Business Horizons (2021) 64, 743e756

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Privacy lost: Appropriating surveillance

technology in China’s fight against
COVID-19
Jun Liu a,*, Hui Zhao b

a
Department of Communication, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
b
Department of Strategic Communication, Lund University, Helsingborg, Sweden

KEYWORDS Abstract China’s unprecedented measures to mobilize its diverse surveillance

China’s pandemic apparatus played a key part in the country’s successful containment of the ongoing
response; coronavirus pandemic. Critics worldwide believe these invasive technologies, in the
Communitarianism; hands of an authoritarian regime, could trample the right to privacy and curb
Guardian model of fundamental civil and human rights. However, there is little domestic public resis-
governance; tance in China about technology-related privacy risks during the pandemic. Drawing
Public surveillance; on academic research and a semantic network analysis of media frames, we explore
Technology-related the contextual political and cultural belief systems that determine public support
privacy risks; for authorities’ ever-expanding access to personal data. We interrogate the
Sociotechnical longer-term trajectoriesdincluding the guardian model of governance, sociotech-
imagination nical imagination of technology, and communitarian valuesdby which the under-
standing of technology and privacy in times of crisis has been shaped. China’s
actions shed light on the general acceptance of the handover of personal data
for anti-epidemic purposes in East Asian societies like South Korea and Singapore.
ª 2021 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Published by Elsevier Inc. This
is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).

1. China’s high-tech war against COVID-

“[W]hen personal safety is at stake, it [giving 19. . . With privacy in peril?
up the right to privacy] becomes a way to
control [the outbreak of the pandemic].” The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic not only
d A Weibo remark (Huang, 2020) poses unprecedented threats to global health and
human well-being but also raises significant con-
cerns about data and privacy breaches. This is
* Corresponding author
largely due to the deployment of technological
E-mail addresses: liujun@hum.ku.dk (J. Liu), hui.zhao@isk. surveillance and tracking measures worldwide to
lu.se (H. Zhao) help slow the spread of the disease (e.g., Ram &

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2021.07.004
0007-6813/ª 2021 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
744 J. Liu, H. Zhao

Gray, 2020; Singer & Sang-Hun, 2020). Among implications on the general acceptance of the
countries that have introduced pandemic-related handover of personal data for anti-epidemic pur-
surveillance, China is a remarkable example that poses in East Asian societies like South Korea and
has mustered the digital contact tracing and Singapore.
health surveillance resources at its disposal to
mitigate the effects of the virus to a significant 2. The guardian model of governance
extent (Cadell, 2020; Wu et al., 2020). A slew of
surveillance systemsdfrom drones to CCTV cam- One of the biggest concerns with epidemiological
eras, from digital barcodes to geospatial informa- tracing measures is intrusive state surveillance
tion on mobile appsdhave established the into citizen privacy. State surveillance carried out
country’s extensive, aggressive virus-tracking sys- by either democratic or authoritarian regimes
tem (e.g., Huang, 2020; Wall Street Journal, 2020; (e.g., BBC, 2020a; Ram & Gray, 2020) involves “the
Wu et al., 2020). monitoring, collecting, and/or processing of per-
Not without controversy, the surveillance sys- sonal data by a government” (Eck & Hatz, 2020, p.
tem has prompted a storm of international 604). While such surveillance on people’s location,
concern and criticism of the invasive technologies activity, or biometrics is largely and increasingly
used by an authoritarian regime in ways that could used for the containment of the coronavirus, it
trample the right to privacy and data protection also significantly expands state power with greater
and repressively curb other fundamental civil and social and political control over citizens. Such
human rights (Huang, 2020; Singer & Sang-Hun, control risks infringing fundamental rights such as
2020). Yet, compared to the increased concern freedom of expression and the right to privacy, as
elsewhere (Sweeney, 2020), there is little public well as entrenching power imbalances between
resistance and criticism domestically about the national governments and its citizens.
technology-related privacy and surveillance risks Nevertheless, this concern about all-powerful
during the pandemic in China. As illustrated in the states does not appear to be relevant in the case
Weibo remark above, Chinese people seem to of China. Rather, the guardian model of governance
consent to the government’s expansive virus- (Lu & Shi, 2015; Shi & Lu, 2010)dwhich promotes
tracking policy (Mozur et al., 2020; see also Yang paternalistic leadershipdgenerates a favorable or
et al., 2020). Are Chinese people “comfortable supportive condition for the Chinese regime to
with outright surveillance” (Huang, 2020) by the impose, in this case, tech-enabled state surveil-
state, or tolerant of the government’s digital lance during a public health crisis. Studies on the
measures that would lead to the infringement of China-specific political model have consistently
privacy rights and freedoms while stemming the revealed that the regime enjoys a substantially
epidemic? If so, why? higher level of political trust, popular support, and
To answer these questions, this article explores confidence (e.g., Chu et al., 2008; Chu et al., 2020;
the terrain in which the understanding of state, Steinhardt, 2012; Wang, 2005), despite the lack of
technology, and privacy has been shaped concerning the institutional fixtures of a representative de-
their social and historical context in China. An mocracy. For instance, the Asian Barometer Survey
analytical framework consisting of three aspectsda showed a high percentage of respondents trust and
high level of expectation and confidence in state obey the Chinese government (Steinhardt, 2012). To
intervention based on the guardian model of gover- account for the pattern of political support and
nance, a cultural horizon of technology through regime legitimacy, scholars have adopted Dahl’s
which technologies are intertwined with nation- (2008, pp. 52e53) term government by guardians,
building and national rejuvenation, and a commu- “a perennial alternative to democracy,” to scruti-
nitarian tradition with less concern over individual nize the influence of Confucian values on Chinese
rightsdoffers a much-needed understanding of the politics. The guardianship model of governance
myth behind Chinese people’s obedience to the au- entails the persistence of paternalistic power,
thorities’ ever-expanding access to personal data including obedience to political authority (Pye &
and cybersecurity during the pandemic. Pye, 2009) and superior-inferior relationships
In the sections below, we first explicate our (Pye, 1999). Shi and Lu (2010, p. 125) explained the
theoretical understanding of these three aspects. Chinese theory of government in this way:
Second, we lay out our methodology, including
case selection, data collection, and data analysis. Under the steady hand of elites according to
Third, we present our findings and discussions with Confucianism, which holds (like all ‘guardian’
plausible explanations and reflections on our con- concepts of governance) that ‘rulership
clusions. We close by looking beyond China at the should be entrusted to a minority of persons
Appropriating surveillance technology in China’s fight against COVID-19 745

