issues” chapters
A glossary

RESOURCES
The Seventh Edition of Doing Ethics is accompanied by InQuizitive, Norton’s easy-to-use,
adaptive learning tool. Through a variety of question types and answer-specific feedback,
students are motivated to learn core concepts. With an in-depth activity for each chapter,
InQuizitive sharpens students’ understanding of moral reasoning fundamentals and prepares
them to debate and discuss the ethical issues covered in Part 4 of the book. New questions focus
on the chapters’ updated and expanded coverage of recent real-world developments that matter to
today’s students. What’s more, LMS integration allows InQuizitive scores to report directly to
the LMS gradebook. The text is also supported by lecture slides and a test bank for each chapter.
Norton Testmaker allows instructors to easily export tests or quizzes to Microsoft Word or
Common Cartridge files for their LMS.

EBOOK
Norton Ebooks give students and instructors an enhanced reading experience at a fraction of the
cost of a print textbook. Students are able to have an active reading experience and can take
notes, bookmark, search, highlight, and even read offline. As an instructor, you can even add
your own notes for your students to see as they read the text. Norton Ebooks can be viewed on—
and synced among—all computers and mobile devices. Access the ebook for Doing Ethics at
digital.wwnorton.com/doingethics7 .

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The silent partners in this venture are the many reviewers who helped in countless ways to make
the book better. They include Marshall Abrams (University of Alabama, Birmingham), Harry
Adams (Prairie View A&M University), Alex Aguado (University of North Alabama), Edwin
Aiman (University of Houston), Daniel Alvarez (Colorado State University), Peter Amato
(Drexel University), Robert Bass (Coastal Carolina University), Ken Beals (Mary Baldwin
College), Helen Becker (Shepherd University), Paul Bloomfield (University of Connecticut),

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Robyn Bluhm (Old Dominion University), Kristin Borgwald (Miami Dade College), Vanda
Bozicevic (Bergen Community College), Matthew Braddock (University of Tennessee, Martin),
Brent Braga (Northland Community and Technical College), Joy Branch (Southern Union State
Community College), Barbara A. Brown (Community College of Allegheny County), Mark
Raymond Brown (University of Ottawa), David C. Burris (Arizona Western College), Matthew
Burstein (Washington and Lee University), Gabriel R. Camacho (El Paso Community College),
Jay Campbell (St. Louis Community College, Meramec), Kenneth Carlson (Northwest Iowa
Community College), Jeffrey Carr (Illinois State University), Alan Clark (Del Mar College),
Andrew J. Cohen (Georgia State University), Elliot D. Cohen (Indian River State College),
Robert Colter (Centre College), Timothy Conn (Sierra College), Guy Crain (University of
Oklahoma), Sharon Crasnow (Norco College), Kelso Cratsley (University of Massachusetts,
Boston), George Cronk (Bergen Community College), Kevin DeCoux (Minnesota West
Community and Technical College), Lara Denis (Agnes Scott College), Steve Dickerson (South
Puget Sound Community College), Nicholas Diehl (Sacramento City College), Robin S. Dillon
(Lehigh University), Peter Dlugos (Bergen Community College), Matt Drabek (University of
Iowa), David Drebushenko (University of Southern Indiana), Clint Dunagan (Northwest Vista
College), Paul Eckstein (Bergen Community College), Gaylyn Eddy (Fayetteville Technical
Community College), Andrew Fiala (California State University, Fresno), Stephen Finlay
(University of Southern California), Matthew Fitzsimmons (University of North Alabama),
Tammie Foltz (Des Moines Area Community College), Tim Fout (University of Louisville),
Dimitria Gatzia (University of Akron), Candace Gauthier (University of North Carolina,
Wilmington), Manuela Alejandra Gomez (El Paso Community College), Mark Greene
(University of Delaware), Kevin Guilfoy (Carroll University), Katherine Guin (SUNY
Brockport), Meredith Gunning (University of Massachusetts, Boston), Don Habibi (University of
North Carolina, Wilmington), Barbara M. Hands (University of North Carolina, Greensboro),
Craig Hanks (Texas State University), Jane Haproff (Sierra College), Ed Harris (Texas A&M
University), Justin Harmon (Southern Oregon University), Carol Hay (University of
Massachusetts, Lowell), Blake Heffner (Raritan Valley Community College), Marko Hilgersom
(Lethbridge Community College), Andrew J. Hill (St. Philip’s College), John Holder III
(Pensacola Junior College), Mark Hollifield (Clayton College and State University), Margaret
Houck (University of South Carolina), Michael Howard (University of Maine, Orono), Frances
Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University), Kenneth Howarth (Mercer County
Community College), Louis F. Howe Jr. (Naugatuck Valley Community College), Kyle Hubbard
(Saint Anselm College), Robert Hull (Western Virginia Wesleyan College), Gary James Jason
(California State University, Fullerton), Amy Jeffers (Owens Community College), Vicki
Jenkins (Ivy Tech Community College), Timothy Jessen (Ivy Tech Community College,
Bloomington), John Johnston (College of the Redwoods), Marc Jolley (Mercer University),
Frederik Kaufman (Ithaca College), Thomas D. Kennedy (Berry College), W. Glenn Kirkconnell
(Santa Fe College), Donald Knudsen (Montgomery County Community College), Gilbert Kohler
(Shawnee Community College), Thomas Larson (Saint Anselm College), Matt Lawrence (Long
Beach City College), Clayton Littlejohn (Southern Methodist University), Jessica Logue
(University of Portland), Ian D. MacKinnon (University of Akron), Tim Madigan (St. John
Fisher College), Ernâni Magalhães (West Virginia University), Daniel Malotky (Greensboro
College), Luke Manning (Auburn University), Ron Martin (Lynchburg College), Michael
McKeon (Barry University), Katherine Mendis (Hunter College, CUNY), Joshua Mills-Knutsen
(Indiana University Southeast), Michael Monge (Long Beach City College), Louisa Lee Moon

