https://securityandefence.

pl/

High power microwave for knocking out

programmable suicide drones
Mohamed Zied Chaari
chaari_zied@ieee.org

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8770-9420

Fab-Lab, Qatar Scientific Club, Wholesale Street, 9769, Doha, Qatar

Abstract

The primary research objective is to reduce the dangers of rogue drones in our lives and the consequences of extremist groups, drug dealers, and
organised criminals using them. The growing number of incidents involving modified drones proves the weakness of existing technology in
stopping and neutralising errant drones such as the hand-held gun jammer, trained eagle, R.F. jammer, and others. This technology is not
very likely to able to knock out a rogue drone and is incapable of stopping programmable drones. This article aims to examine the directed
energy of HPM (high power microwaves) in using the electromagnetic field strength energy to damage the drone’s structure or burn its PCB
board electronics. It goes on to analyse electronic attack using microwave power with high frequency to immediately switch off drones.
The effectiveness of high microwave power for disrupting drones at different distances and in different weather conditions is evaluated.
A study of the conical horn antenna of the magnetron coupling system, which has an operating frequency of 2.45 GHz, is also included.

Keywords:

high power microwave, conical horn antenna, errant drone, kill drone, high frequency

Article info
Received: 26 December 2020
Revised: 8 March 2021
Accepted: 27 March 2021
Available online: 16 April 2021
DOI: http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

© 2021 M. Z. Chaari published by War Studies University, Poland.

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

Introduction

F ar beyond being a nuisance and safety annoyance in controlled areas, including air-
ports, oil fields, and political areas, liquidation of drones is possible (Monte, 2021).
Drones are not simple toys; drones have been used recently on an oil field in Saudi Arabia,
in the United Arab Emirates, and in Syria (‘Drone strike deals a blow to Saudi energy am-
bitions’, 2019). On 14 May 2019, ten coordinated attacks using suicide drones caused fires
at a central oil processing facility and nearby oil and gas fields in the Abqaiq processing fa-
cility. This attack led to around 50% of the Saudi daily petrol production being suspended.
Saudi Arabia stopped oil production after the irregular attack on its oil-field station. On
August 4, 2018, two suicide drones detonated explosives in Caracas, Venezuela, while
President Maduro spoke to the Bolivarian National Guard. The Venezuelan government
says the event was a targeted attempt to assassinate President Maduro (Vaz, 2018). Prison-
ers used a rogue drone to deliver drugs straight to a prisoner’s cell windows in an individual
smuggling bid in Manchester in April 22, 2016, and similarly in Belgium in 2019. The
drone costs around $145; they are capable of closing airports and sparking global turmoil.
In the future, they could push a government closer and closer to an all-out war (Englund,
2019). The existing technology cannot control and neutralise autonomous pilot drones
(Bertizzolo et al., 2020). The following technologies can be used to disable suicide drones:

- Anti-drone jammer system (333 MHz to 6.2 GHz);

- Anti-drone airborne net-guns;

- Counter-drone hand-held gun jammer;

- Anti-drone trained eagle & Anti-drone catch, class (Wajeeha, 2016);

- The counter-drone laser system.

The increasing number of attacks by modified and programmed drones shows the limi-
tations of the existing technology for destroying errant drones in the Middle East (Ar-
chambault and Veilleux-Lepage, 2020). Day by day, the number of rogue drone attacks
increases in the Yemeni and Libyan conflicts (Donnelly, Jacobs and Whitfield, 2020).
Many governments purchase costly technology aimed at destroying illegal drones, but in
reality, the above technology is not efficient enough (Mîndroiu and Mototolea, 2019).
The following section looks at the danger of rogue drones in our public lives and the
possibility of terrorist groups, drug dealers, and organised criminals using this technology
(Plaw, Gurgel and Plascencia, 2020), as shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 1. Mortar drone.