who are specially qualified to govern by its resilience. We thereby ask our first research
reason of their superior knowledge and question (RQ1): How do media discourses impli-
virtue.’ cate the guardianship model of governance
beneath their narratives in COVID-19 coverage?
More specifically, the guardianship discourse ad-
vocates that “the guardians be endowed with the
discretional power and authority that is necessary 3. The cultural horizon of technology
to make decisions on public issues” (Lu & Shi,
2015, p. 25). Apart from the concern over the surveillance state,
Against this backdrop, the Communist Party of the large-scale collection, use, sharing, and further
China (CPC) has been deliberately indoctrinating processing of vast amounts of personal and nonper-
the Chinese people within the guardianship sonal data for purposes related to the COVID-19
discourse to embrace paternalistic leadership that response has drawn criticism from civil society
gives rulers discretionary power in policymaking. groups and nongovernmental organizations, which
For instance, the survey found that high pro- have labeled the pandemic surveillance tech “pri-
portions of citizens agree or strongly agree with vacy-infringing” (Ienca & Vayena, 2020, p. 463)
statements such as “You can generally trust the technologies. Yet, a different language that articu-
people who run our government to do what is lates the “cultural horizon” (Feenberg, 1992, p. 307)
right;” “You can generally trust decisions made by of technologydor more precisely, a sociotechnical
the central government;” or “The government can imaginary (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009, 2013) that ties
be trusted to do what is right without our having to technology with national development in China
constantly check on them” (Wang, 2005, p. 158). doffers another essential framework for the sense-
Such guardian discourse further diverts people’s making and acceptance of the massive adoption of a
attention away from the role of the institutions, digital contact tracing apparatus to monitor in-
procedures, or routines of a democratic system to dividuals’ movements.
“the substance and outcomes of its [the regime’s] Feenberg (1992, p. 307) said that although
policies,” or “what a government doesdhow well “technology ought to be subject to interpretation
it performs and cares for its peopledis more like any other cultural artifact . . . [w]e are assured
important than how it came to be” (Shi & Lu, 2010, that its essence lies in a technically explainable
p. 126). Subsequently, the guardianship discourse function rather than a hermeneutically interpretable
convinces subordinates to believedand welco- meaning.” The technically explainable function, or
medthat the state should intervene in civil soci- “social meaning” of technology (Feenberg, 1992, p.
ety for the sake of social benefits and judge the 307), indicates the goal of the technology but leaves
governance capacity in terms of the outcomes. no room for its meaning in its concrete social context.
This guardianship model of governance is Instead, the hermeneutically interpretable mean-
particularly exemplified in the politics of public ing, or the “cultural horizon” of technology, mani-
emergencies and disasters in China (Lyu, 2012; Xu, fests “culturally general assumptions that form the
2016; Zhao et al., 2017). As studies have uncov- unquestioned background to every aspect of life”
ered, the politics of public emergencies and di- (Feenberg, 1992, p. 309). These assumptions condi-
sasters consists of two key issues: paternalistic tion, shape, or constrain the adoption and develop-
compassion and accountability (Xu, 2016, p. 420). ment of technology, hence making “technology’s
Paternalistic compassion speaks to a continued contextual causes and consequences visible rather
strong, prevailing public expectation that the than obscuring them behind an impoverished func-
“rulers’ primary obligation is to benevolently and tionalism” (Feenberg, 1992, p. 308).
sympathetically protect and enhance the subsis- One way to uncover the cultural horizon of
tence rights of the ruled as a collective good” technology beyond functionalism is through an
(Hung, 2013, p. 196) in precarious situations. exploration of sociotechnical imaginaries. Socio-
Accountability, then, indicates that the authorities technical imaginaries encapsulate “collectively
must demonstrate that they were accountable for held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly per-
the people’s suffering, hence directing public formed visions of desirable futures, animated by
attention towards the state’s effective response shared understandings of forms of social life and
(Xu, 2016, p. 424). In turn, by projecting a publicly social order attainable through, and supportive
expected image as a “grandpa state” (Xu, 2016, p. of, advances in science and technology”
421) to safeguard its “children” (Zhao et al., 2017, (Jasanoff, 2015, p. 4). In other words, the visions
p. 369), the state makes efforts to secure popular of desirable futures regarding a specific tech-
approval, maintain its legitimacy, and strengthen nologyd“typically grounded in positive visions of
746 J. Liu, H. Zhao

