Type of Government

Learning Objectives

1. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of representative democracy.

2. Explain why authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are more unstable politically than
democracies and monarchies.

Various states and governments obviously exist around the world. In this context, state means
the political unit within which power and authority reside. This unit can be a whole nation or a
subdivision within a nation. Thus, the nations of the world are sometimes referred to as states (or
nation-states), as are subdivisions within a nation, such as California, New York, and Texas in the
United States. Government means the group of people who direct the political affairs of a state,
but it can also mean the type of rule by which a state is run. Another term for this second
meaning of government is political system, which we will use here along with government. The
type of government under which people live has fundamental implications for their freedom,
their welfare, and even their lives. Accordingly, we briefly review the major political systems in
the world today.

Democracy

The type of government with which we are most familiar is democracy, or a political system in
which citizens govern themselves either directly or indirectly.

The term democracy comes from Greek and means “rule of the people.”

In Lincoln’s stirring words from the Gettysburg Address, democracy is “government of the
people, by the people, for the people.”

In direct (or pure) democracies, people make their own decisions about the policies and
distribution of resources that affect them directly.

An example of such a democracy in action is the New England town meeting, where the
residents of a town meet once a year and vote on budgetary and other matters. However, such
direct democracies are impractical when the number of people gets beyond a few hundred.

Representative democracies are thus much more common. In these types of democracies, people
elect officials to represent them in legislative votes on matters affecting the population.

Representative democracy is more practical than direct democracy in a society of any

significant size, but political scientists cite another advantage of representative democracy. At
least in theory, it ensures that the individuals who govern a society and in other ways help a
society function are the individuals who have the appropriate talents, skills, and knowledge to do
so. In this way of thinking, the masses of people are, overall, too uninformed, too uneducated,
and too uninterested to run a society themselves.

Representative democracy thus allows for “the cream to rise to the top” so that the people who
actually govern a society are the most qualified to perform this essential task (Seward, 2010).
Although this argument has much merit, it is also true that many of the individuals who do get
elected to office turn out to be ineffective and/or corrupt. Regardless of our political orientations,
Americans can think of many politicians to whom these labels apply, from presidents down to
local officials.
The defining feature of representative democracy is voting in elections.

When the United States was established more than 230 years ago, most of the world’s
governments were monarchies or other authoritarian regimes (discussed shortly). Like the
colonists, people in these nations chafed under arbitrary power. The example of the American
Revolution and the stirring words of its Declaration of Independence helped inspire the French
Revolution of 1789 and other revolutions since, as people around the world have died in order to
win the right to vote and to have political freedom.

Democracies are certainly not perfect. Their decision-making process can be quite slow and
inefficient; as just mentioned, decisions may be made for special interests and not “for the
people”; and, as we have seen in earlier chapters, pervasive inequalities of social class, race and
ethnicity, gender, and age can exist. Moreover, in not all democracies have all people enjoyed the
right to vote.

In the United States, for example, African Americans could not vote until after the Civil War,
with the passage of the 15th Amendment in 1870, and women did not win the right to vote until
1920, with the passage of the 19th Amendment.

In addition to generally enjoying the right to vote, people in democracies also have more
freedom than those in other types of governments. Figure 14.1 “Freedom Around the World
(Based on Extent of Political Rights and Civil Liberties)” depicts the nations of the world
according to the extent of their political rights and civil liberties. The freest nations are found in
North America, Western Europe, and certain other parts of the world, while the least free lie in
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Monarchy
Monarchy is a political system in which power resides in a single family that rules from one
generation to the next generation. The power the family enjoys is traditional authority, and many
monarchs command respect because their subjects bestow this type of authority on them. Other
monarchs, however, have ensured respect through arbitrary power and even terror. Royal
families still rule today, but their power has declined from centuries ago. Today the Queen of
England holds a largely ceremonial position, but her predecessors on the throne wielded much
more power.

This example reflects a historical change in types of monarchies from absolute monarchies to
constitutional monarchies (Finer, 1997).

In absolute monarchies, the royal family claims a divine right to rule and exercises considerable
power over their kingdom. Absolute monarchies were common in both ancient (e.g., Egypt) and
medieval (e.g., England and China) times. In reality, the power of many absolute monarchs was
not totally absolute, as kings and queens had to keep in mind the needs and desires of other
powerful parties, including the clergy and nobility. Over time, absolute monarchies gave way to
constitutional monarchies.

Constitutional monarchy- in these monarchies, the royal family serves a symbolic and
ceremonial role and enjoys little, if any, real power. Instead, the executive and legislative
branches of government—the prime minister and parliament in several nations—run the
government, even if the royal family continues to command admiration and respect.

Constitutional monarchies exist today in several nations, including Denmark, Great Britain,
Norway, Spain, and Sweden.

Oligarchy
The power in an oligarchy is held by a small, elite group. Unlike in a monarchy, members of an
oligarchy do not necessarily achieve their statuses based on ties to noble ancestry. Rather, they
may ascend to positions of power because of military might, economic power, or `
circumstances.

The concept of oligarchy is somewhat elusive; rarely does a society openly define itself as an
oligarchy. Generally, the word carries negative connotations and conjures notions of a corrupt
group whose members make unfair policy decisions in order to maintain their privileged
positions. Many modern nations that claim to be democracies are really oligarchies.

In fact, some prominent journalists, such as Paul Krugman, who won a Nobele laureate prize in
economics, have labeled the United States an oligarchy, pointing to the influence of large
corporations and Wall Street executives on U.S. policy (Krugman 2011).

Other political analysts assert that all democracies are really just “elected oligarchies,” or
systems in which citizens must vote for an individual who is part of a pool of candidates who
come from the society’s elite ruling class (Winters 2011).

Oligarchies have existed throughout history, and today many consider Russia an example of
oligarchic political structure. After the fall of communism, groups of business owners captured
control of this nation’s natural resources and have used the opportunity to expand their wealth
and political influence. Once an oligarchic power structure has been established, it can be very
difficult for middle- and lower-class citizens to advance their socioeconomic status.

Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism

Authoritarianism and totalitarianism are general terms for nondemocratic political systems
ruled by an individual or a group of individuals who are not freely elected by their populations
and who often exercise arbitrary power.

To be more specific, authoritarianism refers to political systems in which an individual or a

group of individuals holds power, restricts or prohibits popular participation in governance, and
represses dissent.

Totalitarianism refers to political systems that include all the features of authoritarianism but are
even more repressive as they try to regulate and control all aspects of citizens’ lives and fortunes.
People can be imprisoned for deviating from acceptable practices or may even be killed if they
dissent in the mildest of ways. The purple nations in Figure 14.1 “Freedom Around the World
(Based on Extent of Political Rights and Civil Liberties)” are mostly totalitarian regimes, and the
orange ones are authoritarian regimes.

Compared to democracies and monarchies, authoritarian and totalitarian governments are

more unstable politically. The major reason for this is that these governments enjoy no
legitimate authority. Instead, their power rests on fear and repression. The populations of these
governments do not willingly lend their obedience to their leaders and realize that their leaders
are treating them very poorly; for both these reasons, they are more likely than populations in
democratic states to want to rebel. Sometimes they rebel, and if the rebellion becomes
sufficiently massive and widespread, a revolution occurs.

In contrast, populations in democratic states usually perceive that they are treated more or less
fairly and, further, that they can change things they do not like through the electoral process.
Seeing no need for revolution, they do not revolt.

Since World War II, which helped make the United States an international power, the United
States has opposed some authoritarian and totalitarian regimes while supporting others. The Cold
War pitted the United States and its allies against Communist nations, primarily the Soviet
Union, China, Cuba, and North Korea.

But at the same time the United States opposed these authoritarian governments, it supported
many others, including those in Chile, Guatemala, and South Vietnam, that repressed and even
murdered their own citizens who dared to engage in the kind of dissent constitutionally protected
in the United States (Sullivan, 2008).

REFERENCE

https://pressbooks.howardcc.edu/soci101/chapter/14-2-types-of-political-systems/#:~:text=The
%20major%20types%20of%20political,and%20instead%20rule%20through%20fear.

Question:

1. Why are democracies generally more stable than authoritarian or totalitarian regimes?
 2. Why is legitimate authority as Max Weber conceived it not a characteristic of
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes?

The system of government refers to the governance arrangements that allocate powers
between the executive and legislative. The quest for the most adequate system of government
involves an assessment of the relative merits of each system so as to reach the overarching goals
of a particular society.

It is important to assess which patterns of political decision making would better serve the
expectations of the higher number of citizens, while protecting minorities’ interests. Social
satisfaction with policy outcomes is usually higher the closer the outcome is to the social
majorities’ preferences.

The design of constitutional mechanisms has an important impact on the interaction between
the branches of power and within individual branches, and represents an important set of choices
to consider (e.g. to avoid potentially negative consequences of either systems, such as policy
gridlocks or authoritarian tendencies).

The actual functioning and interaction of these mechanisms depend on national context (and
the functioning of other branches such as the judiciary and other mechanisms such as the
electoral system). When designing system of government mechanisms, special attention must be
paid to countering political fragmentation (in parliamentary systems), ensuring inter-branch co-
operation and managing cohabitation (in presidential systems).

In establishing the electoral system, the value of proportionality would need to be considered
in balance with that of majoritarianism. While an inclusive electoral system with low entry
thresholds can benefit a culture of co-operative government, often leading to coalition
governments, majoritarian electoral systems can lead to the strongest political parties catalysing
more political sensitivities into a single option. The greater the representativeness, the more
difficult it might be to form stable governments.

Three main patterns or types of government have emerged historically;

 Parliamentarism – The single electoral origin of the legislature and the government can
make it possible for a parliamentary regime with inclusive electoral rules to facilitate the
coexistence of multipartyism with fair representation, socially efficient outcomes and
relatively effective government. Parliamentary systems could also help maximise
inclusiveness and give rise to coalition governments that are representative of several
political choices. However, this could at the same time generate instability and deadlocks
due to limited majorities. Parliamentary systems are inherently flexible, as they enable
removal of the head of government when the majority of parliament no longer supports
the government’s approach. However, these mechanisms may also weaken the separation
of powers between the executive and the legislative.
  Presidentialism – Presidential systems provides the electorate with a direct mandate that
empowers citizens through greater choice. They can select both a head of state and
members of the legislature, and reward well-performing politicians through re-election.
Nonetheless, presidents in this type of system are often elected by slim majorities (a
characteristic that hinges on whether there exist runoffs or party systems), and still
acquire the power to form full cabinets regardless of the share of seats obtained in
parliament or of the policy position of the presidential party in parliament. Presidents do
not depend on the legislature, as there is a stronger separation of powers – a situation that
can generate a stable government but also political deadlocks when the government is
unable to obtain the support of the legislature for its policy programme. There are several
mechanisms for resolving these deadlocks.

 Semi-presidentialism (or lessened presidentialism) – This system’s distribution of powers

represents greater integration of the executive and the legislature than purely presidential
systems. It approximates a presidential system that has characteristics of multiparty
parliamentary regimes. As such it can, in the best-case scenarios, combine the strengths
of the two systems. It can also generate a particular challenge: due to the dual legitimacy
of the president and the prime minister, the authority of both may conflict.

Presidential Systems

In a presidential system, the president is the head of government

and the head of state. As the head of government, he or she
oversees the operations of the government and fulfills certain
duties, such as appointing officials and advisers to help run the
government, signing or vetoing laws passed by the legislature and
establishing an annual budget. A president's duties as head of state
include tasks such as making speeches, representing the country at
public events, hosting or visiting diplomats from other countries,
and presenting prestigious national awards.

