21 January 2008

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A n a l y s e s

Conflicts MONUC Operation ARTEMIS Conclusion

Conflict zones in the Great The peace process and the UN The European Union takes Military training or a success-
Lakes Region Mission in DRC over full crisis management?
Page 5 Page 12 Page 20 Page 32

ANDRÁS ISTVÁN TÜRKE

THE OPERATION ARTEMIS

IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
EU and UN crisis management in Ituri, in the context of conflicts at the Great
Lakes region in 2003
/Translated from the French original version/

CERPESC - CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE RECHERCHE POUR LA PESC

European Solutions for Defence & Crisis Management
www.pesc.eu

Europa Varietas Institute

Association Objectif Europe III - Sorbonne

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i n f o r m a t i o n

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Summary

Introduction

I. The interaction between conflict zones in the

Great Lakes Region
1.1. The Rwandan genocide and the interests of
alliance networks
1.2. President Chirac and the two wars in the DRC

II. Geopolitical frameworks, the peace process

and MONUC
II.1. DRC and (Great) Powers
II.2. African policy framework and MONUC
(30.11.1999 – 30.04.2004)
II.3. The Cease-fire in Lusaka (10.07.1999)
II.4. The establishment of MONUC
II.5. The political situation between 2000 and 2003

III. The Operation ARTEMIS : Effective crisis

management or military training?
III.1. The launch of the operation : legal
frameworks
III.2. The Operation «Black MAMBA»
III.3. The operation chain of command
III.3.1. The political-military level
III.3.2. The strategic level
III.3.3. The operational level
III.3.4. The tactical level
III.4. Applied Transport Capacity
IV.5. The exemple of Cyprus – participation
frameworks of the accession countries
IV.6. Brief history of the Operation ARTEMIS - an
operation with a «single D»

Conclusion of the military operation – a

successful military training, but an ambiguous
crisis management

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Introduction Operation ARTEMIS can be considered a global
commitment to international security in a situation
In 2003, the European Union, following the that is described by former Secretary of State of the
launch of operations/missions like CONCORDIA United States, Madeleine Albright as "Africa's first
and EUPM in the Balkans, has expanded its world war." 2 Is it important for European security
outreach to the African continent. After reasons or is it just a "practice" how to manage
understanding the context of conflicts in the Great future crises close to Europe?
Lakes region, we will deal with the various phases
of the presence of the union in the Democratic Is this a new form of colonial ambitions of
Republic of Congo. France? (Because we know that a new policy began
to ex-colonies during the Iraq crisis (in 2003) by
Operation ARTEMIS is considered the first the visits of President Chirac.) An operation like
military operation led by the EU, "The first this can be used in the preparation of an EU
autonomous EU operation, the first rapid response economic expansion? (For example, the expansion
mission of the EU first operation outside Europe, of the euro zone.) Why the United States have left
first operation applying the principle of the this operation in European hands?
framework nation and first example of "relay
operation", conducted in cooperation between the This inaugural operation falls more problems on
EU and the United Nations1." the objectives of the CFSP and its articulation with
the EU Member States, international organizations
But how she really left between the frames of the and other powers.
Union? What are the lesson learned for future
missions ? Has the EU well played its role? How Finally we will address the development of the
was the cooperation with UN ? The specialized European diplomacy and operations with two
military force of the EU might be more effective as different missions: EUPOL Kinshasa, the first
UN Blue Helmets? Cooperation between the EU (civilian) police mission of the ESDP in Africa and
military operation and the operation of Blue EUSEC DR Congo, a mission with SSR and DDR
Helmets would be more advantageous than that issues.
between Blue Helmets and NATO (and especially
the US Army)?

The United Nations could count on the EU

special army as the "second army" of the UN
whose "civilian control" respect better the decisions
of the Security Council? Are there parallels
between a Operation ARTEMIS and the operation
in Afghanistan or Iraq in the field of strategy or
logistics management? And if the operation can be
considered successful, what are the reasons for
success that differentiate it from the ineffectiveness
EU reactions during the first Balkan crisis in the
1990s?

1Le maintien de la paix en Afrique sub-saharienne : une approche concrète, A/1913, op. cit., p. 24.
2 REISS, Andreas, “European Union sends troops to Congo - First independent EU military mission” (27 June 2003),
http://www.wsws.org/

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I. The interaction between conflict areas in the In Rwanda in 1978, Habyarimana changed the
Great Lakes Region Constitution and passed a one-party, MRND, which
all Rwandans are ex officio members. Tutsi exiles
1.1. The Rwandan Genocide and the interests of organized and formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front
alliance networks (RPF) in 1987. On 1 October 1990, from Uganda,
the RPF comes into force in Northern Rwanda.
To better understand the highly complex situation
in the Great Lakes region, we need a little back in In DRC during the war in Katanga, by a Franco-
history: Trying to understand the origins of the Belgian military intervention in Kolwezi in 1978,
conflict and the causes of the genocide of Rwanda French paratroopers were permanently secured the
in 1994. The objectives of the French and American French military influence on the regime. The city of
politics area. Kolwezi was taken over by secessionist rebels, 600
paratroopers jumped on Kolwezi to extract 2700
After being separated from the Belgian Congo Europeans threatened.
(became independent in 1960) the Rwanda-Burundi
is in turn divided into two independent states in The history of rehabilitating Mobutu back in 1990
1962. George Kayibanda became president of when the DST (Division spéciale présidentielle;
Rwanda, whose power is weakened and finally Special Presidential Division 1,500 men) of
Juvenal Habyarimana overthrown him in July Mobutu intervened in Rwanda, alongside France
1973. and the Habyarimana army, to fight the RPF. The
In 1975, he founded the National Republican assistance provided to Rwandan refugees in eastern
Movement for Development (Mouvement Zaire was $ 2.5 billion, almost the Rwandan GDP 4.
révolutionnaire national pour le développement ;
MRND) and has signed with French President HRW says that much of this money was diverted
Giscard d'Estaing a Military Technical Assistance by the brother-Mobutu, head of supply fields and
Agreement, which allowed the transfer of arms by Hutu Power that controlled the distribution of
from France to the Rwanda. food 5 . The report of the Commission of Inquiry of
the UN (1996) assumes that the militias were
The former Belgian Congo, Zaire became funded in part by the sale of products of the
independent in 1960 and Joseph Desire Mobutu humanitarian aid. But "the dark crowning" of
took power. At the time the level of development in Jacques Foccart`s work, the Zairian epic covers the
Zaire was equivalent to South Korea. In 1996, the period from 1994 to 1997 Zaire. Paris needs
DRC was among the poorest countries in the world Mobutu to keep the country and access to its
while Mobutu became one of the ten richest men in wealth6.
the world: The exploitation of gold and diamond
was a private activity in favor of the president. October 16, 1993, President Mitterrand agreed to
"The Kasai diamond counters were leaded by his receive Marshal, outside the Francophone Summit
son Kongolu trought liege men, mostly Lebanese" in Mauritius, but some argue that the true
and Kinshasa was the place of narco-dollars rehabilitation of Mobutu began at the end of April
laundering where they bought diamants with cash 3. 1994, full of the Rwandan genocide.
During a visit to Zaire, Jacques Foccart (with

3 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, Paris, Stock, 1999., pp. 227-229.
4 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., pp. 243-244.
5 Rwanda/Zaïre, Réarmement dans l'impunité, Human Right Wach Report, mai 1995.
6 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., pp. 243-44

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Robert Bourgi lawyer and former minister Michel in Noroît reach 688 people, thousands of Tutsis
Aurillac) found at Marshal Mobutu, American and were immediately imprisoned and, according to
Belgian representatives of pro-Mobutu lobbies, Minister of Cooperation Robert Galley, the French
Herman Cohen and Max-Olivier Cahen. army has been used to stop the advance of FPR9.
In May 1994, them and Robert Bourgi have
signed a $ 600,000 contract of policy In 1991, Hutu extremists carried out several
communication with Mobutu. The scenario was as massacres of different Tutsis groups. From its rear
follows: Strengthening the Mobutu regime, bases established in Uganda, with the support of
politically and financially by the announcement of the Ugandan army, the RPF gradually establish a
a (customized) presidential election and bridgehead in northern Rwanda where fighting will
rehabilitation of Zaire in the international financial continue until 1994. Under pressure of the
system7. international community, the successive agreements
of Arusha, signed in August 1993 with the RPF,
In November 1994, the French have invited include organizing the return of exiled Tutsis and
Mobutu to the Franco-African Summit in Biarritz. the political and military integration of various
According to some opinions, Mobutu became a internal and external components of the Rwandan
strong pillar in the fight against pan-African aims nation10.
and against the "Anglo-Saxon axis of evil" of the
Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni, allied to the April 7, 1994, after the attack that brought down
Rwandan Patriotic Front (Front patriotique the plane of President Habyarimana, the Hutu
rwandais (FPR)8. Power took power in Kigali, with the support of the
To understand why Zaire has become so presidential guard, militia, gendarmerie, and some
important in one go, we need to return to Rwanda of the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces armées
wire: rwandais - FAR).
Radical eradication of Tutsis began in April-May
During the famine in Rwanda, was born the 1994, during the genocide, the result was 800,000
slogan Hutu Power! This military-political killed in seven weeks (5 times the elimination of
extremist group, racist, consisting of close family Auschwitz daily rate). The core of the genocide
of the president "phagocytosed" the regime. In was the group of officers leded by Colonel
addition, the clan of President`s wife Agathe Bagosora; General Augustin Bizimungu, the ousted
monopolized the wealth of the country. the moderate chief of staff Marcel Gatsinzi and
To respond to the offensive of the rebels of the Jean Baptiste Gatete, the leader of the Interahamwe
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda, France militia11.
organized in 1990 Operation Noroît which would
continue until the establishment of UN troops What was the French reaction? They evacuated
(UNAMIR commanded by General Dallaire) in the French and other European citizens. Moreower
December 1993 and whith dubious legality. exfiltration of part of the clan Habyarimana and 34
Rwandan, under cover of the evacuation of an
The official number of French soldiers involved orphanage was observed. Glued to Hutu Power,

7 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., pp. 231-232.
8 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 232.
9 audition de M. Robert Galley (13 mai 1998), in : Mission d’Information sur le Rwanda, Sommaire des comptes rendus d’auditions,

Assemblé Nationale, pp. 273-286.

10 MELVERN, Linda, Conspiracy to murder : the Rwandan genocide, Verso, 2004, p. 104.
11 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., pp. 23-30.