social progress” (Jasanoff, 2015, p. 4)depitomize With these specifications in mind, we ask the
culturally general assumptions and norms for such next research question (RQ2): How do media dis-
technology and further guide technological courses elicit the specific sociotechnical imagi-
development. naries in which technologies are intertwined with
Scientific and technological development has nation-building and national rejuvenation beneath
been intertwined with visions of nation-building and their narratives in COVID-19 coverage?
national rejuvenation among social elites and polit-
ical leaders in the modernization of China (Elman,
2009). This emerged as early as 1862 and especially 4. The communitarian tradition
grew after the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of
1894e1895 (Kuo & Liu, 1978) when the adoption of Privacy protections have been portrayed as one of
Western (military) technology was regarded as “the the victims of COVID-19 (Meyer, 2020; Singer &
primary task” for the “self-strengthening (Ziqiang)” Sang-Hun, 2020) as the fight against the
movement of Chinese state-building (Kuo & Liu, pandemic has introduced aggressive and evolving
1978, p. 492). The first populist movementdThe mass digital surveillance measures to record and
May Fourth Movement in 1919dthat pursued China’s transmit personal health and geolocation data that
modernity exalted Western ideas, Mr. De (“de- may involve personally identifiable information
mocracy”) and Mr. Sai (“science”), as the only ways (Sharma & Bashir, 2020). While debates heat up in
to revive China (Poo, 2019). Likewise, Mitter (2005, Western countries regarding whether key tenets of
p. 233) observed “a strong romanticist tinge in the democracy, especially the protection of the
tendency to glorify industrial technology...for the fundamental right to privacy, should be set aside
virility and power which it seemed to offer the during the pandemic to enable a more effective
nation” in the transition from pre-modern to response (e.g., Bollyky & Kickbusch, 2020;
modern. Greitens, 2020), Asian societiesdincluding
The enthusiasm for science and technology as Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and the Chi-
the key to national rejuvenation perpetuates and nese mainlanddhave been successful in curbing
swells after the rise of the CPC (Hughes, 2006; the spread of the virus, with their populations
Yang, 1990). Yang’s review (1990) of the Chinese being “more accepting of smartphone app-based
government’s policies prioritizing technology digital tracing . . . despite the privacy in-
development showed that the leadership portrays cursions” (Cha, 2020, p. 2). The answer to the
technology as crucial for the country to catch up acceptance of technologically enhanced surveil-
with advanced industrial countries. For instance, lance, despite the issue of privacy and cyberse-
the Chinese propaganda apparatus launched a curity breach, has less to do with regime type and
full-swing campaign in the 1980s to promote more to do with communitarian citizenship
Deng’s famous theory that “science and tech- (Etzioni, 1996; Janoski, 2014).
nology constitute a primary productive force” Communitarianism is a social philosophy that
(Yang, 2018). Science and technology were underlines the importance of a community or
viewed as nothing but the driving force behind society-based definition of the common good and
economic development (Song, 2008, p. 236). shared value (Etzioni, 1996, 2007, 2014). Often
Through mass media and institutions, the gov- considered in contrast to liberalism, which advo-
ernment has constructed dominant discourses cates the centrality of the individual, communi-
like “rejuvenating China by technology and edu- tarianism prioritizes community and societal
cation” (Na, 2003), “enhancing trade by relying interests over those of the individual. As Taylor
on science and technology” (Fan & Watanabe, (1995, p. 186) explicated, in essence, “[t]he
2006, p. 307), and, most recently, the ambitious ethic central to a liberal society is an ethic of the
plan “Made in China 2025,” through which China right rather than the good,” with basic principles
aims to become a self-reliant technology power involving “the respect of individual rights and
by reducing its reliance on foreign technology freedoms.” In other words, liberalism “does not in
(Wübbeke et al., 2016). In short, the discourses the first instance define what goods the society
encompass a sociotechnical imaginary of tech- will further” (Taylor, 2003, p. 197). Rather, in-
nology as a means and promise of rejuvenating dividuals should formulate the goods “on their
the country. This discourse, as Liu (2005, p. 309) own, without membership in, influence from, or
argued, “excludes any other alternative version regard for a community” (Etzioni, 1996, p. 4). By
of science and technology and exempts any contrast, communitarianism takes a community-
challenge of the ‘power’ of science and oriented perspective to support “a sense of a
technology.” shared immediate common good” (Taylor, 2003, p.
Appropriating surveillance technology in China’s fight against COVID-19 747

