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Third Edition
HIMSS Book Series
Participatory Healthcare: A Person-Centered Approach to
Healthcare Transformation
Jan Oldenburg
The Journey Never Ends: Technology’s Role in Helping Perfect
Health Care Outcomes
David Garets and Claire McCarthy Garets
Glaser on Health Care IT: Perspectives from the Decade that
Defined Health Care Information Technology
John P. Glaser
Leveraging Data in Healthcare: Best Practices for Controlling,
Analyzing, and Using Data
Rebecca Mendoza Saltiel Busch
HIT or Miss
Lessons Learned from Health Information
Technology Projects
Third Edition
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Foreword.....................................................................................................................................xi
Acknowledgments.....................................................................................................................xv
Introduction and Methodology.............................................................................................xvii
Editor........................................................................................................................................xxi
Associate Editors....................................................................................................................xxiii
Contributing Experts, Authors, and Author Teams..............................................................xxv
vii
viii ◾ Contents
13 Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole: Enterprise EHR for Obstetrics....................51
EDITOR: CHRISTOPHER CORBIT
15 In with the New Does Not Mean Out with the Old: Mobile Devices..........................59
EDITOR: RICHARD SCHREIBER
26 Ready for the Upgrade: Upgrading a Hospital EHR for Meaningful Use.................107
EDITOR: EDWARD WU
Contents ◾ ix
37 Weekends Are Not Just for Relaxing: Reconciliation after EHR Downtime............157
EDITORS: JUSTIN GRAHAM AND ERIC ROSE
Section V APPENDICES
Appendix A: HIT Project Categories.................................................................................225
Appendix B: Lessons Learned Categories..........................................................................229
Appendix C: Case Study References and Bibliography of Additional Resources...............235
Index..................................................................................................................................241
Foreword
Once again, the editors and authors of HIT or Miss endow us with lessons on actual implementa-
tions and uses of health information technology (HIT)—electronic health records (EHRs) and
other digital efforts designed to make healthcare more efficient, safe, and less costly. Although
there are some wonderful exceptions, these stories illustrate how many (most?) careful plans are
often shattered by the complexity of healthcare delivery. Every vignette should be required read-
ing by every medical information technology (IT) person, every EHR vendor, every medical and
IT leader (Chief Medical Information Officer/CMIO, Chief Information Officer/CIO, Chief
Technology Officer/CTO, and Chief Executive Officer/CEO,), and anyone with the authority to
buy or install digital technology in a medical setting. Every EHR contract and every consultant
agreement with healthcare providers should include this book in the document, and be required
reading.
The few hours it would take these leaders to read this volume would be the best return on
investment (ROI) they will ever achieve. These lessons will result in reductions of frustration,
patient harm, clinician rage, organizational disharmony, and burnout. They would also save
money and time. This book will not eliminate HIT’s unintended consequences, but it will help
readers more quickly identify them, prepare for them, reduce them, and find solutions for them.
Some of the recent offerings in this third edition highlight the difficulties of integrating HIT
into medical workflows or into some of the stakeholders’ workflows. Many of the vignettes illus-
trate the unfortunate results of communication failure—among teams, among professions, among
consultants, among users and intended users, among consultants, and among IT sellers with
everyone else. Moreover, even when the groups communicate and are all involved with the HIT’s
implementation and design, there are usually what are perceived as winners and losers—where the
outcomes favor one profession or service more than others; where one group adopts the resulting
products, while others ignore them; and where some functions work as desired and others do not
integrate into workflows, or fail completely.
There are also new stories about old problems, for example, ongoing dissatisfaction with com-
puterized decision support (CDS) alerts; finding them irrelevant, annoying, or downright danger-
ous because they interfere with thought-flow and workflow, because the pop-ups hide essential
information, and because they are so often wrong. Excessive and inappropriate alerts result in
override rates that remain stunningly high, often in the 95%–99% range, which exacerbates
dissatisfaction.
