293

WHY LEGAL HISTORY MATTERS

Jim Phillips*

This is the text of Professor Phillips' Salmond Lecture delivered at the Victoria University of
Wellington Law Faculty on 24 June 2010. In it Professor Phillips makes the case for why legal
history matters both for lawyers and historians and argues for a continued contextual approach to the
study of legal history.

I INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am greatly honoured by the invitation
to deliver the Salmond Lecture. I have long known of John Salmond as the author of one of the
leading early twentieth century textbooks on torts, and as someone who also wrote about legal history.
What I had not known before I worked on this lecture was what a remarkable and varied career he had,
as legislator, diplomat and judge as well as legal scholar.1 It is indeed humbling to be giving a lecture
named after such a towering figure. John Salmond's work on torts also made him a significant figure
in the legal history of his period, something I will return to later. I like to think he would have
approved of someone being asked to reflect generally about legal history and its importance. Whether
he would have approved of the content of my remarks is another question.

When I told a friend of mine about my visit here, to talk about why legal history matters as a
prelude to a legal history conference, she suggested that New Zealand is a long way to go to preach to

* Professor, Faculty of Law, Department of History, and Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto;
Editor-in-Chief, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History. This is the revised text of the John Salmond
Lecture, delivered at the Victoria University of Wellington, 24 June 2010. I am deeply grateful to the Law
Foundation of New Zealand for its support of this lecture, the Leading Cases Conference, and the Lost Cases
project. For more on the Lost Cases project see the introduction to this issue and the other essays in the
volume. I thank Jeffers Lennox for research assistance, the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History for
financial assistance, and Philip Girard, Bradley Miller, and Mary Stokes for comments on previous versions
of the lecture and this article.
1 For Salmond generally see Alex Frame Salmond: Southern Jurist (Victoria University Press, Wellington,
1995); and Alex Frame "Salmond, John William 1862-1924" (2007) Dictionary of New Zealand Biography
<www.dnzb.govt.nz>. His major text on torts was The Law of Torts. A Treatise on the English Law of
Liability for Civil Injuries, first published in London by Stevens and Haynes in 1907. It has run to 21 editions,
the latest appearing in 1996. For his legal history work see principally Essays in Jurisprudence and Legal
History (Rothman, Littleton (Colorado), 1891).
294 (2010) 41 VUWLR

the converted. I may or not be preaching to the converted, but I do think it is useful for those who do
legal history to reflect on these kinds of questions from time to time. Perhaps consumed by our
immediate research projects, we do not do this enough. 2 I have been writing and teaching legal
history for twenty-five years, and in that time I have often defended and defined my subject - but
usually in short conversations or in slightly less than short introductions to teaching the subject. I am
therefore delighted to have the opportunity to talk at some length on the topic, and to do so to such a
varied audience of academics, judges, and practitioners.

I will be speaking principally as an academic, but not always with the same audience in mind. I
teach law in a law school, and am convinced that history is a vital part of legal education. We are
trying to teach law students not only analytical skills and substantive knowledge, but also a deeper
understanding of the nature of law. And if I am right that legal developments cannot be separated from
other historical trends then a sense of history is vital to understanding the law, even (or perhaps
because), it tends to highlight the limitations of law. But some of my remarks will also be directed at
historians. I not only teach law in a law school, I also work with history doctoral students and publish
some of my work in standard historical journals. Some understanding of law is an essential part of
civic knowledge and awareness for any educated layperson, and a greater appreciation of legal
developments can particularly enrich historians' work, both by opening new avenues of research and
also by offering a deeper understanding of the work that historians do in apparently non-legal fields. If
we define legal history broadly, as I will do, to include not just high courts and general principles of
doctrine but also the law made by legislatures, law's ideological role, law as practised at the micro
level, and popular understandings of law and justice, then many historians already do legal history,
albeit perhaps without knowing it. Legal history is everywhere, to a greater or lesser degree, for law
surely is, as E.P. Thompson once famously said, imbricated, overlapping with everything else.3

In some respects, of course, the answer to the question of why legal history matters is the same as
the answer to the question of why history of any kind matters. That is, it is always better to understand
not just the shape that some aspect of our present world takes, but also how it got that way. Moreover,
our history is more than an explanation of past developments, it is an essential form of understanding
of the world around us, because it is invariably still with us, aspects of it remain embedded in every
part of our society. But I want to go beyond the importance of history generally and ask why in
particular legal history matters, why it is especially important to have an historical approach to law. I
will organise my remarks around what I see as four principal reasons why legal history especially

2 There are some exceptions which I have found useful. See for example John McLaren "The Legal Historian,
Masochist or Missionary? A Canadian's Reflection" (1994) 5 Legal Educ Rev 67; KJM Smith and JPS
McLaren "History's Living Legacy: An Outline of 'Modern' Historiography of the Common Law" (2001) 21
LS 251 at 311-324; Jeremy Webber "The Past and Foreign Countries" (2006) 10 Legal Hist 1; Robert M Jarvis
and others "Contextual Thinking: Why Law Students (and Lawyers) Need to Know History" (1995-1996) 42
Wayne L Rev 1603.

3 EP Thompson Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Allen Lane, London, 1975) at 261.
 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 295

matters: that legal history teaches us about the contingency of law, about its fundamental shaping by
other historical forces; that legal history shows us that the while law is shaped by other forces, it can
be at the same time relatively autonomous, not always the handmaiden of dominant interests; that
legal history, perhaps paradoxically, frees us from the past, allows us to make our own decisions by
seeing that there is nothing inevitable or preordained in what we currently have; and that legal history
exposes the presence of many variants of legal pluralism in both the past and the present. There is
some overlap between the four, and others may take issue with my taxonomy. Some, if not all, of my
answers will be quite familiar to many of you, but I hope that like me you will find it useful to have
them discussed at some length. Lectures like this, making general theoretical assertions, can be a bit
dry, and I have tried to illustrate all my points with examples derived from a number of different areas
of law and jurisdictions. My examples tend to be North American, because that is the legal history I
know best. Some of them come from my own work, for which I make no apology. I have always said
that when you get a chance for shameless self-promotion you should take it.

II THE CONTINGENCY OF LAW

First, and in some respects most importantly in the context of legal education, legal history
teaches us about the contingency of the law, about the fact that law is not a set of abstract ahistorical
and universal principles, it does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is formed by, and exists within,
human societies, and its forms and principles, and changes to them, are rationally connected to those
particular societies. At the risk of going over some very familiar ground, I think it is useful, both to
illustrate this point about contingency and to show how relatively new this idea is, to contrast the legal
history we are familiar with today with the situation prior to the 1970s.4

As English legal historian David Sugarman, has recently put it, prior to the 1970s English legal
history in the twentieth century was narrow and parochial, "preoccupied with the origins of legal
doctrines and institutions, emphasizing continuity and de-emphasizing change and contingency."5 Its
subjects were limited to courts, judges and legal doctrine, its preoccupations were in the "origins" of
those subjects, its explanatory tools mostly internal to the legal system itself, and it emphasised
continuity with the past, albeit a past that ended usually with the 1535 Statute of Uses although which

4 What follows is necessarily a brief and rather crude summary of a large historiographical change, and it is not
possible here to make all of the qualifications that one would want to make. For more detailed
historiographical surveys, which include such qualifications, see Smith and McLaren "History's Living
Legacy" above n 2; Richard A Cosgrove "The Culture of Academic Legal History: Lawyers' History and
Historians' Law, 1870-1930" (2002) 33 Cambrian LR 23; and David Sugarman "Great Beyond His Knowing:
Morton Horwitz's Influence on Legal Education and Scholarship in England, Canada, and Australia" in DW
Hamilton and Alfred L Brophy (eds) Law, Ideology and Methods: Essays in Honour of Morton J Horwitz
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), forthcoming 2010) 504. I am grateful to David Sugarman for
allowing me to see the page proof version of his article.

5 Sugarman "Great Beyond His Knowing", ibid, at 510.

296 (2010) 41 VUWLR

sometimes extended as far forward as the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 6 Sugarman says all this can
be summed up with the phrase "Small is Beautiful. Old is Good. English is best."7 This was a history
unconcerned with the vast swathe of issues which concerned historians outside the law. It was
possible to write a history of land law without reference to the economic situation of the gentry, or
their dynastic concerns, or their place in national politics. One could discuss the doctrinal evolution of
master and servant law without reference to class. And so on.

The same was largely true of other countries in the common law tradition.8 In some ways it was
actually worse because what was understood as legal history was not indigenous to the country at all.
To take Canada as an example, textbooks on the legal system or on land law often started with an
historical introduction, one that parroted the English story until it got to the transplantation of English
institutions to the colonies, and then stopped. The dominant understanding of the field, Philip Girard
tells us, was to equate legal history with "early English legal history."9

In the 1970s this changed, as scholars everywhere in the common law world (albeit not all
scholars) came to understand that the law's past cannot be separated from the host of other pasts that
historians concerns themselves with – social history, political history, economic history, cultural
history, gender history etc. Two particular historians loom large in this transformation, although I
choose them not so much because of their influence (which was substantial) as for the fact that one
transformed our understanding of the history of legal doctrine and the other our appreciation of the
importance of history to legal systems and ideologies generally. Within the realm of common law

6 The first edition of JH Baker's Introduction to English Legal History (Butterworths, London, 1971) is largely
concerned with the period prior to the eighteenth century. Even when it deals with later years, it is often
simply to "round out" the story, as with, for example, the abolition of the forms of action, or Chancery reform
and fusion. Similarly, TFT Plucknett A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed, Little, Brown, and
Company, Boston, 1958) devoted some 75 pages out of 746 to the period after 1688.

7 Sugarman "Great Beyond His Knowing", above n 4, at 509.

8 For the United States see Morton J Horwitz "The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal
History" (1973) 17 Am J Legal Hist 275; and Robert W Gordon "J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law
Tradition in American Legal Historiography" (1975) 10 Law and Soc Rev 9. For Australia see W Prest "Law
and History: Present State and Future Prospects" (1982) 1 Law and History in Australia 42; Stefan Petrow
"The Future of the Past: The Development of Australian Legal History" (2000) 8 Aust L J 4; Alex Castles An
Australian Legal History (Law Book Co, Sydney, 1982); and Rosemary Hunter "Australian Legal Histories in
Context" (2003) 21 L and Hist Rev 607. For New Zealand see Peter Spiller, Jeremy Finn, and Richard Boast A
New Zealand Legal History (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001), which still bears traces of the dominance of
the "English inheritance" in its institutional chapters. There were exceptions. In the United States
constitutional law has long been the preserve of political scientists and historians as much as that of lawyers.
9 Philip Girard "Who's Afraid of Canadian Legal History" (2007) 75 UTLJ 727 at 737. For some early writing
in the field that belies this interpretation see McLaren "The Legal Historian", above n 2, at 67-68, and Smith
and McLaren "History's Living Legacy", above n 2, at 290-292.
 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 297

doctrine Morton Horwitz's 1977 book, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860,10 was very
important. Horwitz argued that the changing economy and new political ideas of the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries were responsible for substantial alterations to many common law doctrines,
alterations which benefitted the new commercial and industrial classes at the expense of farmers and
artisans. He also showed that this occurred through what he termed an "instrumentalist" style of
judicial reasoning, one which openly and self-consciously adapted doctrine to circumstance and to
changing ideologies, especially the rise of free market principles.

