║JAI SRI GURUDEV║

Sri Adichunchanagiri Shikshana Trust (R)

S J B INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
BGS Health & Education City, Kengeri, Bengaluru – 60.

DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRONICS & COMMUNICATION

ENGINEERING

E-WASTE MANAGEMENT [21EC755]

MODULE 2-EXTENDED PRODUCER
RESPONSIBILITY
ACADEMIC YEAR – 2024-2025

Faculty Name Mrs. Latha S

Designation Assistant Professor
Course E-waste management
Course Code 21EC755
Semester 7th
 Extended producer responsibility 49

Module 2
EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY

A mainstay for e-waste management

The evolution of EPR and wider acceptance suggests that it is multi-dimensional

– a concept, a strategy, a legislative tool/policy instrument, a programme for legal
compliance, and a path to business opportunities. EPR is the most highlighted leg-
islative tool with which several goals could be attained; it is applied across several
domains across the world, such as, different types of waste management, textile sec-
tor, carpets, and mattresses, pharmaceuticals, mercury lights, etc.
There exists vast literature on EPR, which covers varied perspectives, frame-
works, and stakeholder’s concerns. These aspects help in identifying complexi-
ties, and how to deal with them in attaining the goals of EPR in each domain.
Different analytical frameworks are applied in order to understand life of a product
and implementation of EPR, for example, product flows, financial flows, system
management (institutions, city, local governments), and stakeholder roles, and per-
spectives. Heterogeneity in perspectives, and multi-centric nature of EPR, such as,
environmental policy, operation management guidelines, industrial ecology, con-
flicting needs and perspective of each stakeholder, and prevalent conditions, and
socio-cultural aspects influencing implementation of EPR have stressed the need
for adopting EPR for each sector with its particularity.
The chapter begins by describing evolution of concept of EPR and describes how it
was evolved for waste management and now extended for e-waste manage- ment
including its goals, implementation, and challenges. It then provides compre- hensive
overview on the EPR being implemented for e-waste management under the existing
regulatory frameworks in different countries, and discusses three impor- tant aspects,
i.e., role of PRO (producer responsibility organisation) prescribed in the existing
regulatory framework, considerations for successful implementation of EPR, and
challenges in implementing EPR for e-waste management. towards end, the chapter
provides brief description of EPR and e-waste management in India, as EPR is
covered in detail in Chapter 5.

Evolution of concept of ‘extended producer responsibility’

The evolution of EPR has taken place in the broader context of sustainable develop-
ment, which largely focuses on healthy and safe environment. Most developmental
concerns, principles have been articulated from the perspectives of safe environment
and sustainability. For example, the EU started discussing issues of environmental
protection policy circles since early 1970s; considering a few fundamental principles of
sustainable development, such as, the ‘precautionary principle’, the principle of
‘prevention’, and the ‘polluter pays’ principle. The necessity for the introduction of
EPR comes from the growing awareness that other environmental policy measures
might not be sufficient to reach the environmental goals of society (ISWA 2014).
The concept of EPR was first introduced by Thomas Lindhqvist, professor at
 50 Extended producer responsibility
the Lund University in Sweden in 1990 (ibid.); he has discussed policy principle to
promote environment improvements of production systems in detail in his doctoral
dissertation in 2000. During the 1990s, several European countries were preparing
and commencing the implementation of various policy instruments to improve the
management of EoL products, largely based on the preventive environmental strate-
gies as promoted by UNEP in the ‘Cleaner Production Programme’. The concept
implies that responsibilities, which were traditionally assigned to consumers and
authorities responsible for waste management, are to be shifted to product producers.
After introducing formal (primary) definition of EPR in 1992, Thomas revised
the definition as a concept as a policy principle in 2000.

EPR is a policy principle to promote total life cycle environmental improve-

ments of product systems by extending the responsibilities of the manufac- turer
of the product to various parts of the entire life cycle of the product, and especially
to the takeback, recycling, and final disposal of the product.

He presented a model of EPR where ‘ownership’ of a product is linked with

four dimensions: liability,1 economic responsibility,2 physical responsibility,3
and infor- mative responsibility4 (Lindhqvist 2000: iii–iv).This brings EPR
principle in consis- tency with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and a necessary
condition for reflecting the essential life cycle costs in the price of the product.
This revised definition stresses on ‘life cycle perspective’ as an important aspect
for implementation of all policies; thus, the EPR principle and the
implementation of policy instruments need to be viewed as a strategic attempt
to reach sustainable solutions.
Davis Gary in 1994 defined ‘Producer Responsibility Principle’ as a policy prin-
ciple, which is as follows:

Concept that manufacturers and importers of products bear a degree of

responsibility for the environmental impacts of their products throughout the
products’ life cycles, including upstream impacts inherent in the selection of
materials for the products, impacts from manufacturers’ production process
itself, and downstream impacts form the use and disposal of the products.
Producers accept their responsibility when they design their products to min-
imise the lifecycle environmental impacts and when they accept legal, physi- cal
or economic responsibility for the environmental impacts that cannot be
eliminated by design.

Thus, EPR as environmental strategy has been attempting to link the follow-
ing dimensions: (i) area of products (implying that product system improvement
including product material, design, expected life, etc.); (ii) design for environment/
sustainable development (preventive environmental policy making) or Design for
Disassembly (DfD) activities leading to overall life cycle environmental improve-
ments of products and product systems; and (iii) public policy framework (which
can ensure product will protect environment along with administrative, economic
and informative instruments), which includes well-organised collection with high
collection results, increased recycling, and costs connected to waste collection, recy-
 Extended producer responsibility 51
cling, or final disposal, etc.

