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Free Will
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The term “free will” has emerged over the past two millennia as the
Stanford Encyclopedia canonical designator for a significant kind of control over one’s actions.
of Philosophy Questions concerning the nature and existence of this kind of control (e.g.,
does it require and do we have the freedom to do otherwise or the power
of self-determination?), and what its true significance is (is it necessary for
moral responsibility or human dignity?) have been taken up in every
period of Western philosophy and by many of the most important
philosophical figures, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas,
Co-Principal Editors: Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman Descartes, and Kant. (We cannot undertake here a review of related
Associate Editors: Colin Allen, Hannah Kim, & Paul Oppenheimer discussions in other philosophical traditions. For a start, the reader may
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consult Marchal and Wenzel 2017 and Chakrabarti 2017 for overviews of
Editorial Board: https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html thought on free will, broadly construed, in Chinese and Indian
Library of Congress ISSN: 1095-5054 philosophical traditions, respectively.) In this way, it should be clear that
disputes about free will ineluctably involve disputes about metaphysics
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significance of free will, we are forced to consider questions about (among
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Free Will
Copyright © 2022 by the authors Here is an overview of what follows. In Section 1, we acquaint the reader
Timothy O’Connor and Christopher Franklin with some central historical contributions to our understanding of free
All rights reserved. will. (As nearly every major and minor figure had something to say about
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1
 Free Will Timothy O’Connor and Christopher Franklin

it, we cannot begin to cover them all.) As with contributions to many other 4.2 God’s Freedom
foundational topics, these ideas are not of ‘merely historical interest’: Bibliography
present-day philosophers continue to find themselves drawn back to Academic Tools
certain thinkers as they freshly engage their contemporaries. In Section 2, Other Internet Resources
we map the complex architecture of the contemporary discussion of the Related Entries
nature of free will by dividing it into five subtopics: its relation to moral
responsibility; the proper analysis of the freedom to do otherwise; a
powerful, recent argument that the freedom to do otherwise (at least in one 1. Major Historical Contributions
important sense) is not necessary for moral responsibility; ‘compatibilist’
accounts of sourcehood or self-determination; and ‘incompatibilist’ or 1.1 Ancient and Medieval Period
‘libertarian’ accounts of source and self-determination. In Section 3, we
consider arguments from experience, a priori reflection, and various One finds scholarly debate on the ‘origin’ of the notion of free will in
scientific findings and theories for and against the thesis that human beings Western philosophy. (See, e.g., Dihle (1982) and, in response Frede
have free will, along with the related question of whether it is reasonable (2011), with Dihle finding it in St. Augustine (354–430 CE) and Frede in
to believe that we have it. Finally, in Section 4, we survey the long- the Stoic Epictetus (c. 55–c. 135 CE).) But this debate presupposes a fairly
debated questions involving free will that arise in classical theistic particular and highly conceptualized concept of free will, with Dihle’s
metaphysics. later ‘origin’ reflecting his having a yet more particular concept in view
than Frede. If, instead, we look more generally for philosophical reflection
1. Major Historical Contributions on choice-directed control over one’s own actions, then we find significant
1.1 Ancient and Medieval Period discussion in Plato and Aristotle (cf. Irwin 1992). Indeed, on this matter,
1.2 Modern Period and Twentieth Century as with so many other major philosophical issues, Plato and Aristotle give
2. The Nature of Free Will importantly different emphases that inform much subsequent thought.
2.1 Free Will and Moral Responsibility
2.2 The Freedom to Do Otherwise In Book IV of The Republic, Plato posits rational, spirited, and appetitive
2.3 Freedom to Do Otherwise vs. Sourcehood Accounts aspects to the human soul. The wise person strives for inner ‘justice’, a
2.4 Compatibilist Accounts of Sourcehood condition in which each part of the soul plays its proper role—reason as
2.5 Libertarian Accounts of Sourcehood the guide, the spirited nature as the ally of reason, exhorting oneself to do
3. Do We Have Free Will? what reason deems proper, and the passions as subjugated to the
3.1 Arguments Against the Reality of Free Will determinations of reason. In the absence of justice, the individual is
3.2 Arguments for the Reality of Free Will enslaved to the passions. Hence, freedom for Plato is a kind of self-
4. Theological Wrinkles mastery, attained by developing the virtues of wisdom, courage, and
4.1 Free Will and God’s Power, Knowledge, and Goodness temperance, resulting in one’s liberation from the tyranny of base desires

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and acquisition of a more accurate understanding and resolute pursuit of debates between Epicureans, Stoics, and the Academic Skeptics, and as it
the Good (Hecht 2014). concerned freedom of the will, the debate centered on the place of
determinism or of fate in governing human actions and lives. The Stoics
While Aristotle shares with Plato a concern for cultivating virtues, he and the Epicureans believed that all ordinary things, human souls
gives greater theoretical attention to the role of choice in initiating included, are corporeal and governed by natural laws or principles. Stoics
individual actions which, over time, result in habits, for good or ill. In believed that all human choice and behavior was causally determined, but
Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that, unlike nonrational held that this was compatible with our actions being ‘up to us’. Chrysippus
agents, we have the power to do or not to do, and much of what we do is ably defended this position by contending that your actions are ‘up to you’
voluntary, such that its origin is ‘in us’ and we are ‘aware of the particular when they come about ‘through you’—when the determining factors of
circumstances of the action’. Furthermore, mature humans make choices your action are not external circumstances compelling you to act as you do
after deliberating about different available means to our ends, drawing on but are instead your own choices grounded in your perception of the
rational principles of action. Choose consistently well (poorly), and a options before you. Hence, for moral responsibility, the issue is not
virtuous (vicious) character will form over time, and it is in our power to whether one’s choices are determined (they are) but in what manner they
be either virtuous or vicious. are determined. Epicurus and his followers had a more mechanistic
conception of bodily action than the Stoics. They held that all things
A question that Aristotle seems to recognize, while not satisfactorily
(human soul included) are constituted by atoms, whose law-governed
answering, is whether the choice an individual makes on any given
behavior fixes the behavior of everything made of such atoms. But they
occasion is wholly determined by his internal state—perception of his
rejected determinism by supposing that atoms, though law-governed, are
circumstances and his relevant beliefs, desires, and general character
susceptible to slight ‘swerves’ or departures from the usual paths.
dispositions (wherever on the continuum between virtue and vice he may
Epicurus has often been understood as seeking to ground the freedom of
be)—and external circumstances. He says that “the man is the father of his
human willings in such indeterministic swerves, but this is a matter of
actions as of children”—that is, a person’s character shapes how she acts.
controversy. If this understanding of his aim is correct, how he thought
One might worry that this seems to entail that the person could not have
that this scheme might work in detail is not known. (What little we know
done otherwise—at the moment of choice, she has no control over what
about his views in this matter stem chiefly from the account given in his
her present character is—and so she is not responsible for choosing as she
follower Lucretius’s six-book poem, On the Nature of Things. See
does. Aristotle responds by contending that her present character is partly
Bobzien 2000 for discussion.)
a result of previous choices she made. While this claim is plausible
enough, it seems to ‘pass the buck’, since ‘the man is the father’ of those A final notable figure of this period was Alexander of Aphrodisias, the
earlier choices and actions, too. most important Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle. In his On Fate,
Alexander sharply criticizes the positions of the Stoics. He goes on to
We note just a few contributions of the subsequent centuries of the
resolve the ambiguity in Aristotle on the question of the determining
Hellenistic era. (See Bobzien 1998.) This period was dominated by
nature of character on individual choices by maintaining that, given all

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such shaping factors, it remains open to the person when she acts freely to a transformative operation of divine grace. This latter, psychological
do or not to do what she in fact does. Many scholars see Alexander as the conception of freedom of will clearly echoes Plato’s notion of the soul’s
first unambiguously ‘libertarian’ theorist of the will (for more information (possible) inner justice.
about such theories see section 2 below).
Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) attempted to synthesize major strands of
Augustine (354–430) is the central bridge between the ancient and Aristotle’s systematic philosophy with Christian theology, and so Aquinas
medieval eras of philosophy. His mature thinking about the will was begins his complex discussion of human action and choice by agreeing
influenced by his early encounter with late classical Neoplatonist thought, with Aristotle that creatures such as ourselves who are endowed with both
which is then transformed by the theological views he embraces in his intellect and will are hardwired to will certain general ends ordered to the
adult Christian conversion, famously recounted in his Confessions. In that most general goal of goodness. Will is rational desire: we cannot move
work and in the earlier On the Free Choice of the Will, Augustine towards that which does not appear to us at the time to be good. Freedom
struggles to draw together into a coherent whole the doctrines that enters the picture when we consider various means to these ends and move
creaturely misuse of freedom, not God, is the source of evil in the world ourselves to activity in pursuit of certain of them. Our will is free in that it
and that the human will has been corrupted through the ‘fall’ from grace is not fixed by nature on any particular means, and they generally do not
of the earliest human beings, necessitating a salvation that is attained appear to us either as unqualifiedly good or as uniquely satisfying the end
entirely through the actions of God, even as it requires, constitutively, an we wish to fulfill. Furthermore, what appears to us to be good can vary
individual’s willed response of faith. The details of Augustine’s positive widely—even, over time, intra-personally. So much is consistent with
account remain a matter of controversy. He clearly affirms that the will is saying that in a given total circumstance (including one’s present beliefs
by its nature a self-determining power—no powers external to it determine and desires), one is necessitated to will as one does. For this reason, some
its choice—and that this feature is the basis of its freedom. But he does not commentators have taken Aquinas to be a kind of compatibilist concerning
explicitly rule out the will’s being internally determined by psychological freedom and causal or theological determinism. In his most extended
factors, as Chrysippus held, and Augustine had theological reasons that defense of the thesis that the will is not ‘compelled’ (DM 6), Aquinas
might favor (as well as others that would oppose) the thesis that all things notes three ways that the will might reject an option it sees as attractive: (i)
are determined in some manner by God. Scholars divide on whether it finds another option more attractive, (ii) it comes to think of some
Augustine was a libertarian or instead a kind of compatibilist with respect circumstance rendering an alternative more favorable “by some chance
to metaphysical freedom. (Macdonald 1999 and Stump 2006 argue the circumstance, external or internal”, and (iii) the person is momentarily
former, Baker 2003 and Couenhoven 2007 the latter.) It is clear, however, disposed to find an alternative attractive by virtue of a non-innate state that
that Augustine thought that we are powerfully shaped by wrongly-ordered is subject to the will (e.g., being angry vs being at peace). The first
desires that can make it impossible for us to wholeheartedly will ends consideration is clearly consistent with compatibilism. The second at best
contrary to those desires, for a sustained period of time. This condition points to a kind of contingency that is not grounded in the activity of the
entails an absence of something more valuable, ‘true freedom’, in which will itself. And one wanting to read Aquinas as a libertarian might worry
our wills are aligned with the Good, a freedom that can be attained only by that his third consideration just passes the buck: even if we do sometimes

