Geography, Identity, and Politics:

Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Geopolitical Analysis

https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7

Publisher
University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies
Gospodara Vučića 50, Belgrade, Serbia

For the Publisher

Mladen Milošević, Dean

Editors
Nuno Morgado, Corvinus University, Hungary
Mihajlo Kopanja, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Serbia

Program Committee
Petar Stanojević, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Serbia (Co-President)
Zoltán O. Szántó, Corvinus University, Hungary (Co-President)
Igor Okunev, MGIMO, Russian Federation
Sharyl N. Cross, St. Edward`s University, United States of America
Maria Lois, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain
Organizing Committee
Nuno Morgado, Corvinus University, Hungary (President)
Mihajlo Kopanja, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Serbia
Balázs Lajos Pelsőci, Corvinus University, Hungary
Marica Sárközi-Kerezsi, , Future Potentials Observatory, MOME University
Jana Marković, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Serbia

Cover Design
Jelena Tucić

Copies
100

Printed by
Čigoja Štampa

ISBN 978-86-80144-67-2

The views of authors in texts of this Proceedings are entirely their own and do not
represent the views and oppinions of their respective institutions of the publishers.
 Nuno Morgado and Mihajlo Kopanja
(eds.)

Geography, Identity, and Politics:

Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Geopolitical
Analysis

Proceedings from the 7th International Workshop on Geopolitics and

Political Geography
Budapest, 11th to 13th of October, 2024

Belgrade, 2024
The Proceedings are published as a part of a Science Fund of the Republic of Serbia Project “Ideas” –
Management of New Security Risks – Research and Simulation Development – NEWSIMR&D,
#7749151
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .............................................................................................. i
Nuno Morgado

PART I:
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Grounding World Politics Anew:

Reflections on the continued relevance of Geopolitics to the study of
today’s international relations ..................................................................1
David Criekemans

The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries (2022) ...................... 39

Zoltán O. Szántó, Petra Aczél, Pál Bóday, János Csák, Chris Ball, Khadija
Farooqi, Daniel Hogan, Balázs L. Pelsőci

PART II:
CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

Innovating Methodological Concepts in Small States Research:

Introducing the Geopolitical Power Index Framework ........................ 79
Marta Zorko

Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving world-system

analysis:
Examining mobility across periphery-semi periphery-core structure... 93
Ismael de la Villa Hervás

Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard:

New Ways of Theorizing the International Relations of Central Asia . 113
Dragan Trailović

Strategic Simulations in Geopolitics:

Researching, Modelling, Teaching ...................................................... 131
Vladimir Ajzenhamer, Mihajlo Kopanja and Petar Stanojević
 PART III:
CASE STUDIES

Renewing the Idea of the "Two State" Solution

as a Consequence of the War in Gaza .................................................. 143
Arie L. Geronik

Embracing Political Ethnography: The Impact of Identity Constructs in

Response to Ukraine............................................................................. 155
Laura Welty

Is Geopolitics still relevant?

Halford Mackinder and the war in Ukraine ......................................... 175
Krzysztof Sliwinski

Neighborhood Effect Revised:

Spatial Statistical Analysis in Electoral Geography .............................. 193
Igor Okunev

Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness:

Dynamic of Geopolitical Processes in Eurasia..................................... 203
Arseniy Fartyshev and Sergei V. Pisarenko

Stochastic Count Processes and Hypergraph Databases for Dynamic

Network
Analysis of International Visits ............................................................. 221
Alexey Domanov and Oleg Semenov
 INTRODUCTION
Nuno Morgado1

This collective volume is an outcome of the Seventh International Workshop

entitled Political Geography and Geopolitics as scientific approaches: concepts, theories, methods,
and cases, organized by Research Committee 41 – Geopolitics, Research Committee
15 – Political and Cultural Geography of the International Political Science
Association, and the Lab of Geopolitics of Corvinus University of Budapest. The
event took place at Corvinus University of Budapest (Corvinus Institute of
Advanced Studies) and MOME University (Future Potentials Observatory) in
October 2024.
The objective of the event and, therefore, of the book is to push the geopolitical
research agenda forward. In this effort, an umbrella is created to accommodate
radically different theoretical approaches, which, however, are joined by (a) an
epistemological belief in the possibility of knowledge and, at the same time, (b) use
more or less the same concepts. Many of these geopolitical concepts have been
systematized as geopolitical factors in the model of neoclassical/analytical
geopolitics I have been developing (Morgado 2023) – space, position, circulation,
resources, demography and identity, and politico-military structures. They constitute
the potential of the state, which, accumulated and distributed in a certain way by all
states in the international arena, generates systemic stimuli and, therefore, certain
opportunities and threats in each period of time. However, I am convinced that this
often is not enough to explain the behavior of the state and, consequently, a further
step is needed. It is required to study the perceptions and capacities of geopolitical
agents – flesh and blood decision-makers – to first understand them and then
explain how they act(ed) or react(ed).
This book is not, however, about neoclassical/analytical geopolitics. Its theoretical
scope is way broader and permits a theoretical richness that concurs with the
objective mentioned above. The book consists of three parts. Part I contains the
theoretical foundations and comprises two longer Chapters, 1 and 2. Part II contains
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, which are devoted to concepts and theories. Part III
encompasses Chapters 7 to 12, which are more empirical. I will now introduce the
chapters individually, underlining their main arguments and conclusions.

1 Corvinus University of Budapest, and Future Potentials Observatory, nuno.morgado@uni-corvinus.hu

 Introduction

In Chapter 1, Criekemans offers us an excellent summary of the panorama of

geopolitical theories and schools by delving into the research question of how
different schools of thought in geopolitics variably explain phenomena in
international politics. This research trigger serves, therefore, to provide an overview
of the pivotal streams in geopolitics, from classical geopolitics, geo-economics, and
environmental geopolitics to the cutting-edge theoretical developments in
neoclassical geopolitics – as mentioned above (Morgado 2023) – and analytical
geopolitics (Nestoras 2022). In fact, the streams of neoclassical geopolitics and
analytical geopolitics seem to have much in common. Thus, they bring a fresh breath
of air to the geopolitical approach, constituting a much-awaited surpassing of critical
geopolitics.
In Chapter 2, Szántó et al. introduce the concept of “future potential,” a concept
applicable not only to states – the object of the chapter when studying OCDE
countries – but also to the ambition of encompassing other social entities. The
concept of future potential was initially developed with, simultaneously, building a
methodological approach, as the “future potential index” constitutes an empirical
metric associated with a fixed normative, analytical, and discursive framework. The
chapter also compares the FPI with other indexes and explains the sui generis
characteristics of the former. The results of the study show Iceland at the top of the
FPI list and Greece at the bottom.
Appropriately inspired by the unique strategic advantages that small states often
possess (e.g., agility in diplomatic maneuvers, the ability to create niche economic
roles, cyber capabilities, and digital diplomacy), in Chapter 3, Zorko expands on the
scope of geopolitical analysis to include the innovative approaches of small states
and, in this way, better explain international politics. She develops the Geopolitical
Power Index, which originally contained four categories, by including a new
category: cyber-power. This innovative approach involves not only the necessary
methodological sophistication required to study the nuances and sui generis cases but
is simultaneously easily adaptable to working with Big Data and, thus, quantitative
methods.
In tandem with this approach to combining qualitative and quantitative methods –
despite their radically distinctive theoretical assumptions –in Chapter 4, Hervás has
collected quantitative methodologies for world-system mobility analysis and applies
them, combining the different tools to sharpen future outcomes associated with
world-system theory. In this way, he develops his reasoning and statistical
assessments based on the concepts of geographical proximity, economic
production, and trade relations according to the Marxist worldview. He compares
the main methodologies developed using the world-system framework using a

ii
 Morgado

sample of 105 states from 1972 to 2022, concluding that network analysis based on
trade data seems to be the most efficient of the methods.
In Chapter 5, Trailović reviews and sums up four focal emerging ways to re-theorize
Central Asia in the conceptualization of international relations: “international
society,” decolonizing international relations promoting local approaches, “power
as togetherness,” and the “3-i's model.” He concludes that these approaches,
concepts, and explanations have greater explanatory power than classical theoretical
IR traditions such as neoliberalism and neorealism due to their recognition of the
agency of the Central Asian states.
In Chapter 6, Ajzenhamer et al. raise the idea that software development allows the
possibility for experimentation in the virtual realm, helping overcome the challenge
that geopolitics can rarely afford experimentation without high risks and costs. The
authors’ main objective is to show how strategic simulations can be implemented in
the field of geopolitics with a view to improving its research, modeling, and teaching.
The authors conclude that apart from theorizing, specific computer software
strategic simulations can help geopolitics researchers to better understand
international political reality by increasing the comprehension of the relations
between different geopolitical variables, their manipulation, and how different
outcomes come to be.
A review of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the point of view of the two-state
solution is provided in Chapter 7 by Geronik. She argues that any compact solution
to the problems concerning Palestine requires meeting the security needs of Israel,
Jordan, and the Palestinians concurrently. To approach the problem and its solution,
she suggests the “Nordic Balance” model as a way of thinking (mirroring the
security plans of Northern Europe in the Middle East) based on the idea that mutual
dependence ensures stability.
In Chapter 8, Welty offers a study on identity and its relevance for the geopolitical
studies research agenda. She advocates for a bottom-up approach in political
geography and geopolitics, highlighting the significance of incorporating local
narratives and diverse perspectives to create a holistic understanding of geopolitical
phenomena. From the analysis of two case studies – Russo-Ukrainian war narratives
and the discourse surrounding Ukrainian refugees – she concludes that identity
serves as both a catalyst and a consequence of conflict, influencing media
representations and policy responses.
Revisiting Mackinder’s Heartland Theory amid the war in Ukraine is Sliwinski’s
objective in Chapter 9. He discusses the importance of geopolitics as an approach
to explaining international relations. While reminding us of Mackinder’s aphorism

iii
 Introduction

that the key to controlling the Heartland area lies in Central and Eastern Europe, he
brings Dugin and Mearsheimer into the discussion. He concludes that the war in
Ukraine is possibly going to change the international system in that European
security will be influenced more by Germany than by the USA.
Okunev addresses electoral geography as a subfield of political geography in
Chapter 10. He investigates the factors that influence the electoral behavior of
voters, which he divides by types of effect. Using a set of tools from quantitative
methods (e.g., the geographic disparity index and the geographic segmentation
index), he discusses literature in the field, looking to explain the choices of voters.
With the same approach to measuring the impact of geography on politics, but this
time returning to international affairs, Fartyshev and Pisarenko evaluate countries'
friendliness and unfriendliness towards Russia in 2016 and 2024 in Chapter 11.
Their objective is to identify the geographical characteristics of subjects of varying
degrees of (un)friendliness in relation to Russia and Siberia in particular. Their
results confirm that in 2024, the reality of the encirclement of Russia by unfriendly
countries will endure.
Finally, in Chapter 12, Domanov and Semenov study international visits by applying
dynamic topological network analysis. Using this method and a sample selected
from the GDELT dataset, they demonstrate how the abrupt change in international
politics caused by the coronavirus lockdowns negatively affected the degree of
connectivity between various countries by reducing the international visits of world
leaders.
These chapters and their key ideas may contribute to the objective of further
developing the geopolitical research agenda. Also, by generating curiosity about new
topics and domains, they may stimulate others to develop their own lines of inquiry
in this passionate field of research.2