The practical development of EPR can be traced back to the enactment of

the German Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste in 1991.The success
of the Ordinance that saw the consumption of packaging decoupled from
the economic growth in Germany encouraged policy diffusion.
(Manomaivibool and Hong 2014: 203)

In 1994, the European Commission developed a Packaging Waste Directive aimed

to reduce packaging waste generation by 50% throughout Europe by 2001 (Mahesh
2007: 4–5).

EPR applied for waste management and extended for e-waste

management
The EPR has been propagated as a mainstream paradigm in waste management since
beginning of the 2000s by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development) countries, it was applied for ‘packaging waste, electronic, and
electrical equipment, batteries, bottles, paint cans, automobiles, waste oil, tyres and
refrigerators’ (UN ESCAP 2012: 1). The OECD defined EPR in 2001, as an envi-
ronmental policy approach in which a producer’s responsibility for a product is
extended to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life cycle. According to the
OECD (2001: 18), ‘EPR aims at reaching two goals: (i) shifting the responsibility
away from the municipality and general taxpayer towards the producer; and (ii)
provide incentives to producers to incorporate environmental considerations in the
design of their products’. After 15 years, the OECD redefined EPR, based on the
experience that EPR as an environment policy approach sought to shift the burden
of managing certain EoL products from municipalities and taxpayers to producers,
and ultimately to consumers.There is a need to redefine responsibilities; that is, the
incentives provided to producers to redesign products and packaging, which would
reduce the share of waste destined for final disposal, and thus increase recycling.
Also, ‘EPR policy alone does not aim to achieve a full internalization of environ-
mental costs; the task of establishing an environmental price for a wide range of
environmentally diverse waste streams makes this impractical’ (OECD 2016: 21).
In the evolved EPR framework for e-waste management by OECD in 2016, the
EPR embodies the notion that ‘extending the producer’s responsibility’ describes pro-
ducer’s physical and/or financial responsibilities and covers all stages – from environ-
mentally compatible product design and meeting material management goals through
recycling to the post-consumer stage of a product life cycle. The producers typically
pay towards the costs of e-waste processing, such as, collection, recycling, and dis-
posal.The OECD (2016) has mentioned four broad categories of EPR instruments/
responsibilities: (i) product take-back; (ii) economic and market-based instruments;
(iii) regulations and performance standards; and (iv) information-based instruments.
The product take-back is considered a strategy, and therefore often becomes a
voluntary initiative by the producers, by establishing collection and recycling tar-
gets for a product. The economic and market-based instruments provide financial
incentives in form of deposit refund5, advanced disposal fee6, material tax, upstream
combination tax/subsidy.These fees may be assessed by weight or per unit of prod-
 52 Extended producer responsibility
uct sold. After useful life of any e-product, physical responsibility (regulations and
performance standards) of a producer encompasses take-back of the products from
the consumers, which may enforce collection rate targets, and undertake recycling
(processing for recovery). Information-based instrument/responsibility of a product
mandates providing information on the attributes of the products, such as toxicity,
safe disposal, recyclability, and including such requirements as product labelling, as
well as related information on its website (Walls 2003; Patil and Ramakrishna 2020).
In short, in a mandated EPR,‘producer bear cost of the entire reverse supply chain,
including the cost of awareness, access-to-waste, collection, aggregation, transport,
depollution, disposal, recycling, recovery and monitoring and regulating the system’
(Khetriwal 2019: 143).

EPR: goals, implementation, and challenges for e-waste

management
Goals
ISWA (2014) stressed that EPR need not be a stand-alone policy measure; it should
always be incorporated in a mix of environmental policy measures.
EPR is usually conceived as a comprehensive policy package, combining various
instruments to simultaneously achieve the following goals: (i) create a sustainable
production, consumption, and waste management policy;7 (ii) incentives for eco-
design;8 (iii) reduce landfilling and develop recycling and recovery channels; (iv) full
internalisation of environmental costs, other instruments need to be introduced/
employed9 (IGES 2012: 2; ISWA 2014: 5).

Policy instruments
The EPR instruments have been implemented in a heterogenous or selective man-
ner, mainly because of differences in framing of laws and implementing them as per
the requirements of a country (Patil and Ramakrishna 2020). Among various ‘regula-
tory instruments’ mandatory take-back; energy efficiency standards; minimum recycled
content standards; secondary material utilisation rate requirements; disposal bans and
restrictions; material ban and restrictions; and product bans and restrictions.Among dif-
ferent ‘economic instruments,’ advance disposal fees; deposit/refund; material taxes; etc.
are known. The ‘information instruments’ include seal-of-approval types of environ-
mental information labelling – product environmental profiles for the whole life cycle
of materials, product hazard warnings and product durability labelling (Mahesh 2007).

EPR implemented for e-waste management under the existing

regulatory frameworks in different countries
The GEM 2017 recognizes that: Most legislation and policies currently refer to the
principle of EPR, which emerged in academic circles in the early 1990s. It is generally
seen as a policy principle that requires manufacturers to accept responsibility for all
stages in a product’s lifecycle, including EoL management.
 Extended producer responsibility 53

There are three primary objectives of the EPR principle:

• Manufacturers shall be incentivised to improve the environmental design of

their products and the environmental performance of supplying those products.
• Products should achieve a high utilisation rate.
• Materials should be preserved through effective and environmentally-sound
collection, treatment, reuse, and recycling.