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have an ability to directly modify perception-coloring states such as viz., in the ‘beatific vision’ of God in the afterlife—we still can refrain
moods, Aquinas’s account of will as rational desire seems to indicate that from willing it. For discussion, see John Duns Scotus, §5.2.
we will do so only if it seems to us on balance to be good to do so. Those
who read Aquinas as a libertarian point to the following further remark in 1.2 Modern Period and Twentieth Century
this text: “Will itself can interfere with the process [of some cause’s
moving the will] either by refusing to consider what attracts it to will or by The problem of free will was an important topic in the modern period,
considering its opposite: namely, that there is a bad side to what is being with all the major figures wading into it (Descartes 1641 [1988], 1644
proposed…” (Reply to 15; see also DV 24.2). For discussion, see [1988]; Hobbes 1654 [1999], 1656 [1999]; Spinoza 1677 [1992];
MacDonald (1998), Stump (2003, ch. 9) and especially Hoffman & Malebranche 1684 [1993]; Leibniz 1686 [1991]; Locke 1690 [1975];
Michon (2017), which offers the most comprehensive analysis of relevant Hume 1740 [1978], 1748 [1975]; Edwards 1754 [1957]; Kant 1781
texts to date. [1998], 1785 [1998], 1788 [2015]; Reid 1788 [1969]). After less sustained
attention in the 19th Century (most notable were Schopenhauer 1841
John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308) was the stoutest defender in the [1999] and Nietzsche 1886 [1966]), it was widely discussed again among
medieval era of a strongly libertarian conception of the will, maintaining early twentieth century philosophers (Moore 1912; Hobart 1934; Schlick
on introspective grounds that will by its very nature is such that “nothing 1939; Nowell-Smith 1948, 1954; Campbell 1951; Ayer 1954; Smart
other than the will is the total cause” of its activity (QAM). Indeed, he held 1961). The centrality of the problem of free will to the various projects of
the unusual view that not only up to but at the very instant that one is early modern philosophers can be traced to two widely, though not
willing X, it is possible for one to will Y or at least not to will X. (He universally, shared assumptions. The first is that without belief in free will,
articulates this view through the puzzling claim that a single instant of there would be little reason for us to act morally. More carefully, it was
time comprises two ‘instants of nature’, at the first but not the second of widely assumed that belief in an afterlife in which a just God rewards and
which alternative possibilities are preserved.) In opposition to Aquinas and punishes us according to our right or wrong use of free will was key to
other medieval Aristotelians, Scotus maintained that a precondition of our motivating us to be moral (Russell 2008, chs. 16–17). Life before death
freedom is that there are two fundamentally distinct ways things can seem affords us many examples in which vice is better rewarded than virtue and
good to us: as practically advantageous to us or as according with justice. so without knowledge of a final judgment in the afterlife, we would have
Contrary to some popular accounts, however, Scotus allowed that the little reason to pursue virtue and justice when they depart from self-
scope of available alternatives for a person will be more or less interest. And without free will there can be no final judgement.
constricted. He grants that we are not capable of willing something in
which we see no good whatsoever, nor of positively repudiating something The second widely shared assumption is that free will seems difficult to
which appears to us as unqualifiedly good. However, in accordance with reconcile with what we know about the world. While this assumption is
his uncompromising position that nothing can be the total cause of the will shared by the majority of early modern philosophers, what specifically it is
other than itself, he held that where something does appear to us as about the world that seems to conflict with freedom differs from
unqualifiedly good (perfectly suited both to our advantage and justice)— philosopher to philosopher. For some, the worry is primarily theological.

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How can we make sense of contingency and freedom in a world The first step was to argue that the contrary of freedom is not determinism
determined by a God who must choose the best possible world to create? but external constraint on doing what one wants to do. For example,
For some, the worry was primarily metaphysical. The principle of Hobbes contends that liberty is “the absence of all the impediments to
sufficient reason—roughly, the idea that every event must have a reason or action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the
cause—was a cornerstone of Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s metaphysics. How agent” (Hobbes 1654 [1999], 38; cf. Hume 1748 [1975] VIII.1; Edwards
does contingency and freedom fit into such a world? For some, the worry 1754 [1957]; Ayer 1954). This idea led many compatibilists, especially the
was primarily scientific (Descartes). Given that a proper understanding of more empiricist-inclined, to develop desire- or preference-based analyses
the physical world is one in which all physical objects are governed by of both the freedom to do otherwise and self-determination. An agent has
deterministic laws of nature, how does contingency and freedom fit into the freedom to do otherwise than ϕ just in case if she preferred or willed to
such a world? Of course, for some, all three worries were in play in their do otherwise, she would have done otherwise (Hobbes 1654 [1999], 16;
work (this is true especially of Leibniz). Locke 1690 [1975]) II.xx.8; Hume 1748 [1975] VIII.1; Moore 1912; Ayer
1954). The freedom to do otherwise does not require that you are able to
Despite many disagreements about how best to solve these worries, there act contrary to your strongest motivation but simply that your action be
were three claims that were widely, although not universally, agreed upon. dependent on your strongest motivation in the sense that had you desired
The first was that free will has two aspects: the freedom to do otherwise something else more strongly, then you would have pursued that
and the power of self-determination. The second is that an adequate alternative end. (We will discuss this analysis in more detail below in
account of free will must entail that free agents are morally responsible section 2.2.) Similarly, an agent self-determines her ϕ-ing just in case ϕ is
agents and/or fit subjects for punishment. Ideas about moral responsibility caused by her strongest desires or preferences at the time of action
were often a yard stick by which analyses of free will were measured, with (Hobbes 1654 [1999]; Locke 1690 [1975]; Edwards 1754 [1957]). (We
critics objecting to an analysis of free will by arguing that agents who will discuss this analysis in more detail below in section 2.4.) Given these
satisfied the analysis would not, intuitively, be morally responsible for analyses, determinism seems innocuous to freedom.
their actions. The third is that compatibilism—the thesis that free will is
compatible with determinism—is true. (Spinoza, Reid, and Kant are the The second step was to argue that any attempt to analyze free will in a way
clear exceptions to this, though some also see Descartes as an that putatively captures a deeper or more robust sense of freedom leads to
incompatibilist [Ragland 2006].) intractable conundrums. The most important examples of this attempt to
capture a deeper sense of freedom in the modern period are Immanuel
Since a detailed discussion of these philosophers’ accounts of free will Kant (1781 [1998], 1785 [1998], 1788 [2015]) and Thomas Reid (1788
would take us too far afield, we want instead to focus on isolating a two- [1969]) and in the early twentieth century C. A. Campbell (1951). These
step strategy for defending compatibilism that emerges in the early philosophers argued that the above compatibilist analyses of the freedom
modern period and continued to exert considerable force into the early to do otherwise and self-determination are, at best, insufficient for free
twentieth century (and perhaps is still at work today). Advocates of this will, and, at worst, incompatible with it. With respect to the classical
two-step strategy have come to be known as “classical compatibilists”. compatibilist analysis of the freedom to do otherwise, these critics argued

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that the freedom to do otherwise requires not just that an agent could have removes the agent from the natural causal order, which is clearly
acted differently if he had willed differently, but also that he could have unintelligible for human animals (Hobbes 1654 [1999], 38). It is important
willed differently. Free will requires more than free action. With respect to to recognize that an implication of the second step of the strategy is that
classical compatibilists’ analysis of self-determination, they argued that free will is not only compatible with determinism but actually requires
self-determination requires that the agent—rather than his desires, determinism (cf. Hume 1748 [1975] VIII). This was a widely shared
preferences, or any other mental state—cause his free choices and actions. assumption among compatibilists up through the mid-twentieth century.
Reid explains:
Spinoza’s Ethics (1677 [1992]) is an important departure from the above
I consider the determination of the will as an effect. This effect dialectic. He endorses a strong form of necessitarianism in which
must have a cause which had the power to produce it; and the everything is categorically necessary as opposed to the conditional
cause must be either the person himself, whose will it is, or some necessity embraced by most compatibilists, and he contends that there is
other being…. If the person was the cause of that determination of no room in such a world for divine or creaturely free will. Thus, Spinoza is
his own will, he was free in that action, and it is justly imputed to a free will skeptic. Interestingly, Spinoza is also keen to deny that the
him, whether it be good or bad. But, if another being was the cause nonexistence of free will has the dire implications often assumed. As
of this determination, either producing it immediately, or by means noted above, many in the modern period saw belief in free will and an
and instruments under his direction, then the determination is the afterlife in which God rewards the just and punishes the wicked as
act and deed of that being, and is solely imputed to him. (1788 necessary to motivate us to act morally. According to Spinoza, so far from
[1969] IV.i, 265) this being necessary to motivate us to be moral, it actually distorts our
pursuit of morality. True moral living, Spinoza thinks, sees virtue as its
Classical compatibilists argued that both claims are incoherent. While it is own reward (Part V, Prop. 42). Moreover, while free will is a chimera,
intelligible to ask whether a man willed to do what he did, it is incoherent humans are still capable of freedom or self-determination. Such self-
to ask whether a man willed to will what he did: determination, which admits of degrees on Spinoza’s view, arises when
our emotions are determined by true ideas about the nature of reality. The
For to ask whether a man is at liberty to will either motion or rest,
emotional lives of the free persons are ones in which “we desire nothing
speaking or silence, which he pleases, is to ask whether a man can
but that which must be, nor, in an absolute sense, can we find contentment
will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with? A
in anything but truth. And so in so far as we rightly understand these
question which, I think, needs no answer; and they who make a
matters, the endeavor of the better part of us is in harmony with the order
question of it must suppose one will to determine the acts of
of the whole of Nature” (Part IV, Appendix). Spinoza is an important
another, and another to determine that, and so on in infinitum.
forerunner to the many free will skeptics in the twentieth century, a
(Locke 1690 [1975] II.xx.25; cf. Hobbes 1656 [1999], 72)
position that continues to attract strong support (see Strawson 1986;
In response to libertarians’ claim that self-determination requires that the Double 1992; Smilansky 2000; Pereboom 2001, 2014; Levy 2011; Waller
agent, rather than his motives, cause his actions, it was objected that this

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2011; Caruso 2012; Vilhauer 2012. For further discussion see the entry common (and compatible) answers are: (i) up to her in the sense that she is
skepticism about moral responsibility). able to choose otherwise, or at minimum that she is able not to choose or
act as she does, and (ii) up to her in the sense that she is the source of her
It is worth observing that in many of these disputes about the nature of action. However, there is widespread controversy both over whether each
free will there is an underlying dispute about the nature of moral of these conditions is required for free will and if so, how to understand
responsibility. This is seen clearly in Hobbes (1654 [1999]) and early the kind or sense of freedom to do otherwise or sourcehood that is
twentieth century philosophers’ defenses of compatibilism. Underlying the required. While some seek to resolve these controversies in part by careful
belief that free will is incompatible with determinism is the thought that no articulation of our experiences of deliberation, choice, and action (Nozick
one would be morally responsible for any actions in a deterministic world 1981, ch. 4; van Inwagen 1983, ch. 1), many seek to resolve these
in the sense that no one would deserve blame or punishment. Hobbes controversies by appealing to the nature of moral responsibility. The idea
responded to this charge in part by endorsing broadly consequentialist is that the kind of control or sense of up-to-meness involved in free will is
justifications of blame and punishment: we are justified in blaming or the kind of control or sense of up-to-meness relevant to moral
punishing because these practices deter future harmful actions and/or responsibility (Double 1992, 12; Ekstrom 2000, 7–8; Smilansky 2000, 16;
contribute to reforming the offender (1654 [1999], 24–25; cf. Schlick Widerker and McKenna 2003, 2; Vargas 2007, 128; Nelkin 2011, 151–52;
1939; Nowell-Smith 1948; Smart 1961). While many, perhaps even most, Levy 2011, 1; Pereboom 2014, 1–2). Indeed, some go so far as to define
compatibilists have come to reject this consequentialist approach to moral ‘free will’ as ‘the strongest control condition—whatever that turns out to
responsibility in the wake of P. F. Strawson’s 1962 landmark essay be—necessary for moral responsibility’ (Wolf 1990, 3–4; Fischer 1994, 3;
‘Freedom and Resentment’ (though see Vargas (2013) and McGeer (2014) Mele 2006, 17). Given this connection, we can determine whether the
for contemporary defenses of compatibilism that appeal to forward- freedom to do otherwise and the power of self-determination are
looking considerations) there is still a general lesson to be learned: constitutive of free will and, if so, in what sense, by considering what it
disputes about free will are often a function of underlying disputes about takes to be a morally responsible agent. On these latter characterizations of
the nature and value of moral responsibility. free will, understanding free will is inextricably linked to, and perhaps
even derivative from, understanding moral responsibility. And even those
2. The Nature of Free Will who demur from this claim regarding conceptual priority typically see a
close link between these two ideas. Consequently, to appreciate the current
2.1 Free Will and Moral Responsibility debates surrounding the nature of free will, we need to say something
about the nature of moral responsibility.
As should be clear from this short discussion of the history of the idea of
free will, free will has traditionally been conceived of as a kind of power It is now widely accepted that there are different species of moral
to control one’s choices and actions. When an agent exercises free will responsibility. It is common (though not uncontroversial) to distinguish
over her choices and actions, her choices and actions are up to her. But up moral responsibility as answerability from moral responsibility as
to her in what sense? As should be clear from our historical survey, two attributability from moral responsibility as accountability (Watson 1996;