2 As is the case with looking at the relations between AI and geopolitics (Mouakher and Morgado, 2024).

iv
 Morgado

REFERENCES
Morgado, Nuno. 2023. “Modelling Neoclassical Geopolitics: An Alternative
Theoretical Tradition for Geopolitical Culture and Literacy”. European Journal of
Geography 14(4): 13-21. DOI 10.48088/ejg.n.mor.14.4.013.021
Mouakher, Amira and Nuno Morgado. 2024. “Refined Conversational AI Agent for
Insightful Geopolitical Decision-Making.” In Routledge Handbook of Artificial
Intelligence Governance and Policy, and National Security, edited by Scott N. Romaniuk,
Mary Manjikian, Dominika Dziwisz, and Zoltán Rajnai. Abingdon: Routledge, 2024.
(in press)
Nestoras, Antonios. 2022. “Analysing Geopolitical Myths: Toward a Method for
Analytic Geopolitics”. In Geopolitics and International Relations. Grounding World Politics
Anew, edited by David Criekemans, 194-218. Leiden & Boston: Brill Nijhoff.

v
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch1

Grounding World Politics Anew

Reflections on the continued relevance of Geopolitics to the study of today’s
international relations
David Criekemans1

Abstract
The central question and debate to which this chapter wants to contribute touches the core:
how and in what way can various schools of thought in Geopolitics increase the explanatory
power of analyses which study international phenomena? At the core lies the role of
territorially embedded variables (location, physical geography, human geography, spatial) in
international relations, in their various manifestations (material, cognitive and discursive).
Some reflections are being developed on the ‘unique selling proposition’ of Geopolitics to
the study of today’s international relations. A number of concepts, theories and methods are
identified which are highly relevant to understand today’s international relations. In what
way do Geopolitics and IR differ as fields, and how can their respective schools of thought
strengthen each other? It is argued that neoclassical geopolitical analyses could be augmented
via Cognitive Geopolitics (dating back to Harold and Margaret Sprout) and Analytical
Geopolitics (which stems from a critique to Critical Geopolitics and tries to bridge material
and discursive variables, as developed by Antonios Nestoras). Furthermore, geostrategy and
geo-economics have become much more closely intertwined (Gyula Csurgai). In addition,
French geopolitical scholarship contributed greatly to geopolitical analyses ‘below’ and
‘above’ the traditional state level. Geopolitics, as a field of research, could also play an
important role in understanding how environmental challenges such as climate change or
energy transition can affect the foreign policy of nations. After having been ignored for some
decades, it seems as though environmental variables are back with a vengeance within the
study of Geopolitics. Finally, the concept of ‘re-territorialisation’ and its application to, for
instance, the study of the diplomatic activities of sub-state entities such as regions, cities or
even harbors, offers us a way to better grasp the transformative impact of territorially
embedded factors. The chapter makes a plea for Geopolitics and IR to learn more actively
from each other’s insights, theories and methods.

1Associate Professor in International Relations University of Antwerp (Belgium), University College Roosevelt (the
Netherlands) & Geneva Institute of Geopolitical Studies (Switzerland), david.criekemans@uantwerpen.be
 Criekemans

Introduction
Those who study international relations these days are increasingly confronted with a return
of geopolitics in academic language. Although geopolitics has never really gone away after
1945 or 1991, an increasing number of scholars are referring to it in some fashion. The
problem is however that many do not actively engage with the wide and rich schools of
thought in Geopolitics itself. The central question and debate to which this chapter wants to
contribute touches the very core of this workshop; how and in what way can various schools of
thought in Geopolitics increase the explanatory power of analyses which study international phenomena? At
the core lies the role territorially embedded variables (location, physical geography, human
geography, spatial) play in international relations, in their various manifestations (material,
cognitive and discursive). Innovative approaches could help us to better unlock the
geopolitical realities which exist at the same time. Schools of thought in Geopolitics and
mainstream International Relations could also be combined so as to better grasp that reality.
Geopolitics was developed as an academic field in 1899 in another period of rapid changes
in the global shift of power. At that time, the world was dominated by European powers
which encompassed the whole world, in the wake of the colonial age and industrialization.
At the time, European powers were vying for geo-economic and geostrategic power.
Moreover, the world had become in 1904 – in the words of the British geographer Halford
John Mackinder – a ‘closed political system’ (Mackinder, 1904). Since most territories all
belonged to some kind of sphere of influence, border skirmishes in faraway Africa had an
immediate effect upon the power balance among the European powers. Geopolitics was
developed by the Swedish scholar Rudolf Kjellén from a perspective to develop a
scientifically based instrument that could also advise key decision-makers in foreign policy
and defense to avoid war.
Quite interestingly, International Relations (IR) as a field of science was only established
after the First World War. It had an initial mission to study the causes of war. It was engaged
in the sense that it attempted to avoid new disasters in the future. The first academic chairs
in IR were set up in Aberystwyth (Wales) in 1918 and in Geneva (Switzerland) in 1920. That
mission already failed dramatically in the 1930s, which produced the ontological first debate
in IR between Idealists and Realists. Around that same time, Halford John Mackinder was
part of the British delegation at the Versailles treaty negotiations in Paris. Afterwards, he
became very pessimistic about the future because he thought ‘Versailles’ had not solved the
geopolitical imbalance in the world system, in particular on how to deal with the ‘Heartland’
in Eurasia. As early as 1919, he referred to this dilemma in his book ‘Democratic Ideals and
Reality: A Study of the Politics of Reconstruction’ (Mackinder, 1919). Mainstream IR, as it
developed, seemed to have difficulty with grasping and integrating the importance and

2
 Grounding World Politics Anew

influence of territorially embedded explanatory variables or the ‘bigger picture’. The

dichotomic debate between Idealism/Liberalism and Realism also inhibited at a basic
conceptual level, and in terms of the operationalisation of research designs, to see how the
overall geo-economic, geostrategic and geopolitical aims which nations pursue are mutually
supporting one another. The failure by some, though definitely not all, to deal with
territorially embedded factors left IR often with incomplete analyses. Geopolitics itself
became contested during the 1940s, when some scholars in the German geopolitical school
under Karl Haushofer associated themselves with the Nazi regime. However, geopolitical
thinking did not go away, but was encapsulated in (American) geostrategic thinking during
and after the Second World War (Criekemans, 2022a). But what was apparent, was that
territorially embedded factors seemed to be less prominent in analyses in International
Relations after 1945. It was as if most scholars believed that a combination of technological
advances combined with open borders would make these variables less relevant in explaining
international relations.
In earlier publications, the realist author Hans Morgenthau had labeled ‘Geopolitics’ to be a
‘pseudo science’. In his book ‘Politics Among Nations’, Morgenthau described it under the
heading "the fallacy of the single factor" (Morgenthau, 1973: 158-159). However,
contemporaries such as Robert Strausz-Hupé believed a distinction needed to be made
between Geopolitics as a discipline and its application (Strausz-Hupé, 1942; Strausz-Hupé,
1943: 4; Strausz-Hupé, 1945). Henry Kissinger later equated geopolitics with balance of
power-thinking, almost deriving it from its physical geographical and human geographical
dimensions (Kissinger, 1994). Colin Gray sought to combine insights of geostrategy with
conceptual innovations such as Cognitive Geopolitics (Gray, 1979; Gray, 1991; Gray, 1996;
Gray, 2004; Gray, 2009). In more recent publications of the last few decades, a kind of
‘revenge of Geography’ (Robert D. Kaplan) has materialized in publications about climate
change or energy security (Kaplan, 1994; Kaplan, 2012). At the same time, geopolitical
problems have not gone away after 1991, to the contrary. Some of the most fundamental
and difficult problems in international relations entail problems about territoriality; location,
physical geography and human geography.
Building upon earlier work in the edited book ‘Geopolitics and International Relations. Grounding
World Politics Anew’ (Criekemans, 2022a), we argue for research designs and innovative
approaches which combine or even integrate some of the insights of respective schools of
thought in Geopolitics and International Relations.
In this chapter, the following questions will be addressed:
• First, we will go into the ‘unique selling proposition’ of Geopolitics to the study of
today’s international relations. A number of concepts, theories and methods are
identified which are highly relevant. This will bring us to the question in what way

3
 Criekemans

Geopolitics and IR differ as fields, and how can their respective schools of thought
strengthen each other.

• Second, It is argued that neoclassical geopolitical analyses could be augmented via

Cognitive Geopolitics (dating back to Harold and Margaret Sprout) and Analytical
Geopolitics (which stems from a critique to Critical Geopolitics and tries to bridge
material and discursive variables, as developed by Antonios Nestoras).
• Third, geostrategy and geo-economics have become much more closely intertwined.
• Fourth, French geopolitical scholarship contributed greatly to geopolitical analyses
‘below’ and ‘above’ the traditional state level.
• Fifth, Geopolitics, as a field of research, could also play an important role in
understanding how environmental challenges such as climate change or energy
transition can affect the foreign policy of nations. After having been ignored for
some decades, it seems as though environmental variables are back with a vengeance
within the study of Geopolitics.
• Sixth, the concept of ‘re-territorialisation’ and its application to, for instance, the
study of the diplomatic activities of sub-state entities such as regions, cities or even
harbors, offers us a way to better grasp the transformative impact of territorially
embedded factors.
• In conclusion, this chapter makes a plea for Geopolitics and IR to learn more actively
from each other’s insights, theories and methods.