There are new and thoughtful pieces on problems created when leaders seek to change the
scope or scale of a planned project. Many of the contemplated changes initially seem wise. But
xi
xii ◾ Foreword
these stories tell of results that are anything but wise. The changes in plans wreak havoc not only
on the new or planned added efforts, but also on even the existing systems. Alas, this lesson about
late modifications is a difficult one because we know that it’s often impossible to predict what will
emerge when envisioning or effecting HIT changes. We want to encourage—not discourage—
flexible and responsive adjustments and improvements to HIT projects. The complications point
to the complex and interrelatedness of HIT. EHRs are made up of thousands (hundreds of thou-
sands) of moving parts, algorithms, expected inputs (e.g., patient weights, pharmacy data, labora-
tory reports), pieces of vestigial software embedded into the larger whole. When we add the myriad
other interacting elements from outside laboratories, inventory systems, pharmaceutical company
changes, and from the thousands of devices (e.g., smart pumps, monitors), we confront the reality
that EHRs and medicine’s digital landscape are moving entities, not static “things.” Previously,
I’ve suggested that an EHR is always changing—with new algorithms, new drugs, new processes,
and new rules. EHRs are a river, not a lake. I’ll extend that metaphor to the entirety of healthcare
facilities and their network of providers: everything is always flowing. Also, as Heraclitus reminds
us, it’s never even the same river.
This third edition builds on the previous two editions of HIT or Miss, which were enclaves
of honesty amid the incessant advertising by the HIT industry, its supporters in government,
and the enthusiasts who were so enamored of HIT’s promise that they regarded any criticism as
heresy. The first two editions of HIT or Miss contained what few uttered but what we all knew to
be essential, basic, and true: implementing HIT is difficult, often precarious, and always involves
uncertain outcomes. Nevertheless, most of us felt and still feel the promise of HIT is so great that
it was and is worth the effort. The earlier editions of HIT or Miss did not say the emperor was
naked, but they exposed the threadbare reality faced by medical offices and hospitals implement-
ing and using HIT. This third edition is even stronger. It reminds us that HIT is a magnificent
idea, but its execution is generally a serious struggle—most often a struggle each hospital or office
negotiates without the needed information from sharing honest stories like these. As the saying
goes: “You’ve seen one EHR implementation, you’ve seen one EHR implementation.” To make the
systems work always requires a lot more work than imagined.
We’ve known for years that “IT Projects Have a 70% Failure Rate…” (Novak, 2012). HIMSS
offered project management training as a solution. Ordinarily, an admission of that high a failure
rate would generate condemnation from HIMSS and the Office of the National Coordinator
for Health Information Technology (ONC), accusing those voicing such data of technophobia,
Luddite tendencies, and worse. But the costs of digital systems in money and time are so great,
and the benefits are so desired, few can admit failure. Instead, we invest millions more and usually
get something to function after months or years of additional toil. What the industry promoters
still fail to understand is that we often learn far more from examining our mistakes than from
touting our successes—especially when those successes may obscure myriad problems that were
later surmounted at great cost.
One of the joys of this third edition of HIT or Miss is that it continues to move us up on the
learning curve from the dominant presentation of HIT as unalloyed joy and progress to the reality
of what must be done to get HIT to work in situ. It shows us the absurdity of the continued refusal
of industry and government to demand data standards and to delay or sidestep interoperability
needs. It again illustrates the need for usability as a cause of patient-safety dangers and clinical
inefficiencies. It reminds us of the need for constant vigilance and evaluation by clinical and IT
personnel, along with cooperation from vendors and regulators. That is also why this book is so
valuable. Achieving usable HIT requires that we learn from these clear and thoughtful examples.
Each chapter offers invaluable lessons on HIT’s implementation and use. Some focus on order
Foreword ◾ xiii
entry; some on bar coding; some on EHRs; some on medication reconciliation; most on workflow;
almost all on the need for planning and how planning is never enough.
Collectively, these vignettes often delineate the ongoing, Hobbesian struggles of machine vs.
man vs. local organization vs. enterprise headquarters vs. professional allegiance (e.g., nurses vs.
doctors vs. pharmacists) vs. vendor sales departments vs. consultants vs. IT staff vs. HIT design-
ers vs. cybersecurity protectors vs. finance departments vs. everyone’s desire to help patients and
avoid errors. Happily, the providers are usually well-intentioned, good people who deliver good
care. Sometimes, the struggles are overwhelming, and the care is not good. Patient safety requires
resilience and the seemingly paradoxical task of seeing what falls through the cracks. Making
HIT work requires similar observational skills. It requires that we recognize when the extra clicks,
confusing data displays, and lousy navigation that we have learned and to which we are now accus-
tomed are dangerous and lead to errors. Errors we sometimes don’t see.