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they delivered ammunition to the FAR through 1.) Mobutu was allowed to install an impressive
Goma. Operation Turquoise from June 23 to French logistics in Zaire. Mobutu was the ally of
August 22, 1994 was rather a sham, a humanitarian the Hutu Power: together they composed the
alibi. The French expeditionary force equipped exodus of a million refugees.
with armored vehicles was welcomed triumphantly
by those responsible for genocide12. 2.) The Hutu Power was transferred to Zaire
20,000 tons of coffee, and stocks in stores,
By the way, this operation was one of the first belonging to the Mobutu family.
European operations that benefited from satellite
coverage provided by the WEU Satellite Center in 3.) At the Franco-African Summit in Biarritz, in
Torrejón. His images have helped the deployment November 1994 François Mitterrand gave a
of forces enabling them to help refugees as quickly positive assessment of the Franco-African relations
as possible, and prevent fighter`s infiltration13 . during his mandate. The principle of an African
Thus the reason of Mobutu`s rehabilitation became Standby Force was endorsed : Mobutu could
clear: he had to ensure the rear-base in Zaire during participate despite the massacres and his support of
a war against Rwanda. Jacques Foccart since his the civil war in Angola.
relocation to the Interior Ministry, was
campaigning for the rehabilitation of Mobutu. 4.) With the diplomatic support of the Elysee, the
interim government of Hutu Power succeeded in
F r e n c h o ff i c i a l s h a v e d e c i d e d a l m o s t torpedoing with Mobutu a meeting for the
unanimously despite the Mitterrand-Balladur reconciliation in Tanzania. Bruno Delaye gives
cohabitation. Guy Pen says that "in 1994, during explanations: "We can not let the Anglophone
Operation Turquoise (...) the French authorities countries decide the future of a francophone
had an opportunity to clean up the Great Lakes country. " The rapid response could have prevented
Region. (...) They allowed the contrary, the flight of hundreds of thousands of deaths ... Some argue that
militia ... "14 Patrick de Saint-Exupéry complete Mitterrand said that "in these countries, a genocide
him: "In sum, it comes to cutting the Kigali regime is not too important17."
(dominated by Tutsis) from the Hutu population
that remained in countries. It is necessary that this 5.) According to a journalist, the French strategy
system has the reputation of a racist power15." The was as follows: First goal is the maximum
French section of Médecins sans frontières deterioration of the situation in Rwanda for the
emphasize the need to continue to feed the return of the forces of the former government and
criminals: "It was the price to pay to feed hundreds the power sharing. Zaire as a rear base, allows FAR
of thousands of innocent women and children16. " to reorganize and train with Mobutu's presidential
guard. Finally it all makes possible an invasion in
What were the results of the situation resulting Rwanda, or causing the FPR for a counterattack
from the French policy? against the FAR bases in Zaire. And this response
was opening the door to an intervention in Kigali18.

12 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., pp. 31-35.
13 L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 29.
14 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 240
15 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 242
16 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 243
17 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 32. et Jean-Paul Gouteux, Un

génocide sans importance. La France et le Vatican au Rwanda, Tahin party, 2001, p. 102.
18 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 245.

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6.) According to HRW, France delivered via - 1st axis: the alliance between the CAR, DRC,
Mobutu, artillery, machine guns and assault rifles Sudan, Hutu Power in Rwanda, with French
for Hutu Power. Cargo planes companies registered support against the
or based in Zaire transported most of the weapons - 2nd axis: cooperation between Uganda of the
provided. Mobutu quietly left the Hutu Power train "Anglo-Saxon" Yoweri Museveni, Paul Kagame of
in Zaire and according to HRW, France trained the Rwanda, and the Movement of John Garang in
Hutu Power in CAR after the defeat of FAR. South Sudan supported by the United States that
even armed Sudanese opposition via Eritrea and
7.) FAR received weapons via the airport of Ethiopia.
Goma within the area controlled by the French, and
the French have left behind at least a cache of Libya funded rather "the 1st axis," but kept good
weapons in the Rwandan town of Kamembe. contact with Rwanda. So, how different conflict
According to the rapporteurs of the UN, the supply zones and regions interact under the supervision of
of weapons to the ex-FAR was organized from (great)powers, whose knowledge is essential to
Kenya. In addition, in June 1996, Russian aircrafts understand the background of the issues in the
loaded weapons crashed in Kinshasa. Thus the conflict in the DRC and Sudan 22. We add that this
former army Habyarimana received a portion of is a simplified diagram because different alliances
Operation Turquoise`s arm (AML 60 and AML change from time to time, several times with
armored vehicles with 120-millimeter mortars, "antagonism". We'll see how certain "allies" of
anti-aircraft weapons, rocket launchers, howitzers, these axes are fighting each other or make tactical
military trucks) and the other part was sold by maneuvers following the idea of divide et impera in
Zairian officers19. certain theaters, such as Rwanda and Uganda in the
DRC, in the Ituri region.
8.) The international context was as follows:
France was afraid of vacuum caused by the This is the Central African Republic (CAR),
collapse of Habyarimana clan. The French goal was which still plays a key role is the reason why we
to trap Uganda and its allies20. They have increased must delve a little into the details:
the stress to Mobutu of Zaire, asking him to take The strengthening of relations between France
over and "extend its protective shadow over the and the CAR, the former Oubangui-Chari also date
pacific and Great Lakes region." back to the second half of the 1970s, such as in
The consequence of this was that Mobutu allowed DRC and Rwanda. The country has a limited
the massacre descendants of Kasaians in Katanga diamond and uranium resource. In 1959 David
and the massacre of Banyarwanda in Kivu. "By Dacko took power and sought to rely on China.
choosing to deploy around Goma in Zaire, its
military-humanitarian logistics, and then letting it In 1965, Colonel Bokassa "discreetly supported"
install the Rwandan refugee camps, Paris can by France took power and a French paratrooper
demonstrate how Mobutu is essential21 . Following detachment arrived in the country under defense
the logic "the enemy of my enemy is my friend ", agreements between the two contracting parties.
two areas have started to form: But megalomania and massacres of President (then

19 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., pp. 246-247.
20 This is the reason for the approchement between French and Sudanese Secret Service, led by Charles Pasqua. VERSCHAVE, Fran-
çois-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 80.
21 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 232.
22 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 236.

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Emperor) Bokassa became increasingly region and was the counterweights of Libya.
embarrassing for France, moreover Bokassa turned
to Libya23. Dacko was again overthrown in 1981 by General
Kolingba, always advised by Paris. It created a real
After the famous case of diamonds, in 1979, tutelary regime under the good offices of Colonel
France launched Operation Barracuda in CAR, of the DGSE, Jean-Claude Mantion.
depositing President Bokassa. The French army According to François-Xavier Verschave "This is
took Bangui, bringing "in his luggage" the to maintain the trainability and airborne
President David Dacko. Under the reign of Dacko, intervention of French troops in a wide perimeter
France has strengthened its positions in Central including African oil fields in the Gulf of Guinea. It
Africa. A French military occupation force of is also extending the covert action capacities in the
nearly 1,500 men may radiate throughout the countries of the region: Zaire, Chad, Rwanda,

The "two axes" of the Great Lakes region

23 GOURÉVITCH, Jean-Paul, La France en Afrique – Cinq siècles de présence : vérités et mensonges, op. cit., pp. 277-279.

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Sudan, Congo, etc ...24" sect; and Bakonjo, a Ugandan ethnic group that
lives on the Ruwenzori dish fighting against the
Now we understand the key role of CAR in the Ugandan government since 1952 for an
region. We have already mentioned that the administrative autonomy. Since 40 years they fight
Rwandan RPF has found against "all the world": the
strong support to Uganda. English, Idi Amin, Obote,
In Uganda, the "axis" of Museveni.
which France is part 3
supported three guerrillas These Ugandan guerrillas
operating in the cross- operating in southern Sudan and
border area Zaire (DRC) - northern Zaire are meeting in the
Sudan-Uganda 25, 26: region of Kaya (Uganda-Sudan-
Congo common border). This is
1 The LRA (Lord's the place where the weapons
Resistance Army) a transiting including those paid by
Christian movement that the French. It was not the French
builds on the Bible, raised weapons but the weapons
in 1987. Under the The regions in the DRC purchased in the Eastern bloc 27.
tutelage of Alice Auma
priestess, it is led by Joseph Kony, and sustained by
1.2. President Chirac and the two wars in the
weapons of Sudan. In 1993, the LRA had only
DRC
200-300 men, but until 1997, its man force
increased to 5,000 troops, very well equipped, with
What were the changes in French policy in Africa
new trellis, a weapon for every man, rocket
after the election of President Jacques Chirac in
launchers and mines.
May 1995? In short, there was no change. On 24
April 1996, Chirac received Mobutu at the Elysée
2 The WNBF (West Nile Bank's Front) was born
and Jacques Godfrain (near Jacques Foccart),
around 1995 and is led by Juma Oris. Front
Minister for Cooperation, announced the formal
incorporates the Muslim minority, the warriors of
resumption of Franco-Zairian cooperation 28.
Aringa, the Kakawa (tribe of Uganda Idi Amin
"The Elysée-network" and those of Foccart
Dada) and Nubis (descendants of the slaves of the
Pasqua-operate rather neglecting Dominique de
Egyptian-Sudanese army of the nineteenth
Villepin, Secretary General of the Elysee. The
century).
pillars of this policy on the theater remained Paul
Barril, the former super-gendarme of Mitterrand
3 FDA - Allied Democratic Forces arose later
that brings Mobutu advice and services to its
along the Zaire-Uganda border. These "surreal"
private security company. Also in CAR his private
forces mixed Hutu elements of the former
company is responsible for the security of the
Rwandan army ; the Tabek a trans-ethnic Muslim
Central African President Ange-Félix Patassé.

24 « Mascarade électorale en Centafrique », (12/03/2005), http://www.pressafrique.com

25 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., pp. 237-239.
26 Negotiating Peace: Resolution of Conflicts in Uganda’s West Nile Region, June 2004, Refugee Law Project, Kampala, Ouganda, p.

3.
27 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., pp. 237-239.
28 The Mr. Africa (Monsieur Afrique) of the General de Gaulle, the man who oversaw (until his death) French African politics, the right

hand of President Chirac in African affairs.

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- The Congo - Brazzaville for attacks
against Kinshasa
- Zairian soldiers and officers
- military and militia of the Rwandan
genocide and Burundian allies
- remnants of the army of Ugandan Ubu, Idi
Amin Dada
- the LRA
- Muslim fundamentalists, supported as the
The Kaya region previous two groups by the Khartoum
regime ("cleaner" in the Nuba Mountains of
and other Sudanese countries)
The other is Christian Tavernier, the leader of the - Serb militia "fanatics " of ethnic cleansing
mercenaries of Mobutu, who (with Paul Barill and
his 284 men in Watsa) is responsible for However, the second war, a war of predation,
maintaining the delivery channel RCA-DRC-Sudan broke (1998-2002): the vast natural resources
for Ugandan guerrillas 29. aroused the envy of neighbors. Because many rapes
and massacres approximately 4 million people
September 1996 is the start date of the war in died.
Kivu. This war has replicated the "Rwandan Despite mutual distrust between Kabila`s DRC
quake", swept the Mobutu regime and signed the and France of President Chirac, in a short time,
death of Zaire, became the Democratic Republic of both sides had to radically change their goals to
Congo led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. eventually become allies.

The overthrow of Mobutu was a very unpleasant Firstly, the political method Kabila was
surprise for France. Laurent Désiré Kabila, leader monitored when after July 1, 1998, against the
of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the "looting of Rwandan troops in the DRC", he quit
Liberation of Congo (Alliance des Forces his Rwandan and Ugandan advisors. Even France
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo - has sought to regain his lost ally again the United
AFDL) took power. Moreover, as to its allies, he States. And "the need for France" ally of French
quickly became the opponent of French intentions support for Kabila, who began to separate and
in the region, during the period 1997-1998: His remain alone, resulted ultimately the alliance with
allies at that time were Uganda (of Yorevi France. As in the days of Mobutu, part of the
Museveni), Rwanda (of Paul Kagame ), Angola, armament of troops Kabila passes by Chadian
and especially the United States and Sudan (who airports - under French supervision 31.
provided for him 2,000 soldiers).
Kabila has lost his Ugandan and Rwandan allies,
Moreover, Libya was ready to fund his regime. (who have looted and refused to leave the DRC)
His political method involved a racist basis: and won the support of the alliance structure
antitoutsisme and hatred against the French. around France: Angola, Hutu Power, Sudan, Chad.
Against the Alliance of Kabila and the AFDL Libya, Angola and France have funded such
France has rounded up 30 : military intervention in Zimbabwe for his favor.