Horwitz's argument was attacked by many as flawed, and some of those attacks were well
founded,11 even if the extent of the critiques and some of the vitriol which accompanied them said
more about the critics than about Horwitz.12 But the idea that you can and should locate changes in
judge made law not in vague ideas of times changing or the inherent genius of the law itself, but in
actual material circumstances, changing ideologies, and historical context, struck a chord on both
sides of the Atlantic.13 We can still see its influence, I think, in the fact that the first large issue
addressed in the chapter on torts in the recently published comprehensive history of English law in the
nineteenth century is the extent to which judges were motivated by precedent or policy. And the
answer, according to Michael Lobban, is that in some areas - and he cites workplace accidents in
particular, "the policy which evolved was one which assisted enterprise, in throwing the cost of
injuries on the wider community."14

10 Morton J Horwitz The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
1977).

11 See for example AWB Simpson "The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts" (1979) 46 U Chi L Rev
533; Peter Karsten Heart versus Head: Judge-made Law in Nineteenth-Century America (University of North
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1997) and P Karsten Between Law and Custom: "High" and "Low" Legal
Cultures in the Lands of the British Diaspora – The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand,
1600-1990 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002).

12 For an excellent commentary see Laura Kalman "Transformations" (2003) 28 Law and Social Inquiry 1149.
She notes that most of the reviews were "singularly snotty" and emanated largely from Horwitz's rejection of
the notion of law as consensus. See also Dan Ernst "The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal
History" (1993) 102 Yale LJ 1019 at 1022: "for 15 years some legal scholars and historians ... compulsively
frame[d] their research to refute Horwitz's claims".

13 An excellent example is Joel Brenner's survey of nuisance law in 19th century England, actually written
before the publication of The Transformation of American Law, above n 10, but clearly influenced by the
ideas that Horwitz had been publishing in article form for some years. Brenner asked why nuisance law did
not have a profoundly limiting effect on English industrialisation, and found the answer not so much in
doctrinal change – the basic precepts remained the same – but in the fact that the doctrine became
site-specific. Thus it was not applied to factories and railways, and public nuisances were largely
un-prosecuted. But it was still around to preserve the pristine quality of some areas: see Joel Franklin Brenner
"Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution" (1974) 3 JLS 403.

14 Michael Lobban "Torts" in Lobban and others The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume XII
1820-1914 Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 877 at 886.
298 (2010) 41 VUWLR

The second way in which legal history was revolutionised in the 1970s was via the engagement
with the law of the new social history of the 1960s and 1970s. Emanating principally from Britain, in
every jurisdiction this new social history in time brought the relationships between law and class, race
and gender to the fore. The pioneers of this literature were the "Warwick" school of historians of
England clustered around EP Thompson, and out of this group came the seminal work of Douglas
Hay. 15 In a remarkable and still extensively cited article which has lost none of its power to dazzle
and provoke readers, Hay argued that the history of crime and punishment in England could not be
simply reduced to an institutional history, one in which the pre-reform eighteenth century system
relying on corporal and extensive capital punishment was the product of a barbarity which eventually
gave way to more enlightened ideas and to modern systems of policing and punishment through
imprisonment. He analysed the logic of that system, showing how the extensive presence of capital
punishment was actually made up of two pillars – terror and mercy – and how each of these elements
was a reflection of the social and political order of the period. Terror was a necessary component of
enforcing the law because the English feared a state police, which they equated with the absolute
monarchies of Europe. Mercy was necessary because it maintained the system's legitimacy by
limiting executions even as the lost of capital offences grew, and in the particular way it operated it
was also ideally suited to a society based on patronage and personal influence. The criminal law was,
in context, a rational system, despite what some critics claimed, rational because it grew out of and
fitted into the social structure of the period. Hay's work also attracted its critics, although in my view
the principal critique missed the mark.16 The power of his argument is strengthened by comparative
work he did on the English criminal law in post-conquest Quebec, which argued that the system did
not operate in the same way precisely because of different underlying cultural assumptions.17

The developments in the USA and Britain inspired a new kind of legal history throughout the
common law world, one which investigated seriously the ways in which legal forms and legal change
– whether that change was in common law doctrine, procedure, statute law, or legal culture more
generally – were contingent on other developments which occurred outside the law. Canadian legal
history took off from the early 1980s, with the publication of the first two volumes in the Osgoode

15 See especially Thompson Whigs and Hunters, above n 3; and Douglas Hay and others Albion's Fatal Tree:
Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England (Allen Lane, London, 1975), especially Hay's article in the
latter, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law".

16 John Langbein "Albion's Fatal Flaws" (1983) 98 Past and Present 96.

17 Douglas Hay "The Meanings of the Criminal Law in Quebec, 1764-1774" in Louis A Knafla (ed) Crime and
Criminal Justice in Europe and Canada (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, 1981) 77. For another
application of the Hay thesis, which demonstrates an attempt to import the ideology of the English law and a
concomitant failure to adapt it effectively to local conditions, see Jim Phillips " 'High Above the Generality of
the People': The Ideological Origins of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court Circuit" in Jim Phillips, Roy
McMurtry and John C Saywell (eds) Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume X: A Tribute to Peter
Oliver (Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2008) 200.
 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 299

Society's Essays in the History of Canadian Law.18 The volumes are eclectic, covering custody law
and workers' compensation and frontier outlawry and many other topics. But what united them was a
commitment to a contextual, often nationalistic, history of the law. Even before the Osgoode Society
began the search for connections between socio-economic interests and changing legal doctrine
informed the early work of English Canada's pioneer modern legal historian, Dick Risk. Risk, also
influenced by the work of Willard Hurst, an instrumentalist of a different stripe than Horwitz,
analysed the private law of nineteenth century Canada, and concluded that legislatures were more
important than courts in altering the law, and that judges were only mild instrumentalists, not radical
innovators.19 In Canada and elsewhere the broad influence of Hay's ideas are evident and indeed
frequently attested.20 A healthy development in the new legal history of what one might term the
smaller fragments of the common law world produced a somewhat nationalistic history of the law. A
contextual nationalism marks the work of many Canadian legal historians, 21 and I see it even more
prominently also in the writings of people like Andrew Buck and Bruce Kercher in Australia. 22

When I use the term contingency I am not suggesting that legal developments are arbitrary or
random, or a set of constant short term changes. Indeed I am arguing for exactly the opposite, that

18 See David Flaherty (ed) Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume I (Osgoode Society for Canadian
Legal History and University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1981) and Essays in the History of Canadian Law,
Volume II (Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1983).
The Osgoode Society continues, and has to date published more than 80 books, in all fields of legal history.
See <www.osgoodesociety.ca>.

19 See RCB Risk "The Nineteenth-Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario" (1973) 23
UTLJ 207; RCB Risk "The Golden Age: The Law about the Market in Nineteenth-Century Ontario" (1976)
26 UTLJ 307; RCB Risk "The Last Golden Age: Property and the Allocation of Losses in Ontario in the
Nineteenth Century" (1977) 27 UTLJ 199; and RCB Risk "The Law and the Economy in
mid-Nineteenth-Century Ontario: A Perspective" (1977) 27 UTLJ 403.

20 To name just a few, Hay is cited by Bruce Kercher in his history of Australian law as a key influence on his
own analysis of popular attitudes to the law, by David Neal as "seminal" in his study of the rule of law in early
New South Wales, and by Canadian historian Tina Loo in her analysis of prosecutions of aboriginal people for
carrying on the potlatch ceremony. See variously Bruce Kercher An Unruly Child: A History of Law in
Australia (Allen and Unwin, St Leonards (NSW), 1995) at 206; David Neal The Rule of Law in a Penal
Colony: Law and Power in Early New South Wales (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991) at xii;
and Tina Loo "Dan Cranmer's Potlatch: Law as Coercion, Symbol and Rhetoric in British Columbia,
1884-1951" (1992) 73 Can Hist Rev 125. See also the special edition of the Australian Journal of Legal
History devoted to a 30-year retrospective: James Muir "Property, Authority and the Classroom" (2006) 10
Aust J Leg Hist 29; and Jim Phillips "Albion's Empire: Property, Authority and the Criminal Law in
Eighteenth-Century Canada" (2006) 10 Aust J Leg Hist 21.

21 For an example see RCB Risk's various essays on legal thought and the constitution: G Blaine Baker and Jim
Phillips (eds) RCB Risk, A History of Canadian Legal Thought: Collected Essays (Osgoode Society for
Canadian Legal History and University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006).

22 AR Buck The Making of Australian Property Law (Federation Press, Sydney, 2006); Kercher An Unruly
Child, above n 20.
300 (2010) 41 VUWLR

legal developments are rationally and logically connected to other kinds of developments, and like
other historical change the pace is often slow, with old forms co-existing for a period with new ones.
To argue that the principal lesson of legal history is contingency is also to make it inevitable that
different jurisdictions will have different legal histories. To some extent legal developments are
necessarily "fragmented – played out in multiple jurisdictions and forums."23

Perhaps ironically, if John Salmond himself were here today, or, I should say, the John Salmond
of the early twentieth century were here today, he would not be among the already converted. John
Salmond would have disagreed with what I am saying. As Brian Simpson cogently explains in the
first Salmond lecture in 2007,24 he was one of a small group of what have been termed the classical
jurists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In a series of textbooks these men sought to
transform the messy world of the common law into a set of ordered and systematic principles.
Accompanying this ordering went an insistence on, and authority for, the notion of the law as
autonomous and internally coherent. 25 His volume entitled Essays in Jurisprudence and Legal
History deals exclusively with doctrine and with developments in the high courts, and seeks to
discover in a series of areas of law what is "rational" and what is not. In the preface he says that he
rejects what he calls "mere antiquarianism," and instead looks at legal history "not so much for the
sake of any inherent interest it may possess, as for the sake of the assistance afforded by it to the
scientific study of the first principles of law."26 Salmond's rejection of what he saw as the messy and
incoherent common law was a rejection of history, as I understand it. His insistence that law was a
science, an autonomous and internally rationally system, was likewise a rejection of history – even
though he believed that one could uncover the applicable scientific principles through a study of
history.

In short, Salmond's vision of the relationship between law and history is not mine. But I prefaced
my remarks on Salmond by saying if the Salmond of his own period were here. Obviously he cannot
be, and as we, just as much as law, are the products of our times, I like to think that a John Salmond
born in 1962 rather than 1862 might have approved of what I am saying. At least I hope he would for
he would have been a formidable person to debate.

I should take pains to stress that there is no particular politics associated with this view of legal
history. It is true that legal history as it has been practised in the last few decades is, as American legal

23 McLaren "Masochism of the Legal Historian," above n 2, at 72.

24 AWB Simpson "The Salmond Lecture" (2007) 38 VUWLR 669.

25 See David Sugarman "Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind, and the Making of the Textbook Tradition" in
William Twining (ed) Legal Theory and the Common Law (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) 26.