Almost all of chapters speak of the vision and synoptic understanding required for HIT to
work. We learn that we are never done:
Many of these chapters discuss efforts to achieve regulatory compliance. While the ONC and
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) are currently seeking greater flexibility, we are
still burdened with their original sin of requiring providers to purchase HIT rather than with first
demanding HIT with the data fluidity and usability that would make users want to buy it. Many,
also, are incensed at the ONC’s continuing refusal to press vendors seriously to adopt data and
usability standards, and to allow open discussion and presentation of faults (e.g., screenshots of
dangerous data displays). Without data standards, HIT remains the “Tower of HIT Babel” these
authors so well describe. Providers need to have a way not only to get one system to work, but also
to get many IT systems to work together … while each is undergoing change from vendors, users,
and the interplay with others’ systems.
Before even the first edition of HIT or Miss existed, there were, of course, efforts to tell the
real tales of HIT implementations. But unhappy reports were spurned as the ravings of mal-
contents and technophobes. HIT or Miss’s first edition was a needed guide for those seeking to
implement HIT, which was of course best accomplished with the knowledge only learned from
real experiences in the trenches. The first two editions provided some of that. With this third
edition, we have more guidance from more examples and greater insights. The editorial com-
ments, and the analyses accompanying each vignette, continue to be models of brevity and clear
thinking.
The argument about whether or not HIT is better than paper is silly. HIT is better than
paper. It is also better than wet clay slabs with cuneiform styluses, pigeons, or smoke signals. The
task we face is to implement HIT in ways that work reasonably well, and then use HIT to better
serve patients and clinicians. HIT or Miss, Third Edition is just what the doctor needs, and should
order stat.
Acknowledgments
The HIT or Miss books have always been a team effort. Thanks to American Medical Informatics
Association (AMIA) for providing us with the forum to create the idea and the support for this
third edition; the AMIA Clinical Information Systems Working Group (CIS-WG) and the Ethics,
Legal and Social Issues Working Group for promoting the concept and helping to lead the pro-
cess; the Health Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) and CRC Press for
helping to prepare the manuscript and marketing our product; our colleagues for sharing many
failed—and successful—health information technology (HIT) initiatives; and the editorial team
for their support, ideas, and terrific writing, recruiting, and editing.
xv
Introduction and Methodology
Introduction
(J. Leviss and L. Ozeran)
On February 24, 2009, President Barack Obama pledged to the entire US Congress, “Our…
plan will invest in electronic health records and new technology that will reduce errors, bring
down costs, ensure privacy, and save lives.”
President Obama declared that digitizing healthcare would be a critical success factor in
improving healthcare in the United States and the overall US economy. Through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), the federal government offered large-scale
funding to create a technology foundation for the US healthcare delivery system. The ARRA’s
EHR “Meaningful Use” program awarded tens of billions of dollars to physicians and hospi-
tals which was spent on HIT software, hardware, and consulting services, all with the goal of
improving the quality and efficiency of healthcare. Building on that approach, the US federal
government’s CMS continues to require EHRs as a central part of pay for performance and qual-
ity incentive programs.
But what has occurred so far? Many large and small healthcare organizations successfully lev-
eraged the ARRA funding opportunity to advance into the digital age, but many others faltered.
Innumerous anecdotes report the high frequency with which large and small healthcare provider
organizations and vendors fail to follow recognized best practices for HIT implementation, even
those with extensive HIT experience. Originally, the shared struggles to achieve Meaningful Use
accreditation by many hospitals and physician practices raised concerns about our readiness to
advance to Stages 2 and 3 on a national scale in the time frame allotted by the Meaningful
Use program. Now, as organizations have pushed forward, many have created new problems and
exacerbated existing ones, including physician burnout, patient safety risks, privacy and security
breaches, and major cost overruns. Healthcare academic and trade journals, plus the lay press, are
filled with well-documented shortfalls of HIT. Why are these problems still occurring? How can
we learn from these failures to successfully implement HIT and advance our healthcare delivery
systems into the modern digital age of other industries?
In the United States, sequential EHR Meaningful Use stages corresponded to advancing crite-
ria of functionality and adoption. Meaningful Use Stage 1 focused on data capturing and sharing,
but most requirements had low thresholds of adoption and did not require broad impact on the
practices of most healthcare professionals within any one healthcare organization. The successful
attestation for Stage 1 did not mean that a hospital or physician practice was ready to expand
similar or new functionality across its entire organization. Stage 2 expanded upon the accomplish-
ments of Stage 1 with requirements for advanced clinical processes, but still with low adoption
thresholds (such as EHR reminders for preventive care for 10% of patients). Stage 2 accreditation,
therefore, got more complex and involved broader aspects of a healthcare organization, but again
xvii
xviii ◾ Introduction and Methodology
did not require a full commitment to digitize care within a physician practice or across a major
medical center. As a result, hospitals and practices could and did develop strategies to digitize
parts of their organizations in order to achieve accreditation and receive the ARRA payments,
without needing to support full-scale transformation to digital healthcare.