29 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., pp. 232-233., p. 239.
30 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République, op. cit., p. 251.
31 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, Noir silence – Qui arretera la Françafrique?, Paris, Les Arènes, 2002., p. 129.

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The result was a real snub to Washington : Troops II. Geopolitical framework, the peace process
from Angola have changed sides, Zimbabwe and and MONUC33
Namibia have helped Kabila to keep Kinshasa. "In
fact, between two legal principles, the non- II.1. The DRC and the Powers
aggression a sovereign state and the outlawing of
genocidal groups, the Elysee chose the one that Central Africa is very rich in minerals. Several
would suit without consulting Parliament32 . " local wars erupted in controlling the trade. The
environment is particularly hostile, and the general
situation very degraded by inter-ethnic violence
that left several thousand dead. In Ituri, a conflict
between different ethnic groups (farmers and
pastoralists) persists long time ago and Ugandan
forces (UPDF - Uganda People`s Defence Force)
have occupied the area, which relief was provided
by the Luanda Agreement in September 200234.

There is also a significant oil and forest reserve.

The Canadian Heritage Oil Company has made
successful drilling with the permission of the
Kabila government, and the United States have
pursued a discreet financial commitment to acquire
political influence. For several years, 65 UN soldier
(originating mainly from Uruguay), without clear
mandate, were in Congo to defend military
observers. You have to remember that in 1996 the
European Union has appointed Mr Aldo Ajello
Special Representative for the Great Lakes
Region35.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a former

Belgian colony as large as Western Europe. During
32 years (until 1997, the Democratic Republic of
Zaire) it was led by Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko.
His corrupt reign survived thanks to the help and
French influence, but after his fall, the influence of
France fell to the benefit of the United States.
So the competition between the US and Europe is
characteristic of this region. During five years of
war, since 1998, more than 3.5 million people died
estimated due to the effects of conflict 36. But at the

32 VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, Noir silence – Qui arretera la Françafrique?, op. cit., p. 126.
33 REISS, Andreas, European Union sends troops to Congo - First independent EU military mission, op. cit.
34 Le maintien de la paix en Afrique sub-saharienne : une approche concrète, Document A/1913, op. cit., p. 25.
35 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 49.
36 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 47.

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time of Kofi Annan`s application for intervention in Northeast was opened. Various rebel movements
summer 2003, attacks against US troops in Iraq trying to overthrow the Kabila regime:
have deterred the Bush administration to intervene. 1, The RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy -
Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie) in
What were the reasons for the action? Is it a the eastern part of the country (with the massive
philanthropic mission to secure (temporarily) the participation of Banyamulenge / Tutsi /) supported
rights when it was clear that MONUC (Mission of by the Government of Rwanda. And
the UN in the DRC - Mission de l’Organisation des 2 the MLC/ALC (Army/Movement for the
Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Liberation of Congo - Mouvement/Armée de
Congo) was unable to perform its mission? Perhaps Libération du Congo), led by Jean Pierre Bemba
the strengthening of political relations with the who control the North. It is supported by the
parties on the ground have yielded significant Government of Uganda.
results. But is it sustainable especially true after the
evacuation of troops in a situation that is changing Infighting overflowed Borders: Zimbabwe, Chad
day after day? and Namibia sent troops to the DRC to lend a hand
to the loyalist army, while Rwanda, Uganda and
Operation ARTEMIS was rooted in the UN Burundi support rebel movements.
peacekeeping. Although several EU states have Before the internationalization of the crisis that
signed the famous letter assuring their support the adversely affected the international law 37 , the
United States during the Iraq crisis, the EU seeks to Security Council expressed its concern with regard
respect the stabilizing role of the UN in to stability and peace in the Great Lakes region. He
international relations. Legally, ARTEMIS was a reiterated the need for all States to refrain from
special operation with the authorization of the interfering in the internal affairs of others, and
United Nations to strengthen the UN mission called for a cease-fire and the immediate
MONUC, unable to effectively manage this kind of withdrawal of foreign forces.
crisis.
He also proposed a national reconciliation that
II.2. The African policy framework and MONUC respects the equality and harmony of all ethnic
(30.11.1999. - 30.04.2004.) groups and emphasized the importance of
democratic elections. In April 1999, the Secretary
From the first Congo War (1996-97), in 1997, General appointed Niasse (Senegal) as his special
Mobutu Sese Seko was enverse by the Alliance of envoy to control the peace process in DRC 38.
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
(AFDL) and Laurent Kabila became president by II.3. The Cease-fire in Lusaka (10.07.1999)
the help of Uganda and Rwanda.
In accepting the call of the UN July 10, 1999, the
The crisis began August 2, 1998 (Second Congo DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda,
War, 1998-2003), when it was faced with a Zimbabwe and MLC signed in Lusaka (Zambia) an
rebellion led to the east by his former comrades ceasefire agreement. Burundi, Chad and RCD were
AFDL. A few months later an other front in the absents 39 . The agreement was to normalize the

37 « Historique de la MONUC »,
http://www.monuc.org/Faits.aspx (10.11.2003.)
38 « Historique de la MONUC »,

http://www.monuc.org/Faits.aspx (10.11.2003.)
39 « Mandat et résolution de la MONUC »,

http://www.un.org/french/peace/peace/cu_mission/monuc/ monucB.htm

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situation on the borders of the DRC and military observers. The mandate and instruments of
emphasized the following duties: MONUC did not allow an intervention to halt
- control of illegal arms trafficking abuses42.
- control of armed groups` infiltration Following the event, the UN has extended eight
- opening a national dialogue times the mandate of the mission by continually
- ensure the security increasing its man force, which grew from 90
- disarmament of militias and armed groups troops (in August 1999) to 10,800 (from July 2003
to July 200443 ). All the personal is already almost
The agreement also set up a military commission seven times larger than that of ARTEMIS. Both
composed of two representatives of each party divisions included military and civilian personnel.
under the authority of a neutral mediator appointed The mission is responsible for civil duties - to
by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)40. To monitor human rights, humanitarian affairs,
ensure the whole, agreement provided for a United information, child protection, political affairs,
Nations force in coordination with the OAU. medical support.

II.4. The establishment of MONUC II.5. The political situation between 2000 and
2003
The violence in the DRC had left fear a new
genocide in neighboring Rwanda in 1994 41 . The In March 2000, Kofi Annan has appointed Major
UN has called the RCD to sign the Agreement and General Mountaga Diallo (Senegal, Commander of
the Security Council, in its resolution 1258, MONUC Forces). In 2001, violence erupted again
authorized the deployment of 90 members of with the assassination of President Laurent Kabila.
military and civilian staff in the Joint Military His successor was his son, Joseph Kabila, 29 years
Commission. old.
On 1 November 1999, the Secretary-General
decided on the deployment of MONUC and 500 By resolution 1376 the Council launched the third

40 « Mandat et résolution de la MONUC »,

http://www.un.org/french/peace/peace/cu_mission/monuc/ monucB.htm
41 DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », in: Cols bleus – Le magazine de la Marine et de la mer N. 2672 du 13/09/2003

pp. 6-7.
42 DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., pp. 6-7.
43 « Résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité », http://daccess-ods.un.org/ : ( S/RES/1258 of 6 August 1999 - 90 members)

S/RES/1273 of 5 November 1999: until 15 January 2000 (500 observers)

S/RES/1291 of 24 February 2000 : until 31 August 2000 (up to 5537 soldiers)
S/RES/1316 of 23 August 2000 : until 15 October 2000
S/RES/1323 of 13 October 2000 : until 15 December 2000
S/RES/1332 of 14 December 2000 : until 15 June 2001
S/RES/1355 of 15 June 2001 : until 15 June 2002
S/RES/1417 of 14 June 2002 : until 30 June 2003 (up to 8700 personnel)
S/RES/1493 of 28 July 2003 : until 30 July 2004 (up to 10,800 personnel)

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phase of MONUC, devoted to Disarmament, On 5 October 2002, a certain "détente" began

Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and with the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the
Resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups. DRC. MONUC noted the departure of 21,941
On 25 February 2002 began in Sun City (South soldiers from 21 sites. On December 30, a cease-
Africa) the inter-Congolese negotiations were fire agreement was signed between MLC, RCD-N
temporarily suspended following the resumption of and RCD-K/ML which the mediator was MONUC
Moliro by RCD-Goma44. (the Gbadolite Agreement).
In the first months of 2003, the situation has

44« Historique de la MONUC »,

http://www.monuc.org/Faits.aspx (10.11.2003.)

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returned disturbing: MONUC observers confirmed Goma49 . This is why the Union was expelled from
serious violations of human rights in the Mambasa Uganda to Bunia in March 2003, but it resumed its
region, and shortly after received information on positions. It consist of 2000-3000 military since
troop movements in the East and North-Eastern June 2002.
DRC 45 . However, after the withdrawal early May
of the Ugandan army Ituri, militias fought - The Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the
immediately cities, and atrocities on civilians Integrity of Congo (Le Parti pour l'Unité et la
resumed46. Sauvegarde de l'Intégrité du Congo, PUSIC),
On February 10, foreign ministers of Uganda and dissatisfied Hema of the UPC, led by Kahwa
the DRC signed in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) an Mandro, supported by Uganda. This is a military
agreement specifying the timetable for the force of 1,000 people since November 2002. The
implementation of the Ituri Pacification objective of Khawa was to bring together local
Commission and withdrawal of Ugandan troops people within the Front for Integration and Peace
from Bunia. At the end of the month MONUC has in Ituri (Front pour l'Intégration et la Paix en Ituri,
suspended flights to Bunia because of a serious FIPI), a coalition50 created in December 2002,
incident, that risky life of Force Commander of supported by Uganda, so that local people
MONUC, General Diallo Mountaga: his helicopter themselves control the mineral resources of the
suffered a fire in Bunia. region and avoid interference between the Nande
and officials in Kinshasa.
The situation has peaked around Bunia. The
population of the Ituri region's 5 million people - The Nationalist Front (Front des nationalistes,
belonging to 12 different ethnic groups47. 500,000 FNI) of the Lendu ethnic group (750,000 people,
to 600,000 displaced people are scattered farmers), is led by Floribert Ngabu Njabu and
throughout the region. Most impotantes warring supported by Rwanda. It received training and a
parties are UPC and FIPI: military support from the RCD-ML. The Front has
1,000 military people.
- The Union of Congolese Patriots (L’Union des
Patriotes Congolais, UPC), especially the militia of - The Front for Reconciliation, Peace and
the ethnic group Hema (150,000 people, culturally Integration (Front pour la Réconciliation, la Paix et
breeders) and Gegere ; led by Thomas Lubanga48 . l’Intégration, FRPI), the political party Ngiti, is
Until December 2002, the union was supported by chaired by dr. Adirodo, it has 400 military people.
Uganda, but Lubanga turned to Rwanda to seek
support, and formed an alliance with the RCD- The conclusion that these relatively few armed

45 « Historique de la MONUC », http://www.monuc.org/Faits.aspx (10.11.2003.) : RCD/G against Kanyabayonga, four battalions of

the Congolese Armed Forces in Beni, Rwandan troops in Ituri, Ugandan troops towards Mahagi, North of Bunia, soldiers in Rwadan
uniform Kivu.
46 GRIGNON, François, The Artemis Operation in the DRC. Lessons Learned for the Future of EU Peacekeeping in Africa, IGC, Paper

presented at International Conference of IEEI entitled "Challenges of Europe-Africa Relations: an Agenda of Priorities" held in Lisbon
on 23 and 24 October 2003, p. 2.
47 To see all the history of the various combatants in the DRC and their interactions, see PROME, Jean-Louis, « Comprendre la question

de l’Ituri : un dossier particulièrement complexe » in : RAIDS, juillet 2003, pp. 16-18.

