Farah Kabir
BURE AUCR ACY IN BANG LADE SH                    THE POLI TICA L
INVO LVEM ENT AND INFLU ENCE
I.INTR ODUC TIION
     Bureaucracy is of much interest in Third World countries due
to the role it plays in national life both in policy making as well as
in implementation. Bureaucracy is so intricately entwined with
mode m admin istrati on that it cannot be separa ted from
administration inspite of ample criticism against it.
    Literally bureaucracy is understood to mean "a system of
govern ment by officials responsible only to their department
chiefs ". 1 Social scientists define it as a particular way in which
people organise themselv es and their resources to achieve some
agreed upon goal. Bureaucracy is a social organi sation which
contai ns certai n featur es that we attribu te to large scale
organ isatio ns . We can compa re bureau cracy with other
organisations in the same manner as we compare machine to non-
mechanical modes of produc tion. Bureaucracy in a way is a
mechanical system. "Precision. speed. unambiguity , knowledge of
the files, contin uity. discre tion. unity. strict subord inatio n.
reduction of friction and of material and personal costs- tbese are
raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic adminis-
 I. Chamber's Twentieth   Century Dictionary. Allied Publishers. Bombay,
     1979 p. 172.
  BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH
                                                                           237
  tration . "2 The more one or other of these specific features are
  maintained the more bureaucracy is dehum anised , that is, it
  succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred and all
  purely personal, and emotional elements which escape calculation.
      In every day conversation the connotation of bureaucracy is
  to call something bureaucratic is to conde mn it. Burea ucracy
  implies red tape, long lines, elaborate forms, unpleasant officials
 and the cold sweat that accompanies the feeling thai one is not
 being understood. In popula r image bureau cracy is in short,
 inefficient, inhuman and inaccessible, The radical view considers
 bureaucracy dangerous for the individual and society. However, to
 a social scientist it is neithe r efficie nt nor ineffic ient but a
 particu lar manne r in which people organi se thems elves and
 resources available to achieve certain objeclives.
      The bureaucracy of Bangladesh is a classical examp le of
  bureau cracy in third world countries. The Civil Servic e of
  Bangladesh or for that matter the military bureaucracy as well, are
  heirs of the colonial service set up by the British Raj. The British
 organised Indian Civil Service (lCS) to assist them in ruling Indo-
 Pak sub -continent. On partili on of India- Pakist an, Pakist an
 inherited the structural set up, system and practices of I. C. S.
 which was passed on to Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) in 1971.
 Bangladesh Civil Service will be discus sed at length in the process
 of our discussion. Our focus, however, will be on the pOlitical
 involvement of bureaucracy and the participation of bureaucracy
 in policy making. The main interest is to see how bureau cracy
promoted and supported autocratic rule and did not help develop
political institutions. We will also examine how autocratic rule
helped to develop bureaucracy, increased its participation in
policy maldng, and strengthened the institution to such extent that
it considered itself indispensable and involved in corruption at
2. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Translated and Ed.). From Ma<
                                                                      Weber :
   Essays in Sociology, London. Oxford Univers ity Press. 1946. p. 215-216
                                                                           .
238                                   BliSS JOURNAL. VOL 12. NO. 2. 1991
random. The purpose in other words is to see how bureaucracy
and autocracy used each other for each other's survival leading to
deviation from ideal concept of bureaucracy.
    The first part of this paper discusses briefly bureaucracy and
its characteristics as suggested by Max Weber. the German
sociologist whose writings are considered of seminal importance
in the study of bureaucracy. How and why bureaucracy is actively
taking over the role of policy making particularly in the Third
World context ? What factors contribute towards the monopo-
lization of bureaucracy? These and related issues are taken up in
the first part. Then we proceed to examine the legacy inherited by
the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. We try to explore how
bureaucracy became an instrument in the hands of the autocratic
government. We also try to analyse the allegation of politicization
and corruption of bureaucracy that is creation of negative
bureaucratic behaviour. mainly during the autocratic rule of
Ershad. By negative bureaucratic behaviour we mean deviation
from the principles and characteristics suggested by Weber
accepted the world over.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
    Bureaucracy is inevitable in all societies. It is an efficient form
of administration compared to other forms . This was Weber's
opinion and it was he who created interest in bureaucracy through
his writings. Max Weber is considered the founder of systematic
study of bureaucracy.
     He alerted social scientists to the importance of bureaucracy.
He pointed out the important relationship between the emergence
and consolidation of a modem state with the advancement of
bureaucracy in recent times. According to Weber the conditions
that led to the rise of bureaucracy are, (a) the development of
money economy; (b) increasing size of states and organisation;
(c) the impact of CUltural, economic and technological develop-
BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH                                                   239
ments, and (d) the technical superiority of bureaucracy over other
forms of administration.3
    Weber stated that bureaucracy is governed by six principles.
The position of the bureaucratic officials is also based on six
principles.
The six principles are:
1. Duties are fixed and official jurisdictions are ordered by rules;
   official duties are regular activities, based on the ends of the
   organisation.
2. There is a firmly ordered hierarchy providing for the
   supervision of lower offices by specified higher ones. Lower
   officials have the right of appeal as a counter-balance to the
   regulated domination from above. Such offices are not
   ephemeral, they are fixed and then filled by successive
   incumbents.
3. Office management is strictly based on written documents and
   a filing system. Office and home of the official is clearly
   separated, and the segregation of business and family interest
   are presupposed for all members of the b,ureaucracy.
4. For each specialised position a specific training' is required
5. Official business should occupy the energies of official full
   time and not to be a secondary activity.
6. The rules of bureaucracy demands relevant learning and
   expertise based in relevant academic disciplines. 4
3. For details see, ibid. pp. 196-244, and Dennis Warwick, Bureaucracy (London
    Longman, 1974) p. 52.
4. For detail see, G. Roth and C. Wittich, (ed.), Economy and Society. An Outline
    of Inlerpretative Sociology, 3 vols. (New York: Bedminister press, 1968), pp.