Parliamentary Systems

The roles of head of state and head of government often are held by
different people in a parliamentary system. For example, a country
might have a prime minister who acts as its head of government
and a monarch who acts as its head of state. Some countries that
have a parliamentary system also have a president instead of a
monarch, who acts as the head of state. A country that has both a
prime minister and a president is sometimes said to have a semi-
presidential system of government, although it is more closely
related to a parliamentary system because of the power held by the
legislature and prime minister in such a system.
Presidential systems

The presidential system of government implies that the executive and legislative branches are
separate. It can also imply that their establishment and the time they remain in power are
separate. The president normally serves as both the head of state and the head of government and
is elected by popular vote. Usually, the term of office of the president is fixed, with no political
accountability to the legislature (or dependence on the support of the political parties), including
the cabinet whose authority derives exclusively from the president. The president also often has a
certain degree of political impact in the lawmaking process. At the same time, degrees of
presidential power and accountability can vary depending on the constitutional design, thus
resulting in different models of presidential systems.

With much caution, the most common impacts of presidential systems on governance could be
summarised as follows (Cheibub, 2007[5]):

 Governments are likely not to be supported by a majority of the legislature since

generally there are no guarantees in the system that such a majority can exist, except by
using electoral calendars allowing for coattail effects ( The coattail effect or down-ballot effect is
the tendency for a popular political party leader to attract votes for other candidates of the same party in an
election) seeking government trifectas in presidential bicameral systems.

 Gridlocks between the executive and the legislature could arise and can lead to conflict
between the two powers, unless the constitution provides for designs that compel them to
co-operate (for instance through easy presidential veto override and parliamentary control
mechanisms such as questions, interpellations, and impeachment).

 Coalitions are relatively rare as there are limited incentives in the system for individual
politicians and their political parties to co-operate with one another and the government.
However, the more parliamentary a presidential regime, the more likely are the coalitions.

 Decision making is normally considered to be decentralized – that is, to be such that the
president can respond to proposals originated in the legislature, which are in turn
organized in such a way as to allow for political representatives to pursue individualistic
rather than partisan strategies. Consequently, the government’s ability to influence and
implement policy can be reduced.

Several areas are deemed important for the effectiveness of the presidential regime (in addition
to the notion of “parliament arising the presidency”, as described earlier) (Cheibub, 2007[5]):

 The legislative and agenda powers of the presidency

 Electoral rules for legislative and presidential elections
  Constitutional term limits on presidential re-election
 Strong forms of presidentialism
 Presidentialism and political fragmentation
 Adoption of legislation.

These are discussed below:

a) Legislative and agenda powers of the presidency

Any presidential constitution gives some legislative powers to the presidency. The most
important powers include:

 Veto power – After the legislature passes a bill, many constitutions enable the president to
influence or halt it (e.g. Colombia, Portugal). This power stems from the provision that
for it to become law, any legislative bill must be signed by the president. The president in
turn may object to the bill and hence refuse to sign it. When the president can only refuse
the bill in its entirety, they have complete or total veto power. When the president may
object only to portions of the bill, the president has partial veto power. Presidents with
partial veto power are often not presented with an all-or-nothing choice, but they may
have more ways to influence legislation and hence can exercise greater power. When the
president vetoes a bill (either partially or completely), the bill is often sent back to the
legislature, which is then given the opportunity to reaffirm its will and override the
presidential veto. Another distinction can be made with regard to the type of presidential
intervention the constitution allows: the president may reject a bill strictly for policy
reasons, or challenge the constitutionality of a bill. The first is considered a policy veto,
the second a veto on the constitutionality of a bill (e.g. the latter in Colombia and
Portugal). Thus, a constitution can define the extent veto powers can also concentrate or
limit power. Policy vetoes are more commonly embedded in presidential and semi-
presidential systems, where the electorate rather than the legislature elects the president
directly. The legislative majority required for veto overriding is usually larger than the
majority required for the approval of the bill in the first place. Most presidential
constitutions (including the US Constitution and most of the Latin American presidential
Constitutions) require a two-thirds majority of the legislature to override a presidential
veto. If such a majority exists, then the president is required to sign the bill and it
becomes law. Strong presidential veto powers may lead to frequent political gridlocks,
whereas if overriding the presidential veto in parliament requires less qualified majorities,
the system can work more smoothly (e.g. in Colombia, Costa Rica, Finland and
Portugal). The same appears to be the case in systems where the president has no veto or
a very weak (delay) veto power (e.g. France).
The use of vetoes in multiparty presidential systems suggests that the nature of executive-
legislative bargaining can be fundamentally altered when multiple parties compose the
legislature and when presidential veto prerogatives are extended to incorporate partial
(line-item) vetoes. The level of significance of legislation is relevant for predicting
vetoes, with landmark legislation being more likely to be vetoed regardless of levels of
support for the president in congress. In addition, partial vetoes often can become the
preferred alternative when confronting legislation initiated by the president (Palanza and
Sin, 2013[6]).
 Decree power – This refers to the executive’s ability to issue new laws, which exists in a
variety of constitutions, both presidential and parliamentary. Decree power varies widely.
First, it varies with respect to the areas where it may be issued. Some constitutions only
allow for presidential “executive orders”, that is administrative acts pertaining to the
 implementation of laws already approved by the legislature. Others allow for presidential
decrees under special circumstances that can be rather broad (e.g. “relevance”, “urgency”,
“economic or financial matters when so required by the national interest”, and so on).
Second, presidential decree power varies with respect to its time frame. Typically,
presidential decrees enter into force as soon as they are issued. In a few cases, some time
must elapse before they enter into force, during which the legislature is given the
opportunity to reject them. Finally, in some cases executive decrees automatically
become permanent laws, whereas in other cases they expire if not approved by the
legislature within a given time frame.
 Exclusive power to introduce legislation – Usually the president is accorded certain
legislative powers, although in some systems (such as in the United States) the
constitution allows for legislation to be initiated only from within the congress. In most
Latin American presidential democracies, the role of the assembly in initiating legislation
is restricted in some areas, such as in legislation pertaining to the size of the armed
forces, the creation of public jobs, the structure of public administration and, most
importantly, the budget. Normally the assembly can amend these bills, even if
constrained by provisions stipulating, for example, that it can only propose amendments
that do not increase the deficit or the overall level of spending. And in a bargaining
situation, the party that sets the agenda has a large advantage over the other party.
Increasingly, in presidential constitutions there is no exclusivity in legislative initiative,
as in Colombia. In Costa Rica and Portugal there is a plurality of constitutional bodies
that can propose legislation, including through some form of popular initiative.