48 Lubanga was transferred March 17, 2006 from Kinshasa to The Hague to appear before the ICC.
49 ... backed by Rwanda after being excluded by the RCD-ML and MLC from cease-fire discussions in Mambasa, in December 2002.

Source : « Ituri: le coin le plus sanglant du Congo -Qui est qui - Groupes politiques armés en Ituri » (mai 2003), Human Right Wach,
http://hrw.org
50 whose members are: PUSIC, FNI and FPDC (Popular Forces of DRC - Alur and Lugbara political party)

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persons including child soldiers are well contrary to the EU. On 10 May, France has put
represented and rivalry between ethnic groups can three conditions for its participation: acting under
not be simplified to the conflict between the Hema UN mandate, do not be alone, and obtain the
and Lendu (see PUSIC inside the FIPI). The consent of all parties 53.
purpose of Uganda is to keep the chaos, applying
the principle of divide et impera to justify the need In France, an EU-led operation was more
for his presence, in order to exploit the wealth of favorable because of his dubious role in the region
the region (wood, uranium, the largest gold mines and in the Operation Turquoise in Rwanda in 1994.
in Africa). By the time Operation Turquoise was deployed, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in Kigali, in
MONUC has deployed military forces in Ituri July 1994. The Front is still there, and President
(411, then 600 people), and April 23 up to 700 Paul Kagame has been extensively involved at
Uruguayan peacekeepers. The report of the WEU different levels in the wars of Ituri54 .
Assembly stresses "but these forces have neither
the means nor the mandate to enable them to cope The countries of the region involved in the
with the situation" and stop UPC51 supported by combat (including the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda)
Rwanda. The child soldiers under 12 to 16 years would support officially the French intervention.
old drugged and wearing small caliber guns were "According to a source, the African Cell of the
patrolling around the city, extorting the population Élysée who proposed to transform this intervention
52. by EU operation55 ." Moreover, Kofi Annan has
adopted a dual approach to asking for help to both
It seemed that the mission had a tendency to lose France and the EU.
control of events between 7 and 16 May, violent At European level, the question of Ituri was
fighting took place between the Hema and Lendu discussed on 19 May by the ministers of defense at
ethnic groups in Bunia. MONUC managed the the General Affairs Council56 . Thus, the Operation
humanitarian aid by distributing more than 10 tons ARTEMIS was set up ...
of food and protecting more than 15,000 people.
Meanwhile two military observers of the mission The European Commission has welcomed the
were brutally killed near Bunia, heavy fighting intervention but also raised some concerns about
broke out between MONUC HQ and UPC making the overall priorities of the EU in crisis
14 deaths and 100 injuries among civilians. management matters vis-à-vis the previously EU
policy towards the Africa. It recognizes that such
At that time, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan operations are sometimes necessary and
has decided to seek the help of members of the UN complementary to other EU instruments. The
Security Council, but the United States refused, Council also stressed the primacy of long-term

51 L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 15.
52 GRIGNON, François, The Artemis Operation in the DRC. Lessons Learned for the Future of EU Peacekeeping in Africa, op. cit., p. 2.
53 TARDY, Thierry, «L’Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d’Artemis en République démocratique du Con-

go » in : COULON, Jocelyn (dir.), Guide du maintien de la paix 2005, Athéna-CEPES, Montréal, 2005., (Manuscrite) p. 5.
54 TARDY, Thierry, «L’Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d’Artemis en République démocratique du Con-

go », op. cit., p. 12.

55 GRIGNON, François, „The Artemis Operation in the DRC. Lessons Learned for the Future of EU Peacekeeping in Africa”, op. cit.,

pp. 2-3.
56 TARDY Thierry, «L’Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d’Artemis en République démocratique du Con-

go » op. cit., p. 5.

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instruments with a view to sustainable London was always a big supporter of the Berlin
stabilization57. Plus Agreement (2002) and began against the
establishment of autonomous structures C2
As for NATO (and especially the US), it has (command & control) of the EU. With English
neither welcomed an autonomous EU operation, using the basis of Entebbe Uganda became
nor wished not support such an operation because possible. As we have treated more forward, the
of these priorities in the Balkans and Afghanistan. French networks long fought against Uganda
But the well-established consensus is the "Anglo-Saxon" of President Museveni Yorewi.
consideration of EU actions by EU states in areas
where NATO has no strategic interest 58. Thanks to English, using the base in Entebbe
And still recall the rivalry between France and the Uganda became possible. As we have treated more
US in the DRC, around President Kabila: a series forward, the French networks long fought against
of such disagreements in Africa helps us the "Anglo-Saxon" Uganda of President Yorewi
understand why Americans are not looking too Museveni.
much to help their French ally in NATO.
For Germans, Africa seems remote and
Within NATO, there was no formal debate on dangerous. But when France and the UK have
possible intervention in the DRC. Indeed the EU decided to intervene, Chancellor Schröder and
has committed itself rapidly, and the Director Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer saw the need not
General of the General Secretariat of the Council of stay away 60 . Moreover, the Germans and the
the European Union, Robert Cooper, said the DSG Italians (compared to NATO) were not against an
(NATO Deputy Secretary General) with a letter. autonomous EU operation61.
In this case, the problem is the principle of "first
refusal", supported by NATO, that the EU-NATO
relationship is interpreted in the following way:
The EU is not allowed to charge from an external
operation before NATO expresses its commitment
not (indifference) above. (All of the Alliance "is not
involved"). Cooper's letter was a sign to NATO and
the European Union not share this principle and
would not reach the "blessing" of the Atlantic
Alliance59 .

The British were fairly good for an operation

despite disagreements within NATO. Previous
discussions with the French on a possible EU
action in Sudan's pushed it. But they would have
preferred to start an operation under Berlin Plus.

57 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit. pp. 45-46.
58 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit. pp. 57-58.
59 Author interview at SHAPE
60 THARDY, Thierry, «L’Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d’Artemis en République démocratique du

Congo », op. cit., p. 12.

61 Author interview at SHAPE

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III. Operation ARTEMIS: Effective crisis A few days later, in the Conclusion of the
management or military training? Presidency in Thessaloniki on 19 and 20 June 2003,
the operation will be reaffirmed in Title VIII /
III.1. The launch of the operation; legal External Relations, CFSP and ESDP - EU Security
frameworks Strategy. In ESDP, Article 58 says that "the EU's
operational capacity has been strengthened by the
The European Union has launched the military launch of three ESDP operation, EUPM in Bosnia-
operation ARTEMIS in Bunia, town in north- Hercegovina, CONCORDIA in FYROM and
eastern DRC, in accordance with Resolution 1484 ARTEMIS in Bunia, DRC" and the operations
of the UN Security Council and the EU Joint EUPM and ARTEMIS need to cooperate closely
Action of June 5 2003. The operation was formally with the United Nations (Article 59)64.
conducted until 1 September 2003 62.
So the European military force is obliged to act in
What does the Council Joint Action (2003/423/ close cooperation with MONUC. The two main
CFSP) mean? The operation must be placed within goals of this cooperation are the stabilization of the
a legal framework established by the Treaty on security conditions and improving the humanitarian
European Union, in particular Article 17, paragraph situation in Bunia.
2, and Article 25. The EU has decided to provide a But the Multinational Interim Force in Bunia is
temporary stabilization force in the Ituri, in responsible for additional duties in a limited area in
authorization of resolution 1484. the city and airport of Bunia: it is responsible for
According to the third paragraph: "The Council the protection of the airport and displaced persons
authorized the Political and Security Committee in the camps in Bunia; if the situation requires, it
(PSC) to take the relevant decisions concerning the helps to ensure the safety of the civilian population,
political control and strategic direction of the UN personnel and humanitarian organizations
operation." The next paragraph states abstaining present in Bunia65 . About 1800 soldiers are part of
from Denmark, Article first and second reinforcing the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in
the approval of the Operation Plan and the Bunia, the base-support joint mission (BSVIA,
authorization message. base-soutien à vocation interarmées) is in Entebbe.

The military operation was officially launched on But what is the specificity of this action is not
12 June 2003 - the day of signing of the decision. reflected at first glance in official EU documents?
As for the command, Article 4 directs that it "is To answer this, we must mention the debates of the
authorized with immediate effect to release the Senate of the French Republic around the
activation order (ACTORD) to execute the ARTEMIS financial report compared to a previous
deployment of forces, prior to transfer of authority operation:
following their arrival at the theater, and start "No doubt the Union has already assumed a first
execution of the mission" 63. military operation, "Operation Concordia" an
operation in Macedonia, which consisted of a

62 Opération militaire de l’Union européenne en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) http://ue.eu.int/pesd/congo/

index.asp?lang=FR (10.11.2003.)
63 Décision 2003/432/PESC du Conseil, du 12 juin 2003, concernant le lancement de l'opération militaire de l'Union européenne en

République Démocratique du Congo

64 Presidency Conclusions – Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 june 2003, p.18.
65 Opération ARTEMIS en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/artemis.htm (10.11.2003.)

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succession of NATO, but this first operation was III.2. The Operation BLACK MAMBA67
done using NATO assets and capabilities. In
addition, this operation took place on European On 20 May 2003 a French military
territory." reconnaissance mission arrived in Kinshasa where
it would go to Ituri (in Bunia, on 6 June) to assess
The double innovation is an EU military the needs of a deployment of an international UN
operation outside Europe and without means (and emergency force68.
thereby guardianship) of NATO. The control of this The authorization of the deployment of this force,
operation seeks to ensure full transparency between to the request of Kofi Annan, was endorsed on May
the EU and NATO66. 16 by the UN Security Council. The group of 12
men of the reconnaissance mission belonged to the
France played the role of "lead nation" (nation French Marines, and was composed mainly of
cadre). General Neveux was appointed commander logisticians who will evaluate the technical
of the EU operation, based in Paris. Brigadier constraints of the deployment 69.
Thonier was appointed commander of the force.
The general Neveux, who owns several orders of On 5 June 2003, before the delivery by air of
merit, was previously (in 2002) Deputy Chief of French troops, French special forces, as part of the
General Staff of joint force and training, then head mission MAMBA NOIR (Black mamba), seeped
(at the CENTCOM) of the French mission for into the wild to collect all the necessary
Operation "Enduring Freedom". And in 2003 he information to the deployment of the main forces.
was second in command of EMIA-FE, he assured This mission was entrusted with the technical and
the conception and conduct of multinational safety conditions in favor of conventional forces
exercises, particularly in Africa, which France ARTEMIS, so it was an autonomous operation
participated. under the operational command of General
commander (COS). It was an action of marine
General Thonier participated in several french commandos from Arta in the Republic of
operations in Lebanon, Iraq and the former Djibouti70.
Yugoslavia. He was the leader of the third office in
the upper Command of the Armed Forces in New MAMBA "took place within the framework of the
Caledonia (1992-1994) and Land Forces ESDP (Africa Express 2003) 71 )," but the
Commander of Land Forces Command in Djibouti categorization of this mission is still unclear: There
(1999-2001). Between 2002-2003 he was Deputy are those who consider MAMBA as a French
General Staff Force Nr. 1. preparatory operation (in the EU context) which
preceded the ARTEMIS, and the other by which
MAMBA even cover the French participation

66 Budget Communautaire - Communication de M. Hubert Haenel sur une action commune relative à l'opération militaire de l'Union
européenne en République démocratique du Congo, www.sénat.fr., (23.05.2004.)
67 Mamba is a very dangerous snake in the region
68 LINDSTROM Gustav, Enter the EU Battlesgroup, Paris, Chaillot Paper Nr. 97, 02/2007, p. 11.
69 Arrivée d'une mission de reconnaissance militaire française en RDC, 21/05/2003 (Xinhua)
70 DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 7.
71 BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?, in: Afrique contem-

poraine - Printemps 2004, p. 102.