The key principle behind the reasoning that producers or manufacturers should be
primarily responsible for this post-consumer phase is that most of the environmen-
tal impacts are predetermined in the design phase (Baldé et al. 2017: 49).
The principle of EPR has been introduced in multiple countries and for a vari-
ety of waste streams. There is also a broad variety in the policy measures to imple-
ment EPR, the goals, and achievements. There is no one-size-fits-all approach of
EPR, and its effectiveness will always depend on national circumstances, conditions,
priorities, and waste streams. EPR implementation is a complex topic bringing
many potential challenges; therefore, more ‘practical’ or ‘operational’ aspects to be
considered for successful EPR implementation (ISWA 2014: 8).

Process of implementation
The process to implement the EPR concept typically involves the following three
stages: (i) an appropriate policy instrument that embodies the EPR principles is
identified and a legislative framework is developed; (ii) the legislation is translated
into an EPR programme, involving design of a set of detailed operational rules, such
as, specific mechanisms to finance the operations of the programme, to monitor, and
evaluate the legal compliance of each entity involved, within the parameters of the
legislation, etc; and (iii) execution of the EPR programme into a working system in
practice (Gui et al. 2013: 2).
Due to the multi-agent nature of an EPR programme, efficiency of its imple-
mentation is greatly influenced by the heterogeneity in its perspectives. A mandated
EPR programme can give rise to economic opportunities for businesses involved
in e-waste collection and recycling. This may lead to competing interests between
producers and informal sector, especially on collection to recycling mechanisms, on
resource recovery, and management of secondary materials. However, establishing
collection and recycling mechanism may increase economic burden of producers;
location of these facilities also matters vis-à-vis transportation and storage cost or
broadly, value of entire reverse supply chain. For legal compliance, cost of collection
and recycling mechanisms and operations often result in a gap between the EPR
system in practice and what is intended by the EPR principle and/or EPR legisla-
tion (ibid.).
EPR is implemented in different ways in different countries; varied models are
developed in different countries. Table 4.8 presents an overview of EPR imple-
mentation in different countries – through legislation/policy, and through different
combinations of institutions (Table 2.1).
 54 Extended producer responsibility

TABLE 2.1 An overview of EPR implementation under legislation/policy in different

countries

Country, region E-waste legislation/policy and EPR implementation

European countries
Belgium The manufacturers and importers of EEE have founded Recupela as
a non-profit organisation with the support of the Belgian regional
governments in 2001, which is responsible for collection, sorting,
processing, and recycling of WEEE
Estonia Every PRO offers its own containers to the inhabitants
Germany A common container is accessed by the inhabitants and the collected
waste is split between various PROs, prior to being sorted. Producers
are required to finance the provision of the containers and collection,
treatment, and recycling when assigned a pick-up by the Elektro-
Altgeraete Register
Ireland WEEE Ireland is the main EPR organisation responsible for the collection
and treatment of e-waste on behalf of the producers since 2005
Italy Producers can join one of several compliance schemes.The collection
scheme provides pick-up of e-waste from all collection centres
connected to the scheme, both municipal and retail collection points
Lithuania The collection systems work without a strong involvement of coordinating
bodies/government authorities. It determines the amount of historical
WEEE that producers need to be collected and recycled based on the
new EEE put on the market each year
Spain Ecotic is the organisation responsible for the financing and management of
e-waste.There are three types of collection points: recycling points and
other municipal points; distribution company warehouses where waste
is stored; Load Grouping Centres fitted out by Ecotic
Sweden El-Kretsen is the EPR organisation responsible for financing of the take-
back system, collaborating with municipalities, and recyclers. Consumer
products are collected through the municipal collection system. Since
2015 retailers (online and physical stores) of EEE are obliged to accept
e-waste
United No link between industry and municipalities
Kingdom,
partly
Poland
Asian countries
China Rules on the Administration of the Recovery and Disposal of Discarded
Electronic and Electrical Products – was promulgated in 2009 and became
effective in 2011.This consists of general rules, tax administration,
subsidy utilisation, supervision, legal liability, and supplemental rules,
and are applied to domestic EEE producers who are taxed by the State
Administration of Taxation of China. EEE importers who are taxed by
the customs
India E-waste Management Rules, 2016. EPR is a mainstay of this regulation.
Producers are mandated to manage collection to recycling of e-waste,
its reporting, and filing annual return.
Indonesia Specific article on EPR under Solid Waste Management Act 2008
(Continued)
 Extended producer responsibility 55

TABLE 2.1 (Continued)

Country, region E-waste legislation/policy and EPR implementation

Japan WEEE management regulation to recycle and treat four major electrical
equipment wastes specifically air-conditioners, televisions, laundry
machines, and refrigerators (including freezers) under the Home
Appliance Recycling Law in April 2001.The producers are responsible
for recycling the collected waste, the retailers are responsible for the
collection of e-waste, and consumers pay a fee to partially cover the
costs of recycling and transportation.The Law for the Promotion of
Effective Utilization of Resources covers EPR, by specifying administrative
procedures for waste management businesses and standard procedures
for managing different types of waste
Malaysia Specific article on take-back and deposit refund under Solid Waste and
Public Cleansing Management Act 2007 and Draft Regulation on
Recycling and Disposal of EEE
Philippines Ecological solid waste management act of 2000, under which Consumer
electronics, and white goods as e-waste required separate handling from
other residential and commercial wastes
Singapore The Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources has taken up
initiatives to introduce a separate legislation for e-waste management
that includes the EPR principle. A programme (National Voluntary
Partnership Programme) started by the National Environment Agency
has set up for the e-waste recycling under which awareness among the
public is created
South Korea EPR in Recycling Law, 2003. Mandatory take-back, with the flexibility
to choose either individual collection or PRO, with clear targets on
recycling rates for regulated industries.Violation of the recycling rate
targets can cost penalties up to 130% of standard recycling costs.The
consumer is also obligated to pay a volume-based fee at the time of
e-waste disposal
Taiwan Waste disposal act which was amended in 1998.Waste home
appliances, and waste IT products as due recycled waste. Producers
shall submit recycling-clearance disposal fees to the recycling
management bodies
Thailand A form of EPR regulation under its National Integrated Strategy for the
Management of WEEE.This regulation requires producers to pay a
fixed up-front product fee with the revenues from the fee used to fund
a buy back program that pays a subsidy to the consumers who return
their EoL electronic products to collection centres
Vietnam Draft Regulations on the reclamation and treatment processes for disposal
products was released in 2015