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(Mira Costa College), Eric Moore (Longwood University), Jon S. Moran (Southwest Missouri
State University), Dale Murray (Virginia Commonwealth University), Elizabeth Murray (Loyola
Marymount University), J. Daniel Murrell (Ivy Tech Community College), Richard Musselwhite
(North Carolina Central University), Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dickinson College), Jay Newhard
(East Carolina University), Marcella Norling (Orange Coast College), Charles L. North
(Southern New Hampshire University), Robert F. O’Connor (Texas State University), Jeffrey P.
Ogle (Metropolitan State University of Denver), Don Olive (Roane State Community College),
Leonard Olson (California State University, Fresno), Matthew Pamental (University of
Tennessee, Knoxville), Jessica Payson (Bryn Mawr College), Gregory E. Pence (University of
Alabama), Donald Petkus (Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs),
Trisha Philips (Mississippi State University), Grant Potts (Austin Community College), Thomas
M. Powers (University of Delaware), Marjorie Price (University of Alabama), Netty Provost
(Indiana University, Kokomo), Elisa Rapaport (Molloy College), Michael Redmond (Bergen
Community College), Daniel Regan (Villanova University), Joseph J. Rogers (University of
Texas, San Antonio), John Returra (Lackawanna College), Mary Ann Sellars (Ivy Tech
Community College), Robert M. Seltzer (Western Illinois University), Eric Severson (Boston
University and Seattle University), Edward Sherline (University of Wyoming), Aeon J. Skoble
(Bridgewater Community College), Susan Smith (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute), Eric Snider
(Lansing Community College), Eric Sotnak (University of Akron), Susanne Sreedhar (Boston
University), Piers H. G. Stephens (University of Georgia), Grant Sterling (Eastern Illinois
University), John Stilwell (University of Texas, Dallas), Tyler Suggs (Virginia Tech), Michele
Svatos (Eastfield College), David Svolba (Fitchburg State University), Allen Thompson
(Virginia Commonwealth University), Peter B. Trumbull (Madison College), Donald Turner
(Nashville State Community College), Julie C. Van Camp (California State University, Long
Beach), Nicholas VanHorn (Community College of Baltimore County), Michelle Rehwinkel
Vasilinda (Tallahassee Community College), Kris Vigneron (Columbus State Community
College), Sarah Vincent (Florida State University), Christine Vitrano (Brooklyn College,
CUNY), Mark Vopat (Youngstown State University), Matt Waldschlagel (University of North
Carolina, Wilmington), Steve Wall (Hillsborough Community College), Bill Warnken (Granite
State College), Jamie Carlin Watson (Young Harris College), Rivka Weinberg (Scripps College),
Cheryl Wertheimer (Butler Community College), Monique Whitaker (Hunter College, CUNY),
Phillip Wiebe (Trinity Western University), Jonathan Wight (University of Richmond), Sandra
Woien (Arizona State University), John Yanovitch (Molloy College), Steven Zusman
(Waubonsee Community College), and Matt Zwolinski (University of San Diego). Thank you
all.

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PART 1

Fundamentals

27
CHAPTER 1

Ethics and the Examined Life

Ethics , or moral philosophy , is the philosophical study of morality. Morality refers to beliefs
concerning right and wrong, good and bad—beliefs that can include judgments, values, rules,
principles, and theories. These beliefs help guide our actions, define our values, and give us
reasons for being the persons we are. ( Ethical and moral , the adjective forms, are often used to
mean simply “having to do with morality,” and ethics and morality are sometimes used to refer
to the moral norms of a specific group or individual, as in “Greek ethics” or “Russell’s
morality.”) Ethics, then, addresses the powerful question that Socrates formulated twenty-four
hundred years ago: How ought we to live?

The scope and continued relevance of this query suggest something compelling about ethics: you
cannot escape it. You cannot run away from all the choices, feelings, and actions that accompany
ideas about right and wrong, good and bad—ideas that persist in your culture and in your mind.
After all, for much of your life, you have been assimilating, modifying, or rejecting the ethical
norms you inherited from your family, community, and society. Unless you are very unusual,
from time to time you deliberate about the rightness or wrongness of actions, embrace or reject
particular moral principles or codes, judge the goodness of your character or intentions (or
someone else’s), perhaps even question (and agonize over) the soundness of your own moral
outlook when it conflicts with that of others. In other words, you are involved in ethics—you do
ethics . Even if you try to remove yourself from the ethical realm by insisting that all ethical
concepts are irrelevant or empty, you assume a particular view—a theory, in the broadest sense
—about morality and its place in your life. If at some point you are intellectually brave enough to
wonder whether your moral beliefs rest on some coherent supporting considerations, you will see
that you cannot even begin to sort out such considerations without—again—doing ethics. In any
case, in your life you must deal with the rest of the world, which turns on moral conflict and
resolution, moral decision and debate.

What is at stake when we do ethics? In an important sense, the answer is everything we hold dear
. Ethics is concerned with values—specifically, moral values . Through the sifting and weighing
of moral values we determine what the most important things are in our lives, what is worth
living for, and what is worth dying for. We decide what is the greatest good, what goals we
should pursue in life, what virtues we should cultivate, what duties we should or should not
fulfill, what value we should put on human life, and what pain and perils we should be willing to
endure for notions such as the common good, justice, and rights.