    956-962.
8-
                                                                          1
240                                   Bnss JOURNAL. VOL 12. NO. 2. 1991
The six principles behind the position of officials are;
 I. Office holding as a profession requiring a prescribed course of
      training. the passing of examinations to indicate qUality. and
      impersonality of relationship among career professionals in'
      the bureaucracy and with their clienteles.
2. The official enjoys a social esteem in accordance with his rank
   in the hierarchy.
3.    The official is appointed by a superior authority.
4. The official enjoys a tenure (of office) for life.
5. SecuritY is ensured for the officials by the payment of a salary
   in accord with his status in the hierarchy (and a pension at the
   end of his service).
6. In the career there is a system of promotion based on merit
   where the official moves from less well paid to better paid
   offices in time. s
    Therefore. in simple tenus Weber suggested that
bureaucracy works on the basis of specific rules and
regulations laid down in black and white in a rational
objective manner within a firmly ordered hierarchy. The job
of the officials is a full time occupation. They are given
specialised training for specialised pOSition. Officials are
recruited on the basis of open competitive examination and
appointed by a superior authority. The important characteristics
of bureaucracy that Weber emphasised as a result of the principles
on which bureaucracy is based are neutrality. rationality and
efficiency.
5. Ibid.
 BUREAUCRACY IN BANG ....DESH                                         241
       Just as Weber considered bureaucracy as the superior fonn of
  administration in comparison to any other fonn, he was also aware
  of the consequences of bureaucracy. The most noted consequence
  was alienation. Due to its nature of fonnalism and impersonality
  this alienation occurs and cannot be pennanently eradicated.
  Secondly, it has been said that bureaucratization leads to a
  "bastardized fonn of democracy"6 and unlike the democratic
  mass parties which are democratically organised it leads to decline
. in active participation of people in government. It also leads to the
  "leveling of the governed in the face of the governing and
  bureaucratically articulated group, which in tum may occupy
  quite an autocratic position both in fact and in fonn'"
     Bureaucratic allegiance is to the authority above it and it is
 hardly affected by the changes at the political level. Bureaucratic
 orientations like recruitment and training helps the bureaucrats to
 adopt quickly to changing situations.
      Weber promoted bureaucracy as he considered it the most
 efficient system of administration. However, Weber and his ideal
 type of bureaucracy has been criticised. The main criticisms are
 on the specification of organisational structure and the lack of
 human elements in organisations. Weber was of the opinion that
 organisations are autonomous and not vulnerable to external
 influences and therefore, paid emphasis on the structural aspects
 of organisation ignoring the behaviour of personnel working in
 the organisation. He did not consider the human element.
 Infonnal and unofficial aspects of behaviour play a substantial
 role in the maintenance of organisation.
     Weber's theory of bureaucracy and the characteristics
 suggested 'by him are nevertheless the basis of bureaucracy the
 world over. Hierarchy, specialisation, fonnalism, recruitment on
 6. M. M. Khan, Bureaucratic Self· Preservation. University of Dhaka. 1980,
    p.32.
 7. Dennis Warwick <>p. cit., p. 53.
242                                      BliSS JOURNAL, VOL. 12. NO. 2, 1991
the basis of open competitive system based on merit, promotion
and so on are the grounds on which bureaucracy is built.
    We have studied ~angladesh bureaucracy in this paper in the
light of principles and characteristics suggested by Weber and
tried to analyse the prevalent position of bureaucracy and
examined the type and extent of deviations from Weber's
principles . .
ill. ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN POLICY MAKING IN THIRD
WORLD COUNTRIES
     Early theories on the relationship between politiCians and
bureaucrats was simple: politicians make policy, civil servants
execute. The official norm of every state is that civil servants
obediently serve their political "masters" . This concept of
specialisation between pOliticians and bureaucrats "exalts the
glittering authority of the former and cloaks the role of the latter
in gray robes of anonymous neutrality."s This presumption of
separation of politics and administration nevertheless cannot
prevent administrators from getting -involved in politics as they are
not going to be held accountable politically for the outcome of
their actions. They are free of the interference of politicians who
might otherwise make demands upon bureaucrats for
modification of those poliCies. Again "the separation allows a
certain latitude to politicians; (permitting) ..... many of the difficult
decisions of modem government to be made by individuals who
will not have to face the public in subsequent elections.9
    Weber does not make any explicit assumption about
bureaucracy playing an effective role in the policy making
function of a state as it is the function of politics. He understood
8. Joel. D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam and Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats and
    Politicians in Western Democracies. Harvard University Press. 1981. p. 5.
9. B. G. Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy. (New York : London 1978) p. 137.
BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH                                                 243
the separation of politics and administration to be an ideal but an
improbable one. He recognised that "bureaucracy has a tendency
to monopolise .power and conquer new areas of life in modem
society" .10 "Every problem, no matter how technical it might seem,
can assume political significance and its solution can be decisively
influenced by political consideration,"11 writes Weber. The crux of
the problem is that politicians, specially in Third World countries
like Bangladesh, lack the expertise, the information and even the
time to decide the hundreds of policy questions that a modem
government faces. Therefore, even if civil servants wanted to obey
orders or merely follow them, as some honestly try to do, it often
becomes impracticable.
    Having accepted that bureaucracy will participate in policy
making the important consideration is how much power the
bureaucracy will exercise in policy making? This is dependent on
the political culture and political structure of a society which
shape the behaviour of bureaucracy.
    Behaviour 'of individuals is determined by political culture
prevailing in a society. By political culture we mean the systems of
empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which define the
situation in which political actions take place. t 2 It defines the
framework for political behaviour of the ·individual, and at the
same time provides the systemic structure of values and rational
considerations that shape the nature and performance of
organisation and institutions.
10. MUSlafa Chowdury, "Bureaucracy in Cross Cullural Settings," Irrdian
   Journal 0/ Public Administration, Volume, XXXVI. p. 27.