Source: Cao et al. (2016), IGES (2012), Chatterjee (2016: 217), Mahesh (2007: 13–14), EXPRA (2013:
4), Manomaivibool and Hong (2014), Miliute-Plepiene and Youhanan (2019: 32–37), Ogushi and
Kandlikar (2007), Patil and Ramakrishna (2020), Sander et al. (2007: XI–XVI). Compiled by the author.
aManufacturers and importers that belong to Recupel pay the recycling contribution to Recupel for

each appliance put on the market. At the time of purchasing a new e-product, the end user contributes
a fixed amount to the costs, which is determined by the type of appliance, and it corresponds to the
actual cost of recycling.
 56 Extended producer responsibility

European countries
In EU countries, EPR is implemented following the WEEE Directives. Broadly, four
models are observed: (i) Producers create one common non-profit entity that col-
lects the necessary funding, cooperates with local authorities and ensures recycling
in the most cost-efficient and environmental way;10 (ii) ‘Dual model’ adopted –
shared responsibilities between the producers and local authorities (municipalities).
A separate collection system assigned to local authorities and the producers have
full operational and financial responsibility over collection, sorting and recycling;11
(iii) ‘Shared model’ – between industry and the local authorities based on common
agreements regarding collection;12 and (iv) Every PRO signed up with as many
municipalities as needed to fulfil targets according to market shares. 13

Asian countries
A few developing Asian countries have formulated their own EPR regulations;
namely China, India, Japan, South Korea,Vietnam, Cambodia, and Singapore.
In a circular economy, preserving resources and creating jobs in the areas of equip-
ment maintenance, component refurbishment, and remanufacturing, were two major
concerns in some countries, based on which a need had emerged for collection and
processing of e-waste through direct regulation or by providing necessary incentives.
Thus, the ‘take-back system’ as part of EPR was developed under e-waste laws in
Asian countries following the WEEE Directives (McCann and Wittmann 2015: 13).

Role of a PRO prescribed in regulatory framework

Under the EPR, a producer can implement EPR either on their own (termed as
Individual Producer Responsibility – IPR), or by collaborating with their peers and
working as a collective group (termed as Collective Producer Responsibility – CPR).
Every producer should be able to choose to meet their responsibilities on an indi-
vidual basis (for example, appointing a PRO) or setting up authorised collection cen-
tres) or through a collective compliance mechanism, where producers may authorise
common collection centres independently or by joining a consortium as a member.
A PRO is envisaged as an organisation that takes on the EPR mandate of a
single producer/collective group of producers to fulfil the EoL waste related legal
obligations on their behalf. In this conception, a PROs plays a centre-stage role, in
thorough implementation of the EPR on behalf of a producer, such as, meeting
targets of collection, recovery, and recycling obligations, etc. A PRO works with
a range of stakeholders, and expected to create systems that bring transparency,
and accountability in achieving goals defined/legal compliance for producers. The
scope of PRO functioning expands to establishment of take-back channel, sorting,
recycling target compliance, waste prevention, eco-design promotion, and commu-
nication material, verification of data and its reporting to the producer as well as the
government/national authorities.They should guarantee that the collected e-waste
 Extended producer responsibility 57

is treated properly. For this, PROs need to have a solid financial basis. Governments
must establish a strict authorisation process so that only reliable organisations with
secure finances can receive a licence.Transparency is an important feature of PROs
(EXPRA 2013: 3).
Some PROs have a public service mission, and operate in a not-for-profit or
profit-not-for-distribution basis while others seek profit. PROs are expected to
maximise environmental, economic, and social benefits along with their operational
implementation.
Until 2016, 30 countries14 in Europe have implemented EPR in their legislation
and the industry has set up PROs.

Considerations for successful implementation of EPR

ISWA (2014: 6–7) has listed eight key considerations for successful implementation
of EPR; of them, seven are relevant to e-waste management. ISWA mentions that
effective policy design on EPR will depend on national circumstances, conditions,
and priorities.The key considerations include: (i) involvement of stakeholders in the
development of EPR; (ii) clear allocation of responsibilities among all stakeholders;
(iii) producer’s choice for IPR or CPR; (iv) transparency of EPR; (v) governmental
support, monitoring, evaluation and control need to be accompanied by an effective
and efficient legal framework; (vi) ambitious and clever policy targets are a necessity;
and (vii) compensation of reasonable costs for the use of municipal infrastructure
is necessary.