 Urgency requests – In many presidential constitutions, presidents can declare a bill

“urgent”. When they do, the assembly is required to vote on the bill in a relatively short
time (e.g. in 30 or 45 days). This is another constitutional provision that can grant the
president the power to significantly influence the legislative agenda. In France, a fast
track procedure of legislation is frequently used. Instead of two readings by each house of
parliament, only one takes place.

 Declaring a state of emergency – The possibility, scope and mechanisms to declare a

state of emergency is a crucial feature defining the relation between the executive and
other institutions. Constitutions often strike a difficult balance between providing the
executive with a certain degree of discretion in taking extraordinary measures to meet a
range of critical circumstances that cannot be comprehensively predicted at the time of
drafting (such as invasion, natural catastrophe, terrorism or a public health emergency)
and empowering other institutions to evaluate or ultimately validate the declaration and
its associated measures. The power to declare a state of emergency can entail a
concentration of power, and has occasionally given rise to abuses, particularly in post-
conflict societies.

 Impeachment enables removal of the head of the executive on the grounds of their legal
misbehavior, in contrast to the political control exercised by a vote of no confidence. Two
key aspects should be considered: the type of offense that can give rise to an
impeachment procedure, which is sometimes limited to severe offenses such as treason;
and other branches’ involvement in that procedure.
b) Electoral rules for legislative and presidential elections

Election rules for the presidency and the parliament affect the way in which these institutions
will interact.

 Parliamentary elections – Presidential systems could generate stronger policy outcomes

if, in principle, the parliamentary fragmentation is low. For this reason, presidential
political systems have traditionally tended to limit the number of parties acceding to
parliament. This effect is generally achieved by setting up a restrictive electoral system,
which could be developed through different ways:
a) single-member electoral districts (they can reduce the proportionality of the system and
thus the accession to parliament is limited),
b) high electoral thresholds to attain seats in parliament.
c) legal restrictions on building up new political parties. At the same time, accumulated
evidence points to challenges in presidential systems when the number of political parties
is relatively low. Importantly there is evidence that when the constitutions of countries
like Colombia (after 1991) and Costa Rica (after 1949) eased the access of more layers of
the population to parliamentary representation and thus increased parliamentary plurality,
that made the systems more stable than before. In these cases, several experts pointed out
that the proportional vote for the parliamentary lower chamber could make parliament
more inclusive and produce better governance and better policy outcomes (Colomer and
Negretto, 2005[4]). Brazil offers a counter-example, with a very pluralist congress.

 There is also evidence that the efficiency of a presidential system can increase with a
strong president and a unicameral assembly (Reilly, 2003[7]). Yet there may be costs in
terms of representation, and it can become difficult for individual legislators to
“represent” their constituencies’ interests inside the assembly. Thus, the legislative
success of presidents may stem from a restriction on legislators’ ability to represent their
constituents. As Moe and Caldwell (1994[8]) put it, "when nations choose a presidential
or parliamentary form, they are choosing a whole system whose various properties arise
endogenously – whether they like it or not – out of the political dynamics that their
adopted form sets in motion…Presidential and parliamentary systems come with their
own baggage. They are package deals".

In sum, there appear to be two alternatives for enhancing “governability” in presidential systems:

 Limiting representation by restraining the variety of views that can enter the political
process: restrictive electoral and party legislation can reduce the number of running
parties and increase the likelihood that governments would obtain majorities in the
legislature, thus increasing governability and stability.
  Adopting a more inclusive electoral and political party legislation (see Box 4.1). Doing
so allows for a larger variety and plurality in the views that can enter the political process,
but limits the role that individual representatives have in deliberation and decision
making. This alternative requires strengthening the role of the political parties in the
policy-making process, such as in the United Kingdom or Spain.

In both approaches, there is a trade-off between “governability” and “representation.” Both

systems seem to provide similar chances of survival for democracies (Cheibub, 2007[5]). While
one of them gives varied political views a further chance of being heard by allowing them to
compete more easily in the electoral arena, the other can facilitate agreements and stable
majorities in the legislature.

There are several important aspects regarding the way presidents are elected. Two of them seem
particularly relevant for governability:

 Presidential elections – One of the advantages of presidentialism is that it provides a

nationwide constituency for the president’s office. This may be advantageous in
situations of high political volatility and social heterogeneity, since the presidency may
operate as a centripetal force toward unity and integration. But for this to occur, the rules
for electing the president would need to be carefully drafted so that they provide an
incentive for integration rather than a reinforcement of existing political, ethnic, income,
geographic or religious fault lines. While the adequate formula depends on the local
context, it is worth remembering that the rules for presidential elections can be used to
mitigate existing socio-political divides.
 Timing of elections – Countries have different approaches when it comes to the timing of
presidential and legislative elections. In some countries, the two elections can happen
always at the same time or be near in time (e.g. in Colombia, Costa Rica and France);
happen always at different times (e.g. in Brazil during the 1946-64 democratic period); or
they may alternate (e.g. in the United States where, with a legislative term of two years
and a presidential term of four years, elections coincide every four years). Emerging
evidence suggests that when they occur together, presidential elections can reduce the
number of political parties acceding to parliament (Borges and Turgeon, 2019[9]; Costa
Lobo, Lago and Lago-Peñas, 2016[10]). Presidents may generate major coattail effects3,
thus aiding the election of legislators of their own parties. Thus, if fragmentation of the
party system is a concern, the stipulation of concurrent presidential and legislative
elections may reduce the number of political parties in competition without implementing
a restrictive electoral system for legislative elections. The cases of Colombia, Costa Rica
and France may illustrate this point.

c) Constitutional term limits on presidential re-election

Most constitutions set a limit to the number of times that a president can be re-elected. Two
types of term limits can be distinguished: those where there are a limited number of
consecutive terms in office allowed, and those where there is an absolute limit on the total
years that an individual can be in office. For example, France (article 6 of the Constitution)
awards a presidential mandate of 5 years and allows for only one successive re-election,
totalling 10 years.