200). It is collective-based units such as the family, these media packages: “interpretive packages that
schools, and associationsdall parts of communi- give meaning to an issue.” Media frames denote
tiesdthat articulate shared conceptions of the structured semantic representations of associated
good. After determining the shared values or the contextual and cultural information grounded in
common good, “communities command centripe- broader cultural belief systems (Werner &
tal forces that seek to pull in members’ commit- Cornelissen, 2014). To examine media frames un-
ments, energies, time, and resources for what the covers the background structure of shared reality
community as a collectivity endorses as its notion and identifies “the role of political culture and
of the common good” (Etzioni, 1996, p. 5). Sub- practices in stabilizing particular imaginaries”
sequently, from a communitarian standpoint, the (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009, p. 121). Given the idea of
centripetal forces push the communities and other associative framing (Ruigrok & Van Atteveldt,
social entities toward collectivism (Etzioni, 1996, 2007), this study operationalizes media frames as
p. 9). complex patterns of associations between
Scholars address the communitarian tradition different concepts, with the main associations in a
when expounding the distinctive Chinese pattern message being its central organizing idea (Gamson
of state-individual relations (Pye, 1991, p. 446) & Modigliani, 1989). In other words, media frames
and citizenship in China (see also De Bary, 1998; involve not only the selection of concepts but also
Janoski, 2014). Pye (1991, p. 446) suggested that their mutual associations that stand for schemata
“the dominant feature of Confucianism was a of interpretation. We examine such associative
pervasive hostility to the notion of personal au- framings through semantic networks derived from
tonomy and individualism. . . there was no notion the occurrences and co-occurrences of concepts.
of individual rights” in China. Consequently, “in
China’s cultural tradition, ‘individuals have always 5.1. Semantic network analysis
been closely linked with society . . . [and] in-
dividuals have never been placed above society, This study employs semantic network analysis to
and the values of individuals have always been explore media frames of COVID-19, technology,
unified with the responsibilities of society’” (Pye, and privacy in news coverage in the Chinese
1991,). China’s collectivist culture subsequently mainland. Semantic network analysis has its origin
glorifies the common goodd defined mostly by the in cognitive science, arguing that human memory
(Party-)state as “an expression of the majority contains a structural meaning system (Collins &
interests of society” (Pye, 1991, p. 447)dand Quillian, 1972). Semantic network theorists have
praises self-sacrifice in the face of public good thus argued that the frequency, co-occurrence,
(Egri & Ralston, 2004) as selflessness, a virtuous and distances among words and concepts allow
form of communitarianism. A crucial rhetoric for researchers to explore a text’s embedded meaning
public mobilization, the advocacy of communi- (Danowski, 1993; Doerfel, 1998). While there have
tarian virtues like duty, responsibility, and self- been different methods to conceptualize network
sacrifice soars during crises and disasters like the ties (e.g., traditional content analysis, shared
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) perception, and word association) in existing se-
outbreak (Ding, 2014), the Sichuan Earthquake mantic network analysis research (Doerfel, 1998),
(Rosen, 2009; Sorace, 2016), and the COVID-19 this study adopts the word association (concept
pandemic (Palko & Xiang, 2020, p. 206). These co-occurrence) method, which maps the relation-
types of events cultivate a deep commitment to ships among words by indexing pairs of concepts.
taking collective action (Xinhua Net, 2020). Given Extending beyond the standard content analysis of
this, we ask the third research question (RQ3): texts and frequencies of concepts, semantic
How do media discourses portray the state- network analysis reveals the manifest meaning
individual relationship and, especially, communi- structure of the text and indirectly represents the
tarianism beneath their narratives in COVID-19 collective cognitive structure among the text’s
coverage? creators (Danowski, 1993). The analysis, with
secondhand data from news sources, follows the
framework consisting of three aspects and the
5. Methods research questions proposed above.