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throughout the ARTEMIS operation. contingent of 3 people) and we assume that even in
The Headquarters of Forces (FHQ) Mamba was 2003, this number did not exceed 10. It is unlikely
also in Uganda and ARTEMIS was planned on this (but not excluded ) that the french elements were in
current operation 72. Planning MAMBA operation contact with those of MAMBA.
was conducted by the Center of Planning and III.3. The Operational Chain of command
Conduct of Operations (CPCO) of the French
Ministry of Defense in Paris73. The duality between the French capacity of
command and those of the EU is very characteristic
The special forces of MAMBA were deep and can make conclusions for the future. There are
intelligence, lighting and guidance for possible air two questions: was it a genuine EU operation under
strikes. France had five Mirage 2000-D positioned the command ("guardianship") of France, or rather
in Africa and responsible for air support to ground a French operation in the EU framework? As we
forces and aircraft KC-135 for their refueling74 . have seen, France chose a clean operation
The ALT2 the French Naval Aviation have worked codenamed "Mamba"79 , as other sources: "Black
in close collaboration with the pilots of Mirage FI Mamba".
CR (observation aircraft) to support ground and The organization of the command of the
aerial reconnaissance (RESCO), and the operation reveals much about the nature of the
detachment to combat SAR (CSAR - Combat operation. There are four different levels of action:
Search and Rescue : RESCO in French)75. political-military, strategic, operational, tactical
level.
The operation MAMBA has regained Bunia, on
12 and 16 June 2003, and it became ARTEMIS III.3.1. The politico-military level
peace keeping mission conducted under Article 14
of the TEU 76. CPCO officers joined officers from This is the level of the European Union in
other Member States (see OHQ structure below). Brussels, which is the head of the operation. The
The OHQ was located in the center of CCPO in PSC (COPS in French) exercises political control
Paris, but in separate rooms77. On June 18, 400 and strategic direction of the operation under the
soldiers were already in Bunia and another 500 in responsibility of the Council. The Council
Entebbe. July 6, all military forces were approved the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and decided
deployed78. to launch the operation. It authorized the PSC
under Article 25 of the EU Treaty. This
The French element of MONUC consisted of 9 authorization includes the modification of the
persons in 2005 (6 military observers and a OPLAN, the Command Series (Chain of

72 Author interview at EUMC.

73 BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?, op. cit., p. 106.
74 DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 7.
75 DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 6.
76 L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 15.
77 THARDY Thierry, «L’Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d’Artemis en République démocratique du

Congo », op. cit., p. 6.

78 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 49.
79 BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, « Les ministres de l’Union européenne entérinent l’accord sur une force commune en R.D.C. » Kin-

shasa, (06.06.2003),
http://www.digitalcongo.net/

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Command) and ROE (Rules of Engagement). deployed OQG as a political adviseur OPCOM
Decision-making authority assists with the SG/HR. (Operation Commander). According to the
The PSC is obliged to inform the Council, Council's report, a larger team would have been
receives regularly reports of the Military Staff of helpful84.
the EU (EUMS) who chairs the EU Military
Committee (EUMC). The PSC regularly invite the
Operation Commander to a joint meeting80 .

The EUMC has monitored and supervised the

execution of the military operation, it also received
reports of the General Staff of the EU and regularly
invite the Operation Commander to a joint meeting.
The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of the
Defence Staff (CEMA in French) of the Member
States represented in Brussels at the Council
Secretariat, through their Military Representatives
(MILREP). Its president, General Gustav
Hägglund, served as the main point of contact with
the Operation Commander. Finally, the EUMC has General Neveux held office under the political
learned from the experience gained at the end of control of the ambassadors, members of the PSC.
the operation81. This is the EUMC which had the According to a European diplomat, "is that the PSC
primary contact with the EUMS82 . will ensure political control and strategic direction
of the operation" and the Committee will not have
The EUMS has performed the tasks entrusted to it to go back to the Council (ministerial level) to
by the EUMC and provided military expertise. He make decisions85.
has been assisted during the strategic planning
phase by the Situation Centre (SitCen), responsible In short, at the European level, no strategic or
for providing analysis and information on the basis military option was developed. Strategic planning
of information provided to it by the Member States at this level did not affect the launch of the military
and the General Directorate E (especially in its leadership (IMD - Initiating Military Directive) at
womb by the Sub-Directorate VIII which deals the OPCOM. It was at this point that the true
with defense issues)83. "European" nature of the operation must question:
This means that the pattern described above (IMD>
From DG E VIII, three administrator has been OPCOM> CONOPS / Oplan,) was modified in
charged by the ESDP operations. One of them was practice : Oplan was already developed by the

80 Council Joint Action, 2003/423/CFSP, June 5, 2003.

81 BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?, op. cit., p. 109.
82 Council Joint Action, 2003/423/CFSP, June 5, 2003., op. cit., articles 6-8.
83 BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?, op. cit., p. 109.
84 Political, political-military and institutional lessons identified from Operation ARTEMIS, Brussels 20/01/2004, Council of the EU,

DG E VIII 5213/04, 1 A Rapid reponse, p. 18.

85 BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, « Les ministres de l’Union européenne entérinent l’accord sur une force commune en R.D.C. » op. cit.

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French, in advance (and linked to the operation - 2 infantry companies in Gabon : 30 hours -
MAMBA) before the IMD and any EU decision- "National Technical Means" (NTM) - 2.5
making has begun to start 86. days
- 1 infantry company in Chad: 3 days MTN
In addition, the scenario of a possible evacuation - 1 infantry company in Djibouti: 4 days
of the forces deployed in an unexpected case (even MTN
if there was a French scenario) was fully ignored
before the allies at the EUMC87. At European level, III.3.2. The strategic level89
the nations have not provided a OPRES (operating
reserve). For cons, the Committee's internal The strategic level in Paris seems to be the true
documents contain some information about the center of the operation: the document of the French
possible projection of the French forces (OPRES) if Ministry of Defense is already reporter, he begins
needed88: by introducing the OHQ (Operation

86 Author interview at EUMC. See also Political, political-military and institutional lessons identified from Operation ARTEMIS, Brus-
sels 20/01/2004, Council of the EU, DG E VIII 5213/04, 1 A Rapid reponse, p. 4.
87 Author interview at EUMC.
88 General Briefing of EUFOR ARTEMIS (CMUE/EUMC), Power point
89 « Opération ARTEMIS en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) », op . cit.

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Headquarters). The Operation Commander (Op - (C) J7 Training - (IT)
Cdr, COPER in French) is Major General Bruno - (C) J8 Budget / Finance (FR)
Neveux, which the OHQ is subject. General directs - (C) J9 ACM ("civil-military" missions,
the action of the island Saint-Germain. The OHQ humanitarian actions, aid to the population,
has about 80 soldiers from the three armies which reconstruction of public infrastructure, transport
60% come from the framework nation and 40% of and protection of minorities, etc.) - (SW)
other EU member states. (The OHQ should also
include members of the EU Council Secretariat 90.)
The operation of the office was not always as
The working language was English.
usual: Normally J1 Office (Personnel) is
responsible for coordinating the transport of injured
and deaths, procurement and regular changing of
quotas on site. But the office was forced to deal
with the convening of delegates of national staffs
(!) and this spot does not prove easy as a series of
repeated calls proved it 91.

III.3.3. The operational level

At the theater level in Entebbe (Uganda - chosen

by France) was installed the FHQ (Force
Headquarters) or BSVIA (Joint intended to support

The OHQ has the following organs: COPER;

Director of Operation and his deputy; Liaison
Officers of the EU Military Staff (the General Staff
of the EU) at OHQ, and the EU Military Staff
OHQ; the particular Staff and policy, legal and
communication advisors. Multinational Staff is
organized conventionally way in offices (J1 to J9)
specialized areas, including three commanders not
part of the framework nation:
- (C) Personal J1 - (Hungarian command)
- (C) J2 Information (EN)
- (C) J3 (FR)
- (C) J4 Logistics / Movement (B)
- (C) J5 Plans - (EN) base, in French : base de soutien à vocation
- (C) J6 SIC (information and communication interarmées) made up of 650 people92 . General
systems) Thonier command to the multinational force (Force

90 Press Release - Adoption by the Council of the Joint Action on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) http://ue.eu.int, (24.04.2006.)
91 A concrete example: The arrival in Brussels (to EUMS) of one of the representatives of national Military Staff had been postponed

several times due to the vaccination (sic!) of that person. Finally his arrival was scheduled for 1 September : to the end date of the ope-
ration ... Source: Author interview at EUMC.
92 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 51.

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Commander). This multinational FHQ includes a BSVIA (Joint Support Base) commanded by
hundred soldiers and armies of the air with its Colonel French Koehl was presented at
advanced part in Bunia93 . The working language Entebbe airport. 100 people were deployed in
was French. The ARTEMIS was deployed to the Kampala replacement basis of Entebbe, where
6th MONUC sector and the FHQ maintained applicable95.
contact with the MONUC on site. While the OHQ
was in daily contact with DPKO by a liaison - The French GTO (Operation Transport
officer. Group) or GTIAM (Groupement tactique
interarmés multinational - Multinational Joint
The military authorities decided to apply the same Battle Group) has several medium tactical air
strategy as in Afghanistan last year, where the transport type C-130 Hercules and Transall
capital of neighboring Tajikistan, Dushanbe, was C-160 (the EU has 140 + 150 aircraft) of other
the basis for air support. As in Kabul, no direct African bases (Chad)96 to ensure an air bridge
airlift to Bunia town was only possible because of to the elements and the force deployed in
poor infrastructure. Bunia.

III.3.4. The tactical level94 - The 1,100 members (of infantry, light
armored vehicles, means of support and
Engaged units are installed directly in Entebbe engineering) of GTIAM are deployed in
(Uganda) in Bunia (DRC) and N'Djamena (Chad): Bunia. A French and Swedish "special forces
group", and a French "battle group " which
- The 400 soldiers of the air and land of brought together most of the infantry and

93 Opération ARTEMIS en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), op. cit.

94 BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, « Les ministres de l’Union européenne entérinent l’accord sur une force commune en R.D.C. », op. cit.
95 ... and 750 in Entebbe, according FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne,

op. cit., p. 51.