26 Salmond Jurisprudence, above n 1, at xiii.

 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 301

historian Robert Gordon has put it, "a threat to legal scholarship as conventionally practised."27 Thus
there is a politics to the new legal history, in the sense that it requires rejection of the position that law
stands entirely separate from society. But beyond that it is possible to write legal history from a
variety of political stances. I have often been struck, for example, by the similarity of the account of
the nineteenth century developments in private law offered by Horwitz, which I have already
discussed, and by Richard Posner, the doyen of the conservative law and economics movement in the
United States. Both argue that tort and contract law doctrines changed with changing economies.
Horwitz disapproves of the process, seeing it as one in which some groups in society "captured" the
legal system and worked it to their advantage. Conversely, Posner approves of it, seeing it as the
sensible and inevitable response of the law to the period's recognition of the primacy of the market as
a way of organising economic life. For Posner nineteenth-century tort law was, and should have been,
"designed to bring about an efficient level of accidents and safety."28 Similarly Patrick Atiyah's Rise
and Fall of Freedom of Contract, a history of English contract law in the nineteenth century, provides
an analysis of contract law developments that is very similar to Horwitz's but which is underpinned by
a rather different set of conclusions. Atiyah tells the story as the triumph of modern ideas, not as the
capturing of the legal system by industrial "interests."29

Before I leave this topic, I want to address a claim about the law and its relation to history that one
sometimes hears. It is said that the critique of traditional legal history is misplaced, because the
common law method is actually historical, that legal history is embedded in case analysis because our
system is based on precedent. But in truth the search for precedent is a search for an apparently similar
case in a case report shorn of any context. Although the common law relies on the past, it relies on a
past that it constructs, not a contextual, complicated past. On this point I recommend, among many
others, Richard Danzig's classic article on Hadley v Baxendale, a case which still features large in first
year contracts courses.30 I like his metaphor that cases are often viewed as what he calls "doctrinal
fruits on a conceptual tree", all of which are "quite erroneously treated as though they blossomed at
the same time, and for the same harvest".31 One does, in short, offer students half a dozen cases on
point drawn from different jurisdictions decades or centuries apart, all for the purpose of illustrating

27 Robert W Gordon "Historicism in Legal Scholarship" (1981) 90 Yale LJ 1017. See also to the same effect
Sugarman "Great Beyond His Knowing", above n 4, at 504: Legal history challenged the "dominant
ahistorical tendencies" in law schools and the accompanying belief that the law was "internally consistent and
autonomous".

28 Richard A Posner "A Theory of Negligence" (1972) 34 JLS 29 at 34.

29 Patrick Atiyah Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979).

30 R Danzig "Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialisation of the Law" (1975) 4 JLS 249. Danzig's
conclusions have stood the test of time: see Peter Linzer and others "Symposium: Hadley v. Baxendale"
(2004-2005) 11 Tex Wesleyan LR 225.

31 Danzig "Hadley v. Baxendale", ibid, at 250.

302 (2010) 41 VUWLR

some abstract point of doctrine. Danzig insists – and I believe convincingly demonstrates – that in
trying to understand Hadley "it matters that [it] ... was decided in 1854 in England and not in 1974 in
California", and goes on to relate its meaning to transitions in the mid nineteenth century English
economy and emerging ideas about the relationship between judges and juries. 32

III THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF LAW

What I have been talking about so far is putting "history," in all its richness and complexity, into
"legal history." But an equally important reason why legal history matters, and a development which
flowed from and closely followed the new scholarship emphasising contingency, was a recognition of
the importance of law itself, both as a factor in other historical changes and as at times an autonomous
agent, not wholly derivative of other histories. This may sound like a contradiction of my first reason,
but I prefer to think of it as a subtle and necessary qualification, one which complicates our
understanding of history and the law by making it the more precise. There is a danger in taking the
idea of contingency too far. In attributing all legal change to other developments we run the risk of
reducing the law to mere "superstructure." This was what the leading American legal historian
Lawrence Friedman seems to do in the first edition of his History of American Law. For Friedman the
law appears to have had no independent existence at all. He wrote: "This book treats American law ...
as a mirror of society. It takes nothing as historical accident, nothing as autonomous, everything as
relative and moulded by economy and society.... The legal system works like a blind, insensate
machine. It does the bidding of those whose hands are on the controls."33

Many legal historians, while not denying, indeed embracing, the relevancy of other historical
developments to legal ones, have shown that the law and the legal system do not constitute a "blind
insensate machine." They have stressed not only that law itself has a concrete role to play, but also that
it has significant symbolic and ideological power.34 Thus legal historians employ the term "relative
autonomy" to describe the historical role of law. Law has always had some degree of autonomy, has
been to some extent impervious to change from outside influences and indeed able to influence other
histories. This relative autonomy varies in significance from time to time and place to place, but it is
always there.

This notion of relative autonomy actually captures a disparate variety of phenomena. Legal
institutions and their leaders can resist change, often because of the aura that derives from their
apparent autonomy and longevity. It took decades to effect the fusion of law and equity in many
jurisdictions, for example, while criminal law codification took hold of almost everywhere in the

32 Ibid.
33 Lawrence Friedman History of American Law (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1973) at 10 and 14.

34 For an excellent short summary of this argument see Michael Grossberg "Social Science and Legal History:
Friedman's History of American Law the Second Time Around" (1988) 13 Law and Social Inquiry 359.
 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 303

nineteenth-century except in the United Kingdom.35 Both of these examples concern deep, long-term
trends. At the level of individual case analyses also historians must appreciate that the law, like other
institutions, has its own logic, rules, procedures that do need to be taken into account as they seek to
explain legal events by reference to social factors. I often find it necessary to stress this relative
autonomy to history post-graduate students, and recommend, as a simple but very illustrative
example, an article by my former colleague at the University of Toronto, Carolyn Strange, now at the
Australian National University, about rape prosecutions in the first half of the 20th century in
Toronto.36 Many social and feminist historians who have written about rape (rightfully) deprecate all
the ways in which the law has historically failed to support rape victims. Onerous legal requirements,
and a concomitant male distrust of any rape victim which resulted in women who complained of rape
having their own characters put on trial, have combined to produce a very low conviction rate in rape
prosecutions.

Yet we cannot wholly explain this phenomenon by reference to discriminatory attitudes. As

Strange says, "sometimes the cases are decided by the evidence". A prosecution must present at least
a reasonable case, and sometimes they did not. In her study of York County, Ontario, between 1880
and 1940, Strange shows that the rate of prosecution for rape differed widely in different decades, a
fact she attributes to the rise and fall of morality campaigns in the city. Feeling the heat of public
concern, not just over sexual assault but over morality generally, police and prosecutors at certain
times would bring many more cases to court. They would bring strong cases and weak ones as they
sought to get the numbers up, to show they were "doing something." Yet as they did so the acquittal
rate rose substantially because they were too many of the weaker cases coming forward. Hence the
fact that the law has standards, and there are rules, played a key role in explaining the pattern of legal
behaviour she was describing.

A more fundamental aspect of the relative autonomy of the law has been the argument that the
ideology of the law – the idea that it is neutral and autonomous – has given the legal system a degree
of actual autonomy. Here we must return to Douglas Hay's seminal article already discussed. Hay

35 For fusion see Patrick Polden "The Court of Chancery, 1820-1875" and "The Judicature Acts" in Polden and
others The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume II 1820-1914 The English Legal System (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2010), Part 3, chs 4 and 6. See also Michael Lobban "Preparing for Fusion:
Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery, Part I" (2004) 22 Law and Hist R 389, and "Preparing
for Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery, Part II" (2004) 22 Law and Hist R 565. On
codification see Keith Smith "Criminal Law" in Smith and others The Oxford History of the Laws of England:
Volume III 1820-1914 Fields of Development (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) Part 1, and J Barry
Wright "Criminal Law Codification and Imperial Projects: The Self-Governing Jurisdiction Codes of the
1890s" (2008) 12 Legal Hist 19.

36 Carolyn Strange "Patriarchy Modified: The Criminal Prosecution of Rape in York County, Ontario,
1880-1930" in Jim Phillips, Tina Loo, and Susan Lewthwaite (eds) Essays in the History of Canadian law,
Volume V: Crime and Criminal Justice (Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and University of
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1995) 207.
304 (2010) 41 VUWLR

argues that the apparent "inefficiencies" of the criminal law – such as excessive technicality that could
lead to acquittals and a system of private prosecution – made the law appear separate from politics and
class interests. The law manifested a life and logic of its own, the judges merely its servants, not its
masters; it seemed separate and apart from those who held political and economic power. But to be
effective as ideology in this way, it had at times to be autonomous, to work against the apparent
interests of the rulers. That it did so made it, according to Hay, a powerful ideological weapon in
asserting the very class interest that the law formally denied it was assisting. 37

A very effective illustration of this notion that the ideology of the law and legality can play a
significant role in particular events appears in a very fine recent book by Canadian historian Rande
Kostal, on the Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica in 1865.38 An attack on a local courthouse, which
lead to seventeen deaths, was responded to by the authorities with savage retribution. Hundreds of
black Jamaicans were killed, many of them tortured first. The supposed rebellion itself was wholly
suppressed within a few days, but most of the retaliatory violence – almost 450 killed, more than 600
viciously flogged – occurred after this, continuing throughout a 30-day period of martial law. Some
were "tried" by military tribunals before execution, most were simply gunned down. The Morant Bay
Rebellion had been the subject of a number of studies by historians of Jamaica and of the empire, but
Kostal's book greatly enriches our understanding of the event, by writing abut it as legal history. He
deals principally with the aftermath in England, demonstrating that law mattered in the fierce debates
over the affair, that those debates reveal a profound penetration into the language used by what he
terms the "political class" of the 1860s of concepts of law and legality. The peculiar characteristics of
empire, especially the non-white empire, posed considerable challenges to the English peoples'
conceptions of themselves as a moral nation. Many Englishmen believed that "their countrymen had
betrayed the minimum demands of civilized conduct," which was to act according to law, and that the
suppression of the Morant Bay disturbance was "a matter of intense shame" for them.39 At the end of
the day politics prevailed over law, and attempts to prosecute Governor Eyre failed, but the long
drawn out inquiries and proceedings revealed an extraordinarily spirited demand for law and legality
that was a key part of the history of the rebellion and its aftermath.

In short, what these examples reveal is that while almost all legal historians now reject the notion
that the law is in and of itself autonomous, most accept a degree of relative autonomy derived from the
nature of legal institutions or the ideology of the law and legality, or both. This autonomy varies in its
extent from time to time and place to place and subject to subject, but it is an important part of legal
history and, consequently, an important lesson that legal history can teach about the nature of law, a
lesson as important as the message of contingency.