The current technology has many drawbacks, as illustrated by the following examples
(Cureton, 2020):

69
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

- The jammer device can cut off the radio-frequency links with drones, but it absolutely
cannot neutralise autonomous pilot drones (Tedeschi, Oligeri and Di Pietro, 2020);

- Radar cannot detect low cross-section devices (Yaacoub et al., 2020);

- The jammer cannot stop drones working with a frequency link range higher than 6.2
GHz (Chamola et al., 2021);

- Recently, many criminals and terrorists have implanted anti-jammer systems inside the
suicide drone, which means the radio frequency jammer cannot stop it (Colton, 2019);

- Full automation drone, it will be able to use all tools as autonomous learning systems
for planning a flight;

- The radio communication between the drone and the operating stations is lost due to
radio frequency interference; the enemy drone can continue its mission independently
(Chaari and Al-Maadeed, 2021);

- High-energy laser cannon already tested against drones with promising results, but there
are drawbacks in lousy weather (Archambault and Veilleux-Lepage, 2020). These in-
clude an energy requirement that is too high (3-5 kW or more) and reflective drone
surfaces that can bounce the laser beam off the target, negating its ef-fectiveness and
possibly putting ground personnel or other airborne platforms at risk (Chaari, 2020).

In conclusion, it appears there is no natural system to counter illegal drones, no radio-

frequency jammer or any other solution (Shi et al., 2018). For this reason, High-Power
Microwaves (HPM) may be a better option.

Raytheon claims that during tests at Oklahoma in 2013, the PHASERTM HPM system
could upset and damage a group of drones at realistic engagement distances (Pina, 2017, p.
33). This type of development is by no means unique to the US; China invests more than
$300 million per year to study and make this system. The HPM weapons will become a
significant risk to drones in 2025. The HPM technique can be used to upset the electronics
of suicide drones while negating collateral damage worries. This technology makes it pos-
sible to prevent potential adversaries from attack or compel them to stop a course of action.
There are two configurations of the HPM technique; a continuous wave and a pulsed wave.
A continuous wave delivers a constant stream of microwave energy over a wide area in disap-
proval operations against drones. A pulsed wave gives high power, short-duration pulses of
microwave energy, and can provide precise drones (Moafa, 2020). Pulsed-wave weapons en-
gage a specific target set with the intent to upset or degrade its electrical components. HPM
energy (directed energy) for using the electromagnetic field strength energy to maximise
the power distribution from the antenna generates a strength field to upset and damage
electronic components. We will study this energy but all the testing phases and steps will
take place indoors because we cannot test the system out of the lab without authorisation.

High Power Microwaves Background

Principles and Applications

HPM directed energy weapons utilise energy within the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)
to disrupt, damage, degrade, or destroy illegal drones. They can theoretically use it against
all groups of drones. Anti-drone weapons use HPM as they are traditionally limited by
energy and beam physics and this can be mitigated through material hardening. They

70
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

have a low cost per shot, an in-depth magazine, rapid advancements in power, and there
is physical difficulty and cost associated with hardening airborne electronics against them.
This can damage drone electronics, depending on the weapon’s pulse, drone distance gap,
and drone characteristics (Liu, Wang and Jun, 2020). The system’s efficiency depends on
the power level, microwave frequency, pulse duration, and pulse repetition interval. This
pulse creates an electromagnetic (EM) field bordering the drone, typically measured in
watts per square centimetre (W/cm2). The field produces extra power, energy potential,
or power within the drone, measured in joules (J). The aim is to induce a strong enough
flow of electrons in the drone material to cause adverse effects. Field strength is reduced
proportional to the inverse square of the target range (R) or ( ) , assuming a directional
antenna as the pulse source. The wide variety of drones necessitates the inclusion of vari-
ous electronic components that are susceptible to HPM radiation (Tatum, 2017). These
include sensors, communications, avionics, and propulsion/power plant systems, all with
unique properties and vulnerabilities. The AFRL (Air Force Research Laboratory) catego-
rises adverse HPM effects on these electronics on a five-level scale;

- No effect;

- Interference;

- Disturbance;

- Upset (Field strength around 8 KV/m);

- Damage (Field strength around 17 KV/m).