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Does it matter whether the state executes a criminal who has the mental capacity of a ten-year-
old? Does it matter who actually writes the term paper you turn in and represent as your own?
Does it matter whether we can easily save a drowning child but casually decide not to? Does it
matter whether young girls in Africa undergo painful genital mutilation for reasons of custom or
religion? Do these actions and a million others just as controversial matter at all? Most of us—
regardless of our opinion on these issues—would say that they matter a great deal. If they matter,
then ethics matters, because these are ethical concerns requiring careful reflection using concepts
and reasoning peculiar to ethics.

But even though ethics is inescapable and important, you are still free to take the easy way out,
and many people do. You are free not to think too deeply or too systematically about ethical
concerns. You can simply embrace the moral beliefs and norms given to you by your family and
your society. You can accept them without question or serious examination. In other words, you
can try not to do ethics. This approach can be simple and painless—at least for a while—but it
has some drawbacks.

First, it undermines your personal freedom. If you accept and never question the moral beliefs
handed to you by your culture, then those beliefs are not really yours—and they, not you, control
the path you take in life. Only if you critically examine these beliefs yourself and decide for
yourself whether they have merit will they be truly yours. Only then will you be in charge of
your own choices and actions.

Second, the no-questions-asked approach increases the chances that your responses to moral
dilemmas or contradictions will be incomplete, confused, or mistaken. Sometimes in real life
moral codes or rules do not fit the situations at hand, or moral principles conflict with one
another, or entirely new circumstances are not covered by any moral policy at all. Solving these
problems requires something that a hand-me-down morality does not include: the intellectual
tools to critically evaluate (and reevaluate) existing moral beliefs.

Third, if there is such a thing as intellectual moral growth, you are unlikely to find it on the safe
route. To not do ethics is to stay locked in a kind of intellectual limbo, where exploration in
ethics and personal moral progress are barely possible.

The philosopher Paul Taylor suggests that there is yet another risk in taking the easy road. If
someone blindly embraces the morality bequeathed to him by his society, he may very well be a
fine embodiment of the rules of his culture and accept them with certainty. But he will lack the
ability to defend his beliefs by rational argument against criticism. What happens when he
encounters others who also have very strong beliefs that contradict his? “He will feel lost and
bewildered,” Taylor says, and his confusion might leave him disillusioned about morality.
“Unable to give an objective, reasoned justification for his own convictions, he may turn from
dogmatic certainty to total skepticism. And from total skepticism it is but a short step to an
‘amoral’ life. . . . Thus the person who begins by accepting moral beliefs blindly can end up
denying all morality.” 1

There are other easy roads—roads that also bypass critical and thoughtful scrutiny of morality.
We can describe most of them as various forms of subjectivism, a topic that we examine closely
in the next chapter. You may decide, for example, that you can establish all your moral beliefs by

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simply consulting your feelings. In situations calling for moral judgments, you let your emotions
be your guide. If it feels right, it is right. Alternatively, you may come to believe that moral
realities are relative to each person, a view known as subjective relativism (also covered in the
next chapter). That is, you think that what a person believes or approves of determines the
rightness or wrongness of actions. If you believe that abortion is wrong, then it is wrong. If you
believe it is right, then it is right.

But these facile roads through ethical terrain are no better than blindly accepting existing norms.
Even if you want to take the subjectivist route, you still need to examine it critically to see if
there are good reasons for choosing it—otherwise, your choice is arbitrary and therefore not
really yours. And unless you thoughtfully consider the merits of moral beliefs (including
subjectivist beliefs), your chances of being wrong about them are substantial.

Ethics does not give you a royal road to moral truth. Instead, it shows you how to ask critical
questions about morality and systematically seek answers supported by good reasons. This is a
tall order because, as we have seen, many of the questions in ethics are among the toughest we
can ever ask—and among the most important in life.

Glossary
ethics (or moral philosophy)
The philosophical study of morality.
morality
Beliefs concerning right and wrong, good and bad; they can include judgments, rules,
values, principles, and theories.

Endnotes
Note 01: Paul W. Taylor, Principles of Ethics: An Introduction (Encino, CA: Dickenson,
1975), 9–10. Return to reference 1

30
THE ETHICAL LANDSCAPE
The domain of ethics is large, divided into several areas of investigation and cordoned off from
related subjects. So let us map the territory carefully. As the term moral philosophy suggests,
ethics is a branch of philosophy. A very rough characterization of philosophy is the systematic
use of critical reasoning to answer the most fundamental questions in life. Moral philosophy,
obviously, tries to answer the fundamental questions of morality. The other major branches of
philosophy address other basic questions; these branches are logic (the study of correct
reasoning), metaphysics (the study of the fundamental nature of reality), and epistemology (the
study of knowledge). As a division of philosophy, ethics does its work primarily through critical
reasoning: the careful, systematic evaluation of statements, or claims. Critical reasoning is a
process used in all fields of study, not just in ethics. The main components of this process are the
evaluation of logical arguments and the careful analysis of concepts.

Science also studies morality, but not in the way that moral philosophy does. Its approach is
known as descriptive ethics —the scientific study of moral beliefs and practices. Its aim is to
describe and explain how people actually behave and think when dealing with moral issues and
concepts. This kind of empirical research is usually conducted by sociologists, anthropologists,
and psychologists. In contrast, the focus of moral philosophy is not what people actually believe
and do, but what they should believe and do. The point of moral philosophy is to determine what
actions are right (or wrong) and what things are good (or bad).

Philosophers distinguish three major divisions in ethics, each one representing a different way of
approaching the subject. The first division is normative ethics —the study of the principles,
rules, or theories that guide our actions and judgments. (The word normative refers to norms, or
standards, of judgment—in this case, norms for judging rightness and goodness.) The ultimate
purpose of doing normative ethics is to try to establish the soundness of moral norms, especially
the norms embodied in a comprehensive moral system, or moral theory. We do normative ethics
when we use critical reasoning to demonstrate that a moral principle is justified, or that a
professional code of conduct is contradictory, or that one proposed moral theory is better than
another, or that a person’s motive is good. Should the rightness of actions be judged by their
consequences? Is happiness the greatest good in life? Is utilitarianism a good moral theory? Such
questions are the preoccupation of normative ethics.