Meaningful Use Stage 3 required measuring the clinical care and results, addressing short-
comings, and improving clinical outcomes, but now this has been supplanted by new CMS pay-
ment programs, and, more importantly, the anticipated realization that large-scale quality and
transformative programs require digital data, including EHRs and other advanced HIT systems.
Therefore, the ROI for the federal government’s HIT investment first requires large-scale success-
ful and sustainable rollouts of technologies that had only been “piloted” for Stages 1 and 2; this
means that achieving success in Stages 1 and 2 did not necessarily prepare us for our current state.
And, in many cases, the early successes created the false assumption in organizations that they
were prepared for vastly more complex and larger HIT-based initiatives.
Some cases to consider:
A multisite fifty-provider ambulatory care organization is live on an EHR for 2 years—all
demographic and clinical processes are completely dependent on the EHR and its practice man-
agement system, including patient registration, test results review, CPOE, and clinical documen-
tation. One day, the EHR develops slow response times and in a few hours becomes unusable
(Chapter 28).
A hospital system plans a simultaneous EHR transition and an upgrade to the Obstetric
Department’s fetal monitoring system. Detailed plans, implementation meetings, and technical
checklists help keep the project on target … until go-live day when fetal monitoring tracing do not
correlate with the paper backups being used in the transition of systems (Chapter 19).
A hospital’s implementation of voice-recognition software stalls with very limited adoption
by physicians, who prefer the legacy dictation system…until a malware attack disables the entire
dictation system (Chapter 34).
A medical center recruits and hires a physician at 80% time to be the CPOE go-live leader—
chair the governance committees, spearhead communications about CPOE, and oversee the
design, build, and rollout of CPOE. Without sufficient support for a full CMIO role, the physi-
cian becomes overwhelmed and leaves. Without formal leadership, the initiative has significant
delays and fails to deliver the original functionality of the CPOE system (Chapter 21).
What defines failure? For the purposes of discussion, we, the editorial team of HIT or Miss,
Third Edition, define a HIT failure as “a case in which an unintended negative consequence
occurred, such as a project delay, a substantial cost overrun, a failure to meet an intended goal or
objective, or complete abandonment of the project.”
HIT projects fail at a rate up to 70% of the time (Kaplan, 2009). What happens when HIT
projects fail? What will happen when the same hospitals or physician practices that struggled to
meet Meaningful Use Stage 1 are unable to meet the level of HIT performance required by CMS
or commercial payers? What will happen when scarce healthcare dollars are spent on projects that
do not meet the intended goals? Or when patients are harmed as a result of failed HIT projects?
How do health systems and individual providers analyze the costs, challenges, and patient safety
problems from such failed initiatives?
The editors of this book have led successful EHR and HIT projects that brought readily avail-
able patient and health information to all points of healthcare delivery and offered the types of
quality and efficiency benefits that typically are targeted with digital transformation. As a group,
we are both excited and concerned by the potential outcomes of the ARRA funding and the
US implementations of EHRs. Although ARRA addressed the financial burden of initial HIT
Introduction and Methodology ◾ xix
investments, many other challenges remain for HIT projects to be successful, and for the success
of the US government’s massive investment.
The content and human factor challenges associated with implementing technology have
proven to be formidable barriers impeding the widely available transformation that HIT could
bring. Moreover, the same lessons or “best practices” required for successful HIT projects are
being repeatedly learned through trial and error, over and over again, in large and small health sys-
tems without successful dissemination of the knowledge across organizations and at great financial
cost and social cost. Professional conferences routinely share experiences from successful HIT
initiatives, but the lessons do not appear to follow the new technologies to other organizations or
update over time—the common errors remain common.
Sharing success stories does not work, or as William Soroyan wrote, “Good people are good
because they’ve come to wisdom through failure. We get very little wisdom from success, you
know” (Saroyan, 1971). Apparently in the field of HIT, we still, even after two editions of HIT or
Miss, do “not know.” As a result, the adoption of effective HIT remains at a fairly primitive stage
compared with IT adoption in every other major industry.
This third collection of HIT case studies offers a continued approach to change the HIT
knowledge paradigm. The third edition contains expert insight into key remaining obstacles that
must be overcome to leverage IT in order to modernize and transform healthcare. The purpose
of reporting HIT case studies that failed is to document, catalogue, and share key lessons that all
project managers of HIT, health system leaders in informatics and technology, hospital executives,
policy makers, and service and technology providers must know in order to succeed with HIT, a
critical step for the transformation of all health systems.