Operational amplifiers, widely used in integrated circuits, are standard components vul-
nerable to upset, with a threshold of 9x10-10 J. Among standard features most susceptible
to damage are Gallium arsenide metal-semiconductor field-effect transistors (GaAs MES-
FET), used in radar and sensor systems, with a damage threshold as low as 10-7 J, as shown
in Table 1. Simultaneously, upset and damage effects to standard electronic component
coupling are typically associated with field strengths of 8 kV/m (bitter) and 15 to 20 kV/M
(crack). The AFRL considers a field of electrical potential of 200 V/m or more robust as a
threat to sensitive electronics in general (Majcher et al., 2020). This field strength is readily
attainable with current HPM systems at combat-relevant ranges (Gu et al., 2020).
Table 1. Electronic device burnout
and upset thresholds (Burdon,
Electronic device Electronic device 2017, p. 37).
burnout thresholds upset levels
Component Class Energy (J) Component type Energy (J) @ 1 µs
GaAs MESFET 10-7 - 10-6 Operational amplifiers 9×10-10
MMIC 7×10-7 - 5×10-6 TTL 8×10-9
Microwave diodes 2×10-6 - 5×10-4 CMOS devices 10-9
VLSI 2×10-6 - 2×10-5 Voltage regulators 9×10-8
Bipolar transistors 10-5 - 10-4 Comparator 8×10-9
CMOS RAM 7×10-5 - 5×10-4 VHSIC 10-7
MSI 10-4 - 6×10-4
SSI 6×10-4 - 10-3
Operational amplifiers 2×10-3 - 6×10-3

71
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

The miniaturisation, mobility, power, and range of HPM systems operated by allies and
adversaries are likely to increase over the next few years. Three specific electromagnetic
sources, namely the High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP), UltraWide-Band
(UWB), and HPM, are divided according to the delivery mechanism and operating fre-
quency band of the pulse. We will study the concept of the HPM upsetting the electron-
ics mounted in drones in the next section. When the system detects rogue drones, the
high-power microwave systems produce a high magnetic field, effectively stopping errant
and suicide drones. To upset the electronic parts of the drone, all its components and
parts need to be understood, as shown in Fig 2.
Figure 2. HPM counter-drone
system.

Drone components
All drone parts and elements are vital for a smooth and safe flight. Getting the details of
a drone will give users extra self-confidence while flying. We will also know swiftly and
easily which part can be upset. The main elements of a drone, as shown in Fig 3, are:

1. Brushless motors.

2. Motor Mount.

3. Electronic speed controllers (ESC).

4. Flight controller.

5. GPS module, Receiver (Rx) and Transmitter (Tx).

Figure 3. Typical electronic layout.

System design

T he HPM cannon uses electromagnetic radiation to quickly destroy the rogue drone’s Enemy drone
internal electronics or burn its structure (fibre carbon). A conical horn antenna
should be high performance and have high directivity to fabricate a prototype with great-
Microwave generator 10 meters
Frequency: 2.45 GHz
72 Power: 1KW
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

er efficiency to stop the enemy drone. We chose the best microwave generator to damage
a drone at a distance of 10 metres in the test phase (indoor lab testing). The designed
system mainly consists of four parts: power supply, magnetron, tuner, and conical horn
radiator. The magnetron-based generator is selected to drive the pulse power generator at
an operating frequency of 2.4 GHz. The conical horn radiator with a gain of 14.33 dB
is designed using CST Microwave software and fabricated and tested. The performance
tests of the designed system will be conducted in a laboratory environment and field tri-
als. A block diagram of the microwave-based EMP system is shown in Fig 4.
Figure 4. Block diagram of the
HPM cannon.
Electronics to control the Conical horn
Power output power antenna
supply

H.V Redresser Magnetron

Transformer MAG2481

The DC power supply provides enough voltage and current to power the magnetron.
It includes a capacitor diode and a transformer (high voltage and filament). Compared
with switching or pulsed power supplies, the advantages of DC power supplies are sim-
plicity and low cost. The microwave power is generated from an air-cooled magnetron
with a DC input of 0 to 2.5 kV to drive a pulse generator. The output of the magnetron
connects to a waveguide isolator. This isolator protects the magnetron from reflected
microwave energy and provides a matched load to the magnetron for effective microwave
energy generation. For impedance matching to match the propagated wave in the cavity
waveguide, the metal stub depth was adjusted at different guide lengths. This reduces re-
flected power and maximises the coupling power to the conical horn radiator. The source
of the microwave’s short-duration pulses (m the magnetron) and the coupling with the
horn antenna will be discussed in the next section.

Study and design of microwave transmitter

Microwave transmitter source

There are three main microwave sources:

- Magnetrons,

- Klystrons,

- Solid-state amplifiers.