1. The ‘unique selling proposition’ of Geopolitics to the study of today’s international

relations
If we try to define ‘Geopolitics’ and its relation to International Relations, it remains
important to keep in mind that there exist many different schools of thought in each field.
A comprehensive overview is offered in the recent book ‘Geopolitics and International Relations.
Grounding World Politics Anew.’ (Criekemans, 2022a). As indicated earlier, ‘Geopolitics’ as a
body of academic endeavour is exactly 20 years older than ‘International Relations’.
Geopolitics was created as a field of science around 1899 by the Swedish political geographer
Rudolf Kjellén. He understood the relevance of territorially embedded factors. Geopolitics
was devised by Kjellén as an instrument which also could help the state in steering a safe
course for the country in a world that was becoming more and more competitive.
Geopolitics thus was designed as an academic body of literature which applied the insights

4
 Grounding World Politics Anew

of Political Geography to the European state system. Kjellén claimed the physical character,
size and relative location of the territory of the state was central to its power position in the
international system (Holdar 1992, p. 319). From the very beginning, the location of natural
resources above and beneath the ground, or the lack thereof, was already considered to be
essential in order to understand the geopolitical context. However, this fin de siècle geopolitical
literature only saw the state as the most relevant actor. Inspired by the work of Friedrich
Ratzel, the state was likened to a living organism locked in a social Darwinist struggle of the
fittest (Ratzel, 1896; Ratzel, 1897; Ratzel, et al. 1969 [1896]). These ontological assumptions
led to what later in International Relations would grow into the school of thought of Realism,
although including also other ontological variables (Criekemans, 2007). Kjellén underlined
that States as ‘living organisms’ in relation to one another spoke a wholly different language:
the concept of ‘power’ stood central in this. In their role as ‘powers’, national states should
be understood as geographical entities (Thermænius, 1938, p. 166). Kjellén’s analysis in 1914
was that he believed that the future would lie with those land powers that succeeded in
achieving autarky within their own territory (Kjellén, 1924; Kjellén, 1944 [1924]). The
railways over land would considerably reinforce the capacity for ‘internal communication and power
concentration’ (Holdar, 1992, p. 314; Herwig, 1999, p. 220, p. 226; Ó Tuathail, 2001, p. 21).
Eventually, only a few world powers would last (Dolman, 2002, p. 51). Kjellén suggested in
1897 that in the long run only three big continental political and economic zones would
remain: a pan-American system under the leadership of the United States of America, a Middle-
European system (possibly even a Eurafrican system) under the leadership of Germany and an
Eastern system under the leadership of Japan (Holdar, 1992, p. 314).
The British geographer Halford John Mackinder echoed some of the thinking of Kjellén.
His ‘New Geography’ wanted to offer a comprehensive framework to place human events in a
broader perspective (Ó Tuathail, 1996, pp. 86-88), a conceptual bridge between the natural
and social sciences (Heffernan, 1998, pp. 63-66) that tried to provide an answer to the
problem that ‘power’ had become more difficult to measure in an industrializing world in
which the ‘natural seats of power’ also were affected by the introduction of new technologies.
Mackinder believed that in the post-Columbian epoch, the dominance of sea power (e.g.
Great Britain) could come to an end as a result of a combination of new technologies (in
particular railways) and demographic trends (to be more concrete, Russia’s growing
population). He predicted that the area which later would turn out to be the Soviet Union,
constituted ‘the geographical pivot of history’, a potential new world power which could
eventually force the other naval powers (especially Britain) out of their positions in e.g. Asia.
Amongst others, that ‘pivot area’ (1904) or ‘heartland’ (1919, 1943) was endowed with vast
natural resources which could now be extracted via railways and ‘man power’ (read: a growing
human geographical demography). Russia would become a power, potentially challenging
the British Empire – first in Asia, later in Central Europe (Mackinder, 1887; Mackinder, 1919;
Mackinder, 1943; Mackinder, 1994 [1904]).

5
 Criekemans

The American naval historian and Captain (later Rear Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan can
be considered as one of the fathers of American geostrategic thinking. Social Darwinism
constituted an inherent dimension in Mahan’s thinking: he conceptualized the international
relations as a dynamic condition of a continuing battle between nations in which acquiring ‘sea power’
is decisive (Sloan, 1988, p. 90; Raffestin, Lopreno et al., 1995, p. 104, p. 107). Driven by social
Darwinist thinking, Mahan believed (in comparable neo-Lamarckian terms as Ratzel) that a
nation should expand territorially, or else be ruined (Sprout & Sprout, 1944 [1939], p. 214)
(Criekemans, 2022c, p. 105). But Mahan also included the changing power base of the world
into his models; the switch from sailing ships to coal as the basis for a new to-be-built US
Navy with new ships from the Industrial Age. Such US leapfrogging meant that every 2,000
nautical miles so-called ‘coaling stations’ became essential for Navy power projection. In a
world without free trade, one of the future roles of the Navy would be to protect trade
overseas, in particular towards Asia where Japan constituted a potential competitor. Mahan
deemed it crucial that the US would need to possess some of the strategic islands in the
Pacific, which constituted a highway to the future markets in Asia, with coaling stations built
along the way (Mahan, 1890; Mahan, 1898; Mahan, 1900; Mahan, 1957 [1890]).
These authors in ‘Classical Geopolitics’ thus believed in a social Darwinist world of
competition, whereby material forms of power including energy sources and technology
would play a major role to defend both the geo-economic and geostrategic interests of
nations (Criekemans, 2022a). There are some interesting indications that this literature also
affected the thinking in more realist schools of thought later in the 1930s and 1940s, both
directly and indirectly (Criekemans, 2007). Also in Realist strands of theory within IR, the
material capabilities of states including their resource bases or abilities to project power in
order to get access to (power) resources played a role. Later scholars such as Harold and
Margaret Sprout were more interested in the uneven distribution of physical and human
resources including energy, and the potential for technologies to overcome some of these
problems (Criekemans, 2022c, p. 125; Sprout & Sprout, 1971 [1965]).
Next to ‘Classical Geopolitics’, many forget that there also existed a ‘Possibilistic
Geopolitics’ as developed and exercised by the French geographers during the interbellum
period. In this approach, the environment is conceived as being both ‘constraining’ and
‘enabling’, and man is considered to be able to make choices (Vidal de la Blache, 1898; Vidal
de la Blache, 1926). The environment provides a number of parameters or limitations to the
whole spectrum of foreign policy actions which can be undertaken by an entity
('constraining'), but the environment also provides a political entity with a number of
important opportunities (Sprout, 1971 [1965], p. 83). ‘Man’ or human agency stood central
in ‘Possibilist Geopolitics’ because in the end the political decision-makers try to maximise
the opportunities, and to minimise the limitations with which they are confronted. Thus,
nature only laid the foundation for human development; the actual cultural and political

6
 Grounding World Politics Anew

progress depended on ‘man’ himself. Hence ‘strategies’ were needed (Criekemans, 2022a, p.
117).
Later schools of thought in the 1990s such as ‘Critical Geopolitics’ started from the
assumption that ‘geography’ does not constitute an innocent product of nature. On the
contrary, it is the result of the history of the battle between competing authorities about the
power to organise, occupy and manage space. Via discourse analysis, ‘Critical Geopolitics’
tries to achieve insight into the way in which foreign policy-elites of territorial entities think
about the relation of this entity vis-à-vis the “external environment” (Criekemans, 2022c, p.
130-137). This critical analysis of the geopolitical reasoning about central variables such as
energy and climate, were studied over the years by authors such as Simon Dalby (1991, 1998,
2020) and Klaus Dodds (2015, 2021), and more recently by books appeared by Moore (2020)
and Wehrmann (2021). An author who more explicitly applied Critical Geopolitics to
resources is Phillippe Le Billon (2013). In his book on ‘Environmental Geopolitics’, Shannon
O’Lear discusses scholarship on Critical Geopolitics and environmental issues (O’Lear,
2018, pp. 19-21). This school of thought also has connections with Constructivism in IR,
but then focuses more on how territorial factors are ‘imagined’, fitting a wider (geo)political
agenda.
Geopolitics can be seen as constituting a joint project or common field of study between Political
Geography on the one hand, and International Relations on the other.

Figure 1: Geopolitics as a ‘joint project’ of

both Political Geography (PG) and International Relations (IR).

One could define it as follows (Criekemans, 2007; Criekemans, 2022a, pp. 99-100):
“Geopolitics is the scientific field of study belonging to both Political Geography and
International Relations, which investigates the interaction between politically acting

7
 Criekemans

(wo)men and their surrounding territoriality (in its three dimensions; physical-
geographical, human-geographical and spatial).”

2. Routes to augment neoclassical geopolitical analysis: Cognitive Geopolitics and

Analytical Geopolitics
In neoclassical geopolitical analyses, scholars will mostly focus on the relevance of material
explanatory factors and/or be interested to analyze the balance of power (or what neo-
realists would term the ‘power distribution’). Whilst having the advantage to produce a
parsimonious explanation, these approaches also have some limitations. There are however
also two other potential theoretical routes which could augment neoclassical geopolitical
analyses; Cognitive Geopolitics and Analytical Geopolitics.
Harold and Margaret Sprout can be seen as some of the American political scientists who –
throughout their career– showed a continued interest in & influence upon geopolitical
thinking, in the period between the 1930s and the 1970s (Fox, 1985, p. 27). Amongst other
contributions, they can be considered the key authors who developed what we label as
‘Cognitive Geopolitics’. From the 1950s onwards, Harold and Margaret Sprout distanced
themselves from the ‘national power’-approach in favour of the more tangible level of
analysis of the individual decision maker. With this position, they can be regarded as among
the first IR-specialists to make a plea for a “more balanced” approach to international
relations, in which they wanted to spend more attention to the ‘relative weight’ of the
‘different categories of potential explanatory variables in international politics’ (Baldwin,
2002, p. 179). Moreover, their ‘unit of analysis’ changed from the rather abstract ‘national
interest’ in the direction of the more tangible level of the political decision maker. One of
the main reasons for this reversal seems to lie with the more nuanced appreciation that the
Sprouts developed on the relation between ‘geopolitical’ environmental variables on the one
hand and foreign policy on the other hand. In this context, the crucial book ‘The Ecological
Perspective on Human Relations with Special Reference to International Politics’ deserves some special
attention (Sprout & Sprout, 1971 [1965]).2 In the 1950s and ‘60s, the Sprouts also published
a host of important scientific articles in the most prestigious American IR journals. Among
these, the following publications can be mentioned: ‘Environmental Factors in the Study of
International Politics’ (Sprout & Sprout, 1957), ‘Geopolitical hypotheses in technological perspective’
(Sprout, 1963) & ‘Geography and International Politics in an Era of Revolutionary Change’ (Sprout &

2 In 1962, the Sprouts also published ‘Foundations of International Politics’. Chapter 1 consists of an analysis of the field of
International Relations. The next three chapters contain an overview of the components of the ‘international system’, in which
new visions were developed based upon such terms as ‘power’, ‘power potential’ and ‘capacities’. The rest of this book
contained a revision of material from their earlier book ‘Foundations of National Power’ (Sprout & Sprout, 1967 [1962]).
8
 Grounding World Politics Anew

