Operation Sindoor &

India's New Doctrine of

Deterrence
Strategic Lessons from the 2025
India-Pakistan Crisis

Editors
Lt Gen D S Hooda (Retd)
Dr Happymon Jacob
First published in India by The Council for Strategic and Defense Research & PAXANALYSIS
(OPC) Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, India.

Copyright Council for Strategic and Defense Research & PAXANALYSIS (OPC) Pvt. Ltd.

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List of Contributors

Lt Gen D S Hooda
Lt Gen D S Hooda (Retd) served as the Army Commander of Northern Command from 2014 to
2016, leading operations in Jammu & Kashmir and along the borders with Pakistan and China.
A decorated officer, he was awarded the PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, and VSM for his distinguished
service. In 2019, he authored India's National Security Strategy. He is the Co-Founder of CSDR,
where he leads its defence and security verticals.

Brig Arun Sahgal

Brig Arun Sahgal (Retd) is the former founding Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Indian
Integrated Defence Staff, where he shaped strategic thinking on long-term security planning.
His expertise lies in international security, strategic foresight, and nuclear confidence-building
measures. He currently serves as Senior Fellow at the Delhi Policy Group.

Ambuj Sahu
Ambuj Sahu is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Indiana University Bloomington. He
specializes in international security, India-China relations, and the geopolitics of
semiconductor supply chains. He previously served as a Research Associate at the Delhi Policy
Group, contributing to foreign policy projects for government agencies.

Hely Desai
Hely Desai is a research associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research in New
Delhi. She is an incoming Ph.D. candidate at the University of Cambridge, where she also
received a Master’s in Philosophy. She is also a Research Fellow with the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty Organization and a mentor for the Youth Leader Fund at the United Nations Office
of Disarmament Affairs.

Rajesh Basrur
Professor Rajesh Basrur is a senior scholar of international security and a former Professor of
International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore.
His latest book, Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy (2023),
examines how domestic constraints shape India’s foreign policy. He has held visiting
appointments at the University of Oxford, the University of Birmingham, and Stanford
University.

Happymon Jacob
Dr. Happymon Jacob is the Founder-Director of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research.
Specializing in conflict resolution, Indian foreign policy, and nuclear non-proliferation, he
authored the book Line on Fire (2019). He is the Editor-in-Chief of India’s World and a regular
columnist for Hindustan Times, known for his insights on peacebuilding and strategic affairs.
Sidharth Raimedhi
Dr. Sidharth Raimedhi holds a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, specializing in
international relations theory with a focus on India-China dynamics and the Indo-Pacific. He
previously served as a research analyst in the Ministry of External Affairs’ East Asia Division.
Currently a Fellow at CSDR, he edits the weekly newsletter DIPTEL and focuses on India’s
relations with Great Powers.

Capt Sarabjeet S. Parmar

Capt Sarabjeet S. Parmar (Retd) served in the Indian Navy from 1987 to 2023, commanding
frontline ships and helicopter squadrons. He played a key role in formulating India’s maritime
security strategy and was Executive Director at the National Maritime Foundation. He is now a
Distinguished Fellow at CSDR, specializing in Indo-Pacific maritime security, piracy, HADR,
and international maritime law.

Rakesh Sood
Ambassador Rakesh Sood has served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Nepal, and France,
and was the country’s first Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva. He founded and led the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division in
the MEA and served as the PM’s Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. An
expert in Indian foreign policy, international security, nuclear non-proliferation, and space
policy, he is currently a Distinguished Fellow at CSDR.

Lt Gen Sanjay Verma

Lt Gen Sanjay Verma (Retd) retired as Director General of Weapons and Equipment at Army
Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, overseeing planning, acquisitions, and quality assurance
across national and international sectors. With extensive experience in high-level government
and decision-making, he currently consults for DRDO, is a Fellow of the Indian Institution of
Engineers, and serves as an Advisor and Subject Expert with UPSC. He is a Distinguished Fellow
at CSDR.

Bashir Ali Abbas

Bashir is a Senior Research Associate and member of the facilitating team for the Chao Track,
the longest-running Track II dialogue between India and Pakistan, at CSDR. His research
focuses on strategic and political issues in South Asia and the Middle East, with experience at
the Stimson Center and the Takshashila Institution. A regular contributor to The Indian Express
and former columnist for Hindustan Times, he has worked extensively on naval strategy,
international law, and security affairs.
Ashok K. Kantha
Ambassador Ashok K. Kantha is a distinguished diplomat who served as India’s Ambassador to
China (2014-16) and Secretary (East) at the Ministry of External Affairs. With over 38 years of
diplomatic experience specializing in India’s neighborhood relations, he was India’s lead
negotiator for key agreements with China. He is a Distinguished Fellow at CSDR.

Mohammad Kunhi
Dr. Muhammed Kunhi is a staff writer at India’s World. He holds a PhD in International
Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and previously served as a postdoctoral
researcher at the National University of Singapore. His research interests span the politics and
international relations of China, Cold War studies, and the dynamics of public discourse.

Devika Makkat
Devika Makkat is a Research Associate at CSDR, currently managing a project on the India-EU
relationship supported by the HBF New Delhi office. She contributes to research on Indo-
Pacific strategy, including key reports and podcasts. Her expertise spans Indian foreign policy,
EU-China relations, and engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

Lt Gen Paramjit Singh

Lt Gen Paramjit Singh (Retd) is a decorated Indian Army officer with extensive experience in
high-altitude warfare and special forces operations. He has commanded key units, including
the Siachen Brigade, and served as Director General of Military Operations, playing a pivotal
role in the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2021 ceasefire with Pakistan. A recipient of the Sena
Medal and Ati Vishisht Seva Medal, he also served as Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy).

VAdm Anil K Chawla

VAdm Anil Kumar Chawla (Retd) commanded frontline Indian Navy ships including INS Viraat
and the Western Fleet, and held key appointments such as Director General Naval Operations
and Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command. Specializing in maritime
strategy and capability planning, he is the author of the book Maritime Power and China’s
Grand Strategy (2024), a comprehensive analysis of China’s maritime ambitions. He is a
Distinguished Fellow at CSDR.

Ajay Bisaria
Ambassador Ajay Bisaria is a distinguished diplomat and strategic consultant with 35 years of
service in the Indian Foreign Service. He has served as Indian High Commissioner to Canada
and Ambassador to Pakistan, Poland, and Lithuania. An expert on India’s economic and
security relations, Eurasia policy, and geopolitics, he is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF and
an Advisor at CSDR. He is the author of the book "Anger Management" (2024), which examines
India-Pakistan diplomatic relations.
Tara Kartha
Dr. Tara Kartha is a senior strategic affairs expert with over 30 years of experience in national
security and diplomacy. She served for 17 years at India’s National Security Council Secretariat,
where she focused on terrorism, regional dynamics, and cross-border threats. She is the author
of ‘Tools of Terror: Light Weapons and India’s Security’ and a frequent commentator on
national and regional security issues. She currently serves as Director of Research at the Centre
for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS).

Shiv Sahai
Shiv Sahai retired as a senior IPS officer (1987 batch, J&K cadre) who served as Additional
Secretary for Internal Affairs at the National Security Council Secretariat under the Prime
Minister’s Office. He has held key positions in Jammu and Kashmir, including ADG Intelligence
and IGP Kashmir. Known for his strategic approach to counterinsurgency and crisis
management, he has been decorated with multiple gallantry and distinguished service awards.
He is currently a Distinguished Fellow at CSDR.

Col Shashank Ranjan

Colonel Shashank Ranjan (Retd) is a retired Infantry Officer with 33 years in the Indian Army,
including extensive experience in counter-insurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir and the
Northeast. He has served in UN peacekeeping missions, defence diplomacy with the USMC,
and disaster relief operations. Author of Resolving India’s Maoist Challenge, he currently
teaches at OP Jindal Global University as Associate Professor of Practice.
Contents
Introduction................................................................................................... 1
Lt Gen D S Hooda

The Nuclear Dimension ................................................................................. 3

India's New Response Doctrine Towards Pakistan: The New Normal ................................... 4
Brig Arun Sahgal & Ambuj Sahu
A Fragile Pause: Caught Between Nuclear Signaling, Off-Ramps, and Escalation Traps..........8
Hely Desai
Op Sindoor: The Nuclear Dimension.................................................................................. 13
Rajesh Basrur

On Strategic Thought and Preparedness ....................................................... 17

Twelve Arguments to Make Sense of Op Sindoor................................................................ 18

Happymon Jacob
Blind Spots and Silver Linings: Past and Prologue of Op Sindoor......................................... 21
Sidharth Raimedhi
The Indian Navy's Role and Impact in Operation Sindoor: Historical Precedents and Future
Imperatives....................................................................................................................... 27
Capt Sarabjeet S. Parmar
Conventional Operations Under the Nuclear Shadow......................................................... 30
Rakesh Sood
Op Sindoor and India's Defense Indigenization Effort........................................................ 37
Lt Gen Sanjay Verma
Water as Leverage: India's IWT Suspension is Here to Stay................................................. 41
Bashir Ali Abbas

The International Dimension ....................................................................... 45

India's Missing Friends During Op Sindoor......................................................................... 46

Mohammad Kunhi
The China Factor in Operation Sindoor: Diplomatic, Military, and Strategic Ramifications
Now and Beyond............................................................................................................... 52
Ashok K. Kantha
Between Words and Weapons: Europe and the India–Pakistan Flashpoint......................... 59
Devika Makkat
The Geopolitical Context and its Challenges Around Op Sindoor........................................ 62
Sidharth Raimedhi

Bilateral Implications of the Crisis ................................................................ 65

Why Water Will Dominate India-Pakistan Conversations Going Forward............................ 66

Happymon Jacob
Role of the DGMOs Hotline in India-Pakistan Crises........................................................... 69
Lt Gen Paramjit Singh
Maritime Lessons of Op Sindoor: A Perspective Based on the Principles of War.................. 73
VAdm Anil K Chawla
Will India's 'Integrated Deterrence' Stem Cross-Border Terror?.......................................... 77
Ajay Bisaria
Op Sindoor and the Evolution of International Law............................................................ 81
Bashir Ali Abbas
Beyond the Battlefield: Pakistan’s Strategic Reckoning in the Wake of Operation Sindoor... 85
Hely Desai

Counter-terrorism ........................................................................................ 94

Terror, Tactics, and Territory: India's Evolving Response to Cross-Border Threats.............. 95

Tara Kartha
What Awaits J&K in Terms of Terrorism and How to Prepare for it?.................................... 99
Shiv Sahai
Beyond Operation Sindoor: Rethinking India's Counter-Terrorism Strategy...................... 102
Col. Shashank Ranjan
Introduction
Lt Gen D S Hooda

Operation Sindoor is a strategic inflexion point in India’s military history. For decades, India’s
security calculus vis-à-vis Pakistan has been marked by caution, calibrated response, and an
overhanging shadow of nuclear weapons. The operation exemplified India’s resolve to counter
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism through a combination of kinetic force and political instruments
to signal that the pursuit of terrorism as an instrument of state policy would incur tangible and
escalating costs.

It was also a statement of political will. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s articulation of the
“new normal” after the strikes clarified the doctrine in no uncertain terms. Any act of terror
will be met with a strong and resolute response, India will not be intimidated by nuclear
threats, and no distinction will be made between terrorists and their state sponsors. These
three principles now underpin a fundamentally transformed Indian posture.

A new strategic posture also demands doctrinal clarity and appropriate capability building.
This will require an honest assessment of what we have learned from the operation. We must
also be conscious that an 88-hour operation cannot be a complete template of how future
conflicts of much longer duration could play out.

This compilation, produced by the Council for Strategic and Defense Research and India’s
World Magazine, brings together a diverse array of perspectives—ranging from military
practitioners and strategic analysts to scholars of nuclear deterrence and diplomacy—to offer a
comprehensive understanding of Operation Sindoor and its implications for Indian strategy.
Collectively, these essays explore not only the execution of the operation but also the doctrinal,
operational, and political frameworks that shaped it.

Several essays assess how Sindoor represents a pivotal shift in India’s approach to cross-border
terrorism. Moving away from the logic of “strategic restraint,” India has embraced deterrence
by punishment, striking deep into Pakistan's mainland and targeting the leadership hubs of
terrorist groups with unprecedented precision. The analysis reveals that this operation was
carefully planned to consider escalation thresholds and strategic messaging.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 1

Other contributions explore the nuclear dimension—arguably one of the most complex aspects
of the India-Pakistan relationship. These chapters examine how Sindoor operated deliberately
within the nuclear shadow, pushing the boundaries of conventional retaliation while stopping
short of strategic provocation. The muted nature of Pakistan's nuclear signalling during the
conflict is examined closely, with some authors suggesting that India may have successfully
blunted the utility of Pakistan's long-relied-upon "nuclear shield."

The volume also addresses a growing tension in India’s doctrine - the shift from deterrence to
compellence. While deterrence seeks to prevent hostile action, compellence aims to induce a
change in behaviour. Many of the authors argue that India's long-term objective should not
merely be to deter the next attack but to compel Pakistan to dismantle its proxy networks
altogether. This would require not only the threat of military punishment but sustained
diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and even support to dissident movements within
Pakistan. This would be a shift from episodic responses to persistent pressure.

Another set of essays delves into the diplomatic and legal implications of Sindoor. The
suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty is examined not as a symbolic act but as part of a
broader strategy of comprehensive national coercion. In parallel, the international
community's muted response to India's actions is analyzed, suggesting that New Delhi may now
have to manage any future crisis independently.

Finally, the volume considers the road ahead. Sindoor has shifted the goalposts, but it has not
eliminated risk. The next confrontation is likely to begin at a higher threshold, with reduced
warning time and compressed decision cycles. Escalation ladders are now steeper and more
uncertain. The book argues that India must institutionalize the lessons of Sindoor—through
doctrinal clarity, capability enhancement, strategic communication, and sustained political
resolve.

This volume is both a reflection and a guide. Operation Sindoor has raised the bar for India’s
response to terrorism. We must now craft doctrines and build capabilities to ensure
consistency and credibility in the application of force, the management of escalation, and the
preservation of deterrence across future crises.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 2

The
Nuclear
Dimension

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 3

India’s New Response Doctrine
Towards Pakistan
Brig Arun Sahgal & Ambuj Sahu

India’s precision strikes on terrorist infrastructure and their military facilities encompassing
both mainland Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) have heralded
India’s new response doctrine to acts of cross-border terror. Operation Sindoor, marked a swift
and decisive retaliation to the gruesome Pahalgam attacks, which claimed the lives of 26
innocent tourists, targeted on religious grounds. These attacks were part incited by a
provocative speech from Pakistan Army Chief General (now Field Marshal) Asim Munir. In a
rhetorical address to overseas Pakistani’s endorsing the two-nation theory as the cause belie,
described Kashmir as Pakistan’s jugular. The speech was widely viewed as a direct incitement to
terrorists and their handlers within the ISI.

India’s military response to this act of grave provocation was focused and precise: targeting,
terror infrastructure not only in the PoJK, but for the first time headquarters of the terrorist
groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) at Muridke and Bahawalpur. The
operation was the result of weeks of meticulous planning that included detailed intelligence
gathering.

Operation Sindoor was unique in many ways. It was the subcontinent’s first non-contact war,
marked by technology-driven kinetic activity involving missiles and drones. Neither side
physically crossed the other’s territorial space. It not only showcased India’s military and
technological superiority, but more importantly restored strategic deterrence, and unveiled a
new security doctrine. It upheld strategic autonomy, and established India as a decisive power
prepared to employ military capability in pursuit of its core national interests, all while
managing the risk of escalation through demonstrated targeting underpinning both capability
and intent.

The ‘New Normal’

On May 12, Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated the core tenets of India’s new response
doctrine. First, any Pakistan perpetrated terrorist attack on Indian soil would be met with
assured and proportionate retaliation. Second, India would no longer be deterred by nuclear

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 4

blackmail in its resolve to strike terrorist sanctuaries across the border. More importantly, it
called out the false equivalence that the international community tends to make between India
and Pakistan under a nuclear umbrella, thereby ignoring Pakistan’s policy for state-sponsored
terrorism. Third, India will not differentiate between terrorists and the governments that
harbors them. Modi additionally reiterated India’s long-held diplomatic position: terror and
talks cannot go together.

Assured retaliation towards acts of terror

Operation Sindoor marked a decisive departure in India’s approach to terrorism emanating

from Pakistan. In previous instances—such as the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot
airstrikes—India, whilst clearly indicating its threshold of tolerance, exercised restraint and
symbolic resolve, by avoiding striking deep into Pakistan’s mainland. This time, however, the
response was fundamentally different. India’s focus was on dismantling Pakistan’s terror
factories across the entire operational chain.

Sites like Markaz Subhan Allah in Bahawalpur and Markaz Taiba in Muridke were not arbitrary
targets—they were the nerve centers behind some of the most heinous attacks on India,
including the IC814 hijacking, the 2001 Parliament attack, and the 26/11 Mumbai carnage.
Camps in Sialkot, Muzaffarabad, and Barnala served as hubs for fanatical indoctrination and
recruitment. Meanwhile, the Sarjal facility at Tehra Kalan was identified as a key weapons
storage site, and Kotli and Muzaffarabad functioned as forward launchpads for terrorist
infiltration.

The detailed targeting of terrorist networks inside Pakistan showed India pursuing a precise
objective rather than belligerent goals such as territorial occupation or regime change. With
these actions, a new threshold has been established: terror attacks emanating from Pakistani
soil will now be met with military force—not merely as a threat but as a firm precedent.

Nuclear blackmail will not go unchallenged

However, the most significant achievement of Operation Sindoor has been posing a
fundamental challenge to Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. By treating terrorist attacks originating
from Pakistani soil as acts of war, India signaled its intent not to allow Pakistan’s nuclear
capability deter it from using force restrained by its self-perceived thresholds. Through a
campaign defined by clear objectives, controlled escalation, and effective strategic messaging,
India demonstrated the ability to call Pakistan’s bluff, exposing the limitations of its nuclear
deterrent as a shield for the prosecution of terrorism.

Pakistan has long relied on the belief that its nuclear weapons can be leveraged to offset India’s

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 5

conventional superiority by shrinking the space for conflict below the nuclear threshold. As a
result, the strategy of using cross-border terror became the basis of proxy warfare against India
in J&K, secure in the belief that India’s conventional responses can be contained through
nuclear brinkmanship. At the heart of this lay the assumption that any cycle of conventional
military response could spiral into a larger conflict breaching nuclear thresholds. This logic
formed the essence of Pakistan’s ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’ doctrine, designed to forestall
substantive Indian responses by propagating redlines, crossing which, Pakistan might be left
with no option but to escalate up the nuclear ladder. Importantly, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear
Weapons were a key component of this response matrix, reinforcing shallow thresholds.

India’s measured offensive action, executed with precision and determination in response to
Pakistan’s cross-border strikes using drones, missiles, and standoff air and missile attacks,
starkly exposed the failure of Pakistan’s nuclear brinkmanship. By striking eleven major
airbases, India effectively neutralized its adversary’s capacity to deliver a nuclear warhead (via
air) or even a TNW. Complementing this, India’s robust and layered air defense systems further
constrained Pakistan’s missile delivery options.

Additionally, the precise targeting of critical military assets such as Sargodha and Nur Khan
underscored India’s capability to undertake precision non-strategic conventional strikes on
strategic targets with great effect. A particular strike reportedly fell close to Pakistan’s
command and control center, further indicating a breach of air defenses and showcasing
India’s precision strike capabilities. Unnerved by India’s actions, Islamabad reportedly sought
US help for an off-ramp, as highlighted by a direct call from Pakistan’s COAS Gen Munir to
Secretary Rubio and Pakistan’s DGMO, seeking an early ceasefire.

State is not different from state-sponsored terrorism

Pakistan responded to India’s missile strikes on nine terror sites with drone and missile attacks
targeting both Indian military assets and civilian populations. Viral images of Pakistan Army
officers offering state funerals to LeT terrorists in Muridke only reinforced what Operation
Sindoor sought to prove: direct Pakistani state complicity in sponsoring cross-border terrorism.
It is this direct collusion that made India draw a firm line—Pakistan’s military would no longer
be viewed as distinct from the terrorist groups it harbors and enables.

In response, India launched a comprehensive offensive against Pakistan’s military

infrastructure, fully cognizant of the risks of escalation. Operation Sindoor demonstrated
India’s ability to strike targets deep within Pakistan—terror camps, drone hubs, airbases, or air
defense systems—with precision and control, while absorbing Pakistani retaliation at minimal
cost. Pakistan’s Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos laid bare its desperation: the targeting of

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 6

civilian centers blurred any distinction between the state and the terrorists it shields. On the
night of May 9-10, in a reckless escalation, Pakistan fired four missiles at New Delhi—all of
which were intercepted well before nearing their intended targets.

India’s response served a dual purpose: to establish a clear dictum of imposing costs for future
terrorist attacks, and to deliver a controlled yet decisive retaliation, short of full-scale war, to
Pakistan’s military leadership.

Strategic implications of Op Sindoor

Operation Sindoor marks a watershed in India's national security doctrine—an assertive pivot
from reactive restraint to strong deterrence by punishment. For decades, Pakistan relied on
nuclear brinkmanship and the fiction of plausible deniability to sponsor cross-border
terrorism with impunity. That era is now decisively over.

By striking deep into the Pakistani mainland with precision, India not only imposed punitive
costs for the Pahalgam massacre but also dismantled the myth of a no-go nuclear threshold.
The message was unambiguous: terrorism, when abetted by the state, will invite a calibrated,
yet uncompromising military response.

Key lessons for strategic stability in the Indian subcontinent:

India called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, ascending multiple rungs on the escalation ladder
without provoking nuclear retaliation.
India established a doctrine of deterrence by punishment, making it clear that any future
terrorist attack will exact severe costs.
Alongside military, the non-military thresholds of Pakistan’s full-spectrum doctrine have
also been breached. Both the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty as well as other
economic measures taken by India after the Pahalgam attacks, remain. India has clearly
left the door ajar for testing economic and political thresholds in a future crisis.

Conclusion

Operation Sindoor was not born out of adventurism but rooted in strategic clarity. India has
asserted its sovereignty, its autonomy, and resolve—on its own terms, and without recourse to
third-party mediation. The rules of engagement in the Indian subcontinent have changed.
India will escalate conventionally, as in Op Sindoor, in response to sub-conventional attacks.
The burden of further escalation now lies with those who use terror as an instrument of state
policy.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 7

A Fragile Pause: Caught Between
Nuclear Signaling, Off-Ramps,
and Escalation Traps
Hely Desai

The May 10 ceasefire between India and Pakistan may have temporarily halted active military
hostilities, but it has done little to provide reassurance of a return to stability or predictability
in the region. Although the crisis followed a familiar script—terrorist provocation, Indian
retaliation, reciprocal military strikes, and an externally brokered de-escalation—the cadence
of military activity, retaliation target profile, and the nature of signaling suggest a shift in the
dynamics of the confrontation. While much analysis often tends to fall into the pattern of
‘fighting the last war’ by drawing familiar comparisons, the 2025 confrontation resists easy
analogies.

Unlike past crises—Kargil (1999), the 2001–02 terror attacks, Mumbai terror attacks (2008), or
Balakot (2019)—this confrontation was also marked by the conspicuous absence of the ‘N’ word
from Pakistan’s senior leadership until fairly late into the conflict. Aside from a handful of
sporadic remarks by mid-level officials and politicians, the nuclear dimension remained
muted. The only notable reference to nuclear weapons, in the form of a later-retracted National
Command Authority (NCA) meeting, came just hours before the ceasefire and appeared to be
aimed more at an international audience than as a credible deterrent signal.

However, the nuclear dimension this time loomed not in overt threats, but in its deliberate
ambiguity. The near silence of formal nuclear signaling, broken only by subtle cues and
warnings, just to be walked back on, may itself be seen as a signal. It suggested not restraint,
but a confidence in mutual vulnerability. This makes the current pause not a step toward
resolution, but a lull under the long shadow of further escalation.

From tripwire to tactic: Pakistan’s saber rattling or the lack thereof

Historically, in crises, such as in 1999, 2002, and 2019, the Pakistani leadership has been quick
to invoke the nuclear card, sometimes even before the escalation begins. The intent behind

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 8

 such signaling is often understood as serving three core purposes: swiftly restoring deterrence,
compensating for conventional military asymmetry, and internationalizing the crisis.

Early
Crisis / Year Nuclear By Whom Signalling/Key Statements
Signalling?

• Nawaz Sharif: “Confident… to meet

Pakistani officials: [an armed attack] on equal terms.”
• PM Nawaz Sharif • Shamshad Ahmad: “We will not
Kargil
• Foreign Secretary Shamshad hesitate to use any weapon in our
Conflict, Yes
Ahmad arsenal…”
1999
• Military Spokesman Brig. • Quereshi: “Right to retaliate by
Rashid Quereshi whatever means…”

• Pakistan reportedly moved Hatf-1

Implicit and Hatf-2 ballistic missiles closer to
2001 • Pakistani military (reported)
Signalling the international border (and Indian
cities).

• Pakistani leadership
2001–02 • Musharraf (2002): “As a last resort
Yes • Missile tests
Standoff the atom bomb is also possible.”
• President Pervez Musharraf

• Sharif: Military capable of thwarting

• PM Nawaz Sharif
Surgical Strike No (Outright “any evil design.”
• Pakistan Army
Denial, 2016 denial) • Bajwa: Indian claims “false
• A Bajwa (ISPR)
propaganda,” routine cross-LoC fire.

• National Command
Balakot Authority (NCA) meeting
Yes
Airstrike, 2019 called by PM Imran Khan on
the same day of the airstrikes.

• Second-tier voices / • Railway Minister: “Pakistan's nuclear

No (Top- institutional murmurs weapons are not for display… 130
level) • Aborted NCA nuclear warheads aimed only for
Current Crisis
Yes (Second- announcement India.”
tier) • Railway Minister • Ambassador to Russia: “Full
• Ambassador to Russia spectrum of power could be used.”