In vacuum tubes, such as the best-known magnetron, the wave tube, and Klystron are
all strong sources of microwave power that convert electrical energy into RF energy. We
chose the magnetron-like microwave generator for this study because it is an effective and
inexpensive device (Chaari, 2015). Typical electricity to RF conversion efficiencies are
between 75% and 92%. The Klystron is more costly and not as efficient as a magnetron.
Although solid-state FET (Field Effect Transistor) sources are straightforward, they still
give low efficiencies compared to power microwave tubes. The output power variety of a
magnetron, Pmagnetron, varies from 1 kW to about 1.2 kW. Higher power magnetrons used
for industrial applications can generate up to 5.5 kW of output power, as shown in Fig 5.
In our research and prototype, we will use the MAG2481 magnetron.

73
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

Figure 5. Frequency vs. the power of

various microwave sources.

Magnetron operation

The anode of a microwave source is constructed into a cylindrical copper block. The cath-
ode and filament are in the middle of the tube and are backed by the filament tap leads.
The filament tap leads are significant and inelastic enough to maintain the cathode and
filament structure fixed in location, as shown in Fig 6. The cathode is indirectly warmed
and is made of a high-emission density material. The twenty cylindrical cavities around its
girth are resonant cavities. Each resonant cavity works as an equivalent resonant circuit.

Output
Gasket
antenna

Cooling fin Figure 6. Photograph of the magne-

tron (MAG2481).

Magnetron chassis
Filament ground
terminals

The free electrons will try to budge near the anode. However, the crossed magnetic and
electric fields move in a circular path around the anode, as shown in Fig 7. As they travel
in a circular path, they pass out of the anode’s cavities.

Microwave
radiation Patch of an
Cathode electron

Figure 7. Section views of a typical

Anode magnetron.

Cavities
Cooling fins
RF fields
Magnet Ceramic

Magnetron power supply

The magnetron is a suitable device for the HPM because of its high efficiency and low
cost. The magnetron can apply for high frequency and high power (Li, Huang and Zhao,

74
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

2020). This prototype requires high electrical power and a massive magnet. The alimenta-
tion circuit used for the magnetron consists of two-power systems, one low voltage around
(3.5 V) and another high source voltage (2.5 KV) (Hubička et al., 2020), as shown in Fig 8.
Figure 8. The electrical circuit of the
high microwave power supply.

Magnetron coupling and tuning

The actual test can show the efficiency of the HPM short-duration pulses of microwave
energy prototype changes according to the distance gap. This type of coupling uses a
vertical radiator inserted into one end of the waveguide. Generally, the magnetron feed
diameter is a quarter-wavelength of the operating frequency, as shown in Fig 9. The im-
pedance adaptation between the conical horn antenna and the magnetron feed-pin source
ensures the antenna’s maximum power distribution and generates a strength field to upset
the drone electronics board.
Figure 9. The coupling of the mag-
netron with a horn antenna.

Antenna Fabrication, Experimental

ON/OFF Measurements,
and Simulation
Fuse
Techniques
Thermoswitch 3.5 V
Con Step Cathode
Most of the challenges are connected to coupling the pulse -up generator with
trol microwave
220 V circ tran Fuse
the horn antenna to get high efficiency and perfect impedance
50 Hz uit matching.
sfor The radiation
mer
power ratio is related to the beamwidth of the antenna (Teber, 2020).
Cooling
fan
2.5 KV
The dimensions of the conical horn antenna H.V diode Anode

The antenna size depends on the resonant frequency (f0), and the flare diameter (Df).

The gain of a horn antenna (Qi et al., 2020):



Where:

eA: Efficiency of the aperture (Between 0 and 1)

λ: wavelength (mm)

75
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

d: is the physical diameter of a conical horn aperture

The gain of the conical horn is optimum in the equation (Priya et al., 2020) (1):

For calculating the maximum phase deviation (S) (Pan, Cheng and Dong, 2020), we use
equation (2).