Sprout, 1964). Further building upon this work, the Sprouts published in 1968 the pioneering
‘An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of International Politics’ (Sprout & Sprout, 1968).
The Sprouts did not like the term ‘environment’. Especially in the US, there existed a
tendency to interpret ‘environmental variables’ too much in non-human, or –to put it
differently– in restrictive physical-geographical terms (Sprout & Sprout 1957, p. 311; Sprout
& Sprout 1968, p. 17). This is the reason why the Sprouts used the French concept of ‘milieu’
(Rosenau, Davis et al. 1972, p. 6), because the link with the ‘social’ is more clear (Sprout &
Sprout, 1968, 17).3 ‘Milieu’ thus entail the whole spectrum of environmental factors; both
human and non-human, tangible and non-tangible (Sprout & Sprout, 1971 [1965], p. 27).
The contribution of the Sprouts in 1956 brought a new vitality in the debate on the relation
between ‘geography’ and ‘politics’, which was gradually becoming rather banal and repetitive
(Muir, 1997, p. 185). The first ‘breakthrough’ the Sprouts made, was at first instance a
conceptual one, but also had far-reaching ontological, epistemological and methodological
consequences. This first step of the Sprouts was the introduction of their concept of the
‘ecological triad’. This triad consists of: (1°) an entity (‘environed unit’), (2°) his/her environment,
and (3°) the relation between the entity & his/her environment. The relation between an ‘entity’ and
his/her environment always entails a combination of the properties of the entity with the
surrounding conditions. If there is a change in one of both, then also a different relationship
develops. From this, the Sprouts deduced the proposition that change and transformation are
typical for the ecological perspective (to international relations) (Sprout & Sprout, 1968, pp. 17-18). In
other words, the stress lies with the interdependence, which even seems to increase as a
result of technological development, population growth and the increase of the urban nature
of human societies. Just like the ‘classical’ geopolitical scientists of the 1930s and ‘40s, the
Sprouts stress that there exists a fundamental problem; on earth, there exists an unequal
distribution of these physical and human ‘resources’ (cf. climate patterns, topology, available
resources, human communities, etc.). From this, the Sprouts postulated the proposition that
this unequal distribution influences in a significant way all human enterprise, interactions, relations and inter-
state relations (Sprout & Sprout, 1968, p. 21). The concept of the ‘ecological triad’ states that the
attention of the IR scholar, or of the FPA analyst, should focus on the study of a three-part
whole; (1°) the processes of policy choices within an entity, (2°) (the nature of the)
environment, and (3°) the interaction between the entity & the environment (Sprout
& Sprout, 1968, pp. 11-21; Starr, 1992, p. 3). The next step the Sprouts took, was the further
refinement of the concept ‘environment’ or ‘milieu’.

3 The Sprouts formulated it as follows (Sprout & Sprout, 1968: p. 17): “So used, milieu includes social as well as nonhuman phenomena
to which human activities may be relatable. Since the French language contains no adjectival form of milieu, we shall continue to use the English
adjective environmental.”
9
 Criekemans

Harold and Margaret Sprout stated in their central hypothesis that environmental variables
can only influence human activities in two ways. First, such factors can be perceived by
individuals, who take these into account in their ‘foreign policy decisions’ and responses.
Only in such cases can one speak of a form of ‘influence’ of human preferences & decisions
by the environment, ‘mediated’ by perception. Second, environmental variables can be
approached as a kind of ‘matrix’ that possibly limits the results of foreign policy decisions
(‘foreign policy outcomes’), even if these environmental variables are not perceived.
According to the Sprouts two usable explanatory frameworks could be distinguished; the
‘psychological milieu’ or ‘psycho-milieu’ (‘the environment as perceived by the decision maker &
upon which he/she bases his/her reaction’) on the one hand, and the ‘operational environment’
(‘the true environment in which the chosen policy is executed’) on the other hand. The Sprouts
formulated it as follows (Sprout & Sprout, 1968, pp. 33-34):
“We desire to make this distinction between psycho-milieu and operational milieu as
explicit as possible, since failure to do so has been the source of endless confused and muddy
thinking. Psycho-milieu denotes a human individual’s perceived image of a situation, an
image that may or may not correspond to reality. Operational milieu denotes that the
situation as it actually exists and affects the achievements and capabilities of the entity in
question (whether a single individual, group or community as a whole).”
The conceptual distinction between ‘psycho-milieu’ and the ‘operational environment’ in fact means
a fundamental break with the Realist school, which (still) believed that decisionmakers in
foreign policy can perceive their environment in a ‘correct’ way. This ‘amendment’ by the
Sprouts had important consequences for the FPA scholar and for the decision maker in foreign policy:
• First, the consequences for the FPA scholar. In case a researcher is trying to explain
why certain decisions are taken in foreign policy, then one should try to analyse the
‘psychological environment’ of the decision maker. However, in case the analyst is
more interested in the ‘operational results’ of a specific decision, then the
‘operational (or geographical) environment’ should be used as an explanatory
framework (see figure 1). Especially the first of these two analyses is certainly not easy
for the FPA analyst. He/she then should try to work out how the involved (group
of) decision maker(s) perceived the world, and which opportunities or limitations
they saw for themselves. For the researcher, this task entails many obstacles; one
has to develop a reconstruction based upon ‘second hand’-material (what the
decision maker said and did). Even the most ‘neutral’ analyst is not free of
introducing his/her own linguistic or ideologically biased ideas. Moreover, one has
to work with incomplete and sometimes even openly contradictory information
(Sprout & Sprout, 1957, pp. 319-320). In the second kind of ‘analyses’, the researcher
tries to illustrate how the ‘reality on the ground’ changes as a result of decisions
which were taken earlier, and how the ‘characteristic properties’ of the environment

10
 Grounding World Politics Anew

‘enforce’ possible limitations on the ‘operational results’ of foreign policy decisions

which were taken earlier.

Figure 2: The conceptual revolution of Harold and Margaret Sprout

• Second, the consequences for the decision maker in foreign policy. The decision
maker should try to keep the gap between the ‘objective’ and the ‘perceived’
environment as small as possible (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981, p. 67). One
could state that too big a gap between both is ‘lethal’ for foreign policy, and in some
extreme cases even for the very existence of the nation.
Many examples exist, for instance mentioned by the Sprouts; the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor in December 1941 could only take place because the American military and political
elite did not (want to) realize that a Japanese ‘task force’ so far from home could be used in
an offensive operation (Sprout & Sprout, 1957, p. 318; Sprout & Sprout 1971 [1965], p. 12).
Often, decision makers take refuge in a form of thinking in analogies, in which one refers to
history in order to make the case for a certain policy choice in foreign policy. However, the
same conditions never really repeat themselves because the meaning of geography and
technology changes through time (see also: Houghton, 1996). The Sprouts also asked the
following question: “To what extent is a top-level executive a virtual prisoner of the civil and military
officials who provide data for him?” (Sprout & Sprout 1957, p. 321). The civil and military officials
provide the decision makers in foreign policy with data on the ‘operational environment’,
but these data are often prepared in a way “in which the official thinks the president would
like to see the world” (cf. ‘psycho-milieu’). This forms one of the most important difficulties
with which intelligence agencies struggle. The gap between the ‘operational’ and the

11
 Criekemans

‘psychological’ environment forms a powerful conceptual tool in order to approach the subtle
interaction between environment & politics in a more nuanced way.

From this framework of reference, Harold and Margaret Sprout developed in 1957 seven
theses, which they tried to defend in this publication (Sprout & Sprout, 1957, p. 310):
1. Environmental factors become related to the attitudes and decisions which, in the
aggregate, comprise a state’s foreign policy only by being apperceived and taken into
account by those who participate in the policy-forming process.
2. Conclusions as to the manner in which apperceived environmental factors are dealt
with in foreign policy making depend on the theory or theories of decision making
which the analyst brings to bear on the case under consideration.
3. Hypotheses as to the manner in which apperceived environmental factors enter into
the decision making process can provide fruitful linkages between ecological and
behavioural approaches to the study of international politics.
4. Environmental factors can be significantly related to the operational results of policy
decisions, even though such factors are not apperceived and taken into account in
the policy making process.
5. What is called analysis of state power or international power relations or (preferably,
in our view) analysis of state capabilities consists essentially of calculating
opportunities and limitations latent, or implicit, in the milieu of the state under
consideration.
6. Capability calculations or estimates are always carried out within some framework
of assumptions regarding the policy objectives, operational strategy, and political
relations of the state under consideration.
7. Conclusions as to the opportunities and limitations which are implicit in a state’s
milieu and which may affect the operational results of its policy decisions depend
on the ecological theory and the topical explanatory premises which the analyst
brings to bear in the specific case under consideration.
The explanatory power that analysts attribute to the ‘milieu’, largely depends on the way in
which their proposed man-milieu-hypotheses are embedded in a certain epistemology with
regards to the feasibility of scientific knowledge about the relationship territoriality–politics.
Each geopolitical formulation of a theory rests on such initial assumptions.
Another potential approach is that of Antonios Nestoras; Analytical Geopolitics. In his
work on geopolitical myths and Greece, Nestoras has sought to bridge material and identity

12
 Grounding World Politics Anew

factors (Nestoras, 2022; Nestoras, 2024 forthcoming in the Brill book series “Geopolitics
and International Relations”). The author states that the shift from Classical Geopolitics to
Critical Geopolitics in the literature was largely ontological and epistemological in nature. It
replicated the standard dualisms previously introduced in the discipline of IR with the advent
of the postmodern condition. In ontological terms, the scientific materialism of Classical
Geopolitics (i.e. the belief that there is a material reality that has essential properties) was
overturned by the social constructivism of Critical Geopolitics (i.e. reality has no essential
properties, only relative, socially constructed properties). In epistemological terms, the
positivism of Classical Geopolitics (i.e. through geographical survey and philosophical
reflection we can know the essential properties of the material reality) was replaced with the
interpretivist stance of Critical Geopolitics (i.e. without fixed essential properties, reality is
relative to the ideological interpretation of the observer) (Criekemans 2022). According to
Antonios Nestoras, these dualisms – materialism vs. idealism and positivism vs.
interpretivism – outline a Classical/Critical divide in geopolitics that diverts scholarly
attention from important research questions. Moreover it puts the field in an unfavourable
position and reduces its potential to understand and explain patterns of behaviour in IR that
may be grounded in geography. Nestoras reviews the philosophical assumptions that
underline geopolitics through the prisms of New Materialism and Critical Realism and,
drawing from the growing literature on political myth, attempts to initiate a discussion on
possible new research directions for geopolitics (Nestoras 2022). The proposed approach is
called ‘Analytic Geopolitics’. It tries to offer a structural analysis of geopolitical myths into
their constitutive elements, their historical emergence and their effect on patterns of state
behaviour. This contribution suggests yet another, new ‘grounding’ of the discipline of IR,
not only in geography, but also in history, culture and politics. Nestoras believes that a critical
reflection on myth, politics, and geography might show that geopolitics never left in the first
place (Nestoras, 2024 forthcoming). Simply deconstructing myths and exposing them as
fantasies or immoral instruments of power politics (as the school of Critical Geopolitics did)
does not mean that they are no longer active ingredients in the everyday life of a society, or
in the government of the modern state. Myths do affect material reality. Hence the research
agenda of an Analytical Geopolitics could bridge material and constructive approaches to
the geopolitical reality in innovative ways.