II. As ciled in Alfred Diamanls. 'The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected
    Rediscovered Reformed," Ferrel Heady and Sibyl L. Stokes, (eds.), Papers in
   Comparative Public Administration, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
   Instilule of PlIblic Administration. 1963) p. 85.
12. Sidney Verba, "Comparative Polilical Cullure", in Lucian Pye and S. Verba
    (eds.) Political Culture and Political Developmenl. Princeton University
   Press, 1965, p. 513.
244                                  BITSS JOURNAL. VOL 12, NO. 2. 1991
    Public bureaucracy. is a sub-system of the political system and
therefore, political system will determine the behaviour of the sub-
system. Ferrel Heady was of the opinion that political system plays
an important role in shaping the kind of bureaucracy. Six kinds
of political systems were identified by him to show the close
relationship that exists between the characteristics and the political
role · of the bureaucracy in the context of developing countries.
The political systems are : (1) traditional autocratic system (Iran).
(2) bureaucratic elite system-civil and military (pakistan and
Thailand), (3) polyarchal competitive system, (Twkey. Philippines
and Israel). (4) dominant party semi-competitive system (Mexico
and India). (5) dominant party mobilization system (Egypt). and
(6) communist totalitarian system (North Korea and Cuba).13 Till
December 6, 1990 there existed the bureaucratic elite (civil and
military) system in Bangladesh. We will discuss this later in the
paper.
Bureaucracy in Policy-Making
    There are anum ber of factors that contribute to the
involvement of bureaucracy in the policy-making process. These
factors include :
  . (a) Absence oj strong political institutions: Efficient
administration is dependent on the growth of strong political
institutions. Administration can be made effective only when there
is a mature political process capable of exerting its will on
bureaucracy.14 Thus efficient administration is dependent on the
growth of stroI1g'politicaJ institutions which can provide the means
for and exact performance from the bureaucracy. On the other
hand strengthening of the bureaucracy is bound to inhibit the
growth of political institutions. In the absence of strong policitaJ
13. Ferrel Heady. Public Administralion; A Comparative Perspective,
   (Englewood Cliffs. New Jeney. Prentice Hall 1966). p. 72.
14. F. Riggs. Administralion in Developing Countries (Boston, Houghton
   Mift1in Company, 1964), p. 74.
BUREAUCRACY    ~   BANGLADESH                                        245
institutions there is a vicious circle: weak political institutions lead
to strengthening of the bureaucracy's monopolising capability and
scope which for its part leads to the weakening of the foundation
for the promotion of political institutions.
    (b) Expertise of the bureaucracy: Bureaucratic organisations
by their very nature and origin can claim a superior expertise of
statecraft. La Polambora wrote that bureaucracy is able to
monopolise considerable power in the policy making institutions
because of the scientific and technical character of government
policy. Formulation and implementation of any dimension of
national policy require highly specialized technical skill.
Bureaucracy is that part of the government where these qualities
are almost invariably found in considerable disproportion to other
parts. The intricate nature of government programming in a
technological era has resulted in adynamic growth in the
administrators influence even in societies with viable and dynamic
representative structure."
   (c) Public sector in social and economic development and
growth of interest groups : The governments in developing
countries are directly and indirectly involved in most of the
programmes for social and economic development. This extends
the opportunity for the bureaucracy to cultivate variety of
resources, such as professional and enterprenuerial and thereby
exert pre-dominant influence in policy making and
implementation. This touches the population in nearly all spheres
of life. To carry out such programmes many special interest
groups have to be mobilized at official ·initiative. Various
committees and councils are set up to plan and implement
programmes under government supervision. In almost all cases
th~ creation of these interest groups follows a bureaucratic
initiative. The growth of state sponsored interest groups helps to
increase bureaucratic control.
15. Micheal Lofchi, "Representative Govemmen~ Bureaucracy and Politic&!
   Development", TM Journal of Developing Areas. Vol. 11, DeL 1967, p. 37.
246                                BUSS JOURNAL. VOL 12. NO.2. 1991
    (d) The tendency to centralisation of power: Centralisation of
power is also associated with expansion of power of bureaucracy.
In the absence of representative governments in many developing
countries like Bangladesh authority tends to be concentrated more
at the highest echelons often irrespective of the type of
government. In such situation the government needs to depend
too heavily on the administrative capability and expertise of the
bureaucracy. Indeed as experience in most cases including
Pakistan and India suggest. the bureaucracy. both civil and
military. becomes an important part of the core power-base of the
government. Eventually there becomes a mutual dependence
between the bureaucratic and political elites.
     (e) Aid dependence: An important factor that has contributed
to the increase of the dominance of bureaucracy is international
aid programmes. These programmes strengthen and increase the
power of bureaucracy in countries like Bangladesh. The donors
cannot undertake the economic development programmes directly
and for obvious reasons need to depend on the bureaucracy as the
institution through which the largest part of their aid programmes
are implemented. By virtue of its positions as the negotiating.
executing and evaluating institution for aid programmes. the
bureaucracy grows in importance and influence. It also often
becomes a part of the national and international vested interests
that tend to increase aid dependence rather than reduce it. We will
now proceed to examine the political involvement and influence
of bureaucracy in Bangladesh.
IV. THE LEGACY OF BANGLADESH BUREAUCRACY
    Bangladesh became a new independent state in 1971
liberating itself from Pakistan after nine roonths of bloody
struggle. One of the basic reasons for the secession was that East
Pakistan (Bangladesh) was not allowed to be an equal partner in
either decision making or economic development although it
contributed the greater share of national output and foreign
BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH:                                      247
exchange earning. The state apparatus that existed in Bangladesh
at independence was a legacy from Pakistan which the latter in
tum had inherited from British India. The British Raj created
bureaucracy as the chief instrument of control and domination of
the sub continent.