1. Stakeholder involvement in the development of EPR, which creates a basis

for the EPR policy and improves the acceptability and effectiveness.
2. Clear allocation of responsibilities among all stakeholders involved is
an important requirement for a legislation, which would avoid conflicts of
interest between different stakeholders involved.While producers have the pri-
mary responsibility, all other actors in the product chain (producers, import-
ers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers), as well as all the waste management
actors (waste management collectors, recyclers) must be allocated specific
responsibilities.This allocation should be made in view of the policy objectives
and product characteristics along with clear mechanism for implementation.
3. Regarding role of PROs, it is necessary for the government to consider that
producers cannot gain an unfair advantage over their competitors or avoid their
responsibilities by choosing one or the other of different mechanisms. And,
if national legislation allows multiple PROs to compete for the same waste
stream, it should be ensured that they operate effectively together and without
jeopardising the achievement of policy targets. This point has emerged from
five models – combination of systems and financing model – applied for design
incentives under the WEEE Directive.15
4. Transparency of EPR, which is a primary requirement in its implementation,
as EPR is strongly linked to a public service; in this manner, both, producers,
 58 Extended producer responsibility

and consumers can make informed choices. This should be ensured by using
different ways to comply with the legislation, for example, reporting by pro-
ducers or PROs, and regular audits by the government.
5. Governmental support, monitoring, evaluation, and control needs to be
accompanied by an effective and efficient legal framework. Governments should
enforce this legal framework to close loopholes and trace free riders. The legal
framework required to include control mechanisms including monitoring, and
actions vis-à-vis producers, in case of not achieving goals and targets. Information
related compliance by producers should be reviewed in terms of the value of the
information in relation to product, its disposal, burden to provide such data and
information; in case, a PRO is implementing on behalf a producer, an accredita-
tion process for PRO is also required. The implementation of EPR should also
be periodically evaluated by governments and, if necessary, targets be adjusted.
6. Ambitious, and clever policy targets are a necessity. As a fundamental
goal of EPR is to increase the collection and recycling of waste, clear targets
on e-waste (generation, collection, recycling) should be specified. The targets
could be qualitative and/or quantitative and could be set for a group of prod-
ucts or for individual product categories.
7. Compensation of reasonable costs for the use of municipal infrastructure
is necessary. The local and regional authorities should not have any obligation
to hand over collected waste falling under EPR if their reasonable costs are not
covered by producers.

Challenges in implementation of EPR for e-waste management

Some strengths and challenges with EPR have been identified, largely based on
experiences of the European countries. A pre-condition and a challenge – for the
application of the full-scale EPR, it is necessary that a country has institutional
capacity to operate a supportive scheme, such as waste-sorting system (UN ESCAP
2012). A pre-condition identified by the OECD countries is that clear roles and
responsibilities of different actors / stakeholders, including the relationship between
public bodies and PROs shall be defined; and to assign specific functions to each
stakeholder while avoiding any possible overlap, loophole, and conflict of interest.
Unclear and overlapping roles and responsibilities constitute the main challenges
for governance and administration of EPR systems. Moreover, a close, mutual trust-
based partnership between local authorities and industry-owned EPR organisation
is a must (EXPRA 2013: 6).
Among strengths, EPR has potentials for improving resource efficiency by saving
virgin material inputs and energy consumption as well as reducing e-waste to be
land-filled, which lead to environmental benefits. This approach spurs innovation
for more efficient production and packaging and creates business opportunities for
recycling industry (UN ESCAP 2012).
Although EPR has been adopted by the most countries due to its promising
potentials for effective e-waste management, it has been scrutinised on the following
 Extended producer responsibility 59

counts: legal provisions and lacuna; governance/enforcement related challenges

including institutional mechanism for carrying out various functions, monitoring,
and evaluation, etc; linking EPR with new business models/economic opportuni-
ties created; and other aspects, such as, socio-cultural difficulties in a given country,
and whether methods, and standardisation processes are duly addressed.

Legal provisions related challenges

This set of challenges includes ambiguity in definitions, leaving it open to varied
interpretations of each provision.
One of the first legal concerns is, clear definition of a ‘producer’ (its defini-
tion for avoiding ambiguities). A clear distinction is required with regard to the
definition of a producer. A producer can be a producer of an e-product/large
multinational original equipment manufacturers (OEM), or a manufacturer who
assembles an electronic product using technology, or the one who earned by sell-
ing e-product to a consumer, or the one who produce some parts and materials
which gets sourced in production of an e-product. If a ‘producer’ is not defined
properly, the EPR related goals and functions remain ambiguous, creating loop-
holes in implementation.

Governance/enforcement related challenges

As the EPR as a concept is to be translated into a programme, the perspective of
governance typically focus on the following aspects: (i) proper guidelines for every
stakeholder covered under the legislation for legal enforcement, and compliance; (ii)
proper institutional mechanism available/ developed; (iii) whether every producer’s
EPR plan is being examined, e.g. e-waste collection from whom, by whom, how,
its cost, compliance process, etc. are mentioned in the guidelines; (iv) whether risks
of compliance are identified; and (v) whether proper monitoring and evaluation
guidelines are provided – process, mechanism, and standardization are well-defined,
and are functioning as planned. In addition, Bhaskar and Turaga (2017: 10) men-
tioned two more challenges: political will and clarity in the enforcement of EPR,
and careful attention to policy instruments – their choice as well as design – within
the broad EPR framework.

Collection and recycling related challenges

E-waste collection is considered to be a great challenge as part of management.
Though the ‘take-back system’ encourages users for recycling and resource con-
servation, and protection of environment, and human health, it has created a few
challenges as part of the EPR.