In Latin America, up until the early 1990s, the most common constitutional limit on
presidential re-election was the “one term out” rule (e.g. in Mexico), according to which a
president had to wait for a full term out of office before standing for election again. Since
then, several countries (e.g. Argentina, Costa Rica and Brazil) changed their constitutions and
adopted the two-term limit, while others have stayed with the one-term-out mandate. For
example, in Colombia, since 2015 the president has been confined to a single four-year term
and is barred from running for re-election, even for a non-consecutive term.

Presidential term limits are important as they affect the relationship between the president
and voters. Elections are normally considered one of the most important instruments to
encourage governments to act in the interests of voters. In principle, in anticipating voters’
future judgement of their past performance, political figures should have incentives to pursue
the interests of voters in order to be re-elected. While there is debate on whether elections are
a sufficient instrument to induce this type of behaviour, it appears that if elections are to
affect the behaviour of politicians at all, voters must be able to reprove executives who
perform badly by not re-electing them, and they must be able to reward incumbents who
perform well by giving them another term in office. Both are necessary if elections are to
induce governments to act in the interest of voters.

Term limits appear to restrict the full spectrum of choice of the people as to whom they elect
to office, as well as the ability of voters to reward well-performing incumbents. However, the
limits are also an essential mechanism to ensure democratic transformation. Individual
alternation of the chief executive is considered important for various reasons. In particular,
the possibility of indefinite re-election could eventually tempt presidents in power to use
their position and powers while in office to create an institutional and social environment that
guarantees their subsequent re-election.

Presidentialism can possibly give an advantage to the incumbents when they are legally
permitted to run for re-election. In turn, preventing the incumbents from exploiting this
advantage by limiting terms in office leads them to leave office even if voters might wish for
them to stay. Constitutional term limits could serve as a relevant middle-ground tool. Other
instruments to limit the ability of presidents to use the office for undue electoral advantage
include strict regulation of campaign finance and procedures, public funding of campaigns,
free access to media and the strengthening of agencies that oversee campaigns and elections,
such as in Colombia and Costa Rica.

d) Strengthened presidentialism

Strengthened (or exaggerated) presidentialism is a modality of presidentialism in which the

constitution concentrates all or many crucial powers in the executive. It is also known as
centralised presidentialism. Key powers allotted to the executive may include the exclusive
right to initiate legislation in strategic areas; the executive’s ability to determine the priority
with which bills will be debated in legislature; its capacity to act as co-legislator, as for
example through amendatory observations (indicaciones) at any time during the discussion of
a bill; its ability to attend commissions discussing bills and express opinions; and the power
to veto a bill passed by legislature or to reintroduce a bill rejected by one of the houses.

There are in addition differences in the informal powers of the executive and the legislature
that favour the former in terms of access to information and staff to prepare discussions and
draft bills. The allotment of formal legal powers to the executive by the constitution does not
mean that presidents in fact make use of all of them all the time. Presidents tend to negotiate
with other political actors, including those from parties different from those represented in
parliament. Analyses of this modality of presidentialism tend to distinguish between the large
constitutional formal powers attributed to the president and the actual exercise of political
power, which is not always in the executive’s hands. The contrast between “strengthened”
formal constitutional powers allotted by the constitution to the executive and the relative
moderation in its actual exercise by presidents could be explained by a political context able
to moderate the formal powers in practice.

e) Presidentialism and political fragmentation

Where the party system fragmentation is limited, the need for interparty coalitions is
diminished and the perils of presidentialism are usually attenuated. The president may not
enjoy a majority in congress, but their party is very likely to be a major party that controls a
significant share of the seats. This situation can mitigate the challenge of competing claims to
legitimacy because many legislators are likely to support the president. Conflicts between the
legislature and the executive arise, but they tend to be less gridlocking than when most
legislators are against the president. Mechanisms to handle cohabitation situations would be
required, as in Colombia, Costa Rica, and France. The mechanism most used is designing the
electoral calendar to produce coattail effects.

With regard to coattail effects, holding assembly elections concurrently with the presidential
election results, as noted, in a strong tendency for two major parties to be the most important,
even if a proportional electoral system is used. In view of the importance of the presidential
election, it tends to divide voters into two camps, and voters are more likely to choose the
same party in legislative elections as in Costa Rica and France, as they do when presidential
and legislative elections are non-concurring, as in Portugal. If assembly elections are held at
times that differ from presidential elections, the political fragmentation of the assembly
becomes more likely.

Inter-branch co-operation under presidential government can be achieved by giving the

congress the capacity to participate in appointing and dismissing the executive cabinet,
including the opportunity to censure and provoke the dismissal of cabinet members, such as
in Colombia and Costa Rica. These formulae can be combined in different ways. This has
been a common feature in constitutional reforms in Latin America in the 1990s, such as those
in Argentina, Colombia, and Paraguay.

f) Adoption of legislation
In presidential systems, both the congress and the president usually can act proactively,
introducing legislative proposals, or reactively, approving or rejecting other actors’ proposals.
When the president has great legislative powers, the ability of the congress to debate, logroll
and offer compromises on controversial issues tends to be constrained. Instead, the
presidency can take on legislative importance and the incumbent can have tools with which
to fine tune legislation to possibly fit their preferences and limit consensus building in the
assembly. Hence, some countries have considered the need to lessen the powers of the
president in order to strengthen the representativeness and inclusiveness of democracy. For
example, in semi-presidential systems (e.g. France and Portugal), the president has little or
no legislative power, as that generally tends to lie within the government’s mandate.