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 9

In the present crisis, the usual choreography—missile tests, fiery rhetoric, and stern NCA
statements—was either softened or postponed. This pause suggests a calculated waiting posture
- perhaps assuming, based on historical patterns, that India’s response would be limited and
symbolic. But Pakistan’s invocation of the NCA, four days into the standoff, was brief and
ultimately reversed—either due to internal confusion, international pressure, or both. The
break from the past patterns lies not just in the delay, but also in the walk-back after crossing
that threshold. What explains this break from the pattern?

Timing and calculus: One explanation is structural disarray. Pakistan had time to prepare—
after the Pahalgam massacre, there was no ambiguity that a retaliatory Indian strike was
coming. And given India's past patterns (2016, 2019), Islamabad likely assumed any
response would be calibrated, largely symbolic, and designed to avoid escalation. This
assumption provided cushion space: a chance to bolster air defense readiness and posture
forces without needing to activate overt nuclear signaling.

Escalation Dynamics: The initial Indian strikes avoided military infrastructure, hitting only
terror camps, as expected. The NCA was triggered only after a Pakistani military response
led to a second wave of Indian retaliation—BrahMos strikes on air bases—but it was soon
denied and/or walked back on, indicating that Pakistan had expected the crisis to level off
and plateau, without escalating further. The signaling came not as a first line of deterrence
but as a fallback option if the escalation breached assumed limits.

Strategic Recalibration: The delay reflects a deeper strategic recalibration. The use of
nuclear signaling not as a tripwire but as a pressure release mechanism suggests Pakistan
may be seeking to internationalize the crisis, now without appearing reckless. Nuclear
threats carry diminishing returns when overused. By delaying them, Pakistan may have
sought to preserve its credibility and create more favorable conditions for diplomatic
intervention.

Nuclear signaling in the present crisis served more as a channel for diplomacy than a true
escalation threat. It was used to trigger off-ramp conversations, not push toward the next rung
of the ladder. But that creates risk. If nuclear signaling becomes the primary mechanism for
controlling escalation, it may eventually lose its credibility or be misread. In each invocation, it
is harder to tell which signals are performative and which are real.

India’s evolving deterrence playbook

On the other hand, India’s response combined a tone of diplomatic restraint with a firm
approach to deterrence. The Foreign Secretary's initial remarks emphasized de-escalation and
diplomatic restraint, signaling a preference for stability. Yet, Prime Minister Modi’s address

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 10

made clear that India would “not differentiate between conventional and unconventional
attacks,” implying resolve and deterrence. Days later, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's call for
IAEA inspections of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal further emphasized concerns over
“irresponsible” behavior. This mixture of diplomatic caution and firm political rhetoric calls
into question the space below the nuclear threshold for maneuvering, introducing an element
of strategic ambiguity that will impact the nature of the next crisis.

Blurred Boundaries: By erasing the traditional distinction between state-sponsored

terrorism and state aggression, India reinforces its right to respond militarily—a measured
effort to uphold national security in a complex threat environment. But if every proxy strike
is treated as a casus belli for military retaliation, does the escalation ladder become shorter
—and steeper?

Ambiguity as Pressure: India’s mixed messaging creates asymmetric pressures. For

Pakistan, the absence of clear thresholds increases the unpredictability of Indian
responses. This can either delay nuclear signaling, as seen in 2025, or accelerate it in future
crises, depending on perceptions of intent and pressure.

A Hardening Posture: India’s strikes on targets near Pakistan’s alleged strategic

infrastructure at Kirana Hills—close to the Nur Khan and Sargodha air bases, combined
with rhetoric about refusing to “give in to nuclear blackmail,” point to a more assertive
posture. While Air Marshal Bharti categorically denied targeting Kirana Hills, the perceived
proximity to nuclear assets remains sensitive. The practical damage to air bases is often
temporary — hangars, runways, or fuel assets that can be taken offline briefly, and usually
restored within hours or days. But their symbolic and strategic impact can be outsized,
especially if the location is seen as adjacent to nuclear infrastructure or military leadership
nodes.

Its posture had, until now, enabled New Delhi to carve out space for operational flexibility
under the nuclear umbrella, demonstrating resolve without provoking uncontrollable
escalation. But how far can this approach be stretched before the room for calibrated responses
disappears altogether?

The Ceasefire as mirage: A faster, harder, riskier crisis template emerges

The key takeaway from the current crisis isn’t how nuclear weapons are likely or unlikely to be
used — they remain a last-resort option for both sides. But what has changed is the proximity of
nuclear signalling to conventional action, and the erosion of space between escalation ladders.
If in this crisis India’s strikes on military bases were seen as warnings rather than a prelude,
then how many more such warnings can occur before one is misread?

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 11

The deeper question, then, is not whether deterrence held — it did, narrowly — but how long
these back-and-forth cycles can continue before a miscalculation, misinterpretation, or
technological failure triggers a crisis no one can pull back from.

The 2025 crisis was not just another tactical flashpoint—it marked a shift in the region’s
escalation baseline. Both India and Pakistan walked away claiming success, but the perception
of victory on both sides has laid the groundwork for greater risks ahead.

India sees its BrahMos strikes as having compelled the ceasefire. Pakistan views its delayed
nuclear signaling as evidence that deterrence remains effective. These opposing narratives
have hardened domestic postures and increased the likelihood of future escalation. India’s
declarations of its evolving doctrine imply greater willingness to retaliate without courting
global sympathy. Pakistan’s more ambiguous nuclear messaging, meanwhile, may reflect a
deliberate tactical choice—or simply the symptoms of its strained and disjointed civil-military
system grappling with heightened international scrutiny, economic fragility, and political
instability. Either way, the crisis stability that once rested on clear red lines and predictable
thresholds may no longer hold. Every Pakistani strike now invites more assertive retaliation.
Every Indian response that avoids major escalation sets a precedent—and a political
expectation—for the next one.

Unlike 1999, when Kargil reset the escalation ladder and reimposed relative predictability, the
2025 crisis institutionalized ambiguity. It has codified a norm of silent sabre-rattling, where
deterrence rests on uncertain signals and compressed timelines. This is no return to the old
cycle. It is the emergence of a new, far more dangerous one, marked by ambiguous doctrines,
precision capabilities, hyper-politicized threat perceptions, and shrinking windows for de-
escalation. The ladder of escalation has been repositioned on a steeper, narrower, and more
volatile terrain.

Against the mirage of stability of the ceasefire, this crisis shows both sides testing new
boundaries of escalation. The confrontation did not restore deterrence; it normalized
ambiguity. Strategic signaling has not disappeared—it has been deliberately muted,
transformed into a policy of opacity. Each time nuclear signalling is used, its credibility
changes—either by inflation or erosion. If it continues to be treated as a bargaining chip to
draw in third parties, it may crowd out the very strategic clarity that deterrence is supposed to
provide. This silence, while offering little maneuvering space, also clouds thresholds and
invites miscalculation. And in a region where perception drives policy, such ambiguity can be
dangerously destabilizing.

As the space for sub-threshold action now narrows, both sides face a dangerous paradox: more
restraint might now require more risk. The next crisis may not wait for red lines to be crossed—
it may be triggered due to the very absence of them.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 12

Op Sindoor: The Nuclear
Dimension
Rajesh Basrur

Like all India-Pakistan crises since at least 1999, the current confrontation is widely viewed as a
dangerous clash between nuclear powers—yet there is little clarity about what this actually
entails beyond standard expressions of alarm. Nuclear weapons have powerful effects which
constrain what nations can do. They have been used twice (in Hiroshima and Nagasaki), but
only when the targeted nation did not possess them. Military hostilities between nuclear-armed
rivals have occurred on numerous occasions, but the risks of escalation have always restricted
options on both sides. A glance at these episodes lay bare an inescapable reality: nuclear
weapons prohibit a rational resort to major war, and the closer we come to crossing the nuclear
threshold, the larger looms the risk of catastrophe. It makes sense, therefore, to seek less
hazardous alternatives and, if the adversary simply will not negotiate in good faith, resort to
options thus far not considered palatable. Since the 1990s, Indian policy has not achieved
much: every crisis has brought a modicum of compromise, but not for long. There is no reason
to expect anything different this time unless an out-of-the-box approach is adopted that both
eschews nuclear risk and turns an asymmetric conflict into a symmetric one.

Though the fragmentation of Pakistan may produce risks for India, it is worth considering the
potential strategic gains from a nuanced Indian standpoint

Historical patterns of Nuclear confrontation

Let me first outline the patterns discernible in nuclear altercations over the years. Major
border skirmishes broke out between China and the Soviet Union in March-September 1969;
and between India and Pakistan during the Kargil crisis in March-July 1999. In the mid-1960s,
during the Vietnam War, there were occasional dogfights between Chinese and American
ircraft; and Chinese-manned anti-aircraft weapons deployed in the North also targeted the
latter. Lower-level combat occurred between the US and the Soviet Union in 1960 and 1962
when American intelligence-gathering planes were shot down over the Soviet Union and Cuba
respectively; in 1962, when American surface ships dropped practice torpedoes as warnings on

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 13

a Soviet submarines near Cuba (which Soviet commanders mistook for real ones); and when
Indian and Pakistani land and air forces briefly clashed in 2016 and 2019. Major confrontations
without actual serious combat occurred between US and Soviet forces in Berlin in 1961 and
Cuba in 1962, and between India and Pakistan in 2001-02. Overall, regardless of the nature of
the confrontation, both sides actually cooperated in three ways: by not crossing the threshold
between limited combat and major war; by scrupulously avoiding the use of the bomb; and by
negotiating overtly as well as covertly.

Op Sindoor: Unprecedented risks in a familiar pattern

The story is similar in the present crisis. In fact, unlike the 2001-02 crisis, there has been no
nuclear signalling through statements from political or military leaders, or through missile
tests. Both sides have also been careful to avoid deploying troops across the formal lines
separating their forces. At the outset, India declared that it had targeted only terrorist
infrastructure, not the Pakistani military or civilian population. But the near-war produced at
least two unprecedented risks, both initiated by Pakistan: the targeting of civilians, and deep
strikes against each other’s military bases.

In the latter case, Indian forces struck Pakistan’s Nur Khan base, a short distance from the
headquarters of its Strategic Plans Division, which controls the country’s nuclear weapons. This
raised the possibility of accidental nuclear war—one that could occur even without the direct
targeting of a nuclear facility or a national command centre. An off-target missile could strike a
nuclear facility, or a strike on a non-nuclear target might be misinterpreted (by the target
country) as an attack on its nuclear infrastructure. The possibility of rapid escalation to a
cataclysmic nuclear conflict costing millions of lives cannot be ruled out. The key question,
then, is: what political objective is worth the risk of a nuclear conflagration?

The limits of military deterrence

Claims that India has demonstrated its power to punish recalcitrant adversaries and created a
“new normal” ring hollow when we recall that Pakistan has supported terrorist groups
targeting India for decades, periodically backing off under pressure, only to revive its low-cost
strategy of asymmetric warfare. Ultimately, though, nuclear deterrence works both ways,
limiting India’s capacity to flex its military muscle. To be sure, Pakistan has not gained anything
substantial: the overall situation regarding Kashmir remains largely unchanged. What repeated
crises do achieve is the strengthening of the Pakistani military’s entrenched political power,
which sustains hostilities between the two countries.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 14

The international dimension: Support without substance

Nor has India benefited from support extended by other nations. The Kargil conflict was a rare
occasion when firm American support was obtained quickly, but it remained in place for only a
short while. The crises of 2001-02 and 2008 did not see an iteration of such support. Though
intelligence agencies, media investigations, and even admissions by Pakistani leaders have
repeatedly implicated Islamabad, the same governments and news outlets have usually been
coy about calling out the Pakistani government. This is hardly surprising given that Indian
foreign policy similarly avoids taking strong positions on conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine
and elsewhere. India needs to focus on self-help alternatives.

Beyond military solutions: Alternative approaches

What, then, might help alter the tired old pattern of attacks and limited military responses that
enhance nuclear risk and lead nowhere? A negotiated agreement is not out of the question. In
the wake of the 2001-02 crisis, comprehensive talks—between the governments of Pakistan’s
military strongman Pervez Musharraf and India’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee—produced an agreement
to soften the Line of Control (LoC) that divides the portions of Kashmir held by India and
Pakistan, encourage cross-border movement, and enhance overland trade. The compromise
was prompted by the nuclear risks posed by the crises of 1999 and 2001-02. Reports at the time
indicated that the two nations were on the verge of an agreement that had the potential to
gradually convert the LoC into a formal border. As it happened, Musharraf’s domestic political
star went into a tailspin and the Pakistan army turned its back on the whole effort. Today,
although the army remains powerful, its position is uncertain, so it is unlikely to consider a
similar compromise. On the contrary, given the political turmoil and economic uncertainty
prevailing in Pakistan, a confrontation with India serves the Pakistani military’s interests by
allowing it to portray itself as the guardian of national survival and to remain at the helm as the
real power, but without real responsibility.

Still, a major national crisis could prompt a change of heart. Looking to European history, it is
worth remembering that, after a 75-year tug of war, including two world wars, between France
and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine, the territory eventually came under permanent French
control. More importantly, while half of its population speaks the Germanic dialect Alsatian,
there is no present-day tension between the two nations over the once-disputed land. That
resolution came as a result of World War II—an event unlikely to occur in South Asia. However,
should Pakistan face national collapse or the weakening of the army due to its inability to prop
up a crumbling polity, a positive denouement could yet appear. Though the fragmentation of
Pakistan may produce risks for India, it is worth considering the potential strategic gains from
a nuanced Indian standpoint.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 15

The domestic imperative: India's internal challenges

But let us bear in mind that a major source of India’s Pakistan problem is internal. As several
critics have pointed out, the Pahalgam massacre that triggered the present crisis was made
possible by a serious lack of security preparedness, leaving the victims vulnerable to terrorist
attack. Looking back at the series of crises that have plagued India—the 1999 Kargil conflict, the
2001-02 standoff, the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, and now the Pahalgam killings—the
domestic dimension cannot be ignored. Over the decades, regardless of the party in power,
successive Indian governments have shown a woeful lack of preparation for countering violent
attacks with regard to intelligence, equipment, training, and organisation. Above all, there is
little evidence of accountability with regard to the failings of security forces, civilian officials,
and political decision makers, allowing serious vulnerabilities to persist. Finally, a strong
foundation for security must rest on working out a domestic settlement that integrates Kashmir
comfortably and meaningfully into India—a challenge that has not been adequately met since
independence.

Strategic options: The Pakistan fragmentation scenario

Of course, Pakistan’s military will still have to be reckoned with. One possible approach to
incentivise positive change in Pakistan could be for India to retaliate in kind: support the
Baloch nationalist movement in a substantial way, encourage separatist tendencies in Sindh,
which is already experiencing unrest, and back secessionist tendencies in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, which has an unstable border with Afghanistan. This need not actually be
carried out to fruition—even the credible threat of such internal destabilisation might compel
the Pakistan Army to rethink its strategy on Kashmir.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 16

On
Strategic
Thought
and
Preparedness

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 17

Tweleve Arguments to Make
Sense of Op Sindoor
Happymon Jacob

1. Operation Sindoor underscores the idea that the government of India is determined to
respond to terrorism, regardless of the consequences of such a response. Although Delhi has
long signalled this intent, it hasn’t become formal policy nor was this policy implemented
convincingly. With Operation Sindoor—a high-intensity, open, and public military operation—
Indian policymakers seek to establish a ‘military response to terrorist attacks’ as a doctrinal
innovation. If this interpretation is accurate, we might be witnessing a strategic shift in how
India handles terrorism in the years to come.

2. Low-level military actions (like 2016 and 2019) may not be the preferred response any longer:
The recent (declared, publicised and unambiguous) response is a strategy to mainstream
Indian response as a doctrinal move. This would mean that New Delhi could employ varying
degrees of conventional force in future in response to terrorism, opening up, thereby, a range
of potential punitive possibilities.

3. Operation Sindoor seeks to show that India no longer accepts there is a fundamental
distinction between subconventional (terrorism) and conventional (military) aggression.
Pakistan has traditionally exploited this distinction to paint a doomsday escalatory scenario to
prevent Indian military response to terror attacks. If India doesn’t accept that distinction any
longer, Pakistan’s ability to exploit that space to carry out/allow/do nothing about terror attacks
against India no longer exists.

4. Operation Sindoor has challenged two of Pakistan’s important deterrent assumptions vis-à-
vis India. One, as pointed out above, Pakistan has traditionally attempted to create a space
between subconventional (terrorism) and conventional (military) aggression and refused to
accept the space between conventional and nuclear domains, meaning that India will not be
able to undertake conventional military options without worrying about Pakistani tactical
nuclear weapons (TNWs). Op Sindoor calls both the bluffs: It removes the space between
subconventional and conventional aggression; and given that there was little nuclear talk in
2019 or now, it has called the nuclear bluff too.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 18

Pakistan can no longer depend on nuclear threats to deter Indian conventional attacks in
response to subconventional aggression. In that sense, India has Pakistan where it wants it: In
the strictly conventional space where it enjoys superiority. Pakistan is not a military pushover,
for sure, but India certainly enjoys far more conventional firepower and potential military
suppliers. A conventional exchange/limited war with India without nuclear threats in play is
not something Pakistan can win.

Operation Sindoor seeks to create a tripwire situation regarding escalation. The Indian doctrine
underlined by it is that by carrying out a terrorist attack against India, it is actually Pakistan —
its adversary — that is initiating a conventional military conflict. The onus is on Pakistan to
ensure there is no terrorist attack if it seeks to prevent a military conflict as a terror attack will,
in all probability, lead to a conventional response — with the latter being the rule and its non-
occurrence being the exception.

5. Operation Sindoor severely diminishes Pakistan’s ability to hide behind the lack of conclusive
evidence to show the Pakistani state’s complicity in terror attacks against India. The emerging
Indian argument is that in so far as there are anti-India terrorist organisations in Pakistan who
have attacked India, and who have not been brought to justice by Islamabad, those are reasons
enough for Delhi to take punitive measures. Waiting for conclusive evidence to punish Pakistan
is not helpful in the Indian thinking given that such evidence will always be disputed, and by
the time such evidence emerges the situation would have changed dramatically.

6. Delhi no longer feels the need to furnish reams of evidence to the international community
about who is responsible for the attacks. It has done that in the past with little effect either on
the international community or on Pakistani investigation into those responsible. The Mumbai
attacks trial is a prime example. India inviting Pakistani investigators into Pathankot airbase for
joint investigations in 2016 (with no return invitation from Islamabad) is another.

7. Operation Sindoor seeks to create a tripwire situation regarding escalation. The Indian
doctrine underlined by Op Sindoor is that by carrying out a terrorist attack against India, it is
actually Pakistan — its adversary — that is initiating a conventional military conflict. The onus
is on Pakistan to ensure there is no terrorist attack if it seeks to prevent a military conflict as a
terror attack will, in all probability, lead to a conventional response — with the latter being the
rule and its non-occurrence being the exception. In other words, the starting point of India-
Pakistan escalation is not the Indian use of conventional force, but the Pakistani use of
subconventional force. India has put the ball in Pakistan’s court on future escalation. Op
Sindoor is the trailer.

8. Operation Sindoor seeks to reinstate deterrence against terrorism which was established by
the 2019 Balakot strikes but then ruptured by the Pahalgam terror attack. There have not been

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 19

any high intensity terror attacks since the Pulwama terror attack. In the Indian thinking, the
Balakot air attacks deterred Pakistan from carrying out or allowing terrorist attacks against
India thereafter. The Pahalgam attack undid the deterrence established in 2019. In that sense,
Operation Sindoor is an attempt to reinstate deterrence against terrorism as achieved by the
Balakot strikes.

9. From an Indian perspective, the role of third parties is now limited to either stand with India
or choose not to, each of which could have varying degrees of influence on India’s relationship
with them. Those publicly advising restraint and dialogue with Pakistan will get no traction in
Delhi’s corridors of power.

10. Going forward, Delhi is likely to expect its strategic partners to align with its policy on
terrorism, broadly to put pressure on Pakistan, and react strongly to those seeking to repudiate
Indian retaliation or morally shame India for its military response to terrorism. Expect Delhi to
use its leverage as a major economy, growing market, participant in global forums and
governance, and its vast diaspora and its strategic partnerships to achieve this.

11. There has been a gradual escalation in the Indian military response to terror attacks by
Pakistan based terror groups: 2001-2002 (mobilisation but no action); 26/11 attacks (no overt
response); 2016 surgical strikes (limited in scope and impact); 2019 Balakot strikes (limited
objectives). However, the 2025 Operation Sindoor far exceeds the scope, intensity, outcome and
escalatory potentially of any of the previous operations.

12. Operation Sindoor has pretty much ended the old India-Pakistan relationship. There is little
chance of India-Pakistan relations going back to the old format of comprehensive/composite
dialogues, discussions on Kashmir, people to people cooperation etc. Even the start of
conversations to establish normal relations with Pakistan will take considerable time and
effort. Clearly, no one is thinking of dialogue right now.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 20

Blind Spots and Silver Linings:
Past and Prologue of Op Sindoor
Sidharth Raimedhi

While Operation Sindoor successfully imposed costs on Pakistan and demonstrated India's
resolve against terrorism, its execution revealed crucial strategic insights about the limitations
of India's current military doctrine. Despite operational successes, the operation highlighted
that India's approach remains framed around deterrence rather than compellence—a
fundamental misalignment with the challenge at hand. Pakistan's persistent use of terror
proxies demands not merely dissuasion from specific actions but a comprehensive change in
policy, which requires overwhelming operational advantages rather than merely relative parity.
As India analyzes this conflict and prepares for future engagements, it must recognize that
without establishing clear military dominance, particularly in the air domain, it risks becoming
trapped in escalatory cycles that divert resources from broader strategic priorities, including
the China challenge. India's declaration that future terror attacks will be treated as acts of war
signals political will, but must be matched with corresponding shifts in military doctrine and
capabilities.

Deterrence should not be India’s strategic goal

India has framed the problem of Pakistan’s support for terror networks and resultant terror
attacks aimed at India as one of deterrence. However, this is a misnomer. Deterrence, at its
heart, pertains to signaling assured costs and risks to dissuade a state from undertaking an
action. Pakistan’s use of terror proxies has never been a singular act but an established policy.
Therefore, the panacea to this is a doctrine of compellence, not deterrence.

Compellence is about forcing a state to alter an existing policy, making it both a higher reward
than deterrence, but also requiring greater investments and resources. A state can deter
another even while suffering a military disadvantage. However, compellence requires, more
often than not, and certainly in the case of Pakistan, an overwhelming and clear military
advantage as a state of being.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 21

In the India-Pakistan case, India’s ability to compel Pakistan through the operational balance of
power, especially in the air domain, is key to understanding both the meaning of Op Sindoor
and the future trajectory of India-Pakistan military conflicts.

Operational domain (Air) – Where compellence lies

There has been a strong expectation amongst Indian citizens that in any military contest, India
is likely to easily triumph over Pakistan. After all, India has overwhelming size advantages in
terms of population, territory, economy, as well as annual defense budget. However, Indian
punitive actions in response to Pakistan are a different kettle of fish compared to conventional
attrition-based warfare. Bound by the fact of nuclear weapons in the sub-continent as well as
India’s need to avoid a long-drawn, wasteful war, such actions have been domain-specific, brief
and swift, and yet extricable in theory. Macro-advantages in terms of overall national power do
not significantly impact this operational environment, and their influence is somewhat limited.

In 2019, post the Pulwama attacks, India carried out deterrence-restoring punitive military
strikes predominantly in the air domain. Post Op Sindoor, this choice of domain is likely to
continue. This is because naval compellence takes time by its very nature, while ground-based
operations are more demanding, closer to nuclear redlines, and are also harder to extricate
from. Israel, the U.S., and Russia’s recent quagmires in Gaza, Iraq-Afghanistan, and Ukraine
testify to this facet of boots on the ground.

Air options, such as drones and missiles, are cleaner, politically impactful, and extricable by
nature. Hence, air-based operations are fit for purpose as a punitive option that a civilian
administration would like to have during a crisis with Pakistan. Rather than overall military
strengths, it is niche capabilities that matter more and immediately in this operational
environment. Essentially, what is being referred to is the effectiveness of platforms within a
highly sophisticated network, including integrated air defence systems, as well as the numbers
and capabilities of drones and missiles.

India's strategy of emphasizing air operations makes perfect sense given these realities.
However, this creates a challenge: Pakistan, with significant Chinese assistance, has been
specifically investing in capabilities designed to counter India's air advantage and reduce the
operational power gap between the two nations. The Air domain remains key, and by the same
token, it is losing the element of surprise – leading to both focused investment by Pakistan and
higher forms of escalatory exchanges.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 22

Existing military balance in the operational domain

While the 2019 Balakot strike was a great success in heralding a new strategic doctrine for a
new India, it also demonstrated the distance the PAF has covered since the early 2000s in terms
of both platforms and modernization, particularly after the Kargil war and Operation
Parakram.

India had learnt operational lessons from Balakot, and hence, there has been a focus on filling
niche tech-based gaps. This has entailed a focus on procuring or inducting AWACS jets, data
link systems, and the procurement of Software Defined Radios (SDR) to protect against
Jamming, as well as the successful induction of 36 4.5-generation Rafael jets and the formidable
S-400 Air Defense (AD) system. However, this has been an ongoing, albeit incomplete, process.
It’s no secret that the Indian Air Force (IAF) has faced challenges, particularly in procurement,
upgradation, and maintenance, due to erratic supplies from a war-engaged Russia. This has
been widely discussed and written about, and even noted by Air Chief Marshal B. S. Dhanoa, as
well as the present Air Chief, A. P. Singh.

However, it is worth noting that post-Balakot, Pakistan did not remain idle and sought to
enhance its deterrence in response to India. This occurred in the form of inducting the J-10 and
JF-17, intense tech-heavy training, along with a focus on newer AD systems. Through exercises
with China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has
sought to familiarize itself with Su-series Indian platforms, as well as refine electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM). The cost-efficiency of Chinese jets and missiles also works to
Pakistan’s relative advantage, as it can acquire advanced jets and missiles in much greater
numbers, partially offsetting lower defense spending compared to India.