     Bangladesh is a classic example of a Third World developing
country. Its roughly 56 thousand square miles are inhibited by
over 120 million people the majority of whom live in the rural
areas. It's economy is predominantly agricultural with the
substantial proportion of its masses living below the poverty line.
Only about 22% of its population are literate. The 68 thousand
villages of the country have a long way to go to build infra-
structure. electrification. communication and so on. the basics of
any developed country.
     In the twenty years of its existence. except for the period 1972
to 1975. it has been under military rule in one form or the other.
Political institutions as such have had no scope to develop. The
intelligentsia. the professionals. the civil-military elites.
bureaucratic elites and other interest groups control the destiny of
the majority of the people. Nepotism. favouritism and regionalism
are evident in all spheres of life. Bureaucracy being a sub-system
of the society reflects the socio-political and economic features of
the society. Bangladesh bureaucracy is a descendent of the Indian
bureaucracy during the British Raj. The British set up the Indian
Civil Service to administer the country. The prominent feature of
the colonial rule used to be the control over the structure of
government and monopoly on decision making by the
bureaucrats. The military officers also Joined with the bureaucrats
in the governance of India.
    The officers of Indian Civil Service were trained by the British
to run the colonial administration. They were specially trained in
western system and method initially in England. and later in India.
They ended up being prototypes of British officers. As a result
248                                     BlISS JOURNAL, VOL, 12. NO. 2. 1991
they became a class by themselves, turning to the west and
alienated from their own people. .
     On partition from India in 1947, Pakistan as a post-colonial
state and as the lineal descendent of the colonial bureaucrats
inherited from their predecessors their attitude and orientation.
"The elitist character of the Indian Civil Service, became the ideal
of the Civil Service Of Pakistan" .16
     The general trend observed in Pakistsan was that adminis-
tration and bureaucracy had more influence in state affairs. The
impact of politics and pOliticians were less in the overall
Planagement of the country. The bureaucratic elites in Pakistan
had been in command of the state power from the very beginning.
There existed a parliamentary facade of politicians in the 50s. But
in 1958 when the military took over power, the bureaucracy in
collaboration with the military played the key role not only in
managing the administrative system, procedures and relationships,
but also in decisions involving basic political, economical and
social issues. The imposition of Martial law by Ayub Khan
strengthened the role of bureaucrats in decision making. There
were not any substantial change during Yahya Khan's regime.
     Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was the Governor General of
Pakistan and Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister relied very
heavily on civil servants. 11 The reason for this dependence was
said to be the lack of sufficient number of capable and
trustworthy politicians in Muslim League which resulted in Jinnah
and Liaquat turning to qualified bureaucrats. Moreover, "neither
Jinnah nor Liaquat had any reputation for democratic disposi-
16. Hamza Alavi. "The State in Post-Colonial Socities : Pakistan and
   Bangladesh", in K. Gough and H. P. Sharma (ods.), Imperialism and
   Revolution in Soulh Asia, New York Monthly Review Press, 1973, p. 147.
17. Khalid B. Sayee.!, Tire Political System of Pakistan, (Boston, Houghton
   Mifflin 1967), p. 40.
BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH                                                 249
tion".18 Again. politicians were held in poor esteem by Jinoab. He
directed bureaucrats "to watch the activities of the politician
closely. he even warned the bureaucrats against possible misdeeds
by politicians."19 May be that is why we have the evidence of the
Chief Secretary of East Bengal testifying before the law in 1950
about his vigilance on Bengalee Ministers and sending of reports
to the Central Government. 20
                                                           •
    The bureaucrats were very proud of their perfonnance and
their role in decision making in Pakistan. The situation that
prevailed was that bureaucrats worked withour political restraint.
instead they held politicians. in general. in contempt. This gave
birth to poliltical ambitions of bureaucrats. One such example is
Chaudri Muhammad Ali who was the Secretary General and for
four years he undertook the coordination work of various
ministries. This "could be regarded as the personificaton of
political ambitions in the bureaucracy. "21 The post of the
Secretary General was created at his suggestion and was abolished
in 1951 when he left the post and became the Finance Minister.
The chance of reconciling the interests of politicians and
bureaucrats was destroyed largely as a result of political ambitions
of bureaucrats.
    This was the picture in general but if we tum to the condition
prevailing between bureaucrats of West Pakistan and East Pakistan
it was not a politician-bu~aucrat clash. The bureaucrats of West
Pakistan. who were a minority in East Pakistan. tried to dominate
their East Pakistan colleagues who were a majority. The design of
18. Muntassir Mamoon and Jayanla Kumar Ray. Inside Bureaucracy .. Bangla-
   desh. (papyru Publishers. Calcutta. 1982) p. 15.
19. Kalim Siddiqui. Conflict. Crisis and War in Pakislan. (London. Macmilian
    1972) p. 77 in Mamoon and Ray. Inside Bureaucracy .. Bangladessh, op. cil.,
   p.15.
20. Mamoon and Ray. op. cil., p. 16.
21. Kbaiid B. Sayeed, The Polilical System of Pakistan, (Boston. Houghton
    Mifflin, 1967). p_ 75-76.
250                                    BUSS JOURNAL. VOL 12. NO.2. 1991
West Pakistan Bureaucrats for mastery over the politicians of East
Pakist an was more than a strugg le of bureau crats agains t
politicians. It was a struggle undertaken by bureaucrats on behalf
of the domin ant minor ity of Pakistan trying to impos e and
streng then their rule over the majority. Ultimately, it resulted in
the weakening of national unity and the birth of Bangladesh.
      In the 24 years of Pakist an before Bangladesh, we find a
politically ambitious bureaucracy in partnership with the military
dominating the running of the administration. The psychology of
the Pakistan bureaucrat was that "as a successor of his all powerful
British predessor (he) felt that just as the British civil servant had
exercised untrammeled power and often kept the politicians under
contro l so should he be allowed to exercise his power without
political interference. "22
    The Pakistani bureaucracy that Bangladesh inherited on the
eve of its birth was coloni al in nature. Features inherited by
administration such as hierar chy of services, limited and strict
entry points for each service, elitist feature of superior service were
mainta ined. The super elite cadre were the Civil Service of
Pakistan (CSP) who occupied all the key administrative positions
and were involved in new development institutions. The CSPs
securd 60 percen t repres entatio n in the Economic Pool, held
important poSitions in the Planning Commission, and were also the
Chairmen and Directors of most of the new enterprises.