Another major division of ethics is metaethics —the study of the meaning and logical structure
of moral beliefs. It asks not whether an action is right or whether a person’s character is good. It
takes a step back from these concerns and asks more fundamental questions about them: What
does it mean for an action to be right ? Is good the same thing as desirable ? How can a moral
principle be justified? Is there such a thing as moral truth? To do normative ethics, we must
assume certain things about the meaning of moral terms and the logical relationships among
them. But the job of metaethics is to question all these assumptions, to see if they really make
sense.

Finally, there is applied ethics —the application of moral norms to specific moral issues or cases,
particularly those in a profession such as medicine or law. Applied ethics in these fields goes

31
under names such as medical ethics , journalistic ethics , and business ethics . In applied ethics
we study the results derived from applying a moral principle or theory to specific circumstances.
The purpose of the exercise is to learn something important about either the moral characteristics
of the situation or the adequacy of the moral norms. Did the doctor do right in performing that
abortion? Is it morally permissible for scientists to perform experiments on people without their
consent? Was it right for the journalist to distort her reporting to aid a particular side in the war?
Questions like these drive the search for answers in applied ethics.

In every division of ethics, we must be careful to distinguish between values and obligations .
Sometimes we may be interested in concepts or judgments of value —that is, about what is
morally good , bad , blameworthy , or praiseworthy. We properly use these kinds of terms to
refer mostly to persons, character traits, motives, and intentions. We may say “She is a good
person” or “He is to blame for that tragedy.” At other times, we may be interested in concepts or
judgments of obligation —that is, about what is obligatory, or a duty, or what we should or ought
to do. We use these terms to refer to actions. We may say “She has a duty to tell the truth” or
“What he did was wrong.”

When we talk about value in the sense just described, we mean moral value. If she is a good
person, she is good in the moral sense. But we can also talk about nonmoral value. We can say
that things such as televisions, rockets, experiences, and works of art (things other than persons,
intentions, and so forth) are good, but we mean “good” only in a nonmoral way. It makes no
sense to assert that televisions or rockets in themselves are morally good or bad. Perhaps a rocket
could be used to perform an action that is morally wrong. In that case, the action would be
immoral, but the rocket itself would still have only nonmoral value.

Many things in life have value for us, but they are not necessarily valuable in the same way.
Some things are valuable because they are a means to something else. We might say that
gasoline is good because it is a means to make a gas-powered vehicle work, or that a pen is good
because it can be used to write a letter. Such things are said to be instrumentally , or extrinsically,
valuable —they are valuable as a means to something else. Some things, however, are valuable
for their own sakes. They are valuable simply because they are what they are, without being a
means to something else. Things that have been regarded as valuable in themselves include
happiness, pleasure, virtue, and beauty. These things are said to be intrinsically valuable —they
are valuable in themselves.

Glossary
descriptive ethics
The scientific study of moral beliefs and practices.
normative ethics
The study of the principles, rules, or theories that guide our actions and judgments.
metaethics
The study of the meaning and logical structure of moral beliefs.
applied ethics
The application of moral norms to specific moral issues or cases, particularly those in a
profession such as medicine or law.

32
instrumentally (or extrinsically) valuable
Valuable as a means to something else.
intrinsically valuable
Valuable in itself, for its own sake.

33
THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
We all do ethics, and we all have a general sense of what is involved. But we can still ask, What
are the elements of ethics that make it the peculiar enterprise that it is? We can include at least
the following factors:

The Preeminence of Reason

Doing ethics typically involves grappling with our feelings, taking into account the facts of the
situation (including our own observations and relevant knowledge), and trying to understand the
ideas that bear on the case. But above all, it involves, even requires, critical reasoning—the
consideration of reasons for whatever statements (moral or otherwise) are in question. Whatever
our view on moral issues and whatever moral outlook we subscribe to, our commonsense moral
experience suggests that if a moral judgment is to be worthy of acceptance, it must be supported
by good reasons, and our deliberations on the issue must include a consideration of those
reasons.

The backbone of critical reasoning generally, and moral reasoning in particular, is logical
argument. This kind of argument—not the angry-exchange type—consists of a statement to be
supported (the assertion to be proved, or the conclusion) and the statements that do the
supporting (the reasons for believing the statement, or the premises). With such arguments, we
try to show that a moral judgment is or is not justified, that a moral principle is or is not sound,
that an action is or is not morally permissible, or that a moral theory is or is not plausible.

QUICK REVIEW

ethics (or moral philosophy )—The philosophical study of morality.

morality —Beliefs concerning right and wrong, good and bad; they can include judgments,
values, rules, principles, and theories.
descriptive ethics —The scientific study of moral beliefs and practices.
normative ethics —The study of the principles, rules, or theories that guide our actions and
judgments.
metaethics —The study of the meaning and logical structure of moral beliefs.
applied ethics —The application of moral norms to specific moral issues or cases,
particularly those in a profession such as medicine or law.
instrumentally (or extrinsically ) valuable —Valuable as a means to something else.

34
 intrinsically valuable —Valuable in itself, for its own sake.

Our use of critical reasoning and argument helps us keep our feelings about moral issues in
perspective. Feelings are an important part of our moral experience. They make empathy
possible, which gives us a deeper understanding of the human impact of moral norms. They can
also serve as internal alarm bells, warning us of the possibility of injustice, suffering, and
wrongdoing. But they are unreliable guides to moral truth. They may simply reflect our own
emotional needs, prejudices, upbringing, culture, and self-interests. Careful reasoning, however,
can inform our feelings and help us decide moral questions on their merits.