96 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 51.

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armored force units were the two components to reduce the troops. As for the framework nation,
of the ground forces 97 . About 85% of soldiers the French would have particularly favored a broad
were French, with 70 Swedish and 100 commitment to Poland102, but at the time the Poles
British98. They were supported by the South supported rather the war again terrorisme of the
African Oryx helicopters, 1 Belgian medical United States. France also asked Hungary for a
team, 1 Belgian radio team and one team of reserve battalion that J1 Office forwarded to the
British specialists responsible for maintenance Ministry of Defense of Hungary who finally
of the facilities of the airfield. The French refused103.
Mirage F1 and 2000 were responsible for the
recognition and ground strikes 99. The status of the "EU Force" (in French : « force
de l’UE », FUE) and the staff of the FUE is
- (A reserve of 1,000 French soldiers stationed governed by the Agreement between the European
in other countries in Africa, ultimately not Union and the Democratic Republic of Congo and
used, has been scheduled if needed100.) by the Agreement between the European Union and
the Republic Uganda on the status of forces under
Although the number of participants is set at the leadership of the European Union, as well as
1,800 people (this number is more ambitious than their implementation104.
the 350 soldiers deployed of Mission
CONCORDIA in Macedonia, but at roughly one In the ARTEMIS` structure, the French Navy was
seventh of MONUC personnel) and any (public) represented by a detachment of commandos, an
official documents EU refutes it, press reviews Atlantic crew of the flotilla 21F and his technical
mention personal "between 1200 and 1800"101. team, led by the commander of the 23F, the ALT2
of Naval Aviation (the "penguins of Peace")
Because of financial problems, the EU was forced positioned at Entebbe airport, the 3th RIMA unit,

97 Ordre de mission de l’opération ARTEMIS, exposé du Général Thonier lors de la journée d’étude de la Fondation pour la recherche
stratégique (FRS) tenue à Paris le 14 janvier 2004, cited by L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880,
op. cit., p. 16.
98 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 51.
99 Ordre de mission de l’opération ARTEMIS, exposé du Général Thonier, op. cit., p. 16.
100 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 51.
101 „The EU mission, which was approved by the UN Security Council at the end of May, is limited to 1,400 troops and is scheduled to

end in August, which critics say gives it too little time to achieve results.” Source: EGGLESTON, Roland « Germany: Parliament Agrees
To Send Small Military Force To Congo » (06.19.2003)
http://www.freerepublic.com/; or „Cette force sous mandat de l’ONU comprendra environ 1.500 hommes dont une majorité de soldats
envoyés par la France...” Source: BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, « Les ministres de l’Union européenne entérinent l’accord sur une
force commune en R.D.C. », op. cit.
102 That is to say, a Polish contingent is among the largest contingents of the operation, or at least, among observers. The Office J1 also

contacted several times the Poles to the French request to persuade them, without success. The French have expressed the same wish in
fall 2007 on the EUFOR Chad/RCA.
103 Author interview at EUMC.
104 Accord entre l'Union européenne et la République de Chypre relatif à la participation de la République de Chypre à la force de

l'Union européenne (FUE) en République démocratique du Congo Journal officiel n° L 253 du 07/10/2003 p. 0023 – 0025
22003A1007(01) http://publications.eu.int/, Article 3, paragraphe 1.

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air parachute commandos, and the crews of the Entebbe (6200 Km), the EU needed for long-range
projection of air power105. The total French troops machines. A military analyst points out that the
was 900 people. geographical scope of EU operations is not clear, it
depends on what the EU wants to manage an
The German military contingent had 350 people. action, as a regional or global player. In the
Germany wanted in on the operation especially in Brussels Declaration on Military Capability
the field of transport, with logistical support and Commitment of 20 November 2000, it was decided
had a military hospital aircraft that were stationed an operation within 4,000 km of Brussels.
in Uganda. The German Defence Minister Peter
Struck said the German participation does not The boundaries of this zone are Central and
include military troops 106. The Greens, especially Eastern Europe (Balkans included), North-West
the foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, has strongly Africa, the Middle East. The Caucasus and Russia
argued for the operation costing Germany 10 are also included. But there are several areas where
million euros107. European forces have acted outside of this radius:
the Gulf, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and
Denmark declared abstention from the Afghanistan too! "The radius of 4000 km mean the
operation108 . Or an action can be difficult framework within which the EU should be able to
considered "common" part of a "common" foreign operate without the help of the United States 109."
policy in the case where members can arbitrarily be For the realization of the Operation ARTEMIS
absent. Contrary to the view of the European France has leased large aircraft, mostly Antonov
Convention, the second pillar thus remains rather 124, DC-8 and Boeing C-5 Galaxy (including
intergovernmental and closer to that of a Britain rents 4 from the US). It required forty
confederation. No state is forced to participate, rotations between France, or French bases in Africa
which facilitates decision making. and Entebbe 110 . Antonov cargo aircraft (able to
carry more than 80 tons) were transported 3400
III.4. Applied transport capacity tons of needed goods, including 400 combat
vehicles, especially between Nîmes and Entebbe
Strategic transport was divided into two parts: to with 40 rotations.

105 DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 6.

106 "We are not going there to fight but to provide noncombat support, (...) There could be an exception if fighting breaks out while our
men are evacuating the wounded or other victims. But generally, they will not be there to fight." Source: EGGLESTON, Roland « Ger-
many: Parliament Agrees To Send Small Military Force To Congo » ,op ; cit.
107 REISS, Andreas, European Union sends troops to Congo - First independent EU military mission, op. cit., et EGGLESTON, Roland,

«Germany : Parliament Agrees To Send Small Military Force To Congo » op. cit.
108 Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Con-

go – Official Jornal L 143/50 11.06.2003 paragraphe (13)

109 VLACHOS-DENGLER, Katia, Getting there: building strategic mobility into ESDP, Occasional Papers N˚ 38. November 2002, Institut

d’Études de Sécurité, p.13.

110 BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, « Les ministres de l’Union européenne entérinent l’accord sur une force commune en R.D.C. », op.

cit.

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Second, for transport mean distance between intergouver-namental and confederation of the
Entebbe and Bunia (300 km), about 200 rotations 111 operation.
of tactical transport aircraft C-160 Transall (whose
range is 16t/1800 km112 ) were necessary 113. In In addition, its forces remained under the full
Bunia, "the airstrip is in such poor condition that it command and jurisdiction of their national
must be repaired after each landing, which (before authorities. This fact remains strangely hidden in
the work of sappers) limited to three the number of the official or public documentation of the
daily round trips between Entebbe and Bunia." operation ; it is suggested that this is only a joint
Bunia is about 300 km or 45-minute flight from operation of a "coalition of the willing".
Entebbe and "all the support will go by air" 114.
National authorities shall transfer operational
IV.5. The example of Cyprus - The frameworks of control to the EU Operation Commander.
acceding countries`s participation Paragraph 3 provides the same rights and
obligations for the Republic of Cyprus and for the
In addition to the EU participants (France, Great Member States, but the EU Operation Commander
Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Belgium, the last may at any time request the withdrawal of the
two by non-military divisions) 115 , some candidate contribution of the Republic of Cyprus. (p. 4.)
countries, namely Cyprus, the Chez Republic, Moreover, "the Republic of Cyprus designates a
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Senior Military Representative (SMR) to represent
and the Slovak Republic rallied to action. In its national contingent in the EUF. ... " (p. 5.)
addition to the foreign detachments of Brazil and
South Africa and Canada have supported the Regarding the financial dimension, Cyprus
mission116. assumes all costs of its participation except those
which are the subject of joint funding (Article 6).
To analyze the contact with the candidate Any disputes shall be settled by diplomatic means,
countries, take the example of the Agreement and parties have the right to denounce the
between the EU and the Republic of Cyprus 117. agreement with a notice of one month.
Cyprus has accepted the provisions of Council
Joint Action 2003/423/ CFSP. Although it was an IV.6. Brief History of Operation ARTEMIS118 - an
EU operation after subsection 1 and 4 of Article 4 operation of "a single D"
of the Agreement (about the Chain of Command),
all the forces and personnel participating in the Four days after the decision of the Council, on 9
FUE (i.e. the candidate countries forces or EU June 2003, the first French soldiers, after a long 24
forces) force management is further evidence of hour transit via Dakar and N'Djamena, arrived at

111 526 rotations according to the statement of General Thonier in: L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/
1880, op. cit., p. 16.
112 VLACHOS-DENGLER, Katia, Getting there: building strategic mobility into ESDP, op. cit., Annexe
113 See the table on the disposal of transport aircraft in the subchapter III.3.1.
114 BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, Les ministres..., http://www.digitalcongo.net/ Kinshasa, 6. June 2003.
115 HAINE, Jean-Yves, Force structures http://www.iss.org ; It is strange, no (public) official document mentions the list of participants.
116 DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 6.
117 Accord entre l'Union européenne et la République de Chypre relatif à la participation de la République de Chypre à la force de

l'Union européenne (FUE) en République démocratique du Congo, op. cit.

118 « Communiques de presse » sur le site http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/artemis.htm (21.12.2003.)

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Entebbe airport 119. Presumably the authorization of On 2 July 2003, the EU welcomed the formation
the aerial crossing over Algeria and Lebanon was of the Transitional Government of National Union
not granted. in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The EU
considered it as a fundamental step in the peace
Until June 13, 400 soldiers arrived in Bunia; process, which crowns the path indicated by the
Belgian and Canadian aircraft were on site120 . The Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the Sun City and
first clashes took place the following day. Pretoria Agreements.
Europeans have "struck hard at the first The EU "invited the new Transitional
opportunity" and answered every provocation or Government to implement the actions necessary to
militia attack. achieve the objectives of the transition period
anticipated in the Pretoria agreements of 17
They put an end to the looting and violence in the December 2002, including the holding of free and
city and on June 21, they obtained the withdrawal transparent elections at all levels, for the
of the UPC who controlled the sector with about establishment of a democratic constitutional regime
2,500 men121. and the formation of restructured and integrated
General Neveux went to Entebbe and Bunia from national army123 ."
21 to 23 June and from August 13 to 15 to control
elements of ARTEMIS` force. He found the smooth July 8, Bunia has been secured and declared
running of the transition process between the "unarmed city" by the European brigade and patrols
elements of the European force and MONUC Task were conducted beyond the city. On 11 June, the
Force 2. European soldiers have invested a Hema militia
camp, considered too close to Bunia124 . Many of
On 27 June 2003, the French defense minister and the 200,000 refugees have returned home and
General Bentégeat, Chief of Staff (ECS) met with economic life was taken125.
the French General Neveux and the OHQ staff in
Paris. That day, the EU Presidency notes with By cons, European forces have not systematically
satisfaction that there are no visible weapons in disarmed the militia, they were content to prevent
Bunia since June 24, 2003. At the same time, the them from acting in a radius of 10 km around
EU condemned the military confrontations in North Bunia. This was a political decision and even in
Kivu, and particularly the offensives by RCD/ December 2005 the international community has
Goma in violation of the cease-fire. The EU not fully solved the problem of disarmament in the
recalled the signing of the Commitment of region of Ituri126 . In short, the EU military
Bujumbura (19 June 2003) by the government of operation was charged with "a single D" for
the RCD, RCD-Goma and RCD-ML122. demilitarization, for DDR spots (demilitarization,
disarmament, reintegration).

