ANALYSIS

Port Arthur: A developerts first product

b] Scotl Jâckson

- It âllstarted onc dâ] latei trIa!, $âs grârclirl lbr dle châlcc ro prole 'the prot(n\lr. gane wo t àriIc
lust alier mt birthdal. lbllo$ing rnlscll. ior 2 3 Nccks. !) I fiâ\e Rrnr: lim,: kl
proper reqùisirior channels (i.c. ,Lsk I starlcd oùt co fùscd. \\'har lxepùa. $-hi1. I çalt I erlist the dd o1
iùg ûrI rlile) T sùbntted àr applicâ e\âcll) docs â deyelopcrdo l $relt, oûe ol m) ganirg parlner. Ken
tioû lo âssist T) tsonùa with lriii Co I riâs told. ")our job is ro rakc rhis Joiùrson. ro help rrle rese:ùch tur.l dc
l,1.r,r/ nagâ1ire as â plâr lesrcr, dei el- iniliâl dcsisn and Inâkc sùrc ir;s a relop thcgdre \\'e both go topùbljc
oper. or sliter irhâlc!cr he rhought rcall) good galne. OK. hùl $hat a d loa &llcge libranes and chcrk
bcst. Irollo$irlg a bncl c\change of abolr il I ne€d to Drkc a chârge? oDr $cry book $ilh ù\
ùalor relcr
lcucrs and a couplc ol phone câlls. I Sbould 1coûtact srncon. firsl tâlk ence 10 dre Russo Jâpâncsc $:ù. Oùr
sas stlnlrred1o lind nr) self rntltc posi il o\erlrilh the dcsigùer, or let XIR $cckl) gùùiûg sessions 1ù.n into dis
tioD of Dcacloper l)Iojecr f,/r make ihe call? "Ik.)ourbest jùdg cussioos ol Èc'rc .cad. oùr im-
,1//rrl' lrrânkl), I $asâbittunu.dâr lncût. ihoûgh ),où ûighl l!âùt to dis pnssion of '\hal
ùe r\.u, rvhat the lnair
h€i s choscn for this illust.ioùs pos; crrs m.Uorchânges ir ilhrhedesigrcr eleûrerts ol it \yc'r. dd loil llese
lioû. \\ïil. ùxe that I h,rd lit.Éll_r Oh,andfo//Arr /is basicall) rhree elenerts eùr bcst hcprlraled \otes
)ears ol ph)lesliûg e\pcncrcc (aùd ganes combined iûto onc, so )ou ll hegin to pile oI. tùrd our inagiûatioûs
coDsislentl) r{elred prâise tbr hoil needrodo dcrcloplrlent oneach gaùre
s€lt I did), ànd had s€veral nâjor ar sepârntcl!. and rher ûrake sûrc lber .\ cardboard tubc :ùrircs ahoùt
ticles publi shed b) rnrious conpùues. ilork *ell logcther " $.O$'l \\'hat thrcc $eeks âfte. it ryrs c\tccred, a.d
I hâd neverdone aDï design or derel â lùck) hrcâkl lhis nmst bc â najor I nori hai e thc hand.drawr ùL1ps ard
opnenr Nork belore I gùcss I felt rhe issùc gamc, l'll hrrc to lllakc sure I countetr to $ok with. L llfortùtât€ly.
sarnc ri a) \theû I IiÉ1 sLù t.d irnirry gcl it righl beforc I send il iû the del.r) ùillcurdeepl) irto orù schcd
anicles-wh_v shoùld rn)oùe publislr though I also dcdicàte mrself r()
arrylhing I $rote? To sâ\ lhe least. I
de pcrhaps, like IIiller. this \rill
mù.riao rhe suhnri{sion .leâdline pror c to be our \irgoslâliâ l \\:c @I)
thc rulcs, reâd thcm. and lighd) dis
cùss thûr. t]leniresirdoMr aûd pla]'
ihroùgh lhe gtunc t $ ia ro ger a feel for
slÉt Ne hâre 1() \rork \rilh.
All-ii all thingsNork adqrl.llrt€l].
\\rc hare three nups-ihe ûlain one
{7-i% of thc rnàp srrface) cor ers rhc
Liaonùrg PcniDsulâ, a ffall rr.lic.l
nlap (20.4 oi rhe ûL:rp sùrlâce) shos
tiorl tnhtuand sun)ùndingeDr iroûs,
ardâtcry slllall tln.d oncO ) -5-i of
lhe mrp surlàce) shoss tle seâ areâs
l,{ÂNlûlt{tA à1truxtl)on,\nhù. rhecourten @ter
thc lârd ùrits (back printed) ând maj(r
nâlal ulits (1tûrt priûed oDl)). Therc
{t$ rre lrly) srme nep ùni1s lhal lhe lmd
V. \tt ûtnls break donn n)lo nhen pul i ro
trrof{rg . lliqoiu.., plat on the lactical Po{ Artlnr ln.lp
I Pcr;;rc .'.') lltemâiDlardùrapisqdLedrah.sllow
ilrg oDl\ nourlarûs, lorn s. rirers. and
ûi oreûilliDe I he hclical map i s very
colorli rûd e_r'e plczlsing lhe mial
nâp ,nûpl,v blerlds nrto the b:rckgrom.l,
bcùrg oûlt blackùd sirite. I he ùnils
ùel)rett) strnddd\'l ll tlpecoùntcrs:
simple )cl linrctioûâl \\'c consid€r
thesc to bt acceptablc components for
ax XTR garne
ra f.'tAncH aPR L #79
 ANALYSIS
lhe iniliil playtesl h:Ls rere ed {lâlcd balrlc ol rhe Yalû Agailr, ûol t...t1
sereral pobleûN thoùgh. Ihe ùr)ils rer) lrislodcd Discussioù, trial, ard
lllo\ e roo Iâr \!ith liùaregic \ft n cment crorbroughrlôN.mlolulinâl charges
(llre' ca1) corer thc cnti.c nltp in onc ThcscalknredrheJapâ ese tousethcir |i lt
turnl); thc 1âc1icJ nltp plalr e\actl) siege attillerl in the ballle oI Nânshzù,
likc thc op.lall(nlal lllâp: orce the bnttle breiking opcr lhal holtlcneck ân.l 1eâd-
lnor es I o the lictic.ll lllap the RussiarN ing the llussirùs 10 light rl Port Àrthur
are eâsil) orerçhelûled h) lhc J.pr tls rhc) should \\re âlso had a lictorr
Ésci lhc Rùssi,ùr n:rr) gcls blosn I]oint slst€nr thal arrarded the Jâpâ
aDa) â1sm$ ilhoutdD Japues.l{)sses Desc \-iciory |oirrs lor dre clpture of
(so !hc) simpl) tîmain ;n pon-ho$ inDorlânt to$ r that sere .lo g thc
honûg): :md the Jâpanese and ltùs- rail line (especinll] l)ol1,\rrhru) the
sians stan the gùne ir â râce to (arx1 catch was that the Vl) wc1lt do{n as
lbr) \lirkdeù drre âre no suppl) Ê 1i e * ert on (so 1lr hpaûese $ àrled
strictions to hold :ùr) onc ù$r thecoasl lo lâkcrhen ASÀP $hibihèR,,ssirnr
Nânlcd to hold tbcm aç Ioùg âs pos
Ilistordll!. lhe Jnpânese âd siblc). (ircâtl thc oFrâriond ealrl€
vtùad Jong the co$l until thc) be o{ looked pretty liltorial wilhoui
siescd Pofl Ànhur. ùd lheù molcd too ûrary special n es,thoughtheplâ)
Do!1h âk)tlg Lhc dl linc crgrdng drc rras fâirl) repeliùve tsodr sides bâsi
Rùssians in s.1 crai irconclùsivc lltdcs a{l} hâd to ùilie
lhe same I'vo deci
(thoùgh theJeancsc wcre alwâJs thc siors: 1) ho$ Inâry troops are lecdcd
rttrck.ù !r lanùiù) of lr)05 Porl al Port ,\rihÙ'. ùrd 2) how fnst or sl(xl
:\rrhur $rreîdered ùd;r 1905 the do I Inor'e on \Iûkdcn. Se'eml ideâs
bnttleof \lulidenocclrrei Followiûg \vcrckickcd tù1)und in this arcr, qi.g
lhe long (dùee lnolllh) ard hârd foughl to irùt(ne rhc optuns ardlable lo
70.000 Jâpancse câsualtrcs {s. 20.(10(l
( eâchside No reâl solùtioûs $ ere foùlrd
Rùssiân) baltc oi \lùkdcn, tbe Rùs gi\ en the time period ar.l t.rEin repre
siâns rlilhùen deep ùrto Nlturchùnâ
$he( rhc! srùtcd bûildina a 1rùl]
mâssilc âmy; lhe Jâpzùrcsc sxt âl
On 10 thc tâcti€l -gec I Oùrmair
g.ipc hcr! $as lhrt this plalc.l likc a
88Z'
lnlrnLrt Lqh nlmlrY
(orq
\fukden, ùn1lilling or untrhlc to pur
sue lhe Rùssitùrs Shorll) thcrr i.r
miniarùrc opcratiorâl garùc. Whr
bothcr? Ilowever orr rcscarch ha.l
ME turlr€r5 llÊoq Adlhry
both sidcs signcd tù tùrnistia. sho$ n tharho rsides \iewedthesicgc 'nns $orked out e\tremely
oI Foll r\rthur âs lhe pilolâl poùt ol' cspcciall! wilh {hc lendn fire nodi
'!ell.
-'eedless lo sat, lheLure lâiledlo
iollo\r this oullirc. l hc lirsl lhing 10 lhe \ral So. this LlctictJ g.ùnc iicrs. TLcse màdc unib nr clcâr ter
'rhole
l-i\ ças tle àD.operalnûi gzme . Ir needed lo bc rcForkcd lo rellcct rhal .air si tlirg ducks, i\ hitc ùnirs in lbrls
must be the most itnporltùrl. sincc ir irnportnnc!. Thc .pproach ât so nceded or at a higher eleration ivere prctty
has so rurch of lhc mâp dcrolcd to it. to sho$ thc importaùcc of lhc Russia safe (unless the
altâckergol iûto band
lhe tirst thirg lrc dxl $âs add simplc lortilicâtroùs. thc lzrikrrc ol thc ùrâsse.t ro hand coûrbat $ith theûr). $Je also
supply nrlcs lbrcnrs h)rh rides to re- J.pmese s ayc auacks (w;rh their nlâs gaYe lorts ûrore shots thm romul