In terms of missiles, drones, and AWACS, Pakistan is close to equaling India operationally, and
especially in the context of a short and swift military contest where attrition does not come into
play. India has been particularly concerned about the AWACS gap with Pakistan since 2019 and
has made strong efforts to offset the same. However, the gap has remained, allowing Pakistan
to achieve greater situational awareness and sensor-radar separation, thereby increasing the
stealth and lethality for a first strike. In this context, Pakistan has also benefited greatly from
China’s strategic and collusive assistance. As military analyst and China-watcher Craig
Singleton described during Op Sindoor, “Beijing’s long-standing support for Islamabad –
through hardware, training, and now increasingly AI-enabled targeting – has quietly shifted the
tactical balance.” Delhi needs to pay greater attention to such subtle but important shifts for the
future.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 23

Pakistan lost, but imposed risks and costs on India

Despite embarrassing shortcomings in air defense (AD) and suffering significantly greater
losses in terms of airbase hits, Pakistan demonstrated its increased confidence in the air
domain by making escalatory decisions. In the operational domain, India will now have to plan
to subdue this confidence.

The effectiveness of both deterrence and compellence ultimately depends on how the
adversary perceives them, not how the acting state intends them. For example, after the 2019
Balakot strikes, India and Pakistan developed completely different interpretations of what
happened, which destabilized deterrence and increased the risk of escalation in future
conflicts. Similarly, once the current situation resolves, both countries will likely draw different
strategic conclusions again. This pattern makes it essential for India to establish unmistakable
military advantages if it wants to maintain control over escalation during conflicts.

Advancements in preparedness by both sides before May 7 – and based on the template of
Balakot 19- led to an operational balance that was suited for deterrence adjustments (along the
existing scale) by India. However, it was not suited for domination and compellence. This is the
structural reality that needs to be appreciated in assessing Op Sindoor. Given these constraints,
Operation Sindoor's success becomes even more impressive—its planning, rapid execution, and
effectiveness in a high-risk environment deserve special recognition. The operation has
established the Indian military's reputation as a nimble fighting force capable of delivering
powerful strikes. Furthermore, India's political leadership demonstrated a willingness to take
significant risks with full public support, signaling a new chapter in Indian military strategy
that will likely unsettle adversaries in future conflicts.

Yet, despite being economically disadvantaged, with Pakistan's entire GDP smaller than just
India's Maharashtra state, Pakistan still managed to mount several responses to India's actions.
These included reportedly targeting Indian fighter jets with some potential success, using
artillery to impact civilian areas in Poonch, conducting PsyOps with swarm drones, and
launching retaliatory strikes against Indian military assets (though these missed their targets
overwhelmingly). For India, an aspiring great power, this situation isn't ideal strategically and is
too close for comfort. While acknowledging this reality may be uncomfortable in the short
term, it's worth noting that nations rise to great power status by enduring and learning from
even more difficult challenges. Recognizing Pakistan's military capabilities is essential for
understanding why India needs to pursue greater operational and military dominance in the
region.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 24

Therefore, India faces a strategic crossroads. Without establishing overwhelming military
superiority, India risks becoming trapped in endless and worsening cycles of escalation with
Pakistan that divert resources and attention from its global ambitions and the growing
challenge posed by China. These recurring conflicts are inevitable if India maintains its
reactive approach, merely adjusting deterrence strategies after deterrence has already failed.
Escaping this insidious pathway requires a military doctrine based on compellence, clear
operational advantage, as well as supplementary support in the non-kinetic domain (think IWT
and various forms of economic and diplomatic pressure).

The next crisis: Starting from a higher threshold

Op Sindoor can be viewed as Balakot air strikes magnified exponentially. The next military
conflict is likely to start with deeper and harder strikes (a higher threshold) and with military
targets seen as fair game sooner than has been the norm. India’s decision to prioritise de-
escalation by not targeting AD units during the airstrikes may have resulted in the loss of
valuable military assets. This will influence politico-military choices during the next crisis. The
latest crisis saw limited engagement in the naval and land domains. In the next confrontation,
this could change, and it is more likely to occur in the ground domain (greater artillery strikes
and troop movements). Therefore, developing decisive conventional and operational
superiority over Pakistan represents the most elegant solution to break these dangerous cycles
of retaliation.

Without operational domination, India’s future military options will remain high-risk,
constrained, and unable to deter Pakistan’s ‘misadventures’ in response to India’s punitive
strike. . With operational domination, India will have greater coercive leverage during
peacetime as well as more flexible and lower-
risk military options during a near-war crisis.

Given that Pakistan’s procurement plans, as well as its modernization efforts, are ongoing and
rapid, India will have to offset these developments on its way towards striving for a clearer
imbalance of power. Instead of denigrating and pooh-poohing the Pakistan armed forces,
India’s military revival would actually hinge on over-estimating them, regardless of the
emotional dissatisfaction involved in the thought.

New assurances and silver linings

Op Sindoor and the resulting conflict have also provided many sources of reassurance and
confidence. This includes the better-than-expected performance of various indigenous
platforms, such as the Akash SAM system, as well as the resiliency and success rate of the
integrated air defense system, a testament to nascent jointness. Additionally, it encompasses

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 25

the state of national unity and civilian morale in the face of drones and missile strikes. Notably,
these are all indicators of strengths that are only likely to grow manifold in the coming years,
especially indigenization and jointness.

Along with continued modernization (at a faster pace), these mega-trends are likely to help
boost Indian military wherewithal towards clear asymmetry vis-à-vis Pakistan in the coming
years. This also constitutes the pathway that converts Comprehensive National Power to overall
military asymmetry, a favorable operational environment (mainly air) for power projection,
and the material architecture for supporting strategic and political objectives pertaining to
compellence (rather than tit for tat deterrence). In fact, this same road, combined with
necessary higher military spending, is certain to bolster deterrence vis-à-vis China (by
reducing operational asymmetries) over the long term as well. Even as the last crisis was a close
shave in terms of loss of escalation control, the future holds great promise and potential if the
right lessons are learnt.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 26

The Indian Navy’s Role and
Impact in Operation Sindoor:
Historical Precedents and Future
Imperatives
Capt Sarabjeet S. Parmar

The employment of the Indian Navy since its baptism under fire in 1971 has followed a well-
laid-out doctrine and strategy, evolving in response to advancements in technology—of one’s
own and that of adversaries. Since 1971, the Indian Navy has been mobilized and deployed in
full force on two occasions—Operation Talwar in 1999 and Operation Parakram in 2002. While
the Indian Navy did not see any action due to Pakistan’s non-confrontational approach in the
maritime domain, these deployments definitely “influenced events on land”. Influencing events
on land is an important part of the Indian Maritime doctrine and its unclassified 2015 strategy
document, “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”, where it is an objective
of the military role in the Indian Navy’s “Strategy for Conflict”.

The success of the actions in 1971, along with the deployments in 1999 and 2002, have
established a template that—with appropriate changes based on political directives, the
prevailing security scenario, and available technology and assets—can frame strategic-level
planning and offer multiple operational-level deployment options.

The employment of the Indian Navy since its baptism under fire in 1971 has followed a well-
laid-out doctrine and strategy, evolving in response to advancements in technology—of one’s
own and that of adversaries. Since 1971, the Indian Navy has been mobilized and deployed in
full force on two occasions—Operation Talwar in 1999 and Operation Parakram in 2002. While
the Indian Navy did not see any action due to Pakistan’s non-confrontational approach in the
maritime domain, these deployments definitely “influenced events on land”. Influencing events
on land is an important part of the Indian Maritime doctrine and its unclassified 2015 strategy
document, “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”, where it is an objective
of the military role in the Indian Navy’s “Strategy for Conflict”.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 27

The success of the actions in 1971, along with the deployments in 1999 and 2002, have
established a template that—with appropriate changes based on political directives, the
prevailing security scenario, and available technology and assets—can frame strategic-level
planning and offer multiple operational-level deployment options.

The effectiveness of MDA and the operational reach were enabled by networked operations
within the Navy and through joint coordination with the Army and Air Force—both of which are
categorised as “Operational Enablers” in the “Strategy for Conflict”. This strategy also places
the delivery of firepower under “Force Projection” against designated legal targets, thereby
conforming to the additional operational principles of “Application of Force” and “Strategic
Effect”.

Major operations and employment of the India Navy are centered on “Sea Control”. The
number of ships at sea, especially the Carrier Battle Group, supported by land-based maritime
reconnaissance aircraft (such as P8Is and HALE UAVs), would have enabled the requisite degree
of sea control. This was, of course, made easier by the absence of the Pakistan Navy in the areas
of deployment.

The conduct of firing exercises in late April by both navies is a routine measure during times of
high tension, signaling intent to use firepower when required, while also honing crew skills
and procedures. That the exercises were conducted beyond each other’s maritime zones
indicates restraint on both sides. Such an exercise is possibly a first for Pakistan, suggesting the
Pakistan Navy’s active involvement in overall planning. In contrast, the Indian Navy carried out
several such exercises in 1999 and 2002 to demonstrate its intent. While the actual areas of
Indian Navy operations may never be publicly known, it is reasonable to assume that deployed
ships and submarines operated around designated attack points— potentially within Pakistan’s
maritime zones, depending on onboard equipment and missile ranges. Consequently, the
Indian Naval force established a de facto blockade, confining Pakistan Navy units to their
harbors, proving the template and associated operational plans. It is important to note that a
blockade is an act of war; thus, its imposition would be a deliberate and hence considered
decision.

Future imperatives
Policy shift on terrorism
First, is the change in policy against terrorism that “any attack on Indian soil will be considered
as an act of war”. This could result in the India Navy being brought into action earlier than
before—with maritime strikes on designated targets at sea, along the coast, and potentially
inland. This would expand the area of operations for both India and Pakistan, and the resultant
escalation could expand into a full-fledged conflict. This policy shift would require

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 28

re-evaluating and shortening the Navy’s response time, including the operationalisation of
forward operating bases and logistical chains.

Failure of deterrence and the role of compellence

As deterrence has failed to contain terrorist attacks from Pakistan, compellence may become
the preferred strategy. Doctrinally, the Indian Navy recognizes compellence as a concept
related to the use-of-force and hence includes it under the military role in its “Strategy for
Conflict”. Incorporating actions that support compellence into operational plans is therefore
straightforward. In the context of Op Sindoor, it has been stated that “the carrier group acted as
a force for compellence”. The Carrier Battle Group and other deployed ships, supported by
adequate logistics, can act as effective instruments of compellence.

The nuclear dimension

Since the above two factors have the potential for escalation, the nuclear factor may come into
play earlier than expected. While the actual use of nuclear weapons—especially on land—
remains debatable, the maritime domain presents a different arena, especially where tactical
nuclear weapons (TNWs) are concerned. The existing naval asymmetry could encourage
Pakistan to raise the TNW flag at sea with a higher use criterion, especially against the Carrier
Battle Group. Though it is unclear whether Pakistan possesses TNWs for use at sea, land-based
missiles could, in the meantime, serve as substitutes. India’s nuclear doctrine calls for
retaliation with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack on Indian territory and Indian
forces anywhere. The same extends to attacks by biological or chemical weapons. This may
impact conventional operations under the nuclear shadow, and therefore India could look at
enhancing operations in a more intense manner, while managing escalation to pre-empt
raising of the nuclear flag.

Additionally, international sentiment must be accounted for, as maritime conflict in the region
would impact global trade—especially shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-
Mandeb. Any restrictions on international shipping, whether due to blockades or military
operations, would need to be formally communicated through exclusion zones or navigational
area warnings, as outlined in the Indian Maritime Doctrine.

A future conflict with Pakistan, triggered by a terrorist attack, will require a re-calibration of
operational plans—particularly in terms of intensity and design—so as to enable early conflict
termination on terms favorable to India.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 29

Conventional Operations Under
the Nuclear Shadow
Rakesh Sood

Since 1998, when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon states after undertaking
a series of tests, the India-Pakistan crises have followed a predictable pattern. The first
escalatory step is invariably a terrorist attack by one of the numerous terrorist groups based in
Pakistan; India’s outrage and political, diplomatic, economic and, (since 2016) measured kinetic
retaliation against specific terrorist targets, signalling a possible closure to hostilities;
Pakistan’s military retaliation that sets into motion a cycle of escalation, often accompanied by
nuclear sabre rattling designed to energise the international community, leading finally to a de-
escalation with both countries getting a face saving exit.

The terrorist attacks permit Pakistan a degree of deniability unless a perpetrator has been
captured (as happened in the Mumbai 2008 attack) though the deniability claims carry little
conviction, given Pakistan’s well documented, long-standing policy of nurturing such jihadi
outfits. India has been a slow learner in developing and acquiring the intelligence and kinetic
means to be able to track and engage in precision targeting of terrorist groups inside Pakistan.
Though subjected to major terrorist attacks, especially since the 1990s, the recourse to kinetic
retaliation only began in 2016. After Pahalgam, Prime Minister Modi has described it as an
expansive “new normal.”

Developing kinetic retaliation capability

In 2001, following the attack on the Indian parliament by five JeM terrorists, India mobilised its
ground forces with the strike formations. The process lasted weeks, giving Pakistan adequate
time to prepare its counter-mobilisation. Since the U.S. needed Pakistan’s military cooperation
for its Op Enduring Freedom launched against the Taliban in October 2001, and the Pakistani
military claimed that it was stretched on the India front, Pakistan was prevailed upon to
provide assurances of “not allowing its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against India.”
The exercise in coercive diplomacy helped provide a reprieve for seven years.

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks are often called India’s 9/11 moment. A group of 10 LeT militants

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 30

targeted 12 locations in Mumbai. The carnage lasted four days and claimed 175 lives, including
nine militants. Among the dead were 29 foreign nationals from 16 countries, including six from
the U.S. The captured militant provided the details of Pakistan’s involvement. While this
enabled international condemnation and diplomatic measures to penalise Pakistan, the
absence of any kinetic retaliation drew unfavourable comparisons in certain domestic sections
with the U.S and Israel. In Pakistan, it led to a growing conviction that its tactical nuclear
weapons served as an effective deterrent against any conventional military action by India.

Kinetic retaliation, from Uri to Pahalgam

Realising that its military forces were a blunt instrument ill-equipped to undertake short, sharp
punitive operations, India began to build up its capabilities slowly. The 2016 attack on a military
camp in Uri by four JeM militants killed 19 soldiers and provided an opportunity to employ
kinetic retaliation for the first time. A coordinated set of simultaneous cross-border operations
was launched by special teams to neutralise more than half a dozen terrorist launch pads. The
operation was successfully projected as a shift to a more punitive approach, and these “surgical
strikes” were the subject of a successful Bollywood film. Pakistan found a face-saver by denying
that there had been any intrusions.

In 2019, a suicide attack on a paramilitary convoy, claimed by JeM, claimed forty lives. With
general elections less than two months away, the Modi government had little choice. Days later,
Indian authorities announced that the IAF had carried out an air strike on a JeM training camp
at Balakot, 65 km from the LoC, in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Once again, it was
described as a limited operation against a terrorist location, based on real-time intelligence,
and therefore pre-emptive and defensive.

Pakistan denied that there was any camp, protested at its airspace violation, and the following
morning, five Pakistani aircraft entered Indian airspace. Indian fighters scrambled, and in the
ensuing dogfight, an Indian pilot ejected, ending up in Pakistani custody. This created a fresh
crisis, leading to U.S. involvement to ensure the pilot’s release was expedited. The following
morning, Pakistan PM Imran Khan announced that Pakistan had demonstrated its capability
and resolve by retaliating against India’s intrusion and would return the Indian pilot as a
humanitarian gesture, providing a face-saver to both sides.

According to U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, senior officials from both countries had
been in touch with U.S. officials, blaming each other for nuclear escalation and threatening
retaliation, thereby leading to U.S. involvement. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also claimed to have
intervened and counselled restraint.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 31

The Pahalgam attack on April 22 claimed 26 civilian lives. Though a series of political and
economic measures were announced, including putting in abeyance the Indus Water Treaty, it
was evident that the scope of the kinetic retaliation had to be larger. Eventually, nine terrorist
locations, including iconic locations such as the LeT and JeM headquarters in Punjab, were
targeted using loitering munitions, stand-off air-to-surface missiles, and smart bombs. It was
emphasised that India had targeted terrorist locations, and the operation was over unless
Pakistan escalated matters. The next three nights saw an escalation of strikes and counter-
strikes, with both sides employing drones and standoff missiles, although the aircraft remained
within their respective airspaces. Once again, senior U.S. officials began to engage as the crisis
sharpened and news about the ceasefire was made public by President Trump shortly before
the official announcements on May 10.

Evidently, the Modi government’s policy for dealing with Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks
has been evolving, in keeping with improving capabilities. The first Rafale aircraft landed in
India in mid-2020, with some of the weapon systems following. The Harop drone fleet was
expanded after 2019, and indigenous Sky Striker drones were ordered in 2021, including
kamikaze versions. Therefore, compared to the 2019 Balakot operation, India was better placed
to ensure precision targeting and avoid collateral damage, especially in populated areas like
Bahawalpur and Muridke.

The lessons from Pahalgam

In his address to the nation on May 12, PM Modi announced that Op Sindoor had redefined the
fight against terror and established a “new normal.” This consisted of India’s right to respond
militarily since any act of terror was an act of war; India would not be deterred by “nuclear
blackmail,” and India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the
governments sponsoring terrorism. Two new elements can be discerned in this - while
claiming a right to military response is not new, as it was exercised in 2016 and 2019 too, calling
every terror attack an “act of war” expands the scope of the military action that has so far been
limited to terrorist locations. Second, putting together the terrorists and the ISI puts the
military on notice, but what form this would take is left uncertain. In 2016, 2019, and 2025,
India has consistently emphasised that its kinetic action was “non-escalatory” as it was directed
at known terrorist locations and not at a military site.

Even though Op Sindoor’s objectives had not been spelled out, it is clear that on May 7, Indian
forces demonstrated their capability in identifying and destroying multiple terrorist camps and
related infrastructure, across a distance of 800 km, in a speedily executed, coordinated
operation using precision strike weapons. In subsequent days, the operations grew gradually,
and by May 10, the IAF had shown its ability to penetrate Pakistan’s air defence to inflict

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 32

damage on nearly all Pakistan’s forward air bases and air defence installations. Yet, this did not
emerge as the prevailing narrative.

On May 7, Pakistan claimed that five Indian aircraft had been downed, a claim denied by India.
The narrative, therefore, became one of evaluating Chinese technologies (J-10 and JF-17
aircraft, and PL-15E missiles) versus those of the French (Rafale aircraft) and Russian (SU-30
and MiG-29) aircraft. The Indian statement on May 11, “We are in a combat scenario and losses
are part of combat…we achieved all our objectives and all our pilots are back home,” if made
earlier, would have prevented the misleading commentary and maintained the primacy of the
Indian narrative. The fact that the IAF operated under non-escalatory rules of engagement and
did not neutralise Pakistani air defences in advance was a signal to assure Pakistan that our
strike was only against terrorist targets. It would also have reinforced the impact of the punitive
strikes on May 10, in the face of repeated Pakistani escalatory provocations.

It is reasonable to assume that the terrorist infrastructure that has been degraded will be
rebuilt, presumably also at more inaccessible or concealed locations. It is highly unlikely that
the ISI will dismantle the LeT, JeM, or the dozen other outfits that it has nurtured over the
decades. A recent Gallup Pakistan poll revealed that 96 percent of the Pakistanis believe that
Pakistan has emerged victorious from the four-day limited conflict. The elevation of the COAS
Gen Asim Munir to Field Marshal has been welcomed by the political parties, including the PTI.

The current ceasefire is fragile and could therefore break down along the predictable pattern
that led to Pahalgam and earlier attacks. A full-scale war like the 1971 war is not feasible, as it is
an unaffordable exercise that yields no practical military objectives. Therefore, a key takeaway
is to define narrower objectives that yield desirable outcomes and build capabilities, both
kinetic and non-kinetic, accordingly. A realistic objective will combine three elements: degrade
terrorist capabilities as decisively as possible; inflict punitive measures, political, economic,
and military; and demonstrate national unity and resolve.

Exploring the ‘New Normal’

The conception of a ‘new normal’ poses three key questions –

Does the expansive ‘new normal’ establish deterrence?
Second, if deterrence fails and there is a terrorist attack, does the ‘new normal’ lead to
more rapid escalation, and does it ensure superior escalation management?
And finally, does it enable de-escalation without external involvement?

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 33

Deterrence normally implies ‘deterrence by denial’ coupled with ‘deterrence by punishment.’
‘Denial’ implies strengthening intelligence capabilities to track infiltration, movement, and
communications of terrorists, to plan and prevent such attacks. It also means better
preparation to reduce response times, unlike in the Pahalgam instance. If the number of
casualties were less than five, if the perpetrators had been killed or captured, the attack,
though heinous, would have registered on a lower scale. It would deny the adversary the sense
of ‘satisfaction’ at having inflicted significant harm and loss.

In case of failure of deterrence-by-denial, punitive deterrence kicks in. The terrorist needs to
be convinced that punishment will be certain and severe enough to make the terrorists refrain
from the act, in the first place. India has so far declared that its kinetic retaliation was based on
hard intelligence and pre-emptive; pre-emption against a terrorist attack has now gained
acceptance as a legitimate act of self-defence. However, a terrorist is not always guided by a
rational cost-benefit analysis, as the scourge of suicide attacks demonstrates. Nevertheless,
since the terror attacks are often green-lighted by the ISI, the certainty of severe punishment
does strengthen deterrence.

In the past, the limited kinetic retaliation in 2016 and 2019 failed to establish deterrence.
Therefore, deterrence capabilities for both ‘denial’ and ‘punishment’ will need to be
strengthened by continuous investments in new technologies, particularly cyber and space, to
monitor and penetrate terrorist groups and prevent attacks as also permit engagement without
contact and inflict punishment at a distance, if the ‘new normal’ has to prevent future terrorist
attacks.

India needs to plan afresh for managing escalation because if every terror attack is to be
considered an act of war, and no distinction is to be made between terrorists and their
masterminds and sponsors, the response to any future terrorist attack will be larger in scope,
raising the prospects of more rapid
escalation.

In the Balakot (2019) crisis, an Indian pilot being taken captive in Pakistani territory after his
aircraft was shot down was an unforeseen escalatory development. India demanded his
immediate return to maintain the narrative of its successful strike; Pakistan wanted to
capitalise on its air superiority. Neither India nor Pakistan could control the escalation, leading
to external involvement.

In 2025, the U.S. initially adopted a relatively detached approach, initially condemning the
terrorist attack and urging Pakistan to cooperate with India, and after May 7, urging both sides
to work together to de-escalate tensions. By May 9, however, the U.S. position shifted, and it
adopted a more active role.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 34

During the 88-hour crisis, India managed to retain control of escalation. In the initial round,
the IAF refrained from targeting Pakistan air defences, a restraint that may have led to higher
operational risks. Pakistan’s retaliation was against military targets and not against civilian
targets. Even as artillery shelling intensified across the LoC, there was no large-scale
mobilisation of ground forces or strike formations. These were signals that both sides were
exploring thresholds but not crossing them.

By May 10, the temptation for India to exploit its advantage, having neutralised Pakistan’s
forward-based air defences, was high and could have led to a notch up the escalation ladder. It
would have increased Indian reluctance to let Pakistan get a face-saving exit. Finding off-ramps
or de-escalation between nuclear adversaries requires that both sides find a face saver, though
backed by competing narratives. To establish superior escalation management, India must
internalise that at every step on the escalation ladder, it must signal to Pakistan a face-saver, as
was done successfully in the early stages of the Pahalgam crisis. This requires better narrative
management so that policy shapes sentiment rather than the other way around.

Finding an off-ramp without external involvement creates a different challenge. There is a tacit
acknowledgement that the Pakistani establishment has been complicit in sponsoring and
aiding terrorist attacks in India for decades, and India is justified in kinetic retaliation. At the
same time, given that both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states, nuclear sabre rattling
during rising tensions grabs international attention, with de-escalation emerging as the
priority. Since 1998, Pakistan has successfully exploited this opening, as this also serves
Pakistan by obfuscating the distinction between the perpetrator and the victim of the terrorist
attack.

Successive U.S. presidents have played a role in defusing crises since 1998 – President Clinton
during the 1999 Kargil crisis, President Bush following the 2001 Parliament attack, Presidents
Bush and Obama in 2008-09 following the Mumbai attack, and President Trump in 2019 with the
Balakot strike and the 2025 Pahalgam crisis. With the sole exception of President Trump, they
were prudent in not offering to mediate between India and Pakistan; the current aberration is
more a reflection of the disarray in the US administration and President Trump’s propensity for
impulsive pronouncements.

During Pahalgam, no nuclear threats were exchanged between India and Pakistan. The only
nuclear signalling, presumably directed to the international community, was the
announcement by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on May 9 that a meeting of the
National Command Authority was to be held the following day, though he backtracked later
after the phone call with Secretary of State Rubio. This did not prevent President Trump from
claiming on May 12, “We stopped a nuclear conflict. I think it could have been a bad nuclear
war. Millions of people could have been killed”, and repeating the claim a couple of days later.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 35

The contrast between Indian and Pakistani reactions to President Trump’s claims is revealing.
Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif has repeated thanked President Trump for his mediation and
urged him continue mediation on other issues while the Indian Foreign Office spokesperson
denied on May 13 that there was any US mediation or any nuclear escalation or signalling and
the ceasefire was arrived at bilaterally; further, there was no scope for any mediation and no
broader talks at a any neutral venue were planned. Therefore, unlike in 2019, there was neither
any nuclear brinkmanship nor any strategic mobilisation.

The ’new normal’ is a shifting line and introduces a degree of ambiguity. The aim is to
determine if it enhances deterrence. So far, both sides have shown an interest in de-escalation.
However, this requires a face saver for both sides. This means that each side creates its
narrative of “victory” and can sustain it. As the stronger power, India must calibrate how far it
should discredit the Pakistan military to disincentivise it from sponsoring terrorist attacks
while keeping it invested in de-escalation. This is necessary to ensure that conventional
operations remain below the nuclear threshold despite brinkmanship.