37 Hay "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", above n 15.

38 RW Kostal A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, New
York and London, 2005).

39 Ibid, at 460-461.
 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 305

IV LEGAL HISTORY IS LIBERATING

My third reason why legal history matters is in substantial measure a derivative of the first. The
contingency that I have described is liberating. Appreciating the message of contingency demystifies
the law, removes history as authority in itself, and makes it possible for current students and
practitioners to envisage other worlds, other ways of doing things. Earlier I described the state of
English legal history before the 1970s. In one sense that was an unfair characterisation, because this
point was understood long ago by the pioneer English legal historian, F.W. Maitland. Maitland indeed
could have been the person who brought the common law world's legal history into the modern
period, had he created a set of disciples rather then be effectively ignored for decades. He believed in
a legal history which "brought out" all the "political, social, economic and moral aspects" of legal
developments.40 In a famous and often-used quotation on the question of the usefulness of legal
history, Maitland asserted: "The only direct utility of legal history ... lies in the lesson that each
generation has an enormous power of shaping its own law. I don't think that the study of legal history
would make men fatalists; I doubt that it would make them conservatives. I am sure that it would free
them from superstitions and teach them that they have free hands."41

Maitland's point has been made in different ways by many modern commentators. History
destabilizes that mode of current legal argument which purportedly relies on the past as authority.
There is much apparent and beguiling continuity in the law, with institutions like the jury or doctrines
like "nuisance" or underlying ideas like "freedom of contract" having been around for a long time. But
in many cases the words stay the same but the meaning changes. As Jeremy Webber has put it,
adapting the famous aphorism "The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there," we
need to appreciate "how the decisions of the past were often made in profoundly different institutional
contexts and with different questions in mind."42 Stuart Banner puts it this way: "History ... written
according to the conventions of late twentieth century professional historians, with an emphasis on the
ways in which the past differed from the present ... enormously complicates the task of legal
argument. If the texts that constitute today's legal authority were written by people who used words
differently from the way we use them today, who thought differently than the way we think today, ...
the past no longer speaks with an authoritative voice. It can no longer serve as a safe harbour."43

40 FW Maitland "Why the History of English Law is Not Written" in HAL Fisher (ed) Collected Papers of
Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911) 485.

41 "Maitland to AV Dicey, c. July 1896" in PNR Zutshi (ed) The Letters of Frederic William Maitland, Volume
II (Selden Society, London, 1995) 105.

42 Webber "The Past and Foreign Countries", above n 2, at 2.

43 Stuart Banner "Legal History and Legal Scholarship" (1998) 76 Wash ULQ 37 at 37. See also generally
Robert W Gordon "The Past as Authority and Social Critic: Stabilizing and Destabilizing Functions of History
in Legal Argument" in Terrence J McDonald (ed) The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996) 339.
306 (2010) 41 VUWLR

I am not suggesting here that the understanding that we get from appreciating history and its
message of contingency can lead judges or others to the "correct" contemporary answers. History
may, at most, admonish us against repeating the mistakes of the past (although there is regrettably
little evidence of that), but it does not provide the correct answer. For that we must exert all our other
modes of interpretation and analysis, our sense of justice, our desire to see certain policies put into
place that we think will benefit society.

Moreover, judges cannot make good historians, because when the judicial process turns to history
it usually does so to find justification, not nuanced analysis.44 The legal historians job in this respect
is to discourage blind reliance on the past as justification of current decisions. We tend perhaps to
think of the originalist argument in American constitutional adjudication as the most blatant example
of trying to use history to find the answer – the constitution must mean in 2010 exactly and only what
it meant in the late eighteenth century. 45 It is easy to reject this kind of originalism both because it
seems absurd and because it is so uniquely American, but "originalism" operates in more subtle forms
in many contexts.

The late Chief Justice of Canada, Brian Dickson, is widely considered to be a great judge,46 and
indeed he provides me with one of my favourite classroom aphorisms: "A page of history may
illuminate more than a book of logic."47 But he could also be an originalist in some areas. Whenever
Dickson CJC was required to write about the jury – an exclusionary rule of evidence was the most
common occasion – he tended to lavishly praise the institution and to insist that juries should be
trusted to make the right decisions. He would often bolster this contemporary policy preference by a
paean to the jury, talking about its centrality to the English criminal trial for centuries past, its place as
part of the genius of the common law and the English constitution, etc. In R v Corbett, for example, he
insisted that "we should retain our strong faith in juries" because, quoting the famous
nineteenth-century legal historian Sir William Holdsworth, they had been a cornerstone of the system
for "some hundreds of years."48

44 For an argument that the Supreme Court of Canada recently misused labour law history even while, ironically,
finding that the Charter of Rights included a right to bargain collectively, see Eric Tucker "The Constitutional
Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of Labour History in the Supreme Court of Canada" (2008) 61
Labour/Le Travail 151. See also R Blake Brown "One Version of History: The Supreme Court of Canada's
Use of History in the Quebec Secession Reference" in Penny Bryden and Dimitry Anastakis (eds) Framing
Federalism for the Twenty-First Century: Historical Essays in Honour of John T Saywell (University of
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2009) 15.

45 There is a vast literature on this, much of it critical of the courts' use of history. For a useful survey see
Matthew J Festa "Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law" (2008) 38 Seton Hall L Rev 479.

46 See Robert J Sharpe and Kent Roach Brian Dickson: A Judge's Journey (Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal
History and University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2003).

47 R v Wetmore (1983) 2 SCR 284.

48 R v Corbett (1988) 1 SCR 670 at 693.

 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 307

But this is less than convincing if we consider what we know of the eighteenth century jury. The
one that operated in the English colony of Nova Scotia in the second half of the eighteenth century
was based very much on the English model and followed English practice.49 When the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia met for one of its quarterly terms it would select trial 36 jurors for the session,
and they would sit for the whole of the session. They would hear half a dozen criminal cases a day,
some of them capital, and they would do so in largely the same panels of 12, although there could be
small changes here and there. At the end of each trial they would sometimes retire for 10 or 15
minutes, but sometimes they would not – they would huddle together and discuss their verdict in the
courtroom. They did give a verdict at the end of each case, something which was, in the broad sweep
of things, a relatively new practice. Before the late seventeenth century English juries gave their
verdicts on all cases at the end of the day. It was indeed the introduction of verdicts at the end of each
case that brought juries to sit together; previously jurors scattered themselves around the courtroom.

In addition, all this was taking place in a small community, with the inevitable result that jurymen
often knew prosecutors and the accused. In one case a man sat on a jury for the first trial of the day,
came off it to prosecute the second case (the vast majority of criminal cases before the nineteenth
century were by private prosecution by the victim), and returned to the jury for the third. This kind of
personal knowledge of all those involved was not considered a bad thing, it helped juries to weight
evidence and character. My point here is that I have just described an institution with the same name
as one we now have, and formally similar (12 people, sitting together) but which operated entirely
differently. An understanding of those differences would surely caution anybody against historical
longevity as justification. There are good and not so good arguments for keeping the jury; history is
not one of them.

Before leaving this section, it is useful to consider a critique of this apparently limited view of the
utility of legal history. Recent decades have seen law schools become much more interdisciplinary,
and as a result we now have legal scholars arguing not simply that law is best understood through the
lens of economics or philosophy, but that these other disciplines can provide normative answers to
difficult questions – the very thing that I have said history cannot do. History is therefore, our critics
might say, simply much less useful than other disciplines. It seems to me that there are two answers to
this. One is that, assuming that economics, for example, does show us the right way forward, then by
showing that the past cannot be simply relied on for justification history allows the ground to be
cleared for the application of some other theory or policy to contemporary problems. Paraphrasing

49 For what follows see Jim Phillips "The Criminal Trial in Nova Scotia, 1749-1815" in G Blaine Baker and Jim
Phillips (eds) Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume VIII – In Honour of RCB Risk (Osgoode Society
for Canadian Legal History and University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1999) 469 and "Halifax Juries in the
Eighteenth Century" in Simon Devereaux, Greg Smith, and Allyson May (eds) Criminal Justice in the Old
World and the New: Essays in Honour of JM Beattie (University of Toronto Centre of Criminology, Toronto,
1998) 135. For a similar account of the English trial jury in the eighteenth century see JM Beattie Crime and
the Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986).
308 (2010) 41 VUWLR

Maitland, legal history frees the hands of the followers of Richard Posner. I would not want the law to
follow Posnerian dictates, but that is another issue for another day. The point is that history and other
disciplines can be complementary, the one going to our understanding of how we got where we are the
other arguing for a future path.

My second response is rather less conciliatory. In some respects the assertion of interdisciplinary
scholars is not simply that law ought to follow a certain line of development, but that it already does,
that it is in its very nature a distinctive way of thinking about the world of social relations. 50 In short,
formalism has it right and the law is separate from the world in which it operates. Or, as some assert,
the law is entirely determined by the natural laws of the market. Here legal history cannot merely
complement the economists and philosophers, it is a direct challenge to them. History shows us that a
complex set of phenomena have shaped our law and legal institutions, whether we like it or not. John
Weaver convincingly shows that governments, not private ordering, were crucial to what he calls
"The Great Land Rush" of the European empires, whatever conservative development economists
might like to assert.51 At the other extreme, Edward White, a leading American torts history scholar,
many years ago was required to defend his thesis – that tort law emerged as a result of the parallel
emergence of "conceptualism" in American thought – against critics who deprecated the suggestion
that he had painted a picture of law as transitory: "It may well be threatening to persons whose
principal business is the production of scholarship in which they seek to persuade others of the
soundness and validity of their ideas to be told that the prominence of ideas is culturally determined
and the lasting power of ideas only temporary. But the history of tort law in America suggest that
view."52

V LEGAL HISTORY, LEGAL PLURALISM AND ALTERNATIVE

VISIONS
The fourth reason why legal history matters for understanding the complexity of law is that it
allows us to see that what we think of as the law today, and then assume to have always been the case,
has in fact not always predominated. The jury example I have just used to make a different point is an
example of this. Not just the practices of the institution but also the ideas underlying those practices
were radically different from what they are today. More generally, like all history, legal history
produces "winners" and "losers." Losers are those whose vision of society and belief systems lost out
in the struggle with other visions. Legal history enables us to excavate the past for such phenomena, to

50 See for example Ernest J Weinrib The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2005).

51 John C Weaver The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900 (McGill-Queen's
University Press, Montreal, 2003), especially ch 2.

52 G Edward White Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1984) at xi.
 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 309

show that there have been, and thus are, arguably legitimately different ways to think about many
things, including legal orders.

There are many illustrations of what many would call legal pluralism but which I like to term
"alternative visions" that I could use here. I will begin with examples of alternatives that have actually
become the norm after a period of being lost. An excellent illustration of this is the role of history in
the modern development of the law relating to aboriginal rights in Canada,53 and this is an especially
good example because as I understand it a similar story could be told about Australia and New
Zealand.54 In a famous statement in 1969 then Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced
that there was no such thing as rights for aboriginal people distinct from those held by all other
Canadians. In a sense he was right, for one could not find any judicial or legislative statement to the
contrary in the twentieth century. But those few legal historians who had looked at the question had
found a variety of sources – some cases and also government policies, some dealing with areas that
became part of Canada, others dealing with other parts of the empire – that said differently, that said
that at one time it was part of the common law that indigenous peoples had rights in their land and
other kinds of rights. But that legal tradition that had been effectively erased from the law books and
thus from the world view of society and politicians. Indeed in Canada it was so much lost that in 1927
it was made an offence to raise money for the purpose of prosecuting Indian land claims without the
consent of the superintendent general of Indians.