ûIâIn closc to prts o. drc rail line. \\'e sivc casftJ Lics ), alld th€ imDoriânce of ùnils. rrhch rnâde them prinâr] lar
âlso changcd Sùatcgic Nloyelne t so thc Jap.ncse Siege r\dillery in orer gcts lbr ihc Jâpùrcs. (thoùgh tlrt
dnlis $as jllstdouble tlle orlllâlûrol'c conring the RussiârN. r\fler a couple of could only be destro) ed by Japdr€se
mcnt allo\ralce (orrfirsl plâr tcst therc .ltlempls torerrork rhc gâmcsilhinits Siege ,\ûllert or bt being capturcd
âft€r shorred lhât ùis $âs insullircnl. currelltconce s iyc dccidcd 10 give up by JapaDese lroops). BOY DID'IHIS
arrd ire ended up tiPUng the nue ,tnd sinpl) .cdo thc wholc hasic sls G\\lE l trRr- Otrl IOBE:\BAI-L
ûlc 1 alknrua li)r Strategic \{o!e tcm. Sincc thc operâlional garlr€ used 'lO PI-À\ l!l Both sides hâd âll kinds
In!'nt). Thcsc clr.ngcs qorken well, â CRT (Combât ReslnK Table). we of optons. ,\tLrck, feint, counter
bù! lcl! thc Rùssia$ iighrilrg to the dccidcd thâL hâvurg utrits shoot di attack, boûrbard. out flar (, over
dcâth ïourd r\aûshm {a utur.l botde rccrl) âl erch o(her $ould add morc of rrhclm. generâl âssnult, loa{ assâull
neck, ofleù provilg lo be ùnlirrccuble a "lacLical feel" lo this gâme. IÏislcd Oft of rhc best pù1s of this gâmerte
by rlie Jçmcse lorccs dclinilcly à {o a lum seq ùce ol: rrûs thât it had r nia hisloria fcel.
berlcr defenrile psitior ùa l'orl l Jâpanese Moles d playcrs orrld letrn [I{r-.ach
-\rrhur) or r rhdraNiûg ro llùkdcn. 2. Rùssidr lrrcs side did $hat thet did. b'ery time a
'I
hose lcnded b b. thc onl) bd cs u 3. Japancsc lircs pla-rer plâ-ved lhe Japanese side for
the ganc olhc.lhân thc initial. mzùr -1. Rùssidl Àlovcs lhc iir( li e the] Hould h"V]\ltl
MOVES I9
ANALYSIS
ABI)' lbllo$ thc hlstoncal Jearrese assaults $o[ld be larùrched lo\raJds histoia .âùd thcbsscs rvere,Jsals a
apprcrchi Th.re çould l-f lr gûelal those areas of the Russiaûlirc thal had sùrpisc rhc J,rptùrcsc pla) er. li'ery
10
Japrncsc axack atl aiong thep€nln€l€r lost their lbrts to the boùbaldùrcrt oneqùickl) lcrù ncd not lo rllrck forts
silh liulcoroopre 6() )bardrnerll. 1he lleài) tishlirrs. esp€ciall) lu dto llcr'(xs clcar t.râiri \c ph)cd rhis
nusscs oI Japarese lroots advar)cilg h.ûd rloùli1 ô..Dr 'llJc Russi,ûs 1{1iol ganc a loL, .lrd eDjo} cd cvcry
would be quile imlxessire. lher the $ould usuâlll be foracd ort of lhosc g netil ras delidtelt lhe besLoDcol
Russiar forts rlor d oper ùp, slorùrg load d!âs, bùl no nr.Uor brc*throùgh
the altack. FinûllJ. the rtùrgc clo{d woûld 6cùr .\ùolhcr monlh or livo lin:
Thc -gmc wrls thc !.r!al
ârd lhc Rùssirû troops toincd thc No ld b. st]cnr briDgirg ùp rhr hl)â g:ùnc. though it\rts rcill) jùs a loken
lircligl{. Th. Japanôsc ræk {ould ncse siegc r\rtilleq aDd bombârding âltcmpl to @rcr thc navil l)orûon of
l.tter. manâge to close $ilh dre ltrls theirext Russ;r]l positiolrs, though this drc qzù. Thc.c $cre or ) Iire nar al
siàns in a corple ôl places. and theù Noùldn l r2rkc loo lory. Àddilional âR:,s lh,r h.rh si,lc{ s ld enicr , d
brcaka d strean back to safet_v ha\ Jâpa esc rciùfor..mertswoùld joiù in @mbal wzls nrdghl linc
em up artd
rng lost llalf of their strerglh. lLis a firlal J apâneie attack that woùld fbrce câch ship shoots once . Thc Japmese
rrordd be followed b) ser eral ùronths the ltùssiais back i to l'or1 Al1hllr at$â)s hlcs thc Rùssims à$â!. rrith
otbonbûdrncnt 8rd tlt ari r rl oiJapa itsrlf. a1d the liussi:ls wordd ther be rirnrall,\ ûo danage \\'e cùdcd ùp
nèc(: n:inl,)rû:m.xns \(r! limildl {arced to surrend$ Tbrs Fas \ ÈItY ti}niii gmostlt minorchang€s thât sâ' e