Considerations in lessening the powers of the presidency

It would be useful to consider factors that can attenuate the challenges of presidentialism, as
in, some cases it may be politically more feasible to modify presidential systems than to
switch fully to parliamentary government:

 Presidents usually have greatest power if their veto cannot be overridden; they have least
power if they have no veto or if a veto can be overridden with a simple majority.
 The partial veto is an important instrument in the hands of some presidents; they can
thereby reject parts of bills rather than accepting or rejecting the whole bill. Presidents
have greatest power if they can exercise a partial veto that cannot be overridden, and
weakest if they have no partial veto.
 Reduce decree powers, i.e. the authority of presidents to make laws without prior
consultation with congress.
 Reduce powers granted to presidents to act as the sole agenda setters in certain key policy
areas (e.g. taxation, budget, etc.). In such areas, legislation cannot be considered unless
first proposed by the president. Exclusive presidential law-making initiatives are most
powerful if the assembly cannot amend the president’s initiatives but must either accept
them as presented or reject them in block.
 Limit the extent to which the president has primacy in the budgetary process, which
reduces the ability of congress to change revenues or expenditures. At one end of the
spectrum, the president prepares the budget and congress may not amend it. At the other
end, the assembly either prepares the budget or has constitutionally unrestricted authority
to amend it, as in France.
 Strong presidents may submit legislative proposals to the voters directly, thereby
bypassing the congress, while if such presidential powers are lessened this is not possible,
and referendums can be a joint proposal of the president and the parliamentary assembly.
 As mentioned, limiting the number of terms that a president can serve in office, and the
number of years of each term, could also be an effective limit to the powers of the
presidency. For example, in Costa Rica the president is directly elected for a four-year
term and can seek a non-consecutive second term.
 Parliamentary systems

Many OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) member countries
have put in place parliamentary systems of government. The primary overarching feature
defining a parliamentary system is the blending of the executive and legislative powers and
the accountability of the government to the parliament. The government must have the
support of the parliament for it to enter and remain in office. The parliamentary right to a
vote of no confidence against the government is the primary criterion that differentiates
parliamentarian from presidential systems.

The system may have a president (or monarch) with the role of head of state, but that person
may not necessarily be popularly elected (although in several countries with parliamentary
systems there may be presidents directly elected by the electorate, such as in Ireland or
Finland, or by the parliament, such as Germany, who hold limited political power). Moreover
they are not the same person as the head of government.

The legislature plays a central role

 In parliamentary systems, parliament holds significant political control, and is central in
the selection of the head of the government (prime minister). The selection method can
range from a formal election that is exclusively in the hands of parliament (e.g. in
Sweden) to selection by the president of the nominee from the party who obtained the
highest number of seats in the election (as in Greece), to a middle-ground system where
the president can nominate a candidate but parliament may appoint another if the
candidate is not supported by an absolute majority of votes, whom the president must
then appoint (e.g. in Germany). Other systems elect prime ministers based on the
emergence of informal agreements through inter-party negotiations in the legislature,
followed by an official appointment by the head of state6 (e.g. Portugal and Spain).
 The parliament can also remove the head of government through a vote of no confidence.
In other words, the legislature retains the power to decide on the head of government’s
survival. Despite this, several constitutions introduce restrictions on this possibility,
including the ability to vote no confidence only after the prime minister has spent a set
period of time in the post, or the ability to dismiss only a limited number of cabinets per
term. Some constitutions require a “constructive” motion, meaning that the majority
dismissing the head of government must select a new one simultaneously (for example in
Germany, Hungary, Poland and Spain). As a result, a motion of no confidence does not
automatically force either the resignation of the cabinet or a new election.
 Parliamentary systems also often entrust the legislature with the authority to oversee
other branches of government, particularly the executive. In other words, aside from
political control, there can also be legal or at least quasi-legal control to scrutinise the
actions of government: the constitution might, for example, empower the legislature to
initiate legal investigations, including the ability to request officials of the executive
branch to appear in the chambers. A majority of constitutions offer some options for the
 legislature to question the actions of the executive and request an explanation of its
policies. On occasion they specify the maximum time frames in which interpellations
must be answered (e.g. in Albania). In a number of constitutions, the legislature can
conduct an independent investigation of the executive, or is even compelled legally to do
so if a percentage of parliamentary votes is reached.
 In most parliamentary systems, one of the chambers, the lower one, deals with the
relationship with government. Existent constitutions have created legislatures that either
have two chambers (80 countries) or are unicameral (112 countries).7 Typically, the
“lower” chamber (house or congress) is designed to be “closer” to the people – an
arrangement ordinarily defended on the grounds that the lower chamber will be more
responsive to popular needs and demands.
Upper chambers (or senates) usually represent the subnational territories and regions.
Bicameral legislatures may increase forms of representation, and can halt the approval of
sudden or impulsive laws by requiring additional deliberations. They can also become a
limit to the power of a simple majority and to that of powerful interests that may try to
control the chamber in different ways. By contrast, unicameral systems may enable
passing legislation more efficiently, and as a single body it may become easier for the
citizens to monitor. Smaller countries more commonly have unicameral systems, while
large or very plural states with high degrees of territorial complexity tend to have
bicameral ones. In addition, in some larger and complex countries, transitions to
unicameral systems have historically reflected growing authoritarian tendencies.

The executive power is exercised collegially

Executive powers are exercised by a collegial body: the cabinet or council of ministers. The head
of government’s constitutional position can vary from pre-eminence to virtual equality with the
other ministers, but there tends to be a relatively high degree of collegiality in decision making,
traditionally making collective responsibility, or “cabinet solidarity”, a key formal feature of
parliamentary government, even if today this collegiality is diminished in most countries.