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Fischer and Tognazzini 2011; Shoemaker 2011. See Smith (2012) for a of ways. For example, blame disposes us to respond with some kind of
critique of this taxonomy). These different species of moral responsibility hostility toward the blameworthy agent, such as verbal rebuke or partial
differ along three dimensions: (i) the kind of responses licensed toward the withdrawal of good will. But while these kinds of dispositions are
responsible agent, (ii) the nature of the licensing relation, and (iii) the essential to our blaming someone, their manifestation is not: it is possible
necessary and sufficient conditions for licensing the relevant kind of to blame someone with very little change in attitudes or actions toward the
responses toward the agent. For example, some argue that when an agent agent. Blaming someone might be immediately followed by forgiveness as
is morally responsible in the attributability sense, certain judgments about an end of the matter.
the agent—such as judgments concerning the virtues and vices of the
agent—are fitting, and that the fittingness of such judgments does not By ‘desert’, we have in mind what Derk Pereboom has called basic desert:
depend on whether the agent in question possessed the freedom to do
The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent would
otherwise (cf. Watson 1996).
deserve to be blamed or praised just because she has performed the
While keeping this controversy about the nature of moral responsibility action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for
firmly in mind (see the entry on moral responsibility for a more detailed example, merely by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist
discussion of these issues), we think it is fair to say that the most considerations. (2014, 2)
commonly assumed understanding of moral responsibility in the historical
As we understand desert, if an agent deserves blame, then we have a
and contemporary discussion of the problem of free will is moral
strong pro tanto reason to blame him simply in virtue of his being
responsibility as accountability in something like the following sense:
accountable for doing wrong. Importantly, these reasons can be
An agent S is morally accountable for performing an action ϕ = S outweighed by other considerations. While an agent may deserve blame, it
df .

deserves praise if ϕ goes beyond what can be reasonably expected of might, all things considered, be best to forgive him unconditionally
S and S deserves blame if ϕ is morally wrong.
instead.

The central notions in this definition are praise, blame, and desert. The When an agent is morally responsible for doing something wrong, he is
majority of contemporary philosophers have followed Strawson (1962) in blameworthy: he deserves hard treatment marked by resentment and
contending that praising and blaming an agent consist in experiencing (or indignation and the actions these emotions dispose us toward, such as
at least being disposed to experience (cf. Wallace 1994, 70–71)) reactive censure, rebuke, and ostracism. However, it would seem unfair to treat
attitudes or emotions directed toward the agent, such as gratitude, agents in these ways unless their actions were up to them. Thus, we arrive
approbation, and pride in the case of praise, and resentment, indignation, at the core connection between free will and moral responsibility: agents
and guilt in the case of blame. (See Sher (2006) and Scanlon (2008) for deserve praise or blame only if their actions are up to them—only if they
important dissents from this trend. See the entry on blame for a more have free will. Consequently, we can assess analyses of free will by their
detailed discussion.) These emotions, in turn, dispose us to act in a variety implications for judgments of moral responsibility. We note that some
might reject the claim that free will is necessary for moral responsibility

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(e.g., Frankfurt 1971; Stump 1988), but even for these theorists an account of the kind of ability in terms of which the freedom to do
adequate analysis of free will must specify a sufficient condition for the otherwise is analyzed, and an argument for why this kind of ability (as
kind of control at play in moral responsibility. opposed to some other species) is the one constitutive of the freedom to do
otherwise. As we will see, philosophers sometimes leave this second debt
In what follows, we focus our attention on the two most commonly cited unpaid.
features of free will: the freedom to do otherwise and sourcehood. While
some seem to think that free will consists exclusively in either the freedom The contemporary literature takes its cue from classical compatibilism’s
to do otherwise (van Inwagen 2008) or in sourcehood (Zagzebski 2000), recognized failure to deliver a satisfactory analysis of the freedom to do
many philosophers hold that free will involves both conditions—though otherwise. As we saw above, classical compatibilists (Hobbes 1654
philosophers often emphasize one condition over the other depending on [1999], 1656 [1999]; Locke 1690 [1975]; Hume 1740 [1978], 1748
their dialectical situation or argumentative purposes (cf. Watson 1987). In [1975]; Edwards 1754 [1957]; Moore 1912; Schlick 1939; Ayer 1954)
what follows, we will describe the most common characterizations of sought to analyze the freedom to do otherwise in terms of a simple
these two conditions. conditional analysis of ability:

2.2 The Freedom to Do Otherwise Simple Conditional Analysis: An agent S has the ability to do
otherwise if and only if, were S to choose to do otherwise, then S
For most newcomers to the problem of free will, it will seem obvious that would do otherwise.
an action is up to an agent only if she had the freedom to do otherwise.
Part of the attraction of this analysis is that it obviously reconciles the
But what does this freedom come to? The freedom to do otherwise is
freedom to do otherwise with determinism. While the truth of determinism
clearly a modal property of agents, but it is controversial just what species
entails that one’s action is inevitable given the past and laws of nature,
of modality is at stake. It must be more than mere possibility: to have the
there is nothing about determinism that implies that if one had chosen
freedom to do otherwise consists in more than the mere possibility of
otherwise, then one would not do otherwise.
something else’s happening. A more plausible and widely endorsed
understanding claims the relevant modality is ability or power (Locke There are two problems with the Simple Conditional Analysis. The first
1690 [1975], II.xx; Reid 1788 [1969], II.i–ii; D. Locke 1973; Clarke 2009; is that it is, at best, an analysis of free action, not free will (cf. Reid 1788
Vihvelin 2013). But abilities themselves seem to come in different [1969]; Chisholm 1966; 1976, ch. 2; Lehrer 1968, 1976). It only tells us
varieties (Lewis 1976; Horgan 1979; van Inwagen 1983, ch. 1; Mele 2003; when an agent has the ability to do otherwise, not when an agent has the
Clarke 2009; Vihvelin 2013, ch. 1; Franklin 2015; Cyr and Swenson 2019; ability to choose to do otherwise. One might be tempted to think that there
Hofmann 2022; Whittle 2022), so a claim that an agent has ‘the ability to is an easy fix along the following lines:
do otherwise’ is potentially ambiguous or indeterminate; in philosophical
discussion, the sense of ability appealed to needs to be spelled out. A Simple Conditional Analysis*: An agent S has the ability to choose
satisfactory account of the freedom to do otherwise owes us both an otherwise if and only if, were S to desire or prefer to choose

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otherwise, then S would choose otherwise. cf. Campbell 1951; Broad 1952; Chisholm 1966), consider an
agoraphobic, Luke, who, when faced with the prospect of entering an open
The problem is that we often fail to choose to do things we want to space, is subject not merely to an irresistible desire to refrain from
choose, even when it appears that we had the ability to choose otherwise intentionally going outside, but an irresistible desire to refrain from even
(one might think the same problem attends the original analysis). Suppose choosing to go outside. Given Luke’s psychology, there is no possible
that, in deciding how to spend my evening, I have a desire to choose to world in which he suffers from his agoraphobia and chooses to go outside.
read and a desire to choose to watch a movie. Suppose that I choose to It may well nevertheless be true that if Luke chose to go outside, then he
read. By all appearances, I had the ability to choose to watch a movie. And would have gone outside. After all, any possible world in which he
yet, according to the Simple Conditional Analysis*, I lack this freedom, chooses to go outside will be a world in which he no longer suffers (to the
since the conditional ‘if I were to desire to choose to watch a movie, then I same degree) from his agoraphobia, and thus we have no reason to doubt
would choose to watch a movie’ is false. I do desire to choose to watch a that in those worlds he would go outside as a result of his choosing to go
movie and yet I do not choose to watch a movie. It is unclear how to outside. The same kind of counterexample applies with equal force to the
remedy this problem. On the one hand, we might refine the antecedent by conditional ‘if S desired to choose otherwise, then S would choose
replacing ‘desire’ with ‘strongest desire’ (cf. Hobbes 1654 [1999], 1656 otherwise’.
[1999]; Edwards 1754 [1957]). The problem is that this assumes,
implausibly, that we always choose what we most strongly desire (for While simple conditional analyses admirably make clear the species of
criticisms of this view see Reid 1788 [1969]; Campbell 1951; Wallace ability to which they appeal, they fail to show that this species of ability is
1999; Holton 2009). On the other hand, we might refine the consequent by constitutive of the freedom to do otherwise. Agents need a stronger ability
replacing ‘would choose to do otherwise’ with either ‘would probably to do otherwise than characterized by such simple conditionals. Some
choose to do otherwise’ or ‘might choose to do otherwise’. But each of argue that the fundamental source of the above problems is the conditional
these proposals is also problematic. If ‘probably’ means ‘more likely than nature of these analyses (Campbell 1951; Austin 1961; Chisholm 1966;
not’, then this revised conditional still seems too strong: it seems possible Lehrer 1976; van Inwagen 1983, ch. 4). The sense of ability relevant to the
to have the ability to choose otherwise even when one’s so choosing is freedom to do otherwise is the ‘all-in sense’—that is, holding everything
unlikely. If we opt for ‘might’, then the relevant sense of modality needs fixed up to the time of the decision or action—and this sense, so it is
to be spelled out. argued, can only be captured by a categorical analysis of the ability to do
otherwise:
Even if there are fixes to these problems, there is a yet deeper problem
with these analyses. There are some agents who clearly lack the freedom Categorical Analysis: An agent S has the ability to choose or do
to do otherwise and yet satisfy the conditional at the heart of these otherwise than ϕ at time t if and only if it was possible, holding fixed
analyses. That is, although these agents lack the freedom to do otherwise, everything up to t, that S choose or do otherwise than ϕ at t.
it is, for example, true of them that if they chose otherwise, they would do
otherwise. Picking up on an argument developed by Keith Lehrer (1968;

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This analysis gets the right verdict in Luke’s case. He lacks the ability to Like the Simple Conditional Analysis, a virtue of the Categorical
do otherwise than refrain from choosing to go outside, according to this Analysis is that it spells out clearly the kind of ability appealed to in its
analysis, because there is no possible world in which he suffers from his analysis of the freedom to do otherwise, but like the Simple Conditional
agoraphobia and yet chooses to go outside. Unlike the above conditional Analysis, critics have argued that the sense of ability it captures is not the
analyses, the Categorical Analysis requires that we hold fixed Luke’s sense at the heart of free will. The objection here, though, is not that the
agoraphobia when considering alternative possibilities. analysis is too permissive or weak, but rather that it is too restrictive or
strong.
If the Categorical Analysis is correct, then free will is incompatible with
determinism. According to the thesis of determinism, all deterministic While there have been numerous different replies along these lines (e.g.,
possible worlds with the same pasts and laws of nature have the same Lehrer 1980; Slote 1982; Watson 1986. See the entry on arguments for
futures (Lewis 1979; van Inwagen 1983, 3). Suppose John is in incompatibilism for a more extensive discussion of and bibliography for
deterministic world W and refrains from raising his hand at time t. Since the Consequence Argument), the most influential of these objections is
W is deterministic, it follows that any possible world W that has the due to David Lewis (1981). Lewis contended that van Inwagen’s argument
∗

same past and laws up to t must have the same future, including John’s equivocated on ‘is able to break a law of nature’. We can distinguish two
refraining from raising his hand at t. Therefore, John lacked the ability, senses of ‘is able to break a law of nature’:
and thus freedom, to raise his hand.
(Weak Thesis) I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law of
This argument, carefully articulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s by nature would be broken.
Carl Ginet (1966, 1990) and Peter van Inwagen (1975, 1983) and refined
in important ways by John Martin Fischer (1994), has come to be known (Strong Thesis) I am able to do something such that, if I did it, it
as the Consequence Argument. van Inwagen offers the following informal would constitute a law of nature’s being broken or would cause a law
statement of the argument: of nature to be broken.