Port Arthur Variants and Scenarios bv lâmes al. Goilon

l'ort -\ hùr: lùe RBso-,Jâpancs molemenl or ldd moremert sta.ti!g frem adds thc rcedr to lis Rèplâ.ement poinl
$ âr irom co,r,rarl nâgâzlne #l 9 slnù- lhe map edee soulh ollbe tâlu loral at slan. 'fhc Russian tlater gains a
lates Î!e 1ûd pùnion ôl thât .ahpailB for À Frll l,1obi1i1âlion variahlmâkes àll Replacenentpoint resorrcc by rclljng thè
slpreûac] iI lhc Far East in the earll )ears lûccs ar.ailâble'à1$1âr1 lo. bolh plavcn. die oû.e drd taklng the resull as his Re-
ol this century. 1 he codlict matched the Unils schedùled to aniîe on tùûs ore ahd piaccmcnl polnt lolal Aty Rusiât unn
iU prepaÈd and pNdy Led rsa.ist Arny nro are deplo],ed beiôre plày begins Gee nay æceive replacement stcps e\æp! lôr
aèairstlhewell'aàined anditsÉredImle Fiee Deplovment !àriânt abolc) ;\ll olhcr udts out ol suppl) sùrcunded bl JaI'a-
rial Japarese iorces- 'fhè rÈsult pàs â lb(es nrile on lùmonc, Russian ùnils by ùese for.es, o. occùpyilg l'ort Arthur.
pret.a.ted war with sieges, tussjle lând rajl h.vèûent and Japanese lorccs !ià na Rrsian uûits rebùilt fron the de.d pile
balllc$, and hlo decisire ,ael actiors arjv. on thc ûap via ra'l rxncncnL
edy and late in the *a. Japar established 3. Victory Poitis vandftL 6. Ndrdl Moreùenî Varia t.
ilselfês ûre doninart force lD.\sia. Èolh playes scoÉ liclory poirlis 1ôr The Japaùese pla)er ma} atempt kr
I Gùne Lengih Yatiûts. o.cùpving all ihe Japàncsc playc.rèceivcs land ùùits on aly racanl coastal [ei ir an
BeloÈ plat bcgins dl one die to alter I vPforeacb irdividual.âilMd heirhich ùnoqlsedêmpl'bious tanding. inÊteàdôl
the gaûc lenglh and Lhe ât sLafi depioy is made inopemble. Ihe Rù$irn plâr.r being r€st icted !'r landing .t ports. Aficr
ùent A di.mlloi i,2, or3lèngrhens the gains 1 VP lor eâch railroÂd hex rhich is a.noun ing the iùteùlloD to iand ùnits
gaûc b) onc, 1wo, or thrco tums, Fslec Èpaired. These vPs are coùnled as lhev along the cast, ihe Japanese plale. rolh
tively. All rules ând victory conditidF occu at anltjme du.inglhe tiun, and VPs ône die to detemine the sùcceN or la ilùre
temain ihe sah€. A dic tull ol 1,5, 016 can be gained nore thaû once lor lhe sâme ol dre altempied larding. ,\ die reNlr ol I
ieares lhe game lengh àr ten ths and 3 t'emirs the lânding to take placei a .esulr
advances the 1rm of arii'al loi.cinlor.c ot+6 neans ûe la ndiûg rvas crlled orând
denl ùrils by one, two or th€e lùms, Ary cii]- controlled hy ihc Rù$iar thôse urits nùsl rctunr lo fiei. I'ort ol
respcctii,cly. In rbe lattercase, Éirforce- plâyei càn seûc âs a soùrce ol supply lor o.isin The] may ,ot be mored again rhât
ftenls rvhich are schedù]ed to ariye on ànlr Rusiàn unils occlplilg the hei
tùns orc, txo, or thEe will deploy àt ^try
!ôn ci{y conlrolled by the Ja[nnese plâ)€r 7. StroL9i. \4otetrert Vatiùl.
slart'. Rlssian ùils dctioy jn any coÈ ca! se'ae as  $'ppl) sôu.e lb. Japanese tlhc s lart ollhc Slralcgjc \lovemcn1
A
trolledcity Jafoese unjts deploy south of Phàse càcb 1un], both llaleN .oll lhe die
the Yàlù Rirer orôrdre via laval nove- 5. Rei JarcetueùRe @e%entvdria l. tùrc and add the resulls to detemiùe the
Bclô.e plày begins, roll oùe die for n$nber of unih which my use stmtegic
2. De plal) r1etut Vùiar b. reinforcenenh lo nodilt thc t!É ol aftilal movemenL drring tiat tum. 'fhcr boù
An Eârly Molcmenl ràriant allows lo. each ùlit indilidùâlly. A die oll ol I playes anle doivn tùeir stràlcgic frore-
oft iùrn olieguldr (ovem.!t
lôr ant unit$ 3 ûears that reinforcenenh detlôy ôhc, ment iùêltions iÀ seÊt, specilyhg lhe
deplo),ed.ù rhe map al slan, ercluding the h!o, or tture tuos ea.lt, Éipeclilely. Àny unih whi.h will aore ànd theirtuallocâ
IJod,\lthu gârison ùnils which husL.e uits whicù rcceire a netr aûilal tun of &nN Then, bolh plêyer relql1hei. plans
zcroorlossaredeployedatst.n r\dieroll and all strategic morenelt is petformed
Deploynent tanant allo\rs aU
A Frce ol .1 means no change in the r.info.cefcnl
stadrg Rùssiaù forees to deploy anys'hen tinetablè. Die rclk ols àld 6delayrcin L Russidn ?'orce.l \|u.c!t Vatiùn.
cxcepr $ulb oi the Yalu Rirer Japanese lorcemeùts by one or 1!!ô lrms, respec- Optional Nle 1:12 aUo*s the Jrp.
iorces çirich deploy a1 sLld begin the lese plaler to use Fo.ced vnrch mo!€
game off map and may arire by Mval lhe Japanese plâyù rolk one die ard ment by iNreasiû8 their norement laclor

20 MAFCH APNIL #79

 ANALYSIs
thc lhrssiars a chând to defeat tlle us fioù) lill) d.rclopiûg rhis grùùeirc chdngcs llic 1r!o b;-g:cst oncs $crc
Iapârer€, especi l) il-rhe' sptit ùeir irto solnelhùg morc €njo) able. l)8rs I dloppiûg thc ho g1ùrcttcs (Nhich
Idc€r. Xlost ol our na\al corrbars \cll, \!e did gct thc gtùnc r orl çâs loo hâd, bcaùsc thc hcticâl qùnc
cnded \r ith lhe Jâptùcsc takirg hirs où 1imc, though it coùld hâr c ùscd another r!a! g.eatl) tùr.t rc irilating the rdi
rlost oflheir shbs, bùL rot losilig rn:ùr) ùnnlh s $orlh ol dcrclqxùcrt pri mrcSûalcgic\foleme l (rlhichkills
of lheln sùnk. The Russials xoùld ûnrily oll th. nâi al ,Jld tho operâlxù,l ltr) Rùss jân defense southof Ilukder
usuall ) losc ûrosl of lheir slnps. though gàxes. tsùr $ lLt çe taned ln workcd o1h.. thar alou d I'ort AihLr).
somc ol rhe biggeroft s ùoù1d sùr1 ire l'ell rogeth.r. a d Ihe tacticâl Stùùe Hl]ltID, ûot nhâlI1roùld har e done.
li) $ rlhdraç iûto Irort lrthùr. \\'h) did iï:ùs oùtstânding. I didn'l hcù mùch hulit s-\llt ssarne. Obrrcùsl] their
the Llùssiâns bolhcr t() come oùt ùrd liom \TR aflerrhal;jusr lhât thcl bâd l ier! of the pirxar) àn ol dre gtuùc
iighl lhe Jâpùesc thcùl Becâus€ they rcccirc.l our submissioù 1 aNioùsl) \ras ditÈrerl lhâù ùnne (:ud m) co
had a chance toinlcrcclr theJaptul€sc â$ailed thc gaine s pùblicâtion Bo) dei eloper). i drd teel â iitlle slighled
reiùforcrnetrts eil hloN the awar'l $âs I in lbr a srrpnsel llle $mc that becàuse the' hâdft eren contâcted
lhe s) stcnr Norked OK. bùt Dot Srcal. .tptxzr.-d bore little rcsenblance ki s hat nl€ lo discùss the chàngcs or how I
'nris is the lrren that olll lost thrcc rhough the gameis coul{l bc bclter
I had developed. nrdccd $en to Nhat
wcck$ caûre back to haùn1 us Timc Ron tsell hâd sent mc nriliâIl) Illt Èesenled. bul I would s1ill do il
ard rules largthhrùktrrs pr.\.nt.d hadurilalerâll) d(idcd ro mdlie lalor agaltr creù ibr \TR.