Today, there is an absence of established crisis management mechanisms between India and
Pakistan. During Pahalgam, the only channel of communication in operation was the DGMO’s
hotline. Past practice and experience indicate that in military hierarchies on both sides, a
degree of faith in an inbuilt culture of restraint remains. However, it is possible that a terrorist
group may deliberately act to heighten confrontation to sabotage de-escalation, severely testing
the culture of restraint. At such moments, until India and Pakistan invest in building crisis
management mechanisms and additional communication channels, de-escalation will
continue to be outsourced to external parties.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 36

Op Sindoor and India’s Defense
Indigenization Effort
Lt Gen Sanjay Verma

Op Sindoor will go down in history as a watershed response to terrorist operations. The steely
resolve and intent displayed in identifying and targeting the perpetrators of the ghastly and
inhuman attack on unsuspecting and vulnerable tourists marks a departure from the earlier
model of ‘surgical strikes’ in response to similar provocations. The unified political support
across party lines and bold leadership in drawing up the operational plan, with the three
services, was commendable. The purpose and intent had remarkable resonance. In a volatile
global geopolitical environment, marked by multiple flashpoints, the operation garnered
significant international support. The 88-hour series of calibrated strikes on targets—ranging
from close to deep inside Pakistani territory—redefined the classical military response matrix,
as well as the selection of force levels to convey the intended message.

The extensive use of technology—spanning air defense, surveillance, target acquisition,

missiles, drones, and loitering munitions—was central to showcasing India’s capability to
undertake precision strikes with impunity. The power of Information Warfare and its
manifestation in various domains and capability to influence outcomes is eliciting a ‘de-novo’
assessment. Op Sindoor is thus now under scrutiny in strategic discourse, with focus on
dimensions such as strategy options, political and military objectives, leadership, decision-
making, capability, capacity, and termination scenarios. Drawing lessons, identifying voids,
and shaping future postures is imperative. The Kargil conflict similarly triggered a major
review process, resulting in the Kargil Review Committee and subsequent GoM
recommendations, which continue to form the structural basis of India’s national security
apparatus. In a classical sense, Op Sindoor, being limited in both scope and application of
force, does not alter the macro-outlook, but does offer an opportunity to reassess the response-
escalation matrix and matching capabilities.

The military capability employed predominantly long-range standoff missiles and munitions
packaged in aerial delivery platforms under an active air defense umbrella with a fair mix of
indigenous and imported systems. Notably, indigenous platforms such as Akash and BrahMos,
along with select drones, have boosted confidence in the public and private defense

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 37

ecosystem. It also reinforces faith in the Atmanirbhar journey and the bold and radical reforms
initiated over the last few years. However, this engagement falls short of offering a complete
gauge of capability readiness. But what does stand out— bearing an uncanny resemblance to
the post-Uri surgical strike, Balakot, and Galwan—is the talk of a fifth tranche of Emergency
Procurement approved to the tune of a staggering INR 40,000 Cr to enhance combat readiness.

This highlights existing voids and the need for priority acquisitions. Under the previous tranche
(EP-IV), between September 2022 and September 2023, the Indian Army spent almost INR
11,000 Cr on 70 schemes, while the Air Force and Navy executed 65 and 35 schemes valued at
INR 8,000 Cr and INR 4,500 Cr respectively. With an average scheme cost of INR 123-157 Cr,
factoring in taxes, duties, warranties, spares, and margins, the actual capability punch of each
scheme is limited.

Clearly, a long journey lies ahead. Critical force equipping must be prioritized. Emergency
Procurement, while helpful, is not a panacea for holistic capability development—it only fills
select gaps. India needs to look inward to develop larger platforms and enhance long-term
preparedness. Despite a wave of reforms and procedural revisions, progress has been slow.
With 2025 declared as the ‘Year of Transformation’, the Defence Acquisition Procedure may
enter its ninth iteration since its 2002 inception, but that alone is not the answer. Two issues
need serious overhauls and Op Sindoor should be taken as a wake-up call to adopt these
reforms:A) Institutionalized and robust R&D; B) Structural reform in capability building.

Institutionalized and robust R&D

The essence of true Atmanirbharta lies in self-reliance through research and innovation. This
can only happen if the nation nurtures a research-oriented outlook. The issue assumes greater
importance in today’s context of emerging and disruptive technologies, Defense R&D must not
be seen as limited to military needs—it demands a whole-of-nation approach. It intersects with
national R&D in fields such as advance materials, aerospace, tele-communication, strategic
electronics, AI, robotics and autonomy, marine, aeronautics, sensors and actuators, scientific
computing, power systems, nano-technology, quantum, and space, among others. Recent
financial allocations are encouraging, as shown in the table below (illustrative, not exhaustive):

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 38

 DEPARTMENT ALLOCATIONS

Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Rs 23,855 Cr

Technology Development Fund (TDF) Rs 60 Cr

Rs 518 Cr in FY 2024-25 from Rs 115

Innovation in Defence Excellence (iDEX)
Cr in FY 2023-24

2021-India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) Outlay of ₹76,000 Cr

2023- National Quantum Mission Outlay of Rs 6003 crore from 2023-24

to 2030-31

Central Sector Schemes/Projects in the DST – NQM Rs 2800 Cr

Science and Engineering Research Board and Technology Development Board -

Rs 903 Cr
DST

National Research Foundation (NRF) including provision for Anusandhan

Rs 2000 Cr
National Research Foundation (ANRF)

Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and National Laboratories Rs 6265 Cr

This is a positive and mission-oriented landscape. However, many initiatives still operate in
silos and lack direction. Key trends in national R&D expenditure are: India’s Gross
Expenditure on R&D (GERD) is around 0.64-0.66% of its GDP.
India accounts for only 3.1% of global GERD.
Countries like Germany, Japan, Israel, USA, and South Korea spend more than 3%.
In India, the government drives 59.2% of GERD (of which the central government drives
43.7% across twelve major scientific agencies).
Public sector and private sector R&D expenditure is 4.4% and 36.4% respectively.
Public sector R&D units invest 0.3% of sales in R&D vs. 1.46% in private sector.
In countries like China, South Korea, USA, business enterprises drive over 70% of R&D.

Reforms at the national level in R&D are therefore the way ahead. India must increase R&D
investment with strategic focus. Many technologies overlap with defense needs. While intent
exists, efforts must be synergized to prevent loss of capital and delayed outcomes. The
government would do well to establish a National Research & Development Commission,
linking sectoral R&D to respective ministries. Missions like National Quantum and Semi-
Conductor Mission with timelines and budgets. Specific action points include:

Draft a national strategy and roadmap for R&D.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 39

 Build a credible database of all ongoing R&D activities.
Synergize and align research efforts.
Identify strategic technologies including defense and deep-tech and assign lead agencies.
Identify technologies having dual/multi applications across sectors and institute a lead
mission.
Incentivize private R&D investment.
Monitor research across Centres of Excellence and academia for tangible outcomes.
Scale up funding and build a robust R&D ecosystem.

Structural reform for capability building

The current acquisition framework—rooted in the Kargil Review Committee recommendations

and implemented via the Defence Acquisition Council and Defence Procurement Board—is
fragmented. While forces prepare for grey zone warfare, grey zones in acquisition structures
are unacceptable. The presence of multiple stakeholders, all operating in silos, hinders forward
movement. Collegiate approaches, layered committees, and undefined accountability delay
outcomes for years. Other countries have faced similar challenges. Even the US struggled for
years to arrive at the option of Army Futures Command adopting a cross-functional team model
oriented towards outcomes rather than processes. India too needs integrated, process-friendly
structural reform in defence acquisition.

The US Army Futures Command offers a useful model. In the MoD-constituted Pritam Singh
Committee report of 2017 there was a recommendation for a similar autonomous body. It is
time to revisit that proposal. A professional, accountable, and empowered organisation must be
created—featuring experts in operations, finance, law, academia, science, industry, and quality
control. The Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) should assign a named Project Manager, with
timelines and targets, supported by a cross-functional team. Only this approach can ensure
ownership and drive timely results. These teams should be responsible for resolving conflicts,
removing bottlenecks, and integrating workflows. Technology can further infuse agility. Digital
simulations, pricing models, and negotiation tools can greatly speed up decision-making. A
simple example is the CNC which does not take very long and is an ideal process for evolving a
technology driven pricing and negotiating strategy.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 40

Water as Leverage: India’s IWT
Suspension is Here to Stay
Bashir Ali Abbas

On April 23, the Indian government announced a raft of diplomatic measures against Pakistan
in response to the Pahalgam terror attack (a day earlier). Among other decisions, India declared
that “the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 would be held in abeyance with immediate effect,
until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.”

Rejecting India’s move, Pakistan in turn declared that “any attempt to stop or divert the flow of
water belonging to Pakistan as per the Indus Waters Treaty, and the usurpation of the rights of
lower riparian will be considered as an Act of War.”

While Pakistan continued to voice its concerns internationally with India’s decisions, the issue
over the IWT and India’s actions was temporarily relegated to the background as a fresh
military conflict played out between India and Pakistan between May 7 and 10. Presently, a
ceasefire is in effect between both states, following a hotline conversation between the Indian
and Pakistani Director Generals of Military Operations on May 10 and 12. Following the
discussion, both sides have agreed that “not a single shot” will be fired at each other,
“aggressive and inimical” action will be avoided, and that the overall number of troops on
either side of the Line of Control will potentially be reduced. While the DGMOs are set to speak
again on May 18 (until when the ceasefire has been reportedly extended), diplomatic tensions
continue between both sides, especially with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh asserting on May
15 that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons should be placed under IAEA Supervision. However, amidst
the fog that continues to exist over the developments between May 7 and 10, a significant and
clearly new point of contention between the two states is the dispute over the Indus Waters
Treaty (IWT). The waters of the Indus—especially its three Western rivers (Indus, Chenab,
Jhelum)—are a lifeline for about 240 million people in Pakistan.

Water as diplomatic leverage: The strategic shift

In its ceasefire understanding with Pakistan on May 12, India focused solely on the technical
military dimensions of the May 7-10 crisis. India did not commit to rescinding any of the

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 41

diplomatic measures it undertook against Pakistan on April 23, meaning that the 64-year-old
Indus Waters Treaty remains “in abeyance”. There are two crucial aspects related to India that
keep the Treaty suspended.

First, the IWT was already in the midst of an unprecedented dispute between India and
Pakistan since January 2023. Since then, India has sent at least four notices to Pakistan, asking
to renegotiate key provisions of the Treaty with a particular focus on its dispute resolution
mechanism. India’s immediate concerns related to the World Bank initiating two parallel tracks
of dispute resolution (the Court of Arbitration and the Neutral Expert), while India preferred
only the NE. The disputes were related to India’s Kishenganga and Ratle hydropower projects,
located on the Jhelum (a tributary) and Chenab rivers, respectively. But, there have also been
long-standing concerns in India about the need to update the Treaty’s provisions in light of
growing consumption as well as climate change. Hence, arguably even without the Pahalgam
trigger, the IWT would suffer a similar fate.

Second, India’s new and assertive connection between the issue over the Indus and the issue of
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir. The Pahalgam attack allowed India to innovatively
use a ‘national security’ based reasoning to suspend the Treaty. No issue that either side might
have with regard to the merits of the IWT itself allows either a suspension or a unilateral
withdrawal. However, India is implicitly arguing a fundamental “change in circumstances”
from when the Treaty was signed, and now in line with the rights of a state under the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

In 1960, the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism did not exist as a sustained threat to India,
and it substantially began only in the late 1980s. In his first address to the nation since Op
Sindoor, PM Modi reiterated his long-standing view that “water and blood cannot flow
together.” But this time, the backdrop is different. None of the earlier such assertions had led to
any adverse action by New Delhi against the Treaty, meaning that, beyond limited military
cross-border skirmishes, India now views the IWT as its strongest leverage over Pakistan to
compel Islamabad and Rawalpindi to cease their support for cross-border terror. As Dr
Happymon Jacob has argued, India’s suspension of the IWT has possibly “replaced Kashmir
with water as the central issue in India-Pakistan relations, thereby changing the terms of their
bilateral engagement.”

India's calculated move: Permanent recalibration

India’s IWT decision is unlikely to be reversed; India does not look to return to adhering to the
provisions of the Treaty, as they presently stand (lex lata). The immediate effects of India’s IWT
decision have already been evident—a halt to all data-sharing related to water flow with
Pakistan, and a lack of warning before opening or closing dams (as water levels rise or fall).

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 42

A case in point is India’s surprise water release from the Baglihar and Salal dams on May 5.
India’s actual ability to substantially manipulate the course of the Western rivers has been
repeatedly cast in doubt by credible analysts and hydrology experts, especially since India does
not have adequate infrastructure on the Indus (storage facilities on Jhelum, for instance) to
cause any unacceptable damage to Pakistan, in the short term. Building these will take time.

However, the increased political willingness to use the IWT as potentially successful leverage
against Pakistan undercuts this limitation. Such political willingness can help accelerate the
timeline for new infrastructure construction on the Western rivers – especially by the relevant
departments of the Ministries of Power, Water, and the Central Public Works Department.
Already on April 25, India’s Union Jal Shakti Minister C.R. Patil held a meeting with Union
Home Minister Amit Shah and declared that the Ministry was undertaking “short, medium, and
long-term plans to ensure that “not a drop of water will go to Pakistan.”

Arguably, India deems this a credible plan to compel Pakistan to course correct on terrorism.
Apart from India’s willingness to bear the risk of testing Pakistan’s freshly reiterated war
threshold (and an implicit nuclear redline since stopping the Indus’ flow counts as economic
strangulation), Pakistan itself needs a viable route out of this crisis.

Ensuring that India releases enough water for Pakistan’s agriculture and livelihood is an
imperative that has no alternative. This, in turn, means that the military approach might
worsen, and not improve, Pakistan’s ability to reverse this decision. Moreover, the faster India
can impose more fait accompli by building new infrastructure, the more the pressure on
Pakistan to negotiate with India in good faith, on India’s core issue of terrorism, before it can
negotiate on its (new) core issue of water-sharing.

Naturally, the Indus Waters Treaty has been a crucial high-stakes arrangement for Pakistan,
and it has shown a past tendency to relent on key issues, reinforcing the perception of Pakistan
having limited choice except cooperation with India. This was evident when Pakistan
eventually joined the Neutral Expert-led process, even as India stayed out of the Court of
Arbitration. Now, Indian government sources have confirmed (on May 15) that the Pakistan
Water Secretary wrote “a polite letter” to India which protested India’s decision to set the IWT
in abeyance and deemed it a violation of the treaty’s terms. But the letter also asserted that
Pakistan is willingto meet and would like to begin the process for arranging the necessary
logistics.

Given India’s new national security-based reasoning for the IWT, it is likely that whenever New
Delhi engages Islamabad in IWT re-negotiations or a new Treaty entirely, it will indicate that
Pakistan has “credibly and irreversibly” stopped its support for terrorism against India.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 43

Anything short of this will harm New Delhi’s credibility, given its public statements about the
yardstick against which the IWT will now be measured.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 44

The
International
Dimension

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 45

India’s Missing Friends During
Op Sindoor
Mohammad Kunhi

Operation Sindoor, India’s military response to the Pakistan-sponsored deadly terrorist attack
in Pahalgam that claimed 27 civilian lives on 22 April, has ignited a national reckoning, not only
over counterterrorism strategy, but also of the country’s understanding of its friends and foes.
When India launched a major round of strikes under Operation Sindoor between May 7 and 10,
destroying nine terrorist camps and thirteen military installations across Pakistan and Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir with force and precision, the country’s perceptions of friends who can truly
be trusted in moments of crisis, those who are less reliable, and outright friends of its enemies,
became far more defined.

The response of Western powers, particularly the United States, to Indian retaliation against
Pakistan not only fell short of expectations from friends but also challenged India’s long-held
positions against third-party involvement in the India-Pakistan conflict. These powers appeared
to compromise their declared commitments to counterterrorism, adopting a troubling posture
of neutrality that effectively benefited Pakistan.

While the West’s stance caused disappointment, it was the support Pakistan received from
Turkey and Azerbaijan that truly struck a nerve with Indian public sentiment. This triggered
significant backlash, with strong Indian public anger directed at these countries, leading
substantial decline in Indian tourist traffic to these destinations.

As India keeps Operation Sindoor in suspension, declaring that there will be no compromise
with enemies who target the country through conventional or non-conventional means, the
renewed understanding of friendship and enmity is likely to continue shaping Indian public
discourse across a wide range of national concerns.

Analysing the global response to Operation Sindoor, this article explores India’s newly emerged
understanding of alliance, neutrality, and enmity in a world increasingly driven by interests
rather than ideals.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 46

The Western response: Expectations and disappointments

The Indian strategic establishment was highly confident about its growing alignment with
Western powers, especially with the United States, the UK, and France, under the leadership of
Prime Minister Narendra Modi. When India emerged as a major defence partner of some of
these countries through a range of defence agreements, many observers expected that India
could politically and diplomatically benefit from such a partnership during moments of crisis.

When Operation Sindoor was launched, there was a widely shared expectation in India that the
West would support India’s right to retaliate against Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism.
However, the Western powers not only refused to extend unequivocal support to India’s
counterterrorism efforts but also urged “restraint”, “de-escalation” and “dialogue”, categorically
dismissing the Indian narrative about Pakistan’s involvement in the Pahalgam terror attack.

Responding to the Indian military strikes, US President Donald Trump remarked, “They’ve
gone for tit-for-tat, so hopefully they can stop now”, signalling Washington’s tacit acceptance of
India’s right to retaliate. However, this did not amount to an acceptance of the broader Indian
stance. Further clarifying the US position, Vice-President JD Vance told Fox News, “What we
can do is try to encourage these folks to de-escalate a little bit, but we’re not going to get
involved in the middle of a war that’s fundamentally none of our business and has nothing to do
with America’s ability to control it.”

The British Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the UK is engaging “urgently with both
countries, as well as other international partners, encouraging dialogue, de-escalation and the
protection of civilians”. UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy echoed similar concerns,
emphasising the seriousness of the situation. Similarly, Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister Jose
Manuel Albares held talks with his Indian and Pakistani counterparts, urging restraint amid
escalating tensions.

Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide also urged both India and Pakistan to show
restraint. He noted that “this is exactly the type of escalation we hoped to avoid”. Italy’s Deputy
Prime Minister Antonio Tajani reached out to the foreign ministers of both India and Pakistan,
expressing Italy’s willingness to mediate and urging both parties to de-escalate the situation.

The lukewarm response of the West turned into a flashpoint in Indian public discourse, on May
10, when President Trump announced a “full and immediate ceasefire” and expressed his
desire to work with India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute, challenging the Indian
position against third-party involvement in the India-Pakistan conflict.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 47

Trump claimed that he made India and Pakistan agree to a ‘ceasefire’ by threatening to suspend
trade with both of them. However, India dismissed Trump’s claim of brokering a ceasefire and
rejected his offer to mediate on the Kashmir issue. The Indian government clarified that
Operation Sindoor had not concluded and that the temporary pause in military activity was the
result of direct negotiations between the armed forces of both countries.

Public dissatisfaction with the West grew further with subsequent developments: reports on
the Trump family-backed company’s cryptocurrency deal with Pakistan, a USD 1 billion loan
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to support Pakistan’s failing economy, and
Islamabad’s elevation to the chairmanship of several United Nations Security Council
Committees. Together, these developments not only exposed the blunder of Western neutrality
but also forced India to reimagine its idea of friendship in international politics.

Friends we can trust now: Israel, France, and Russia

Response from a few countries stood out either due to unequivocal support or through
substantive gestures during Operation Sindoor.

Israel emerged as the only country extending unequivocal support to India’s retaliatory military
action against Pakistan. In a clear and concise message posted on X, Israel's Ambassador to
India declared, “Israel supports India’s right for self-defence”. The statement resonated deeply
within Indian strategic circles and public discourse, reaffirming the depth of India’s
relationship with Israel.

Among the major Western powers, France distinguished itself by acknowledging India’s
legitimate security concerns while advocating restraint. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel
Barrot stated in an interview, “We understand India’s desire to protect itself against the scourge
of terrorism, but we obviously call on both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint to avoid
escalation”. Echoing the stand, the French Embassy in India posted on X that “France is deeply
concerned about the latest developments between India and Pakistan”, while also affirming
that “France supports India in its fight against terrorist groups”.

India’s long-standing strategic partner, Russia, responded with a careful but significant
message. While President Vladimir Putin made no personal remarks, the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs expressed “deep concern” over the escalation between India and Pakistan, and
strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms, calling for global unity in combating the
menace. It also urged both sides to exercise restraint to prevent further escalation and
expressed hope that the dispute would be resolved through negotiations, guided by the 1972
Shimla Agreement and the 1999 Lahore Declaration.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 48

However, what truly reaffirmed Moscow’s strategic alignment with India came days later. In
early June 2025, Russia renewed its offer to India for the Su-57E, its fifth-generation fighter jet,
with an unprecedented defence proposal. The offer included the setting up of a joint
production facility in India, full technology transfer, and complete access to source code. This
would allow India to integrate its indigenously developed weapons into the jet, ensuring
strategic autonomy and avoiding long-term dependency on foreign military systems. Through
these gestures, these countries gained renewed significance in Indian public discourse—as
nations that stood by India when it mattered most.

A measured neutrality: The response of Global South

Among India’s South Asian neighbours, Nepal expressed concern over the escalating tensions
between India and Pakistan. While it did not explicitly express solidarity with India, the
statement affirmed that “Nepal stands together with all in the fight against terrorism”, and
emphasised that “Nepal shall not allow any inimical forces to use its soil against its
neighbouring countries”.

Sri Lanka took a neutral and balanced stance. Cabinet Spokesman Nalinda Jayatissa, in a press
briefing, stated, “Our territorial land, waters, and airspace will not be used by one country
against another”. He reaffirmed Sri Lanka’s commitment to its longstanding policy of ‘non-
alignment’ in regional geopolitical disputes.

In Southeast Asia, Singapore expressed concern about the military confrontation between
India and Pakistan, and calledon “both parties to de-escalate tensions through diplomatic
means and ensure the safety of all civilians”. Similarly, Indonesia urged restraint, posting on X,
“We urge both parties to exercise restraint and prioritise dialogue in resolving the crisis”.

Malaysia, reiterating Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s call for a thorough investigation into the
Pahalgam attack, released a statement urging “both sides to exercise maximum restraint and
restore channels of communication”. It also reaffirmed Malaysia’s “support for all efforts aimed
at de-escalation and meaningful dialogue between India and Pakistan”.

Brazil issued a statement expressing “grave concern” over the “military actions in the Kashmir
region, in areas administered by both India and Pakistan”. It urged all parties to exercise
restraint to prevent further escalation of tensions.

Countries including Iran, Qatar, the UAE and Egypt issued general calls for restraint and de-
escalation, without taking explicit sides in the conflict.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 49

Notably, Saudi Arabia sought a more proactive diplomatic role in de-escalating the tensions in
the region. Its Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Abdel Aljuber, visited both India and
Pakistan as part of the Kingdom’s “efforts to de-escalate tensions, end current military
confrontations, and promote the resolution of all disputes through dialogue and diplomatic
channels”.

In general, most of the Global South adopted a cautious or neutral approach toward India’s
Operation Sindoor. However, the silence of India’s neighbour Bangladesh stood out as an
exceptional and conspicuous omission. While these responses did not oppose India, their
caution underlined the limits of solidarity when strategic interests collide with moral clarity.

Friends of our enemy: Turkey, Azerbaijan and China

Pakistan shares a deep, historically rooted, “brotherhood” with both Turkey and Azerbaijan.
With ties defined by shared Islamic identity and cultural commonalities, both countries have
consistently supported Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute. While Turkey is one of the
major suppliers of arms to Pakistan, Azerbaijan considers Pakistan a strategic partner. Given
these close ties, the responses of Turkey and Azerbaijan to Operation Sindoor carried
considerable weight in public discourse.

When India launched its retaliatory military action, Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan
expressed solidarity with Pakistan. A statement from Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
warned that India’s strikes risked “an all-out war” and condemned what it called “provocative
steps” as well as “attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure”. Echoing this stance,
Azerbaijan also issued a statement expressing solidarity with Pakistan and condemning Indian
military strikes on terrorist infrastructure in the region.

During the operation, reports emerged that Turkish cargo planes had delivered military
supplies to Pakistan. Although Ankara denied such claims, Pakistan deployed over 400 Turkish-
made Asisguard Songar drones to target both civilian and military areas in India. More recently,
reports have also indicated that Pakistan is preparing to purchase the ALP-300G air defence
system from Turkey.

Extending their support to Pakistan, both Turkey and Azerbaijan became the subject of public
debates in India. Many in the country called for a boycott of products from these countries,
urged the government to halt trade deals and demanded a ban on travel to these nations as
vacation destinations. Media reports suggest that the boycott call led to a significant decline in
Indian tourists choosing these countries as their vacation destinations.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 50

While Turkey and Azerbaijan faced Indian backlash for supporting Pakistan, Indian public
sentiment against China, the largest supporter of the Pakistan army, remained less intense. In
the context of Operation Sindoor, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian described the
Indian military operation as ‘regrettable’ and urged both sides to act in the larger interest of
peace and stability. He emphasised the need for calm and restraint and stated that China is
willing to play a role along with the international community in de-escalating the situation.

However, China provided multi-layered and critical support to Pakistan during the operation.
Its JF10 fighter jets, PL15 missiles and drones remained core assets in Pakistan’s military
arsenal. Its real-time battlefield surveillance and intelligence sharing enabled Pakistan to
better coordinate both ground and air operations. Additionally, its online ecosystem
contributed to Pakistan's narrative-building efforts against India.

Following the military tension reports emerged that China may fast-track its military deliveries,
including J-35A stealth fighters, to Pakistan. This deepening military support not only reveals
China’s strategic intent in the subcontinent but also highlights its role as an ally and supporter
of Pakistan’s actions against India.

New lessons on friendship and enmity

While asserting India’s military resolve, Operation Sindoor not only redefined India’s response
to sub-conventional attacks but also brought greater clarity to its concept of strategic partners
and reliable friends. Contrary to expectations, many so-called partners of India chose
ambiguity at a moment when clarity and conviction were most needed. The ‘neutral stance’ of
Western powers was not just diplomatically hollow but politically consequential. Although the
new realisations are unlikely to bring a radical transformation in India’s defence cooperation
and global engagement, public perception in India regarding the friendship of Western powers
has undergone a dramatic transformation.