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the If we are committed to the Categorical Analysis, then those desiring to
laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us defend compatibilism seem to be committed to the sense of ability in ‘is
what went on before we were born [i.e., we do not have the ability able to break a law of nature’ along the lines of the strong thesis. Lewis
to change the past], and neither is it up to us what the laws of agrees with van Inwagen that it is “incredible” to think humans have such
nature are [i.e., we do not have the ability to break the laws of an ability (Lewis 1981, 113), but maintains that compatibilists need only
nature]. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our appeal to the ability to break a law of nature in the weak sense. While it is
present acts) are not up to us. (van Inwagen 1983, 16; cf. Fischer absurd to think that humans are able to do something that is a violation of
1994, ch. 1) a law of nature or causes a law of nature to be broken, there is nothing
incredible, so Lewis claimed, in thinking that humans are able to do
something such that if they did it, a law of nature would be broken. In

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essence, Lewis is arguing that incompatibilists like van Inwagen have the ability to go outside (cf. Speak 2011). (For other important criticisms
failed to adequately motivate the restrictiveness of the Categorical of Lewis, see Ginet [1990, ch. 5] and Fischer [1994, ch. 4].)
Analysis.
While Lewis may be right that the Categorical Analysis is too restrictive,
Some incompatibilists have responded to Lewis by contending that even his argument, all by itself, doesn’t seem to establish this. His argument is
the weak ability is incredible (van Inwagen 2004). But there is a different successful only if (a) he can provide an alternative analysis of ability that
and often overlooked problem for Lewis: the weak ability seems to be too entails that Luke’s agoraphobia robs him of the ability to go outside and
weak. Returning to the case of John’s refraining from raising his hand, (b) does not entail that determinism robs John of the ability to raise his
Lewis maintains that the following three propositions are consistent: hand (cf. Pendergraft 2010). Lewis must point out a principled difference
between these two cases. As should be clear from the above, the Simple
(i) John is able to raise his hand. Conditional Analysis is of no help. However, some recent work by
(ii) A necessary condition for John’s raising his hand fails to Michael Smith (2003), Kadri Vihvelin (2004; 2013), and Michael Fara
obtain (i.e., that the laws of nature or past are different than (2008) have attempted to fill this gap. What unites these theorists—whom
they actually are). Clarke (2009) has called the ‘new dispositionalists’—is their attempt to
(iii) John is not able to do anything that would constitute this appeal to recent advances in the metaphysics of dispositions to arrive at a
necessary condition’s obtaining or cause this necessary revised conditional analysis of the freedom to do otherwise. The most
condition to obtain (i.e., he is unable to do anything that would perspicuous of these accounts is offered by Vihvelin (2004), who argues
constitute or cause a law of nature to be broken or the past to that an agent’s having the ability to do otherwise is solely a function of the
be different). agent’s intrinsic properties. (It is important to note that Vihvelin [2013]
has come to reject the view that free will consists exclusively in the kind
One might think that (ii) and (iii) are incompatible with (i). Consider again
of ability analyzed below.) Building on Lewis’s work on the metaphysics
Luke, our agoraphobic. Suppose that his agoraphobia affects him in such a
of dispositions, she arrives at the following analysis of ability:
way that he will only intentionally go outside if he chooses to go outside,
and yet his agoraphobia makes it impossible for him to make this choice. Revised Conditional Analysis of Ability: S has the ability at time t
In this case, a necessary condition for Luke’s intentionally going outside is to do X iff, for some intrinsic property or set of properties B that S
his choosing to go outside. Moreover, Luke is not able to choose or cause has at t, for some time t after t, if S chose (decided, intended, or
′

himself to choose to go outside. Intuitively, this would seem to imply that tried) at t to do X, and S were to retain B until t , S ’s choosing
′

Luke lacks the freedom to go outside. But this implication does not follow (deciding, intending, or trying) to do X and S ’s having B would
for Lewis. From the fact that Luke is able to go outside only if he chooses jointly be an S -complete cause of S ’s doing X. (Vihvelin 2004, 438)
to go outside and the fact that Luke is not able to choose to go outside, it
does not follow, on Lewis’s account, that Luke lacks the ability to go Lewis defines an ‘S -complete cause’ as “a cause complete insofar as
outside. Consequently, Lewis’s account fails to explain why Luke lacks havings of properties intrinsic to [S ] are concerned, though perhaps

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omitting some events extrinsic to [S ]” (cf. Lewis 1997, 156). In other choose or do otherwise that is relevant to moral responsibility and yet
words, an S -complete cause of S ’s doing ϕ requires that S possess all the some merely determined agents have this ability.
intrinsic properties relevant to S ’s causing S ’s doing ϕ. This analysis
appears to afford Vihvelin the basis for a principled difference between 2.3 Freedom to Do Otherwise vs. Sourcehood Accounts
agoraphobics and merely determined agents. We must hold fixed an
agent’s phobias since they are intrinsic properties of agents, but we need Some have tried to avoid these lingering problems for compatibilists by
not hold fixed the laws of nature because these are not intrinsic properties arguing that the freedom to do otherwise is not required for free will or
of agents. (It should be noted that the assumption that intrinsic properties moral responsibility. What matters for an agent’s freedom and
are wholly separable from the laws of nature is disputed by ‘dispositional responsibility, so it is argued, is the source of her action—how her action
essentialists.’ See the entry on metaphysics of causation.) Vihvelin’s was brought about. The most prominent strategy for defending this move
analysis appears to be restrictive enough to exclude phobics from having appeals to ‘Frankfurt-style cases’. In a ground-breaking article, Harry
the freedom to do otherwise, but permissive enough to allow that some Frankfurt (1969) presented a series of thought experiments intended to
agents in deterministic worlds have the freedom to do otherwise. show that it is possible that agents are morally responsible for their actions
and yet they lack the ability to do otherwise. While Frankfurt (1971) took
But appearances can be deceiving. The new dispositionalist claims have this to show that moral responsibility and free will come apart—free will
received some serious criticism, with the majority of the criticisms requires the ability to do otherwise but moral responsibility does not—if
maintaining that these analyses are still too permissive (Clarke 2009; we define ‘free will’ as ‘the strongest control condition required for moral
Whittle 2010; Franklin 2011b). For example, Randolph Clarke argues that responsibility’ (cf. Wolf 1990, 3–4; Fischer 1994, 3; Mele 2006, 17), then
Vihvelin’s analysis fails to overcome the original problem with the Simple if Frankfurt-style cases show that moral responsibility does not require the
Conditional Analysis. He writes, “A phobic agent might, on some ability to do otherwise, then they also show that free will does not require
occasion, be unable to choose to A and unable to A without so choosing, the ability to do otherwise. Let us consider this challenge in more detail.
while retaining all that she would need to implement such a choice, should
she make it. Despite lacking the ability to choose to A, the agent might Here is a representative Frankfurt-style case:
have some set of intrinsic properties B such that, if she chose to A and
Imagine, if you will, that Black is a quite nifty (and even generally
retained B, then her choosing to A and her having B would jointly be an
nice) neurosurgeon. But in performing an operation on Jones to
agent-complete cause of her A-ing” (Clarke 2009, p. 329).
remove a brain tumor, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones’s
The Categorical Analysis, and thus incompatibilism about free will and brain which enables Black to monitor and control Jones’s
determinism, remains an attractive option for many philosophers precisely activities. Jones, meanwhile, knows nothing of this. Black
because it seems that compatibilists have yet to furnish an analysis of the exercises this control through a sophisticated computer which he
freedom to do otherwise that implies that phobics clearly lack the ability to has programmed so that, among other things, it monitors Jones’s
voting behavior. If Jones were to show any inclination to vote for

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Bush, then the computer, through the mechanism in Jones’s brain, for his decision. But if the connection is nondeterministic, then it is
intervenes to ensure that he actually decides to vote for Clinton and possible even in the absence of showing any inclination to decide to vote
does so vote. But if Jones decides on his own to vote for Clinton, for Bush, that Jones decides to vote for Bush, and so he retains the ability
the computer does nothing but continue to monitor—without to do otherwise. Either way Frankfurt-style cases fail to show that Jones is
affecting—the goings-on in Jones’s head. (Fischer 2006, 38) both morally responsible for his decision and yet is unable to do
otherwise.
Fischer goes on to suppose that Jones “decides to vote for Clinton on his
own”, without any interference from Black, and maintains that in such a While some have argued that even Frankfurt-style cases that assume
case Jones is morally responsible for his decision. Fischer draws two determinism are effective (see, e.g., Fischer 1999, 2010, 2013 and Haji
interrelated conclusions from this case. The first, negative conclusion, is and McKenna 2004 and for criticisms of this approach, see Goetz 2005,
that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. Palmer 2005, 2014, Widerker and Goetz 2013, and Cohen 2017), the
Jones is unable to refrain from deciding to vote for Clinton, and yet, so majority of proponents of Frankfurt-style cases have attempted to revise
long as Jones decides to vote for Clinton on his own, his decision is free these cases so that they are explicitly nondeterministic and yet still show
and one for which he is morally responsible. The second, positive that the agent was morally responsible even though he lacked the ability to
conclusion, is that freedom and responsibility are functions of the actual do otherwise—or, at least that he lacked any ability to do otherwise that
sequence. What matters for an agent’s freedom and moral responsibility is could be relevant to grounding the agent’s moral responsibility (see, e.g.,
not what might have happened, but how his action was actually brought Mele and Robb 1998, 2003, Pereboom 2001, 2014, McKenna 2003, Hunt
about. What matters is not whether the agent had the ability to do 2005, and for criticisms of these cases see Ginet 2002, Timpe 2006,
otherwise, but whether he was the source of his actions. Widerker 2006, Franklin 2011c, Moya 2011, Palmer 2011, 2013, Robinson
2014, Capes 2016, Capes and Swenson 2017, and Elzein 2017).
The success of Frankfurt-style cases is hotly contested. An early and far-
reaching criticism is due to David Widerker (1995), Carl Ginet (1996), and Supposing that Frankfurt-style cases are successful, what exactly do they
Robert Kane (1996, 142–43). According to this criticism, proponents of show? In our view, they show neither that free will and moral
Frankfurt-style cases face a dilemma: either these cases assume that the responsibility do not require an ability to do otherwise in any sense nor
connection between the indicator (in our case, the absence of Jones’s that compatibilism is true. Frankfurt-style cases are of clear help to the
showing any inclination to decide to vote for Bush) and the agent’s compatibilists’ position (though see Speak 2007 for a dissenting opinion).
decision (here, Jones’s deciding to vote for Clinton) is deterministic or not. The Consequence Argument raises a powerful challenge to the cogency of
If the connection is deterministic, then Frankfurt-style cases cannot be compatibilism. But if Frankfurt-style cases are successful, agents can act
expected to convince incompatibilists that the ability to do otherwise is not freely in the sense relevant to moral responsibility while lacking the ability
necessary for moral responsibility and/or free will, since Jones’s action to do otherwise in the all-in sense. This allows compatibilists to concede
will be deterministically brought about by factors beyond his control, that the all-in ability to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism,
leading incompatibilists to conclude that Jones is not morally responsible and yet insist that it is irrelevant to the question of the compatibility of