This study explores thoughts and ideas beneath 5.2. Data collection
narratives through interrogating media discursive
frames as important units of analysis. Gamson and To identify and collect data, we first performed
Modigliani (1989, p. 3) referred to such called an extensive search of news coverage in Chinese
748 J. Liu, H. Zhao

published on the Chinese mainland. Data health QR code), and privacy-related concepts in
collected was published between December 1, the text data as nodes linked together by the
2019, the date of the first known COVID-19 case, frequencies with which each concept co-occurs
and December 1, 2020. We used the keyword- with other concepts. Network clusters that
screening method in the Huike News Data- emerged organically from the large network were
basedthe Wisers Information Portal1dthe most further identified and categorized deductively
professional Chinese media content database. using three predetermined themes: the guardian
Instead of contact tracing apps, terms including model of governance, the (cultural horizon of)
“健康码 (health code),” “健康通行码 (health QR technology, and the communitarian tradition.
code),” and “追踪App (tracing app)” has been
used in the Chinese mainland to refer to a traffic-
light style personal identification code to declare 6. Findings
people’s health status and to upload documents
such as test certificates, passports, and itiner- There are 636 words and 343 edges in the news
aries to permit travel from one area to another articles semantic network. We created a visual of
(BBC, 2020b). The codes are based on a combi- the semantic network for Chinese news articles
nation of big data and information submitted by (Figure 1) using Gephi (Bastian et al., 2009). We
the users themselves. Next, the keywords “新冠 ran the average degree to calculate the node
(nova coronavirus)” in combination with “health strength for each word. The node degree is
code,” “health QR code,” “tracing app,” or “隐私 determined as the number of edges that are inci-
(privacy)” were used in all fields to locate news dent on that node. The average degree refers to
articles covering COVID-19, technology, and pri- the average number of edges per node. Only words
vacy, if any, yielding 1,010 news articles and with more than 3 degrees were collected for
commentaries. further analysis (average degree Z 2.975). The
784 words with the highest node strength are dis-
5.3. Data cleaning and analysis played in the figures. Each node represents a
word, and its size indicates the node strength
The next step was to conduct semantic network calculated by summing the weights of the edges
analysis and explore the discursive network of belonging to the node. Edges are undirected and
COVID-19, technology, and privacy in news weighted. The modularity partition algorithm
coverage through the following three steps. The suggested that the network could be divided into
corpus of 1,010 news articles and commentaries 13 communities, with a modularity score of 0.509.
was first preprocessed and cleaned. We We identified topics for each word community
segmented raw texts into words using the Chinese by their top words and inductively summarized
lexical analyzer Jieba and filtered punctuation, those topics into three themes. Five main clusters
numbers, common Chinese stop words, and non- can be identified from the semantic network,
words. Second, we submitted the corpus con- including one general cluster (pandemic) and four
sisting of space-spliced words to WORDij 3.0,2 a specific clusters, in ranking order: technology,
text analysis tool that counts the frequency of service, state, and health QR code. Table 1 pre-
each word and the co-occurrence of word pairs. sents the themes and top words for the semantic
Word pairs with a raw co-occurrence frequency networks.
higher than 5 were retained for further analysis, The pandemic cluster (Figure 2) offers the
following the suggestion of Church and Hanks context for news coverage. This cluster involves
(1990), who noted that the mutual information terminology related to the pandemic, such as “新
score becomes unstable and meaningless when 冠 (COVID-19)” and “肺炎 (pneumonia).” It also
the count is smaller than 5. Third, we visualized encompasses words describing campaigns to com-
the semantic network of news coverage on bat COVID-19 like “措施 (measures),” “防控 (con-
COVID-19 using Gephi,3 specifically employing its trol),” “保护 (protest),” “消毒 (disinfect),” and
modularity partition algorithm (Newman, 2006) “抗体 (antibody).”
to detect concept communities for semantic The technology cluster (Figure 3) is the largest in
networks. The generated semantic network the semantic network. Within the cluster, the word
identifies major COVID-19, technology (such as “technology” is generally associated with “数字
(digital)” and “数据 (data).” The utility of the term
1
http://wisesearch.wisers.net.cn/wortal/index.do?_
technology during the pandemic is specifically
2
http://wordij.net delineated through the use of words such as “检测
3
https://gephi.org/ (test)” and “抗疫 (anti-pandemic).” The remaining
Appropriating surveillance technology in China’s fight against COVID-19 749