119 DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 6.

120 « EU Sends Peace-Keepers To Democratic Republic Of Congo: Code Name “Artemis”. » 13.06.2003 http://www.europaworld.org/
121 L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 16.
122 Commission Pressrom P/03/77 Bruxelles, le 27 juin 11016/03 : "The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to the governments of the

DRC, Rwanda and Uganda to refrain from any actions which could further destabilize the situation in North Kivu. It urges all parties
to fully respect the Lusaka, Luanda and Pretoria Agreements as well as the Kampala and Harate disengagement plan. The govern-
ments concerned must exert their influence on the armed groups in the East, to urge them also to respect these agreements, to coope-
rate fully with MONUC and ensure access for humanitarian organizations."
123 Déclaration de la Présidence du 2 juillet 2003, P/03/80 11072/03.
124 L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 16.
125 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 52.
126 Le maintien de la paix en Afrique sub-saharienne : une approche concrète, Document A/1913, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

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On July 10, the PSC officially visited the General Conclusion & lesson learned - a successful
Staff of ARTEMIS (OHQ) in Paris; Javier Solana military exercice, an ambiguous crisis
has been assisted by the EU Military Committee in management
Brussels, whose president is Army General Gustav
Hagglund. From July 31 to August 2, the French 1, ESDP Evolution - The autonomous EU
and Belgian Ministers of Defence visited Entebbe. military operation is a logical phase of a process
They moved to Bunia. At the end of the visit that began in Paris in 1997, with the Declaration of
Michèle Alliot-Marie said: "Today we demonstrate the WEU Council of Ministers, continued to Saint-
in Macedonia with NATO, and especially in Ituri Malo in 1998, pursued by the decision on the
autonomously that the European defense exists. » Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) and by the Mission
CONCORDIA in 2003, again under NATO
September 1, Operation ARTEMIS ended its supervision, in the framework of the ESDP.
mission in Bunia. It took place a symbolic
ceremony of transfer of responsibility between the The greatest significance of this event is that the
General Thonier and General Isberg, acting EU itself can achieve such an operation. However,
commander of MONUC`s Ituri Brigade. it can be regarded rather as a French operation 127 in
September 6, 2003 the last soldiers of the close cooperation with EU organizations. It was
Multinational Interim Force left Bunia and were also a test of the capacity of the latter in practice,
placed under national authority the next day. This even if there is very little information on their
transfer of authority to a considerably strengthened activities.
MONUC by troops from India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Indonesia, formally marks We must not underestimate the effectiveness and
the end of the operation, and the end of the importance of this action in the future ESDP, but do
responsibility the EU. not overestimate the effectiveness and importance
The return of French personnel from the support of this crisis management in the international
base Entebbe was planned until September 25. system.
After the military withdrawal, the EU remains
committed to supporting the DRC peace and 2, Deployed Capabilities - As for international
reconstruction process. relations, the ambitions of the European Union and
its ability to manage such an operation became
widely known. But it was a very risky operation
with 1,800 people compared to Afghanistan for
example, where 50,000 troops have been deployed.
These types of missions rather reinforce the need
for battle groups (GT-1500, groupement tactiques
in French) proposed by the United Kingdom and
France during the Franco-British summit of 24
November 2003 (citing the success of the
ARTEMIS), that the 60,000 people of HHG. The
EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was declared
operational in May 2003, although it still lacked a
third of the projected enrollment 128. "The goal of

127 Military rather share this opinion, because the OHQ was in Paris and not in Brussels. (L'OPÉRATION ARTEMIS EN RDC - Thierry
TARDY, 13 décembre 2005, séminaire organisé par C2SD à l’Ecole Militaire)
128 FARIA Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 58.

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this policy is not currently set up a European army Union has signed a coopration program with the
in replacement of the national armies, but to DRC (EUR 205 million) over a period of 5 years.
develop capacities to allow the Union to act if joint Europeans also support the DDR process by a
action is decided. ESDP is thus governed by the multi-country and multiregional prgoram led by the
principle of voluntary cooperation: the capability World Bank131.
commitments are presented by the Member States
on a voluntary basis and the participation of all The operation has had a robust mandate, but it
EU-led operations is based on a sovereign was very limited in space and in time. It was the
decision129." key to success. But the result is ambiguous.
According Brigadier General Thonier, ARTEMIS
3, Results on the theater - The positive units on site received information on the massacres,
conclusion is that after the operation, the Bunia measurement of Srebrenica, 5 km from Bunia, but
population increased from 40,000 to 100,000 the European forces were neither ready nor
inhabitants, markets were reopened and a authorized to stop the violations132.
reinforced MONUC contingent was deployed130 . This reminds us of the inefficiency of
Bunia, its airport and the refugee camp were secure UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, but on a
and disarmed. On 2 September 2003, the European European theater. In the Balkans such a massacre

129 BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?, op. cit., p. 105.
130 L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880, op. cit, p. 4.
131 FARIA, Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 54.
132 Entretien avec le général de division Bruno Neveux, commandant de l’opération ARTEMIS in : RAIDS, octobre 2003, pp. 16-17.

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could not stay long in the shadows. The French Charter, the primary responsibility for maintaining
soldiers were surprised worried by the fact that they peace and international security. "
had to fight against the militias of which 60% The paper also focuses on the dialogue between
consisted of child soldiers. Some of their leaders the EU and the Organisation of African Unity
feared a new "Dien Bien Phu": Rwanda could (OAU) (8). The EU continues to consider, case by
imprison them and they prepared the operation case, the deployment of own operational means for
against the heart, at the request of President Chirac conflict management and crisis prevention in Africa
and the African Unit at the Elysee133 . (6). It has done successfully with ARTEMIS, in the
province of Ituri in the DRC136.
And finally, if the transaction received no
political mandate, for example, to conduct 5, The relationship between the EU and the
negotiations with the militia, its deployment was UN - As for the international aspect, the
however an indirect stabilizing effect which relationship between the UN and the EU
allowed indirectly the formation, on June 30, the strengthens with this operation. Strengthening the
National Transitional Government in Kinshasa134. UN seems to be very important for the EU, which
is understandable on the part of a great power still
4, The theater after the operation - Regarding unable to control its interests through its own
past events after the operation - not, of course, the institutions, but has (mostly indirectly through its
immediate consequences of the action - the member states) good positions in international
situation is rather disturbing. DRC stabilization organizations.
proved fragile. The EU condemned the massacres So the EU intends to become one of the most
that took place again in Ituri, Monday, October 6, important executive organization of the United
in the village of Katchele. These events Nations through its emerging army, that gradually
demonstrate the persistence of elements opposing will correspond to requirements of crisis
the peace process in the DRC, despite progress in management in the twenty-first century. At the
recent months. The European Union has confirmed highest level of multinational command, but also in
its commitment to end impunity for the perpetrators accordance with international law. It is also clear
of these killings and noted the decision of the that the EU wants to set a good example to expand
International Criminal Court to examine the its moral dominance to the detriment of the United
investigations into the events in Ituri135 . States.

The EU Council has adopted a decision in The cooperation has been effective between
January 2004 which strengthens the EU's MONUC and the EU. The scenario gives for the
commitment to a situation "after - ARTEMIS" future: the EU secures the area with a rapid, but
between the frames of the first two paragraphs: limited and short intervention, during that a UN
"(1) The primary responsibility for the prevention, mission prepares. But for future missions, it is a
management and resolution of conflicts on the competition or complementarity? Instead of
African continent lies with Africans themselves. strengthening the UN mission (European elements
(2) The UN Security Council has, under the UN are very "discreet" in such UN missions) an

133 GRIGNON, François, The Artemis Operation in the DRC. Lessons Learned for the Future of EU Peacekeeping in Africa, op. cit., p. 3.
134 TARDY, Thierry, « L’Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d’Artemis en République démocratique du
Congo » op. cit., p. 11.
135 Commission Pressrom: P/03/127 13526/03 (Presse 301) http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/docs
136 Position Commune, 2004/85/PESC du Conseil

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operation led by a regional organization (the EU), humanitarian action to guarantee peace and
unlike the Brahimi Report recommendations, with protect the population. The European powers who
not truly neutral countries (like France, Belgium) is are conducting this operation have interests in the
responsible for a mission that would report to the region. According to a very traditional method the
UN... (and now we ignore the African regional or suffering of the civilian population are used to
sub-regional organizations.) justify this international action. ... In addition they
want to send a signal ... (that) the United States is
September 24, 2003, in New York, Kofi Annan not the only world power. (...) The European
and Silvio Berlusconi signed a declaration on adventurism in Congo can only serve to aggravate
cooperation between the UN and the EU 137 on the conflict between the great powers 141."
crisis management. The preface mentions
successful cooperation in the Balkans and the DRC. 6, The "framework nation" concept and
It is said that the safety of the world is the main planning - The idea of the framework nation
responsibility of the UN Security Council. Article 3 (nation cadre) or "pilot countries" concept was
says mutual intention to create a consultative developed over five years by the Paris Declaration
mechanism in the following areas: in 1997. The document states that the "framework
- Planning (improved contact between planning concept is in the context of autonomous WEU
units) operations, of which it is a special case and should
- Training (for civilian and military personnel) a l l o w t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a E u ro p e a n
- Communication (enhanced cooperation "desk- headquarters within timeframes compatible with
to-desk" between New York and Brussels) the operational requirements, from national or
- Best practice (regularized systematic exchange existing multinational resources, especially in
of information and experiences) extreme emergencies142." At the time, in April
1997, Operation ALBA of the WEU has not yet
It is obvious but not really "honest" by the US taken advantage of this opportunity. The concept
security experts when they consider the most has been incorporated in the Luxembourg
important aspect of the operation the political side, Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers (22
competition with the United States. Embezzlement and 23 November 1999)143.
and violations of the law by the Americans at the
time of the second (1991) 138 and the third Gulf This framework nation concept has led to the
crisis (2003)139 do not give them the moral rapid response of the EU, especially the political
authority to argue against EU 140, although this will has not failed: France alone was able to deploy
analysis lack irrelevant on several points: "It must the first troops (June 5, 2003) one week after
be clear: the current mission of the EU is not a adoption of resolution 1484 of the UN Security

137 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management New York, 24 September 2003 12510/03 (Presse 266)
138 Falsification of satellite images.
139 N New manipulations of satellite photos, and "photocopying" reports by Colin Powell at the Pentagon violating the jurisdiction of

the UNMOBIT in Iraq. Source: Háború Irak ellen ?, 2003. RESZ – Euroatlanti Estek, www.resz.hu
140 Especially knowing the case of US torture.
141 REISS, Andreas, European Union sends troops to Congo - First independent EU military mission, op. cit.
142 Déclaration de Paris du Conseil des ministres de l’UEO, 13. mai 1997., Titre V, paragraphe 3,
143 « Il peut être utile de recourir plus largement au concept de nation-cadre et au partage des tâches entre les pays afin d’améliorer les

capacités opérationnelles. » « Recommandation pour renforcer les capacités européennes pour les opérations de gestion de crise », in :
Déclaration de Luxembourg du Conseil des Ministres de l’UEO (les 22 et 23 novembre 1999).