3. Geostrategy and geo-economics: closely intertwined

At the beginning of the 1990s, some authors suggested that as a result of the end of the Cold
War and the globalisation of the economy, competition between states was shifting from the
political-military to the economic-technological field (Labohm, 1998, p. 54). Richard Rosecrance was
an early proponent of this idea; in his 1986 book ‘Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest
in the Modern World’. He predicted that leaders would increasingly realise that material

13
 Criekemans

production and trade were a more effective method of increasing a state's power potential
than military conquest and occupation (van Staden, 1999, p. 613). Rosecrance drew a very
optimistic conclusion; the chances of interstate conflict would, in his view, largely or almost
entirely disappear (Labohm 1998, p. 54). Ten years later, Rosecrance published an article
entitled ‘The Rise of the Virtual State’ in Foreign Affairs, in which he turned his prediction into
a conclusion (Rosecrance, 1996). It is no longer the geographical size of a state that
determines the success of a country, he argues ('territory becomes passé'), but the size of the
market. The more open the economy, the bigger the market (as long as it exceeds that of the
country). Small countries in particular can therefore benefit from this situation. Instead of
accumulating territory, capital and labour, 'virtual states' (i.e., states that have dismantled their
territorially embedded production capacity and reorganised it elsewhere) emphasise strategy
(e.g., attracting foreign direct investment), as well as investing in people, Rosecrance believed.
Other authors such as Lester Thurow and Edward Luttwak argued that this 'economisation'
of international relations is taking us into a new phase of interstate and interregional conflict,
this time focused on the control of markets and capital. In this context, the American
Edward Luttwak believed that there would be an evolution “from geopolitics to geo-economics” 4 ,
or as he likes to put it “from violence to money”. As a former strategic thinker, Luttwak associated
geopolitics with military strategies, which may partly explain his preference during the 1990s
for the paradigm of geo-economics. According to Luttwak, there is still competition in the
international political arena, but it is now mainly settled through an economic struggle
between nation states (as opposed to the paradigm of borderless capitalism, as suggested by
Kenniche Ohmae during the same period) (Ohmae, 1993; Ohmae, 1996).
In 1993, Samuel P. Huntington wrote an essay, ‘Why International Primacy Matters’ in the
journal International Security (Huntington, 1993). This analysis was fairly close to Luttwak's.
Huntington expanded on Daniel Bell’s assertion: “economics is the continuation of war by other
means” (Bell, 1990). Samuel P. Huntington asserted that in the coming years, the main conflict
of interest between the US and the great powers would probably be over economic issues
(especially the relationship with Japan and the European Union). Huntington believed that
economists are blind to the fact that economic activity is a source of power, as well as "well-
being". In the realm of economic competition, the instruments of power are productive
efficiency, market control, trade surplus, strong currencies, foreign exchange reserves,
ownership of foreign companies, factories and technology (Baru, 2012).

4 About the term 'geo-economy', Luttwak writes: “This neologism is the best term I can think of to describe the admixture of the logic of conflict
with the methods of commerce - or, as Clausewitz would have written, the logic of war in the grammar of commerce.” (Luttwak, 1998, p. 126) (our
underlining). However, the concept of 'geo-economics' is not new. The political scientist Kristof used it as early as 1960:
“Contemporary geopolitics [...] rejecting the theory of nature-molded human character [...] has concentrated on geostrategy and the foreign-policy
implications of geo-economics.” (Kristof, 1960, pp 19-20).
14
 Grounding World Politics Anew

A third author worth mentioning in this context is Mark P. Thirwell. He too examined the
interrelationship between geo-economics and national security, stating in 2010 that if one is
to “understand many of the key strategic developments facing the world in the coming decades, then one will
need to spend a reasonable amount of time thinking about what is going on in the international economy.”
(Thirwell, 2010, p. 2). Thirwell lists a number of reasons why geo-economics has made a
come-back since Luttwak’s time: the evolution towards a multipolar global economy, the
possible degradation of Washington’s willingness to continue to provide international public
goods needed to sustain a (relatively) smoothly functioning global economy, the rise of the
dark side of globalisation such as transnational crime, the rise of state capitalism, the financial
and economic crisis since 2008 and the era of scarcity (Thirwell, 2010). Earlier, Luttwak
almost seemed to suggest that in the post-Cold War era, the geo-strategic struggle would be
subordinate to the geo-economic struggle. In a case study on EU-Russia natural gas relations
between 2013 and 2016, Criekemans argued however that geo-economic and geostrategic
competition can exist simultaneously, and can reinforce each other. It could even be argued
that those actors in international relations who manage to align their geo-economic and
geostrategic strategies have a greater chance of achieving their goals in a timely manner. As
a unitary actor, the Russian Federation seemed much more capable of integrating both than
the European Union. This led to a situation in Ukraine where Russia was effectively waiting
for the West to blink first. A similar scenario developed later in the war in Syria (Criekemans,
2017).
The thesis of ‘geo-economics’ received increasing support since the end of the 1990s. For
example, the success of the neologism ‘géo-économie’ in France is striking, and even somewhat
contradictory. After all, in 1997, a new journal was founded that tried to investigate the geo-
economic thesis: the ‘Revue française de Géoéconomie’ (now called simply ‘Géoéconomie’). Its
founders are people like Pascal Lorot, previously known for their popular science books on
geopolitics, such as ‘Histoire de la géopolitique’ (Lorot, 1995) and ‘La géopolitique’ (Lorot & Thual,
1997). In this sense, the success of the geo-economic paradigm in France is somewhat
contradictory; Lorot had made interesting contributions to the French geopolitical literature
as an author, but now switched to geo-economics. The fact that he was trained as a political
economist might have something to do with that. The first issue of the journal ‘Revue française
de Géoéconomie’ contains an interview with the French geopolitical writer, Lacoste. ‘Géo-
économie’ is presented here as complementary to géopolitique, an idea that also appeared in
Lorot’s books from the mid-1990s. Lorot defines geoeconomics as follows;
“the analysis of economic strategies –notably commercial–, decided upon by states in a
political setting aiming to protect their own economies or certain well-identified sectors of
it, to help their national enterprises acquire technology or to capture certain segments of
the world market relative to production or commercialization of a product. The possession
or control of such a share confers to the entity –state or national enterprise– an element of

15
 Criekemans

power and international influence and helps to reinforce its economic and social potential.”
(Lorot, 1999, p. 15)
The question arises whether the economisation thesis can be empirically “proved”. After all,
as the Dutch IR specialist van Staden rightly points out, this thesis seems to be at odds with
what we observe in the world on a daily basis (van Staden, 1999, p. 615). Although the
number of armed conflicts may have decreased since the fall of the Wall, the conflicts that
remain or resurface are of a more profound and long-term nature, and often have an intra-
state character. Moreover, van Staden rightly notes that (van Staden, 1999: 615): “By far the
most important and potentially most dangerous disputes that we face in the world today are precisely those
that have a clear territorial dimension” (e.g. Israel & the Palestinians, India & Pakistan, but also
Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). Aside from this, a second, more important reservation can be
formulated with regard to the economisation thesis, according to van Staden: “the suggestion
that one could conceive of security and economy as separate compartments should be particularly objected to.”
(van Staden, 1999: 615). This remark is very justified. Economy and politics cannot be
regarded as separate spheres. It may be true that nowadays in the West relatively more
attention is being paid to territorial political themes of a predominantly economic nature (e.g.
impact of the Eurozone, geo-economic integration along the borders of Europe, etc.), but
the question remains whether there are no questions of politics involved. Who has the “last
word” in such international questions; economics or politics? As political scientists, we
would tend to choose the latter option. Economists may have a different view... The division
between geopolitics and geoeconomics may therefore be artificial. The proposition can be
defended that Geopolitics originally also took account of the politicisation of “(geo-
)economic issues”, but that this is not always (anymore) recognised by the current authors.
Kjellén’s ideal type in the economic realm was for instance for the state to achieve ‘autarky’
in key essentials such as food and resources.
Nevertheless, some contemporary authors have in recent years pleaded for a reintegration
of geopolitics & geo-economics into one whole. More recent authors such as Braz Baracuhy
come to quite similar conclusions. In his book chapter ‘Geo-economics as a dimension of grand
strategy. Notes on the concept and its evolution’, Baracuhy stresses that geo-economics and
geopolitics constitute two sides of the same coin. Although they are different in terms of
their instrumental and operative logics, they both constitute expressions of the geostrategic
competition among great powers, acquiring relevance and meaning in foreign policy”
(Baracuhy, 2019, pp. 14-15). What does remain striking is that geo-economics is often
associated in the Anglo-American literature with great power politics, whereas some French
authors and also others seem to be more open to the idea that also smaller territorial entities
such as regions or even cities could play a geo-economic role (see infra; 6).
In his book chapter ‘The Increasing Importance of Geoeconomics in Power Rivalries: from the Past to the
Present’, Gyula Csurgai underlines that relations between states in the post-Cold War period

16
 Grounding World Politics Anew

have been shaped by an increased economic competition. This includes Non-Market factors
such as intelligence sharing between state agencies and private businesses, successful
economic diplomacy and different techniques to influence and manipulate non-
governmental organisations to weaken an economic adversary, among other things. The
considerable influence of these Non-Market factors illustrates the limits of the liberal
economic theories that emphasise the dominant role of market forces and the rather limited
role of the state in economics (Csurgai, 2022b, p. 244). One could apply these thoughts also
to the energy domain; in the Western world over the past decades, the main investment
decisions have been left to the private sector, with the national capitals by the end of the
1990s realising that they had to guide behind the scenes the main decisions of these large
energy multinationals, as energy comes very close to the national sovereignty of a state. This
explains why for instance in France the Presidential Elysée has played such a major role in
matters of energy policy.
This brings us to another often forgotten concept in geopolitics and geo-economics; the
‘geo-technical ensemble’. In our recent book chapter ‘‘Geotechnical ensembles’: how new
technologies change geopolitical factors and contexts in economy, energy and security’, the interaction
between technology and geopolitics is discussed at length (Criekemans, 2022b). The
evolution towards a world increasingly run on renewable energy will also mean that the needs
of many countries will shift; from conventional oil over natural gas towards the critical
materials that will power a renewable energy future. This could lead to scarcity & supply
problems and geopolitical competition over key resources such as nickel, cobalt, copper,
silver, scandium, lithium and rare earth elements (Criekemans, 2018). In summary, the
interaction between technologies and geopolitical factors may also have consequences for
the foreign policy and diplomacy of nations; patterns of conflict and cooperation may be
affected. 5 The thesis which we developed in this recent publication states that territorial entities
(states, regions or cities) which invest in ground-breaking technological know-how, both fundamental and
applied innovation, as well as in the industrial base that comes with it, will in many ways be able to shape
tomorrow’s world in its geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic dimensions (Criekemans, 2022b).
Already many authors in Classical Geopolitics (e.g. Mackinder, Spykman, Sprout) developed
hypotheses with regard to the impact that new technologies could have upon geopolitical
and geo-economic relations. Geopolitical hypotheses in this context were defined by Sprout
as “propositions that purport to explain or to forecast the geographical distribution and patterning of political
potential (power)” (Sprout, 1963, p. 190). One of the types of geopolitical hypotheses in