b! ône|otnr That optioù car t e er€ûdcd PonAfthù.is reinaorced, ilithas nor

3 = I st ,\rft!: 2nd siberiân .
Manchlrian
10 lùe Rusiaù player ùlder the sâme con làllen alread], and witl 1lilhslard in! lù Rese5e (-) 22nd lrfanlry, and 17ù LÈ
ditions as lhe Jâpanese. Allernarilely, farnl ir12302), sth Eâ\t sihnân G), 1st
eâch plald 6lls onè dic ard lhe rc$ 1 4-6 = Thc Russiar Fleet is detealed bt Sibedan Resene C) and 3.d Sjbenar
eqùâls thè nuhbcr ol unjts Flrich may lhe Japareie in the Batrle of lsushinâ as Rcsen e ( ) in 12:102), 3r{ Ehst Siberia! i '
atenpi lor.cd march Bovenenï. '1 he die )€rd6th u1st sibedan C) in (2501).
is dledagain, iùdividùally iq caoh unil IL sieg. oJPo Atthut IIiûi 5..tutiôt. Resem es: 25th hlanhy ând .11 sl ln
màking a lo.ced na..h, ard the .esult Gane I-cngrh: Aùgusi Decehber, lantry in (210?1, 6rst Rcaewc ( ) in
equâls the nunber of âddiltunal mo\e 1901 (gamè tunN !8). (2r0r).
ûenl poink available. Àny ùùirs which 11usiân Amy deplotmerr .11h. 7!h Ièinforcemenls: 2nd Reservc, ith
use for.ed march âE oùt of s trtplt d!.irg Enst Sibenàn divisions. ard the Pon Arrhùt Resen e, ând 3oth Infanût arivc on tum .
liat tuù if engàgcd in combat as the a;arrisou at lull sr.cnsih dcpio) ii hèx 9,42nd irfæÎry à!d:tlIh Infer arirc
r_'

atkcker (bùl æ nr srypjy as the de- I l-l]

lendet. Alsq un'ls which lo.ced marcb JaFnese 3rd Ann] detloymenl: lst Impenal Japanese Amiès of NIan-
Da) lol makc a strâlegic nDreùeùldur 9th, ard lltirDirisions at full slrehglh,1st chûnâ deploy'nenr aU dirisioùs and bn
ànd 4lh Rese5e Bri8adcs, a.d the qeav! Cades deploy àt iLrll strength.
9. Rbsiat Nsal G aSuppoûVatiahr. A.tiller! Divisiôh d.ploy in heies l0+3 2!d C'ara1ry Brigade in h.x (1906)
The Russiân naval lorces statoned I 142. .nd 1243. Ih ,\*orenber add thè 71h 2nd Àm,vi ath Dnision in (i9o5)
a! Pol1 Â r1hùr àssist the defenders dùing Dii,isioù al fùll st.eneth to the lâpanese aDd 5th Dn'ision in (2005), :ltb Dirision in
thè siegc ed act as long rarge siege am} The Japùtese plà)cr has lwo rcplâce (2104)i 4th âDd 8ù Reserae tsdgades ilr
artillery Russia!lo.cesdelèndinginPort (2û16)
Ârthù (hex 14-.13) or in âny adiacelr 1rei \rictory the plàye. rho controh P{fi -lth ,\my: 6th Dlisiônand IslRo
€ceire onccolùlnshifttolhe left on the Arrhû al rhe end of {rc De.enrber, 1904. s€Fe ts.ieade in (2204), lothDivisronin
(23(E).
Results Tàbtc This adjustment is Dot t2. Rdûle oJ Mhi-Sce@.io_ lst A.ny: Guards Dirisior jD
added whcÀlhe Russianiorccsarcatlack Came ^lakd.aFcbruary \tarch, 1905
lf,nelh: (2.{03), 2ùd Dilision ih (2,104), 121h Dn,i
nrc. sio! in (2502) Guards ard 2nd Resen-.e
/0, Rusia Navl
'\rmies ol thc rhsl deploy
Sortic Vatiant. Rus$ân BdgÂdes in (2503).
tseginningon gamenrm si\, thc Rus mert àll units are divisiors except rhe 5th llth Dilisnln in {2702),
sian plater rotls ole die ànd adds tlre câlalry Çorps i ùtnts marked (l deployal ^my:
5rh, 101h, ilth, ând 12ù Rcs$c Bn
resùlt io thc gaùe turn 10 delermile tlre reduccd strength, othcNise full strèngrh gades ir (2803)
a{ival of the Bâllic Sea Fleet Il ûe .csùlt alalal.y Corps ib hex (18os) 3rd lsl Dirisior in (2iO-5).
is greater than le! Lhc fieei adives âlter 2M \fârchùriatr^m): 1st Rifle and Îh ^ftrv:
Dvision in (220c), 9th Dn'ision in
tre Baille ol N1ùkdeù aft
rheie is no l5th Intrntry h (190.t), 9th lnlànrry, t.1ih (230j) 2nd Cavalry tsriBade in {19(x),
iùpacronihe gane. Ilthe Èsultis len o. Infàntrv alld 3lst llliânq C) in (20i4), 1st 1sl Rcse'ae ts.igade in {2207)-
lc$ the Rù$iai tlayer rells a8àin witù Eastsjbe,ja.( ) and 9th tàst sibr.ian ( )ir ReseFe: 3rd DilisioD iû (2205). 1sl
(2103). a'avàkr. Btgade ir (2.10-s),3rd, 7th, ard
I = T}e Rusians Bâir iive Viciory 3rd \fanchlria! Ad!
351h hfaùlry 9th R€s.ne Bngades in (250:i}
C), 5nh Resefl'e, ddTl erReseûeiù{2103), Rella.ements: thÈe poinisâ!àilable.
=Thê JalEnese.anrot usc an) mval
2 3rd Infanl4,, 55th Resef,'e. ànd 72ùd tae-
movcnrcnt lor 1{ o nrns st.vc O in (2:03)-