     The actual strength of civil servants in 1971 in government
                                                               23
 offices, autonoqlous and semi-autonomous bodies was 4,54,450.
 Out of these only 315 were in the rank of secretary, additional
 secretary and joint secretary.24 A good number oftivi l servants
 22. Mamoon and Ray. op. Cd .• p. 16.
 23. Bangladesh Establishment Division, StaJistics on Civil Employ
                                                                  ees of the
     GovernmenJ of Bangladesh. Dhaka.    BOP.  1975. p. 2.
                                                                       desh.
 24. Syed Giasuddin Ahmed. Public Personnel Administration in Bangla
     (The City Press. Dhaka 1986), p. 155-167.
BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH                                           251
were stranded in West Pakistan. The former Civil Service of
Pakistan, the Police Service of Pakistan, Pakistan Foreign Service.
Pakistan Audit and Accounts and Taxation Services as well as the
higher echelons <if the military bureaucracy were in disorder.
    The early liberation period was not socially and politically
favourable for domination by bureaucratic elites. They were
considered collaborators having been. identified as a part and
parcel of Pakistani bureaucracy and not as Bengali civil servants.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman publicly stated that their services were no
longer required.
     A set-back was suffered by the bureaucrats as a whole. during
1972 to early 1975. The civil servants were alienated along with
military bureaucracy. The senior and experienced Bengali Civil
Servants and military officers working with the Central
Government were left behind in Pakistan. Those remaining in
Bangladesh were victims of 'schism and factionalism'. With the
independence of Bangladesh those is the provincial service started
agitation for a merger between other services and the former
central service. The important factor that supported such merger is
relationship between job specification, skills. merit, posting and
rank in the higher civil service. Moreover. those in the provincial
service began to claim that they were now performing jobs similar
to those performed by the former members of the central service.
Thus they wanted the elitism to end. In fact they asked that
members of both services should be given equal opportunity. This
situation was aggravated by some selective cases of discriminatory
promotion permitted by the new governments. In one such case.
an officer not only "secured extraordinarily rapid promotions for
himself but boosted the career opportunities of his ex-EPCS
colleagues in expected disregard to the claims of ex-CSP
officers". 25 In addition, rewards to those who fought in the
liberation movement or supported it from within the government
25. T. Moniruzzaman, as cited in Manwon and Ray, op. cit., p. 49.
252                                       BliSS JOURNAL, VOL 12. NO. 2. 1991
were awarded by appointing them in the civil service without
sufficient consideration of qualification or merit. A special
examination was organised for the recruitment of freedom
fighters. Again, certain administrative reforms were introduced
which broke down the use of cadre affiliations of civil servants. A
distinguishing feature of Pakistan Civil Service was reservation of
posts. This was not strictly followed . The officers of East Pakistan
Civil Service occupied n()W after liberation, important
administrative positions in the Secretariat while non-government
officers were employed to important posts on the basis of
political patronage. Mujib's government also introduced the
Presidential Order 9, through which civil servants could be
removed without any explanation, thus weakening the security of
government service. 26 The position of the bureaucracy became
clearly subservient to political leadership and the ruling party
which in many cases dictated the way administration was to run.
Ironically though, the saying has it that during those days the civil
servants would check the newspaper in the morning to be sure that
they were still in office.
  , The set-back of bureaucracy during Mujib's era was, however,
short lived. When it became evident that non-bureaucrats were
unable to administer the country bureaucrats were called back.
Reliance on bureaucrats became ineviatable and gradually
increased. Facts such as the nomination of "21 senior bureaucrats
(9 former CSP officers, I police officer, 4 tOj) military officers
and 7 senior members of other services) as members of the central
committee"27 of Baksal speak of such dependence. Through a
26. The Coilstitution of Bangladesh conlains provision relating to the services
   similar to those l1fovided under the Government of India Act of 1935, and
   the Constitutions of 1956 and 1962 of Pakistan. Article 29, Part 1II and Part
   IX deal with the services. However it is noteworthy that the constitution
   provides no procedural protection to civil servants. The constitution fmnly
   maintains that "decision of the authority empowered to remove or dismiss
   such penon or to reduce him in rank shall be fmal." In Bangladesh the
    President is such authority.
27. Bangl4desh Observer. Dhaka, June 7, 1975.
(
    BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH                                          253
    Presidential Ordinance the 19 provinces of the country were made
    into 61 districts and the 61 Governors of these districts consisted
    of 14 senior bureaucrats (9 CSP officers 1 military officer and 4
    members of other services). Graduallly CSP officers replaced
    party nominees in key position.
        The military had also been alienatd during Sheikh Mujib's
    early days of reign. The budget for the military was cut down
    from 16% to 15%. The entry of military back into the national
    scenario came about with the need to check rampant smuggling
    and hoarding, as well as checking other internal threats that were
    mounting. This exposed the weakness of .the ruling party to the
    bureaucrats and military. Sheikh Mujib reinstated both groups by
    1975. They in tum began to assert themselves in the decision
    making process. Subsequently, when Zia's government came to '
    power in the wake of series of coups and counter coups the
    bureaucrats joined the government with open arms. The Martial
    Law regime of General Zia "was in fact a partnership between
    the military officers and elite civil servants. "28 It was also been
    observed that there is a tendency among military rulers to rely on
    bureaucrats in their desire to establish their illegitimate rule.