5 In their book chapter ‘Technologies for the Global Energy Transition’ in the book ‘The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition’,
Manfred Hafner and Michel Noussan offer an interesting overview of some of the more recent technological developments
(Hafner & Noussan, 2020), but do not always explicitly link to geographically embedded opportunities and limitations. This
however is essential to also more explicitly connect to a ‘geopolitical analysis’ in the body of literature, and can be approached
in many different ways.
17
 Criekemans

technological perspective dealt with the uneven distribution of natural resources. According to
Harold Sprout, these geopolitical hypotheses generally start from the proposition that a
nation’s political position in international politics is significantly related to its capacity to
provide military instrumentalities (Sprout, 1963, p. 201). That may have been true in the
decades after the Second World War. However, today’s literature also investigates how (the
changing demand for) resources impacts the geo-economic and overall geopolitical position
of territorial entities other than the state; sub-state entities such as a region, or for instance
the European Union as an emerging foreign policy actor. More recent emanations of this
body of literature tackle a wide range of issues. One can think of publications on resource
war and the scramble for resources (Klare, 2001; Klare, 2012), oil geopolitics (Yergin, 1992),
natural gas geopolitics (Grigas, 2017), the geopolitics of renewables (Criekemans, 2018b),
the interconnection between energy and climate (Yergin, 2020) or even the geopolitics of
the deep oceans (Hannigan, 2016). Technological advances may change once again the geo-
economic and geopolitical situation and consequences. Harold Sprout had already referred
to ‘geo-technic politics’ (Sprout, 1963, p. 192). Daniel Deudney believed geopolitical scholars
should describe the base or infrastructure as combinations of particular geographic features and
technological capabilities. He termed these “geotechnical ensembles”. Whereas ‘global
geopoliticians’ treated combinations of geographical and technological factors as exogeneous
factors acting upon or shaping human institutions, IR scholars primarily saw technology as
derivative of human and political choice (Deudney, 1989, p. 13). Deudney believed that by
incorporating technology, with some changes, into their concept of the base or non-social
environment, ‘global geopoliticians’ were able to advance beyond the impasse of the
naturalist theories (Deudney, 1989, p. 14). They were all theorists of change, looking at the
impact of new technological forces and new aspects of geography. ‘Classical Geopolitics’
“inferred that the existing natural resource base was fixed, subject only to the question of distribution – which
might grow in a zero-sum environment”. Deudney believed this inference was flawed. The
continued growth of scientific knowledge and technical know-how has altered in many
important ways the effective uses to which human institutions can put materials and energies
drawn from the fixed or closed Earth (Deudney, 1989, p. 627). The same can be said of
technologies today. How can this be applied to questions of energy transition in today’s
world? First, changes to existing energy mixes might provoke geo-economic and geopolitical
‘fall out’. Conventional oil will in the coming decades diminish in relative importance. This
may provoke crises in the business models of traditional oil producers such as in the Middle
East, which could produce societal instability. Second, a growing need to get access to the
critical materials that will power a renewable energy future could lead to scarcity & supply
problems and geopolitical competition over key resources such as nickel, cobalt, copper,
silver, scandium, lithium and rare earth elements. Third, a race over technological advances
and intellectual property in the energy domain could erupt, most notably in the field of
battery efficiency & recycling technologies. In conclusion, the debate in the West on ‘strategic

18
 Grounding World Politics Anew

autonomy’ may also be relevant for the domain of energy. The interaction between
technology and geopolitics changes also the economic relations, both on the supply side, the
demand side, and the dimension of transit countries. If electrification further grows to
connect for instance more windy or sunny regions with lesser endowed ones, then those
territories through which power lines pass may be able to develop a new business model,
hence rising in geopolitical importance (Criekemans, 2021).

4. Some lessons that can be drawn from French geopolitical scholarship

In future literature, authors could again be inspired by the Environmental Possibilism of the
French geopolitical schools pre-1945, the so-called ‘Possibilists’ (Criekemans, 2022c, pp. 116-
117). These scholars argued, in contrast to the German geographical determinists of the
interbellum, that the environment should be approached as being both ‘constraining’ and
‘enabling’, and man is considered to be able to make choices (Vidal de la Blache, 1898; Vidal
de la Blache, 1926). The environment provides a number of parameters or limitations to the
whole spectrum of foreign policy actions which can be undertaken by an entity
('constraining'), but the environment also provides a political entity with a number of
important opportunities (Sprout, 1971 [1965], p. 83). As stated earlier, ‘man’ stood central in
‘Possibilist Geopolitics’ because in the end the political decision-makers try to maximize the
opportunities, and to minimize the limitations with which they are confronted. In addition,
Possibilism makes active connections between elements of physical geography (again
relevant in energy transition in terms of resources or ideal locations to pursue solar or wind
power), human geography (think about social acceptance of these technologies), and spatial
factors (needed to take into account for instance in the development of power lines and grid
infrastructure over longer distances). Good statesmanship maximizes the opportunities, and
minimizes the disadvantages. Also in complex questions of energy transition these lessons
still are very relevant indeed (Criekemans, 2022b, pp. 116-117), and await further exploration.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the literature in Geopolitics underwent a revival in France.
One of the leading figures became Yves Lacoste and the journal ‘Hérodote’. The objective was
not to simply leave geopolitical discourse exclusively to "certain groups", the "strategic elites"
who had dominated Cold War thinking, and had consequently narrowed the
conceptualisation of "geopolitics" to mere "strategic issues" (Lacoste, 1983: 4). Lacoste
wanted to show that there were many different ways in which geographical and geopolitical
problems could be studied. Lacoste believed that the 'geo' aspect should not be reduced to
mere "natural phenomena" (Lacoste, 1993: 9; Lacoste, 2000: 127). "Geo" should be more
broadly defined to include ALL factors that are territorially "embedded". One can think of
the quantitative & qualitative characteristics of a territory (e.g. territorial size & available
resources) or of its geographical position & borders. Nevertheless, there are also other

19
 Criekemans

'geopolitical variables' such as demographics, transport-economic situation, language &

culture, and so on. The Hérodote school pays much attention to geographic/geopolitical
reasoning at different spatial levels of analysis (e.g. local, regional, national, macro-regional,
global) (Hepple, 2000: 279-280). This school payed a lot of attention to identity. It believed
the object of Geopolitics lies essentially in the study of territorial rivalries between actors,
and their repercussions on public opinion (Lacoste, 2000: 155). In his impressive 'Dictionnaire
de géopolitique' (1993), Lacoste-'Hérodote' concentrated more and more on the analysis of the
'representations' of territoriality (or expressed differently; the way in which 'territoriality' is
presented); "the set of ideas and perceptions of the political, religious or other order that drive social groups,
and structure their vision of the world." (Lorot, 1997: 44). Indeed, it is through the analysis of
different representations about territoriality that Yves Lacoste hopes to better understand
the strategic importance or symbolic value; attached to it in situations of rivalry (Lacoste,
2000: 155). According to French lecturers in Geopolitics and International Relations Pascal
Lorot and François Thual, the main contribution of the group around Lacoste now lies
precisely in bringing the notion of 'representation' into geopolitical analyses. To this very day
the French literature in Geopolitique can be seen as an inspiration. Innovative as well was there
distinction between ‘géopolitique externe’ and ‘géopolitique interne’. French scholars in Geopolitics
also devoted attention to the political levels ‘below’ and ‘above’ the national state, as
additional carriers of geopolitical action.

5. Geopolitics, energy transition and climate change

When one takes a long view at the ontological assumptions of many schools of thought in
academic fields such as Geopolitics and International Relations, one realizes that most of
the foundational academic work conducted in each of them saw the daylight in a world of
centrally state-controlled, fossil energy sources such as coal, oil and later natural gas. That
world gradually took shape in the latter part of the nineteenth century and speeded up into
the twentieth century. One could say that academic work in this long time period has been
‘fueled’ by the ‘energy building blocks’ of each phase of human development in this new era.
The literature on ‘energy geopolitics’ and ‘energy security’ has a long tradition and
connection (Biresselioglu, 2011). The earliest concerns around these issues date back to a
century ago (Prontera, 2017, p. 4), in the midst of an earlier energy transition we sketched in
the introduction of this chapter. Academic literature on energy security theory started to
develop in the 1970s, as a result of the oil crises. These were ‘artificial’ supply side crises
whereby OPEC countries pressurized Western governments’ support of Israel by ‘turning
the tap’ several times. It was not a coincidence that the International Energy Agency (IEA)
was set up in 1973 within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) to study supply and demand issues, and the impact of new technologies in the

20
 Grounding World Politics Anew

energy sector. This helped western countries to deal with the major impact of the energy
crises of the 1970s.
In 1979, David Deese defined ‘energy security’ in the journal ‘International Security’: “a condition
in which a country perceives a high probability that it will have adequate energy supplies at affordable prices”
(Deese, 1979, p. 140). There were two principal economic and political components of
energy security. First, the set of all behaviours which are affected by the reliability and
quantity of energy supplies. Second, the set of all behaviours which are affected by external
energy supplies, and more in particular the relationship between demand and supply. But
until then the geopolitical or geostrategic dimension remained underexplored.
This changed radically only a year later via the so-called ‘Carter Doctrine’. On 23 January 1980,
the then US President Jimmy Carter declared in his State of the Union Address that the
United States would use military force, if necessary, to defend its national interests in the
Persian Gulf. This statement was geopolitical and geostrategic in nature, a response to the
Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. It was intended to deter the Soviet Union
from seeking further influence in the Persian Gulf. ‘Energy geopolitics’ and ‘energy security’
now seemed to become extensions of each other. However, the definition of ‘energy security’
in practice still remained somewhat unclear.
During the 1980’s, David Deese (MIT) and Joseph Nye (Harvard) contributed to a broader
conceptualization of ‘energy security’ (Deese & Nye, 1981; Biresselioglu, 2011). They
focused on the energy security threats that consumer governments face; demand reduction
and restructuring, stockpiles and emergency plans, development of alternative domestic
supplies, development and diversification of sources of external supply, as well as diplomatic,
industrial and military measures. During those years, western literature became deeply
entrenched in a Cold War East-West context; the risk of the dependency of the ‘West’ on
the ‘East’ – most notably via oil and natural gas.
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990’s, increasingly authors started to talk
about the eclipse of the ‘oil age’ and the ‘geopolitics of oil’, the structural shortages between
demand and supply, and their geopolitical consequences. Michael T. Klare can be considered
as one of the authors who was quoted often and who also managed to open up a broader
public debate, together with many other contributions from think tanks around the world.
Especially Klare’s ‘Resource Wars. The New Landscape of Global Conflict’ (Klare, 2001) and ‘The
Race for What’s Left. The Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources’ (Klare, 2012) can be
mentioned in this regard. From conventional oil and gas, over to unconventional oil and gas
(shales, tar sand) into rare earths and other critical materials, Klare sounded the alarm bells
that countries needed to prepare for what was coming. The author seemed to lean more
towards the scarcity side of the spectrum, whereas others would later predict an age of
abundance due to technological revolutions. However, Klare did realise that also energy

21
 Criekemans

innovation would become a major factor in a ‘clean energy race’ in which China and perhaps
the United States would become major players or competitors (Klare, 2012, pp. 230-234).