The Universal Perspective

Logic requires that moral norms and judgments follow the principle of universalizability —the
idea that a moral statement (a principle, rule, or judgment) that applies in one situation must
apply in all other situations that are relevantly similar. If you say, for example, that lying is
wrong in a particular situation, then you implicitly agree that lying is wrong for anyone in
relevantly similar situations. If you say that killing in self-defense is morally permissible, then
you say, in effect, that killing in self-defense is permissible for everyone in relevantly similar
situations. It cannot be the case that an action performed by A is wrong while the same action
performed by B in relevantly similar circumstances is right. It cannot be the case that the moral
judgments formed in these two situations must differ just because two different people are
involved.

This point about universalizability also applies to reasons used to support moral judgments. If
reasons apply in a specific case, then those reasons also apply in all relevantly similar cases. It
cannot be true that reasons that apply in a specific case do not apply to other cases that are
similar in all relevant respects.

The Principle of Impartiality

From the moral point of view, all persons are considered equal and should be treated
accordingly. This sense of impartiality is implied in all moral statements. It means that the
welfare and interests of each individual should be given the same weight as the welfare and
interests of all others. Unless there is a morally relevant difference between people, we should
treat them the same: we must treat equals equally. We would think it outrageous for a moral rule
to say something like “Everyone must refrain from stealing food in grocery stores—except for
Mr. X, who may steal all he wants.” Imagine that there is no morally relevant reason for making
this exception for stealing food; Mr. X is exempted merely because, say, he is a celebrity known
for outrageous behavior. We not only would object to this rule but might even begin to wonder if
it was a genuine moral rule at all, because it lacks impartiality. Similarly, we would reject a
moral rule that says something like “Everyone is entitled to basic human rights—except Native
Americans.” Such a rule would be a prime example of discrimination based on race. We can see
this blatant partiality best if we ask what morally relevant difference there is between Native
Americans and everyone else. Differences in income, social status, skin color, ancestry, and the
like are not morally relevant. Apparently there are no morally relevant differences. Because there

35
are none, we must conclude that the rule sanctions unfair discrimination.

We must keep in mind, however, that sometimes there are good reasons for treating someone
differently. Imagine a hospital that generally gives equal care to patients, treating equals equally.
But suppose a patient comes to the hospital in an ambulance because she has had a heart attack
and will die without immediate care. The hospital staff responds quickly, giving her faster and
more sophisticated care than other patients receive. The situation is a matter of life and death—a
good reason for not treating everyone the same and for providing the heart attack patient with
special consideration. This instance of discrimination is justified.

The Dominance of Moral Norms

Not all norms are moral norms. There are legal norms (laws, statutes), aesthetic norms (for
judging artistic creations), prudential norms (practical considerations of self-interest), and others.
Moral norms seem to stand out from all these in an interesting way: they dominate. Whenever
moral principles or values conflict in some way with nonmoral principles or values, the moral
considerations usually override the others. Moral considerations seem more important, more
critical, or more weighty. A principle of prudence such as “Never help a stranger” may be well
justified, but it must yield to any moral principle that contradicts it, such as “Help a stranger in
an emergency if you can do so without endangering yourself.” An aesthetic norm that somehow
involved violating a moral principle would have to take a backseat to the moral considerations. A
law that conflicted with a moral principle would be suspect, and the latter would have to prevail
over the former. Ultimately, the justification for civil disobedience is that specific laws conflict
with moral norms and are therefore invalid. If we judge a law to be bad, we usually do so on
moral grounds.

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RELIGION AND MORALITY
Many people believe that morality and religion are inseparable—that religion is the source or
basis of morality and that moral precepts are simply what God says should be done. This view is
not at all surprising, because all religions imply or assert a perspective on morality. The three
great religions in the Western tradition—Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—provide their
believers with commandments or principles of conduct that are thought to constitute the moral
law, the essence of morality. For their millions of adherents, the moral law is the will of God,
and the will of God is the moral law. In the West, at least, the powerful imprint of religion is
evident in secular laws and in the private morality of believers and unbelievers alike. Secular
systems of morality—for example, those of the ancient Greek philosophers, Immanuel Kant, the
utilitarians, and others—have of course left their mark on Western ethics. But they have not
moved the millions who think that morality is a product exclusively of religion.

So what is the relationship between religion and morality? For our purposes, we should break
this question into two parts: (1) What is the relationship between religion and ethics (the
philosophical study of morality)? and (2) What is the relationship between religion and morality
(beliefs about right and wrong)? The first question asks about how religion relates to the kind of
investigation we conduct in this book—the use of experience and critical reasoning to study
morality. The key point about the relationship is that whatever your views on religion and
morality, an open-minded expedition into ethics is more useful and empowering than you may
realize, especially now, at the beginning of your journey into moral philosophy. You may
believe, for example, that God determines what is right and wrong, so there is no need to apply
critical reasoning to morality—you just need to know what God says. But this judgment—and
similar dismissals of ethics—would be premature, as you will see.

Believers Need Moral Reasoning

It is difficult—perhaps impossible—for most people to avoid using moral reasoning. Religious
people are no exception. One reason is that religious moral codes (such as the Ten
Commandments) and other major religious rules of conduct are usually vague, laying out general
principles that may be difficult to apply to specific cases. (Secular moral codes have the same
disadvantage.) For example, we may be commanded to love our neighbor, but what neighbors
are included—people of a different religion? People who denounce our religion? The gay or
lesbian couple? Those who steal from us? The convicted child molester next door? The drug
dealers on the corner? The person who got an abortion? Also, what does loving our neighbor
demand of us? How does love require us to behave toward the drug dealers, the gay couple, or
the person who denounces our religion? If our terminally ill neighbor asks us in the name of love
to help him kill himself, what should we do? Does love require us to kill him—or to refrain from
killing him? And, of course, commandments can conflict—as when, for example, the only way
to avoid killing an innocent person is to tell a lie, or the only way to save the life of one person is
to kill another. All these situations force the believer to interpret religious directives, to try to
apply general rules to specific cases, to draw out the implications of particular views—in other
words, to do ethics.