HIT or Miss, Third Edition presents a model to discuss HIT failures in a safe and protected
manner, providing an opportunity to focus on the lessons offered by a failed initiative as opposed
to worrying about potential retribution for exposing a project as having failed. Learning from
failures is what every major industry regularly does. Air travel safety is enabled by organiza-
tions like the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), a multidisciplinary coalition of
government and industry experts that analyzes accidents and safety incidents for continued
safety improvements; mountaineers famously read the journal Accidents in North American
Mountaineering to learn about the devastating errors of their peers and avoid repeating them;
and business developers scrutinize failed efforts, from outages of airline booking systems and
online banking to failed market launches of new technologies. And back in healthcare, clinical
departments around the world learn from clinical failures in regularly scheduled “morbidity
and mortality” rounds.
At the AMIA 2006 Fall Conference, the CIS-WG hosted an “open-microphone” event
called “Tales from the Trenches” where members shared HIT failures from their own institu-
tions. The “Tales from the Trenches” event, created for professional development and entertain-
ment purposes, quickly proved the value of sharing failure cases and lessons learned in a safe and
protected environment. A group of us committed to publishing a collection of brief vignettes that
documented situations that did not go quite right, but could be generalized so a larger audience
would learn from the collective wisdom of these stories rather than repeat the same (often costly)
mistakes. We committed to deidentifying all aspects of the submissions prior to publication and
all submitting authors agreed to have their names appear in the book, separate, and not linked to
their case submissions. The unanimous agreement among all contributing authors to have their
names listed in all three editions of HIT or Miss reinforces the message that reviewing failed ini-
tiatives offers valuable knowledge and insight, rather than an opportunity for casting blame and
defensive posturing.
xx ◾ Introduction and Methodology
You will find these case studies catalogued by HIT project (such as CPOE and ambulatory
EHR), but the index will also allow you to search based upon types of lessons learned (such as
project management and technology failure). The catalogue and index should enable you, the
reader, to find the right anecdote that best applies to your specific circumstance and to share with
others in your organization. The storytelling format is intended to make it easier for you to reach
out to peers, superiors, and staff to say “this could be us” and then to proactively address problems
before they spiral out of control.
Learning from failures is an iterative process. Do not permit all of the cost of failure to be
borne by your organization. Instead, reflect on these failures as if they occurred in your circum-
stance so that you can improve your organization’s chances of success and reduce your risk of
financial and social loss. Some have called for national and international reporting databases of
HIT failure—we ask that at the very least, let’s start in our own organizations. We trust that you
will find this collection to be a useful guide in your efforts. With effective knowledge sharing, we
can successfully lead healthcare into the digital age.
Methodology
All cases published in HIT or Miss, Third Edition, were voluntarily submitted by authors who were
directly involved in the projects themselves; all contributing authors to all three editions deserve
credit in this effort and are therefore listed as authors, even if their case appeared in an earlier
edition and not the third edition. This was also done to maintain anonymity by not removing
authors’ names for cases that were not reprinted. Prior to the first edition of HIT or Miss, the edito-
rial team agreed upon the definition of HIT failure:
An HIT project failure is one in which an unintended negative consequence occurred
such as a project delay, a substantial cost overrun, failure to meet an intended goal or
objective, or abandonment of the project.
Requests for deidentified cases that met the definition were solicited from various professional
society listservs and other professional networking. All submissions were carefully reviewed by the
editorial team for publication. The editorial team assumed ultimate responsibility for reviewing,
organizing, editing, and deidentifying the case material, and for providing additional expert com-
mentary. All submitting authors of cases attested to participation in the described HIT project and
the originality of the work. All cases were deidentified, removing all names of locations, organiza-
tions, and vendors, as well as identifying descriptions that were not essential to the lessons offered
by the case. All opinions and analyses of the authors and editors are purely their own and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of the other authors or editors of HIT or Miss, AMIA, or HIMSS.
Editor
xxi
Associate Editors
Dr. Melissa Baysari, PhD, is Associate Professor in Digital Health at the University of Sydney,
Australia. Her research interests include human factors and computerized decision support, with
a focus on digital solutions to support medication management. Prior to focusing on medication
safety since 2009, Dr. Baysari studied railway safety and train driver errors.