Table 2 illustrates the calculated parameters of the horn antenna after simulations. We
have created the conical horn antenna with the dimensions shown in Fig 10.
Table 2. Various parameters of horn
antenna (fr= 2.45 GHz).
Name Technical Specification Value
Dg The diameter of the waveguide 82.22 mm
Lg Length of the waveguide 183.5 mm
Df The diameter of the flare 270.2 mm
S Feed-pin insert 43.44 mm
Dp The diameter of the feed pin 10 mm
F0 Operating frequency 2.45 GHz
Rin Input resistance 50 Ω

Figure 10. Side and top view of the

conical horn antenna (Antenna
Magus).

We affected many parameters such as directivity, reflection coefficient, radiation pattern

3D, current distribution, and the Smith plot.

Directivity

The antenna’s directivity gain showing at 2.5 GHz is 14.7 dBi:

Figure 11. HPM antenna gain.

76
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

The reflection coefficient of the antenna

We obtain a reasonable return loss S11 = -22.611 dB at the operation frequency of 2.45
GHz, as shown in Fig 12. The antenna bandwidth is around 39 MHz and a standing
wave ratio of 1.036 at 2.45 GHz.
Figure 12. The simulated reflection
coefficient S11 of the horn antenna.

Radiation pattern 3D

The antenna’s 3D radiation pattern shows that the radiation has a good directivity equal
to 14.33 dB:
Figure 13. The radiation pattern
of the HPM antenna in 3D (CST
software).

Current distribution

The simulation shows that the current distributions were different for different frequen-
cies. We have high current distribution at 2.45 GHz, as shown in Fig 14.
Figure 14. Plot showing the HPM
antenna current distribution (CST
software).

Smith plot

In the Smith chart, we can see that at frequency 2.5 GHz, the antenna is almost per-
fectly matched to the microwave source, with no imaginary part for the impedance, as
shown in Fig 15.

77
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

Figure 15. Smith chart plot of the

proposed antenna.

After studying and analysing all the horn antenna parameters and the microwave genera-
tor, we will now explore prototyping and testing.

Prototype fabrication and testing

Conical horn fabrication

This research provides a detailed description of the waveguide and the flared conical horn
fabrication process. This section also describes all the equipment used, explains all the
testing procedures and the locations chosen for testing radiation pattern measurements.
This antenna was simulated in CST to match the high efficiency. After completing all the
calculations and CST simulations on the conical horn antenna, the antenna was ready to
be fabricated as the first experimental prototype. The horn antenna has been made from
1.5 mm thick aluminium plates, as shown in Fig 16.
Figure 16. The manufactured
conical horn with the dual polarised
waveguide.

Testing location
HPM directed energy cannon systems consist of a power source, magnetron, waveguide,
antenna, and PWM control unit. They function by producing microwave radiation and
directing that energy toward the drone place. This energy’s capability affects the electronic
equipment of any drone. The conical horn radiator with a gain of 15 dB and 330 of 3-dB
beamwidths is designed using CST software and made and tested using a Vector Net-
work Analyser (VNA). We use the VNA TTR506A to measure the S11 of the fabricated
horn antenna. After testing, we only have S11= -20.23 dB compared to -21.611 dB in
theoretical simulation. The designed horn radiator is expected to have a low VSWR value
of 1.075 at 2.45 GHz. The posterior horn’s cavity expects to be filled with a dielectric
material to enhance the radiated electrical field’s intensity at the horn aperture to achieve
those performances.

On the other hand, the proposed designed system’s performance tests will be conducted
in a laboratory environment and laboratory trials. In this test, we keep the same drone
types damaged with high microwave power, as shown in Fig 17. We change only the dis-
tance gap between the microwave source and the drone.

78
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

Figure 17. Photos of testing the

HPM cannon inside the lab.

The lab does not have several obstructions, which eliminates most of the multipath inter-
ference, and the configuration also reduces ground reflections.

Results and discussion

T his is an essential finding for understanding the efficiency of the HPM energy to
stop the enemy drones. According to multiple factors and parameters, the power
density delivered upset the drones’ electronics changes (Gt, Pt, Fr, …). Field strength
lowering proportional to the inverse square of the target range (R) or ( ) , assuming a
directional antenna as the pulse source is shown in Fig 18.
Figure 18. HPM coverage distance
and power density.