Figure 1. Semantic network of media coverage

keywords, in essence, address the benefits of tech- specify the role of the state in the campaign, while
nology and technological applications, such as “发展 words like “治理 (governance),” “安全 (safety),”
(development),” “创新 (innovation),” “改革 (re- and “稳定 (stability)” further underline the
form),” and “现代化 (modernization).” Words like importance of the state’s role in the pandemic.
“推动 (enhance),” “重要 (important),” “智慧 The health code cluster (Figure 6) involves
(wise),” “提升 (improve),” “助力 (boost),” “快速 words that narrate practical information regarding
(swift),” and “赋能 (empower)” also encapsulated the use of contact tracing, such as “登记 (regis-
positive expectations for and assessment of tration)” and “申领 (application).” It is noteworthy
technology. that this cluster contains words related to data
The second-largest cluster is service (Figure 4), security and privacy, but with two opposite stan-
which also addresses aspects of technology or ces. On the one hand, words like “公共 (publicity)”
technological applications in the COVID-19 and “群体 (community)” highlight society’s gen-
campaign with keywords such as “平台 (plat- eral interest. On the other hand, individual and
form),” “智能 (intelligence),” “人脸识别 (face privacy related to the health code are also
recognition),” and “扫码 (scan).” The cluster also addressed, yet with a relatively lower degree;
points to technological development in the both “隐私 (privacy)” and “个人信息 (personal in-
campaign with words like “保障 (safeguard),” “优 formation)” gain only 5 degrees, while “泄露
化 (optimize),” “完善 (improve),” and “简化 (leakage)” has 4 degrees. In comparison, “公共
(simplify).” (publicity)” and “群体 (community)” obtain 23 and
The next cluster is that for state (Figure 5), 10 degrees, respectively.
which identifies the state and government as the
main actor in handling the pandemic. It refers to
the Party-state, Chinese government, and political 7. Discussion
leader with keywords including “中国 (China),” “国
家 (state),” “习近平 ([President] Xi Jinping),” and While concern is increasing in the West over privacy
“政府 (government).” Action verbs such as “加强 trade-offs with rush-to-release data surveillance
(reinforce),” “开展 (launch),” “支持 (support),” applications for the ongoing COVID-19 health crisis,
“维护 (maintain),” “制定 (formulate),” “组织 less controversy has unfolded in China over the pri-
(organize),” “研发 (R&D),” and “整治 (overhaul)” vacy and security of such applications beyond public
750 J. Liu, H. Zhao