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Council (30 May), while the European 'strategic' By cons, there are some who believe that "the
headquarters was fully operational since June 16, French predominance is also likely to question the
and 900 troops was on site in two days, (June 18). concept of framework nation148."
(Plus the French reconnaissance mission started on
May 20) But all the military forces were deployed It is also remarkable that four years later, in
after 36 days of the resolution (July 6). summer 2007, the lessons learned from Operation
ARTEMIS are not always applied to the planning
This design results in a more flexible and rapid of the EUFOR Chad/CAR: Council document
response that respects the progressive development stresses that the planning of an operation should
of the establishment as "a 7/14 scenario": the rapid start at European level, where at least with the
initial deployment of the framework nation (in a participation of interested Member States149. In the
week) and the relatively longer consultation case of EUFOR Chad/CAR, the applied pattern was
mechanism with other European partners for the the same as that of the ARTEMIS: a previous
establishment of a multinational operation (in two French planning and, later, the EU decision-making
weeks)144. process.

Planning has followed the same scenario: Other problems emerged around the "framework
strategic planning was carried out in 6 days and nation" concept consist considerable financial
operational planning in 12145. burdens of lead nation, cooperation difficulties with
This method of fast planning was crucial the participating States, and the 'autonomous'
"because the UN were facing the looming threat of management (and thus faster) aspects. Partners
another tragedy such as the Srebrenica, since the remained uninformed or subsequently informed.
peacekeepers, poorly equipped and limited in their Thus the key domains are:
action (...) had proved unable to prevent - planning (see above)
violence ..." 146. - information management of the national
military intelligence and communication
Without this method, the fears of Commission's services
officials could have achieved: They thought the - The SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement)
military point of view, placing the operation under between the EU and Uganda was based on a
the EU banner give more harm than benefit, Franco-Ugandan bilateral SOFA already
because the process of EU decision-making could existed, which was signed without
delay the launch of the owner of the operation147 . consultation with the EU150.

144 L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Assemblée de l’UEO, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 17.
145 HEBRARD, VA (French Defence Staff Director of Operations), Lessons Learned from a recent MN Operation : Lead / Framework
Nation Perspective (Powerpoint)
146 Le maintien de la paix en Afrique sub-saharienne : une approche concrète, Document A/1913, op. cit., p. 25.
147 FARIA, Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 50.
148 TARDY, Thierry, L’Union européenne en Afrique : Un partenaire stratégique dans les opérations de paix (Rapport du séminaire

GCSP et l’International Peace Academy, 7 juillet 2006.) p. 13.

149 Political, political-military and institutional lessons identified from Operation ARTEMIS, Brussels 20/01/2004, Council of the EU,

DG E VIII 5213/04, 1 A Rapid reponse, p. 4., p. 21. „Framework Nations should welcome EU planning assistance teams to help con-
vert national military planning into EU planning that is coherent with the overall EU objectives and other employed measures.”; et
entretien de l’auteur auprès du CMUE.
150 Political, political-military and institutional lessons identified from Operation ARTEMIS, op. cit., p. 16.

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- The costs of the operation was financed by of a European headquarters in Tervuren that
the framework nation (see below). arouses less enthusiasm and interest. So without a
fixed location, the HQ would settle in the
7, Gaps, problems, successes - Multi- framework nation, that would allay the fears of
nationalisation of the military staffs was sometimes those who are against creating a European HQ153.
a bit "chaotic". Only Sweden, the UK, South Africa
and Belgium, through their medical teams, engaged 8, Benefits compared to the Berlin Plus frame -
terrestrial components. By cons, multinatio- Strategic planning was carried out by the EUMS
nalization of tactical and strategic air transport has and operational planning by France. Unlike the
not had the slightest flaw. The Canadian, South long delays of planning during Operation
African and Brazilian units were integrated within CONCORDIA, under Berlin Plus Agreement, with
the ARTEMIS force151 . a parallel command structure (EU/NATO) decision-
making procedures in politico-military level (PSC-
We need to develop more homogeneous European EUMC relations) can allow the adoption of quick
communication capabilities, because the lack of decisions154, although the small size of the EUMS
interoperability of information systems resulted result a real weakness of EU operational planning.
recourse to the presence of liaison officers and Some have proposed the establishment of an
traditional telephony 152. autonomous European Military Planning Unit
within the EU Military Staff 155 . (Without
Moreover, "forces coming from other country completely filled this gap, since 2005, the EU was
than France were (in relative terms) much more responsible for sending planning expert for the
numerous in command centers than in the field. In mission of the African Union in Darfur, whose
fact, none of the other contributors have offered to feasibility left some question marks.
send large contingents, and it is not certain that
France would have accepted such an item, which 9, Strategic Airlift - Gaps in airlift became
would, in all probability, have complicated visible again: The commissioning of the Airbus
coordination on the ground, and could weakening A400M, routing would be directly in Bunia,
the strong position taken by France against the without a stop in Entebbe156. (We're not 100% sure
UPC`s escalation strategy..." This means that the that by the application of the A400M, the strategy
command structures were rather multinational, and could overlook the airlift between Entebbe and
the forces on the theater more homogeneous. Bunia mainly because of infrastructure poverty
locally and grouping method different elements 157.)
The framework nation concept takes up the role The problem is that the payload of the Airbus is 4

151 L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 17.
152 Ordre de mission de l’opération ARTEMIS, exposé du Général Thonier lors de la journée d’étude de la Fondation pour la recherche
stratégique (FRS) tenue à Paris le 14 janvier 2004, cité par L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880,
op. cit., p. 18.,
153 FARIA, Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 51. et p. 59. (Entre-

tien au Secrétariat général de Conseil)

154 BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?, op. cit., pp. 109-

110.
155 FARIA, Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
156 L’Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 18.
157 Our interview at the EUMC reinforces these doubts: Strategic / tactic planning relies on a airbase, relativly close to the theater wi-

thout the threat of attack : mostly civilian cargo aircraft (never negligible) does not bear the risk of an attack above the territory of the
conflict. The lack of infrastructure on site is decisive. The tire of the first C-130 of Belgium was punctured at the first landing in Bunia.

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times less (20 tonnes) than the Antonov (80 tons). operation and of the Operation CONCORDIA for
Thus the route between Entebbe and Paris would be example. Because it does not seem that benefit
multiplied by 4 (160 X rotations 6200 km) or 200 analyzes and reports during the planning of new
rotations (X300km) between Entebbe and Bunia EU operations and missions (eg EUFOR Chad/
could be reduced to 160. RCA)161. We add that the development of a
possible evacuation scenario (or the sharing of
10, Liability and feasibility - Only France, the information with European partners in this area) is
United Kingdom and possibly Germany are able to also an Achilles heel of the mission.
master such an operation, deployed forces and
provide air cover and reconnaissance. But a number 13, Final Conclusion - The first EU operations in
of capability shortfalls were identified: deficiencies the relationship of NATO and EU forces are more
in collecting and sharing strategic, operational or like the operations of a second power. In the
policy intelligence have been identified, the nineteenth century, the Kingdom of Piedmont-
obsolescence of certain equipment was Sardinia followed a similar diplomacy by
denounced158. participating in the Crimean War to ensure its
There is no question that France could have acted diplomatic position and French support. And in
alone, without the help of its partners. But despite 1860 it unified Italy! Perhaps the European activity
the difficulties initialed within the multinational will experience a similar efficiency. For more
HQ, the "European helmet" and the "coalition" has effectiveness and long-term resolution, additional
facilitated the sharing of responsibility for such an measures in the region would be essential: the
operation159. mandate of the EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR
Congo does not touch the Ituri region, theater of
11, Costs - The costs of the first ESDP operations Operation ARTEMIS .
have steadily increased: for CONCORDIA 2
millions €, for ARTEMIS 46m €, (and for
ALTHEA 80m €) only for France. In 2003, it is the Sources of images
states that fund their troops, and not the union. p. 1/1. - ARTEMIS - MONUC handover; Source : ECPAD
Furthermore, ARTEMIS was an exception, France p. 1/2. - An ERC-90 Sagaie in DRC; Source : unknow
p. 10. - The regions in DRC; Source :
has also supported the transportation costs, and the http://congobandit.tripod.com/
costs of the ARTEMIS Force`s Command p. 11. - The Kaya region ; Source :
Center160. The possibility of the lack of funding of http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Map_Sudan_
BaD_Kaya.png
the ESDP (eg Denmark) challenges the cohesion p. 23. - ARTEMIS Air Assets & OPRES; Source : General
policy and the intergovernmental nature of the Briefing of EUFOR ARTEMIS (CMUE/EUMC)
CFSP. Common funds should be incrased to help p. 24. - Organigramme OHQ ARTEMIS - Source :
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/artemis.htm
finance such operations like ARTEMIS. One of the p. 25. ARTEMIS OHQ Structure - Source : Lessons Lear-
reasons for non-use of 20,000 troops of European ned from a recent MN Operation : Lead / Framework
RIF (Rapid Intervention Force) could be the Nation Perspective (VA HEBRARD French Defence Staff
Director of Operations)
deficiency of sufficient financial basis. p. 26-27. - Source of images :
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/artemis.htm
p. 33. ARTEMIS Planning Process - Source : Lessons Lear-
12, Should better analyze and take advantage of ned from a recent MN Operation : Lead / Framework Na-
the conclusions, lessons learned from this

158 BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, L’opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?, op. cit., pp. 112.
159 GRIGNON, François, The Artemis Operation in the DRC. Lessons Learned for the Future of EU Peacekeeping in Africa, op. cit., p. 5.
160 FARIA, Fernanda, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l’Union européenne, op. cit., p. 60.
161 Author interview at EUMC.

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tion Perspective (VA HEBRARD French Defence Staff Di-
rector of Operations)
p. 42. - The DRC; Source : unknow

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Abstract

Operation ARTEMIS is considered the first military

András István TÜRKE
operation led by the EU, the first autonomous EU
operation, the first rapid response mission of the EU, • Ph.D student in History of International Relations at
first operation outside Europe, first operation the Sorbonne University (Paris III)
applying the principle of framework nation and first • visiting fellow at the EUISS (2006) & at the AWEU
example of "relay" operation, conducted in Defence Committee (2008)
cooperation between the EU and the UN. • visiting & associated fellow at the HIIA (Hungarian
Institute of International Affairs),
Operation ARTEMIS can be considered a global • associated research fellow at the IRSEM, and SVKI
commitment to international security in a situation (Institute for Strategic & Defence Studies, Budapest)
described by former Secretary of State of the United & and at the ROP-CERIUM (Montréal)
States, Madeleine Albright as "Africa's first world • founder of CERPESC
war. " Is it important for the European security or is it • turkeandras@gmail.com
just an "exercice" how to manage possible future
crises closer to Europe?
CERPESC ANALYSES
07/AF/02/2008
The first EU operations in the relationship between
NATO and EU forces are more like the operations of Editors
a secondary power. For more effectiveness and long- Europa Varietas Institute
www.europavarietas.org
term resolution, additional measures in the region
would be essential: the mandate of the EUPOL Association Objectif Europe III
Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo does not touch the - Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III
Ituri region, theater of the Operation ARTEMIS.
Editor-in-chief
András István Türke Ph.D

© 2005-2008
Europa Varietas Foundation (Hungary)
1135 Budapest, Szent László út 15. 5. em. 8,
All rights reserved

ISSN 2073-5634

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