Meanwhile, countries like Israel, France, and Russia demonstrated that friendship with India
holds more value than echoing hollow sentiments of neutrality. The open support for Pakistan
from Turkey and Azerbaijan clearly underscored that moral values hold little significance in
international politics. China’s crucial support to Pakistan once again highlighted the depth of
strategic challenges India faces in dealing with its two belligerent neighbours. The largely
cautious posture of the Global South, though not antagonistic, underscored the strategic
limitations of solidarity when confronted with competing geopolitical interests.

As the smoke of Operation Sindoor clears, India emerges with a sharpened understanding: the
world is not divided simply between friends and enemies, but between those who offer support
when it matters and those who do not. In this new global outlook, trust will no longer be built
on diplomatic pleasantries but on proven reliability in times of crisis.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 51

The China Factor in Operation
Sindoor: Diplomatic, Military,
and Strategic Ramifications Now
and Beyond
Ashok K Kantha

The four-day military confrontation between India and Pakistan, from May 7 to May 10, 2025,
served as a stark reminder of the complex security landscape in South Asia. While India's
calibrated yet assertive use of force drew significant regional and international attention, the
role of China in shaping both the prelude and the aftermath of this crisis demands close
scrutiny, particularly against the backdrop of the durable China-Pakistan strategic nexus.

This article undertakes such an examination and concludes that India’s deterrence dynamics
vis-à-vis China and Pakistan have been further complicated. While the traditional notion of
India facing a "two-front war" with China and Pakistan launching simultaneous military
operations remains less likely, a more imminent challenge has emerged: a “one-front
reinforced war”, with a conflict with Pakistan inherently involving China.

China's diplomatic and media stance: A calculated narrative

In previous India-Pakistan conflicts as well, China refrained from directly intervening

militarily and creating a two-front situation for India.

During the 1965 India-Pakistan war, China extended strong diplomatic support to Pakistan,
condemned India's actions as "naked aggression", and accused India of violating the Line of
Actual Control (LAC) along the India-China border, particularly in the Sikkim sector. It issued
ultimatums, demanding that India dismantle alleged military structures within three days or
face "serious consequences," but this threat remained rhetorical and did not materialize into
actual combat.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 52

In the 1971 Bangladesh war, China continued to support Pakistan diplomatically, and there
were reports of limited Chinese troop movements along the Sino-Indian border, particularly in
the eastern sector, but this did not escalate into conflict. China resisted prodding from the US
and entreaties from Pakistan, refusing to come to Pakistan’s rescue.

During the 1999 Kargil conflict, China adopted a relatively neutral position, a departure from its
earlier pro-Pakistan positions in 1965 and 1971. Diplomatically, Beijing called for restraint and
dialogue between India and Pakistan, emphasizing respect for the Line of Control (LoC) and
avoiding explicitly supporting Pakistan’s actions.

This time, too, there were no diversionary activities by China along our northern frontiers, but
its stance has evolved and acquired qualitatively different dimensions.

Diplomatically, China’s initial response to the Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor reflected
a calculated narrative. Chinese state media, such as Xinhua, characterized the April 22 incident
as a "shooting incident," frequently downplaying its nature or omitting details entirely. This
framing aimed to minimize the severity of the terrorist attack that provoked India's subsequent
military actions.

Official statements from China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Guo Jiakun, urged restraint
from both India and Pakistan, advocating for a "quick and fair investigation" into the Pahalgam
attack, reflecting Pakistan’s position. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi engaged in discussions
with Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, conveying China's "full
understanding" of Pakistan's "legitimate security concerns" and offering support in
safeguarding its sovereignty and security interests.

During the four-day conflict, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian explicitly stated
on May 7 that China found India's military operation "regrettable." China's criticism of India's
targeting of terrorist facilities in Pakistan, while maintaining silence on the massacre of Indian
civilians, revealed a notable asymmetry in its normative behavior. On May 10, Wang Yi spoke to
National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, condemning the terrorist attack in Pahalgam and
expressing hope for calm and a lasting ceasefire, while applauding Doval’s statement that war
was not India's choice. Notably, until Wang Yi’s call, India had avoided any political-level contact
with China in the context of Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor, unlike with other UNSC
members (excepting Pakistan), signaling India's assessment of China's unhelpful stance.

China also backed Pakistan’s narrative at the UN, playing a role in tempering the language of
the UNSC’s statement. In the UNSC, India was able to secure a strong press statement on May
10. Although Pakistan is a non-permanent member and was supported by China, it couldn’t
dilute the statement, except by excluding the reference to the Resistance Front (TRF). The

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 53

statement noted: “The members of the Security Council underlined the need to hold
perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of this reprehensible act of terrorism
accountable and bring them to justice.”

The underlying narrative in Chinese media portrayed India's retaliatory response as

unwarranted. By omitting the context of the terror attack's severity, Chinese reports sought to
imply that India's military actions were disproportionate. Some members of China's strategic
community went further, suggesting that the Pahalgam terrorist attack was a "false flag
operation" orchestrated by Indian security forces.

Indeed, Chinese media and commentators amplified Pakistan's propaganda. This included the
propagation of unverified stories regarding Indian aircraft losses and accusations that India
was escalating tensions by violating the Indus Waters Treaty. Chinese bloggers and wumao
(online commentators) provided extensive support to Pakistan's disinformation and
psychological warfare efforts, drawing directly from the Pakistan Army's Inter-Services Public
Relations to exaggerate Indian losses and shape Pakistan's narrative. A recurring theme among
Chinese experts was the concern that the crisis could escalate into a nuclear conflict,
prompting calls for international diplomatic intervention to prevent further escalation.

The military dimension: Chinese-origin weapons in combat

Militarily, the crisis marked a significant turning point towards battlefield collusion between
Pakistan and China. For the first time, advanced Chinese-origin systems were visibly employed
by Pakistan in a live operational environment, with the Chinese media cheering the alleged
success of those platforms in their first-ever encounter with advanced Western weapon
platforms in a combat situation. The Pakistan Air Force’s use of Chinese J-10C fighter aircraft
equipped with PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles, coupled with Chinese-made HQ-9 air
defense systems, showcased a new level of interoperability and capability enhancement.
Interoperability has been refined through progressively sophisticated Shaheen series and
other joint military exercises over the past 15 years.

Beyond specific hardware, the tactical approaches employed by Pakistan, such as drones, net-
centric operations, and potentially more sophisticated cyber warfare efforts, hint at the
adoption of a "Chinese military playbook." There is reason to believe that Chinese intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) assets may have provided real-time inputs or situational
awareness support during Pakistan’s military operations. A Chinese fishing fleet was
reportedly used to monitor the India Navy’s deployments, while the Pakistan Navy remained
confined to its coastal waters.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 54

Likewise, there are credible reports that China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System was utilized
for global positioning services. The PL-15 missile's guidance system crucially includes BeiDou
satellite updates, demonstrating a direct and critical integration of China's indigenous satellite
navigation system into Pakistan's advanced weaponry.

Our experts have suggested that there was a fusion of not only Chinese-origin platforms but
also the Swedish-designed Saab 2000 Erieye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C)
system, an arrangement which was reportedly instrumental in bringing down Indian aircraft
on May 7.

While the efficacy of Chinese-origin platforms in actual combat remains contested, their value
in reinforcing the China-Pakistan defense nexus is undeniable.

Strategically, the crisis highlights the evolution of China’s traditional role—from bolstering
Pakistan’s strategic and conventional capabilities to keep India off balance, to acting as a
strategic enabler for Pakistan in an operational scenario involving India.

In recent years, India has considered China as the primary strategic challenge and tended to
view Pakistan as a threat that could be handled en passant. However, the reality is that India
views Pakistan and China as a potent, combined challenge.

The significant role played by advanced Chinese weapon systems in Pakistan's operations,
coupled with reports of real-time ISR inputs, the use of BeiDou satellites, and Chinese advisory
roles, indicates a deeper, more layered military involvement. This pattern of battlefield
collusion has significantly complicated India’s deterrence dynamics. The traditional notion of
India facing a "two-front war" with China and Pakistan has evolved into a “one-front reinforced
war”. This means that a conflict with Pakistan now inherently involves China due to their
strong military relationship and significant defense interoperability. Chinese support to
Pakistan in its military operations can take many forms, including ISR inputs, targeting data,
cyber interference, and live support extended by Chinese Original Equipment Makers (OEMs),
with China stopping short of any overt involvement. China is better positioned to sustain
prolonged pressure across multiple axes and has the strategic depth to play a long game, testing
India's red lines while simultaneously denying direct provocation. This grey-zone technique of
enabling Pakistan while avoiding open confrontation allows China to probe India’s thresholds.

India has maintained high-level troop deployments and infrastructure build-up along the LAC
with China since 2020. The ceasefire along the India-Pakistan LoC and international boundary
was restored in February 2021 and largely held, though there was some escalation in violence
since late 2023. During Operation Sindoor, there was intense shelling across the LoC, and our
borders with Pakistan are now live, which necessitates the diversion of crucial assets,

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 55

including troops, air defense units, ISR platforms, and logistical support, towards the western
front, or at least a division of these limited resources.

The impact is more worrisome along the northern borders with China. India's conventional
deterrence against China relies on maintaining a credible defensive posture along the LAC and
the ability to impose costs on any PLA aggression. A two-live-front situation affects this
capability by diverting resources and attention. China, with its larger military and defense-
industrial base, is better positioned to sustain a long standoff or exploit India's predicament.

Looking ahead, we can expect China to strengthen its military collaboration with Pakistan
further and maintain its diplomatic, economic, and strategic support. Now that India has
carved out greater space for conventional operations against Pakistan despite the nuclear
overhang, we can expect China and Pakistan to work together to prepare for this situation,
creating their own “new normal” to deal with India. This adjustment will almost certainly
involve China actively helping Pakistan plug any loopholes or weaknesses exposed during the
recent hostilities. Pakistan will undoubtedly share data emerging from the 87-hour conflict,
and together, the two countries will learn lessons on how to deal with India more effectively in
the future. The conflict also served as an invaluable "live-fire demonstration" for China's
defense industry, providing critical performance data and validating its capabilities.

Indeed, the government of Pakistan announced on June 6 its intention to buy China's J-35
stealth fighter jets as part of a major arms purchase. The deal would mark China's first export
of the fifth-generation jet, which boasts advanced stealth capabilities, and would also include
the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, as well as the HQ-19 ballistic missile
defense system. Pakistan is notably the only country that has received the J-10C fighter jets
from China.

There are reports suggesting that China is helping Pakistan develop the sea leg of its nuclear
triad to complement its land and air-based capabilities. China is providing the Pakistan Navy
with eight Hangor-class submarines, four built in China and four in Pakistan with Chinese
technology, under a 2015 deal. These submarines, equipped with air-independent propulsion,
are believed to be capable of carrying nuclear-tipped Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise
missiles. These missiles are potentially Pakistan’s primary sea-based nuclear delivery system,
designed to develop a second-strike capability. China is suspected of providing technical
assistance in propulsion systems and guidance technology for Babur-3.

US role

Doubts about the reliability of the US as a strategic partner under President Trump further
complicate our response. The friction between Washington and New Delhi over their divergent

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 56

messaging at the end of the crisis has injected tension into a relationship that has otherwise
been on a strong footing for the past several years.

President Trump has repeatedly claimed that the US brokered the ceasefire between India and
Pakistan, while India has suggested that the ceasefire was agreed after India’s DGMO was
approached by the Pakistan counterpart. Trump has also linked ongoing trade talks with India’s
position on continued military operations and established a false equivalence between India,
the victim of terrorism, and Pakistan, the perpetrator of terrorism. Secretary of State Marco
Rubio claimed that India and Pakistan had agreed to hold talks in a neutral venue after the
ceasefire. Trump’s White House lunch meeting with the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, Asim
Munir, sent negative signals from India’s perspective.

Besides, Trump’s strategic stance towards China remains unclear beyond trade and tariff issues.
Senior US officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth
have spoken of the “imminent threat” posed by China, but Trump speaks highly of President Xi
Jinping and seeks a “beautiful deal” with China. In talks on trade and tariff issues, the US has
repeatedly backed down, while China has taken a relatively firm stand. Given Trump’s
transactional approach, his disdain for alliances, and his targeting of friends and adversaries
alike with enhanced tariffs, concerns have arisen in the Indo-Pacific region about how far the
US will fulfill its security commitments to counter China.

Against this backdrop, India needs a pragmatic assessment of the role of external balancing in
its deterrence strategy to counter China. A crucial question to address is how to avoid a
mismatch of expectations regarding the US role in an India-China conflict and the Indian role
in an Indo-Pacific conflict against the backdrop of the US-China rivalry.

India’s options

In the expansive “new normal” that PM Modi outlined on May 12, he reiterated India’s right to
respond militarily to any terror attack and not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail”, while adding
that India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the
governments sponsoring terrorism. This addition puts the Pakistani military on notice that the
next time, India’s kinetic response under an Operation Sindoor 2.0 may not be limited to
terrorist targets. The hardening position is evident in his statement, “terror and talks cannot go
together; terror and trade cannot go together; water and blood cannot flow together.”

By expanding the scope of conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, PM Modi is
seeking to nullify the nuclear overhang, but this requires a significant expansion in
conventional capabilities. Capabilities to suppress hostile air defenses and adopt a network-
centric approach that seamlessly integrates manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 57

based support for surveillance, communication, and targeting will need to be introduced. India
will need to develop its capabilities to counter China and Pakistan acting in collusion.

Simultaneously, India needs to draw lessons from the intelligence and security lapses that led
to Pahalgam to better plan, predict, and prevent future attacks of a similar nature. Only then
will the “new normal” be a credible deterrent against terrorist attacks. It is open to question to
what extent Operation Sindoor will deter future misadventures by Pakistan, more so given
China’s role.

India seeks to avoid external involvement in its relations with Pakistan. There are only two
ways of avoiding external intervention: first, increase the economic and military differential
with Pakistan, and second, maintain independent communication channels between the two
countries. Unfortunately, recent developments have led to re-hyphenation with Pakistan.

We will need to think creatively to address these challenges. Above all, we need to upgrade our
economic, military, and technological capabilities. Some of the data here is not very
encouraging.

Studies by PRS Legislative Research reveal an inconvenient fact: in recent years, the central
government’s expenditure on defense has decreased as a share of its total expenditure, from
17.1% in 2014-15 to 13% in 2025-26 (BE).

India’s R&D spending as a percentage of GDP dropped from 0.81% in 2011-12 to 0.64% in 2023-
24, while China increased its R&D spending from 1.7% in 2010 to 2.7% of GDP in 2024. The
corresponding figure for the US is 2.7% in 2010 and 3.4% in 2024. Let’s remember, China’s GDP
is five times larger than India’s. Thus, India is falling further behind, while Operation Sindoor
confirmed that future wars will be more technology-intensive.

Finally, can India avoid raising the altered reality of battlefield collusion between China and
Pakistan in its diplomatic dialogue with the former? India should categorically convey to China
that the nexus with Pakistan has a serious impact on India’s security environment, and
therefore, it would have negative implications for the future course of India-China relations.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 58

Between Words and Weapons:
Europe and the India–Pakistan
Flashpoint
Devika Makkat

On 22 April, tourists in the Pahalgam region of Kashmir were targeted in a terrorist attack,
resulting in the deaths of 25 Indian citizens and one Nepali national. The attackers, reportedly
affiliated with a group called The Resistance Front (TRF), specifically targeted Hindus. Coming
after years of relative calm in the volatile region, such an attack on tourists — traditionally
considered off-limits even by “militant” groups in the Valley due to the impact on local
livelihoods — sent shockwaves across the subcontinent. In response, the Indian government
conducted targeted strikes on multiple sites within Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
(PoK) that it claimed as terrorist infrastructure. After multiple retaliatory strikes from both
sides, the two countries have arrived at a ceasefire.

The diplomatic response from various world actors have come under scrutiny within domestic
discussions in India. The European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy Kaja Kallas put out a series of statements condemning the terrorist attack as well as
acknowledging “every state’s” duty and right to “lawfully protect its citizens from acts of terror”.
Nonetheless, as tensions mounted in the subcontinent, and an Indian response seemed
imminent, the EU’s statement urged both countries to "exercise restraint, to de-escalate
tensions and desist from further attacks." — remarks that were poorly received in New Delhi.
India perceived them as drawing an unfair equivalence between itself — the aggrieved party —
and the aggressor. Prominent commentators opined that the statement is likely to undermine
the EU’s relations with India, at an “avoidable” time. In a public engagement soon after, EAM
Jaishankar stated that India is looking for “partners, not preachers” —a statement widely
considered to have been directed at Europe.

Even if in line with precedent, the EU’s position has disappointed New Delhi, considering the
years of closer engagement since Balakot in 2019, the last major Ind-Pak conflict. The move has
largely been viewed through the lens of reciprocity, a like-for-like response for India’s position
on Ukraine.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 59

Europe’s stakes

Meanwhile, the European stakes in the issue have finally boiled over into the material realm.
The latest conflict was the biggest live, air-to-air kill combat between the aerial forces of two
nuclear armed states in recent times. From the active combat performance of key modern
equipment, to the working thresholds (and limits) of nuclear deterrence, and the role of non-
state actors in inter-state conflict, the world has received a glimpse into a wide array of modern
combat realities amidst rising uncertainty in the global order.

Hence, wider global interest has been on the active combat performance of European
equipment fielded by India (mostly the French-made Rafales) against Pakistan’s Chinese
weapons. Unconfirmed reports of a Chinese-made J-10C aircraft equipped with the PL-15 long-
range air-to-air missiles shooting down an Indian Rafale have been making the rounds, raising
concerns about the performance of Western equipment against China’s in fatal combat
interaction. Dassault’s stocks took a hit, even as China hailed the incident as a “DeepSeek”
moment for its defense industry. However, Indian experts have been largely ambivalent about
the potential loss of the Rafale, insisting that it doesn’t speak to any quality concerns. How
India and Pakistan proceed in the near term could signal broader trends in modern warfare.

For Europe, this also expands into a more urgent concern about the kind of advanced
capabilities China may be able and willing to provide partners like Russia. The Sino-Russian
bilateral increasingly focuses on joint military and defense-industrial collaboration. Europe is
not without concerns about the lessons Russia has learnt in Ukraine amidst Western
rejoicement about the superiority of its modern equipment over Soviet-era munitions. China
could likely balance some of those gaps for Russia.

A renewed PR problem

Beyond the narratives on equipment and the managed back-and-forth of official rhetoric,
Europe should be more concerned about the popular Indian perception of Western
abandonment in this conflict. Western media coverage and leaders’ comments have reinforced
the view that the West’s historical “affinity” for Pakistan endures, despite recent deepening
engagement with — and even reliance on — India. While Pakistan secured clear support from
close allies like Turkey and China — who also serve as its key arms suppliers — India didn’t
generate similar optics. This has reinforced a perception that India’s Western partners remain
primarily transactional in their approach, interested in India’s purse rather than a more
meaningful partnership. Despite emerging relatively confident in the military outcomes, the
narrative battle played out in Western coverage, and India feels shortchanged — particularly
amidst partners with far greater economic and strategic stakes in India than in Pakistan.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 60

Meanwhile Russia, despite saying little, has gained in public perception. Despite a lack of
official confirmation regarding both, Russia’s S-400 system has been cheered as a reliable and
successful addition to India’s military arsenal, contrasted with the alleged loss of the much-
heralded Rafale. This has strengthened Russia’s image as a steady, no-frills partner — free from
the perceived hypocrisy and conditionality of Western partnerships. This narrative increasingly
defines itself in opposition to Europe (and the U.S.), who are seen as unwilling to back India in
a moment of crisis, despite grand declarations about the partnership. The landscape has
somewhat reshored existing popular Indian distrust of the West, harking back to easy parallels
like the 1971 war and more.

The potency of this sentiment is far from trivial. The Indian government must account for
domestic opinion, particularly on an emotionally charged issue like India-Pakistan relations.
Public sentiment has already boiled over as the unseemly backlash, however unjustified,
against foreign secretary Vikram Misri. Despite projecting strong ties with Western partners
over the past decade, the Indian government risks appearing as though it has little to show for
it. It is not without risks to the Indian government’s incentive structures, both internal and
external.

India will now be busy taking stock of the military lessons from the conflict. New Delhi will be
undertaking some recalibration of its priorities and partnerships, with Russia, and Israel, likely
to assume renewed prominence in the defense realm. The implications of the current,
admittedly brief, flashpoint for India-Europe relations will likely only pan out over the long
term.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 61

The Geopolitical Context and its
Challenges Around Op Sindoor
Sidharth Raimedhi

The Pahalgam terror attack and the need for an Indian response did not take place in a
geopolitical vacuum. India needed to take into account geopolitical realities in terms of
choosing the means, scale, and accompanying narratives of the response. Clearly, there was a
sense in Delhi that the impending military imbroglio could divert India from its larger strategic
trajectory that had been so carefully cultivated over the last few years. This pertained to India’s
rising status as a leading power in a fracturing world. Additionally, the geopolitical lens was
also shaped by the template of the Balakot strikes and its associated geopolitical context.
Notably, India achieved significant diplomatic support and understanding from the U.S. in
February 2019 under Trump’s first administration. However, post-Pahalgam, India appeared to
face a significantly changed geopolitical context. This is most strongly characterized by the
following features—an unwillingness by key players to place blame on Pakistan; the U.S.’ hands-
off and on-again approach; the active support provided by China and Turkey to Pakistan; and
Russia’s perceived indifference.

In this context, there are four primary takeaways:

Military support in crisis vs strategic autonomy

The conflict has made India take note of the contrast between itself and Pakistan in terms of
benefitting from strategic allies during conflict or crisis. India’s non-alignment or strategic
autonomy approach had been a key aspect of its rising profile as a great power. India’s ability to
maintain foreign policy independence, after all, has been a marker of its greatness. However,
the conflict has demonstrated that such an approach may have certain short-term (but key)
disadvantages as well. Hence, the conflict has shown that India’s strengthening partnerships
lack a certain amount of military wherewithal compared to Pakistan’s more concrete strategic
partnerships with Iron brother Turkey and historic ally China. This played out in terms of
military logistics and operations as well, given that shared or common platforms and
equipment between China and Pakistan allowed a sophisticated degree of network-centric
interoperability, and hence a hard to discount kill-chain. India, in comparison, and related to

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 62

its pursuit of military diversification as well as strategic autonomy conducted the conflict with a
patchwork of systems that were more difficult to integrate with each other. India’s dividends
from strategic autonomy are abiding and long-term in nature, however they do entail short-
term costs.

Narrative and anti-terrorism

India had expected greater understanding from the world, including its partners, based on the
view that it had been a victim of a dastardly terror attack by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists.
Arguably, India was left dissatisfied by general responses. To a degree, this was a function of
external countries offering support and sympathy to India while hesitating to explicitly blame
Pakistan in the absence of conclusive proof. However, this disjunct is also a consequence of the
broader shift in global norms regarding the prioritization of terrorism. In a world where great
power competition has returned with force, global cooperation and solidarity against terrorism
has arguably weakened. Given that India’s initial series of strikes against Pakistan were much
more extensive and decisive than previous cost-imposition kinetic actions (2016 and 2019), it
led to an escalatory spiral that appeared dangerous, unprecedented, and out of control in many
ways. This naturally amplified fears of a nuclear escalation, which overshadowed concerns
about terrorism itself.

Sweet spot disturbed

India’s rising geopolitical influence in recent decades has been a function of it inhabiting what
is known as a geopolitical sweet spot. This dynamic was shaped by the U.S.’ long-term bet on
India as a future counter-balancer to China, as well as China’s efforts to appeal to Indian
sensitivities in order to weaken momentum toward a stronger India–U.S. strategic partnership.
However, this sweet spot has been saturated in recent years due to a multiplicity of factors.
Primarily, the U.S.’ faith in the long-term bet on India has weakened to a degree, and with it
China’s need to exercise greater caution and restraint vis-à-vis India. President Trump’s
transactional leverage-based approach to foreign policy runs counter to the traditional U.S.
long term view of India. The latter has been replaced by an approach that seeks immediate
gains for the U.S. in relations to a India-Pakistan crisis or conflict. This growing dynamic meant
that Pakistan was able to lean on both China as well as the U.S. to help achieve specific goals
related to the conflict. Pakistan’s cultivation of strong ties with Turkey, meanwhile, also allowed
it to benefit from a sophisticated arms industry as well as ideological goodwill. Hence, Israel’s
rare unequivocal support of India’s positions was appreciated in Delhi, but it also explains
India’s recentdiscomfort in multilateral groupings such as BRICS and SCO.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 63

A more unrestrained China

China has traditionally adopted an approach of largely ‘keeping out’ of conflicts in the sub-
continent. This has been the case in almost all India-Pakistan wars, with relatively minor
exceptions (such as in 1965). This trend had only strengthened after normalization of ties
between India and China after the end of the Cold War, reflecting in China’s greater
understanding towards India during the Kargil conflict (much to Pakistan’s dismay). China’s
own serious concerns pertaining to terrorism only reinforced this status quo. China’s stance
and position during the Balakot strike was also not an obstacle to India. Given that India and
China have chosen to achieve a thaw in relations and a movement towards greater restoration
of ties and pragmatism, there were reasons to expect China to continue with its ‘restrained’
approach. However, Chinese statements of intent, warning, and support to Pakistan were
notable. Their impact on India’s decision-making is yet unknown, but future historians will
certainly choose to examine the same. Did anticipation of possible Chinese entry (through
diversion) reinforce the need for de-escalation?

China did not undertake any form of preparedness or mobilization at the LAC that could have
put India off-balance. However, China’s active support provided to Pakistan during the conflict
—in terms of satellite data feeds and possibly urgent deliveries of supplies—marked the
crossing of a new threshold in the India-Pakistan-China trilateral. Content with the PAF’s
performance in the conflict, China is likely to increase its levels of support to Pakistan in future
crises—with recent reports of expedited arms deliveries only strongly indicating the same. If
anything, this aspect is arguably the strongest geopolitical repercussion of the conflict.