Table 1. Top words, word clusters, topics, and themes on the media coverage
Themes Clusters Word% Selected top words (English translation, degree)
1 Pandemic 1 11.52% 疫情 (pandemic, 291), 防控 (control, 145), 新冠 (COVID-
19, 74), 肺炎 (pneumonia, 58), 核酸 (nucleic acid, 48), 措
施 (measures, 38), 风险 (risk, 37), 应对 (response, 34), 防
疫 (anti-pandemic, 21), 防护 (protect, 18), 消毒
(disinfect, 12), 体温 (temperature, 14), 抗体 (antibody,
11), 咳嗽 (cough, 5)
2 Technology 2 25.19% 发展 (development, 194), 数字 (digital, 156), 经济
(economy, 127), 检测 (test, 109), 技术 (technology, 94), 数
据(data, 67), 推动 (enhance, 60), 建设 (develop, 57), 抗疫
(antipandemic, 45), 创新(innovation, 43), 重要
(important, 37), 智慧 (wise, 28), 能力 (competence, 27),
提升 (improve, 27), 构建 (construct, 23), 积极 (positive,
17), 改革 (reform, 16), 助力 (boost, 12), 快速 (swift, 8), 现
代化 (modernization, 7), 赋能 (empower, 6)
3 Service 6 17.77% 服务 (service, 169), 老年人 (elder, 143), 平台 (platform,
52), 智能 (intelligence, 39), 保障 (safeguard, 35), 应用
(apply, 31), 优化 (optimize, 25), 完善 (perfect, 19), 便利
(convenient, 13), 鼓励 (encourage, 13), 简化 (simplify, 9),
人脸识别 (face recognition, 6), 扫码 (scan, 6)
4 State 4 12.02% 中国 (China, 147), 国家 (state, 142), 治理 (governance,
62), 安全 (safety, 62), 加强 (reinforce, 61), 开展 (launch,
41), 支持 (support, 40), 习近平 (Xi Jinping, 21), 提出
(propose, 19), 维护 (maintain, 19), 政府 (government, 17),
稳定 (stable, 16), 疫苗 (vaccination, 14), 制定 (formulate,
14), 组织 (organize, 13), 研发 (research and develop, 10),
政策 (policy, 10), 整治 (overhaul, 10), 手段 (means, 6)
5 Health QR code 5 11.13% 健康 (health, 93), 人员 (stuff, 91), 信息 (information, 86),
健康码 (health code, 83), 管理 (manage, 46), 公共
(publicity, 23), 通行 (pass, 20), 隔离 (quarantine, 13), 保护
(protect, 11), 专业 (professional, 11), 群体 (community,
10), 登记 (register, 9), 申领 (apply, 9), 隐私 (privacy, 5), 个
人信息 (personal information, 5), 泄露 (leak, 4), 公众 (the
public, 3)

health utilities. Less is known about why Chinese the people through various activitiesdsuch as
people are tolerant of such surveillance toolsdalong policies and R&Ddin the campaign against COVID-
with the regime’s expansive tracking policydthat 19. Terms like “治理 (governance),” “安全
also gives the regime a great deal of power over and (safety),” and “稳定 (stable)” not only imply
knowledge about its people (Huang, 2020). In this paternalistic meritocracy as the outcome of the
study, we propose a framework with three aspects to guardian model of governance, but they also
understand the lack of concern over privacy risks in legitimize the guardian role of the (Party-)state in
China. We support our proposed framework with China through evaluation of government policies
exploratory results from a semantic network analysis dealing with COVID-19 in people’s daily life.
of media coverage of COVID-19 in the Chinese “A government for the people, rather than gov-
mainland. ernment by the people” (Shi & Lu, 2010, pp.
Cultural orientations provide the setting for 123e130), is further illustrated in the association
politics, while the relationship of society to the between the words elder and service in the service
state is a part of political culture (Moody, 1994, p. concept cluster. The pandemic exacerbated the
735). Our first question concerns the guardianship digital divide, particularly for China’s rapidly aging
model of governance beneath media narratives in population, as elders without smartphones or who
COVID-19 coverage. As illustrated in the analysis, do not know how to use a health QR code are
the state has been described, with its paternalistic encountering many inconveniences in daily life or
role, as the pivotal actor in caring for and serving even finding it nearly impossible to travel with
Appropriating surveillance technology in China’s fight against COVID-19 751

Figure 2. Pandemic cluster

Figure 3. Technology cluster

public transportation (China Global Television guardianship discourse (Lu & Shi, 2015), rather than
Network, 2020). The state subsequently responded democratic institutions and procedures. As Cha
with solutionsdexemplified by terms like “简化 (2020, p. 12) explained, in a public health emer-
(simplify)” and “便利 (convenient)”dfor this tech gency like COVID-19, when “the government’s re-
dilemma to help seniors, and the words “服务(ser- sponsibility” to provide services meets with
vice)” and “老年人 (elder)” then marked the media demands from the public, society gains confidence,
frame for a government that considers people’s in- and civic trust in the regime increases. In short, the
terests when making decisions. This, in turn, would acceptance of state surveillance in China, which is
facilitate Chinese people’s acceptance of and sub- well-equipped with data applications, is embedded
sequent expectations for the state in terms of the in the country’s unique sociopolitical environment
752 J. Liu, H. Zhao

