World Bank Document
World Bank Document
CREATING MARKETS
Public Disclosure Authorized
IN SRI LANKA
Private Sector-Led Inclusive Growth from
Islands of Excellence
Executive Summary
July 2022
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Sri Lanka is a country of paradoxes. With the lowest poverty rates, best social
indicators, and highest per capita income in South Asia, Sri Lanka’s economic
performance since independence had generally been hailed as a success before the
current debt crisis. However, past performance occurred amidst many distortions
and an economy less open than its peers, largely reflecting the strong involvement
of the state in the economy. Even if this interventionist model of economic policy
and the presence of many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) served the country well
through the years of conflict and their aftermath, it is no longer sustainable. Indeed,
after the rapid growth of the peace dividend in the years post-2009, the economy has
faltered and progress on social indicators has stagnated. Many of market distortions
remain and have been exacerbated by COVID-19. Understanding how, despite these
handicaps, Sri Lanka achieved positive economic and social outcomes in the past
provides the building blocks of a realistic, forward-looking growth strategy—one of
the objectives of this Country Private Sector Diagnostic (CPSD). The research for this
report was conducted prior to the current crisis, but the recommendations remain
relevant to implement public policies that will support private sector led inclusive and
sustainable growth.
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SRI LANKA COUNTRY PRIVATE SECTOR DIAGNOSTIC
The key drivers of growth in the last decade have been the favorable export
performance of the apparel sector and tourism sectors; the boost to consumption,
partly on account of remittances; and the government’s infrastructure investments
following the end of the war. From 2009–13, about half of the growth performance
was the result of higher productivity, possibly reflecting the impact of the
reconstruction effort, the industrial upgrading in the apparel and garment sectors, and
the performance of the information technology (IT) and light manufacturing sectors,
which compete in some of the most competitive destination markets.
The deceleration of growth starting in 2013 reflected lower public investment and a
subsequent contraction in construction, as well as a slowdown in manufacturing. It
highlights the weakness of the foundations of Sri Lanka’s growth performance and
the inability of the state—despite its central presence in the economy—to provide an
environment conducive to such growth. This all the more so because the state’s public
investments suffer from a considerable efficiency gap, estimated at 30 percent (World
Bank 2019g) and have not generated the return on investment needed to finance the
corresponding loans. This has been associated with the build-up of unsustainable
macroeconomic imbalances and large external financing requirements, resulting from a
high fiscal deficit. Considerable increases in external debt, weak revenue mobilization,
and large losses suffered by SOEs have constrained fiscal space and created an
acute balance of payments crisis. Since April 2020, Sri Lanka has lost access to the
international capital markets, and in April 2022, authorities announced a suspension
of repayment of certain Fx-denominated loans.1
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MATRIX OF ACTIONS
Growth has failed to deliver the qualitative results expected by Sri Lanka’s population:
• The employment intensity of growth has declined, and there is a lack of high-quality
jobs, especially outside Colombo. While the official unemployment rate is low, the
share of informal employment in low-quality jobs is large. At the same time, many
skilled workers choose not to work in the private sector, as they prefer prestigious
civil service or SOE positions, the latter employing around 250,000 people.
Moreover, high-quality job opportunities for workers have not always materialized,
leading to outward migration.
• Structural transformation has been slow. The export product mix of Sri Lanka
has not changed much and remains much less complex than in aspirational peers
like Costa Rica, Malaysia, and Thailand. Some transformation in production
and employment has happened: the share of agriculture in GDP declined from
14.3 percent (2002) to 7.7 percent (2018), and agriculture’s share of employment
declined from 38 to 26 percent, while employment in services increased from 38 to
46 percent over the same period. Agriculture employment remains, however, higher
than in some aspirational peers (Costa Rica, Malaysia). In fact, a large part of the
economy—including the apparel and agriculture sectors—continues to operate in
the low-skills labor-intensive space at wages comparable to those in lower income
countries like Bangladesh.