Op Sindoor and its aftermath has served as a wakeup call to India in many senses. It has
reinforced India’s quest for strategic and defense self-reliance and alerted India to Pakistan’s
stealthy building of transactional ties with major powers over the years. Pakistan’s niche
abilities in air warfare have also left a mark on India’s military assessments. Similar to Balakot
2019, both India and Pakistan have declared, and projected victory, towards their domestic
audiences—thereby reinforcing deterrence instability. There is a lurking sense that both sides
see the conflict as unfinished, reinforced by the fact that India has also not officially called off
Op Sindoor. The anticipation of a future conflict with Pakistan, especially given the new terror
doctrine, complicates India’s long-term plans for military preparedness vis-à-vis China—the
real existential threat. India’s growing need to balance short-term regional threats (Pakistan,
and possibly Bangladesh) along with preparations for long-term competition will mark India’s
new geopolitical zeitgeist.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 64

Bilateral
Implications
of the Crisis

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 65

Why Water Will Dominate India-
Pakistan Conversations Going
Forward
Happymon Jacob

As the dust settles after the military standoff between India Pakistan in May this year, what is
emerging is that the India’s decision to keep the Indus Waters Treaty will dominate the India-
Pakistan conversations in the months and years to come. Kashmir is an emotional and political
issue for Pakistan, but water is a life and death issue, senior members of the Pakistani strategic
community candidly admit.

While the India-Pakistan ceasefire, agreed through the director general of military operations
(DGMO) channels and reportedly brokered by the US, on May 10 ended the rapidly escalating
military hostilities between the two sides, India-Pakistan relations may have changed in
fundamental ways between the Pahalgam attack on April 22 and the ceasefire on the May 10.
And it will take a great deal of diplomacy for the two sides to go back to where they were on the
day of the terror attack (i.e., the minimal relations), let alone going back to normalcy and
dialogue. But most importantly, Pahalgam and after has fundamentally transformed the terms
of engagement between the two sides, and to India’s advantage.

Let’s quickly recall how things stood between India and Pakistan on the day of the attack.
Despite unresolved tensions, functional mechanisms were in place: A stable ceasefire,
adherence to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), several functional confidence building measures
(CBMs), and an open Wagah-Attari border with limited travel. Senior diplomatic officials
(minus high commissioners) were present in respective capitals, and there were expectations
that some form of discussions on Kashmir would be plausible someday. On April 23, a day after
the attack took place, New Delhi announced that it was putting the IWT in abeyance, closing
the Attari-Wagah border, and cancelling the posts of defence attaches, among other such
measures. The ceasefire between the nuclear-armed neighbours eventually broke down, and
Pakistan threatened to suspend the Simla agreement of 1972.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 66

The hostilities have since ended, and a ceasefire is in place. But what exactly does this ceasefire
do, and what is it that it doesn’t? The ceasefire agreed upon on May 10 is a technical agreement
between the two DGsMO to end military attacks against each other that includes firing and
shelling on the Line of Control (LoC), use of drones, missiles and other long-range weapons
against each other, and so on. What the ceasefire does not entail is more important to the
argument I am making here. The ceasefire agreement of May 10 doesn’t undo the measures
India took on April 23 or Pakistan thereafter. The ceasefire is a technical instrument, not a
political one — DGsMO are not authorised to enter into political agreements. That is for the
respective foreign offices to do, which they have not done. Put differently, the status quo ante
bellum between India and Pakistan as on April 22 has not been reinstated. And, as a result,
there is a new status quo between India and Pakistan today.

This means that the IWT will continue to be in abeyance, with India dealing with the river
waters as it pleases, unwilling to share hydrological data with Pakistan, thereby triggering long-
term implications for Pakistan’s economy and domestic politics. More crucially, the suspension
of the IWT has the potential to fundamentally transform the structure of India-Pakistan
diplomacy going forward. In announcing the suspension of the IWT, India stated that the treaty
would not be reinstated unless Pakistan “credibly and irreversibly” ceases support for cross-
border terrorism against India. This can, of course, be changed either by India unilaterally
undoing the suspension of the treaty or doing so after negotiations with Pakistan. But the
ceasefire agreement of May 10 doesn’t cover this.

In that sense, for New Delhi, the revival of the IWT will now be a major bargaining chip with
Pakistan. Simply put, if Pakistan wants water from the Indus basin rivers, it will have to
concede to India’s demands on terrorism. While Kashmir is an emotive issue for Pakistan,
water is one of life and death — literally and figuratively -- for the people of Pakistan. So, while
Pakistan may continue to harp on the Kashmir question going forward, their real objective
would be to get India to reverse its decision on the IWT, with the latter becoming far more
substantive than the former. Therefore, going forward, the IWT is bound to replace Kashmir as
the key point of conversation between the two sides. Let me rephrase that: With the singular act
of suspending the IWT, New Delhi may have replaced Kashmir with water as the central issue
in India-Pakistan relations, thereby changing the terms of their bilateral engagement.

Delhi did something similar in the Simla agreement of 1972 signed after the 1971 Bangladesh
liberation war. After the war ended, it refused to accept the territorial status quo ante bellum
(unlike after the 1965 war) thereby changing the name of the border in Kashmir from ceasefire
line to line of control (LoC). In doing so, India refused to entertain third party mediation in
Kashmir and has since ignored the presence of the UN observers in Jammu and Kashmir for, in
the Indian argument, the job of the UN observers was to monitor the ceasefire line in Kashmir
that had ceased to exist.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 67

Therefore, while the Pahalgam attack and the aftermath may have brought some international
attention to the Kashmir issue which Pakistan was keen on, India may have deftly removed
Kashmir from the negotiating table as Pakistan will now be forced to focus on the IWT instead
of Kashmir. Pakistan needs water and India wants an end to terrorism. So, the new terms of
engagement for bilateral conversations would be Pakistan ending terrorism for the Indian
provision of water, instead of India agreeing to have a dialogue on Kashmir for Pakistan
agreeing to end terrorism.

The ‘life and death’ consequences of keeping the IWT in abeyance will materialize as India
constructs infrastructure in J&K to control water flows into Pakistan. While Islamabad has a
brief window before India takes those irreversible steps, delaying discussions only diminishes
Pakistan’s ability to alter India’s actions and safeguard its water supply. So we must expect
Pakistan to bring up this issue sooner than later.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 68

Role of the DGMOs Hotline in
India-Pakistan Crises
Lt Gen Paramjit Singh (retd)

On May 10, 2025, as tensions between India and Pakistan reached a dangerous crescendo
threatening to spiral into full-scale conventional warfare, a single telephone call changed the
trajectory of South Asian security. At 15:35 hours, Pakistan's Director General of Military
Operations (DGMO) initiated contact with his Indian counterpart, setting in motion a
communication that would halt military operations across land, air, and sea by 17:00 hours the
same day. This pivotal moment underscores both the critical importance and inherent
limitations of existing crisis management mechanisms between two nuclear-armed
adversaries.

The announcement by India's Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri came as a welcome surprise to a
world watching the fourth day of escalating hostilities with growing alarm. The agreement to
cease operations, with both DGsMO scheduled to review the situation on May 12 at 12:00 hours,
demonstrated the enduring value of direct military-to-military communication channels even
in the most heated moments of conflict. Yet this incident also revealed the precarious nature of
peace in the subcontinent, where a single hotline serves as the primary bulwark against
catastrophic escalation.

The architecture of military communication: A proven but limited framework

The May 10 ceasefire was not an anomaly but rather the latest successful deployment of a well-
established, multi-tiered communication mechanism that has evolved to manage the complex
security relationship between India and Pakistan. This framework operates on multiple levels,
ranging from local commanders addressing routine border incidents to DGMO-level
interventions for matters that threaten broader stability.

At the grassroots level, local military commanders regularly communicate through established
hotlines and flag meetings to resolve issues ranging from inadvertent border crossings by
shepherds and cattle to more serious concerns involving unauthorized military presence or

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 69

terrorist activities. These mechanisms handle the daily friction points along the Line of
Control, preventing minor incidents from escalating into major confrontations.

However, when situations develop the potential for significant escalation, as occurred in the
lead-up to May 10, the matter ascends to the DGMO level, where senior military leadership can
engage directly to find solutions. This system has proven its worth on multiple occasions, most
notably during the February 2021 understanding between the two DGsMO that brought
sustained calm to the border until the Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, once again shattered
the peace.

The durability of this communication framework reflects its practical design and the mutual
recognition by both militaries of its essential role in conflict management. Unlike diplomatic
channels that can become entangled in political posturing, military-to-military communication
often maintains a professional focus on operational realities and immediate security concerns.
The fact that these channels remained open and effective even during the intense four-day
standoff of May 2025 speaks to their institutional strength and the professionalism of the
officers involved.

Yet the May 10 communication also highlighted the limitations of relying primarily on military
channels for crisis management. The conflict had evolved beyond traditional border skirmishes
to encompass operations across multiple domains and geographical areas, raising questions
about whether existing mechanisms are adequate for managing increasingly complex
scenarios.

Op Sindoor: A new paradigm of retaliation and its implications

The May 2025 crisis marked a qualitative shift in the dynamics of the India-Pakistan conflict,
exemplified by the scope and strategic objectives of Operation Sindoor. Unlike previous
engagements confined to border areas, this operation demonstrated India's willingness to
strike deep into Pakistani territory, targeting nine terrorist headquarters and training facilities
across Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and mainland Pakistan, including Punjab province.

The operation's characteristics—its scope, magnitude, weapon systems employed, and target
selection—suggested a level of retaliation that arguably exceeded the traditional purview of the
DGMO, whose primary responsibility centers on Indian Army operations. This evolution
reflects India's declared strategy of increasing the cost of Pakistan's state-sponsored proxy war
beyond bearable thresholds, fundamentally altering the escalation calculus that has governed
subcontinental conflicts for decades.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 70

India's strategic communication following Operation Sindoor was equally significant. Through
coordinated briefings by the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence, India clearly
articulated its limited objectives while simultaneously warning of proportionate responses to
any Pakistani escalation. This measured approach demonstrated sophisticated crisis
management, combining decisive military action with diplomatic signaling to prevent
uncontrolled escalation.

Pakistan's response, however, revealed the persistent challenges in managing conflicts with a
state that continues to view terrorism as a legitimate policy instrument. By escalating through
attacks on both civil and military targets, Pakistan brought the confrontation to the brink of
conventional war, demonstrating how quickly situations can deteriorate despite initial restraint
by one party.

The success of the May 10 communication in halting this escalation should not obscure the
underlying structural problem: Pakistan's continued reliance on state-sponsored terrorism
ensures that future crises are virtually inevitable. With India's declared intention to respond
more forcefully to future terrorist attacks than it did during Operation Sindoor, the region faces
an escalating cycle that existing communication mechanisms may struggle to contain.

Strengthening crisis management: Recommendations for enhanced stability

The May 2025 crisis offers valuable lessons for strengthening crisis management mechanisms
between India and Pakistan. While the DGMO-level communication successfully prevented
war, the episode highlighted several areas that require urgent attention to enhance stability and
reduce the risk of catastrophic escalation.

First, the sanctity and confidentiality of military-to-military communication channels must be

preserved and protected. These conversations provide crucial space for military leadership to
step back from escalation without public loss of face. The effectiveness of such channels
depends on maintaining their professional character and ensuring that both parties refrain
from making irresponsible public statements or engaging in media rhetoric that could
undermine future communications.

However, accountability mechanisms require significant enhancement. The February 2021

ceasefire understanding, despite simultaneous press releases from both DGsMO, failed to
specify public conditions for maintaining the ceasefire. This ambiguity allowed Pakistan to
avoid accountability while providing room for interpretation that ultimately facilitated the
breaking of commitments. Future agreements should include joint statements or simultaneous
press releases signed by both DGsMO, clearly articulating the agreed-upon conditions and
establishing public accountability frameworks.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 71

The current crisis management architecture, while functional, appears inadequate for the
evolving nature of India-Pakistan conflicts. Drawing from successful models like the India-
China special representative mechanism—where National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and
China's Wang Yi maintain dedicated communication channels alongside established military
hotlines—India and Pakistan should consider appointing special representatives with dedicated
crisis management mandates.

Such a system would provide multiple layers of communication, ensuring that various types of
crises can be addressed through appropriate channels. While military-to-military
communication excels at operational issues, political-level dialogue may be better suited for
addressing underlying policy disagreements that fuel recurring crises.

The May 10, 2025, communication that prevented war stands as both a testament to the value of
existing crisis management mechanisms and a warning about their limitations. As India and
Pakistan navigate an increasingly complex security environment characterized by expanding
military capabilities and persistent underlying conflicts, strengthening these mechanisms
becomes not just advisable but essential for regional and global stability. The hotline that
prevented war in May 2025 may not be sufficient to prevent the next crisis from escalating
beyond control.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 72

Maritime Lessons of Op Sindoor:
A Perspective Based on the
Principles of War
VAdm Anil K Chawla (retd)

The three-day conflict under the ongoing Operation Sindoor, which occurred from 7-10 May
2025, may have been brief but has revealed several important lessons that need to be imbibed
and acted upon expeditiously. The war against Pakistan-sponsored terror is far from over. This
analysis uses the immutable principles of war as a framework to either derive new lessons or
validate existing ones, with a particular focus on the maritime sphere.

Selection and maintenance of the aim

‘Selection and maintenance of the aim (objective) is the ‘master principle of war’ as it enables
unity of effort and purpose. However, prior to deciding the objective, the ‘desired end state’
(DES) needs to be determined—i.e., the political, military, economic, social, or other conditions
the political leadership seeks at the end of hostilities. From this, the military leadership derives
the military-strategic DES, which in turn informs theatre-strategic, operational and tactical
objectives.

In Op Sindoor, the national-strategic DES was clear: dissuade Pakistan from sponsoring terror
groups and their attacks inside India. The initial military action planned in execution of this
end state, and stated clearly by the Government of India, was to attack terror camps and
terrorists inside Pakistan—not the Pakistani state or its people. Additional dissuasion measures
included suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, complete severing of economic links and people-
to-people exchanges, and further down-grading diplomatic relations.

“It is crucial to consider the adversary’s likely desired end state—in this case, escalating the
conflict to provoke international mediation under the pretext of nuclear threat, with the goal of
reviving global attention on Kashmir. While this does not alter our own DES, it is vital for
planning military operations, especially regarding the potential escalation ladder.”

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 73

Offensive action

Any future conflict with Pakistan is likely to be intense but short, given Pakistan’s propensity to
invoke the nuclear threat to draw international intervention. Therefore, early gains are critical,
and the next principle of war, ‘offensive action’, attains greater salience. Winning a war requires
bold action to obtain a decisive advantage. Without proactively creating and exploiting
opportunities the best that can be achieved is maintenance of the status quo.

It is also a truism of warfare that an attacking force will almost always suffer greater losses than
the defending side, which could provide the weaker power a chance to claim a notional victory
in a brief conflict. The Armed Forces must be mindful of this in future operations. In the
maritime sphere this may necessitate reprioritizing objectives—with longer-term aims (such as
sea control or blockades) being subordinated by rapid offensive actions against enemy forces.
Achieving this will not be easy as smaller navies will always seek shelter in a ‘fortress’ which
will need to be breached. This will require appropriate weapon systems, training, deep tactical
and technical knowledge of one’s own and adversary weapon systems and tactics, and insight
into the adversary’s mindset.

Security

The principle of ‘security’ includes protecting your own forces and information, and also the
availability of adequate intelligence about every aspect of the adversary. In the maritime
sphere, maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the starting point. The Indian Navy (IN) has
invested heavily in this capability over the past two decades and should maintain an accurate
picture of the maritime order of battle in the likely area of operations—the North Arabian Sea.

While this might be of comfort to operational commanders at sea, it needs to be kept in mind
that a high level of domain awareness would also be made available to the Pakistan Navy (PN)
through Chinese surveillance and intelligence assets to enable specific sea denial operations,
which is the PN’s maritime strategy. This possibility warrants even more investment in MDA to
enable a near real-time picture of the area of operations, with satellites and drones being the
preferred platforms.

Surprise

The principle of ‘surprise’ is important as it can demoralize the enemy and create decisive
opportunities, though achieving it is very difficult in the modern era of transparency and
interconnectedness. The limited Indo-Pak theatre of war further increases predictability. Yet,
lack of surprise is generally a recipe for failure. While the physical element of surprise may be

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 74

difficult to achieve, surprise in ‘intent’ is possible, and something that needs to be thought
about deeply. Likewise, the adversary’s own capacity for inventive intent must be anticipated to
avoid being caught off-guard.‘

Unity of command and Jointness

‘Unity of command’ is vital for coordinated and efficient operations. This has seen major
improvement at the military-strategic level with the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
but remains a ‘work in progress’ at the theatre-operational level.

Jointness also ensures better ‘concentration of force’, ‘economy of effort’, ‘flexibility’ and
‘maneuverability’—four other important principles of warfare. The principle of ‘concentration
of force’ implies concentration and coordination of effort in space and time. This requires the
prioritization of resources and sequencing of their deployment and usage to achieve the
maximum effort against the adversary, essentially matching weakness with strength. No
individual service will ever have all the resources they wish for, and combining their individual
resources will make ‘the whole greater than the sum of its parts’. As an example, Operation
Sindoor demonstrated high levels of synergy in air defense, which can be enhanced with the
creation of the long-proposed Integrated Air Defence Command (IADC). In the maritime
theatre, the creation of an Integrated Maritime Theatre Command (IMTC) also brooks no
further delay.

Sustainability

‘Sustainability’ encompasses the adequacy of logistics support. It includes the entire range of
materiel, ordnance, and other support necessary for an armed force to sustain its warfighting
effort. This an especially critical consideration for navies; while duration of actual hostilities
may be short, navies remain at sea for considerable periods before and after conflict. It needs
to be borne in mind that land and air systems and machinery are not required to be run day
and night. Navies can also not ‘live off the land’ and maintenance and rearming facilities
require to be integral to a fleet. This is a key consideration that is not new, but needs to be
reiterated, and chinks, if any, ironed out earliest.

Communications and information warfare

‘Swift, reliable, secure and redundant communication’ has always been a fundamental
requirement for effectiveness in battle. Today, ‘communication’ also implies seamless
connectivity between weapons and sensors of different origins to enhance their effectiveness
and enable armed forces to fight as a ‘joint system’. This issue acquires great urgency today due

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 75

to the ever-faster incorporation of new technologies in weapon systems, and the debut of
unmanned craft.

The information and communication technology (ICT) revolution has also made Information
Warfare (IW) an all-pervasive aspect of modern warfare, with adversaries such as China clearly
professing and practicing the need to obtain ‘information dominance’ over an adversary. IW—
especially its employment to impact human cognition—is directly related to the principle of
‘maintenance of morale’. In Op Sindoor, considerable time was spent on combating
disinformation, which can erode morale, both within the forces and among the civilian
population, and damage international perceptions. IW must therefore be a major focus before,
during, and long after any conflict.

Maritime forces have unique attributes of flexibility, mobility, and endurance. Coercion is also
a specialty of maritime forces as witnessed during Operation Sindoor. This operation has
yielded several lessons that need to be incorporated into maritime strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan,
as in the next round the IN’s role may not be restricted to coercion. However, the option to
escalate to the maritime domain must be a calibrated move, with changes in the strategic
environment and weapons technology being used to modify the escalation ladder as required.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 76

Will India’s ‘Integrated
Deterrence’ Stem Cross-Border
Terror?
Ajay Bisaria

As more information about the battleground realities trickles in, security analysts are busy
finding templates to explain India’s calibrated counter-terror action launched in response to
the brutal cross-border terrorist attack in April 2025. Operation Sindoor has already reignited
debates on the theory of deterrence. Did the deterrence of 2019 fade? Does deterrence really
work? Can classical Cold War-era models truly be applied to the South Asian security
environment?

Among the most relevant theoretical frameworks that should be revisited is that of economist
and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling. He described deterrence and compellence in the 1960s
as forms of ‘the diplomacy of violence.’ In this model, deterrence works when credible threats,
or limited applications of force, successfully prevent adversarial action. The key question today
is whether India’s latest military doctrine of zero tolerance for terrorism—and its practical
application through Operation Sindoor—has re-established sub-conventional deterrence vis-à-
vis Pakistan’s use of terrorist proxies or merely escalated the cost of proxy warfare for the
Pakistan Army.

So far, contemporary scholars have not made up their minds on this issue. Walter Ladwig of
RUSI has arguedthat while deterrence by punishment carries inherent risks—“chief among
them the possibility that fringe actors may attempt to provoke confrontation in order to
manipulate state responses”—the continued viability of this approach may hinge on improved
crisis management. Most importantly, he notes, “preventing the next Sindoor—or the next 26/11
—requires sustained international pressure to dismantle the networks that make these attacks
possible in the first place”.

In contrast, Joshua White of Brookings, while emphasizing India’s military victory,

cautions/worries that the audacity of Indian targeting “could make for a crisis that escalates
even more quickly and opaquely than this one”.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 76

Both perspectives seem to undervalue the credibility and calibration of India’s actions.

Op Sindoor: Escalation without war

India’s high-precision, multi-day military operation concluded swiftly within four days,
targeting terrorist and military infrastructure across the Line of Control (LoC) and deep into
Pakistani territory. It marked the most significant escalation in Indo-Pak conflict in a nuclear
environment since Kargil in 1999. For its part, Pakistan attempted to establish its deterrence
against Indian military escalation but failed to render its kinetic response credible.
Nevertheless, Pakistan’s army swiftly claimed a ‘notion of victory’—sufficient to persuade
domestic audiences and to promote its Army Chief to Field Marshal.

India’s approach this time was marked by controlled aggression that would not trigger a full-
scale war. Also, pre-emptive diplomatic engagement ensured that India’s actions would not face
significant international backlash. In contrast, Pakistan was left scrambling to justify its
position, clinging to implausible deniability, while India, albeit more gradually, shaped the
conflict narrative in the information domain.

The evolution of Integrated Deterrence

India’s military response cannot be viewed in isolation. It represents the latest phase in an
evolving doctrine of ‘Integrated Deterrence’—a term borrowed and adapted from broader
international security parlance in the nuclear context, yet reshaped to fit the unique contours
of the Indo-Pak relationship.

Integrated Deterrence rests on a multi-pronged approach: military readiness, diplomatic pre-

emption, economic leverage, and informational control. It transcends reactive defense by
incorporating proactive signaling and layered coercion. In Operation Sindoor, India
demonstrated each element with clarity and precision:

Military dominance through deep-penetration airstrikes, overcoming air defenses and

neutralizing/deflecting Pakistan’s escalatory counterstrikes with robust air defense;
Diplomatic insulation via pre-emptive engagement with key global powers;
Economic pressure, including a declared pause in the Indus Waters Treaty;
The information domain was more contested, with Pakistan moving with the ‘first to lie’
advantage, claiming victory even before the battle concluded. However, once the fog of
war lifted, India responded with clear, credible dissemination of battlefield details and
post-conflict global messaging focused on Pakistan’s use of terrorism.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 77

This suite of actions represented a clear departure from India’s earlier posture of strategic
restraint, which had been practiced until 2016, or even the relatively milder deterrence
measures, such as the 2016 ‘surgical’ground strikes and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes. India has
now graduated from a posture of surgical retaliation to one of doctrinal deterrence, assuring
retaliation to every act of cross-border terror, each to be treated as an act of war. These are not
isolated actions, but elements of a comprehensive doctrine aimed at deterring and pre-empting
Pakistan, ultimately shaping its behavior over time. Notably, this is the first time India has
orchestrated a multi-domain response that amounts to a credible and integrated deterrence.

Escalation dominance and conditional clarity

Multi-domain deterrence was accompanied by the assertion of—what strategists call—

escalation dominance. This concept implies that India now has the capacity and credibility to
control the intensity and trajectory of conflict escalation.

Operation Sindoor is a textbook case. India inflicted precise, punitive costs on Pakistan but did
not cross the threshold into full-scale war. India dictated the terms of engagement, forcing
Pakistan into a reactive posture. Each step on the escalation ladder was accompanied by a de-
escalation instinct and the offer to the adversary of an ‘off-ramp’. Unlike earlier times, when
Pakistan used terror as a low-cost, deniable strategy, it now faced the reality of proportionate,
multi-domain retaliation.

Equally important is India’s shift from ‘strategic ambiguity’ to ‘conditional clarity’. The message
is simple and direct: any cross-border terror attack will be treated as an act of war. No more
grey zones. The consequences will be calibrated but unavoidable. This clarity is crucial to re-
imposing deterrence, making Pakistan’s traditional playbook of low-cost proxy warfare far less
viable.

Beyond the battlefield: Diplomatic and economic tools

Military strikes alone do not sustain deterrence. What makes India’s new approach particularly
potent is its willingness to add non-kinetic instruments of power. With the Indus Waters Treaty
kept in abeyance, water infrastructure projects on the Chenab and Jhelum rivers can be
developed in the medium term, and the flow of water can be calibrated according to Pakistan’s
actions against terrorism. These are not symbolic gestures—they represent long-term pressure
points that could constrain Pakistan’s development options.

India also worked through diplomatic channels to condition the release of IMF tranches to
Pakistan on commitments to de-escalation and counterterrorism. India will undoubtedly

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 78

lobby for stiffer sanctions targeting Pakistan’s army and for its re-entry into the FATF grey list,
an unwelcome prospect for any loan-dependent economy. For a nation struggling with high
inflation, fiscal instability, and dwindling foreign reserves, these actions have immediate and
tangible consequences.

Economic costs may weigh the heaviest to influence policy. Pakistan now finds itself in a bind:
pursue provocation and risk economic collapse, or alter its long-term strategic calculus.

Institutionalizing deterrence: A strategic inflection point

The most significant outcome of Operation Sindoor may be that deterrence is no longer
episodic in India’s strategic playbook—it is institutionalized. Each major Indian operation since
2016 has built upon the credibility of the previous one, creating a trajectory that few can ignore.

This layered deterrence is difficult to dismantle. It rests not only on the military’s demonstrated
capability to strike, but also on political will, diplomatic acumen, and economic leverage.
Unlike in earlier decades,

India is no longer content to absorb the costs of terrorism quietly. It has created a system of
consequences that can be activated and scaled at will.

This also puts the onus on Pakistan to recalibrate. Continued reliance on terror proxies is no
longer a low-risk, high-reward strategy. It is a high-risk, multi-domain liability.