When the matter did finally get into a courtroom, and to the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Calder case in the early 1970s, the Court relied on cases and practices long forgotten to assert, or
rather re-assert, the idea of native title.55 Here there was a particular irony, for the last decades of the
nineteenth century saw a dispute between the federal government and the province of British
Columbia about native title. The later denied its existence, while the former asserted it, indeed could
hardly do otherwise because it had devoted considerable resources in the 1870s to negotiating a set of
treaties to extinguish it in much of the Canadian west. In the early twentieth century the federal
government decided to test the issue in court, and a legal opinion was prepared in the Department of
Justice. That opinion was so comprehensive and so much in line with what the Supreme Court of
Canada finally decided that it could have been simply adopted as a judgment by the Court seventy

53 For what follows see Hamar Foster "Letting Go the Bone: The Idea of Indian Title in British Columbia,
1849-1927" in Hamar Foster and John McLaren (eds) Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume VI:
British Columbia and the Yukon (Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and University of Toronto
Press, Toronto, 1995) 28; Hamar Foster "The Romance of the Lost: The Role of Tom MacInnes in the History
of the British Columbia Land Question" in Baker and Phillips (eds) Essays in Honour of RCB Risk, above n
49, at 171; and Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, and Jeremy Webber (eds) Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title,
the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver,
2007).

54 See Henry Reynolds "The Judges Judged: Mabo and the Disaffected Historians" (2007) 11 Legal Hist 231.

55 Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR 3d 145 (SCC).

310 (2010) 41 VUWLR

years later. Yet at that time, because of an intervening election, the case was never brought forward
and the legal opinion literally "lost" in the Department archives.

A second aspect of the Canadian story about aboriginal rights involves legal pluralism. Again, it
was asserted throughout the twentieth century that there was no place in Canadian law for anything
other than European law. Yet historians investigating practice in the period before extensive
settlement found judges and officials perfectly willing to accept that in many inter se matters
aboriginal law was the touchstone for dispute resolution. The most famous such case occurred as late
as the 1860s, when a Quebec court found valid a marriage of a Cree woman and a Hudson's Bay
Company employee carried out in the north west territories according to Cree law. It was not simply
valid in the territories, it was valid in Quebec for determining succession to the husband's property
there. In deciding the case Mr Justice Monk found the idea that Cree law was abrogated by British
sovereignty "monstrous."56 This case, and other historical excavations, are now playing a role in
arguments about aboriginal sovereignty under the Canadian constitution.

Lest it be thought that this kind of role for legal history is restricted to arguments about indigenous
rights, other examples could easily be provided. One comes from the debate over same sex marriage
in Canada. Among other arguments, opponents of the notion frequently offered a beguiling but
fundamentally flawed view about the historical consistency of marriage rules. Yet it is clear that these
have changed, and not infrequently, over time.57

I am not contradicting my earlier argument history does not provide answers. My point is that
history shows that ways of thinking other than conventional wisdom are possible. At the end of the
day courts and legislatures must make their own decisions. And, as with the jury example, legal
history shows us that we cannot resolve the question with a simple appeal to an inadequately
understood past.

The role that legal history can play in exposing the degree of legal pluralism in our system, past
and present, is by no means restricted to ideas that were once the mainstream, became forgotten, and
have now been revived. Legal pluralism appears in many other guises historically, and these may well
have a contemporary co-existence with other legal orders. Studying the past, for example, enables us
to chart the co-existence with state based law of "forms of private ordering." To John McLaren these
include "the rules, practices and processes of corporations, trading companies, market regulators,

56 Connolly v Woolrich and Johnson (1867) 11 Lower Canada Jurist 197 (Que SC).
57 See Robert Leckey "Profane Matrimony" (2006) 21 Can JL and Society 1. See also generally Sarah Carter The
Importance of Being Monogamous: Marriage and Nation Building in Western Canada to 1915 (University of
Alberta Press, Edmonton, 2008).
 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 311

professional bodies," and others.58 They also include the remarkable prevalence of local jurisdictions
even in a country as apparently centralised as Britain, as Harry Arthurs has so ably demonstrated. 59

Increasingly in recent years historians' have also turned their eyes to another form of legal
pluralism, what has been termed "low law." Here the goal is to examine the law as it operates not in
high courts or among elite lawyers, but as it is made, operated and interpreted by lay, local officials.
Douglas Hay and Paul Craven's monumental study of master and servant law in the British empire is
perhaps the best-known example of this,60 and there are many others as we increasingly bring under
the historians' eye Justices of the Peace, municipal officials, and the like.61 When we do so we find a
world in which legal actors carried out their functions largely unsupervised and unconstrained by the
governments and high courts who were supposedly their superiors. The result was that those who
experienced the "law" administered were as much subject to the rule of men as laws – a salutary
reminder that the "modern" world of law and government is neither as well-rooted nor as ubiquitous
as we think. A current doctoral student of mine is looking at the history of Canadian extradition law
and practice, and one of his key findings is that of the prevalence of what we might perhaps
generously term "informal" extradition in the nineteenth century. Another word for this is kidnapping,
easily done across the Canadian-American border. Some of this kidnapping was wholly outside the
legal system, but on plenty of occasions local police, magistrates and jailors either turned a blind eye
to what was under their noses or actually participated in the process. 62

A perhaps even more fundamental challenge to traditional legal history and thinking about law is
the legal pluralism which emerges from legal norms outside the state ordered ones. History shows us
that law is not always limited to what we call "formal" or "state" law, that the law world often involves
popular understandings of law and justice which are different to official norms, or methods of dispute
resolution which ignore or by pass official ones. I am not suggesting these are somehow superior, but
they are at times highly significant. They represent a form of pluralism which has long existed in most
legal systems. Probably the best-known example of this is Dirk Hartog's famous article on "Pigs and
Positivism," which explored the issue of whether or not it was legal to let pigs run on the streets in

58 McLaren "The Legal Historian", above n 2, at 73.

59 Harry W Arthurs Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century
England (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985).

60 Douglas Hay and Paul Craven (eds) Masters, Servants and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955
(University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2004).

61 Laura Edwards The People and their Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in the
post-Revolutionary South (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2009).

62 See Bradley Miller "The High and Low Law of Nations: State Power and Community Justice on the Border,
1810-1910" (Paper presented to the Canadian Historical Association Conference, Montreal, June 2010). This
is part of a soon to be completed doctoral thesis at the University of Toronto, "Emptying the Den of Thieves:
International Fugitives and the Law in Canada, 1810-1910."
312 (2010) 41 VUWLR

early nineteenth century New York. A court said it was not, but there was a competing custom which
permitted them, and which worked to mean that they stayed on the streets for many years, whatever
the law said.63 To similar effect, the history of marriage and divorce, as opposed to the history of
marriage and divorce law, often reveals the prevalence of self-divorce, of informal ways in which
people not only separated in fact but considered that they had a right to do so, and to remarry.64 There
are also many accounts from British settler societies of the importance of "informal" land titles in
delineating patterns of settlement and, often, aboriginal dispossession. 65 The earliest work on this
kind of "customary" law came out of the new English social history of the 1960s and 1970s, much of
it concerned with what EP Thompson called "alternative definitions of property rights" as opposed to
"property, supported by law, against no property."66

In line with my earlier comment about self-promotion, the example I most like to use for this point
is drawn from a book which a colleague and I wrote a few years ago, about a murder trial in early
twentieth century Seattle, Washington, which turned on something called the "Unwritten law."67 The
story is a fascinating one, and the book is of course still available at a very reasonable price. The story
involved an early twentieth century radical preacher, part of what was termed the holiness movement,
a movement that grew into pentecostalism a few years later. The preacher had a small but very
devoted following in a small town in Oregon, a following consisting principally of women, who were
so devoted to salvation that they forsook family and children and respectability to follow him. The
first example of informal law came about when the men of the community took him from his
residence one night, paraded him through the town, and tarred and feathered him. Should he return
they said, a much worse fate would await him. The men who did this believed, and stated publicly,
that there was a higher law than that of the state of Oregon, a law that gave men the right to take action
against someone who ruined their families and corrupted their womenfolk. Later, after the preacher
had managed to re-gather his flock elsewhere, a brother of one of his followers simply gunned him

63 Hendrik Hartog "Pigs and Positivism" (1985) Wis L Rev 899.

64 Jamie Snell In the Shadow of the Law: Divorce in Canada 1900-1939 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto,
1991).

65 See, inter alia, Bruce Kercher "Formal and Informal Law in Two New Lands: Land Law in Newfoundland
and New South Wales under Francis Forbes" in C English (ed) Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Vol
IX: Two Islands, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island (Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and
University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2005) 147; Weaver The Great Land Rush, above n 51; Bruce Ziff and
Sean Ward "Squatters' Rights and the Origin of Edmonton Settlement" in Phillips and others (eds) Essays – A
Tribute to Peter Oliver, above n 17, 446. See also Kercher in this volume.

66 Thompson Whigs and Hunters, above n 3, at 261. The phenomenon is explored in detail in EP Thompson
Customs in Common (New Press, New York, 1991). See also the extensive literature on custom as law in
whaling and similar resource industries, an example of which is the excellent article by Anderson in this
volume.

67 Jim Phillips and Rosemary Gartner Murdering Holiness: The Trials of Franz Creffield and George Mitchell
(University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2003).
 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 313

down in cold blood in the streets of Seattle, and then claimed the sanction of another kind of higher
law, the so-called "Unwritten law".

This doctrine, used in many cases in the second half of the nineteenth century although of course
never part of any state code (except that of Texas which tells you all you want to know about Texas),
said that a man had the right to take the life of another in revenge for offences committed against his
female family members or to protect them from sexual dishonour. The young man, George Mitchell,
claimed that he killed the preacher to prevent him from "ruining" his younger sister. Mitchell's crime
fuelled a furious press and public debate over the validity of his action, with half the city in favour and
half opposed. And the jury who tried the case acquitted him. Hence his defence struck a chord with
popular attitudes about what the law should be. What is interesting about the two instances in this
book, the tarring and feathering and the murder, is not that people decided they had the right to operate
outside the law, but that they believed in their right to act according to a different vision of law. In
their minds it was not lawlessness but a higher vision of law than anything the state could offer. And
lest it be thought that such reliance on popular visions of law is confined to the "wild west," or in this
case the still somewhat untamed west, one can find similar examples elsewhere, including the
acquittal of servant girl Carrie Davis for gunning down a scion of the Toronto establishment in
1915.68

As an aside, but a relevant one giving the events of the next two days, this book is an example of a
methodology we are seeing increasingly used – that of case studies, or sometimes called micro history
or legal archaeology. Part of the reason for its popularity is precisely the fact that it enables the
historian to say something substantial about legal pluralism. Survey histories invariably privilege the
process of getting to the end result, case studies seek to capture a moment in time.