From mid-2001 till July 2008, the oil price rose from 20 US dollar a barrel to 147.50 US
dollar. This created a new dynamic in the literature on the Geopolitics of Energy, discussing
the need for alternative supplies and demand reduction via energy efficiency. One year
earlier, in 2007, Mathew Burrows and Gregory Treverton developed a new energy paradigm
in the journal ‘Survival’ (Burrows & Treverton, 2007). They discussed a much more nuanced
definition and approach of ‘energy security’. Taking into account the latest societal and
international developments, Burrows and Treverton saw the concept more as a set of
complex “trade offs” that decision-makers had to make between three sides of a triangle;
security and foreign policy objectives, economic objectives and now also environmental
objectives. Many different technologies and forms of energy ticked one but not always
necessarily all three of these boxes. Political choices sometimes had to be made as a
consequence. In the middle of the triangle however, Burrows and Treverton placed ‘energy
efficiency’. The best energy that ticks all three sides of the triangle at the same time, is the
energy which you do not consume.
From the years 2000 onwards, the debate on ‘energy security’ gradually came of age.
Academia produced certain criteria which together could make up a good definition of
‘energy security’. In 2005, Barton, Redgwell, Rønne and Zillman, hence defined the concept
as follows: “A condition in which a country or several, or most of its citizens and businesses have access to
sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future, free from any serious risk of major
disruption of service” (Barton et al., 2005, p. 5). Next to security of supply issues (important for
consumer countries and territories), there existed also security of demand (important for
producer countries and territories). The reliability of supply was closely connected to the
functioning of energy markets. The only actors which this definition of ‘energy security’ did
not completely address were transit countries and regions, for instance the predicament of
countries such as Ukraine, which had already in the past major pipelines (Brotherhood,
Yamal) running over its territory from the East (Soviet Union and later the Russian
Federation) towards the markets in the West.
In a recent book on ‘The New Politics of Energy Security in the European Union and Beyond’,
Prontera uses the traditional definition of ‘energy security’, referring to such matters as “long
term security of supply and its connection to international politics in the areas of diversification, infrastructure,
investments and market governance” (Prontera, 2021, p. 7). A recent, two-part book is ‘The changing
world of energy and the geopolitical challenges’ by Samuel Furfari. Its second volume is solely
devoted to the ‘geopolitics of energy’. He sees geopolitics as “a methodology based on
multidisciplinary analysis”, which brings together variables as geography, demography, history,

22
 Grounding World Politics Anew

economic and financial power, transport routes, technology, etc. (Furfari, 2017, p. 45-48).
His approach comes quite close to the ‘geopolitical method of analysis’ as explained and
developed by Gyula Csurgai at the Geneva Institute of Geopolitical Studies in Switzerland
(Csurgai, 2022a).
Yet other authors emphasize ecological issues and crises that “threaten to radically alter the
very nature of international relations” (Ó Tuathail, 1997, p. 36). According to Mustafa Tolba,
executive director of the United Nation Environment Program, a transition needs to be made “from
geopolitics to ecopolitics” (Tolba, 1990). According to Simon Dalby, ecological issues have been
regarded as having a fundamental, 'global' dimension since the 1970s. Dalby and more
recently O’Lear rather use the term 'environmental geopolitics' (Dalby, 1998; O'Lear,
2018), which partly reflects the fact that the term 'ecopolitics' has never really gained a foothold
in the literature. According to Dalby, the new element lies in the fact that, since the mid-
1990s, the 'global environment' has been increasingly explicitly regarded as both an object of
research and the object of prescriptive policy recommendations. Also outside of this, in the
more "popular" IR literature of the mid-1990s, "ecological degradation" was identified as
one of the causes of state disintegration and chaos. Consider, for example, the well-known
article ‘The Coming Anarchy’ by the American foreign correspondent and writer on
international relations Robert D. Kaplan, in the magazine ‘The Atlantic Monthly’ (February
1994). In it, the author argued that the microcosm of failed states in Africa foreshadows what
awaits us internationally as a result of disruptive global demographic, economic and
ecological dissolution processes. Kaplan’s ideas are an archetype of what is often referred to
in textbooks on international relations as the ‘anarchy model’. From a geopolitical
perspective, however, it becomes more difficult to maintain the classic assumption that only
states play a role in global ecological issues; multinational corporations & grass roots
movements also fulfil their function (Dalby, 1998, p. 184-185). In more recent literature on
energy geopolitics, it has become apparent that this can no longer be seen separately from
climate politics (Faye, 2022; Yergin, 2020). In her study on ‘Geopolitics of Climate Change and
Sustainable Development’, Faye develops an actor-centred approach (Faye, 2022). Human
agency of not only state actors but also non-state actors such as multinationals becomes
important in order to understand these processes. Realist and neo-realist paradigms rather
suggest states as the main actors without whom joint management cannot be imagined, but
there exist also more liberal paradigms that can help us to tap into energy transition with a
broader, perhaps more accurate portrayal (including the role of individuals, private
companies, multinationals) (Faye, 2022, pp. 63-65). The author is right in this analysis, yet
there are also territorially embedded and geographical issues at play here. In that sense
‘energy geopolitics’ and ‘environmental geopolitics’ touch upon different dimensions of the
geopolitical challenges related to energy transition. In his book ‘Anthropocene Geopolitics.
Globalisation, Security, Sustainability’, Simon Dalby outlines a number of important issues
(Dalby, 2020). Among other things, he discusses the use of chemicals and the long-term

23
 Criekemans

viability of the current agricultural sector. Dalby also questions the limits and finiteness of
what is possible on this planet Earth, indirectly interacting with earlier debates on the ‘end
of growth’. Geopolitics can also reflect on the extent to which and with which humanity
moves or organizes its production chains. Sustainability comes to the fore as a central
concept in human survival. The implicit message is that this is only possible by coming back
into balance with 'environmental variables'. A combination of technological innovations and
a new geo-environmental awareness should provide solace in this, although, according to
Dalby, it is not certain that a ‘good Anthropocene’ can emerge from this.

6. ‘De-territorialisation’, ‘re-territorialisation’ and the study of the diplomatic

activities of non-state actors such as regions and cities
At the beginning of the 1990s, influential IR scholars focused their attention on globalization
and its impact. Some believed the world would gradually become one village, with no
borders. They argued that myriad processes of de-territorialisation were occurring, in which
society and politics were less bound to territorial spaces. Different authors in IR but also in
Political Geography focused on other aspects of de-territorialization. Ó Tuathail (1998), a
seminal author in ‘Critical Geopolitics’, made some very important remarks in this regard:
“Deterritorialization is best interpreted, as Virilio remarks, as a question; it evokes the
challenges posed to the status of territory and, by extension, our territorially embedded
understandings of geography, governance and geopolitics, states, places and the social
sciences, by planetary communication networks and globalizing tendencies. But it is
deceptive when it becomes an answer polemically naming this challenge as a clear
disappearance of territoriality. The problematic of deterritorialization is therefore also the
problematic of reterritorialization; it is not the presence or absence of state territoriality
but its changing status, power and meaning in relation to postmodern technological
constellations, speed machines and global webs of capitalism” (82).
Another seminal contribution can be found in the work of Ruggie (1993). He spoke of a
process of “unbundling” of territoriality:
“in the modern international polity an institutional negation of exclusive territoriality
serves as the means of situating and dealing with those dimensions of collective existence
that territorial rulers recognize to be irreducibly transterritorial in character.
Nonterritorial functional space is the place wherein international society is anchored.”
(165).
During the 1990s, it seemed this process would continue. However, as the twenty-first
century dawned, it became clear that territoriality had not vanished as a potential explanatory
variable of international relations and diplomacy. In fact, quite the opposite has occurred.

24
 Grounding World Politics Anew

Scholte (2000) argued: “The end of territorialism as a consequence of globalization does not mean the end
of territoriality.” (59).
Today, multiple processes of re-territorialisation can be identified. This concept can be
understood as a series of “developments which occur when certain territorial entities diminish in
importance, in favour of other territorial configurations” (Scholte 2000: 60). Thus, geopolitics has not
vanished: different types of re-territorialisation are altering the fabric of international
relations and, inevitably, such processes are also influencing the practices and conduct of
modern diplomacy.
An interesting example concerns the relationship between re-territorialisation and non-state
actors. Both above and beneath the state level, territorial entities become relevant, and
generate their own external relations, foreign policy and diplomatic practices. As stated
earlier, Europe constitutes an interesting testing ground in this regard. On the one hand, the
Lisbon Treaty in 2010 has led to the establishment of the European External Action Service
(EEAS). European diplomacy is still in its infancy, but with the new Commission under the
leadership of Ursula von der Leyen, it has expressed an ambition to think more in a
geopolitical and geostrategic fashion. Many institutional hurdles, such as the need for
unanimity and the compartmentalization of dossiers over different policy-matters, are
obstacles to achieving that goal. Nevertheless, the EU’s Global Strategy developed under the
former High Representative for Foreign Affairs Mogherini, constitutes an important
milestone in this ongoing ambition. One of its added values is that it tries to identify the root
causes of problems such as migration, terrorism and instability in Europe’s near and far
abroad. At the same time, national diplomatic services are adapting to this new geopolitical
reality. They often sent their brightest diplomats to the European External Action Service.
Gradually, a new division of work between the EU level and the member states will
materialize on the wide variety of foreign policy dossiers. This experiment will impact
European and possibly global diplomatic practices.
On the other hand, Europe has been and still is a nursery for sub-state diplomacy, a
phenomenon that also exists in other parts of the world. Different regional sub-state entities
in Europe such as Flanders, Wallonia, Catalonia, Scotland, Bavaria and others engage in
international relations on their own merits, and conduct a foreign policy parallel,
complementary or sometimes in conflict with their diplomatic state counterparts. The days
when diplomacy was exclusively associated with national states are gone. Since the late 1990s,
the spectrum of diplomatic instruments and the strategies that accompany sub-state entities
have become more diverse and complex (Criekemans 2010a; Criekemans 2010b). To a
certain extent, today’s diplomatic practices resemble a pre-Westphalian world in which
realms of different territorial sizes generate their own diplomatic identity and practices.
Diplomacy has become a multi-level endeavor, in which different policy levels
(macroregional, national, cross-border, substate: regions and cities) each generate specific

25
 Criekemans

types of diplomatic activities reflecting specific needs felt at their respective territorial levels.
The question here then is when and under what conditions are diplomats of the macro-
regional, national and sub-state level able and willing to cooperate with one another? This
line of thinking mirrors the complexity of societal questions relating to the EU experiment
and would add another layer of knowledge to diplomatic studies. In addition, all around the
world, cities and even harbors are becoming important geopolitical actors in domains such
as energy, climate mitigation, security and supply chains.
Re-territorialisation challenges the study of diplomacy, particularly in terms of its research
questions and objectives. The potential for exploring the geopolitics-diplomacy-nexus is
valuable but multifarious.

