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1) Space-based Missile Defense Systems: A Closer Look
Legal Foundations & Limitations
Germany acknowledges that no current treaty explicitly bans conventional weapons in space; however,
the Outer Space Treaty (1967)prohibits WMDs in orbit (Article IV) and mandates peaceful use
([en.wikipedia.org][1]). Our interpretation: while conventional interceptors aren't expressly banned, any
deployment must align with the peaceful ethos of the OST and shouldn't trigger an arms race.
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty once barred space interceptors, but has since lapsed—yet
its spirit lives on in Germany’s support for revisiting its core principles .
Cost, Utility & Vulnerability
Technically, interceptors in orbit are possible, but at an astronomical cost—an estimated- US\$100 billion
just for regional coverage like North Korea ([weforum.org][2]). Plus, they move in predictable paths and
are vulnerable to ground-based ASAT attacks. One Reddit engineer sums it neatly:
> “you need weapons deployed on dozens of different ground tracks… you end up needing a
Starlink‑sized constellation… wildly infeasible” .
Risks: Arms Race & Debris
Historical precedent shows that ASAT tests (China ’07, India ’19, US’s Operation Burnt Frost in ’08)
generate debris and can trigger tit-for-tat weaponization .
Environmental cascade risks like Kessler Syndrome pose real threats to global communication, climate
monitoring, and human spaceflight.
2) Limiting Military Activity in Space 🌍 vs 🚀
A) Strict Prohibitions & Red Lines
No WMDs or co-orbital weapons(like interceptors or destructive lasers) in orbit or on celestial
bodies—aligned with OST Art. IV alongside interpreting conventional weapon deployment as
destabilizing .
Ban on destructive ASAT tests—building on resounding public & diplomatic concern for debris and
civilian safety .
No military operations on moons/minor planets—reinforcing the Moon Agreement's principles of
demilitarization.
B) Permissible Activities—if Transparent & Cooperative
Defensive sensor & debris tracking R\&D is okay—as long as systems are dual-use, shared, and verified
by international observers.
Confidence-building measures: timely reports on maneuvers, pre-approval for rendezvous approaches,
ASAT moratoria, debris-sharing data .
Joint civil-military missions: e.g., satellite servicing or climate sensing architectures coordinated via
COPUOS.
C) Governance: Treaty + Behavioural Norms
1) Behavior-based Approach (Preferred by Germany)
Recognizing dual-use ambiguity, Germany emphasizes conduct-focused norms: forbidding unsafe
maneuvers, debris creation, or aggressive satellite approaches—much more practical than a pure weapons
ban
2) Treaty Mechanism: “Arms‑Free Space Accord” (AFSA)
Broad weapon ban: interceptors, ASATs, space-based lasers.
Transparency obligations: satellite registers, orbital activity followed by shared data.
Rigid verification: on-site inspections, AIS tracking, coordinated satellite sensors.
Enforcement tools: graduated sanctions from UN censure to tech embargoes and SC referral.
Liability expansion: update the 1972 Liability Convention to cover debris from military outer-space
actions
3) Allies & Blockers
EU, NATO, Australia, Canada, Japan: broadly supportive of transparency-first and behaviour-based
frameworks.
Meanwhile: India, UAE, South Korea—potential adopters with diplomatic outreach.
Pushback expected from: Russia & China, who prefer soft-law proposals or non-binding codes; Iran,
North Korea will resist overall .
4) Diplomacy: Working via the UN
1. UN GA First Committee: Germany to champion transparency norms + legal pathways for AFSA.
2. COPUOS & OEWG: negotiate behavioural codes, then build AFSA negotiation mandate.
3. Confidence-building: propose voluntary moratoria (e.g., no kinetic ASAT tests) and joint R\&D
projects.
4. Verification Trials:pilot transparency layers—satellite data, hosted sensors, mutual inspections.
5. Security Council: define enforcement paths for treaty breaches.
5) Q\&A Prep
“What about deterrence?”
Passive defense (e.g., ground-based interceptors) is allowed; Germany warns that space-based weapons
provoke threats and likely retaliation—undermining deterrence stability.
“Is a new treaty necessary vs COPUOS norms?”
Existing norms lack legally binding force. Only a ratified treaty with verification & liability ensures real
accountability.
“What of civilian satellite safety?”
Destructive ASAT tests breach the principle of distinction under IHL by risking civilian assets and
services like weather forecasting.
6) Summary & Germany’s Message
Germany advocates peaceful innovation, not militarization. It supports R\&D in sensing and resilience but
draws a hard line at deploying weapons—even conventional ones—in space. Through dual-pronged
diplomacy—behaviour-norms first, then treaties like AFSA—it seeks a safer, stable, and debris-free
cosmos for all.