Effective Isotropic Radiated Power, EIRP

(4)

Power density at the drone, S

(5)

In free space, and S = (6)

If we assume that path loss is its free space value: Horn antenna Drone pilot

S= (7)

Where: HPM generator

Transmitter power (Pt) = 1 KW Drone

Estimated antenna gain (Gt) = 10 dBi

Estimated feeder waveguide losses (Lp) = 4 dB

79
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

Then, EIRP = 76 dBm

Then the field strength at the target (S):

At a range of R = 10 m, S = = W/

After the calculation and investigation of the field strength, it takes time for the drone’s
electronics to be damaged because the field strength is very low at 10 metres.
Table 3. Range vs. power density at
the target drone.
Pt (W) Range (m) S (W/ S (V/m)

10 31.69 109.3

20 7.92 54.64

50 1.26 21.79
1000
100 0.31 10.81

150 0.14 7.26

200 0.079 5.45

The drone’s power density attack was reduced when the distance gap was high, as shown
in Table 3. The transmitter power of 1kw is not enough for this type of application. The
results are acceptable and show the benefit of using a conical horn antenna with a magne-
tron to quickly destroy the drone’s electronic components quickly.

Table 4 shows the experiment’s results and the time necessary to switch off the errant
drone (damage its electronics components). The time taken to stop the drone is shown
in Table 4, and when the gap between the ground station and drone is large, the UAV
stopping time is longer.

According to the experiment phase, the time needed to stop the rogue drone is related to the
output microwave radiation and power, the firing duration, and the magnetron’s efficiency.
Table 4. The time necessary to stop
the drone and damage its electronic
The gap distance between the HPM components.
The time needed to stop the drone
and the drone

2m 2 min

4m 6 min

6m 13 min

10 m 17 min

After the experiment test, we concluded that the drone switches off after some time be-
cause the pulsed microwave energy is not enough to produce field strength and can upset
or damage electronic components. We figured that the HPM takes time to carbonise and
stop illegal drones because the RF field strength is very low. The results demonstrated
in this research match state-of-the-art methods. Here, we compared the results of the
proposed method with those of the experimental methods. The HPM does not provide a

80
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

perfect solution because it is affected by several external and physical limitations. In our
test, seventeen minutes to stop an enemy drone is a long time; to reduce it should change
the microwave source with high power and high frequency.

Conclusion

W e proved that we could stop rogue drones with the HPM cannon in this research.
The HPM cannon can destroy any unlicensed drone pilot by RF, GPS, and au-
tonomously programmed drones. We tested the HPM cannon prototype utilising HPM
energy pulses to cause a significant problem to enemy drones. The experiments show
that HPM is a better solution with high efficiency that can destroy an autonomously
programmed drone. The HPM technique is considered the best solution for reducing the
risk of autonomous drones. After testing this prototype, we concluded that the technol-
ogy has many drawbacks including:

1. Some drones use the dispersion of EMI through stable electronic architectures.

2. The Faraday cage can use shielding electronics from the HPM attack and radiation.

3. The disadvantage of these techniques comes from the threat of unintentionally disrupt-
ing telecommunications towers and electronic devices. The stop drone switches off
immediately, falling uncontrolled to the ground.

All the simulated and real measurements show that the antenna performs exceptionally.
We concluded that this technology is not enough to mitigate this danger. Regulation
standards and roles in reducing the threat of rogue drones should be enforced. We advise
regimes to apply strict laws on the use of drones. Buying normal drones from a shop
requires at least $600, and to neutralise or destroy them, governments must spend more
than $600,000.

In our testing phase, we proved that HPM technology is one of many solutions. Current
challenges that need to be worked through before the HPM technique include extend-
ing their range and learning how the drone composition affects radiation absorption. In
the future, we will use a high microwave source of 10 KW; the magnetron used is not
enough for this kind of problem. The biggest challenge is whether the technology is ideal
and satisfactory to cause discomfort to drones protected from electromagnetic impact
(Faraday shield).

Funding
This research received no external funding.
Data Availability Statement
The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

81
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

References
Archambault, E. and Veilleux-Lepage, Y. (2020) ‘Drone imagery in Islamic State propaganda: flying like a
state’, International Affairs, 96(4), pp. 955–973. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiaa014.