        The six years of Zia's rule may be classified as a military rule
    for the first half while the second half was a military rule under
    civilian facade. In either case the military and civil bureaucracy
    occupied important positions in the country. In the first half of his
    rule Zia as the President was the Chief Martial Law Administrator
    as well as Chief of Army Staff. The Chiefs of Staff of Airforce
    and Navy were the Deputy Martial Administrators. The country
    was divided into 9 Martial Law Zones placed under the charge of
    9 Zonal Martial Law Administrators who were not only
    responsible for the maintenance of law and order they also
    participated in policy making by contributing significant inputs.
    28. Emajuddin Abamed, Bureaucratic Elites in SegmenJed EcononUc Growth:
       Bangladesh and Pakistan, UPL, 1980, p. 162.
254                                  BlISS JOURNAL. VOL 12. NO.2. 1991
Composition of the Advisers to the President during Zia regime
Professional Background                                  Number
Military bureaucrats                                         3
Civil bureaucrats                                            6
Police                                                       I
Teacher (University)                                         4
Businessmen                                                  4
Doctor                                                       I
Lawyer                                                       I
Journalist                                                   2
Women Social Workers                                         2
Total                                                      24
      If we also look at the composition of the Advisers that helped
the President in running the country we see a dominance of
military and civil bu,reaucrnts . The positions of the President. the
Chief Martial Law Adminis- trator. Deputy Chief Martial Law
Administrator and advisers in the over all power structure were
very important. Similar to those in Pakistan days the key policy
making bodies like the National Economic Council (NEC).
Planning Commission as well as Secretariat and other
Corporations were headed by civil-military bureaucrats. The
President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. Zia. headed the
National Economic Council which consisted of none others but
the Deputy Martial Law Administrators the Advisers to the
President and the Deputy Chainnan of the Planning Commission.
that is Civil-military bureaucratic elites. A civil servant was the
head of the Planning Commission. In the 38 public corporations
existing in 1975 the Chainnen or Managing Directors were as
follows : II fonner CSP officers. 5 military officers. 2 polices
officers. 6 officers belonging to EPCS while the rest belonged to
the fonner central and other services. These clearly manifest how
BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH:                                     255
civil-military bureaucrats were involved in the policy-making
process of the country.
    In the seco~d phase of Zia's rule he tried to civilianize his
regime. However, the domination of civil-military bureaucrats
continued. At the time of Zia's death his last Council of Ministers
was made of 24 full ministers and their composition was: military
bureaucrats - 6, civil bureaucrats - 5, technocrats - 6, Businessmen
- 4, Landlord - I, Lawyer - 2. Between the civil and military
bureaucrats, at the later stage of his regime the former was
acquiring more say or power than before in lIecision making. The
military however also remained dominant. There were 79 military
officers in the civil service in 1980. Key positions such as that of
Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and
Chairmen or Directors of Corporations were held by 16 military
bureaucrats in 1980.
    This set-up of the state apparatus was inherited by Ershad
when he took power in 1982.. He took over on the ground that
politicians were corrupt and unable to run the country. This cut
short the civilianization process of Zia's government and military
rule prevailed openly in the country for the next three years.
There were not any qualitative difference in the politico-economic
and administrative field at the initial stage of &shad's rule as he
followed the same strategy as Zia's government. However, Ershad
helped to enhance the power of the military bureaucrats. In the
prior regime, particularly at its later phase civil and military
bureaucrats were more or less equal partners but under Ershad the
civil bureaucracy became the subordinate partner of the military
bureaucracy.
    During Ershad's military rule he was also the Chief Martial
Law Administrator. The country was divided into five Zones and
twenty sub-Zones headed by army officers. These officers were
Chairmen of various development and planning bodies as well as
heads of civil administrative units in their respective areas.
9.-
256                                       BOSS JOURNAL. VOL 12. NO.2. 1991
     To aid and advise the CMLA. a Council of Ministers. which
was originally a Council of Advisers, were appointed. The
composition of the Council in 1982 was : 7 military bureaucrats. 3
retired civil bureaucrats. 2 teclmocrats and 4 lawyers. Political
leaders were later inducted as a part of the regime's attempt to
civilianize the government. By 1988 the Ministers of Ershad
government consisted of 13 military bureaucrats. 9 civil
bureaucrats. 7 intellectuals (teacher. doctor . lawyer and so on). 6
businessmen and 45 persons affiliated with party politics. In the
 same manner as that of Zia's rule, during Ershad government the
 Civil-military bureaucrats were dominating the chief policy
 implementing institutions like the NEC, Planning Commission,
 National Councils, National Council Committees and Public
 Corporations. In the last few years a progressive increase was
 notice able in' the representation of the armed forces in
 government and semi-government service. "The colonization of
 civilian posts by military officers, which began in a small way
 during Zia regime , greatly expanded under Ershad ." 29 Retired
 military officers virtually took over the police service.
      There were 28 senior posts occupied by military officials in
 the secretariat, "serving or retired members of the armed forces
  headed 14 of the 22 lucrative public corporations. Six more were
  headed by civilians with special connections with Ershad and other
  senior army generals. "30 One-third of the 48 heads of Bangladesh
  missions abroad were from the defence services. This was Ershad's
  way of ensuring the loyalty of the army personnels to him. He
  would discuss all important policy measures with his military
  officers before formally placing it to the Cabinet.
    This was the scenario till Ershad held the controversial election
 of 1986. Subsequent upon the election his confidence increased
 and reliance on bureaucracy was not to the extent of the early
                                                                  Sri
 29. Tu Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bang/adesh and
      Lanka, (Cambridge University Press 1989), p. 222.
 30. Ibid. p. 222.
BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH                                        257
days of his rule. Ershad helped to create conflict and clash within
the civil bureaucracy intentionally by inducting army personnel
so as to weaken the civil bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was,
however, not going to give up. Thus, .the 9 member secretaries
committee, considered to be the "elite committee or super
cabinet"31was influential in decision making on national issues
even to the last days of Ershad's fall. Efforts were on as late as
November '90 to raise the age limit for the retirement of
government officers and employees to 60 years. If this attempt
had succeeded than "the Pakistan generation officers who are
reportedly close to the Ershad Government would have got three
more years to help this regime to cling to power. " 32 Some of the .
most influential secretaries reported to be the crux of the extended
power base of Ershad were due for retirement within a year or two,
thus this step was to be taken.