A takeback system is a complex interrelated structure that has four key com-
ponents: (a) the rules that govern the system; (b) the operational areas of
 60 Extended producer responsibility

collection and processing; (c) financing of the system; and (d) how to control
the flow of e-waste into and out of a jurisdiction.
(McCann and Wittmann 2015: 14)

The collection centre related challenges are establishing and operationalising

collection centres required budgetary provisions, which one producer may find bur-
densome; whether recycler would bear the cost of transportation or the producer
that also has become a debatable point as part of budgetary concern. Collection of
e-waste and its quality cannot be ensured through the collection centres.
As the recycling cost is considerably high with little infrastructure in developing
countries, the government needs to provide clear guidelines – whether all EEE to
be recycled or a specified subset of e-products need to be recycled;‘cherry picking’
of e-waste items for recycling is a problem and a challenge. This decision depends
on whether the material is critical to be recovered or it has severe impact on envi-
ronment or infrastructure is available in the country. If e-products are not specified
under the law, producers must pay a heavy price for this system; the cost-benefit
ratio is skewed in this circumstance. Moreover, if a list of specified products is pre-
pared, large part of e-waste may remain untreated, and remain a threat to environ-
ment and human health. For example, recycling CRT monitors, or and lamps are
not accepted by recyclers because of their negative value fractions. With change in
product design, reduction in use of hazardous substances, and metals is observed.
Miniaturisation, technological developments, and changing material composition
has an impact on the intrinsic material value and thereby on the economics of recy-
cling is a challenge that needs to be recognised. If the efficiency of final recovery
technology has physical limits, the overall efficiency of a take-back and recycling
system is determined by the weakest link in the chain (Khetriwal 2019: 143).
According to the environmental economics literature, a mandated producer take-
back policy may not be able to motivate manufacturers to adopt product designs
that are more environmentally friendly (Walls 2003). However, Nokia’s example is
considered to be an exception to the set of challenges mentioned here. Nokia twice
conducted a campaign for take-back of any mobile phone, first in 2009, and then
again in 2012. In 2009, 1,400 specially designed secure bins at all its Care Centres
and Branded Retail Stores (known as Nokia Priority Dealers) were set up in four
cities of India; during 45 days of campaign, Nokia could collected 160 tonnes of
e-waste (mobile phones). In 2012, Nokia collected 65 tonnes of mobile phones
for recycling. As promised, it planted one tree for each mobile phone received
as e-waste (Singhal 2010; Singhal 2012; Sohail 2015). Singhal (2012) proposed
‘Ecosystem Approach’ that the businesses can take to accomplish their brand envi-
ronmental responsibility under EPR.

Risks of compliance and adverse consequences

For compliance, if detailed guidelines and standards are not provided for collection
and recycling, the goals of resource recovery may suffer. The detailed guidelines
 Extended producer responsibility 61

related to legal compliance include the following: whether adequate awareness

exists about different stakeholders and their requirements for compliance; whether
periodic monitoring takes place, and process and mechanism for compliance are
in place; in absence of monitoring and evaluation, paper trading16 in the name of
compliance may increase, and as a result, leakage of e-waste may continue on a
large scale.
‘When a policy instrument targets only one of the primary stakeholders with
a potential to play a pivotal role across the product lifecycle, it poses a compliance
risk’ (Sharma 2019: 158). Therefore, ‘recycling subsidies, advance disposal fees, and
command and control standards and point out the impact of certain externali-
ties in determining the efficiency of these policy instruments. Fair cost allocation
and collective efficiency, volume uncertainty, long-term contract, local economic
development, education and outreach’ (op. cit.) etc. play critical roles in legal com-
pliance by producers under EPR. Producers are expected to pay costs for collec-
tion, aggregation, transportation, storage, and recycling; if these costs are not shared
by municipalities or any government agency for collection, recycling cost by the
recyclers, etc., and when producers are not incentivised in any manner, motiva-
tion for compliance is found to be lesser, especially in the developing countries,
wherein collection to recycling related operations are carried out by informal sec-
tor efficiently.
The concerns of product design, investment optimisation, resource recovery,
management of secondary materials, etc. involve specific technicalities regarding
value creation. Complementarity of formal and informal actors on such counts is
a critical factor. If these are ensured, and monitoring is carried out on regular basis,
they altogether reduce risks of compliance.
For producers, economically, coordination among different entities is difficult
for compliance; for example, to establish collection centres/channels, and ensure
adequate (required quantity to meet the target) e-waste collection; whether collec-
tion takes place through a PRO or a third party organisation; whether a consumer is
financially incentivise; budget allocation for such incentives; reimbursing collectors
and processors of equipment once work has been carried out; setting and enforcing
treatment standards; approving processors and collectors to take part in the system,
etc.This way, collection may not be economically viable, and can lead to additional
layers of administration.

‘From large multinational (OEMs) to small importers of EEE, companies are

focused on keeping compliance costs for e-waste management at the mini-
mum possible, and willing to cut corners where possible’; producers with
such mind-set are ‘lobbying to have volumes that are collected above the
minimum collection target for 2018, count towards the collection target for
the next year.’
(Khetriwal 2019: 142)
 62 Extended producer responsibility

Challenges faced by PROs

PROs, on behalf of producers, are expected implement mandated EPR through a
range of activities (setting up e-waste management systems across entire value chain,
compliance management), and working with different stakeholders. The selection
process and its criteria set up by producers of a PRO is usually a challenge in itself;
a PRO is selected usually for a year or two – that prevents

PROs from making long-term and deep-rooted systemic transformation

efforts…The success of PROs is dependent on the success of EPR imple-
mentation and the maturity of the e-waste sector. Producers will need to have
a long-term vision and play an enabling role in the development of collection
channels and recycling infrastructure.
(Sinha 2019b: 151)

The concept of PROs is not yet mainstreamed in many developing countries;

because of this, performance of PROs is usually affected, especially in terms of col-
lection of e-waste. Leakage of e-waste from or to informal sector is a very common
phenomenon in a country where informal sector is dominant. PRO being sand-
wiched between producers, and the government is identified with such malprac-
tices and get discredited in the larger context of transparency and accountability.17
Some scholars (Skinner et al. 2010; Manomaivibool 2011) argue that the dif-
ficulty in identifying producers; illegal imports of e-waste; the existence of a large
informal sector; and weak regulatory capacity pose major challenges to EPR regula-
tions in developing countries.