Bertizzolo, L., D’oro, S., Ferranti, L., Bonati, L., Demirors, E., Guan, Z., Melodia, T. and Pudlewski, S.
(2020) ‘SwarmControl: An Automated Distributed Control Framework for Self-Optimizing Drone Networks’,
in IEEE INFOCOM 2020 – IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, July, pp. 1768–1777. doi:
10.1109/INFOCOM41043.2020.9155231.

Burdon, C. J. (2017) Hardening Unmanned Aerial Systems Against High Power Microwave Threats in Support of
Forward Operations. Research Report. Air Command and Staff College. Available at:https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/
tr/fulltext/u2/1042082.pdf (Accessed: 20 December 2020).

Chaari, M. Z. (2015) Transfert d’énergie électrique pour charger les batteries d’un robot Transmission d’énergie.
Available at: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201508131323 (Accessed: 20 December 2020).

Chaari, M. Z. (2020) ‘Testing the efficiency of laser technology to destroy the rogue drones’, Security and De-
fence Quarterly 32(5), pp. 31–38. doi: 10.35467/sdq/127360.

Chaari, M. Z. and Al-Maadeed, S. (2021) ‘The game of drones/weapons makers’ war on drones’, in Koubaa, A.
and Taher Aza, A. (eds) Unmanned Aerial Systems: Theoretical Foundation and Applications. London: Academic
Press, pp. 465–493. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-820276-0.00025-X.

Chamola, V., Kotesh, P., Agarwal, A., Naren, Gupta, N. and Guizani, M. (2021) ‘A Comprehensive Review
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks and Neutralization Techniques’, Ad Hoc Networks, 111, p. 102324. doi:
10.1016/j.adhoc.2020.102324.

Colton, J. (2019) ‘The Problems and Limitations of RF Jammers for Stopping Rogue Drones’, Fortem Technologies.
Available at: https://fortemtech.com/blog/rf-jamming-limitations-rogue-drones/ (Accessed: 22 December 2020).

Cureton, P. (2020) Drone Futures: UAS in Landscape and Urban Design. Oxon and New York: Routledge.

Donnelly, J., Jacobs, T. and Whitfield, S. (2020) ‘First IPTC in Saudi Arabia Attracts Top Executives, Breaks
Attendance Record’, Journal of Petroleum Technology, 72(03), pp. 38–46. doi: 10.2118/0320-0038-JPT.

‘Drone strike deals a blow to Saudi energy ambitions’ (2019) Emerald Expert Briefings, oxan-db(oxan-db).
doi: 10.1108/OXAN-DB246450.

Englund, S. H. (2019) ‘A dangerous middle-ground: terrorists, counter-terrorists, and gray-zone conflict’,

Global Affairs, 5(4–5), pp. 389–404. doi: 10.1080/23340460.2019.1711438.

Gu, X., Cui, D., Lu, F. and Xin, Z. (2020) ‘Analysis on Damage Efficiency of High Power Microwave to Marine
Navigation Radar’, in 2020 23rd International Microwave and Radar Conference (MIKON). 2020 23rd Interna-
tional Microwave and Radar Conference (MIKON), pp. 271–273. doi: 10.23919/MIKON48703.2020.9253931.

Hubička, Z., Gudmundsson, J. T., Larsson, P. and Lundin, D. (2020) ‘Hardware and power management for
high power impulse magnetron sputtering’, in Lundin, D., Minea, T. and Gudmundsson, J. T. (eds) High Power
Impulse Magnetron Sputtering Fundamentals, Technologies, Challenges and Applications. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.
49–80. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-812454-3.00007-3.

Li, S., Huang, H. and Zhao, D. (2020) ‘GaN nanowires decorated with Pd for methane gas sensor’, IOP Con-
ference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, 558 042037. doi: 10.1088/1755-1315/558/4/042037.

82
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

Liu, Q., Wang, J. and Jun, Y. (2020) ‘Damage evaluation of microwave anti swarm attack based on scoring
method’, in 2020 IEEE International Conference on Advances in Electrical Engineering and Computer Applica-
tions( AEECA), pp. 345–350. doi: 10.1109/AEECA49918.2020.9213545.

Majcher, K., Musiał, M., Pakos, W., Różański, A., Sobótka, M. and Trapko, T. (2020) ‘Methods of Protect-
ing Buildings against HPM Radiation-A Review of Materials Absorbing the Energy of Electromagnetic Waves’,
Materials, 13, 5509. doi: 10.3390/ma13235509.