These case studies can be broadly divided into two types. One kind of legal archaeology involves
taking a well-known case and investigating the deep background to it. My immediate predecessor in
giving the Salmond lecture, Brian Simpson, has popularised this approach,69 and in the US one press
has brought out a whole series of books on leading Supreme Court cases.70 Simpson explains why he
embarked on his work by noting that "cases need to be treated as what they are, fragments of antiquity,
and we need ... gently to free these fragments from the overburden of legal dogmatics, and try, by
relating them to other evidence ... to make sense of them as events in history and incidents in the
evolution of the law."71

68 Carolyn Strange "Wounded Womanhood and Dead Men: Chivalry and the Trials of Clara Ford and Carrie
Davis" in France Iacovetta and Mariana Valverde (eds) Gender Conflicts: New Essays in Women's History
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1992) 149.
69 See especially AWB Simpson Leading Cases in the Common Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995).

70 This is the University Press of Kansas' series of Landmark Law Cases and American Society.

71 Simpson Leading Cases, above n 69, at 12.

314 (2010) 41 VUWLR

I have recently done two of these "leading cases" studies myself, and the results were interestingly
different. In one, a Canadian Supreme Court case on picketing on private property, we were able to
provide a fuller understanding of the case, but nothing that surprised us or made us feel any differently
about the result.72 The second, a study of the leading Supreme Court of Canada case on de facto
expropriation, was a case that I have taught for twenty years – without, I am now painfully aware,
really knowing anything about it. The reported decision is so lacking in significant context, and
indeed factually wrong in some respects, that I have had to completely change the way I teach it. 73
Like American historian Deborah Threedy, the experience has made me "destablilize the received
wisdom about the case and to suggest other ways of looking at the litigation."74

Not all case studies involve "leading cases." In other instances the case chosen is not a well known
case at all, it may not even be reported. Here the historian starts from the case but writes about it as
much as a social issue as a legal one. Our book on the Seattle case is an example of that, and there are
many others – the best-known probably still being Natalie Davis' The Return of Martin Guerre.75
Using cases in this way enables historians to gather evidence about social practice unavailable
elsewhere. One of the papers to be given in the conference which follows this lecture concerns breach
of promise of marriage. The evidence from that case about how a middle class couple courted in
nineteenth century Wellington contradicts what family historians have assumed to be the norm, a
norm derived from reading idealistic etiquette manuals and similar literature. 76 But while advocating
the use of legally derived evidence to enhance social history, I repeat a caution made above. Case files
or similar legal evidence are not simply a repository of information about the past, such source
material has a context, was produced by a legal, not some other, system. As I have suggested in my
earlier remarks on relative autonomy, a lack of attention to the ways in which legal ideologies and
legal process affected events, even in a case where the purpose is not apparently to study legal history,
distorts the story.

VI CONCLUSION – LEGAL HISTORY AND LEGAL EDUCATION

At the start of this lecture I referred to the fact that I come at this subject from the point of view of
a legal educator, and I want to finish with the relationship between legal history and legal education,

72 Philip Girard and Jim Phillips "A Certain Mallaise: Harrison v. Carswell, Shopping Centre Picketing, and the
Limits of the Postwar Settlement" in J Fudge and E Tucker (eds) Work on Trial: Canadian Labour Law
Struggles (Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and Irwin Law, Toronto, 2010) 249.

73 Jim Phillips and Jeremy Martin "Manitoba Fisheries v The Queen: The Origins of Canada's De Facto
Expropriation Doctrine" in James Muir, Eric Tucker and Bruce Ziff (eds) Property Law Stories in Canadian
History [title provisional] (Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and Irwin Law, Toronto, forthcoming
2012).
74 Debora Threedy "A Fish Story: Alaska Packers Association v. Domenico" (2000) Utah L Rev 185 at 221.

75 Natalie Davis The Return of Martin Guerre (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1983).

76 See Simpson in this volume.

 WHY LEGAL H ISTORY MATTERS 315

and with something of a lament. If indeed the law has always been shaped by circumstances and
context, has never been a wholly independent force, then we need to appreciate this in order to impart
students with a proper understanding of the law. We do them a disservice by not teaching enough legal
history, enough, that is, to show them the law in context. There is no question that the number of legal
history courses available in most jurisdiction's law schools has declined in the last couple of decades,
ironically during the same period that the subject has become more popular among academics in both
law and history departments.

In an odd way this is perhaps not a bad thing, for some of those courses were simply adjuncts to a
neutral and ahistorical view of law reflected everywhere in the curriculum. We should not wish for
revival of those kinds of courses, but we can wish for more engagement with history. It is not likely,
given the demands of other things, that we will see a serious attempt anywhere to make modern legal
education compulsory in law schools, even though doing so would impart a much greater
understanding of law as well as improve students ability to think contextually. But what we can do is
to operate somewhat subversively in the interstices of the courses we do teach. I teach property, and
my students have, remarkably, been known to complain about history coming into my first year
property course, but most appreciate the greater understanding that they get from it. I do of course
explain tenure and estates through history, else how else would anybody make sense of the basic
concepts of English land law. That is standard fare. But I put history into lots of other things as well.

Very early in the course we deal with the threshold issue of what can be "property," using, among
other things, the famous case of International News Service v Associated Press, in which the US
Supreme Court had to decide in 1919 whether a news agency could "own" its news, at least to the
extent of being able to prevent a competitor from using it for a period of time. 77 The decision is
written largely in the abstract, with only Brandeis J's dissenting judgment offering any hint of the
context. Yet it is very important to know that the case arose because British and French authorities
denied access to news sources to the International New Service, because it was owned by William
Randolph Hearst, Citizen Kane, who opposed the allied side in the war, wanting to see the old
European empires weakened and a new American empire take their place. So he simply took the news
published by the Associated Press and reproduced it in his own papers. Students who study this case
through other instructors know it as a case about whether information can be property. My students
know it as a case about that too, of course, but also very much as a case about the concentration of
news services, about monopoly.78

Finally, I also started by saying that I have had lots of short conversations about legal history with
colleagues over the years. One concern they sometimes express is that the message of contingency,

77 International News Service v Associated Press 248 US 215 (1918).

78 See Douglas Baird "Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v.
Associated Press" (1983) 50 U Chi L Rev 411; and Douglas Baird "Property, Natural Monopoly and the
Uneasy Legacy of INS v AP" (June 2005) SSRN Electronic Paper Collection <www.ssrn.com>.
316 (2010) 41 VUWLR

the suggestion that judges respond to social context, risks, in our system, some kind of nihilistic
descent into excessive judicial law making. I have three answers to this. First, as I have suggested,
legal history is actually about much more than doctrine and high courts. It is a complex mix of
common law and statute, of high and low law, of formal and informal law. Second, and narrowing the
answer to courts and doctrine, we should not be ostriches. If I am wrong about what legal history
teaches us, then say so. Make an argument that the formalist view of legal history is correct. But don't
say you should not say something because people might lose faith. Third, to talk about the broad ways
in which legal change reflects social change is not to suggest that lawyers cannot go about their
everyday business without faith that the law is generally stable in their time, that we cannot trust
judges not to make good faith efforts to decide the vast majority of cases according to what they see as
established law. Few people now seriously contend that judges are not themselves the product of their
time and not influenced by broader social considerations. We turn our minds now not to the existence
of some degree of judicial creativity, but to its legitimate limits, and that is an intriguing and healthy
debate. As Maitland would have said, your hands are free to debate that issue.
THE RELATION OF HISTORY TO THE STUDY AND
PRACTICE OF LAW.

By H. H. WILSON.

[Read before the Society, January 12, 1887.]

In this age of Hccumulated knowledge, he who would know anyone

thing well must be eontent to remain ignorant of many others. In
order to bring a limited area up to its highest state of produetiveness
the ordinary man must leave a vast region uncultivated. When one
like Mill urges that there is time for all learning, the old as well
as the new, it is well to remember that but few can bring to the
task the leisure, and still fewer the mind, of a lYE II. The question is
ever being asked, "How can I best employ a few years in preparation
for active life?" To the average young man who has but a limited
time to prepare for the work of his life, before he will be compelled to
enter upon it, the answer to this question is of vital importance. I
will suppose this question to be asked by one who has chosen the pro-
fession of law.
It may safely be said that no other professional man finds use for
so wide a range of knowledge as the lawyer. The nature of the law
is such that its practice touches the practical life of maq at every
point. There is no relation in life, there is no trani'action among men,
that may not become the subject of judicial investigation. There is
no branch of learning that may not, at some time, be of great use to
the lawyer. The doctor's profession covers a wide domain of knowl-
edge, but there is no branch of his practice that may not furnish the
basis for a suit for malpractice, to successfully conduct which the law-
yer must cope with his medical brother in the knowledge of his art.
The management of a vast railroad system requires special knowledge
Qf the several arts and scienccs involved in it, yet, in fixing the re-
sponsibility_ for an accident, the lawyer may have to know something of
them all. He, however, who would master all knowledge as a prepara-
tion for the bar will never enter the lists. Merely because a lawyer

Published in TRANSACTIONS AND REPORTS OF THE NEBRASKA

HISTORICAL SOCIETY, vol. 2 (Lincoln, NE, 1887)
6 NEBRASKA STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

may be called upon to try a cause involving the proper construction

of a broken bridge, it would not be advisable for him to master civil
engineering before coming to the hal'. That his first case may be one
growing out of malpractice in the setting of a limb, is not a sufficient
reason why the mastery of surgery should form a part of his prepa-
ration. That chemistry, natural history, geology, and even theological
creeds may enter into the subjects of his investigations would not
justify the lawyer in attempting to master these branches of learning
as a part of his preparation for active life. He must necessarily
depend largely upon experts in these various branches of knowledge,
when it may become necessary for him to use them. These and kin-
dred sciences are merely incident to the practice of the law, and while
a knowledge of them may occasionally be of great value to the law-
yer, an attempt to master them would leave no time for the practice of
his profession. On the other hand, there are some branches of learning
which, in their methods of investigation, as well as in the knowledge
they impart, are so closely allied to the study and practice of the law,
that no one who would stand high in that profession ean afford to neg-
lect them. Foremost among these stands history.
In estimating the practical value of any branch of learning as a
disciplinary study, for a particular object, we naturally inquire what
faculties are brought into activity, and what is the tendency or bias
given to these faculties by such study. For instance, mathematics
employs pure reason. The mathematician deals with the absolute.
When his premises are granted, the conclusion inexorably follows.
That the prolonged and exclusive study of such a science gives a
peculiar bias to the faculty employed, there can be no doubt. The
natural scientist reaches a conclusion which, while not so absolutely
certain as that of the mathematician, yet has the highest degree of
probability. While reason is still our guide we feel much less certain
of the ground on which we tread. 'Ve have now left the domain of
the absolute and entered upon that of the relative. Here we can no
longer draw our conclusions with absolute certainty; we are now called
upon to weigh the evidence and determine the preponderance of proof.
Probability, very strong probability, may be reached, but not certainty.
On the other hand, the historian is compelled to content himself
with conclusions whose probability falls far below that which attaches
to the conclusions of the natural scientist. Here we are met at the
 HISTORICAL PAPERS. 7