• There is significant spatial disparity in economic and social development, with
several regions of the country significantly lagging the relatively prosperous region
around Colombo. Regions affected by the civil war (in the Northern Province,
Mullaitivu, Mannar, and, to a lesser extent, Kilinochchi), Batticaloa in the Eastern
Province, and Monaragala in the Uva Province remain far behind in levels of poverty,
infrastructure, and economic development.
Finally, the economy is facing the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic2 , which
has adversely affected several sectors, including tourism, and further constrains the
already tight fiscal space. Moreover, rapid aging poses an additional constraint on the
country’s future growth performance.
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SRI LANKA COUNTRY PRIVATE SECTOR DIAGNOSTIC
A highly restrictive trade regime with average customs duties on imports of 22.3
percent because of para-tariffs creates a bias against exports and diversification by
directing private investments into protected sectors served by Sri Lanka–based firms.
Import protection has been driven partly by the desire to protect national production,
and partly by fiscal exigency: taxes on international trade accounted for a high average
of 18 percent of tax revenue during 2014–19, much higher than in other upper-middle-
income countries, where the average is about 1–3 percent. Access to foreign-sourced
inputs also becomes more costly because of high taxation and controls at the border.
The investment climate is poor for most firms. The poor quality of the regulatory
environment constrains investment decisions. However, some foreign investors and
larger companies can access far better terms, notably under Board of Investment (BOI)
sanctioned regimes and BOI zones. The success of some of the exporters attests that
investment climate conditions can be improved when needed.
With the government owning about 40 percent of the banking system, large budget
deficits are to a significant extent funded by state-owned banks. Furthermore, the
state provides guarantees to state banks to facilitate lending to SOEs and occasionally
allows for outright dismissal of loan obligations. As a result, the private sector, in
particular small and medium enterprises (SMEs), is deprived of resources that are
needed to support innovation and productivity-enhancing investments. Furthermore,
the preferential access to finance for SOEs distorts competition with the private sector
and in turn affects the quality and cost of services in these sectors.
Most land is publicly owned (80 percent). Land use is highly fragmented and can be
subject to regulations, such as the restriction of the use of agricultural land in some
regions to certain crops (rice for instance) and restrictions on foreign use of land.
Also, ownership of vast tracks of land by some public entities leads to underutilization
and misallocation.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MATRIX OF ACTIONS
ES.3 H
OW DID SRI LANKA GROW DESPITE CONSTRAINTS
IN THE PAST?
Many of the above constraints have been prevalent in the past, including periods when
Sri Lanka enjoyed rapid economic growth and poverty reduction. Understanding how
this came about provides guidance in charting a growth strategy in the future. Some of
the constraints have endured for a long time because they are politically sensitive and
may be challenging to relax in the near term. A growth strategy must take this into
account and identify reforms that are both economically salient and politically feasible.
In reviewing Sri Lanka’s past economic performance in the wake of several obstacles,
three lessons emerge:
a. Making use of the global marketplace. In some sectors (textile and clothing,
tourism, IT, high-end manufacturing) companies have been expanding their
footprint to the global marketplace where the distortions prevalent in the domestic
market are not present and demand is unlimited. In this process, companies have
been able to become competitive and upgrade production to more sophisticated
products and markets.
To fully harness Sri Lanka’s comparative advantage and integrate it further into
global value chains, the country needs to build on the innovative drive in the large
existing manufacturing sectors, such as apparel, and entrepreneurial dynamism
in niche sectors, such as information and communications technology (ICT) and
high-tech products. These sectors, if scaled up, hold the potential to drive Sri
Lanka’s full transformation to an upper-middle-income country. Improved access
to external markets is essential in this respect: the size of the country’s domestic
market is too small to allow production of higher technology products at the
scale necessary to fully support their growth potential. In this context, it will be
essential to step up efforts at greater integration in global value chains: concluding
bilateral free-trade agreements could be the key to accessing large markets and
becoming a more attractive destination for new investments.