V. BUREAUCRACY AS AN OBJEer OF PATRONAGE
    In the nine years of rule Ershad and his governmnet broke
down all rules, regulations, norms and practices in order to ensure
domination by distribution of patronage. There were anomalies in.
appointment, posting, promotion, transfer and so on. Bureaucracy,
as already mentioned. follows specific rules and regulations. This
is among the basic principles of bureaucracy. Bangladesh bureau-
cracy is also supposed to be guided by such rules and regulations.
Articles of the Constitution, President's order and different rules of
the Establishment Ministry are applicable for appointment,
promotion. transfer and so on.
    Ershad managed to disregard all these whenever it pleased
him. This practice started even before he became the President.
Ershad was instrumental in the promotion of Finance Director of
Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation. Musharraf Hossain
31 Dhaka Courier. August 10-16. 1990.
32. Dhaka Courier. November 23-29. 1990.
258                                     BliSS JOURNAL. VOL. 12, NO. 2. 1991
to acting chainnan in 198J.33 Prior to this the officer was being
investigated for corruption charges under Zia's government. In
fact Zia had asked Ershad to look into the matter. With the
blessings of Ershad. subsequently Musharraf Hossain became the
Industries Secretary and exened extraordinary influence. '
    A. G. Mohiuddin a junior officer in the taxation depanment
of the Pakistan Government soon rose to prominence in foreign
service under Ershad regime merely by vinue of a matrimonial
relationship between the two. Immediately after the change of
Government in 1982 he was posted in Washington as a diplomat.
The last post held by Mohiuddin was that of Pennanent
Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations. "The
principle of seniority was blatantly violated in order to promote
Mohiuddin. He was given the rank of Ambassador in 1986
superseding as many as 14 officers."34
  . There was cause of discontent in Bangladesh Petroleum
Corporation (BPC) as well as in Bangladesh Parjatan (Tourism)
Corporation. Gulam Mohammad Kader, the younger brother of
Ershad was made the director of BPC in 1989. He was serving as
Operation Officer in the said corporation in 1977. By 1984-85 he
became Operation Manager by vinue of being Ershad's brother. 35
     Habibur Rahman. another of Ershad's relaltives became the
Chairman of Parjatan Corporation and Foreign Employment
Bureau simultaneously. On the basis of regular promotion in
1975 he was promoted to the post of Assistant Director. But with
change of power he became Managing Director of Expon Promo-
tion' Bureau and later Chairman of the Parjatan Corporation.36
    The Foreign Ministry has been amongst the worst affected out
of Ershad's political and family patronage. He damaged the
structure, efficiency and image of the ministry. During President
33. See for details Robber (Bengali Weeldy), December 30. 1990, and Sangbad
    (Bengali Daily), 27 December 1990.
34. Holiday , December 29. 1990.
35. Sangbad, December 30, 1990,
36. Ibid.
BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH                                     259
Zia's rule there was widespread political appointment in the
FQreign Ministry and inductiQn Qf Army. The practice Qf lateral
entry was introduced during Zia's time. TO' regularize their
services Zia gQvernment absQrbed them in the FQreign Service
Cadre. Army persQnnel whO' were absQrbed were gQing to' be
cQnsidered fQr seniQrity from the day these Qfficers were
cQmmissiQned. By the time the Qfficers were 30 years they CQuid
becQme DirectQr General Qf the FQreign Ministry. But a university
graduate nQt belQw the age Qf 21 CQuid appear fQr the BCS
cQmpetitive examinatiQn and jQin the service. Thus anQmaly was
created by Zia. Ue appointed General Shafiullah, General Dastigir
and Air Marshal KhQndakar, to' name a few Qf the army Qfficers.
as AmbassadQrs. ErShad fQIlQwed the fQQtsteps of Zia to' inflict
severe damage to' the dignity Qf the FQreign Office. structurally
and Qtherwise. There were viQlatiQn Qf various rules. There is, for
example. a regulatiQn that Qfficers including the Head Qf MissiQn
shQuld nQt be PQsted abroad fQr more than eight years in a row .
But Ershad's favQurities have been abroad fQr 15 uninterrupted
years. "Major General (Retd) K. M. Shafiullah. nQW High
CQmmissiQner in LondQn. tQPS the list Qf beneficiaries. Brig A. N.
M. Nuruzzaman. AmbassadQr in StQckhQlm (13 years). Major
General (Reid) Quazi GQlam Dastgir in Riyadh (12 years). A. H.
G. MQhiuddin. Permanent Representative to' the UN in New YQrk
(12 years)" 37 and so Qn. NQne Qf the FQreign Service Qfficers
benefited from this viQlatiQn. Again an Qfficer from the FQreign
Service cadre has to' serve as DirectQr General for 3 to' 4 years
berore he is given an ambassadQrial post. The lateral entrant A. H.
G . MQhiuddin did nQt have any difficulty in securing
AmbassadQrial apPQintments withQut serving as DirectQr
General. "38 The student leader lalaluddin was apPQinted to' the
Bangladesh High CQmmissiQn in Australia as a reward from
Ershad fQr his role in breaking up the student political groups in
the university.