37
When Conflicts Arise, Ethics Steps In
Very often moral contradictions or inconsistencies confront the religious believer, and only
moral reasoning can help resolve them. Believers sometimes disagree with their religious leaders
on moral issues. Adherents of one religious tradition may disagree with those from another
tradition on whether an act is right or wrong. Sincere devotees in a religious tradition may
wonder if its moral teachings make sense. In all such cases, intelligent resolution of the conflict
of moral claims can be achieved only by applying a neutral standard that helps sort out the
competing viewpoints. Moral philosophy supplies the neutral standard in the form of critical
thinking, well-made arguments, and careful analysis. No wonder, then, that many great religious
minds—Aquinas, Leibniz, Descartes, Kant, Maimonides, Averroës, and others—have relied on
reason to examine the nature of morality. In fact, countless theists have regarded reason as a gift
from God that enables human beings to grasp the truths of science, life, and morality.

Moral Philosophy Enables Productive Discourse

Any fruitful discussions about morality undertaken between people from different religious
traditions or between believers and nonbelievers will require a common set of ethical concepts
and a shared procedure for deciding issues and making judgments. Ethics provides these tools.
Without them, conversations will resolve nothing, and participants will learn little. Without
them, people will talk past each other, appealing only to their own religious views. Furthermore,
in a pluralistic society, most of the public discussions about important moral issues take place in
a context of shared values such as justice, fairness, equality, and tolerance. Just as important,
they also occur according to an unwritten understanding that (1) moral positions should be
explained, (2) claims should be supported by reasons, and (3) reasoning should be judged by
common rational standards. These skills, of course, are at the heart of ethics.

Now consider the second question introduced earlier: What is the relationship between religion
and morality? For many people, the most interesting query about the relationship between
religion and morality is this: Is God the maker of morality? That is, is God the author of the
moral law? Those who answer yes are endorsing a theory of morality known as the divine
command theory . It says that right actions are those that are willed by God, that God literally
defines right and wrong. Something is right or good only because God makes it so. In the
simplest version of the theory, God can determine right and wrong because he is omnipotent. He
is all-powerful—powerful enough even to create moral norms. In this view, God is a divine
lawgiver, and his laws constitute morality.

CRITICAL THOUGHT: Ethics, Religion, and tough moral issues

38
How can we hope to grapple with complex moral issues that have emerged only in recent
decades? Can religion alone handle the job? Consider the following case:

According to a report by CNN, Jack and Lisa Nash made history when they used genetic
testing to save the life of their six-year-old daughter, Molly, by having another child. Molly
had a rare genetic disorder known as Fanconi anemia, which prevents the generation of
bone marrow and produces a fatal leukemia. Molly’s best chance to live was to get a
transplant of stem cells from the umbilical cord of a sibling, and Molly’s parents were
determined to give her that sibling, brother Adam. Through genetic testing (and in vitro
fertilization), Jack and Lisa were able to select a child who would not only be born without
a particular disease (Fanconi anemia, in this case) but also would help a sibling combat the
disease by being the optimal tissue match for a transplant—a historic combination. As Lisa
Nash said, “I was going to save Molly no matter what, and I wanted Molly to have
siblings.” *

Is it right to produce a child to save the life or health of someone else? More to the point, do the
scriptures of the three major Western religions provide any guidance on this question? Do any of
these traditions offer useful methods for productively discussing or debating such issues with
people of different faiths? How might ethics help with these challenges? Is it possible to
formulate a reasonable opinion on this case without doing ethics? Why or why not?

In general, believers are divided on whether the divine command theory gives an accurate
account of the source of morality. Notable among the theory’s detractors are the great theistic
philosophers Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). And conversely,
as odd as it may sound, some nonbelievers have subscribed to it. In The Brothers Karamazov
(1879–80), the character Ivan Karamazov declares, “If God doesn’t exist, everything is
permissible.” This very sentiment was espoused by, among others, the famous atheist
philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80).

Both religious and secular critics of the divine command theory believe that it poses a serious
dilemma, one first articulated by Socrates two and a half millennia ago. In the dialogue
Euthyphro , Socrates asks, Is an action morally right because God wills it to be so, or does God
will it to be so because it is morally right? Critics say that if an action is right only because God
wills it (that is, if right and wrong are dependent on God), then many heinous crimes and evil
actions would be right if God willed them. If God willed murder, theft, or torture, these deeds
would be morally right. If God has unlimited power, he could easily will such actions. If the
rightness of an action depended on God’s will alone, he could not have reasons for willing what
he wills. No reasons would be available or required. Therefore, if God commanded an action, the
command would be without reason, completely arbitrary. Neither the believer nor the
nonbeliever would think this state of affairs plausible. On the other hand, if God wills an action
because it is morally right (if moral norms are independent of God), then the divine command
theory must be false. God does not create rightness; he simply knows what is right and wrong
and is subject to the moral law just as humans are.