Two general issues have featured greatly in political debates on the constitutional regulation of
parliamentary systems, one of a conceptual nature and the other more practical. The first debate
concerns the relationship between parliamentary government and the separation of powers; the
second concerns the role and effectiveness of constitutional regulation to ensure governmental
stability (Grote, 2016).

Ensuring the separation of powers

The concept of separation of powers rests on the distinction between three basic functions of the
state – executive, legislative and judicial. The separation was meant to apply to the relations
between the executive and the legislature, which had to be “balanced” to allow the system to
function properly (“seul le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir”, “only power stops power”).

The separation of powers between the executive and the legislative, understood as checks and
balances, is more common in presidential systems, but it also has a role to play in a
parliamentary system based on close co-operation between the government and the parties
forming the majority in parliament. A fundamental distinction exists within parliament between
the majority, whose main political mission is support of the government and its agenda, and the
opposition parties whose role consists of monitoring and criticising the government’s policies
and proposing policy alternatives.
An important challenge in constitutional regulation of a parliamentary government is thus the
recognition and proper definition of the role and the rights of the political opposition. Regulation
should allow it to present its political alternatives freely and to become and remain a credible
alternative to replace the current government and its parliamentary majority. In other words, the
separation of powers between the executive and the legislative in parliamentary systems should
not rely on the judiciary alone. It also necessitates that the statute of the opposition parties in
parliament is well defined and respected.9

As regards the role and functions of the political opposition in general and parliamentary
opposition in particular, there are few international standards that promote the protection of
parliamentary opposition and minorities as such. Many national constitutional systems do not
regulate these issues. Some categories that ought to be protected are i) procedural rights of
participation in parliamentary committees and the right to propose legal amendments (some
parliaments even reserve the presidency of certain important committees, such as budget, for the
opposition); ii) rights to initiate and participate in the supervision and scrutiny of the
government; iii) rights of veto or delay for certain decisions of a fundamental character or
landmark decisions; iv) the right to demand constitutional review; v) protection against
persecution and abuse (Venice Commission, 2010[12]). Constitutions may recognize these rights
of the opposition in a general manner, to be developed by the relevant parliamentary rules.

Stabilizing the government

As the government is dependent on the confidence of the legislature, governmental stability

becomes a more acute issue in parliamentary than in presidential systems. This requires
mechanisms to ensure that the government remains stable and is not constantly challenged. The
most important of those instruments are the following.

Regulating the censure motion and parliament’s power to appoint a new government.

The head of government normally has wide discretion in deciding whether, and on which issue,
to ask the parliament for a vote of confidence. By contrast, the votes of no confidence brought by
members of parliament (MPs) are often subject to a number of strict procedural requirements:
they must be signed by a minimum number of MPs to be admissible; a vote on the motion may
not take place immediately, but only after a “cooling off” period has lapsed, to allow MPs to
reflect properly on the potential consequences of their decision; and confidence can only be
withdrawn from the government by a qualified majority vote.

Some constitutions prescribe that for a no confidence motion to proceed, it must contain the
name of the person who shall replace the incumbent head of government (constructive censure
motion, German Basic Law, art. 67(1); Spain, art. 113). MPs who have signed a censure motion
that has been rejected may be barred from bringing a new one before the end of a constitutionally
prescribed waiting period (France, art. 49(2); Spain, art. 113(4)).

Constitutional provisions on the formation of the government are usually explicit about the level
of parliamentary support needed for a new cabinet to enter office.12 Constitutional provisions
frequently require a formal vote of parliament demonstrating its support for the new government,
either in the form of the election of the designated candidate for the office of prime minister or
chancellor; by the directly elected chamber as a necessary condition for its appointment (Finland,
art. 61(1); German Basic Law, art. 63; Spain, art. 99); or in the form of a parliamentary
confirmation vote on the government and/or its political programme immediately following its
appointment (Poland, art. 154(2); Romania, art. 103(2)).

Some constitutions ensure that the new government disposes of a stable majority in parliament:
the election or confirmation vote must take place by qualified majority, and only if several
attempts to elect or to confirm a new head of government by qualified majority have failed may
the election or confirmation proceed with a relative majority of votes13 (German Basic Law, art.
63; Finland, art. 61; Spain, art. 99(3)). If the proposed prime minister does not achieve a
majoritarian support of members of parliament, then the general solution tends to be the
dissolution of parliament and a call for fresh parliamentary elections.

Strengthening the position and the powers of the prime minister

Seeking cabinet stability has tended to strengthen the role of the prime minister and led to its
explicit constitutional recognition. The prime minister “directs the work of the government” (e.g.
France, art. 21(1); Spain, art. 98(2); Poland, art. 55(1); Romania, art. 107(2)), and the chancellor
“determines the general guidelines of policy” (German Basic Law, art. 65). Moreover, it is the
head of government with whom the final decision rests whether to ask parliament for a vote of
confidence and thus to put the government’s existence on the line (France, art. 49; Spain, art.
112; German Basic Law, art. 68). If the prime minister resigns, the other members of the
government also lose their offices and a new government must be appointed (German Basic Law,
art. 69(2); Spain, art. 101(1); Japan, art. 70; see also France, art. 8(1)).

Correspondingly, the prime minister (in France, the president) can dissolve the parliament at any
time and call for fresh parliamentary elections, or simply resign. How this works in practice
depends in part on the specific circumstances of each event (such as, for example, whether there
is a politically feasible, alternative government that can be formed without needing a new
election), but it also depends on the existing constitutional rules. Some constitutional rules
favour the dissolution of parliament and holding new elections, while other rules favour trying to
form a new government without an intervening election. Given this close association, both
conceptually and in practice, between dissolution rules and the rules of government formation
and removal, it is important to consider these two constitutional design issues side by side.

Source of legitimacy: Double legitimacy and inter-branch co-operation

In most parliamentary systems, the executive is chosen by and is responsible to the parliamentary
assembly. The legitimacy of such an executive is thus underpinned by the democratically elected
parliament. Nevertheless, it may happen that the existence of two agents of the electorate
(president and parliament), each endowed with different although carefully defined authorities,
can serve as an advantage for presidentialism. The key is to define the powers and the method of
election of the two branches so as to mitigate inter-branch conflict (Mainwaring and Shugart,
1993, p. 10[13]).