Impact of EPR
This is one of the least explored areas; there are a very few studies that has captured
impact of EPR. For example, while in many countries, informal sector is dominant,
which pays for different scraps, including e-waste items. Such dimensions have cre-
ated challenges in implementation of EPR.
Regarding the impact of EPR, research conducted by the European Commission
on 36 case studies of EPR on different waste streams in the EU revealed that in most
of the benchmark cases, the net operational costs for collection, transportation, and
treatment of separately collected waste are covered by the EPR system.The extent to
which net operational costs are assumed by producers is highly variable and depends
notably on the share of organisational and financial responsibilities of the various
stakeholders, as well as on the national framework for EPR (ISWA 2014: 7).
A study by Bhaskar and Turaga (2017) examining impact of E-waste Management
Rules, 2011 on e-waste management practices, they observed that:

the EPR regulation forced the producers to take action on a few relatively
inexpensive aspects of the rules, the collection and recycling system has not
 Extended producer responsibility 63

been made convenient for the consumers to deposit e-waste in formal collec-
tion and recycling centers.

EPR and e-waste management in India

EPR in India was first introduced through the E-waste Management Rules, 2011, and
the responsibilities for producers were defined, such as collection of e-waste gener-
ated during manufacturing of EEE and channelisation to the registered dismantler
or recyclers; setting up collection centres or take-back system either individually or
collectively; financing and organising a system to meet the cost involved in ESM
of e-waste generated from the EoL. However, no target, neither collection nor the
recycling amount of e-waste (in weight, item-wise) was specified under the EPR.

Experiences of EPR and take-back campaign by Nokia in 2009 and 2012

Between formal and informal operations for collection to recycling, the Nokia
mobile company’s example is often quoted among the industry actors, in the
broader context of EPR and take-back systems, which could be more effective
when ‘brand environmental responsibility’ (BER) adopts ‘ecosystem approach’ rea-
soned Singhal (2010). Nokia organised take-back campaigns for mobile phones in
2009 and 2012, in different phases. Nokia had promised that the company would
plant a tree for every mobile handset collected, and all old phones and accessories
would be recycled; over 50 tonnes of mobiles were collected and 60,000 trees were
planted. The campaign became popular as ‘Planet ke Rakhwaale’ (protectors of the
planet); through this community platform, Nokia could bring and engage like-
minded people together, who were willing to take steps for environment protection,
starting from old phone recycling (Singhal 2010).
Along with a take-back campaign, Nokia conducted a survey covering 6,500
respondents from 13 countries about consumer attitudes towards and behaviours
regarding recycling of mobile phones. The survey highlighted a contradiction that
74% didn’t think about recycling their phones, while 72% thought that recycling
makes a difference to the environment. Among 13 countries, 84% of Indians did
not consider the need for recycling of unwanted devices; 83% did not know how
mobiles are recycled, and whether or not recycled materials from them could be
reused for making new products. In this context, Singhal (2010) has identified key
factor that play crucial role in the development of a recycling ecosystem and shaping
up of consumers’ behaviour towards responsible recycling, which are valid even after
a decade.These findings also have influenced the government for enacting a legisla-
tion. They include existence of possibilities, ease of acting, and incentive for con-
sumers in a pro-environmental way; presence of information systems for consumers
on why to act, how to act, when to act, and the benefits of the action for environ-
ment and society at large; existing environmental awareness amongst the consumers,
and momentum in the society for environmental protection; presence of adequate
recycling infrastructure; and a regulatory framework for e-waste management.
 64 Extended producer responsibility

Effectiveness of EPR post-rules, 2011 in India: roles and responsibilities

of producers
The Toxics Link (2014, 2015) attempted to evaluate and analyse the roles and
responsibilities of the regulatory agencies and the producers and their assigned
responsibilities, in the consecutive years – in 2014 and 2015, after two years of the
implementation of the Rules, 2011. Total 50 Brands were evaluated on the basis of
the decided criteria18 (action taken by producers towards fulfilling their responsi-
bility under the Rules) and given score.19 The research of 2014 was conducted on
50 producers based on secondary data (accessing their website and contacting the
helplines or customer care numbers) while the study of 2015 collected primary
data (direct responses/interview method) and used secondary data (websites, infor-
mation booklets, use of social media, print, visuals, etc. used by the producers for
creating awareness).
Major findings of these reports are briefly shared here: in 2014, 17 companies
earned ‘bad performance’; 15 companies ‘not so good’; 11 companies ‘fair perfor-
mance’ and seven companies ‘good performance.’ Among them, the biggest defaulters
are the cell phone companies; 17 out of 11 companies belong to ‘bad performance’
(Toxics Link 2014b). In 2015, 18 companies earned ‘bad performance’; 15 compa-
nies ‘not so good’; 15 companies ‘fair performance’ and three companies ‘good per-
formance’. Like 2014, many cell phone companies fared badly. RoHS compliance
has helped companies scoring good points, though 15 companies remained on the
‘not so good’ slab. Of the seven companies in ‘good performance’ in 2014, three of
them (Lenovo, Microsoft and Ricoh) have maintained position in this slab (Toxics
Link 2015: 15).
Toxics Link (2016) conducted a survey on ‘awareness about e-waste rules’
in 2015, covering 2,030 respondents from five cities of India – Delhi, Mumbai,
Chennai, Kolkata, and Bengaluru. 50% of people interviewed are acquainted with
the term e-waste; the lowest among Kolkata, Delhi and Chennai cities, and high-
est in Mumbai city. After almost five years of the Rules, 2011, 66% respondents
had no knowledge on the rules; among the aware respondents (34% of total), 12%
had heard about the rules but did not know the details. In response to, ‘who is
responsible for management of e-waste/toxic waste’, most respondents gave mul-
tiple answers making more than one to all the stakeholders (government, producer,
consumer) responsible – most Kolkata respondents claimed the government to be
the exclusive responsible entity.
Regarding toxicity of e-waste, Mumbai respondents know the least (almost 90%
are unaware), and all respondents of Chennai are aware. Sources of information
included newspapers (34%), media (22%), internet (16%), friends (14%), product
manuals (11%), and other (2%). More than half of the respondents (51%) hand over
their toxic e-waste to kabaadiwalas, which most likely end up reaching to the infor-
mal sector with crude methods of recycling, 36% discarded to second hand market
or exchanged them for new equipment, 16% gave away to their friends, relatives or
maids, 0.7% people handed them to the licensed recycler. 61% EEE users do not
 Extended producer responsibility 65