For some theists, this charge of arbitrariness is especially worrisome. Leibniz, for example,
rejects the divine command theory, declaring that it implies that God is unworthy of worship:

39
 In saying, therefore, that things are not good according to any standard of goodness, but
simply by the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realizing it, all the love
of God and all his glory; for why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally
praiseworthy in doing the contrary? Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he has only
a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will takes the place of reasonableness, and if in accord
with the definition of tyrants, justice consists in that which is pleasing to the most powerful?
2

Defenders of the divine command theory may reply to the arbitrariness argument by contending
that God would never command us to commit heinous acts, because God is all-good. Because of
his supreme goodness, he would will only what is good. Some thinkers, however, believe that
such reasoning renders the very idea of God’s goodness meaningless. As one philosopher says,

[O]n this view, the doctrine of the goodness of God is reduced to nonsense. It is important
to religious believers that God is not only all-powerful and all-knowing, but that he is also
good; yet if we accept the idea that good and bad are defined by reference to God’s will,
this notion is deprived of any meaning. What could it mean to say that God’s commands are
good? If “X is good” means “X is commanded by God,” then “God’s commands are good”
would mean only “God’s commands are commanded by God,” an empty truism. 3

In any case, it seems that through critical reasoning we can indeed learn much about morality
and the moral life. After all, there are complete moral systems (some of which are examined in
this book) that are not based on religion, that contain genuine moral norms indistinguishable
from those embraced by religion, and that are justified not by reference to religious precepts but
by careful thinking and moral arguments. As the philosopher Jonathan Berg says, “Those who
would refuse to recognize as adequately justified any moral beliefs not derived from knowledge
of or about God, would have to refute the whole vast range of arguments put by Kant and all
others who ever proposed a rational basis for ethics!” 4 Moreover, if we can do ethics—if we can
use critical reasoning to discern moral norms certified by the best reasons and evidence—then
critical reasoning is sufficient to guide us to moral standards and values. We obviously can do
ethics (as the following chapters demonstrate), so morality is both accessible and meaningful to
us whether we are religious or not.

Endnotes
Note *: “Genetic Selection Gives Girl a Brother and a Second Chance,” CNN.com, October
3, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/10/03/testube.brother/index.html
(December 8, 2005). Return to reference *
Note 02: G. W. von Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics , in Selections , ed. Philip P. Wiener
(New York: Scribner, 1951), 292. Return to reference 2
James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy , 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003),
51. Return to reference 3
Jonathan Berg, “How Could Ethics Depend on Religion?,” in A Companion to Ethics , ed.
Peter Singer, corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 525–33. Return to reference 4

40
CHAPTER REVIEW
SUMMARY
Ethics is the philosophical study of morality, and morality consists of beliefs concerning right
and wrong, good and bad. These beliefs can include judgments, principles, and theories.
Participating in the exploration of morality—that is, doing ethics—is inescapable. We all must
make moral judgments, assess moral norms, judge people’s characters, and question the
soundness of our moral outlooks. A great deal is at stake when we do ethics, including countless
decisions that determine the quality of our lives.

You can decide to forgo any ethical deliberations and simply embrace the moral beliefs and
norms you inherited from your family and culture. But this approach undermines your freedom,
for if you accept without question whatever moral beliefs come your way, they are not really
yours. Only if you critically examine them for yourself are they truly yours.

The three main divisions of ethics proper are normative ethics (the study of the moral norms that
guide our actions and judgments), metaethics (the study of the meaning and logical structure of
moral beliefs), and applied ethics (the application of moral norms to specific moral issues or
cases).

Ethics involves a distinctive set of elements. These include the preeminence of reason, the
universal perspective, the principle of impartiality, and the dominance of moral norms.

Some people claim that morality depends on God, a view known as the divine command theory.
Both theists and nontheists have raised doubts about this doctrine. The larger point is that doing
ethics—using critical reasoning to examine the moral life—can be a useful and productive
enterprise for believer and nonbeliever alike.

KEY TERMS
ethics ( or moral philosophy ) ( p. 3 )
morality ( p. 3 )
descriptive ethics ( p. 5 )
normative ethics ( p. 5 )
metaethics ( p. 5 )
applied ethics ( p. 5 )
instrumentally (or extrinsically ) valuable ( p. 6 )
intrinsically valuable ( p. 6 )

EXERCISES
Review Questions

41
 When can it be said that our moral beliefs are not really ours? ( p. 3 )
In what ways are we forced to do ethics? What is at stake in these deliberations? ( pp. 3–4 )
What is the unfortunate result of accepting moral beliefs without questioning them? ( pp. 4–
5)
Can our feelings be our sole guide to morality? Why or why not? ( pp. 4–5 )
What are some questions asked in normative ethics? ( p. 5 )
What is the difference between normative ethics and metaethics? ( p. 5 )
What is the dilemma about God and morality that Socrates posed in the Euthyphro ? ( pp.
10–11 )
What kinds of moral contradictions or inconsistencies confront religious believers? ( pp. 8–
9)
What are the premises in the arbitrariness argument against the divine command theory? ( p.
10 )
Does the principle of impartiality imply that we must always treat equals equally? Why or
why not? ( pp. 7–8 )

Discussion Questions

Do you think that morality ultimately depends on God (that God is the author of the moral
law)? Why or why not?
Do you believe that you have absorbed or adopted without question most of your moral
beliefs? Why or why not?
Formulate an argument against the divine command theory, then formulate one for it.
Give an example of how you or someone you know has used reasons to support a moral
judgment.
Identify at least two normative ethical questions that you have wondered about in the past
year.
Name two things (such as persons, objects, experiences) in your life that you consider
intrinsically valuable. Name three that are instrumentally valuable.
How do your feelings affect the moral judgments you make? Do they determine your
judgments? Do they inform them? If so, how?
What is the logic behind the principle of universalizability? Cite an example of how the
principle has entered into your moral deliberations.
How does racial discrimination violate the principle of impartiality?
What is the “dominance of moral norms”? Does it strike you as reasonable? Or do you
believe that sometimes nonmoral norms can outweigh moral ones? If the latter, provide an
example.