MOVEs 2]
 ANALYSIS
Recommendolions for m\ dclclofrlcnl nâs Fell\ scNk I I r] Io allo\ both srdcs iD â:.ne
Developers $âs sùpfosed rr) liùd ùr\ os! thcoppo unil) torro\e tùrd ro iish( a
I rcrllr ento\cd fia1e somcore ro
pla)lcjlc.s,and oDI) kne\ ol lhc loctù lair rûrouùl G.nes $itlr cirher litde
g.nùcrs I headdcdpelspccrir cs.pl,rl Droreûeùt or little ighling.re BOR
helpDrc r.sedchùd bonnæ iJcff o11
ot Ibigl ! l.(rcommend lL1! i rg fdeûds DSsr) lcs. and (Tinio s $ illbc iûr rnu I\ii 1o D(xl garners. Ard cach sidc
hcbiry loù galher hisro\ anLl frcl\ rblc Lrdeed. il lhad $itun opiûions rholdd hÙe â good ch ce àl rrcl(na
- and theù brù ûstotuùùg $ iLh
sul4})nùU drc tlcliad Sdnere, l{rltafs (at lcâ!r h\ lle Lhird plàrnrg).
rhem Thc
diffcnng Nrspecù r cs rr. reatl ) ur tcr
ir sor dD t hire lÈcn cull lieali/. b€forc I ou s Lrn rhâthe erid
estnrg, lrd somc ol rhe ro\ el ideas rlut Àfrer ) ou.lo ) ol11 nùlial res.,rch reiLil irillrareh rcscDrhl. e\acth trhar
com. lrp ûur $oû quitc $c]l Do l ùrd biaioslorùur:. drlcuss shât )où \or! ntùrL she \ou shned. l1r s:ntc
lirgel to chcck lriù toe college lL sc. as thc irnportdx âspccls N iLh llie coDptùr) ùu\ clnùgc ir (ai lnp|*neJ k)
brâdes litr rcr.arch books, rhe] :ùc dcsigncrt .orsidcr .nd con|zùc s'1l l ûie). rh. desigler ma) r.lk theùr inro
oller lhe hlst sorùcc he sh. caûre up $;rhtoBhrr \où have. soùre ch,nges, tr la)oû lÈqrlc ùn)
Bcsure to r\ thcdesignc/s s\ steùr oùr hâr c to chargc il Ibn t ler it Llrthcr roù
Lire up as nmrl pla\Lester\ as
theù 10 ph) rhe gamc
s$ eral timcs helore \où nan nrrliir: lt) nùtch D,o \our pân:rs s ell tLs ) où
) ou cax. turd get
Iepearedl] this srrs one aft nhcrc
chturges You could casil) ù{ie mis qùr, md tbcD lcrfo
tâiics $irhjlAt onc fl.) throùgh.