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SRI LANKA COUNTRY PRIVATE SECTOR DIAGNOSTIC
Leaving aside these large firms, Sri Lanka’s private sector is dominated by the
informal sector (in terms of number of firms), albeit to a lesser extent than in
some South Asian peers. While there are numerous SMEs, they are not dynamic
enough to drive structural transformation toward a more typical upper-middle-
income country.
For instance, even though Sri Lanka has a good education system with among
the best indicators in South Asia and boasts pockets of highly qualified labor,
skills gaps are noted by employers as one of the important constraints to their
development. Notably, lack of graduates from public education in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields and technical and
vocational skills that can more easily be used in the private sector are among
the most significant shortcomings noted by employers. While there are private
providers of education, to the extent authorized, the regulatory environment fails
to properly monitor their quality.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MATRIX OF ACTIONS
With a limited domestic market, Sri Lanka cannot compete at scale in most industries.
It must differentiate itself by further diversifying into higher value-added industries
and harnessing opportunities for regional integration. Recent successes in knowledge
and quality-intensive sectors (spanning sectors from value-added agricultural products,
to specialized manufacturing and IT-enabled services) could be scaled up with
appropriate upstream policies. The second pillar of private sector-led growth should be
on scaling up tourism, as soon as recovery from the COVID-19 crisis will permit, and
then investing in more sophisticated and varied tourism offerings.
A focus on green and sustainable development will leverage Sri Lanka’s natural
assets and a well-preserved environment while contributing to the fight against
climate change. The environmentally sustainable use of natural assets is central to the
tourism industry, but also to several key natural-resources connected sectors such as
agriculture and marine-based production mentioned below. Mitigation of the impact of
climate change will also be integral to future private sector growth through an increase
in renewable energy use (a key objective for the energy, urban, and transport sectors)
and better management of coastal areas.
Through SOE reforms, the government can mitigate the mounting fiscal risks
and costs negatively affecting macrofiscal stability, a key determinant for foreign
investments. It can further use its state-owned business enterprises as catalysts for
private investments and partnerships instead of displacing them. This would require
the government to modernize and consolidate the legal and regulatory framework
governing SOEs, reduce the competitive neutrality concerns affecting the level
playing field, and strengthen the corporate governance and performance of its key
SOEs through specific measures recommended by the World Bank integrated SOE
diagnostic, which complements this report (World Bank 2020c).
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SRI LANKA COUNTRY PRIVATE SECTOR DIAGNOSTIC
To ensure growth in the tourism sector in the medium term, there is a need to improve
logistics and connectivity and address shortages of skilled and service-oriented
workforce, which would be important to provide high-value tourism services. The
capacity of tourism and hospitality training institutes in regions outside Colombo
needs to increase to address future demand. There is also the need to build strategic
capacity for policy formulation within government agencies dealing with tourism and
enhance interagency coordination. Post-COVID-19, it will take longer than expected
to regain the confidence of tourists to return; now is the moment to review how this
could be facilitated.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MATRIX OF ACTIONS
TABLE ES.1 MATRIX OF INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO CREATE MARKETS
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SRI LANKA COUNTRY PRIVATE SECTOR DIAGNOSTIC
Education and Opportunities for private investment Opportunities for private investment
skills • TVET PPPs. • Internationalization of universities:
Boost TVET offerings attracting international students; foreign
and industry- Measures investments in universities (with the BOI);
university links • Reinforce university–private sector links with foreign universities for research.
(compensating for coordination to match skills to • Private sector investment in universities
and working around demand and promote innovation focused on the provinces.
distortions). (improve fiscal incentives; review IPR
policies; fund innovation spaces).a Measures
• Develop Sector Skills Councils in • Improve university faculty in priority fields
priority sectors (TVET) with a view such as STEM: promote PhD scholarships;
to aligning the supply of skilled labor fill vacancies; hire foreign nationals.
with demand. Offer firms incentives to • Establish an independent quality
build in-house training capabilities. assurance council. Review quality of EDPs;
• Improve governance of the TVET reform National Vocational Qualifications
sector and coordination among the (course accreditation; quality assurance).
ministries responsible for training • Differentiate missions between teaching,
institutions to improve efficiency and research and innovation, and community
enhance the quality of training programs. services and regional development.