The road ahead: Risks and responsibilities

To be sure, deterrence is not foolproof. There are risks of miscalculation, accidental

escalation, and the ever-present fog of war. Therefore, India must invest in institutional
frameworks that sustain escalation control, including clear red lines, backchannel
communications, and public diplomacy. Moreover, integrated deterrence must be adaptive.
Terror outfits evolve, technologies change, and geopolitical contexts shift. A successful
strategy today must be updated and refined to meet tomorrow’s threats.

But if there is one takeaway from Operation Sindoor, it is this: India’s deterrence posture is no
longer reactive, ambiguous, or compartmentalized. It is proactive, layered, and integrated.
Perhaps, India has re-imposed the deterrence established in 2019. At the minimum, it has
imposed real costs on Pakistan’s army and its strategic calculus.

Whether this posture will finally stem the tide of cross-border terrorism remains to be seen.
But it has undoubtedly changed the game—and perhaps, just perhaps, the rules.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 79

Op Sindoor and the Evolution of
International Law
Bashir Ali Abbas

Countermeasures and restraint: India’s conduct in Op Sindoor is a rare victory for

international law

The April-May 2025 military confrontation between India and Pakistan, triggered by the
Pahalgam terror attack, represents a significant development in international law, particularly
regarding state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. India’s treatment of ‘terrorism’
as an act of war, its calibrated military cross-border response against Pakistan against terror
targets, and its cessation of hostilities after it deemed its response over (with any escalation
being made contingent on Pakistani action) – collectively advances the norm of self-defence
against terrorism. But more specifically, it illustrates a rare instance of a state credibly
upholding other international norms in its response to terrorism, without excesses against
another state’s (Pakistan’s) sovereignty.

Sovereignty vs state responsibility

The sovereignty of every state is inviolable. However, the concept of sovereignty has evolved to
include responsibility for violations of the existing norms of international law, or
“internationally wrongful acts”. A distillation of the views of all United Nations member states
on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts was adopted by the UN General
Assembly in its 53rd session in 2001. These Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA) – which
India has long supported - open with the assertion that every internationally wrongful act by a
state entails the responsibility of that state (Article 1).

India’s single most significant allegation against Pakistan is its support and sponsorship of anti-
India terrorist groups, especially since the 1990s following the beginning of the Kashmir
insurgency. Both before and parallel to this, and until their last semi-conventional war in
Kargil, 1999, Pakistan also relied on groups of ‘raiders’ mixed with Pakistan Army regulars to
trigger at least three wars with India. New Delhi’s assertions of Pakistan’s support to terror
groups, has United Nations sanction, at least since UN Security Council adopted Resolution

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 80

1267 (1999) in which it designated several Pakistan-based anti-India terror groups, including the
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). This has been reiterated and
strengthened by subsequent resolutions. Terror attacks by these groups (as well as their direct
proxies) have been a recurrent feature of Pakistan’s policy to pressure India’s position on the
Kashmir dispute. These attacks have ranged from mass casualty civilian bombings and
shootings to attacks on the Indian Parliament, State Assemblies, and military installations and
bases.

The latest attack in Pahalgam was a targeted attack against Hindu tourists from several parts of
India, by a proxy force of the LeT – The Resistance Front. Already by hosting these groups
Pakistan has consistently breached an old customary norm of international law – famously
reasserted by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States (1986) – an
obligation to not let its territory to be used in a manner that infringes upon the rights of other
states (here: India’s).

Hence, even without Pakistan actively sponsoring terror groups, its passive facilitation of their
activities would amount to an internationally wrongful act. But Pakistan also actively funds and
directs the activities of these groups either in whole or in part. International jurisprudence is
divided over whether a state should have ‘overall’ control (Nicaragua v USA, ICJ) or ‘effective’
control (Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, ICTY) over a group to garner responsibility. However,
Pakistan’s actions attract such responsibility in both the letter and spirit of Article 8 of the
ARSIWA, which considers the conduct of groups as acts of the state which instructs, directs, or
controls such conduct. The consistency of such attacks in India across two decades also
amounts to Pakistan’s wrongful act being continually conducted in breach of its obligation for
cessation and non-repetition of such acts (Article 30).

The use of force

As the state that has consistently suffered the consequences of the wrongful acts for which the
Pakistani state is responsible, India has a raft of rights and duties drawn from both customary
and conventional principles in international law.

The most obvious among these is the supersession of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which
prevents using force, with Article 51, which enables states to respond to an “armed attack”.
Despite the strict thresholds that an act has to meet to qualify as an “armed attack” as well as
the fact that the global practice of invoking Article 51 against terrorists is still new (relative to
other historic principles of inter-state conduct), India’s case is relatively unique. Unlike
globalized traditional jihadist groups or armed non-state actors in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, or
Palestine (where these groups share in government and have some degree of autonomy) India-

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 81

focused groups such as JeM and LeT draw succor and support from the Pakistani security
establishment and are actively used by the state as instruments of policy. This also makes
India’s case distinct from the United States’ traditional (and globally unrecognized) basis for the
use of force against a state which is “unable or unwilling” to act against such groups. Here, the
Pakistani state actively co-opts these groups as part of a deliberate strategy of sub-conventional
war and has also historically helped key individuals from these terror groups find new
sanctuaries from international action through diplomatic, political, and security cover – a
unique mix.

Therefore, apart from India retroactively considering acts of terror as acts of war (and hence
legitimizing a counterattack), New Delhi also benefits from the ARSIWA’s provisions on
‘countermeasures’.

First, such measures should be taken “as far as possible” in such a way as “to permit the
resumption of performance” (by Pakistan) of the obligations it has breached (Article 49). In the
last two decades, India has attempted to cooperate several times with Pakistan to demand
fulfillment of Islamabad’s international obligations by eliminating terror groups on its soil. The
Composite Dialogue process itself was scuttled, among other things, by a mass casualty terror
attack in Mumbai in 2008, reflecting Pakistan’s strong inclination to continue its wrongful acts.

Second, countermeasures must be both necessary and proportional, i.e., commensurate with
the injury suffered, “taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act” (Article
51, ARSIWA). India began taking such countermeasures in 2016, with the latest in May 2025 (Op
Sindoor). India’s strikes in Op Sindooron May 7 were “focused, measured and non-escalatory”,
conducted within 30 minutes and against terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, commensurate
with the attacks conducted by these groups in India. Moreover, by explicitly asserting that
Pakistani military facilities were not targeted, India’s actions also stayed clear of being a
‘reprisal’ or a disproportional act of vengeance. India’s response to each round of Pakistani
escalation on the nights of May 8 and 9 was similarly proportional, conducted on the heels of
Pakistan’s attacks, which Islamabad justified as responses to violations of its sovereignty.

Crucially, however, India’s countermeasures and its conduct cannot be considered

internationally wrongful acts themselves. International sanction for such actions has evolved
through decades of state practice, with the ARSIWA codifying it in Article 22 – it asserts that the
wrongfulness of such actions is precluded if it qualifies as a countermeasure. Essentially, then,
it is not the case that India’s use of force does not violate Pakistan’s sovereignty or stays clear of
Article 2(4) of the Charter. Rather, within a strict scope and scale, India’s actions are justified
violations of Pakistani sovereignty and exceptions to Article 2(4), since they are legal
countermeasures to Pakistan’s continuing wrongful acts.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 82

Moreover, India has consistently worked within the UN’s larger legal framework. While it kept
the members of the UNSC apprised of its intent and right to self-defense (as also implicitly
required by Article 51 of the Charter) before/during/after May 7 through bilateral
communications, India has also spent years presenting evidence against Pakistan to the UN.
This includes providing intelligence about The Resistance Front’s links to Pakistan-based
groups to the 1267 Sanctions Committee.

India’s contribution to an evolving norm

The United Nations Charter was formally adopted decades before terrorism became a global
threat. In line with both the need to evolve the global understanding of the Charter’s provisions
– specifically on self-defense – and the growing intensity of terrorist conduct (such as in 9/11),
the UN Security Council concluded at least a quarter century ago that a state’s inherent right to
self defence can be invoked against acts of terrorism. Both UNSCR 1368 and 1373 reaffirmed
this, while also categorizing the 9/11 attacks as a “threat to international peace and security”
(with a rare invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter). Drawing from Article 25 of the
Charter and subsequent ICJ jurisprudence, such UNSC Resolutions form a part of the extant
norms of international law (lex lata) and are legally binding on states.

India’s actions then are an advancement of the reasoning in these resolutions, but without the
excesses of force conducted by other states in their actions against terror groups. Unlike the
coalitions led by the United States after 9/11 or Israel’s actions after Hamas’ October 7th terror
attacks, the Indian action was necessary and proportionate, against nine terror targets in
Pakistan. India also communicated the cessation of its operations to Pakistan, while also
asserting its right to respond if Pakistan escalates proportionately.

Given Pakistan’s targeting of Indian military infrastructure, India calibrated its escalation, first
against Pakistan’s air defence sites, followed by its airbases. Throughout its countermeasures,
India restricted itself to proportional terrorist (May 7) and military (May 8, 9) targets.
Essentially, in all three times that India has exercised its right to countermeasures since 2016,
its actions have been strictly proportionate. Unlike both American actions in Afghanistan and
Iraq which have included unjustified excesses and recognized breaches of international law, as
well as Israeli actions in Gaza for which the International Court of Justice is investigating the
charge of genocide, the Indian military action is a rare and unique application of international
law which significantly involved the element of restraint (and effectively respect for Pakistan’s
sovereignty). Such restraint is crucial to ascribing legal intent to a state’s actions (opinio juris)
since India was cognizant of its international legal responsibilities. Combined with its practice,
Op Sindoor, as well as India’s past cross-border action, is a distinct and laudable advancement
of state practice that further contributes to the evolving custom of self-defense against terror

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 83

groups in another state. Within such framing, any future terror attack in India actively
sponsored or passively enabled by Pakistan allows India to continue its countermeasures.

Essentially, should India’s response uphold the same characteristics as May 2025, it will be
among the few states to uphold and further the norm of proportionate self-defense against
terror groups in another state, without excesses against that state’s sovereignty, with sincerity
and diligence. Each such action flows from Pakistan’s responsibility for acts that are legally
recognized as internationally wrongful.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 84

Beyond the Battlefield:
Pakistan’s Strategic Reckoning in
the Wake of Op Sindoor
Hely Desai

The four-day confrontation post the Pahalgam terror attacks—branded by India as Operation
Sindoor and Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos on the Pakistani end—paused under what was
officially described as a 'temporary suspension of hostilities’. Amid discrepancies and
conflicting accounts over assets lost and targets hit, both sides were quick to claim victory, with
nationalistic public and media rhetoric competing to frame the conflict in terms of the material
damage inflicted on the adversary. The high-intensity exchange, marked by missile strikes,
drone incursions, and aerial skirmishes, played out across multiple domains: from traditional
military engagements to narrative warfare and digital propaganda. For both countries, the
confrontation offered more than just tactical data points; it became a stress test of strategic
posture, economic preparedness, and information control, with either side maneuvering to
impose escalation costs that would make further response prohibitively risky for the other.

A post-conflict reckoning for Pakistan: Key takeaways

With both India and Pakistan now engaged in post-conflict assessment, the urgency of drawing
coherent and actionable takeaways has become more pronounced for Islamabad. Confronted
with structural economic fragility, internal political volatility, and overreliance on external
defence partners, its post-conflict reckoning may not be merely strategic; it calls for a broader
reassessment of its national priorities. Domestically, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has
continued to downplay the risk of further escalation, citing the "Trump factor" and India’s
economic stakes as natural deterrents for New Delhi. This posture, however, may conceal a
more sobering internal calculus. Pakistan must now prepare for a future shaped by sustained,
multidimensional pressure.

Militarily, the conflict has reaffirmed Pakistan’s confidence in Chinese defence platforms and
underscored Beijing’s centrality as a ‘friend for all seasons’. The conflict has triggered calls for

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selective yet urgent modernization, especially in integrated air defense, and for accelerating
the acquisition of fifth-generation aircraft. The focus now may not be on expansive
rearmament, but on prioritized upgrades tailored for multi-domain threats. Pakistan aims to
assert a revised strategic baseline while shifting the burden of escalation onto India. Its
approach remains grounded in constraining India’s freedom to operate in the conventional
domain and in raising the costs associated with New Delhi’s strategy of incremental pressure,
which seeks to systematically weaken Pakistan’s capabilities.

Economically, the war reinforced a familiar yet unavoidable truth: a credible defense posture is
unsustainable without structural economic reform. The need to reduce reliance on external
debt, widen the tax base, and align defence spending with national capacity has also gained
renewed urgency.

Officially, Islamabad has cast its response as measured and deliberate, a calibrated
counterstrike that stayed within escalation thresholds while still imposing costs on India. The
intended message, both domestically and internationally, is that Pakistan demonstrated
strength through restraint: a rational actor that maintained regional stability while defending
its sovereignty. This portrayal is not just about shaping public perception at home; it is also
central to securing diplomatic backing abroad. As part of this effort at the Shangri La Dialogue,
the Pakistani Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO) publicly called for a shift from
conflict management to conflict resolution, what prima facie appeared to be a performative
appeal, aimed less at genuine transformation and more at reinforcing Pakistan’s image as the
responsible, non-aggressive party. This narrative aims to attract external partners by portraying
Pakistan as committed to de-escalation, even as it continues to manage tensions on its own
terms.

Battle of narratives

A consequential theatre of this conflict also included a non-kinetic aspect. As Pakistan’s

deployment of Chinese-origin aerial equipment demonstrated narrowing performance
differentials with India and posed credible challenges, reflecting a notable shift, there
remained little indication of disparity in tactical effectiveness. The challenge for both sides,
hence, lay as much in claiming the narrative as in translating these experiences into coherent
introspective lessons for military preparedness, strategic posture, and domestic resilience.

The engagement through air power and ordnance was therefore accompanied by a parallel
effort in shaping perception, managing public morale, and asserting legitimacy. However,
compounding this effort for India was the military's silence on its own asset losses, which
Pakistan leveraged to fuel speculation and amplify narratives of official opacity, creating space
for its own, often also unverifiable, counterclaims to circulate unchallenged.

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Additionally, in a departure from previous encounters, where Pakistan defaulted to outright
denial of Indian strikes, this time, New Delhi furnished satellite imagery, strike coordinates,
and visual documentation to substantiate its claims. Pakistan, in response through a series of
media pressers, relied on a patchwork of unverifiable satellite grabs, which many widely
dismissed as doctored, along with WhatsApp audio clips and screenshots purporting Indian
involvement in the Baloch insurgency. It also denied any connection to the Pahalgam terror
attack and has routinely rejected the existence of militant camps that Indian strikes claimed to
target.

Unpacking Pakistan’s evolving playbook: Balancing perceptions and denials

However, this post-conflict behaviour of Pakistan—characterized by denial, deflection, and

curated press briefings—may not merely be about propaganda. Rather, it appears to reflect a
broader strategic approach, where narrative framing is also used as a tool to manage internal
pressures, pre-empt external perceptions, and convey a sense of stability. These efforts seem to
be driven by three overlapping imperatives.

1. Reversing the Optics: Capitalizing on India’s Internal Dissent

Pakistan appears to have adopted a page from India’s post-2016 playbook, utilizing information
operations to shape the perception battle. If India’s success has been in spotlighting Pakistan’s
support for cross-border militancy, Islamabad’s response has been to flip the script: position
itself as the rational, tolerant actor, and project India as the destabilizing force, internally
divided, oppressive, and irresponsible.

At the heart of this effort is Pakistan’s active attempt to capitalize on India’s domestic dissent.
This includes amplifying issues tied to religious polarization and highlighting alleged human
rights violations. For instance, while Pakistan mirrored India’s tit-for-tat measures almost
entirely, shutting down communication channels, blocking airspace, and reducing diplomatic
strength, even suspending the largely redundant postal services, it notably left the Kartarpur
Corridor untouched. It still remains open from the Pakistani side and shut on the Indian end,
seemingly not just as a gesture of goodwill, but as a counter-symbol to projecting Pakistan’s
accommodation of minorities against India’s perceived marginalization of them. This gimmick
further intensified with statements like “Sikhs are never on Pakistan’s target” and “India’s
Hindutva mindset”, from the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, with the undertone,
India alienates; Pakistan accommodates.

Further, as India released satellite images and precise strike data, Pakistan responded with
counterclaims of Indian false-flag operations, particularly in Kashmir and Amritsar. These
were accompanied by messaging about Indian media control, mistreatment of minorities, and
the silencing of dissent. The DG ISPR’s remarks absurdly asserted that Pakistan is a

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democratic, tolerant state where the military is accountable, the media is free, and minority
rights are respected, however selectively or strategically that narrative may be constructed. By
a propagandistic and distorted portrayal of internal unrest in India, whether among Sikh
groups, Muslims, or activists, suggesting the failure of India’s pluralistic model, Pakistan seeks
not only to obfuscate international perceptions but also to exacerbate internal divisions within
India. Responding to these assertions, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri starkly noted: “It may be
a surprise to Pakistan to see citizens criticizing their own government. That is the hallmark of
an open and functioning democracy.”

Ironically, Pakistan is borrowing from India’s own tactical lexicon. Just as India once
internationalized its grievances against Pakistan-backed terror, Pakistan now seeks to
internationalize India’s domestic tensions. The attempt may lack the credibility or institutional
depth of India’s earlier campaigns, but the intent is glaring. In doing so, Islamabad is not
seeking victory in the factual domain. It is attempting to create narrative parity, with sufficient
contradiction and moral equivalence, to avoid an outright reputational setback. Whether this
holds over time is uncertain. But in the short term, it offers breathing room, both at home and
abroad.

2. Externalizing blame: Diversions from internal faultlines, insurgency, and military control
But this is not purely external messaging. Much of it may also be aimed inward. In a time of
economic stress, political instability, ethnic insurgency, and military overstretch, Pakistan
needs a unifying narrative.

Claiming moral and political superiority over India helps contain internal faultlines at home.
Instead of engaging with legitimate grievances of regional alienation, Islamabad projects these
internal conflicts as orchestrated by “external handlers,” primarily India and Afghanistan.
Balochistan, with its intensifying separatist movement and persistent unrest in parts of Sindh
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, exemplifies this dynamic. This narrative projection aims to suppress
public introspection on issues within the military and political establishment, thereby avoiding
any admission of potential governance failures.

In moments of political flux, such as elections or military reshuffles, the military has often
intensified this rhetoric, positioning itself as the indispensable guardian against Indian
aggression and international conspiracies. This externalization of threat tries to justify the
military’s dominant role over civilian leadership and the continued militarization of civilian
spaces. This broader strategic posture, as reflected, for example, by the controversial
promotion of General Asim Munir to Field Marshal, underscores how the military reinforces its
institutional dominance beyond immediate crises.

Echoing the norm within the subcontinent, by labeling political opponents, dissenters, and

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minority groups as “anti-state” elements further delegitimizes internal criticism, stifling calls
for meaningful reform. Increased surveillance, curbs on freedom of assembly, and aggressive
security operations in restive regions are framed as necessary measures to counteract foreign-
supported terror proxies.

This oversimplification of a multi-dimensional crisis, where internal dissent, economic

fragility, and Indian military posture coexist, into a singular, totalizing Indian threat allows
Pakistan to externalize blame efficiently. The complexity of Pakistan’s internal challenges is
thus reduced to a manageable rhetoric: India is the root cause of instability and unrest. This
narrative, while politically expedient, prevents genuine dialogue or reforms and instead
entrenches a militarized state apparatus that perpetuates cycles of repression and instability.

Thus, Pakistan’s narrative choice is not a simple case of denial of its terror affiliations, but a
strategic effort to preserve internal cohesion by manufacturing a clear enemy image. Yet, this
short-term narrative protection risks undermining long-term strategic credibility, both within
the country and among international partners, by eroding trust and obscuring the need for
deeper reforms essential to Pakistan’s stability.

For Pakistan’s military establishment, narrative control is often not just a wartime necessity; it
remains a peacetime governance strategy in general. The military’s dominance over state
affairs depends not only on coercive strength but also on political passivity and a tightly
managed national discourse that avoids scrutiny. This control is designed to maintain its
supremacy without resorting to overt interventions, such as coups, which incur costs both
domestically and internationally.

3. Countering Diplomatic Marginalization

Pakistan’s narrative, positioning itself as a victim of extremism rather than a state complicit in
sheltering militant groups, draws partly on its historical coordination with Western powers in
funding such actors. This effort at narrative control is increasingly also shaped by the need to
counter India’s rising global influence and diplomatic reach. New Delhi has effectively
positioned itself as a victim of cross-border terrorism and a responsible regional actor, over the
years, establishing Pakistan as the aggressor and exporter of instability. For Islamabad, this
framing undermines its credibility with global lenders, weakens its diplomatic leverage, and
reinforces a rhetoric of dysfunction and dependency. Dismissal of involvement with militant
networks, then, is not simply about face-saving; it is also about preserving institutional
legitimacy, preventing external pressure, and signaling coherence to both domestic and
international audiences. At a time when Pakistan’s geopolitical relevance has waned,
particularly following the West’s disengagement from Afghanistan and India’s improved ties
with the Gulf, it faces mounting pressure to reshape its global image. The persistent association
with terrorism and internal instability has eroded its standing.

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By rejecting the occurrence and/or efficacy of any Indian military action, Islamabad seeks to
reinforce a perception it has long peddled: that of a restrained, beleaguered state confronting a
militarily superior neighbour. This posture not only enables the eliciting of diplomatic
sympathy but also helps internationalize the crisis, drawing external intervention.

Pakistan’s geopolitical realignments in the aftermath of the conflict

Following the Indian diplomatic outreach, Pakistan has also assigned two delegations to engage
with key international actors, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European
Union, and Russia, to present its case. Moving forward, Pakistan’s approach to its bilateral ties
will reflect a careful recalibration based on shifting global alignments and regional priorities.
Pakistan’s diplomatic outreach at large is likely to be shaped by its engagement with three tiers:
major global powers, its long-standing allies, and key regional partners. The following
breakdown explores each category and the strategic logic underpinning Islamabad’s approach.

Engagement with major global powers

United States: Pakistan will maintain a cautious yet pragmatic approach toward the United
States. Despite the unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy under a second Trump
administration, Islamabad will aim to reaffirm its strategic relevance in the region. Trump has
frequently highlighted his self-proclaimed role as a peacemaker in the recent crisis, including
his public offers to mediate the Kashmir issue. Pakistan may seek to capitalize on this tendency
by framing the India-Pakistan crisis as a destabilizing development that merits renewed U.S.
involvement. In doing so, Islamabad will need to strike a balance between its close ties with
China and exploring emerging areas of cooperation with Washington, particularly in sectors
such as critical minerals and regional connectivity.

Russia: While Russia has traditionally been an ally of India, recent geopolitical shifts,
particularly following the Ukraine conflict, have led Moscow to deepen its strategic partnership
with China, a key economic and military ally of Pakistan. Islamabad will seek to engage
Moscow, leveraging its role in regional stability efforts, especially in Afghanistan, an area of
shared interest highlighted through Russian-led platforms such as the Moscow Format and the
Afghan Quad. Given Russia’s broader ambitions in Eurasia, Pakistan is likely to maintain a
diplomatic posture directed at preserving open channels with Moscow, while positioning itself
as a regional stakeholder Russia cannot ignore.

China: The recent conflict has reaffirmed Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China and is
likely to accelerate further military cooperation, including the potential acquisition of
advanced equipment such as fifth-generation fighter aircraft. As the upper riparian state in key
river systems, China also holds theoretical leverage in the region’s water politics, an area where

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 90

Pakistan allegedly threatens to seek Beijing’s support. While unlikely to yield concrete
outcomes, it primarily serves to exert symbolic pressure on India. Allegations of Chinese
satellite and military support to Pakistan during the standoff further illustrate the growing
integration of their defense and technological capabilities. This cooperation may expand
beyond economic domains, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), evolving
into a broader security framework that encompasses cybersecurity, satellite collaboration, and
the protection of critical infrastructure. By recasting CPEC not just as an economic initiative
but as a strategic security corridor, Pakistan aims to encourage deeper Chinese engagement to
counterbalance India's regional influence. It also actively leverages China’s expanding
diplomatic role, particularly Beijing’s efforts to facilitate reconciliation between Afghanistan
and Pakistan, to assert its own indispensability in regional stability. By positioning itself as a
key interlocutor and partner in China-led regional initiatives, Islamabad underscores its
strategic value to Beijing’s broader Eurasian ambitions.

Sustaining Long-standing Alliances

Iran: In stark contrast, Pakistan’s recent manoeuvres, however performative, reflect a

calculated diplomatic balancing act. Islamabad has re-engaged the Gulf, expressed solidarity
with Tehran post the U.S.-Israeli attacks, and maintained informal communication channels
with Israel, all while publicly distancing itself from sensitive allegations. For instance, it
promptly rejected claims by a senior IRGC official, General Mohsen Rezaei, that Pakistan had
pledged nuclear retaliation on Iran’s behalf in the event of an Israeli strike, reaffirming its
India-centric nuclear doctrine while still preserving diplomatic space. Periodic speculative
reports of the ISI’s backchannel contacts with Israeli officials, including one as recent as March
2025, further illustrate Pakistan’s efforts to quietly preserve strategic flexibility across opposing
blocs. This balancing was also evident following the Trump-Munir lunch after which Pakistan
nominated President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in brokering the India-
Pakistan ceasefire, yet managed to issue a carefully worded condemnation the very next day
after US strikes on Iran, positioning itself in a way that neither alienated Tehran nor provoked
Washington.

Arab World: Pakistan is likely to recalibrate its diplomatic approach toward Gulf countries,
particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, shifting from a focus on aid dependency to one that
emphasizes attracting investment. As Gulf states deepen their ties with India, Islamabad
recognizes the need for a more nuanced and pragmatic engagement. Pakistan may seek to
attract economic investment while reaffirming its geostrategic significance. It will continue to
leverage its sizeable expatriate workforce and shared religious connections to bolster
diplomatic goodwill. Rather than seeking overt political backing in regional disputes, Pakistan
may prioritize practical cooperation in trade, labor, and defense, aiming to maintain its
strategic relevance amid the rapidly shifting dynamics of the Middle East.