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determinism with moral responsibility (and perhaps even free will, phrase, and compatibilists in fact still think that the ability to do otherwise
depending on how we define this) (cf. Fischer 1987, 1994. For a challenge in some such senses is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.
to the move from not strictly necessary to irrelevant, see O’Connor [2000, Consequently, even though Frankfurt-style cases have, as a matter of fact,
20–22] and in reply, Fischer [2006, 152–56].). But, of course, showing moved many compatibilists away from emphasizing ability to do
that an argument for the falsity of compatibilism is irrelevant does not otherwise to emphasizing sourcehood, we suggest that this move is best
show that compatibilism is true. Indeed, many incompatibilists maintain seen as a weakening of the ability-to-do-otherwise condition on moral
that Frankfurt-style cases are successful and defend incompatibilism not responsibility (but see Cyr 2017 and Kittle 2019 for criticisms of this
via the Consequence Argument, but by way of arguments that attempt to claim). (A potentially important exception to this claim is Sartorio [2016],
show that agents in deterministic worlds cannot be the ‘source’ of their who appealing to some controversial ideas in the metaphysics of causation
actions in the way that moral responsibility requires (Stump 1999; appears to argue that no sense of the ability to do otherwise is necessary
Zagzebski 2000; Pereboom 2001, 2014). Thus, if successful, Frankfurt- for control in the sense at stake for moral responsibility, but instead what
style cases would be at best the first step in defending compatibilism. The matters is whether the agent is the cause of the action. We simply note that
second step must offer an analysis of the kind of sourcehood constitutive Sartorio’s account of causation is a modal one [see especially Sartorio
of free will that entails that free will is compatible with determinism (cf. (2016, 94–95, 132–37)] and thus it is far from clear that her account of
Fischer 1982). freedom and responsibility is really an exception.)

Furthermore, while proponents of Frankfurt-style cases often maintain that 2.4 Compatibilist Accounts of Sourcehood
these cases show that no ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral
responsibility (“I have employed the Frankfurt-type example to argue that In this section, we will assume that Frankfurt-style cases are successful in
this sense of control [i.e. the one required for moral responsibility] need order to consider two prominent compatibilist attempts to construct
not involve any alternative possibilities” [Fischer 2006, p. 40; emphasis analyses of the sourcehood condition (though see the entry on
ours]), we believe that this conclusion overreaches. At best, Frankfurt- compatibilism for a more systematic survey of compatibilist theories of
style cases show that the ability to do otherwise in the all-in sense—in the free will). The first, and perhaps most popular, compatibilist model is a
sense defined by the Categorical Analysis—is not necessary for free will reasons-responsiveness model. According to this model, an agent’s action
or moral responsibility (cf. Franklin 2015). To appreciate this, let us ϕ is free just in case the agent or manner in which the action is brought

assume that in the above Frankfurt-style case Jones lacks the ability to do about is responsive to the reasons available to the agent at the time of
otherwise in the all-in sense: there is no possible world in which we hold action. While compatibilists develop this kind of account in different
fixed the past and laws and yet Jones does otherwise, since all such worlds ways, the most detailed proposal is due to John Martin Fischer (1994,
include Black and his preparations for preventing Jones from doing 2006, 2010, 2012; Fischer and Ravizza 1998. For similar compatibilist
otherwise should Jones show any inclination. Even if this is all true, it treatments of reasons-responsiveness, see Wolf 1990, Wallace 1994, Haji
should take only a little reflection to recognize that in this case Jones is 1998, Nelkin 2011, McKenna 2013, Vargas 2013, Sartorio 2016). Fischer
able to do otherwise in certain weaker senses we might attach to that and Ravizza argue that an agent’s action is free and one for which he is

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morally responsible only if the mechanism that issued in the action is moderately reasons-responsive. There is no world with the same laws of
moderately reasons-responsive (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, ch. 3). By nature as our own, this mechanism operates, and yet it reacts to a sufficient
‘mechanism’, Fischer and Ravizza simply mean “the way the action was reason to go outside. No matter what reasons there are for Luke to go
brought about” (38). One mechanism they often discuss is practical outside, when acting on this mechanism, he will always refrain from going
deliberation. For example, in the case of Jones discussed above, his outside (cf. Fischer 1987, 74).
decision to vote for Clinton on his own was brought about by the process
of practical deliberation. What must be true of this process, this Before turning to our second compatibilist model, it is worth noting that it
mechanism, for it to be moderately reasons-responsive? Fischer and would be a mistake to think that Fischer and Ravizza’s account is a
Ravizza maintain that moderate reasons-responsiveness consists in two sourcehood account to the exclusion of the ability to do otherwise in any
conditions: reasons-receptivity and reasons-reactivity. A mechanism’s sense. As we have just seen, Fischer and Ravizza place clear modal
reasons-receptivity depends on the agent’s cognitive capacities, such as requirements on mechanisms that issue in actions with respect to which
being capable of understanding moral reasons and the implications of their agents are free and morally responsible. Indeed, this should be clear from
actions (69–73). The second condition is more important for us in the the very idea of reasons-responsiveness. Whether one is responsive
present context. A mechanism’s reasons-reactivity depends on how the depends not merely on how one does respond, but also on how one would
mechanism would react given different reasons for action. Fischer and respond. Thus, any account that makes reasons-responsiveness an essential
Ravizza argue that the kind of reasons-reactivity at stake is weak reasons- condition of free will is an account that makes the ability to do otherwise,
reactivity, where this merely requires that there is some possible world in in some sense, necessary for free will (Fischer [2018] concedes this point,
which the laws of nature remain the same, the same mechanism operates, though, as noted above, the reader should consider Sartorio [2016] as a
there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, and the mechanism brings potential counterexample to this claim).
about the alternative action in response to this sufficient reason (73–76).
The second main compatibilist model of sourcehood is an identification
On this analysis, while Jones, due to the activity of Black, lacks the ‘all-in’
model. Accounts of sourcehood of this kind lay stress on self-
sense of the ability to do otherwise, he is nevertheless morally responsible
determination or autonomy: to be the source of her action the agent must
for deciding to vote for Clinton because his action finds its source in
self-determine her action. Like the contemporary discussion of the ability
Jones’s practical deliberation that is moderately reasons-responsive.
to do otherwise, the contemporary discussion of the power of self-
Fischer and Ravizza’s theory of freedom and responsibility has shifted the determination begins with the failure of classical compatibilism to produce
focus of much recent debate to questions of sourcehood. Moreover, one an acceptable definition. According to classical compatibilists, self-
might argue that this theory is a clear improvement over classical determination simply consists in the agent’s action being determined by
compatibilism with respect to handling cases of phobia. By focusing on her strongest motive. On the assumption that some compulsive agents’
mechanisms, Fischer and Ravizza can argue that our agoraphobic Luke is compulsions operate by generating irresistible desires to act in certain
not morally responsible for deciding to refrain from going outside because ways, the classical compatibilist analysis of self-determination implies that
the mechanism that issues in this action—namely his agoraphobia—is not these compulsive actions are self-determined. While Hobbes seems

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willing to accept this implication (1656 [1999], 78), most contemporary constraint is external (e.g., broken cars and broken legs), but addictions
compatibilists concede that this result is unacceptable. and phobias seem just as threatening to free will. Identification theorists
have the resources to concede that some constraints are internal. For
Beginning with the work of Harry Frankfurt (1971) and Gary Watson example, they can argue that our agoraphobic Luke is not free in refraining
(1975), many compatibilists have developed identification accounts of from going outside even though this decision was caused by his strongest
self-determination that attempt to draw a distinction between an agent’s desires because he is not identified with his strongest desires. On
desires or motives that are internal to the agent and those that are external. compatibilist identification accounts, what matters for self-determination
The idea is that while agents are not (or at least may not be) identical to is not whether our actions are determined or undetermined, but whether
any motivations (or bundle of motivations), they are identified with a they are brought about by motives with which the agent is identified:
subset of their motivations, rendering these motivations internal to the exercises of the power of self-determination consists in an agent’s actions
agent in such a way that any actions brought about by these motivations being brought about, in part, by an agent’s motives with which she is
are self-determined. The identification relation is not an identity relation, identified. (It is important to note that while we have distinguished
but something weaker (cf. Bratman 2000, 39n12). What the precise nature reasons-responsive accounts from identification accounts, there is nothing
of the identification relation is and to which attitudes an agent stands in preventing one from combing both elements in a complete analysis of free
this relation is hotly disputed. Lippert-Rasmussen (2003) helpfully divides will.)
identification accounts into two main types. The first are “authority”
accounts, according to which agents are identified with attitudes that are Even if these reasons-responsive and identification compatibilist accounts
authorized to speak for them (368). The second are authenticity accounts, of sourcehood might successfully side-step the Consequence Argument,
according to which agents are identified with attitudes that reveal who they must come to grips with a second incompatibilist argument: the
they truly are (368). (But see Shoemaker 2015 for an ecumenical account Manipulation Argument. The general problem raised by this line of
of identification that blends these two accounts.) Proposed attitudes to argument is that whatever proposed compatibilist conditions for an agent
which agents are said to stand in the identification relation include higher- S ’s being free with respect to, and morally responsible for, some action ϕ,

order desires (Frankfurt 1971), cares or loves (Frankfurt 1993, 1994; it will seem that agents can be manipulated into satisfying these conditions
Shoemaker 2003; Jaworska 2007; Sripada 2016), self-governing policies with respect to ϕ and, yet, precisely because they are manipulated into
(Bratman 2000), the desire to make sense of oneself (Velleman 1992, satisfying these conditions, their freedom and responsibility seem
2009), and perceptions (or judgments) of the good (or best) (Watson 1975; undermined. The two most influential forms of the Manipulation
Stump 1988; Ekstrom 1993; Mitchell-Yellin 2015). Argument are Pereboom’s Four-case Argument (2001, ch. 4; 2014, ch. 4)
and Mele’s Zygote Argument (2006, ch. 7. See Todd 2010, 2012 for
The distinction between internal and external motivations allows developments of Mele’s argument). As the structure of Mele’s version is
identification theorists to enrich classical compatibilists’ understanding of simpler, we will focus on it.
constraint, while remaining compatibilists about free will and
determinism. According to classical compatibilists, the only kind of