At the same time, parliamentary systems tend to vary regarding the extent to which the
parliament and its committees are disposed to amend bills submitted by the cabinet and the ease
with which majorities may vote to displace a cabinet. As such, the simple dichotomy,
presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, while conceptually useful, can prove generally insufficient
to assess the relative merits of different constitutional designs (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1993, p.
14[13]).
Mixed or semi-presidential systems
Mixed or semi-presidential systems are characterized by a dual executive approach, where the
constitution includes both a popularly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet
accountable to the parliament. This usually means that the prime minister is accountable to the
legislature (through the vote of no confidence) and the government can be removed by the
legislature; and that there is a popularly elected head of state (president), which the legislature
cannot remove through censure motion. Thus, neither the president nor the legislature fully
controls the selection and appointment of the prime minister, nor their removal from office.

A core idea of semi-presidentialism is that the respective roles of the dual executive, the
president and the prime minister, should be complementary: the president upholds popular
legitimacy and represents the continuity of the state and nation, while the prime minister
exercises policy leadership and takes responsibility for the day-to-day functioning of government
(double legitimacy).

The number of semi-presidential systems has increased in recent decades (Ginsburg, Elkins and
Melton, 2008[14]). Semi‐presidential systems can now be found in several OECD countries,
including France, Portugal, Lithuania and South Korea. The exercise of political power and the
allotment of authority between the two leaders of the executive vary significantly. This can make
semi-presidential systems closer to a presidential or to a parliamentary system. In France, when
the president and a majority of the national assembly belong to the same party, there is a
tendency to presidentialisation. Conversely, when the situation is one of cohabitation (like in
1986-88, 1993-95, 1997-2002), there is a tendency to parliamentarisation, as the prime minister
is truly the leader of the parliamentary majority and the president’s power decreases. Examples
of recent OECD country transitions from or towards semi-presidentialism to other types of
systems.

In dual executives, an important consideration relates to ensuring a fair balance of powers

between the president and the prime minister in choosing the members of the cabinet. For
example, in France the Prime Minister recommends candidates for appointment or removal to the
President, who then decides. Parliament’s vote of no confidence affects only the government as
such, not its individual composition.

Often the decisive aspect defining a semi-presidential system is the power attributed to the
president. Too many powers for the president can make the system shift towards presidentialism
or semi-presidentialism; too few and it becomes a parliamentary system of government (Siaroff,
2003[15]).

The president may or may not have a) discretionary power to appoint key individuals like judges,
public attorneys, diplomatic and military figures, central bankers, or regulators; b) the right to
chair formal cabinet meetings; c) the right to return legislation for further consideration or the
right of definite veto on legislation, except if the veto power can be reversed by the parliament;
d) broad emergency or decree powers during crises; e) a central role in executive and policy-
making issues like foreign affairs and defence; f) a central role in forming the government;
namely selecting and/or removing the prime minister and/or other cabinet ministers; g) the
ability to dissolve the legislature at will, subject at the most to only temporary restrictions; h) the
right to send messages to parliament; i) the right to propose legislation to parliament.
 The Definition and Purpose of Political Institutions

Political institutions are the organizations in a government that create, enforce, and apply laws.
They often mediate conflict, make (governmental) policy on the economy and social systems,
and otherwise provide representation for the population.

In general, democratic political regimes are divided into two types: presidential (headed by
a president) and parliamentary (headed by a parliament). Legislatures built to support the
regimes are unicameral (only one house) or bicameral (two houses—for example, a senate and a
house of representatives or a house of commons and a house of lords).

Party systems can be two-party or multiparty and the parties can be strong or weak depending on
their level of internal cohesion. The political institutions are those bodies—parties, legislatures,
and heads of state—that make up the whole mechanism of modern governments.

Parties, Trade Unions, and Courts

In addition, political institutions include political party organizations, trade unions, and the
(legal) courts. The term 'political Institutions' may also refer to the recognized structure of rules
and principles within which the above organizations operate, including such concepts as the right
to vote, a responsible government, and accountability.

Political Institutions, in Brief

Political institutions and systems have a direct impact on the business environment and activities
of a country. For example, a political system that is straightforward and evolving when it comes
to the political participation of the people and laser-focused on the well-being of its citizens
contributes to positive economic growth in its region.

Every society must have a type of political system so that it may allocate resources and ongoing
procedures appropriately. A political institution sets the rules which an orderly society obeys and
ultimately decides and administers the laws for those that do not obey.

Types of Political Systems

The political system consists of both politics and government and involves the law, economy,
culture, and other social concepts.

The most popular political systems that we know of around the world can be reduced to a few
simple core concepts. Many additional types of political systems are similar in idea or root, but
most tend to surround concepts of:

Democracy: A system of government by the whole population or all the eligible members of a
state, typically through elected representatives.

Republic: A state in which supreme power is held by the people and their elected representatives
and that has an elected or nominated president rather than a monarch.
Monarchy: A form of government in which one person reigns, typically a king or a queen. The
authority, also known as a crown, is typically inherited.

Communism: A system of government in which the state plans and controls the economy. Often,
an authoritarian party holds power and state controls are imposed.

Dictatorship: A form of government where one person makes the main rules and decisions with
absolute power, disregarding input from others.

The Function of a Political System

In 1960, Gabriel Abraham Almond and James Smoot Coleman gathered three core functions of a
political system, which include:

1. To maintain the integration of society by determining norms.

2. To adapt and change elements of social, economic, and religious systems necessary for
achieving collective (political) goals.

3. To protect the integrity of the political system from outside threats.

In modern-day society in the United States, for example, the main function of the two core
political parties is seen as a way to represent interest groups and constituents and to create
policies while minimizing choices. Overall, the idea is to make legislative processes easier for
people to understand and engage with.