very outset with the most contradictory evidence coming from sources
which scem to be equally credible. From the very beginning we arc
compelled to test the credibility of our witnesses, to balance the proba-
bilities of their testimony, and after all remain content with conclu-
sions supported only by a greater or less degree of likelihood. It is
certainly no disparagemcnt to any branch of lcarning to say that the
study of one furnishes the best discipline for one pursuit, and that of
another for another pursuit.
To my mind it is this very inconclusiveness of its conclusions that
rendcrs the study of history so valuable to the lawyer. The histo-
rian alid the lawyer alike deal with the affairs of men, the most un-
certain of all subjects of investigation. The lawyer is to-day dealing
with that ever-changing life of man which, centuries hence, will em-
ploy the future historian. The conclusions of the historian must
always contain an element of uncertainty, because the subject of his
investigation is human affairs, and his evidence is usually human tes-
timony. Not only may this testimony be willfully false, but the
witness may have been mistaken, or so prejudiced as to render his tes-
timony of little or no value. The first lesson for the student of his-
tory is to lcarn the pcculiarities of his author and to estimate the
influence of his bias or prejudice upon his testimony; or, as the astron-
omer would say, we must first eliminate the personal equation. No
one can safely read Rume without knowing his prejudice against the
church, or Macaulay, without making due allowance for his bias in
favor ofthe whigs. It is from a mass of contradictory evidence taken
from sources of varying degrees of credibility, and in itself containing
various degrees of probability, that the historian is to gather his facts
and reach his conclusions.
The study of history is a daily exercise in the weighing of evidence
and drawing conclusions of such probability as the proof may warrant.
The conclusions, while never absolutely certain, may reach that high
degree of probability upon which we would all be willing to act in
our own affairs even' though property or life itself were at stake.
What better training than this can be given to one whose busine:::" of
life it will be to try the differences between man and man upon the
diverging and often contradictory testimony of living witnesses. The
rules which he has learned to apply in settling a controverted point in
hist()ry are equally applicable in the settlement of controversies at
8 NEBRASKA STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

the bar. For instance, should several witnesses narrate a transaction

exactly alike in every detail, the historian, as well as the lawyer, would
at once conclude that either the several narratives were copied from a
'common original, or were the result of conspiracy. Should the nar-
:ratives agree in the main, but differ as to details, this would indicate
:an endeavor to tell the truth; and should the several witnesses who
differed in the details of their narratives yet all agree as to a certain
fact, the existence of this fact would reach a high degree of likelihood.
In short, the general principles upon which the preponderance of evi-
dence is ascertained are the same, whether applied by the historian or
the lawyer, whether the question involved be the fate of a dynasty
or the cause of a railroad accident.
The historian must ascertain the facts from such evidence as he may
be able to command, never absolutely conclusive, seldom entirely sat-
isfactory, yet always the best that can be obtained. These facts, how-
-ever well they may be proven, if unorganized, are of little or no value.
It is their relation to life, their bearing on the course of human affairs,
that gives them value. It is then a part of the duty of the historian
to bring these facts, thus ascertained, into their natural relation to
each other, and thus show, if he can, their influence upon the course of
events. Let us illustrate this two-fold duty of the historian. It will
fall to the lot of SOUle future historian to ascertain from the acculllula-
ted mass of contradictory evidence what actually did occur at thc grcat
battle of Shiloh. And surely if a few more of the eyc-witnesses of that
memorable battle volunteer their testimony, to find the real fiwts will
be no small task. This done, it will be the duty of our future his-
torian to take the facts so found, and tell future generations the effect
of that battle upon the progress of the great conflict, and the effect of
the latter upon civilization.
The value of this training to the lawyer is apparent when we look
at the two-fold duty of the bat. ·While the lawyer is not the tribunal
that in the last resort ascertains the facts in issue, yet it is his duty to
assist in so doing. 'Vhile the jury or court is to find the facts; it is the
office of the lawyer to establish them by such evidence as a very im-
perfect and somf'times very corrupt human nature may render avail-
able. When the facts are thus ascertained, or should they be con-
ceded, it becomes necessary to determine to what relief these facts
entitle the client. In other 'Yards, it no,v becomes necessary to apply
 HISTORICAL PAPERS. 9

the general rules of law to the facts of the particular CaSE'. At

:first thought, this would seem a very simple matter. Supp08e, how-
ever, thQ point at issue is one which has never been decided in our
jurisdiction. Suppose it be a qlle8tion of COIllmon law, and our own
state decisions do not cover the point. We must then draw Ollr pre-
cedents from the decisions of thirty-six independent states, having
thirty-six indcpendcnt jurisdictions, whose decisions are by no means
harmonious, even on elementary principles of common law. Add to
these a vast systcm of federal courts, as well as English and colonial,
and we have a mass of independent and often contradictory adjudica-
tions from which the lawyer is to determine what rule applies to the
facts of his particular case. These decisions, however conclusive upon
the rights of the parties determined by them, cannot be considered
the law itself, for the law cannot contradict itself; they are rather
evidences of the law, and from them we must determine, if we can,
the true principle applicable to the facts in hand. But where the ad-
judicated cases are hopelessly contradictory, what shall be our guide?
The plaintiff presents an armfi.J1 of authorities holding that the facts
entitle him to recover, and the defendnnt an equal number holding
that the facts constitute no CalIse of action. "What now shall be done?
The later Roman lawyers solved this problem by the simple rule of
addition. By statute the court was required to count the authorities
holding for the plaintiff, and then those holding for the defcndant,
and then he was to decide with the majority. If the number cited
was the same for either side and Papinian was among them, his side
should prevail. And as Papinian had expressed an opinion on most
questions likely to come up, it was a rare chance indeed if a judge
needed any acquiremcnts beyond simple addition to enable him to de-
cide the most important and complicated cases. The modern court
asks for the basis upon which the decisions rest. The weight to be
given to an adjndicated precedent will depend largely upon its histor-
ical soundness. No precedent, however well established by adjudica-
tions, can stand long in the filee of modern juridical criticisms unless
it comport fairly with historic truth. No case to-day is so uncertain
as that which stands on precedent alone, with neither reason nor jus-
tice to Stlpport it. The law is not an artificial mechanism, but a natural
growth. There is a unity and continuity in the law that will tolcrate
no precedent long that does not harmonize with the spirit of its growth.
10 NEBRASKA STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

Thc history of the growth of the law is but a part of thc more gen-
eral histor:v of thc race, and no mcreijJsc clia,it of the courts cau stand
long against tlw admitted truth of history. The lawyer of' to-day
'vho relies merely on precedent, is having his foundation gradually
sapped from under him. Hc must learn that error, howcvcr often
repeated, does not cease to be error. He must learn that truth, cven
though unknown to Coke and Blackstonc, is the bcst authority upon
,,-hich to rest his caS8, and that justice is his most eloquent argument.
It is the chicf glory of th8 common law that it had its origin in the
cnstoms of the people, and that it is evcr changing to meet their nccds.
Century by century principles and rules become obsolete because the
life to which they applied has become extinct. On the other hand new
principles and new rules arise as the necessary accompaniment 6f the
new life born of every advance of the race. The historical law, the
law of the past, vanishes unobserved, and a new law, thc law of the
present, is ever arising to takc its place. The great mass of the law
is found in the habits and customs of a people long before it is to be
found on the dusty shelves of the lawyer. ·When the members of a
community have voluntarily assumed certain relations toward each
other, and such relations have existed so long that all have a right to
rely on their continuance, and important rights depend upon such con-
tinuance, courts of justice recognize these relations and enforce the
rights based upon them. The courts take up and crystallize the law
which the people have consciously or unconsciously made for them-
selves in their daily contact with each other. Customary law is as
truly enacted by the people as though it was adopted by the formal
vote of their representatives duly assembled. It is therefore clear
that when the circumstances which gave rise to any rule of customary
law have ceased to exist, the rule itself ought no longer to be applied.
Where there was no cxpress enactment of a law there is no need of
an express repcal. It is therefore one of the famili~r maxims of the
law that when the reason of a rule ceases, the rule itself cease.'l. It
needs no argnmcnt to show that in order to know what is the law of
to-day one must know the history of the people among whom the law
has grown up. ·When the lawyer is asked whether or not a certain
principle or rule of the common law is the law here and now, be-
fore he can answer with certainty he must know the circumstances
that gave rise to this particular principle or rule, and he must know
 HISTORICAL PAPERS. 11

whether those circumstances still exist. Then, whether or not a given

proposition is the law of to-day, depends, not upon whether it is found
in Blackstone or Kent, but upon its history.
·When we remember the strong tendency exhibited by law writers
and j ndges to copy from their predecessors, it is not strange that we
should find in text books and adjudicated cases many things laid
down as law, the reasons for which have long since ceased to exist.
It will be seen, however, that the common law contains within it-
self a perfect remedy against any hardship growing out of the enforce-
ment of a principle or rule after its utility has ceased. That the com-
mon law is sometimes harsh and unjust may be admitted. A careful
examination, however, will show that most of these defects arise, not
from any original imperfection in the law, but from the fact that rules
and principles have been retained and enforced 'long after the reasons
that gave rise to them have passed away. For this, not the law, but
those who administer it, are responsible. A knowledge of the history
of its growth, and the moral courage to lop off the dead members, is
all that is necessary to preserve the body of the common law in a
healthy and vigorous condition.
A forcible illustration of the doctrine just set forth is furnished by
a recent decision of the supreme court of Kansas. * The owner of a
large packing house in Leavenworth rented the same for a term of
years at an agreed rent of $250 per month. The landlord insured
the building for $10,000. Ten days after the execution of this lease
the building was totally destroyed by an accidental fire, and the landlord
received the full amount of the insurance. The tenant thereupon re-
fused to pay the rent and suit was brought to recover it. Counsel
for the landlord presented a vast array of authorities that showed be-
yond doubt that at common law, as taught in the books, the destruction
of the building was no defense to a claim for the rent agreed upon.
Judge Brewer, after a masterly review of the authorities, said: "The
general doctrine of the common law unquestionably wa.", that upon a
covenant in a lease of lands and buildings for a term of years to pay
rent, the rent could be recovered after a destruction of the buildings
leased by accidental fire. The express contract and promise was not
discharged by an act for which the lessor was not responsible. * *
* * * This doctrine is challenged by the counsel for the defend-
• Whitaker vs. Hawley, 25 Kansas Rep.• 674.
12 NEBRASKA STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