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Imagine a goddess Diana who creates a zygote Z in Mary in some Here compatibilists might point out that the idea of being manipulated is
deterministic world. Suppose that Diana creates Z as she does because she worrisome only so long as the manipulators are interfering with an agent’s
wants Jones to be murdered thirty years later. From her knowledge of the development. But if the manipulators simply create a person, and then
laws of nature in her world and her knowledge of the state of the world allow that person’s life to unfold without any further inference, the
just prior to her creating Z , she knows that a zygote with precisely Z ’s manipulators’ activity is no threat to freedom (McKenna 2008; Fischer
constitution located in Mary will develop into an agent Ernie who, thirty 2011; Sartorio 2016, ch. 5). (For other responses to the Manipulation
years later, will murder Jones as a result of his moderately reasons- Argument, see Kearns 2012; Sripada 2012; McKenna 2014.)
responsive mechanism and on the basis of motivations with which he is
identified (whatever those might be). Suppose Diana succeeds in her plan 2.5 Libertarian Accounts of Sourcehood
and Ernie murders Jones as a result of her manipulation.
Despite these compatibilist replies, to some the idea that the entirety of a
Many judge that Ernie is not morally responsible for murdering Jones free agent’s life can be determined, and in this way controlled, by another
even though he satisfies both the reasons-responsive and identification agent will seem incredible. Some take the lesson of the Manipulation
criteria. There are two possible lines of reply open to compatibilists. On Argument to be that no compatibilist account of sourcehood or self-
the soft-line reply, compatibilists attempt to show that there is a relevant determination is satisfactory. True sourcehood—the kind of sourcehood
difference between manipulated agents such as Ernie and agents who that can actually ground an agent’s freedom and responsibility—requires,
satisfy their account (McKenna 2008, 470). For example, Fischer and so it is argued, that one’s action not be causally determined by factors
Ravizza propose a second condition on sourcehood: in addition to a beyond one’s control.
mechanism’s being moderately reasons-responsive, an agent is morally
responsible for the output of such a mechanism only if the agent has come Libertarians, while united in endorsing this negative condition on
to take responsibility for the mechanism, where an agent has taken sourcehood, are deeply divided concerning which further positive
responsibility for a mechanism M just in case (i) she believes that she is conditions may be required. It is important to note that while libertarians
an agent when acting from M , (ii) she believes that she is an apt target for are united in insisting that compatibilist accounts of sourcehood are
blame and praise for acting from M , and (iii) her beliefs specified in (i) insufficient, they are not committed to thinking that the conditions of
and (ii) are “based, in an appropriate way, on [her] evidence” (Fischer and freedom spelled out in terms either of reasons-responsiveness or of
Ravizza 1998, 238). The problem with this reply is that we can easily identification are not necessary. For example, Stump (1988, 1996, 2010)
imagine Diana creating Ernie so that his murdering Jones is a result not builds a sophisticated libertarian model of free will out of resources
only of a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, but also a originally developed within Frankfurt’s identification model (see also
mechanism for which he has taken responsibility. On the hard-line reply, Ekstrom 1993, 2000; Franklin 2014) and nearly all libertarians agree that
compatibilists concede that, despite initial appearances, the manipulated exercises of free will require agents to be reasons-responsive (e.g., Kane
agent is free and morally responsible and attempt to ameliorate the 1996; Clarke 2003, chs. 8–9; Franklin 2018, ch. 2). Moreover, while this
seeming counterintuitiveness of this concession (McKenna 2008, 470–71). section focuses on libertarian accounts of sourcehood, we remind readers

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that most (if not all) libertarians think that the freedom to do otherwise is her choice. While event-causal libertarianism admits of different species,
also necessary for free will and moral responsibility. at the heart of this view is the idea that self-determining an action requires,
at minimum, that the agent cause the action and that an agent’s causing his
There are three main libertarian options for understanding sourcehood or action is wholly reducible to mental states and other events involving the
self-determination: non-causal libertarianism (Ginet 1990, 2008; McCann agent nondeviantly causing his action. Consider an agent’s raising his
1998; Lowe 2008; Goetz 2009; Pink 2017; Palmer 2021), event-causal hand. According to the event-causal model at its most basic level, an
libertarianism (Wiggins 1973; Kane 1996, 1999, 2011, 2016; Mele 1995, agent’s raising his hand consists in the agent’s causing his hand to rise and
chs. 11–12; 2006, chs. 4–5; 2017; Ekstrom 2000, 2019; Clarke 2003, chs. his causing his hand to rise consists in apt mental states and events
2–6; Franklin 2018), and agent-causal libertarianism (Reid 1788 [1969]; involving the agent—such as the agent’s desire to ask a question and his
Chisholm 1966, 1976; Taylor 1966; O’Connor 2000; Clarke 1993; 1996; belief that he can ask a question by raising his hand—nondeviantly
2003, chs. 8–10; Griffith 2010; Steward 2012). Non-causal libertarians causing his hand to rise. (The nondeviance clause is required since it
contend that exercises of the power of self-determination need not (or seems possible that an event be brought about by one’s desires and beliefs
perhaps even cannot) be caused or causally structured. According to this and yet not be self-determined, or even an action for that matter, due to the
view, we control our volition or choice simply in virtue of its being ours— unusual causal path leading from the desires and beliefs to action. Imagine
its occurring in us. We do not exert a special kind of causality in bringing a would-be accomplice of an assassin believes that his dropping his
it about; instead, it is an intrinsically active event, intrinsically something cigarette is the signal for the assassin to shoot his intended victim and he
we do. While there may be causal influences upon our choice, there need desires to drop his cigarette and yet this belief and desire so unnerve him
not be, and any such causal influence is wholly irrelevant to understanding that he accidentally drops his cigarette. While the event of dropping the
why it occurs. Reasons provide an autonomous, non-causal form of cigarette is caused by a relevant desire and belief it does not seem to be
explanation. Provided our choice is not wholly determined by prior self-determined and perhaps is not even an action [cf. Davidson 1973].) To
factors, it is free and under our control simply in virtue of being ours. fully spell out this account, event-causal libertarians must specify which
Non-causal views have failed to garner wide support among libertarians mental states and events are apt (cf. Brand 1979)—which mental states
since, for many, self-determination seems to be an essentially causal and events are the springs of self-determined actions—and what
notion (cf. Mele 2000 and Clarke 2003, ch. 2). This dispute hinges on the nondeviance consists in (cf. Bishop 1989). (We note that this has proven
necessary conditions on the concept of causal power, and relatedly on very difficult, enough so that some take the problem to spell doom for
whether power simpliciter admits causal and non-causal variants. For event-causal theories of action. Such philosophers [e.g., Taylor 1966 and
discussion, see O’Connor (2021). Sehon 2005] take agential power to be conceptually and/or ontologically
primitive and understand reasons explanations of action in irreducibly
Most libertarians endorse an event-causal or agent-causal account of
teleological terms. See Stout 2010 for a brisk survey of discussions of this
sourcehood. Both these accounts maintain that exercises of the power of
topic.) For ease, in what follows we will assume that apt mental states are
self-determination consist partly in the agent’s bringing about her choice
an agent’s reasons that favor the action.
or action, but they disagree on how to analyze an agent’s bringing about

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Event-causal libertarians, of course, contend that self-determination self-determines his choice ϕ, then S ’s reasons r nondeterministically
1

requires more than nondeviant causation by agents’ reasons: for it is cause (in a nondeviant way) ϕ, and it was possible, given the past and
possible that agents’ actions in deterministic worlds are nondeviantly laws, that r not have caused ϕ, but rather some of S ’s other reasons r
1 2

caused by apt mental states and events. Self-determination requires nondeterministically caused (in a nondeviant way) a different action ψ.
nondeterministic causation, in a nondeviant way, by an agent’s reasons.
While historically many have thought that nondeterministic causation is Agent-causal libertarians contend that the event-causal picture fails to
impossible (Hobbes 1654 [1999], 1656 [1999]; Hume 1740 [1978], 1748 capture self-determination, for it fails to accord the agent with a power to
[1975]), with the advent of quantum physics and, from a very different settle what she does. Pereboom offers a forceful statement of this worry:
direction, an influential essay by G.E.M. Anscombe (1971), it is now
On an event-causal libertarian picture, the relevant causal
widely assumed that nondeterministic (or probabilistic) causation is
conditions antecedent to the decision, i.e., the occurrence of certain
possible. There are two importantly different ways to understand
agent-involving events, do not settle whether the decision will
nondeterministic causation: as the causation of probability or as the
occur, but only render the occurrence of the decision about 50%
probability of causation. Under the causation of probability model, a
probable. In fact, because no occurrence of antecedent events
nondeterministic cause C causes (or causally contributes to) the objective
settles whether the decision will occur, and only antecedent events
probability of the outcome’s occurring rather than the outcome itself. On
are causally relevant, nothing settles whether the decision will
this account, S ’s reasons do not cause his decision but there being a
occur. (Pereboom 2014, 32; cf. Watson 1987, 1996; Clarke 2003
certain antecedent objective probability of its occurring, and the decision
[ch. 8], 2011; Griffith 2010; Shabo 2011, 2013; Steward 2012 [ch.
itself is uncaused. On the competing probability of causation model, a
3]; and Schlosser 2014); and for critical assessment, see Clarke
nondeterministic cause C causes the outcome of a nondeterministic
2019.
process. Given that C is a nondeterministic cause of the outcome, it was
possible given the exact same past and laws of nature that C not cause the On the event-causal picture, the agent’s causal contribution to her actions
outcome (perhaps because it was possible that some other event cause is exhausted by the causal contribution of her reasons, and yet her reasons
some other outcome)—the probability of this causal transaction’s leave open which decisions she will make, and this seems insufficient for
occurring was less than 1. Given that event-causal libertarians maintain self-determination.
that self-determined actions, and thus free actions, must be caused, they
are committed to the probability of causation model of nondeterministic But what more must be added? Agent-causal libertarians maintain that
causation (cf. Franklin 2018, 25–26). (We note that Balaguer [2010] is self-determination requires that the agent herself play a causal role over
skeptical of the above distinction, and it is thus unclear whether he should and above the causal role played by her reasons. Some agent-causal
best be classified as a non-causal or event-causal libertarian, though see libertarians deny that an agent’s reasons play any direct causal role in
Balaguer [2014] for evidence that it is best to treat him as a non-causalist.) bringing about an agent’s self-determined actions (Chisholm 1966;
Consequently, according to event-causal libertarians, when an agent S O’Connor 2000, ch. 5), whereas others allow or even require that self-
determined actions be caused in part by the agent’s reasons (Clarke 2003,