Mîndroiu, A. and Mototolea, D. (2019) ‘Drone Detection’, Journal of Military Technology, 2(1), pp. 17–22.
doi: 10.32754/JMT.2019.1.03.

Moafa, A. (2020) Drones Detection Using Smart Sensors. Master’s Thesis. Daytona Beach, Fl: Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University. Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/edt/507 (Accessed: 20 December 2020).

Monte, L. A. D. (2021) War at the Speed of Light: Directed-Energy Weapons and the Future of Twenty-First-
Century Warfare. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, Potomac Books. doi: 10.2307/j.ctv1f70m1m.

Pan, Y., Cheng, Y. and Dong, Y. (2020) ‘Dual Polarized Directive Ultrawideband Antenna Integrated with
Horn and Vivaldi Array’, IEEE Antennas and Wireless Propagation Letters. IEEE Antennas and Wireless Propaga-
tion Letters, 20(1), pp. 48–52.doi: 10.1109/LAWP.2020.3039377.

Pina, D. F. (2017) Ideal Directed-Energy System To Defeat Small Unmanned Aircraft System Swarms. Avail-
able at: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1042081.pdf (Accessed 15 October 2020).

Plaw, A., Gurgel, B. C. and Plascencia, D. R. (2020) The Politics of Technology in Latin America (Volume 1):
Data Protection, Homeland Security and the Labor Market. Oxon and New York: Routledge.

Priya, A. H., Chandu, N. S., Apoorva, P. and Raghavendra, C. (2020) ‘Design and Analysis of Planar Array
with Horn Antenna Beams’, in 2020 International Conference on Communication and Signal Processing (ICCSP).
pp. 0987–0991. doi: 10.1109/ICCSP48568.2020.9182425.

Qi, J., Dang, Y., Zhang, P., Chou, H. and Ju, H. (2020) ‘Dual-Band Circular-Polarization Horn Antenna
With Completely Inhomogeneous Corrugations’, IEEE Antennas and Wireless Propagation Letters. IEEE Anten-
nas and Wireless Propagation Letters, 19(5), pp. 751–755. doi: 10.1109/LAWP.2020.2978878.

Shi, X., Yang, C., Xie, W., Liang, C., Shi, Z. and Chen, J. (2018) ‘Anti-Drone System with Multiple Surveil-
lance Technologies: Architecture, Implementation, and Challenges’, IEEE Communications Magazine, 56(4),
pp. 68–74. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2018.1700430.

Tatum, J. (2017) ‘HPM DEWs and their effects on electronic targets’, DSIAC Journal, 9(3). Available at:
https://www.dsiac.org/resources/articles/hpm-dews-and-their-effects-on-electronic-targets/ (Accessed: 20 De-
cember 2020).

Teber, A. (2020) ‘Investigation of Beam Width Shaping of a Ku-band Horn Antenna using a Diffractive
Optic Element and an Electromagnetic Wave Absorber’, Sakarya University Journal of Science. doi: 10.16984/
saufenbilder.726905.

Tedeschi, P., Oligeri, G. and Di Pietro, R. (2020) ‘Leveraging Jamming to Help Drones Complete Their Mis-
sion’, IEEE Access, 8, pp. 5049–5064. doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2963105.

Vaz, R. (2018) ‘Venezuela Assassination Attempt: Maduro Survives but Journalism Doesn’t’, Venezuelanalysis.
com 7 August. Available at: https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/13979 (Accessed: 20 December 2020).

83
 M. Z. Chaari
2/2021 vol. 34
http://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/135068

Wajeeha (2016) Netherlands Police Is Training Eagles To Take Down Rogue Drones, Wonderful Engineering. Avail-
able at: https://wonderfulengineering.com/netherlands-police-is-training-eagles-to-take-down-rogue-drones/ (Ac-
cessed: 10 April 2021).

Yaacoub, J.-P., Noura, H., Salman, O. and Chehab, A. (2020) ‘Security analysis of drones systems: Attacks,
limitations, and recommendations’, Internet of Things, 11, p. 100218. doi: 10.1016/j.iot.2020.100218.

84