ETHICAL DILEMMAS
You are the mayor of a major city, and you want to keep the streets as clean as possible.
You send the city’s street sweepers to the more affluent neighborhoods, but you ignore the
poorer neighborhoods because the poor residents pay less in taxes than the rich people do. Is
this practice a violation of the impartiality principle? Why or why not?
You try to live strictly by the moral rules contained in your religion’s moral code. The two
most important rules are “Be merciful” (don’t give people what they deserve) and “Be just”

42
 (give people exactly what they deserve). Now suppose a man is arrested for stealing food
from your house, and the police leave it up to you whether he should be prosecuted for his
crime or set free. Should you be merciful and set him free, or be just and make sure he is
appropriately punished? How do you resolve this conflict of rules? Can your moral code
resolve it? To what moral principles or theories do you appeal?
Suppose you are an engineer building a road across a mountain. From a prudential point of
view, it would be easier and cheaper to build it through a family’s farm. This option would
require compelling the family to move, which would be an extreme hardship for them. From
a moral point of view, the family should be allowed to stay on their farm. Which view
should take precedence?

FURTHER READING
Anita L. Allen, New Ethics: A Guided Tour of the Twenty-First-Century Moral Landscape (New
York: Miramax, 2004).

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 2, parts 1 and 4 .

Simon Blackburn, Being Good: A Short Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).

Donald M. Borchert and David Stewart, Exploring Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1986).

Steven M. Cahn and Joram G. Haber, eds., Twentieth Century Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995).

David Edmonds, Would You Kill the Fat Man ? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2013).

William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973).

Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

David Kelley and Debby Hutchins, The Art of Reasoning: An Introduction to Logic , 5th ed.
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2019).

Brooke Noel Moore and Robert Michael Stewart, Moral Philosophy: A Comprehensive
Introduction (Belmont, CA: Mayfield, 1994).

Dave Robinson and Chris Garratt, Introducing Ethics, ed. Richard Appignanesi (New York:
Totem Books, 2005).

Peter Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics, corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

Gregory A. Smith, “A Growing Share of Americans Say It’s Not Necessary to Believe in God to
Be Moral,” Pew Research Center, October 16, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/10/16/a-growing-share-of-americans-say-its-not-necessary-to-believe-in-god-to-be-
moral (December 10, 2020).

43
Paul Taylor, Principles of Ethics: An Introduction (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975).

Jacques P. Thiroux, Ethics: Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1986).

Lewis Vaughn, The Power of Critical Thinking , 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2019).

Thomas F. Wall, Thinking Critically about Moral Problem s (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003).

G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971).

Glossary
ethics (or moral philosophy)
The philosophical study of morality.
morality
Beliefs concerning right and wrong, good and bad; they can include judgments, rules,
values, principles, and theories.
descriptive ethics
The scientific study of moral beliefs and practices.
normative ethics
The study of the principles, rules, or theories that guide our actions and judgments.
metaethics
The study of the meaning and logical structure of moral beliefs.
applied ethics
The application of moral norms to specific moral issues or cases, particularly those in a
profession such as medicine or law.
instrumentally (or extrinsically) valuable
Valuable as a means to something else.
intrinsically valuable
Valuable in itself, for its own sake.

44
READINGS

45
From What Is the Socratic Method?
C HRISTOPHER P HILLIPS

The Socratic method is a way to seek truths by your own lights.

It is a system, a spirit, a method, a type of philosophical inquiry, an intellectual technique, all

rolled into one.

Socrates himself never spelled out a “method.” However, the Socratic method is named after him
because Socrates, more than any other before or since, models for us philosophy practiced —
philosophy as deed, as way of living, as something that any of us can do. It is an open system of
philosophical inquiry that allows one to interrogate from many vantage points.

Gregory Vlastos, a Socrates scholar and professor of philosophy at Princeton, described

Socrates’ method of inquiry as “among the greatest achievements of humanity.” Why? Because,
he says, it makes philosophical inquiry “a common human enterprise, open to every man.”
Instead of requiring allegiance to a specific philosophical viewpoint or analytic technique or
specialized vocabulary, the Socratic method “calls for common sense and common speech.” And
this, he says, “is as it should be, for how many should live is every man’s business.”

I think, however, that the Socratic method goes beyond Vlastos’ description. It does not merely
call for common sense but examines what common sense is . The Socratic method asks: Does the
common sense of our day offer us the greatest potential for self-understanding and human
excellence? Or is the prevailing common sense in fact a roadblock to realizing this potential?

Vlastos goes on to say that Socratic inquiry is by no means simple, and “calls not only for the
highest degree of mental alertness of which anyone is capable” but also for “moral qualities of a
high order: sincerity, humility, courage.” Such qualities “protect against the possibility” that
Socratic dialogue, no matter how rigorous, “would merely grind out . . . wild conclusions with
irresponsible premises.” I agree, though I would replace the quality of sincerity with honesty,
since one can hold a conviction sincerely without examining it, while honesty would require that
one subject one’s convictions to frequent scrutiny.

A Socratic dialogue reveals how different our outlooks can be on concepts we use every day. It
reveals how different our philosophies are, and often how tenable—or untenable, as the case may
be—a range of philosophies can be. Moreover, even the most universally recognized and used
concept, when subjected to Socratic scrutiny, might reveal not only that there is not universal
agreement, after all, on the meaning of any given concept, but that every single person has a
somewhat different take on each and every concept under the sun.

What’s more, there seems to be no such thing as a concept so abstract, or question so off base,
that it can’t be fruitfully explored [using the Socratic method]. In the course of Socratizing, it
often turns out to be the case that some of the most so-called abstract concepts are intimately
related to the most profoundly relevant human experiences. In fact, it’s been my experience that

46