Port Arthur: publjshclr XTR Corporation

dcsigner: Ron Bell
A Short, Victorious War b1 Ëd Ericson lli
INTRODUCTION blood] rdlanccs nr$ânl Hrll 2o3 iD rvhich nrch inierio. Rusran lorces while lre
Ore obvious critcria lor âny ùe lapâùesc Iost l2,oarl io Île Rùssia, 2nd l21L and (lùârds dilisions orr
$argaùe is hos,well it ÉUecls rhc his 3,000 B L b) Dctoirbù 5 the hitt $as flnntcd the rilèr lire frcn thc norlh.
tort irislrl,inssinùlate This. of côuBc. taken and the big JaFnese gùns qùickly lt!\$aù casùâltrc\ Fere hexry, $ith lhe
neans more tha.jùst ùariûg an hÀlon sâtiltherenànrirgships in lhe ha{roi Où reùaininB arnr\ allemltirrB lo withdraF
cal O.der olBa lealdnâp Th€ g.me l.truâq 2 tlc Ru$iâns surendere.l, de lo the \esi. Our o\vn casirlties scrc
tuus alsodraw rcu ùto rhè l]enod, Cn spile slill lrâine 33,000 men and loLs ot veq Lahl. l hellgh{rcsiskn.ehere nrdi
inf roù a Fât l.cl lq tlle ebb ànd flolv ot cat s rhâi the Rùssians are.oncentdnrg
lhc warand prtn idtug yor $irh realisric 'l hc carlpaign ùp roûh sas, rhe Rls tlDir lo.ces fnnher westand ronh. pnrb
choices tbal rcsùlt in lrisioricâlly los sians sùiier one dclnar alter ânolhe., abh nerI-iao Yùrg.
sible olicomes. UDIônùnatel], rvhjle thoù gh thc lapanes e s,.re un.ble kJsccu.e ,Va-t 15, 19A1. Ge etul Kdîaûùrd,
this Coûmatrd Èâmc may hare the uslal
an) deci$ivc lictor) The Jâprncsc sùc- Conùardet oJ thc 5th Anry.
XIRF ish dmàysqcceenoD Llie fist ccededatTeli5sù in Jùnc, arLiaolârg in .\ue hare ,..onptished ou.
poiùt, ildùs a !@rjob nis
01 futtilg !où in early Sèplember, ând ar \{ùtden nr ca y ron 01 cluiùg the Russian rait hre â(
charge of lhe histod.at slrugete
\Jnrch àgainsL numcncal)
-quat Russion Ying I< où nortùcas! ol the porl of
lôr à r2rie!--. ol gmd reasôns. Ron lorces. ll onùnalcll, the Jâpancsc.oùld Wùchou, ùrd la{tc rhereb) prc! eDrcd the
Bell hâs chose! lo concenrâte on rhe neler lorce âdecÈite hâute. ttthe had Itùss'ars frun seùdilg arr ûirtore
lênd cÂm|aigns ând has essentiattt ie .onrinred, rhc Rusiân reseoes of '!ar
n^n nents l() P.fi r\fhùr in rhe soùth \\ic
norèd the na!âl tieater. r,Iilhi! thr\ power and haLcnal wôutd erefixâ11y nale wer sùryrised ai hoir casy il ças ld us lo
ûamewo*, he oilire a laid y \'mple ând rvoùoùt Àsilwas, grùÈiùg inremal ùùresr .nte.lhis lJortunhildcEd, rnd hor det
slraighfomved limulation wjth a ierv linallv loc€d tbc Rù$ians to seek peacc_ astadngtea&1gtlta lewailes oirait $as
'lpecialty tulca like ùnhnned srtulcEic !o t|e Rù$ion ùii \!stem. Ap|'arcrdv.
molelneDt .nd crl.enchmeùG. The Atr'TER.ACTION RNPOR'T
ùpon th. a{ilal ol lhe 12th rescFe bd
.oùntcB âùd Rap are liûiled ând lhc \\'ilh tnat as bxckeFùld, I oller thc gâdc jù the .jr! ot ! ing K bù the ertire
Santc lltès only a leû louts pèrplay. foiio$ing afler-a.lion" rporl tron vân
Éi I reiwo.k loralmosr I 50 rriles sourh ot
the war that lhis Aame coleN is oùs kcy Japaùese commahdcF nr our siru rhe citv dowû 1o FheÈ rhc 3rd dirisio!
a.tulll$!ocampaiflrsinone Afrerthc lated wàr, or plâyins ol rhe gàne. These
h.dcutdlc.aih nerrthc po of l,irzùLro
iritialJapanesc re @crpàLnrr ot Ko.ca reports rep.csent â qpical gdmc rrom m)
spontareoùslt destoyed nselfl It \ritl
in the slring of l9o.l ard the Ru$ian limited c\I'erieùfu oi h 'in8 ptàlcd tour la\c the Rù$ians neâd\, tratt a )qr to
dcfeal ar the B.itle ol ttr. Y alu al rtc end !$ù!layc! re$ùns aùd lh.cc vtitai.c
iepair rhc daDage $c hale done b! this
ol April. the land wa, .lilided nno a
Japa!eseadvan€ tolrà.d i-iaoyangard April 30, l!4r1. Oeîetul Kt oki, Cotn
n@.letoJth? lstAtht.
!b. thctr part, thèR $ianshalc cuL
N1ùkdèn, and the J.paiese sieg€ ot ihe
oi1 and destù\ed lht t2th iesene bri
main Russian Davalbrse ai Port 'The $ar blean in eânrest foùr dâ_rs gàde bùl ral is a sûall price to pa\
Despilo the qùic\ victor'\ ^.rhùr
al \tn ago wlien the ltulsraùs decidc.l lo make a The resroithe 1iù$iais hele iD the norrh
Shar on NIay 26. the Jalanese â*âutt on sland at :\n lùnë o! the \_âiu River 'fh! iraredcf loledin ahu{c arc frcn.just casL
Port A.lhur boggcd dow inio â series ot Guards .esen,e brigade d,nled doçn rhe of \fukdeù dorvn to jNt rldsi ôl ou!