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Turkey: Apart from Azerbaijan, it remains one of Pakistan’s most pronounced supporters.
Pakistan is expected to further deepen its ideological and defense ties with Ankara to
strengthen its counter-India stance. Joint narratives highlighting Islamic solidarity and
common regional security challenges will be amplified through coordinated media campaigns
and enhanced defense cooperation. This partnership is likely to expand, accelerating the
transfer of advanced defense technology and energy.

Regional engagement

Bangladesh: Pakistan will continue to engage with Bangladesh by promoting shared cultural
and religious ties. Islamabad is likely to frame the recent conflict as a broader threat to regional
stability. Diplomatic outreach to Bangladesh’s interim government and informal connections
with religious groups may run in parallel with public messaging that focuses on economic
cooperation and cultural solidarity. This dual-track approach may look to exacerbate existing
tensions in India-Bangladesh relations following the departure of the Hasina government.
Against this backdrop, however, it is equally important to consider how and to what extent
these shifting alliances may shape the nature of future conflicts between India and Pakistan.

Nature of escalation and risks in future India-Pakistan conflicts

Future India-Pakistan conflicts are likely to ignite swiftly and escalate rapidly, defined by short,
high-intensity operations followed by premeditated narrative arcs. Compressed political
decision-making timelines, combined with heightened domestic expectations, may reduce the
space for calibrated responses, raising the risk of breaching critical escalation thresholds
before adequate stabilizing mechanisms can take effect. This shift reflects the growing
centrality of narrative-building and denial in both countries’ strategic communications,
fundamentally reshaping the post-conflict conduct, especially within the information domain.
Pakistan’s mixed track record in narrative control will continue to inform its strategic calculus,
enabling it to galvanize domestic support and frame India as the aggressor in regional and
international forums.

During border incidents and skirmishes, both sides may intensify efforts to project strength
and resilience, feeding victory-driven narratives to increasingly assertive domestic audiences.
The expectation for a strong retaliation is now ingrained in the political narrative, making the
public and media less receptive to de-escalation, in turn constraining diplomatic options and
increasing the political cost of restraint.

Compounding these dynamics is the potential for China-Pakistan strategic convergence, aimed
at pressuring and distracting India. Both countries are accelerating their military
modernization efforts. Pakistan is doing so with Chinese backing, while India is pursuing

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investments in its military-industrial complex and diversifying its global partnerships. The
usual Indian response cycle to such attacks, measured military retaliation coupled with
domestic assertions of success and diplomatic condemnation of Pakistan-backed terror, is
being increasingly influenced by a more contested information space and evolving regional
pressures. This is likely to further harden the region’s conflict dynamics, narrow diplomatic off-
ramps, and entrench a cycle of confrontation, complicating crisis management and potentially
undermining prospects for long-term stability in South Asia.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 93

Counter-terrorism

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Terror, Tactics, and Territory:
India’s Evolving Response to
Cross-Border Threats
Tara Kartha

The Pahalgam attack is now part of a 34-year history of cross-border terrorism, which began
just before Pakistan formally announced its nuclear capability to the world in 1987. Reports
from the Ministry of Home Affairs confirm that terrorism was nonexistent until the mid 1980’s,
but from then on it details terrorism in Punjab, with clear footprints from across the border. By
1998, Kashmir was in flames, with the graph of violence climbing steadily. Both have yet to die
down, and a Prime Minister even lost her life as a result of counter-terrorism operations in
Punjab. As Pakistan realized it could not win in two wars, it chose the terrorism option. With
such a long and well-documented history, the current demand for “proof” of Pakistani
involvement seems disingenuous. But in the present situation, there is a need to look inwards at
not just our narrative, but also its effectiveness in delivering the desired outcome: an end to
terrorism from Pakistan.

Accustomed to terrorism

Over these long years of withstanding terror, some trends have become evident. First,
terrorism has become normalized to an extent where most incidents of infiltration and terror
were unreported in national media, let alone the international press. While paramilitary or
armed forces responded at a local level, the broader government and bureaucracy, not
unnaturally, continued with business as usual. Diplomats hardly ever articulated the narrative
of a debilitating terror sponsorship, barring at the UN when regular ‘standardized’ statements
were made. Even the Balakot attack did not see any outreach by major embassies including the
one in London, or even a press briefing in Washington.

Overall media reaction was similarly lacklustre, dominated instead by Pakistan’s narrative.
Indian officials' claims of having eliminated hundreds of terrorists in Balakot were refuted, and
Pakistan even accused India of ‘'eco terrorism' for hitting trees in a protected forest. A similar

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situation unfolded after Pahalgam. Analyses of X (formerly Twitter) accounts of 24 embassies in
G-20 countries revealed that none had organized any outreach event after the tragedy. While the
Foreign Secretary’s official briefings and Operation Sindoor were masterpieces in controlled
escalation, no outreach was apparent prior to Op Sindoor from our outposts across the world.
Clearly international opinion mattered, since India did send out delegations to some 32
countries. But building an effective narrative requires sustained effort, not sporadic crisis
management.

India and the world

The second major trend is the nature of India’s reaction. The only time India received not just
sympathy but also meaningful international action against Pakistan was during George W.
Bush’s "War on Terror." The then government had little difficulty in linking the 2008 Mumbai
attack to this huge effort lead by the United States. Indeed, investigative agencies of various
countries were involved in tracing the operation, while Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency
conducted a thorough investigation, given the intense outside pressure. Some terrorist camps
were shut down, and by 2011, Kashmir police were reporting zero success in infiltration.
During this relatively peaceful period, India-Pakistan relations improved. Prime Minister Modi
even ‘dropped in’ on Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in December 2015. Following the Pathankot
attack, India invited Pakistani investigators to the air base and shared intercepted
communications between Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists, who claimed the attack, and the
United Jihad Council. Pakistan, in turn, shared a tip off on a group planning attacks.
Interestingly, India provided consular access to jailed terrorists to establish its case.

The use of force

This budding counter-terrorism cooperation ended with a vicious attack in Uri (2016) which
killed 19 soldiers. India presented evidence of Pakistan involvement—including names of
guides from POK and a captured Pakistani national—to then-Ambassador Abdul Basit, This
time, PM Sharif, who was ousted just six months later, dismissed it as a ‘false flag operation’,
despite pressure from the US and UK. India responded with surgical strikes into PoK, signaling
a major shift in strategy. For two years, government agencies noted a decline in terror attacks.
India responded with surgical strikes, just a few kilometers into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir,
signaling a major shift in strategy. For two years, government agencies noted a drop in terror
attacks.

But in February 2019, a convoy was targeted in Pulwama, killing forty personnel after rules on
troop movements had been relaxed. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh tactfully ‘apologized’ to
Kashmiris for reinstating movement restrictions during military transport, walking back from
India’s earlier pro-people policies in the Valley. The Jaish claimed the attack and the National

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 96

Investigation Agency provided a detailed charge sheet. Amid an outpouring of sympathy, NSA
John Bolton said India had “ a right to self defence” which it exercised with the Balakot attacks;
but that had consequences. Then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed in his memoir that
Indian Foreign minister Sushma Swaraj informed him that Pakistan was preparing to use
nuclear weapons and that India would act accordingly. Washington apparently worked
overtime to prevent it, even as Trump hinted that he facilitated the release of a captured Indian
pilot. Trump’s then reiterated his offer of mediation after meeting Imran Khan in September
2019. Pakistan was not slow to learn that lesson.

Terrorism goes well under

Balakot did lead, relatively, to a reduction in terrorism in Kashmir for nearly five years, despite
the revocation of Article 370. Following the Galwan skirmish with China, a surprising
development was the February 2021agreement between India and Pakistan to observe a
ceasefire along the LoC. The hotline between the Directors General of Military Operations
(DGMOs) played a key role, and the border went quiet. India then shifted focus to the larger
threat from China.

However, terrorism hadn’t ended—it had merely gone quiet. Reporting was sparse, and
incidents were few. Terrorists also got smarter, evading interception by using smart phones
with radio sets, encryption, and self-destructing chats. These were highly trained individuals
who avoided populated areas, operated in small numbers, and used advanced equipment like
day-and-night sights. At no time did their number exceed 50, making them virtually invisible.
As Indian troops were redeployed to the Chinese border, a series of incidents began, with one
targeting a bus full of pilgrims in 2024. The casualties were limited only because the bus fell
into a gorge. The main perpetrators were never apprehended. Clearly, the patterns had
changed.

The end effect

Then came Pahalgam. Every indication suggested Pakistan sought escalation: cruel taunts to
victims’ families, and inflammatory rhetoric from Gen. Munir just days prior, against Hindus,
and Kashmir as a ‘jugular vein’. And this time around, Pakistan was fully prepared militarily for
its own version of ‘victory’ in hitting a few aircraft, even as six of its own airfields were struck.
Meanwhile of 123 countries surveilled, 64.4% supported India, with 54.4% expressing
‘solidarity’. But even France, while defending India’s right to self-defense, called for restraint.
The end effect was that global focus shifted once again from the terrorist attack to the
“dangers” of an India-Pakistan war. President Trump sailed in with his declaration that he had
stopped a nuclear war, and that talks would happen, at a ‘neutral’ location. A senior aide to
Putin Russia later confirmed Trump’s ‘personal involvement’.

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Benefits and costs

On the face of it, Pakistan’s army got what it wanted, which was ‘mediation’, a huge (but
temporary) boost to the military’s image, a new Field Marshall, and a jump in defense
expenditure apparently with the concurrence of the IMF, due to ‘risks of war’. Meanwhile,
much has been made of the testimony given by Gen. Kurilla, Commander US Central
Command, calling for cooperation with Pakistan, and the testimony provided by Paul Kapur,
nominated to the State Department, who indicated that Washington would cooperate with
Pakistan if deemed ‘beneficial to US interests’. It seems the near ignoring of Pakistan had
ended. Pakistan has long been adept at offering up terrorists—including the alleged Abbey Gate
bomber timed to disrupt Trump’s congressional address—and providing access to strategic
minerals to keep the US engaged. In addition, Gen. Kurilla also pointed out that other
Pakistanis in the US have been caught planning terrorist attacks. Pakistan military has been
able to offer up goodies including strategic minerals to keep the US engaged. None of this has
anything to do with the India-Pakistan conflict.

Meanwhile, Gen. Asim Munir’s secret visit to the US, reportedly to CENTCOM, suggests that
Pakistan may be repurposed to counter Iran. With its IMF dependence, Pakistan’s bargaining
power is limited. Its longstanding support for Iran may now be compromised under external
pressure.

India’s “Operation Sindoor’ ushered in a new doctrine based on the three core pillars: decisive
retaliation to terrorism on India’s terms, zero tolerance for nuclear blackmail, and no
distinction between terrorists and their sponsors. This doctrine will require significantly
higher defence spending and a permanent alert posture, particularly in Kashmir. Any
relaxation has historically led to renewed terrorism. The hard-won gains of normalization may
be lost if security forces are forced to return to heavy-handed tactics. Modi also said that any
‘talks’ would be about Pakistan-occupied Kashmir only. The operation also demonstrated that
India can retaliate under the nuclear threshold. With the Indus Waters Treaty suspended, India
has added another tool of pressure. However, India’s insistence on excluding outside actors
from talks may be tested—especially since international players have historically played a role
in de-escalation.

India will need to invest considerable diplomatic capital in navigating future negotiations,
where US interests are likely to dominate. It must also strengthen its counterterrorism stance
through alliances with other affected countries like Australia, the UK, Israel, and many other
nations grappling with extremism. As a former Foreign Secretary said, India needs a new T-20,
with structure and institutionalized architecture. Many of these countries include Islamic states
worried by extremism in their own lands. Ultimately, if India wants terrorism to end, it must
not only build a compelling narrative and military deterrence but also find ways to address
internal divisions—perhaps the most difficult challenge of all.

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What Awaits J&K in Terms of
Terrorism and How to Prepare
for it?
Shiv Sahai

Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir had been driven by several factors, primarily the region’s
confusion about its future—whether it would be independent, go with Pakistan, or remain with
India. Independence has always been their eternal dream. Some radical elements, especially
those backed by Jamaat-e-Islami, favored Pakistan. However, India also had a strong base of
support, first evident during the resistance against the Kabali raiders in 1947 and again during
Operation Gibraltar in 1965. Both events led to wars that ended in Pakistan’s defeat.

In 1971, Pakistan faced complete humiliation with the creation of Bangladesh. Bhutto
responded by vowing to wage a thousand-year war against India, laying the groundwork for the
asymmetric warfare that Pakistan continues to pursue. Alongside this political dilemma was
the issue of religion. During the 1930 movement against the Hindu Maharaja, the Muslim
Conference gave the struggle a religious dimension, inspired by the Muslim League’s quest for a
separate Muslim state. This sentiment was further underscored by the gradual exodus of
Kashmiri Pandits, culminating in 1989-90.

Economically, Kashmir had been linked to Lahore, with most trade routes passing through
what is now Pakistan. The Partition closed that option, fostering a sense of economic
deprivation. Communications with the rest of India were arduous and fraught with
uncertainty.

The dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah’s government in 1953 following his arrest, Farooq Abdullah’s
in 1984, and the allegedly rigged 1987 elections strengthened the belief that democracy in J&K
would remain a farce.

Pakistan seized this opportunity in 1987 to initiate an armed struggle, having gained experience
during anti-Soviet operations in Afghanistan. They first encouraged the ‘Azadi’ sentiment and

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 99

slowly ensured the decimation of those groups by introducing pro-Pakistan elements like the
Hizbul Mujahideen. They built on this ideological base to create several outfits, finally settling
on the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Over the past three decades, the conflict has evolved from insurgency to militancy, and now to
terrorism. Today, violence is at its lowest levels, thanks to the success of security forces,
democratic reinforcement, economic development, and Pakistan’s relative decline.

India’s tolerance for violence has reduced significantly, as shown by its response to the
Pahalgam attack. The question remains: how much will this deter the Pakistan Army? Is the
promotion of Asim Munir to Field Marshal merely a face-saving move, or is it based on
misplaced confidence in Chinese support? The Pakistan Army, under pressure from its own
people and seeking legitimacy, may have gained some temporarily. Unless it is punished—
directly or indirectly—it is unlikely to abandon terrorism. What worked in Afghanistan will not
work in India.

Pakistan has continued to train groups like Lashkar and Jaish, now rebranded as the Resistance
Front or the People’s Anti-Fascist Front to give them a secular-political facade. These highly-
trained groups depend on advanced technology for movement and communications. They have
sophisticated weapons for precise strikes, night vision devices and thermal imagers. They are
well trained in marksmanship. They are trained to survive in the jungles and are very mobile.
They strike in different parts of the state and are constantly on the move, making it difficult to
track them or to gather intelligence about them. This is a departure from the past, earlier
groups of terrorists were entrenched in specific areas where it was easier to dislodge them.
However, studying past hideout geographies may still offer clues to their movements.
Combined with human and technical intelligence, their activities can be anticipated.

Emerging communication technologies must also be studied—especially Chinese-made

devices, reportedly used in the Pahalgam attack. Currently, wireless data transfer technology is
being used by these groups. Jungle warfare remains slow and manpower-intensive. While the
overground network has weakened, some elements persist. Local recruitment is at an all-time
low, but a few radicalized individuals still join. As the state edges closer to ending terrorism,
public sentiment must be watched closely.

After the Pahalgam attack, there were public protests against Pakistan. The state must ensure
this sentiment continues. Pakistan will try to spin a narrative of victory, bolstered by Chinese
support. It is crucial to prevent radicalized elements from regaining hope. Grassroots
democratic engagement and public outreach are essential to counter Pakistani propaganda.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 100

Tactically, the Pahalgam incident must be thoroughly analyzed and used to adapt operational
strategies. Security forces need to reorient to counter the guerrilla tactics of cross-border
terrorists. Small group operations, familiar to the Jammu & Kashmir Police and other forces,
may result in casualties but are necessary. Local police and seasoned military personnel, with
their understanding of the terrain and public support, hold a distinct advantage over the
technology-dependent terrorist sustaining on casual contact or a small support base itself
fearful of being discovered.

The human intelligence network, by greater interaction particularly with border populations,
need to be strengthened. This has been done before and can be done again—only now, the
approach must be more granular. A careful, sustained effort can identify the right sources. A
knee-jerk reaction to every incident will not help to create the systems required to eliminate
terrorism. What’s needed is a cadre of committed individuals who value results over personal
glory; success requires patience and diligence.

Counter-intelligence capacities must be enhanced by penetrating terror networks—possibly by

flipping overground workers. Cooperating with intelligence agencies of friendly countries
could help monitor the movement of money from other countries.

Equally important is cyber-patrolling. Monitoring social media to prevent youth radicalization

is vital. Involving civil society and families can help prevent vulnerable youth from being
drawn in.

The abrogation of article 370 resolved the political question. Any lingering confusion over J&K’s
sovereignty must be addressed by reinforcing the belief that no level of terrorism will help
Pakistan alter the boundaries.

A large, pragmatic, and aspirational youth population sees its future in India. Economic
integration through trade, manufacturing, and tourism will further deepen emotional ties. The
reaction of Himanshi Narwal, widow of the naval officer killed in Pahalgam, who was moved
by the local support she received, is a powerful example of solidarity.

As Pakistan remains relentless in its pursuit to destabilize J&K, India must be equally steadfast
in strengthening its own constituency. Strong border management, improved intelligence, and
adaptive operational tactics must ensure terrorism does not silence the majority. Over the last
several decades, the people have seen the duplicity of Pakistan. Their faith must be reinforced
with robust institutional support. As the last shreds of anti-India sentiment dwindle, so will
terrorism, making way for sustained peace.

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 101

Beyond Operation Sindoor:
Rethinking India's Counter-
Terrorism Strategy
Col. Shashank Ranjan (retd)

The dastardly terror strike perpetrated by Pakistan-sponsored proxies on April 22 in Pahalgam

and India's retribution through Operation Sindoor have fundamentally altered the security
landscape of South Asia. Four days of "calibrated, measured and retaliatory military actions"
targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan mark a watershed moment in which India has
decisively redrawn its red lines and achieved escalation dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan. This
military operation represents a significant departure from India's traditionally restrained
posture and signals the emergence of a more assertive strategic doctrine.

However, while Operation Sindoor represents an undeniable tactical and operational success,
its strategic efficacy in diminishing the long-term terrorist threat remains to be seen. Although
the Operation delivered an unmistakable and clear message across the border - one that is
likely to be taken seriously - a more comprehensive approach is required at home. This
approach should aim to address both external and internal dimensions of terrorism in Jammu
and Kashmir and balance military imperatives with political and social considerations.

Terrorism in J&K and the external element

Pakistan bears substantial responsibility as the principal external element for the security
situation in J&K. The pronounced trends of militancy that emerged in the late 1980s have their
roots in the years immediately following the first India-Pakistan war of 1947-48. In its pursuit of
the "unfinished agenda of partition," Pakistan has consistently supported underground
separatist movements since the late 1940s, though the character of this support has evolved
over time in response to changing regional dynamics and international scrutiny.

The security landscape has transformed from predominantly indigenous insurgency to

significant participation of foreign terrorists—a strategic shift orchestrated by Pakistan's

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 102

security establishment. Direct involvement of Pakistan's proxies commenced in the mid-1990s
when Pakistan diversified terrorism's footprint from the Kashmir Valley to the Jammu region
while withdrawing support for local terrorists. This recalibration was designed to maintain
plausible deniability while continuing to advance Pakistan's strategic objectives in the region.

Analysis of insurgency patterns in J&K reveals that local dynamics related to identity,
marginalization, repression, political disenfranchisement, socio-economic disparities, and
psychological and historical contexts have played pivotal roles in providing overground support
to foreign actors. These facets have provided fuel to Pakistan's efforts to foment trouble in J&K
and require a long-term strategy from India that addresses these underlying grievances rather
than merely treating their symptoms. The interplay between external sponsorship and internal
vulnerabilities creates a complex ecosystem of terrorism that defies simplistic military
solutions.

Indian security forces have made substantial progress, reducing overall fatalities from more
than 4000 in 2001 to 127 last year and 57 thus far in the current year. This remarkable
achievement stems from the consolidation of the security grid, non-military governmental
outreach to local populations, and Pakistan's diminishing capacity to wage high-intensity proxy
warfare due to its internal challenges and growing international isolation. This positive
trajectory suggests that India's multifaceted approach has yielded tangible results, even as
significant challenges remain.

Internal shifts: The new pivot to radicalization in J&K

India’s strategy vis-à-vis the external element – Pakistan – has evolved especially since 2016,
with New Delhi showing a greater appetite for cross-border kinetic actions. However, an
analysis of terror-related fatalities in Jammu and Kashmir over the past decade reveals a
concerning reality: high-profile kinetic operations like the 2016 Surgical Strikes and 2019
Balakot aerial strike have failed to deter Pakistan-sponsored terrorism effectively. Contrary to
strategic expectations, fatalities actually increased from 175 in 2015 to 267 in 2016, with this
upward trajectory continuing through 2019. This implies the need for a greater focus on the
internal dynamics of J&K’s security.

The contemporary terrorism landscape in the region exhibits notable shifts in operational
patterns. Local youth participation has diminished significantly compared to the Burhan Wani
era. However, this apparent improvement is counterbalanced by the increasing technological
sophistication of foreign terrorists who operate with reduced dependence on local support
networks. Nevertheless, the contribution of local operatives remains strategically significant.
Recent intelligence assessments following the Pahalgam attack have identified 14 local

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 103

terrorists operating in the region, providing critical logistical support to foreign operatives
through their affiliations with established groups like Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and
Jaish-e-Mohammed.

A particularly noteworthy development since 2019 has been the emergence of ostensibly new
terror organizations such as The Resistance Front (TRF), People's Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF), and
Kashmir Tigers (KT). These entities represent a sophisticated rebranding strategy rather than
genuinely independent movements. Their creation served as a calculated maneuver by
Pakistan to evade Financial Action Task Force (FATF) gray-listing sanctions—a status Pakistan
maintained from 2018 to 2022. These groups strategically position themselves as opposing the
abrogation of Article 370, with nomenclature deliberately crafted to suggest secular political
resistance rather than religious extremism.

The 2019-20 period initially saw these emergent groups encounter formidable resistance due to
a reinforced security infrastructure in the Kashmir Valley. However, the subsequent Indo-China
standoff necessitated troop redeployment from the Jammu region to Ladakh, creating critical
security vacuums. Terrorist elements swiftly exploited these vulnerabilities, expanding
operations throughout the Jammu region—including Kathua, Reasi, Kishtwar, Doda,
Udhampur, Rajouri, and Poonch—precipitating a marked deterioration in regional security. The
kill ratio shifted unfavorably, emboldening terrorist cadres and culminating in the April 22,
2025, Pahalgam attack.

Particularly concerning is the apparent erosion of human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities,

as evidenced by the continued evasion of the perpetrators of the Pahalgam attack. This
intelligence deficit suggests deeper challenges in community engagement and trust-building.
Therefore, the current situation demands a substantive recalibration of governance
approaches, emphasizing enhanced outreach to local populations and more meaningful
engagement with civil society. Effectively addressing these challenges will require empowering
elected representatives and strengthening the authority of the Chief Minister to foster greater
political accountability and community trust.

Beyond kinetic operations: A multidimensional approach

Following the Pahalgam massacre, bipartisan demonstrations erupted in J&K in solidarity with
the victims, which were spontaneous, widely participated in, and unprecedented. Similarly,
border communities affected by recent ceasefire violations unanimously voiced their
opposition. Such civic engagement represents a strategic opportunity that must be consolidated
rather than squandered through counterproductive measures like demolishing houses of
alleged terrorists or initiating mass arrests of youth. These expressions of solidarity with the

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 104

Indian state could potentially transform the sociopolitical landscape of J&K if appropriately
leveraged and sustained through inclusive policies.

While the externalization of terrorism through high-impact, war-like responses to terror acts is
necessary, it could also lead to undesirable overkill situations that inadvertently alienate the
very populations whose support is essential for long-term success. It is anticipated that the
Indian government's policy will incorporate more nuanced thresholds that differentiate
between various levels of terrorist threats and calibrated responses. Expert commentary
following Operation Sindoor suggests a concerning tendency to oversimplify the complex
challenge of insurgency in J&K, potentially numbing policymakers to harder questions
regarding terrorism and its multifaceted roots in both external sponsorship and internal
grievances.

Historical evidence suggests limitations to the deterrent effect of kinetic actions against terror
infrastructure. Fatalities in J&K actually increased following the 2016 surgical strikes and
continued rising until 2019-20, when Article 370 was abrogated and a severe clampdown
imposed. This counterintuitive outcome underscores the complex relationship between
military operations and terrorist violence, suggesting that tactical successes do not
automatically translate into strategic gains without complementary political and social
initiatives.

What is required is a long-term perspective on terrorism that may necessitate a fundamental

reconsideration of current approaches. Operation Sindoor demonstrates India's growing
prowess in kinetic non-contact warfare, but must be complemented by non-kinetic tools,
including economic, diplomatic, legal, informational, and cyber capabilities, to establish a
more effective deterrent against Pakistan. This comprehensive approach would target not only
terrorist infrastructure but also the financial networks, ideological foundations, and diplomatic
cover that sustain terrorism as a strategic tool for Pakistan.

Most critically, this multidimensional approach cannot neglect internal dynamics where the
fundamental principle of "people as the center of gravity" must be respected. For India, this
basic tenet has been a challenge, due to the preference for more immediately visible and
politically expedient security measures that address symptoms rather than causes. The genuine
grievances and aspirations of J&K's diverse populations must be addressed through sustained
political engagement, economic development, and social integration that goes beyond security-
centric paradigms.

Therefore, while Operation Sindoor represents a tactical victory in India's counter-terrorism

campaign, its strategic success will ultimately be determined by India's ability to integrate

Operation Sindoor: India's New Doctrine of Deterrence 105

military operations within a comprehensive framework that addresses both the external and
internal dimensions of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Only through such a holistic
approach—one that combines decisive military action with political acumen, economic
development, and social inclusion—can India achieve sustainable security and peace in this
troubled region. The path forward requires not merely military superiority but also strategic
patience, political wisdom, and a genuine commitment to addressing the complex realities of
J&K beyond the simplified narratives of cross-border terrorism.

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