37. Holiday , Decemller 29. 1990.
38. Ibid.
260                                      BUSS JOURNAL, VOL. 12, NO.2, 1991
    Besides these amonalies in posting and induction of anny
personnel Ershad was involved in the promotion of civil servants
even upto the level of Deputy Secretary. These interventions often
did not abide by the rules of appointment and promotion. 39
Again, Ershad managed to obtain the support of some highly
placed bureaucrats for his political party. An influential secretary
to the Government was reported to have joined politics directly
while in service and openly worked for the ruling party. In
different meetings and processions he rendered slogans in favour
of Ershad and IP. During the anti-Ershad movement he tried to
stop engineers from joining in processions and meetings against
Ershad. "40 On the other hand, army retired bureaucrats, both civil
and military, joined the ruling party and/or government. 41 The
prospect of becoming a minister or influential factor in the
government at the highest echelons of service and thereafter led to
patron-client relationship between the government and
bureaucracy, thereby damaging the neutrality of the latter.
VI. CONCLUSION
    This paper was aimed at understanding bureaucracy as it
functions in Bangladesh in the light of the characteristics and
principles prescribed for bureaucracy by Weber. We have seen
that Weber's rational type of bureaucracy is not functioning in
Bangladesh in its true form largely due to the political
environment and socio-economic factors . Under autocratic rule
bureaucracy was stripped of its neutrality and it became a partner
of the autocratic ruler in running the state to serve the interest of
only those at the top and not the people or the nation as a whole.
39. See for datails, Ananda Patra (Bengali Weeldy), Dec 21-27, 1990.
40. For details see Robber (Bengali Weeldy) January 20, 1991, p. 40-42.
41. A. B. M. Golam Mustafa, B. M. Abbas A. T., Hurnayan Rasheed Choudhury,
    Mahbubur Rahman, Syeduzzaman, A. R. S. Doha, are amongst the retired civil
    bureaucrats who joined &shad's Cabinet. Military bureaucra .. who joined
    &shad's Cabinet on retirement include Major General Munim, Major General
    Mahmudul Hassan, Major General Sharnsul Huq, Lieutenant Colonel H. M.
    A. Gaffar and Major Manzur Kader to name a Cew. For details see Ananda
   Palra (Bengali Weeldy) ~mber 7·13, 1990.
                                                                               •
  BUREAUCRACY IN BANGLADESH
                                                                         261
       From our observation we find that bureaucracy and autocracy
   promote each other in their own interest and for retaining their
   domination in the man;lgement of the state. Bureaucracy supports
   autocratic rule for the sake of self-aggrandizement. Autocratic
   and military rulers rely on bureaucracy to establish, legitimise and
  perpetuate their rule. This in effect implies violation of rules and
  regulation in such areas as appointment, PrQJllotion, transfer and
  dismissal. Subjective factors tend to prevail over basic norms and
  principles of bureaucracy which causes severe damage to the
  institution itself, particularly its neutrality and objectivity.
       On the other hand, bureaucrats who succeed in carrying
  favour with the autocratic ruler got involved in different means of
  self-aggrandizement. Bureaucrats lose their neutrality ending up
  as yes-men of the autocrats. Politicization of the bureaucracy
 makes the bureaucratic decision-making less independent, civil
 servants do not practice neutrality any longer and instead involve
 themselves in the competition among interest groups. Bureaucrats
 in the process become a part of the group of sycophants around
 the autocratic ruler and in the name of advising the ruler cause
 irreparable damage to the cause of the welfare of the masses.
      There is a tendency among military rulers to favour military
 bureaucrats over civil bureaucrats. So was the case in Bangladesh.
 The military regime equated the civil bureaucrats with lower
 military bureaucrats. "Military rulers of Bangladesh. . . scan-
dalusly downgraded the civil service by repeated enhancement of
military pay scales and revision of the Warrant of Precedence, so
that even a Major General enjoys a superiorrity to a Secretary. "42
This breeds discontent and frustration among civil servants. They
are demoralized . Therefore, a group reacts with apathy, obstruc-
tionism or evasiveness towards duty while the other group tries to
make material gain and advance their career by pleasing the .
military rulers, inspite of the humiliation suffered.
42. Hassan Uzzaman, The Military and Socio-Ecotwmic Reality and Politics in
   Bangladesh. Published by Author in 1985 in Bengali, p. 36-37.
..
     262 •                                 BUSS JOURNAL, VOL 12. NO.2. 1991
           This tendency of pleasing bosses and promoting personal
     gain has set a bad precedent. Therefore. fresh entrants enter
     the service with the understanding that if they please those in
     power or in the higher echelons their advancement in life will be
     ens,ured, Since the senior bureaucrats involve in corruption in
     which the Chief Executive of the couIlt'¥ is himself involved. there
     are no examples for the new entrant. no role model~ or political
     example which would teach them to abstain from such practices.
     They begin by servin g those in power so as to gain their
     patronage and fail in their duty to the people as the servant of the
     Republic.
           The image of bureaucracy has to be re-established first by
      restoring pride and neutrality and efficiency of the services. Rule
      of law should be emphasized which is essential for maintaining the
      neutra lity of the bureaucracy. Accountability needs to be
      introd uced in all the government offices. corporations. and
      autonomous bodies. Committees or national bodies comprising of
      people 's representatives and government officers should be set up.
      Along with financial audit, performance audit should be
      emphasised. This will help assess the achievements or failures of
      individuals and organizations. Heads of departments may be held
     ·responsible for any lapses. commissions or irregularities.
                                               43
            Writing in the 60's Warren Bennis said that bureaucracy will
       demise and democracy will take its place in twenty years time, that .
       is by the 80's. But what we find today is that bureaucracy remains
       "nece ssary evil". Bureaucracy continues to be a permanent
       institution indispensable for sustaining the political system. And
       indeed there is no conflict between bureaucracy and the principles
       and functioning of democracy. The two are rather complementary
       to each other. Burea ucracy is an organised and efficient
       machinery vital for managing the affairs of the state. For its part
       bureaucracy draws its stability from its position as the supportive
        institution for the state. The objective of this mutual dependence
        can however, be best served by enSuring strict neutrality, indepen-
        dence and professionalism of bureaucracy and by minimizing the
        political involvement and influence on this institution.
             -            . .
      43. Warren .Bennis. Beyond Bureaucracy. (New York, McGraw Hill Boole Co.).
       , 1966.