22 MARCH APR: t] 19

5
 ANALYSIS

positoral Wuchou. lanàmazcdattlris eilhcrand musl sinply û!il lor rs tofirish we d.lise a plan ol attâck Ilarllcr
depl.yûenr Att milirâ.\ rhcorr lvould siur Pod ]\rthû and attack them nr $e assaults agâiùsl the enen] line hale
point to concenhatine forc.s so drât they prcyed lrtritlcss rvith no enin ol terd,
coulddrlve trr l l th dilisioninlol|c sca l9A. l4ûtla OJana, Oeen
Autustg, toq and thc Rusian losses equâling
ardre.laimlhis pôn'fhe)mùslfea.ù. corwkdet .[ the Jdpûiee Arn! in Man oùr owù I am not sùæ horv we rvill
speed riih lvhich ourJapdese soldicB force tne Rù$ia.s oùt ol \,Iùkden.
c.Ànarch àourd iheirfl anks orthrough ''Over two months of bombàrdDcnh Ieb dry t4,1905. MaÆhd olahd,
âùI eÂps in their li,res pith the collapse O|etuI coûttuNlet aJ the Jdpdrese
ald Âssâults hare ended
ln lâct, I hâve repôrrs that after ol Lhc rcm.iDing Èlislance iù Pod Anhù. I otces in À,la claria.
oùLruDnirg and drsloyirrS die fleeiry The Ru$ianloscs ncarly doubled ous bl ''Russiaù reinforcenenrs con'
3rd Eâst Siberiàn dir'i sion, iIe Japânese lhe eldollhe sicsc, ûuch better thd could tinqe to slreâm to the cntrenchmenls.
forcèl ned the Yalù River will lorce haye beer expe.led Fùihemôre, the Tnis has becone a war ol attrition as
narch I 50 miles all tli. \rat to \aD Shar Rùssian lorces elsenheÉ sc.m contenl ro our adillery àllcûpls to poùnd a hole
ùear Pot A.thu. in less thar te! dals. sil back and s2it lor our adva.cc. I his is lhroùgh tbe enemv line $r that ou bo)s
Ercn nore asroudirgly, I also hale probabl) dùe to our apparcnr lack ol stnie- .àn go over the rop. unforlùnaol),
reports llùtRusslan lo.ceshavelmleled gic wcakle$es. 'Iherc arc no straltgi. tlt RussiaD tenches, nuûbcrs. and
alùosl250miles f.om scsl oi Llùkden objcclilc! tor them to march ôn, and whât nâchire eùns haîe stynicd ourever\
in the nodh lo Hsin Chin ir the soùlh ir Japancsc lr@ps rehàii oper ior po$iblr nove, and lhe lo$cs arc moùrlingon
about the sànè âhoùnt ol tine (rhoùgb allacks are too shong ard toowelldùg in bolh sides. ll wè could onll novc
nt sone inerllicnble reâlon drey seeD to. the Rùsian$ lo hare nùch suc.css aDud dre ereny flanks, I woùld be
unehle lo crcss the urdeleùded Yalu a8a;nsl Noly that the siegd is finished, we confideût of ri.lory However, rve
ircr ard destro]_ oùr sùpply bases)l plàn 10 advaùce towàrd tho mair RBsian conti!ùe to bmp ùI' aSainst some in
\vilh slperhùmùns likr lhese wlatleed amy and defeal il in a ùa$ire baldc ol li.ible banier that hinde ou. ad-
vânocl Perhals the Rùsiansùalc in
June 2a, 19tY. À,fa6hall atdnd, Saptenbel 22, 19A4. a* ercl Kanahnaa, venled sone rcw $eâÈî?"
Ovra cohrùnder oI the Jdparese Connandù o! the sth Amt. !lla..h 30, 1901. Ma ln OJù d,
Arntr i M.ù(hutia (at thh ti,tu con ''Thc tall ol Poil Arlbùr lràs dr.mâli- ù,era CotùrM.Lt oJ rhe J palÈse
ptisin9 thz 1si, 2r.1, ù.1 3..1 Arrlies)_
.ally alLer€d the sihrâlion here in Ure north
''$rc have .ombined almost the eû Fèânng lhe adraD.e ol ùe mâin Ja[Enese ''Our Lrccs arc bein8 recalled.
rire Japanese amy of àbul 250,ûlO àmy, Ihe Russiam pùllcd ouLofrheiren, Despileoù ih.rcdihly qui.kconqùest
soldie$ and âll oloûr sieee anillery to lrchched pos'tions nèr Wùchoù aft rc- ol Pod Althùr, the sùperhùnân pe.toF
assaullPon Adhùr Tlris maneulerwas treatcd 10 theil iniliâl arc like deplo)'mcnt mance of où tr@ps, and lhe lad tbal
made pGsible b) tho incedible spcôd oi cenleringjrt south ol Liao tàng. Once lhe Rùsiàns sùfic.ed nruch ereater
ouJapanese lr@$ ând the inàbrlitt ol again we hear teporls ol Ru*ian and Japa- casùalties thân i!., ou. golemmenl
the Russians to thrcalen ânything ritll &) nese soldien nmrching lwonûdred miles lDs dccided to sùrerderl l.ân only
oùr.ause. ÀÀy tefitoN they take can ilt Icss rhaù ten dâ)s orer mouDrainoù! coùclude that the p6sibrlity of NN
easil] bc .ecoryùered by our srvilt- le.min with lcw roads and ùo risible Rùsiar weapons techrciogy has con
mor'ng forces. So far we ae Donihs vinced our leàde.s to reach a ne€ioli,
ahead otour predictcd Aùeùstâssaùlt âted setllemeùt bâsed l@!!ly on the
We are follôwirgù! the Rù$jaù re
Tlie attacks theinselves !â!è coûc bingEinlorced bv the Estof
Lrcat and are I)re llarstalùsqùo ]n nyopinlon, the
ollrêlher$ell, r'lh our losesc!rcùtly the Japânese amy slrcaming nodh lrom
only honûablc oplioù is to comit
runningaboùt urc same as the Russians sùicide. I plar lo end mt ôwn lil!
despile theù iùcediblc dcleDsire p6i, Nir,liDthe hoùr lor having led tlris iii
lion. Some ol lhis I dùsl chalk ùp to
Octaber la,l9M. llta^haU Olatu,
Overdll cotntnardet oJ rhe .lqparese
luck, bùl mDch ot this is due siùply lo REM-A,RXS
olr oveNhelnnB surdo.ity iû nùn- Wlarcanlsal? l'hc desisner and
'''Ihe Russian €teal coùtirues. They
ben and ûÈpower. I an contiùlally devclopeA of this supcrfi.ial shall
havelàllen bæh b Nfûkdcl 1€ariùe us the
amazed al oùr àbility to conccntra te i! slÈtègic ciry of Liaô Yan8. we hadhoped should probâbly follo{ Nlashall
credible nùmbe6 olmetrinto lhese sorts O]€mat eMmplel Nomalll,I lhink
10 reach this.ily â fe'v wccks eadier buL
ol ùarrcw assaslts \rithout takirg oùtra, the tr1)'ld oIXTR'S producb, bùrthis
theRussiâns musînodoubtdiginand hsht
8eôùs casuâllies! The sup(.huma! hàs 10 be the wost Coûrmand galre
qùalities ofoùr.Iap ese soldieF hale æar l,lùl<del! so wc aE gepadng f(x a
agâin shone throlgh. i .@irdentlv prc, linal bàl{c terc. rvo arc confident ot finai
dicl thal rhe porl will fall in Augùst .1
The des igncr's notes tid me thât

months belore our stâtt planners had Deteahef 25. 1901, Mdshdl a)tahùt, once I had Pla$d a gane oi two b get
otruu Contkdndet oJ rhe Japa ese used to lhe ùlimiaed str.tegic norc-
mehl Fles, lhe limited vjcbry point
Gencral K.waùuràassù!es me thàl conditioN. and lh. enLre..hment
hisaûyin lvuchôùcà!holdoùtindc'l "The ltus$iâ.s na\€ askcd iq a firG
rules, drè gamc would Ëive ne â prope.
nitel!. Our afparentlv ùnlimited mvd dayChristnàs truce. sincôthoyha'emân
histodcal leel Norlring ol lhe sort
supènority has allowod us to einforæ aged tô prepa.e such elaborate delrnses
haplened In facl, ihc no€ i played,
his amy !ril! Iwo more divisùns ard and sirce fo. some iærplicabh reason$e
tbe more âhilrôrical rhe oulcomes be,
supplt tbè ertire fùce by 5ea. The seem ùnâble tomatth arouùd theirflânts
camè. 'ro saX I was disappôi,ted
Rusian can do oothiù8 to hùrt ùs here we hàlc decided to honor the 1rucc wh'le
woùld h( an ùrde$talemenll
^
MOVr-S 23