Dr. Christopher Corbit, MD, is the Medical Informatics Director for SC TeamHealth and the
Facility Medical Director for Colleton Medical Center. He previously served as the Chief Medical
Informatics Officer for Emergency Medicine Physicians/US Acute Care Solutions for over
8 years. He is a practicing emergency medicine physician and also a Principal at the HealthLytix
Consulting Group.
Dr. Catherine Craven, PhD, is a Senior Clinical Informaticist at the Institute of Healthcare
Delivery Science and the IT Department of the Mt. Sinai Health System in New York. She has
worked in industry, provider healthcare, and library sciences. She received her PhD in clini-
cal informatics as a National Institutes of Health (NIH)/National Library of Medicine Health
Informatics Research Fellow at the University of Missouri.
Mr. David Leander is an MD-MBA candidate at Dartmouth University, class of 2020. He
worked on EHR projects at many health systems before medical school as a project manager at
Epic Systems and continues as a consultant since entering medical school. Mr. Leander hopes to
continue his formal informatics training in residency.
Dr. Karl Poterack, MD, is board-certified in clinical informatics as well as anesthesiology. He
serves as the Medical Director for Applied Clinical Informatics for Mayo Clinic; he practices
anesthesiology at the Mayo Clinic Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona.
Dr. Eric Rose, MD, is the Vice President of Terminology Management at Intelligent Medical
Objects (IMO), responsible for managing terminology content creation operations as well as con-
tributing to company-wide product, go-to-market, and partner engagement strategy. Dr. Rose has
held numerous health informatics leadership positions in health systems and industry; he is also a
family physician and clinical faculty at the University of Washington School of Medicine.
Dr. Richard Schreiber, MD, is an Associate CMIO for the Geisinger Health System at Geisinger
Holy Spirit Hospital; the Regional Assistant Dean of the Geisinger Commonwealth School of
Medicine; a practicing hospitalist; and an informatics researcher focusing on clinical decision support,
documentation, and venous thromboembolic disease. He is board-certified in clinical informatics.
xxiii
xxiv ◾ Associate Editors
Dr. Christina Stephan, MD, PhD, has over 15 years of experience in advancing innovative health
technology and EHR solutions for clinical and population health systems through strategic plan-
ning, education, and research and development, including the Director of Medical Informatics at
Health Book, an Associate Director of Health Management and Informatics at the University of
Missouri School of Medicine, and the Co-chair of the AMIA Public Health Informatics Working
Group.
Dr. Kai Zheng, PhD, focuses on consumer-facing technologies and design; he is an Associate
Professor of Informatics at the Donald Bren School of Information and Computer Sciences and
the Director of the Center for Biomedical informatics at the Institute for Clinical and Translational
Science, both at the University of California—Irvine. He is the Chair of the AMIA CIS-WG.
Contributing Experts,
Authors, and Author Teams
Jeffrey Adams, PhD, RN; Audrey Parks, MBA; and Virginia Williams, MSN, RN
Lawrence B. Afrin, MD; Frank Clark, PhD; John Waller, MD; Patrick Cawley, MD; Timothy
Hartzog, MD; Mark Daniels, MS; and Deborah Campbell, RN
Melissa Baysari, PhD
Pam Charney, PhD, RD
Christopher Corbit, MD
Catherine Craven, PhD
Chris Doyle, MD
Wen Dombrowski, MD
Michael Gallagher, MD, MPH
Nicholas Genes MD, PhD, and Romona Tulloch, MS, RN
Justin Graham, MD, MS
Julie Gregoire, RPh
Brian Gugerty, DNS, RN
Christopher Harle, PhD; Marvin Dewar, MD, JD; and Laura Gruber, MBA, MHS
Jacqueline Henriquez, RNC, MSN
Melinda Jenkins, PhD, FNP
Henry W. Jones III
Bonnie Kaplan, PhD
Gail Keenan, PhD, RN
David Leander
Christoph Lehmann, MD; Roberto A. Romero, BS; and George R. Kim, MD
Jonathan Leviss, MD
Steven Magid, MD, Richard Benigno, and Jessica Kovac
George McAlpine, MBA RN and Aditi Vakil, MBBS, MHA
Sandi Mitchell, BS Pharm, MSIS
Ilene Moore, MD
Kenneth Ong, MD, MPH
Paul Oppenheimer, MD
Larry Ozeran, MD
Patrick A. Palmieri, EdS, RN
Liron Pantanowitz, MD and Anil V. Parwani, MD, PhD
Eric Poon, MD, MPH
Brad Rognrud, MS, RPh
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