Constitutional Law 1 Reviewer
Citizenship
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, GR 161434
Doctrine:
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries, from simply being
limited to civil citizenship and then expanding to include political citizenship, social
citizenship, and an ongoing and final stage of development might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.
There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime but “subjects
of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.”
Treaty of Paris; Upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and pending legislation by
the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects, and although they did not become American citizens,
they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”under American laws and were thus issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of
the United States.
Philippine Bill of 1902; The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for the first
time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic
Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States in
the Philippines.
that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands.
Jus Soli Principle; With respect to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11
April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines, weight was given to the view that the common law principle of jus soli,
otherwise known as the principle of territoriality, governed.
Jones Laws (Philippine Autonomy Act); Words and Phrases; With the adoption of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens” had for the first time
crystallized; The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor
General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, “The
Philippines for the Filipinos”; Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, (3)
since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
Jus Sanguinis Principle; 1935 Constitution; The 1935 Constitution brought to an end to
any such link to the common law principle of jus soli by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship.
1973 and 1987 Constitutions; Seeking to correct the anomaly of women automatically
losing their Filipino citizenship and acquiring that of their foreign husbands, resulting in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their
Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and requiring such children to still elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, as well as fully cognizant of the
newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973
Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns.
Bengson v. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, GR 142840
Doctrine:
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth and (2) by naturalization; A
person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born
citizen thereof.
Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization
generally under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.
Modes by Which Philippine Citizenship may be Reacquired by a Former Citizen.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino; As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
Republic of the Philippines v. Sagun, GR 187567
Doctrine:
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by
law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual
If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality.
The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and
other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of
election of Philippine citizenship.
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420
Doctrine:
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it
is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a
former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a
local elective position.
While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage,
those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full
and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
citizenship. Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his
certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based
on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code; The affirmation of Arnado’s
disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010
elections.
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections 700 SCRA 367
Doctrine:
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together
with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone
who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen.
There is no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen
of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country
which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the
solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has
sworn to.
David v. Agbay, GR 199113
Doctrine:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003.
Sections 2 and 3 of said law read: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act. SEC. 3.
In the case of those who became foreign citizens after Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 took
effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship
provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
AASJS v. Datumanong, GR 160869
Doctrine:
Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who has lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance; By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship.
Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what
really constitutes dual allegiance; Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department including this Court to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
The case of Mercado did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but
merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Court cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual
allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining
what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.
Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, GR 221697
Doctrine:
Citizenship; Burden of Proof; The burden of proof was on private respondents to show
that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.
Foundlings; Presumptions; That a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in
Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a ninety-nine percent
(99%) chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more
than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side
and inflict this across the board marginalization.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
Natural-born Citizens; Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be
reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disagree with the Congress’ determination.
It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having
been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
Lee v. Republic of the Philippines, GR 128195
Doctrine:
In Pari Delicto; Prescription; In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title
thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution, both the vendor and the vendee
are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto
the courts will not afford protection to either party; Prescription never lies against the
State.
If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Muller v. Muller, GR 149615
Doctrine:
National Patrimony; Aliens; The primary purpose of the constitutional provision
disqualifying aliens from acquiring lands of the public domain and private lands is the
conservation of the national economy.
Trusts; Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, an alien’s
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute—not even an ownership
in trust is allowed; Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in
evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of
the fraud.
National Patrimony; Aliens; The distinction made between transfer of ownership as
opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on alien spouse’s part—to allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which
he is not allowed to own.
Matthews v. Taylor, GR 164584
Doctrine:
Public Land Act; Aliens whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain; They are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or
private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions.
Beumer v. Amores, GR 195670
Doctrine:
The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land
and not to the improvements built thereon.
Republic v. Chule Lim, GR 153883
Doctrine:
Citizenship; The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children.
The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692
Doctrine:
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizen; The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of private respondent Jose Ong, Jr.
would not only have been superfluous but would also have resulted in absurdity
considering that it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for
him.
An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity, not through a collateral approach.
The term “residence” has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
It is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence
and domicile.
Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.
So v. RP, 513 SCRA 267
Doctrine:
Citizenship; Naturalization; Commonwealth Act No. 473; Republic Act No. 9139; Under
current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen
by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in
the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act
are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473 while Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139
provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by
administrative act.
Although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law
of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139—what the legislature had in mind
was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be
availed of by native born aliens.
Witnesses; Character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the
applicant’s conduct and character—they ought to testify on specific facts and events
justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law.
Within the purview of the naturalization law, a “credible person” is not only an individual
who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has
no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not
incredible—what must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it.
A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata—a certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the
court upon any material fact.
Citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer
upon an alien.
Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, GR 162759
Doctrine:
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law—R.A. 9225—requiring “duals” to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise the right to vote—on the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
“duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9225); Overseas
Absentee Voting act of 2003 (R.A. 9189); Considering the unison intent of the
Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage
of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of
suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
The Court notes that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be
tagged as the next generation of “duals”; If the next generation of “duals” may
nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section
5 of the Act, then there is neither rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other
present day “duals,” provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas
absentee voter.
Aznar v. Comelec, GR 83820
Doctrine:
Citizenship; Contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen not supported by
substantial and convincing evidence.
Petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains.
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino.
Statement in the 1987 Constitution that “dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law” has no retroactive effect.
Valles v. Comelec, GR 137000
Doctrine:
Citizenship; Before the 1935 Constitution, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the
country. The signing into law of the 1935 Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Citizenship; Renunciation; The mere fact a person is a holder of an Australian passport
and has an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship.
The phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. 7160 and in R.A. 7854 must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance”—persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship; A declaration in the certificate of candidacy that one is a Filipino citizen
and that he or she will support and defend the Constitution and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
Judgments; Res Judicata; Requisites in Order that the Doctrine of Res Judicata May be
Applied in Citizenship Cases.
Mercado vs Manzano, 307 SCRA 630
Doctrine:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person,
ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen
of both states.
Instances where it is possible for certain classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess
dual citizenship.—Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and
alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that
country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No. 7160, §40(d) and in Republic Act
No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”—In including
§5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual
citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates
with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.