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ch. 9; Steward 2012, ch. 3). But all agent-causal libertarians insist that best) way to understand reasons-explanation and motivational influence is
exercises of the power of self-determination do not reduce to within a causal account of reasons, where reasons cause our actions
nondeterministic causation by apt mental states: agent-causation does not (Davidson 1963; Mele 1992). If agent-causal libertarians accept that self-
reduce to event-causation. determined actions, in addition to being agent-caused, must also be caused
by agents’ reasons that favored those actions, then agent-causal
Agent-causal libertarianism seems to capture an aspect of self- libertarians need to explain how to integrate these causes (for a detailed
determination that neither the above compatibilists accounts nor event- attempt to do just this, see Clarke 2003, ch. 8). Given that these two causes
causal libertarian accounts capture. (Some compatibilists even accept this seem distinct, is it not possible that the agent cause his decision to ϕ and
and try to incorporate agent-causation into a compatibilist understanding yet the agent’s reasons simultaneously cause an incompatible decision to ψ
of free will. See Markosian 1999, 2012; Nelkin 2011.) These accounts ? If agent-causal libertarians side-step this difficult question by denying
reduce the causal role of the self to states and events to which the agent is that reasons cause action, then they must explain how reasons can explain
not identical (even if he is identified with them). But how can self- and motivate action without causing it; and this has turned out to be no
determination of my actions wholly reduce to determination of my actions easy task. (For more general attempts to understand reasons-explanation
by things other than the self? Richard Taylor nicely expresses this and motivation within a non-causal framework see Schueler 1995, 2003;
intuition: “If I believe that something not identical to myself was the cause Sehon 2005). For further discussion see the entry on incompatibilist
of my behavior—some event wholly external to myself, for instance, or (nondeterministic) theories of free will.
even one internal to myself, such as a nerve impulse, volition, or whatnot
—then I cannot regard the behavior as being an act of mine, unless I Finally, we note that some recent philosophers have questioned the
further believed that I was the cause of that external or internal event” presumed difference between event- and agent-causation by arguing that
(1974, 55; cf. Franklin 2016). all causation is object or substance causation. They argue that the
dominant tendency to understand ‘garden variety’ causal transactions in
Despite its powerful intuitive pull for some, many have argued that agent- the world as relations between events is an unfortunate legacy of David
causal libertarianism is obscure or even incoherent. The stock objection Hume’s rejection of substance and causation as basic metaphysical
used to be that the very idea of agent-causation—causation by agents that categories. On the competing metaphysical picture of the world, the event
is not reducible to causation by mental states and events involving the or state of an object’s having some property such as mass is its having a
agent—is incoherent, but this objection has become less common due to causal power, which in suitable circumstances it exercises to bring about a
pioneering work by Chisholm (1966, 1976), Taylor (1974), O’Connor characteristic effect. Applied to human agents in an account of free will,
(2000, 2011), Clarke (2003), and Steward 2012, ch. 8). More common the account suggests a picture on which an agent’s having desires, beliefs,
objections now concern, first, how to understand the relationship between and intentions are rational powers to will particular courses of action, and
agent-causation and an agent’s reasons (or motivations in general), and, where the agent’s willing is not determined in any one direction, she wills
second, the empirical adequacy of agent-causal libertarianism. With freely. An advantage for the agent-causalist who embraces this broader
respect to the first worry, it is widely assumed that the only (or at least metaphysics is ‘ideological’ parsimony. For different developments and

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defenses of this approach, see Lowe (2008), Swinburne (2013), and not blindly, but deliberately, in accordance with some reasons r . But for
1

O’Connor (2021); and for reason to doubt that a substance-causal that choice to be a responsible one, one must have chosen to be such as to
metaphysics helps to allay skepticism concerning free will, see Clarke and be moved by r , requiring some further reasons r for such a choice. And
1 2

Reed (2015). so on, ad infinitum. Free choice requires an impossible infinite regress of
choices to be the way one is in making choices.
3. Do We Have Free Will?
There have been numerous replies to Strawson’s argument. Mele (1995,
Most philosophers theorizing about free will take themselves to be 221ff.) argues that Strawson misconstrues the locus of freedom and
attempting to analyze a near-universal power of mature human beings. But responsibility. Freedom is principally a feature of our actions, and only
as we’ve noted above, there have been free will skeptics in both ancient derivatively of our characters from which such actions spring. The task of
and (especially) modern times. (Israel 2001 highlights a number of such the theorist is to show how one is in rational, reflective control of the
skeptics in the early modern period.) In this section, we summarize the choices one makes, consistent with there being no freedom-negating
main lines of argument both for and against the reality of human freedom conditions. While this seems right, when considering those theories that
of will. make one’s free control to reside directly in the causal efficacy of one’s
reasons (such as compatibilist reasons-responsive accounts or event-causal
3.1 Arguments Against the Reality of Free Will libertarianism), it is not beside the point to reflect on how one came to be
that way in the first place and to worry that such reflection should lead one
There are both a priori and empirical arguments against free will (See the to conclude that true responsibility (and hence freedom) is undermined,
entry on skepticism about moral responsibility). Several of these start with since a complete distal source of any action may be found external to the
an argument that free will is incompatible with causal determinism, which agent. Clarke (2003, 170–76) argues that an effective reply may be made
we will not rehearse here. Instead, we focus on arguments that human by indeterminists, and, in particular, by nondeterministic agent-causal
beings lack free will, against the background assumption that freedom and theorists. Such theorists contend that (i) aspects of ‘how one is, mentally
causal determinism are incompatible. speaking’, fully explain an agent’s choice without causally determining it
and (ii) the agent himself causes the choice that is made (so that the
The most radical a priori argument is that free will is not merely agent’s antecedent state, while grounding an explanation of the action, is
contingently absent but is impossible. Nietzsche 1886 [1966] argues to not the complete causal source of it). Since the agent’s exercise of this
this effect, and more recently it has been argued by Galen Strawson (1986, power is causally undetermined, it is not true that there is a sufficient
ch. 2; 1994, 2002). Strawson associates free will with being ‘ultimately ‘ultimate’ source of it external to the agent. Finally, Mele (2006, 129–34,
morally responsible’ for one’s actions. He argues that, because how one and 2017, 212–16) and O’Connor (2009b) suggest that freedom and moral
acts is a result of, or explained by, “how one is, mentally speaking” (M ), responsibility come in degrees and grow over time, reflecting the fact that
for one to be responsible for that choice one must be responsible for M . ‘how one is, mentally speaking’ is increasingly shaped by one’s own past
To be responsible for M , one must have chosen to be M itself—and that choices. Furthermore, some choices for a given individual may reflect

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more freedom and responsibility than others, which may be the kernel of demanded by the critic—a ‘noncontrastive’ explanation, perhaps, rather
truth behind Strawson’s sweeping argument. (For discussion of the ways than a ‘contrastive’ explanation, or a species of contrastive explanation
that nature, nurture, and contingent circumstances shape our behavior and consistent with indeterminism (see, e.g., Kane 1999; Clarke, 2003, ch. 8;
raise deep issues concerning the extent of our freedom and responsibility, and Franklin 2011a; 2018, ch. 5).
see Levy 2011 and Russell 2017, chs. 10–12.)
We now consider empirical arguments against human freedom. Some of
A second family of arguments against free will contend that, in one way or these stem from the physical sciences (while making assumptions
another, nondeterministic theories of freedom entail either that agents lack concerning the way physical phenomena fix psychological phenomena)
control over their choices or that the choices cannot be adequately and others from neuroscience and psychology.
explained. These arguments are variously called the ‘Mind’, ‘Rollback’, or
‘Luck’ argument, with the latter admitting of several versions. (For It used to be common for philosophers to argue that there is empirical
statements of such arguments, see van Inwagen 1983, ch. 4; 2000; Haji reason to believe that the world in general is causally determined, and
2001; Mele 2006; Shabo 2011, 2013, 2020; Coffman 2015). We note that since human beings are parts of the world, they are too. Many took this to
some philosophers advance such arguments not as parts of a general case be strongly confirmed by the spectacular success of Isaac Newton’s
against free will, but merely as showing the inadequacy of specific framework for understanding the universe as governed everywhere by
accounts of free will [see, e.g., Griffith 2010].) They each describe fairly simple, exceptionless laws of motion. But the quantum revolution of
imagined cases—individual cases, or comparison of intra- or inter-world the early twentieth century has made that ‘clockwork universe’ image at
duplicate antecedent conditions followed by diverging outcomes— least doubtful at the level of basic physics. While quantum mechanics has
designed to elicit the judgment that the occurrence of a choice that had proven spectacularly successful as a framework for making precise and
remained unsettled given all prior causal factors can only be a ‘matter of accurate predictions of certain observable phenomena, its implications for
chance’, ‘random’, or ‘a matter of luck’. Such terms have been imported the causal structure of reality is still not well understood, and there are
from other contexts and have come to function as quasi-technical, competing indeterministic and deterministic interpretations. See the entry
unanalyzed concepts in these debates, and it is perhaps more helpful to on quantum mechanics for detailed discussion.) It is possible that
avoid such proxies and to conduct the debates directly in terms of the indeterminacy on the small-scale, supposing it to be genuine, ‘cancels out’
metaphysical notion of control and epistemic notion of explanation. Where at the macroscopic scale of birds and buildings and people, so that
the arguments question whether an undetermined agent can exercise behavior at this scale is virtually deterministic. But this idea, once
appropriate control over the choice he makes, proponents of common, is now being challenged empirically, even at the level of basic
nondeterministic theories often reply that control is not exercised prior to, biology. Furthermore, the social, biological, and medical sciences, too, are
but at the time of the choice—in the very act of bringing it about (see, e.g., rife with merely statistical generalizations. Plainly, the jury is out on all
Clarke 2005 and O’Connor 2007). Where the arguments question whether these inter-theoretic questions. But that is just a way to say that current
undetermined choices can be adequately explained, the reply often science does not decisively support the idea that everything we do is pre-
consists in identifying a form of explanation other than the form determined by the past, and ultimately by the distant past, wholly out of

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our control. For discussion, see Balaguer (2009), Koch (2009), Roskies chosen, over large enough number of instances, close to 99 percent
(2014), Ellis (2016). of the time. The proposal that agent-caused free choices do not
diverge from what the statistical laws predict for the physical
Maybe, then, we are subject to myriad causal influences, but the sum total components of our actions would run so sharply counter to what
of these influences doesn’t determine what we do, they only make it more we would expect as to make it incredible. (2014, 67)
or less likely that we’ll do this or that. Now some of the a priori no-free-
will arguments above center on nondeterministic theories according to Clarke (2010) questions the implicit assumption that free agent-causal
which there are objective antecedent probabilities associated with each choices should be expected not to conform to physical statistical laws,
possible choice outcome. Why objective probabilities of this kind might while O’Connor (2009a) challenges the more general assumption that
present special problems beyond those posed by the absence of freedom requires that agent-causal choices not be governed by statistical
determinism has been insufficiently explored to date. (For brief discussion, laws of any kind, as they plausibly would be if the relevant psychological
see Vicens 2016 and O’Connor 2016.) But one philosopher who argues states/powers are strongly emergent from physical states of the human
that there is reason to hold that our actions, if undetermined, are governed brain. Finally, Runyan 2018 argues that Pereboom’s case rests on an
by objective probabilities and that this fact calls into question whether we implausible empirical assumption concerning the evolution of objective
act freely is Derk Pereboom (2001, ch. 3; 2014, ch. 3). Pereboom notes probabilities concerning types of behavior over time.
that our best physical theories indicate that statistical laws govern isolated,
small-scale physical events, and he infers from the thesis that human Pereboom’s empirical basis for free will skepticism is very general. Others
beings are wholly physically composed that such statistical laws will also see support for free will skepticism from specific findings and theories in
govern all the physical components of human actions. Finally, Pereboom the human sciences. They point to evidence that we can be unconsciously
maintains that agent-causal libertarianism offers the correct analysis of influenced in the choices we make by a range of factors, including ones
free will. He then invites us to imagine that the antecedent probability of that are not motivationally relevant; that we can come to believe that we
some physical component of an action occurring is 0.32. If the action is chose to initiate a behavior that in fact was artificially induced; that people
free while not violating the statistical law, then, in a scenario with a large subject to certain neurological disorders will sometimes engage in
enough number of instances, this action would have to be freely chosen purposive behavior while sincerely believing that they are not directing
close to 32 percent of the time. This leads to the problem of “wild them. Finally, a great deal of attention has been given to the work of
coincidences”: neuroscientist Benjamin Libet (2002). Libet conducted some simple
experiments that seemed to reveal the existence of ‘preparatory’ brain
if the occurrence of these physical components were settled by the activity (the ‘readiness potential’) shortly before a subject engages in an
choices of agent-causes, then their actually being chosen close to ostensibly spontaneous action. (Libet interpreted this activity as the brain’s
32 percent of the time would amount to a coincidence no less wild ‘deciding’ what to do before we are consciously settled on a course of
than the coincidence of possible actions whose physical action.) Wegner (2002) surveys all of these findings (some of which are
components have an antecedent probability of about 0.99 being due to his own work as a social psychologist) and argues on their basis

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that the experience of conscious willing is ‘an illusion’. For criticism of However, effective intervention in the world (in scientific practice and
such arguments, see Mele (2009); Nahmias (2014); Mudrik et al. (2022); elsewhere) does not (obviously) require that our behavior be causally
and several contributions to Maoz and Sinnott-Armstrong (2022). Libet’s undetermined, so the ‘freedom is rationally presupposed’ argument cannot
interpretation of the readiness potential has come in for severe criticism. be launched for such an understanding of freedom. Instead,
After extensive subsequent study, neuroscientists are uncertain what it incompatibilists usually give one of the following two bases for rational
signifies. For thorough review of the evidence, see Schurger et al. (2021). belief in freedom (both of which can be given by compatibilists, too).