• Restructure the Skills Development Fund
to allocate resources competitively.
Transport and Opportunities for private investment Opportunities for private investment
logistics • Development of the East and West • Value-added storage facilities (cold
Develop future Container Terminals using a landlord storage, third-party logistics, and MCC/
transport and port model and evaluate strategic LCL services).
value-added logistics private sector participation. • Value-added services (bunkering, marine,
services (better and so forth) related to Hambantota port
use of the global Measures
activities.
marketplace) • Improve institutional strength and capacity
development to bolster SLPA as a regulator. Measures
• Develop a master plan to improve city-port • Finish highway expansion projects.
and port-hinterland connectivity (including • Expand Jaffna International Airport
feasibility studies and financing options). runway.
• Perform needs assessment for new • Automate port-gate clearances and
gateway supply chain advanced logistic transfers between extended port
infrastructure. gates, inland ports, and other customs
• Complete the extension of the BIA authorized economic zones, industrial
terminal.b parks, and container freight stations.
• Roll-out the Sri Lanka customs
National Single Window with the
appointment of a high-level steering
committee.
IT infrastructure Measures.
Prepare for a • Review regulations to allow local loop
more open market unbundling and address last-mile
(compensating for connection competition issues.
distortions).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MATRIX OF ACTIONS
Traded sectors
IT-enabled services Opportunities for private investment Opportunities for private investment
Facilitate the • Post-angel-stage VC funding (see above). • Continued expansion of the BPM sector.
supply of labor, key
skills, and inputs Measures Measures
to a growth sector Prioritize IT skills at the university level • Improve the regulatory environment to
(better use of the • Improve labor laws and facilitate address issues regarding data localization
global marketplace). granting visas for qualified expatriates and management and digital transactions
(for example, French Tech Visa). (signatures, payments).
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SRI LANKA COUNTRY PRIVATE SECTOR DIAGNOSTIC
Access to land • Adopt the policy of parcel-based land • Establish a new policy on state land
registry and cadastral map for all land and building asset management
Better use fallow
ownership and land use rights in Sri Lanka. incentivizing public asset
public lands while
• Revise the registering property monetization and revising permitting,
improving land
processes to 3 steps (from the leasing, and granting concessions on
information systems
current 9). state lands.
(compensating for
distortions) • Carry out or review an inventory
of State Land Assets with a view to
putting them to commercial use .
Note: Priority measures are in boldface. BIA = Bandaranaike International Airport; BOI = Board of Investment; BPM = business process management; CBSL = Central
Bank of Sri Lanka; CEB = Ceylon Electricity Board; EDP external degree programs; fintech = financial technology; FMA = Financial Markets Authority; IPR = international
property rights; IT = information technology; LCL = less container load; MCC = multi-country consolidation; MICE = meetings, incentives, conference/conventions and
exhibitions/events; MSMEs = micro, small, and medium enterprises; NBFI = nonbank financial institution; NCRE = nonconventional renewable energy; PPP = public-
private partnership; R&D = research and development; SL = Sri Lanka; SLPA = Sri Lanka Ports Authority; STEM = science, technology, engineering, and mathematics;
TVET = technical and vocational education and training ; VC = venture capital.
NOTES
1 Sri Lanka's credit rating was downgraded by S&P (to 'Selective Default') ’Fitch (to 'C') and Moody's (to ‘Cd') after authorities announced
suspension of interest and principle repayments in foreign currency.
2 The successive national lockdowns affected not only tourism but also domestic consumption.
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SRI LANKA COUNTRY PRIVATE SECTOR DIAGNOSTIC
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CONTACTS
Jean-Christophe Maur
jmaur@worldbank.org
Volker Treichel
vtreichel@ifc.org
ifc.org
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