The new normal after Pahalgam, India’s response
Rakesh Sood
is a former diplomat and currently Distinguished Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR)
India needs to work on its expansive ‘new normal’ in order for it to be a credible
deterrent against
terrorist attacks
Operation Sindoor is on ‘pause’ and though the ceasefire began somewhat shakily on Saturday
evening (May 10), it seems to be holding. On May 12, the two Director Generals of Military
Operations (DGMO) — India and Pakistan — had a follow-up conversation and discussed
further de-escalatory measures to reduce troop presence in the forward areas that had seen a
buildup in recent weeks.
Addressing the nation on Monday evening (May 12), Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared,
“Operation Sindoor has redefined the fight against terror…setting a new benchmark and a new
normal in counter-terrorism measures.” Kinetic retaliation is not new. The Modi government
conducted “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016 after the Uri attack, and an
air strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) camp in Balakot in 2019 following the Pulwama suicide
attack. Yet, the Pahalgam response was qualitatively different.
Eighty-eight hours to a ceasefire
After the Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, it was clear that the Indian government would
respond with force. The only question was when and in what manner. The measures
announced in the days that followed such as reducing diplomatic presence, switching off trade,
closing down the Wagah-Attari border crossing, cancelling existing visas, and putting the Indus
Waters Treaty in abeyance, were a strong response but not a substitute for kinetic retaliation.
The intervening fortnight till May 7 was used in finalising targets for kinetic retaliation and
ramping up diplomatic engagement at all levels. Post 2019, Indian authorities were certain that,
sooner or later, there would be a terrorist attack of a magnitude that would compel a
calibrated military response. This demanded planning and periodic updating, based on
evolving technical capabilities. Eventually, nine targets were chosen out of nearly two dozen
options. The intense diplomatic engagement at all levels, in Delhi and other key capitals,
prepared the ground to ensure an acceptance (though sometimes with caveats) of India’s right
to target the terrorists and their infrastructure. India’s challenge was to restore red lines while
managing the escalation narrative and leaving a de-escalation option open.
Shortly after the May 7 early morning strike was concluded (Operation Sindoor), the Pakistan
DGMO Major General Kashif Abdullah was informed of the nine locations targeted as these
were closely associated with designated terrorist groups, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the JeM,
and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. India emphasised the point that Operation Sindoor was against
terrorists and not the Pakistani military or the Pakistani people. It added that if the Pakistani
forces responded, India would reserve the right to retaliate. Pakistan acknowledged the strike
(at six locations) and claimed that it had downed between five to six Indian aircraft, including
some Rafale fighter jets, though this was denied by India. It offered an off-ramps de-escalation
option — Pakistan claiming success in terms of taking down Indian aircraft, playing down the
impact of Indian strikes, and taking the issue of violation of its territory to the United Nations
Security Council, where it is currently a non-permanent member.
However, Pakistan’s military leadership saw it as an opportunity to bolster its faltering image
and vowed military retaliation. The following two nights, Pakistan mounted escalating drone
intrusions, together with some loitering munitions and missile firings, over 36 locations along
the 3,300 kilometre-long India-Pakistan border, more with the intent to probe for gaps in
India’s air defences. India retaliated, with its declared quid pro quo plus policy, targeting
Pakistani air bases and air defence units. However, Pakistan denied its intrusions even as it
blamed India for repeated violations and attacks. Its air space remained open for civilian air
traffic, prompting an Indian warning on May 9 that this was jeopardising civilian air traffic. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) board meeting on May 9 to approve the next tranche of the
IMF Extended Fund Facility (loan to Pakistan) necessitated prudence.
The night of May 9-10 witnessed a dramatic escalation. Pakistan claimed to have struck 26
Indian targets “to reestablish deterrence after repeated Indian attacks”. India acknowledged
“limited damage to equipment and personnel at air force stations Udhampur, Pathankot,
Adampur, and Bhuj”. The Indian response on the morning of May 10 was ferocious and
targeted nine military airfields, from Skardu and Chaklala in the north to Rahim Yar Khan and
Jacobabad in the south as well as three forward air defence units. The stand-off weapons used
included the Scalp and BrahMos missiles as well as the Crystal Maze, Hammer and Spice 2000
precision guided munitions. The previous 24 hours had seen intense diplomatic activity with a
flurry of telephone calls between Washington, Islamabad, and Delhi. Following a conversation
between the two DGMOs in the afternoon, a ceasefire came into effect at 5 p.m. (1700 hours)
on May 10.
The U.S.’s role
Initially, the U.S. adopted a hands-off approach, with United States Vice-President J.D. Vance
suggesting on May 8 that the U.S. was not going to get involved “in the middle of a war that is
fundamentally none of our business”. However, within 24 hours, the U.S. assessment changed
as it picked up signs of more cross-border strikes and reports that Pakistan was scheduling a
meeting of its National Command Authority (NCA), or the body that oversees the country’s
nuclear arsenal. While Mr. Vance spoke to Mr. Modi on the evening of May 9 (Indian time),
sharing the U.S.’s concerns about a “dramatic escalation”, the following day (Indian time) U.S.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir, following
it up with calls to his counterparts India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Pakistan’s
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja
Asif announced on May 10 that no meeting of the NCA had taken place.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s message on May 10 pre-empted the official announcement
about the ceasefire raising questions about the U.S.’s role. The fact is that after 1998, the U.S.
has played a role in de-escalating multiple crises: Kargil in 1999, the Indian Parliament attack
and Operation Parakram in 2001, Mumbai in 2008 and Balakot in 2019, the exception being the
2016 surgical strikes that Pakistan denied had happened. Yet, none of these instances has led
to U.S. mediation and there is little reason to think otherwise this time. There are only two
ways of avoiding external intervention — first, increase the economic and military differential
with Pakistan, and second, have independent communication channels between the two
countries.
Conflict under the nuclear shadow
Since 1998 when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states, Pakistan’s
approach has been to reduce the space for conventional war, by flashing the nuclear card and
threatening early nuclear use. The objective is to constrain India’s space for a kinetic response
to a terrorist attack. However, this is no longer working. If the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ made
kinetic retaliation the new normal, Balakot enlarged it in 2019 by introducing air power, and
Operation Sindoor has expanded it to cover all of Pakistan. So far, India has emphasised that it
has been retaliating against terrorist targets — launch pads across the LoC in 2016, a Balakot
training camp in 2019, and the nine locations now (Operation Sindoor). However, Mr. Modi has
added a new dimension.
In the expansive ‘new normal’ that he outlined on May 12, he reiterated India’s right to respond
militarily to any terror attack and not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail”, but added that India
would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments
sponsoring terrorism. This addition puts the Pakistani military on notice that the next time,
India’s kinetic response under an Operation Sindoor 2.0 may not be limited to terrorist targets.
The hardening position is evident in his statement, “terror and talks cannot go together; terror
and trade cannot go together; water and blood cannot flow together.”
By expanding the scope of conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, Mr. Modi is
seeking to nullify the nuclear overhang but this requires a significant expansion in conventional
capabilities. Capabilities to suppress hostile air defences and adopt a network-centric-approach
that seamlessly integrates manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-based support for
surveillance, communication and targeting, will need to be introduced. Simultaneously, India
needs to draw lessons from the intelligence and security lapses that led to Pahalgam, in order
to better plan, predict and prevent future Pahalgams. Only then will the expansive ‘new normal’
be a credible deterrent against future terrorist attacks.