Figure 4. Service cluster

and cultural heritage and is thus significantly sociotechnical imaginary rooted in a nationally
different from Western norms and values built bounded collective vision in China that pushes the
around individual freedom and rights. adoption of such technologies as mandatory for
Our second research question queries the spe- wide distribution in everyday situations. The con-
cific sociotechnical imaginaries in which technol- troversies around surveillance technologies in the
ogies are intertwined with nation-building and West center on their benefits as bounded, while its
national rejuvenation to underpin media narra- risks are unpredicted and unmanageable (Ram &
tives in COVID-19 coverage. The culturally general Gray, 2020; Singer & Sang-Hun, 2020). The socio-
assumptions (Feenberg, 1992, p. 309) of technol- technical imaginary of COVID-19 surveillance
ogies thus determine the sensemaking process of technology in China, however, represents a sense
pandemic-related surveillance technologies. Such of cultural continuity with the view of technology
sensemaking and social imaginaries are exempli- as beneficial to national development and, in this
fied through words like “推动 (enhance),” “提升 case, to the nationwide battle against COVID-19.
(improve),” “创新 (innovation),” “助力 (boost),” The semantic analysis further disclosed the
“赋能 (empower),” and “加强 (reinforce),” all of positive outcomes of technological adoption as the
which imply that the employment of state- only emphasis in the media framed“创新 (inno-
imposed surveillance technologies and policies is vation),” “智慧 (wise),” “提升 (improve),” “助力
both a necessity and a promise to contain the (boost),” “赋能 (empower),” “智能 (intelli-
pandemic. As said, social imaginaries suggest gence),” and “保障 (safeguard)”dregardless of
particular ways in which people view their re- the accountability mechanisms over, for instance,
lationships with artifactsdin this case, public data collection, analysis, storage, and removal
health surveillance. Our analysis reveals that the (e.g., Kavanagh & Singh, 2020; Lin et al., 2020).
media frame on surveillance technology mirrors Concerns such as state interference or technology-
the general cultural horizon of technology in driven solutions, including voluntarily surrendered
China. Underneath the acceptance of the politics personal data, have been addressed with sufficient
of surveillance technologies is, without question, a procedural safeguardsdas illustrated in words like
Appropriating surveillance technology in China’s fight against COVID-19 753

Figure 5. State cluster

Figure 6. Health code cluster

“优化 (optimize),” “完善 (perfect),” “维护 (main- Although worrying reports about leaks of personal
tain),” and “整治 (overhaul)”dbut specification data have emerged (e.g., Xu, 2021), the legitimacy
requirements enacted remain largely unspecified. of government surveillance derives from “what a
754 J. Liu, H. Zhao

government does” (Shi & Lu, 2010, p. 126) instead face of an all-powerful state. While attributing the
of the procedures of governance. To sum up, the effectiveness of the measures deployed by the
continued strong faith in technology and adminis- Chinese regime in containing the epidemic to state
trative reasoning in the media frame not only un- capacity, one should not overlook the underlying
derpins but also buttresses the shared factors fueling or leading to widespread support
sensemaking embedded in the country’s imaginary from the Chinese people. Our findings are not only
on surveillance technologies in the COVID-19 indispensable to make sense of the discussion in
campaign. China, but also beyond China. For instance, the
We asked our third research question regarding guardianship discourse exists in both China and
communitarianism beneath media frames in news Singapore (Lu & Shi, 2015), while the majority of
coverage of COVID-19. As our analysis uncovered, East Asians in other countries with a Confucian
terms addressing collectivism and communitari- legacy also tend to be attached to paternalistic
anism occupied more prominent positions than meritocracy (Chu, 2013, p. 8). Likewise, commu-
personal privacy concerns. This signifies the nitarian values span Asian countries and must be
broad support for and cooperation with collective kept in mind to understand why Asian populations
interest through individual responsibility, fidelity, seem broadly tolerant of pandemic-related sur-
and even sacrifice in the COVID-19 campaign (He veillance (Cha, 2020). A contextual, comprehen-
et al., 2020). This media frame resonates with, sive understanding of cultural orientations and
for instance, the central government’s lockdown institutional performance helped us unpack Chi-
of Wuhan and other cities in Hubei as decisions nese (and East Asian) exceptionalism regarding
for “the greater good,” with “heroic sacrifice” (the lack of) privacy risk and security concerns in
made by both the Chinese people and China as a the ongoing containment of the COVID-19
nation (Rolland, 2020, pp. 28e29). More impor- pandemic.
tantly, it pinpoints the decisive role of the
(Party-) state in defining the publicly supported
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