While Pereboom and others point to these empirical considerations in First, philosophers have long claimed that we have introspective evidence
defense of free will skepticism, other philosophers see them as reasons to of freedom in our experience of action, or perhaps of consciously attended
favor a more modest free will agnosticism (Kearns 2015) or to promote or deliberated action. Augustine and Scotus, discussed earlier, are two
revisionism about the ‘folk idea of free will’ (Vargas 2013; Nichols 2015). examples among many. In recent years, philosophers have been more
carefully scrutinizing the experience of agency and a debate has emerged
3.2 Arguments for the Reality of Free Will concerning its contents, and in particular whether it supports an
indeterministic theory of human free action. For discussion, see Deery et
If one is a compatibilist, then a case for the reality of free will requires al. (2013), Guillon (2014), Horgan (2015), and Bayne (2017).
evidence for our being effective agents who for the most part are aware of
what we do and why we are doing it. If one is an incompatibilist, then the Second, philosophers (e.g., Reid 1788 [1969], Swinburne 2013)
case requires in addition evidence for causal indeterminism, occurring in sometimes claim that our belief in the reality of free will is epistemically
the right locations in the process leading from deliberation to action. Many basic, or reasonable without requiring independent evidential support.
think that we already have third-personal ‘neutral’ scientific evidence for Most philosophers hold that some beliefs have that status, on pain of our
much of human behavior’s satisfying modest compatibilist requirements, having no justified beliefs whatever. It is controversial, however, just
such as Fischer and Ravizza’s reasons-responsiveness account. However, which beliefs do because it is controversial which criteria a belief must
given the immaturity of social science and the controversy over whether satisfy to qualify for that privileged status. It is perhaps necessary that a
psychological states ‘reduce’ in some sense to underlying physical states basic belief be ‘instinctive’ (unreflectively held) for all or most human
(and what this might entail for the reality of mental causation), this claim beings; that it be embedded in regular experience; and that it be central to
is doubtful. A more promising case for our satisfying (at least) our understanding of an important aspect of the world. Our belief in free
compatibilist requirements on freedom is that effective agency is will seems to meet these criteria, but whether they are sufficient is
presupposed by all scientific inquiry and so cannot rationally be doubted debated. (O’Connor 2019 proposes that free will belief is epistemically
(which fact is overlooked by some of the more extreme ‘willusionists’ basic but defeasible.) Other philosophers defend a variation on this stance,
such as Wegner). maintaining instead that belief in the reality of moral responsibility is
epistemically basic, and that since moral responsibility entails free will, or

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so it is claimed, we may infer the reality of free will (see, e.g., van Many suppose that there is a challenge to human freedom stemming not
Inwagen 1983, 206–13). only from God’s perfect power but also from his perfect knowledge. A
standard argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal
4. Theological Wrinkles determinism has a close theological analogue. Recall van Inwagen’s
influential formulation of the ‘Consequence Argument’:
4.1 Free Will and God’s Power, Knowledge, and Goodness
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the
A large portion of Western philosophical work on free will has been laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us
written within an overarching theological framework, according to which what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what
God is the ultimate source, sustainer, and end of all else. Some of these the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things
thinkers draw the conclusion that God must be a sufficient, wholly (including our present acts) are not up to us. (van Inwagen 1983,
determining cause for everything that happens; all of them suppose that 16)
every creaturely act necessarily depends on the explanatorily prior,
And now consider an argument that turns on God’s comprehensive and
cooperative activity of God. It is also commonly presumed by
infallible knowledge of the future:
philosophical theists that human beings are free and responsible (on pain
of attributing evil in the world to God alone, and so impugning His perfect If infallible divine foreknowledge is true, then our acts are the
goodness). Hence, those who believe that God is omni-determining (logical) consequences of God’s beliefs in the remote past. (Since
typically are compatibilists with respect to freedom and (in this case) God cannot get things wrong, his believing that something will be
theological determinism. Edwards (1754 [1957]) is a good example. But so entails that it will be so.) But it is not up to us what beliefs God
those who suppose that God’s sustaining activity (and special activity of had before we were born, and neither is it up to us that God’s
conferring grace) is only a necessary condition on the outcome of human beliefs are necessarily true. Therefore, the consequences of these
free choices need to tell a more subtle story, on which omnipotent God’s things (including our present acts) are not up to us.
cooperative activity can be (explanatorily) prior to a human choice and yet
the outcome of that choice be settled only by the choice itself. For An excellent discussion of these arguments in tandem and attempts to
important medieval discussions—the apex of philosophical reflection on point to relevant disanalogies between causal determinism and infallible
theological concerns—see the relevant portions of Al-Ghazali IP, Aquinas foreknowledge may be found in the introduction to Fischer (1989). See
BW and Scotus QAM. Three positions (given in order of logical strength) also the entry on foreknowledge and free will.
on God’s activity vis-à-vis creaturely activity were variously defended by
Another issue concerns how knowledge of God, the ultimate Good, would
thinkers of this area: mere conservationism, concurrentism, and
impact human freedom. Many philosophical theologians, especially the
occasionalism. These positions turn on subtle distinctions, which have
medieval Aristotelians, were drawn to the idea that human beings cannot
recently been explored by Freddoso (1988), Kvanvig and McCann (1991),
but will that which they take to be an unqualified good. (As noted above,
Koons (2002), Grant (2016 and 2019), and Judisch (2016).

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Duns Scotus is an exception to this consensus, as were Ockham and by our having an unmistakable awareness of what is in fact the Good?
Suarez subsequently, but their dissent is limited.) Hence, if there is an And yet is it not passing strange to suppose that God should be less than
afterlife, in which humans ‘see God face to face,’ they will inevitably be perfectly free?
drawn to Him. Following Pascal, Murray (1993, 2002) argues that a good
God would choose to make His existence and character less than certain One suggested solution to this puzzle takes as its point of departure the
for human beings, for the sake of preserving their freedom. (He will do so, distinction noted in section 2.3 between the ability to do otherwise and
the argument goes, at least for a period of time in which human beings sourcehood, proposing that the core metaphysical feature of freedom is
participate in their own character formation.) If it is a good for human being the ultimate source, or originator, of one’s choices. For human
beings that they freely choose to respond in love to God and to act in beings or any created persons who owe their existence to factors outside
obedience to His will, then God must maintain an ‘epistemic distance’ themselves, the only way their acts of will could find their ultimate origin
from them lest they be overwhelmed by His goodness or power and in themselves is for such acts not to be determined by their character and
respond out of necessity, rather than freedom. (See also the other essays in circumstances. For if all my willings were wholly determined, then if we
Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002.) were to trace my causal history back far enough, we would ultimately
arrive at external factors that gave rise to me, with my particular genetic
If it is true that God withholds our ability to be certain of his existence for dispositions. My motives at the time would not be the ultimate source of
the sake of our freedom, then it is natural to conclude that humans will my willings, only the most proximate ones. Only by there being less than
lack freedom in heaven. And it is anyways common to traditional Jewish, deterministic connections between external influences and choices, then, is
Christian, and Muslim theologies to maintain that humans cannot sin in it be possible for me to be an ultimate source of my activity, concerning
heaven. Even so, traditional Christian theology at least maintains that which I may truly say, “the buck stops here.”
human persons in heaven are free. What sort of freedom is in view here,
and how does it relate to mundane freedom? Two good recent discussions As is generally the case, things are different on this point in the case of
of these questions are Pawl and Timpe (2009) and Tamburro (2017). God. As Anselm observed, even if God’s character absolutely precludes
His performing certain actions in certain contexts, this will not imply that
4.2 God’s Freedom some external factor is in any way a partial origin of His willings and
refrainings from willing. Indeed, this would not be so even if he were
Finally, there is the question of the freedom of God himself. Perfect determined by character to will everything which He wills. God’s nature
goodness is an essential, not acquired, attribute of God. God cannot lie or owes its existence to nothing. Thus, God would be the sole and ultimate
be in any way immoral in His dealings with His creatures (appearances source of His will even if He couldn’t will otherwise.
notwithstanding). Unless we take the minority position on which this is a
Well, then, might God have willed otherwise in any respect? The majority
trivial claim, since whatever God does definitionally counts as good, this
view in the history of philosophical theology is that He indeed could have.
appears to be a significant, inner constraint on God’s freedom. Did we not
He might have chosen not to create anything at all. And given that He did
contemplate immediately above that human freedom would be curtailed

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create, He might have created any number of alternatives to what we critical replies to Rowe, see Almeida (2008, ch. 1), Kray (2010), and
observe. But there have been noteworthy thinkers who argued the contrary Zimmerman (2018).
position, along with others who clearly felt the pull of the contrary
position even while resisting it. The most famous such thinker is Leibniz Finally, Norman Kretzmann (1997, 220–25) has argued in the context of
(1710 [1985]), who argued that God, being both perfectly good and Aquinas’s theological system that there is strong pressure to say that God
perfectly powerful, cannot fail to will the best possible world. Leibniz must have created something or other, though it may well have been open
insisted that this is consistent with saying that God is able to will to Him to create any of a number of contingent orders. The reason is that
otherwise, although his defense of this last claim is notoriously difficult to there is no plausible account of how an absolutely perfect God might have
make out satisfactorily. Many read Leibniz, malgré lui, as one whose basic a resistible motivation—one consideration among other, competing
commitments imply that God could not have willed other than He does in considerations—for creating something rather than nothing. (It obviously
any respect. cannot have to do with any sort of utility, for example.) The best general
understanding of God’s being motivated to create at all—one which in
One might challenge Leibniz’s reasoning on this point by questioning the places Aquinas himself comes very close to endorsing—is to see it as
assumption that there is a uniquely best possible Creation (an option noted reflecting the fact that God’s very being, which is goodness, necessarily
by Adams 1987, though he challenges instead Leibniz’s conclusion based diffuses itself. Perfect goodness will naturally communicate itself
on it). One way this could be is if there is no well-ordering of worlds: outwardly; God who is perfect goodness will naturally create, generating a
some pairs of worlds are sufficiently different in kind that they are dependent reality that imperfectly reflects that goodness. Wainwright
incommensurate with each other (neither is better than the other, nor are (1996) discusses a somewhat similar line of thought in the Puritan thinker
they equal) and no world is better than either of them. Another way this Jonathan Edwards. Alexander Pruss (2016), however, raises substantial
could be is if there is no upper limit on goodness of worlds: for every grounds for doubt concerning this line of thought; O’Connor (2022) offers
possible world God might have created, there are others (infinitely many, a rejoinder.
in fact) which are better. If such is the case, one might argue, it is
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Related Entries
action | agency | blame | causation: the metaphysics of | compatibilism |
determinism: causal | fatalism | freedom: divine | free will: divine
foreknowledge and | incompatibilism: (nondeterministic) theories of free
will | incompatibilism: arguments for | moral responsibility | quantum
mechanics | skepticism: about moral responsibility

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Timothy O’Connor and Christopher Franklin

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