know about hazardous nature of e-waste; Kolkata reported the least awareness while
50% of Bengaluru respondents reported awareness. About 30% of the total respon-
dents know that e-waste could have adverse impact on health and environment.
Four states, namely Kerala, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, and Telangana, have taken ini-
tiatives for implementation of EPR under the Rules, 2016. The analysis of perfor-
mance of EPR under the Rules, 2016, and role of the regulatory body is described
in detail in Chapter 5.

Notes
1 ‘Liability’ refers to the responsibility for proven environmental damages caused by the
product in question. The extent of the liability is determined by legislation and may
embrace different parts of the life cycle of the product, including usage and final disposal.
2 ‘Economic responsibility’ means that the producer will cover all or part of the expenses,
for example, for the collection, recycling or final disposal of the products he is manufac-
turing.These expenses could be paid for directly by the producer or by a special fee.
3 ‘Physical responsibility’ is used to characterise the systems where the manufacturer is
involved in the physical management of the products and/or their effects.
4 ‘Informative responsibility’ signifies several different possibilities to extend responsibility
for the products by requiring the producers to supply information on the environmental
properties of the products they are manufacturing.
5 consumers are given a refund when returning the products to the dealer or treatment
facilities after their use. In many developing countries, informal sector operates and
therefore this scheme has little relevance.
6 It is a tax paid in advance by manufacturers to cover the cost of collection or recycling of
a product or sometimes paid by consumers as a separate tax, reflecting in the bill against
the product purchased.
7 This goal talks about establishing effective collection of end-of-life products from con-
sumers, promote environmentally sound treatment and efficient recycling, use of second-
ary raw materials and the production of sustainable goods, and reduce the amount of
waste for final disposal.
8 This goal leads to make products easier to dismantle, reuse, and recycle. Thus, the total
environmental impact of a product decreases and waste prevention is stimulated, and
the financial burden for waste management is transferred from the public sector to the
manufacturers.
9 The environmental costs, at least, include costs for pollution prevention and the collec-
tion, recycling and treatment of waste.These environmental costs should be incorporated
into the price of products. As a consequence, the consumer, and not the taxpayer, bears
all costs related to the waste he has produced, which is more socially fair.
10 Nine countries follow this model: Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, France,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain.
11 Three countries follow this model: Austria, Germany, Sweden.
12 Eight countries follow this model: France, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Czech
Republic, Slovenia.
13 Six countries follow this model: Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania.
14 Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, Germany, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Sweden, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Italy,
 66 Extended producer responsibility

Slovenia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria,Turkey, Norway, Finland, Serbia, Israel, Netherlands,

Poland, Macedonia and Bosnia.
15 For further details, refer Sander 2007: XVIII–XX.
16 This is used in Indian context. Paper trading refers to ‘instead of procuring e-waste, fake
invoices and paper trails are procured to show e-waste movement and recycling’ (Singhal
2019: 153).
17 For more information on PROs in India, see Singhal (2019).
18 In 2014, criteria were: sufficiency of information on Website (maximum of 15 points),
ease of accessibility to information (maximum of 10 points), take-back system (maximum
of 30 points), number of collection points (maximum of 20 points), information with
Customer Care or the helpline provided (maximum of 10 points). In 2015, the criteria
were refined and elaborated, such as, Sufficiency of information on Website (A maximum
of 10 points), Ease of accessibility to information (A maximum of 10 points), Information
provided in the booklet (A maximum of 20 points), Take-back system (A maximum of
15 points), Products RoHS Compliant (A maximum of 15 points), Collection centres
in all states/UTs (A maximum of 20 points), Authorization from CPCB or SPCBs (A
maximum of 5 points), Submitted Annual returns under E-waste Rules, 2011 for the year
2014–2015 (A maximum of 5 points), Number of collection Points (A maximum of 15
points), Awareness campaigns conducted (A maximum of 15 points), Amount of space
allocated for e-waste recycling in Product Advertisements (A maximum of 15 points),
Any other initiative taken (A maximum of 10 points), Information with Customer Care
or the helpline provided (A maximum of 10 points), Take back centre operational (A
maximum of 20 points), and Tied up with an authorised recycler for environmentally
sound recycling and disposal of e-waste collected through Take back programme (A
maximum of 15 points).
19 In 2014, the company achieving points between 75 and 85 are ‘good performance’; with
points between 50 and 74 are ‘fair performance’; with points between 25 and 49 are ‘not
so good performance’; and points between 0 and 24 are ‘bad performance’. In 2015, the
company achieving points between 150 and 200 are ‘good performance’; with points
between 100 and 149 are ‘fair performance’; with points between 50 and 99 are ‘not so
good performance’; and points between 0 and 49 are ‘bad performance’.