ants, and it is urged that it has no foundation in natural justice ; that

the reasons for its existence have disappeared with the changed con-
ditions of society, and that it ought not to be recognized as the la,,, of
leases in Kansas. * * * * * The feudal system shaped and
modified the common law concerning real estate. Land could not be
taken on execution. Alienation was difficult and expensive. The
landlocd was but the successor of the ancient feudal lord, and his
rights were correspondingly sacred; but now, the holder of real estate
has little or no vantage over the owner of personal property. The
distinctions growing out of the feudal system are disappearing, and this
distinction between the lease of real property and the hiring of chat-
tels is one which sooner or later will cease to exist. * Insurance,
now so com mOll, works a change in the relative position of the parties.
Formerly, the landlQl:d was, to a great extent, at the mercy of the
tenant, who might put an end to his liability by firing the building,
and being in possession could do it easily and without probability of
detection. The burden of such a loss would :filll upon him who had
so little means of prevention or detection; hence, one source of pro-
tection ,,,as to continue the liability {or rent. Rut to-day the rule is
IIlsnrance. By this, fire only changes the character of the owner's
property {i'om buildings to money-often a welcome change. And if
the landlord gets the value in money, which he may put at interc"t,
he certainly ought not to receive rent {or that which has ceased to
exist, and thus double his profits, and especially when the insurance
prt:miums are paid by the tenants. In this eilse it appeared that the
landlord had $10,000 insurance on the building which he has received.
In other words, that amount he may put at interest while demanding
rent for the use of property no longer existing whose price that is."
Had Judge Brewer been one of those who yield a servile obedience
to long established precedent, closing his eyes to the truth of history
and turning a deaf ear to the cries of justice, he would have given the
landlord double profits on his wealth, and compelled the tenant to
pay rent for the use of that whieh did not exist. And all this, not
beeause it is just or reasonable, not bemuse the safety of society of our
day demands it, but because another people in another age {(lUnd it a
neeessary restraint on lawlessness. This the court refused to do.
Guided by the light of history, recognizing the changed conditions of
* It was conceded in this case that no rent could be recovered for the use of mere chattels
after their destruction. Page 686.
 HISTORICAL PAPERS. 13

the business world, and moved by the manifest injustice of the demand,
it swept away a long line of venerable authorities and established what
may be callcd a new dispensation of the law of leases.
That the lawyer should be filmiliar with the history of every people
among whom any branch of our law has had its growth, may be
illustrated by an examplc from the Roman law. We borrow almost
the whole of our law governing the liability for negligence from the
civil or Ruman law. The terms in which its principlcs are cxpressed
are taken almost exclusively from the Latin, and their cxaet meaning
can be learned only from the history of the people who' used them.
A striking instance of this is found in the use of the word pater-
familias. By the Roman law, which is also our own, a specialist
who undertakes to do that which is within the scope of his specialty
is bound to exercise such diligence as is commonly exercised by a
diligens, banns, stndiosns paterfamilias, and he is liable for damages
resulting from his failure to do so.
The diligence of the ordinary paterfamilias, as known to English
and American civilization, would hardly come up to our ideas of the
duty of the modern specialist. \Ve would shudder at the thought of
placing our property, our health, and even life itself in the hands of
one from whom the law exacted no greater diligence than that com-
monlyexercised by the head of a family in his own affairs. The
paterfamilias as we know him would afford a very doubtful criterion
of diligence and care. But when we learn* that the family of classi-
cal Rome was indeed a principality, and its head a monarch, whose
descendants, be they ever so remote or ever so scattered, yielded im-
plicit obeLl!ence to his almost unlimited authority, whose daily life
required the exercise of the highest faculties of the mind, we get
quite a different idea ?f the diligence commonly exercised by the
pate1jamilias. The doctor, the druggist, the railroad engineer are no
longer excused by showing the diligence of the head of a family as
known to our civilization, but they are required to exercise" the dili-
gence shown by a good and trustworthy specialist when dealing with
his particular dutiL·s." t
* Hadley's Introduction to Homan Law, 107.
Maine's Ancient Law, 13H.
Gibbon's Decline and Fall, Vol. IV., 341, et seq.
tWharton's Law of Negligence, Second Edition, 1878, page 25.
Man sich unter einen diligens paterfamilias einen durehaus tueehtigen Mann ZIldenken
haben, der ueber seine Angelegenheiten mit voller Aufmerksamkeit und ganzem Fleisse ZIl
wachen gewohntsei. Die Cnlpa des roemischen Rechts, eine civilistisehe Abhandlung von
Johan Christian Hasse, Seite 508. (Quoted by Wharton.)
14 NEBRASKA STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

vVhen we enter upon the construction of constitutional and statu~

tory law, a thorough knowledge of local history is of the utmost im~
portance to the lawyer. The best guidc to the correct interpretation
of a constitution or statute is the condition of thc people who adopted
it, the wrongs which were to be remedied and mischief to be pre-
vented by it. Noone who does not understand the history of the
colonies, their unsuccessful efforts to establish a general government,
the wrongs thcy suffered and mischief they foresaw, would be a safe
counselor in the interpretation of the constitution by which our sister
states are held together. Noone who does not know of the contro-
versies, differences, clashings of interest, and final compromises that
took place in that remarkable convention, could safely undcrtake to
interpret the instrument they finally adopted. In 1824, in one of the
most important causes cver decided by the federal supreme court, *
Chief Justice Marshall, the great expounder of the constitution,
speaking for the court, held that the power of congress to regulate
commerce between the states was exclusive of state control, and that
the laws of New York granting a monopoly of steam navigation in
the waters of that state were therefore unconstitutional and void.
vVith no precedent to guide him, the great chief justice drew the
argument with which he sustained his position almost wholly from
the history of the colonies at and before the adoption of the constitu-
tion. It was in the consideration of these great constitutional ques-
tions, untrammelled by precedent, guided only by the history of thE
past, that Marshall's pre-eminent abilities shone at their best. ThiE
country has never yet fully recognized the debt it owes to the his-
torical research of this its greatest jurist. In this case vVebster mad{
one of his most famous arguments, which in its nature was almos1
entirely historical. This form of argument had a peculiar fascinatior
for vVebster and was always powerful when wielded by him. NoonE
can read the argument of vVebster and then the opinion of Marshal
without coming to the conclusion that the former as well as th,
latter did his part" to set free every brook and rivulet in the country.'
The concurring opinion by Justice Johnson is based almost entirel)
upon" the history of the times," and upon" the general understand·
ing of the whole American people when the grant was made." t
*Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton. l.
tGibbons v. Ogden. 9 Wheaton, 225.
 HISTORICAL PAPERS. 15

A good example of the value of local history in construing constitu-

tional and statutory hny may be found in a decision of tlH~ supreme
court of l\1iehigau. * ,fhen that remarkable tide of immigration so
rapidly turned the sparsely settled territory of Michigan into a pop-
ulous state, the spirit of 'western enterprise demanded a vast system
of internal improvements. Accordingly when the people formed the
constitution under which Michigan was, in 1837, admitted into the
Union, they recommended therein an extensive system of railroads
and canals to be constructed by the state at public expense. The leg-
islature, in carrying out this recommendation, burdened the people
with a debt of millions; and after destroying public credit, stopped
but little short of a disgraceful repudiation. For all this burden and
disgrace the state had nothing to show, except some unfinished rail-
roads, which were soon sold for a small portion of the money ex-
pended on them. ,Vhen the constitution of 1850 was adopted, the
people, still feeling keenly the burden and disgrace brought upon them
by theiie visionary schemes, provided in the new instrument that the
state should in no manner aid works of iuternal improvement. Thus
the people of Michigan absolutely prohibited in 1850 that which they
had recommended in 1837. Soon there occurred one of those unac-
countable oscillations in popular judgment upon financial questions
to which the American people seem to be peculiarly subject. t In
1869, the legislature, yielding to popular demand, provided by a gen-
eral law for the granting of aid to railroads by the several municipal
subdivisions of thc state. Millions of debt had already been con-
tracted by the cities and towns of Michigan under this statute when
its constitutionality was first presented to the supreme court of the
state in 1871.
That court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Cooley, held the law
unconstitutional and void. It was urged that other states had con-
strued a similar provision in their constitutions as prohibiting only
the state as such ii'om incurring debts in aid of "uch enterprises, while
it left the subdivisions thereof free to give such aid as they saw fit,
and pay the same by general taxation. In reply to this argument
the learned justice said, that whatever might be the just and proper
construction of this provision when found in the constitutions of otber
• Bay City v. The State Treasurer, 23 Mich., 449.
t For an interesting account of the variable policy of Michigan on the question of internal
~v:ovcment, see Judge Cooley's" Michigan," in the A.merican Commonwealih Series, chap.
16 NEBRASKA STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

states, whose history had been different, the public history of :Michi-
gan left no doubt th~lt its pcople intenckod to deprive, not only the
state as a whole, but its component parts as well, of the power to
repeat the folly of the past. This decision has become a part of the
history of the state, and has determined its policy ever since on the
question of internal improvements. It is referred to here because the
construction there given to an important constitutional provision is
based solely upon the public history of the state and the well known
feeling of the people at the time of its adoption. Here, then, we find
one of America's foremost constitutional lawyers recognizing and
adopting the public history of a state as the best guide in the inter-
pretation of its fllndamentallaw.
'When we reach the broader domain of international law, we must
rely wholly upon history for our precedents. Here there is no
supreme power to prescribe rules of action; no court with jurisdiction
to decide or power to enforce its decrees. The law by which nations
are to be judged, in war or in peace, are to be learned only from the
public history of the nations we call civilized; and the history of the
intercourse of one nation with another is so intimately connected with
the internal history of each that no one can understand the former
without some knowledge of the latter.
Much might be said, did time permit, on the value of history in
solving the ever recurring problems involving the security of life, lib-
erty, and property. All these questions have arisen and been answered
in some way by every civilized people. The communistic. and nihilistic
tendencies of the present would seem to indicate that these problems
have not been finally disposed of, and that the lawyer of the near fu-
ture may be called upon to reconsider and perhaps readjust them. In
any discussion of these great questions, involving as they do the rights
of all, the practical answers given to them by other nations in other
times must always be of the highest importance.
It is perhaps needless to say that the study of history to yield the
benefits here indieated must be something more than the daily eonning
of a given number of pages in a text book. 'What the student needs to
be taught is not the facts of history, but how to find them for himself.
In no branch of study isit more important that the student should do
the work himself than in history. No one would now attempt toteaeh
chemistry and botany without requiring of the student practical work
 HISTORICAL PAPERS. 17

in the laboratory amI the field. ~What the laboratory is to the student
ofehemistry, what the fields are to the student of botany, the well fur-
nished library is to the student of history. The text book and the in-
structor are valuable as guides; but after all, that which is most valua-
ble is obtained only by the individual research of the student himself.
In this research the student should be led as near as possible to the
original sources from which the faets are to be ascertained. Our own
national history furnishes a fertile field for investigation, and the ease
with which its primary and secondary sources may be obtained renders
it peculiarly inviting. And may we not hope that at no very distant
day the archives of this society may contain material for a comprehen-
sive study of the history of our own commonwealth.
The range of history, like that oflaw, is limited only by the bound-
ary that circumscribes the life of man. The historian deals with life
as fonnd entombed in the mute records of the past. The lawyer strug-
gles with life governed by the passions, the pr~juelices, the hopes, anel
the fears of the present. Both alike, in reaching their conclusions,
must tread upon uncertain ground and remain content with proof far
short of the absolute. Law stands foremost among the practical scien-
ces as an aid to history, and history in turn becomes the interpreter of
law. As the lawyer gathers the f~lCts of his case from the uncertain
memories of Iiving witnesses, as he draws his principles from the con-
tradictory statements contained in his books, so the student of history
mnst cross-examine his authors, probe their motives, estimate the influ-
ence of their prejudices, balance their testimony against that of others,
and finally determine, by a preponderance of proof~ the point at issllc.
So intimate is the relatioJl behYcen history and Jaw that the best prc'p-
aration for the stndy of either is found in the thorough study of the,
other