7. Geopolitics and IR: a plea to learn more actively from each other’s insights,
theories and methods
Bringing the scholarships of Geopolitics and International Relations more actively together
may result, over time, in the development of a joint research agenda (Criekemans, 2022). It
may be guided by and facilitated through the fascinating process of learning from different
schools of thought and of academic fields. The most obvious elements of such a research
agenda are affected by the times in which we are living. Clearly, global power centres are
shifting and territorial entities around the world (states, macro-regional entities, cities and
regions) are trying to deal with these realities. The drivers of these shifts are multiple;
demography, technology, economy, energy, military, etc. Each of these variables offer us a
‘way into’ better understanding the fundamental geopolitical shifts which we are
experiencing, and how world actors are responding to them. Combining material capability
approaches with cognitive or critical research approaches could offer us a more multi-faceted understanding of
a changing geopolitical reality.
Geopolitical analyses can be developed at a global, macro-regional or local level. The French
geopolitical tradition has shown how a geopolitical analysis may also be relevant inside states
themselves, in addition to their foreign policy (‘géopolitique interne’ vs. ‘géopolitique
externe’) (Lacoste, 1976; Lacoste, 1982). Geopolitical developments at the local level may
also change regional equations. Conversely, global geopolitics may limit what is possible at
the regional or local level. Specialists in Geography and International Relations can also help
each other in making sense of some of these dynamics.
Geopolitical analyses can be historical in nature, contemporary or even include scenario
analysis. Historical analyses can help us to better understand key geopolitical concepts of the
past. In this book we for instance discussed the origins and interpretations of the concept of
‘containment’. Such an analysis can still be relevant to today’s world. Another domain to be
further developed lies in extrapolating key geopolitical variables into the future for the

26
 Grounding World Politics Anew

purpose of developing better policy or even investment choices. Both military planners and
financial specialists have, over the last years, become quite interested in combining the
insights of forecasting with geopolitical analysis (Papic, 2021). This area clearly also
constitutes a domain which can be of future relevance to both academia and practitioners.
For foreign policy elites, it is crucial to gain a better insight into the dependence of societies
upon the ‘changing’ environmental variables; to include them into their political ‘calculations’
in order to better understand the viewpoints they have to defend in their foreign policy ‘the
day after tomorrow’.
During the past decades, Geopolitics and International Relations have at best been ‘living
apart together’. In our opinion, Geopolitics and International Relations can again become at
least ‘friends with benefits’. Both have much to offer to each other, but hurdles at the
conceptual, theoretical or methodological level may lie in between. Both have similar
interests; to make sense of a world which is in transition in many domains; economic, energy,
technological, environmental and in terms of power politics. Both are also different;
Geopolitics asks attention for territorially embedded variables and provides a more holistic
view of world problems and their interconnectedness. International Relations is a broader,
multi-disciplinary endeavour which also encapsulates approaches coming from diplomatic
history, economic theory, international law, etc. Moreover, IR has branched out in many
different areas around crucial concepts such as power (Realism), interdependence
(Liberalism), inequality (Marxism), and identity and international norms (Constructivism).
Similar theoretical developments have taken place inside the field of Geopolitics. But
because of all these theoretical branches and different schools of thought, it has become less
apparent for outsiders where respective theories of Geopolitics and IR can be mutually
strengthening each other’s ontological views and epistemological insights.
The renewed attention for territorially embedded factors in several schools of thought
nevertheless connects numerous scientific approaches. By better understanding these
contributions, academics, students and practitioners can learn from each other. Hence it is
possible to develop more comprehensive analyses on the geopolitical challenges which affect
many dimensions of politics today and tomorrow (security, economy, energy, environment,
technology, diplomacy & foreign policy).
Better understanding these changes through an innovative combination of theoretical and
methodological insights beyond neoclassical geopolitical geopolitics, can help us to better
understand that geopolitical reality. In this chapter, we pointed to Cognitive Geopolitics,
Analytical Geopolitics and the literature on Geoeconomics as some of the more promising
routes to further explore and apply in future studies. In conclusion, Geopolitics and IR can
further learn from each other’s insights, theories and methods in the years to come.

27
 Criekemans

An ongoing challenge within the literature of Geopolitics remains that the Western
perspective often seems to dominate (Parker, 2015; Rona, 1982), whereas the actual richness
of the literature is much greater. Mainstream literature could thus be enriched to also
discover more local, non-Western approaches from Central and South America, Africa,
Russia and the post-Soviet area, Asia, etc. Only gradually are these trickling into the
mainstream geopolitical literature. Confronting Western and non-Western approaches with
regard to basic geopolitical concepts and their political application at home may prove very
insightful, both from a fundamental and a more practical point of view. It may give us a
better insight into basic sources of contention and potential areas of agreement. It may help
us to identify misunderstandings or fundamental differences in opinion. It may also help us
in the “decolonization” of key geopolitical concepts and approaches. Through such a
scientific endeavor, a critical attitude can be developed which may inform a rethinking of
North-South relations (Slater, 2004) and the ongoing debate about a new multipolar order
in the making.

28
 Grounding World Politics Anew

Bibliography

Baldwin, D. A. (2002) Power and International Relations, Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and B. A.
Simmons, Handbook of International Relations. London: SAGE Publications.
Baracuhy, B. (2019). Geo-economics as a dimension of grand strategy: notes on the concept
and its evolution. In M. Wigell, Scholvin, S. & Aaltola, M. (eds). Geo-economics and power politics
in the 21st century. The revival of economic statecraft. Abingdom & New York: Routledge: 14-27.
Baru, S. (2012). A New Era of Geo-Economics: Assessing the Interplay of Economic and
Political Risk: Understanding Geo-economics and Strategy, IISS Seminar, 23-25 March 2012,
11 p.
Barton, B., Redgwell, C., Rønne, A. & Zillman, D. N. (2005). Energy Security – Managing Risk
in a Dynamic Legal and regulatory Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bell, D. (1990). Germany: The Enduring Fear, Dissent, Vol. 37 (Fall).
Biresselioglu, M. E. (2011). European Energy Security. Turkey’s Future Role and Impact. New York:
Palgrave MacMillan.
Burrows, M. & Treverton, G. F. (2007) A Strategic View of Energy Futures, Survival, Vol.9,
Issue 3, pp. 79-90.
Criekemans, D. (2007). Geopolitiek, ‘geografisch geweten’ van de buitenlandse politiek?
Antwerpen/Oud-Turnhout: Garant/Maklu.
Criekemans, D. (2010a). Regional sub-state diplomacy from a comparative perspective:
Quebec, Scotland, Bavaria, Catalonia, Wallonia and Flanders, In The Hague Journal of
Diplomacy, 5 (1): 37-64.
Criekemans, D. (Ed.) (2010b). Regional Sub-State Diplomacy Today. Leiden: Brill.
Criekemans, D. (2017). Where geoeconomics and geostrategy meet : the troubled relations
between the European Union and the Russian Federation, Munoz, J. M. (ed.) Advances in
geoeconomics. New York, N.Y., Routledge, p. 113-120
Criekemans, D. (2018a). Geopolitiek van aardgas: brug naar de toekomst? Karakter : tijdschrift
van wetenschap (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Vlaamse Leergangen), 62(16): 25-27,

29
 Criekemans

Retrieved at: https://www.tijdschriftkarakter.be/geopolitiek-van-aardgas-brug-naar-de-

toekomst/ .
Criekemans, D. (2018b). ‘Geopolitics of the Renewable Energy Game and its potential
impact upon global power relations’, In Scholten, D. (et al.) (2018). The Geopolitics of Renewables
(Lecture Notes in Energy, 61), Springer: 37-73.
Criekemans, D. (2021). Energy transition, Europe, and geopolitics, in: M. Foulon & J.
Thompson, (2021). Forum : The future of European strategy in a changing geopolitical environment:
challenges and prospects. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2021, 4 p.
Criekemans, D. (ed.) (2022a). Geopolitics and International Relations. Grounding World Politics
Anew. Leiden & Boston: Brill Nijhoff.
Criekemans, D. (2022b). ‘Geotechnical ensembles’ : How New Technologies Change
Geopolitical Factors and Contexts in Economy, Energy and Security. In Criekemans, D.
(ed.) (2022a). Geopolitics and International Relations. Grounding World Politics Anew. Leiden &
Boston: Brill Nijhoff: 61-93.
Criekemans, D. (2022c). Geopolitical Schools of Thought: A concise Overview from 1890
till 2020, and beyond. In Criekemans, D. (ed.) (2022a). Geopolitics and International Relations.
Grounding World Politics Anew. Leiden & Boston: Brill Nijhoff: 97-155.
Csurgai, G. (2002). Geopolitics, Geo-economics and Competitive Intelligence, Geofocus.
Official Journal of The Council of Geopolitics, 1(1).
Csurgai, G. (2022a). The main components of geopolitical analysis. In Criekemans, D. (ed.)
(2022a). Geopolitics and International Relations. Grounding World Politics Anew. Leiden & Boston:
Brill Nijhoff: 13-60.
Csurgai, G. (2022b). The Increasing Importance of Geoeconomics in Power Rivalries: From
the Past to the Present. In Criekemans, D. (ed.) (2022a). Geopolitics and International Relations.
Grounding World Politics Anew. Leiden & Boston: Brill Nijhoff: 244-257.
Dalby, S. (1991). Critical geopolitics: discourse, difference and dissent, Environment and
Planning D: Society and Space, 9: 261-283.
Dalby, S. (1998). Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries: Political geography and International
Relations after the Cold War. In E. Kofman and G. Youngs. Globalization. Theory and Practice.
London, Pinter: 29-42.
Dalby, S. (1999). Against 'globalization from above': critical geopolitics and the World
Order Models Project, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 17: 181-200.
Dalby, S. (2020). Anthropocene Geopolitics. Globalization, Security, Sustainability. Ottawa, Canada:
Ottawa University Press.

30
 Grounding World Politics Anew

Deese, D. A. (1979). Energy: Economics, Politics, and Security, International Security, Vol. 4,
No. 3 (Winter, 1979-1980): 140-153, https://doi.org/10.2307/2626698
Deese, D. A. & J. S. Nye (eds). (1981). Energy and Security: A Report of Harvard’s Energy and
Security Research Project. Cambridge: Ballinger.
Deudney, D. H. (1989). Global Geopolitics: A Reconstruction, Interpretation, and Evaluation of
Materialist World Order Theories of the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Princeton: Princeton
University Press (unpublished Ph D.-manuscript).
Deudney, D. H. (1997). Geopolitics and Change. New Thinking in International Relations Theory.
M. W. Doyle and G. J. Ikenberry. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press: 91-123.
Deudney, D. H. (2020). Dark Skies. Space Expansionism, Planetary Geopolitics & the Ends of
Humanity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dodds, K. and M. Nutall (2015). The Scramble for the Poles. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Dodds, K. (2021). Border Wars. The conflicts that will define our future. London: Ebury Press.
Dolman, E. C. (2002). Astropolitik. Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age. London - Portland,
Oregon, Frank Cass.
Dougherty, J., Pfaltzgraff, R. (1981) ‘Environmental Theories’, in: Contending Theories of
International Relations. A Comprehensive Survey. New York: Harper Collins Publishers: pp. 54-
83.
Faye, N. (2022). Geopolitics of Climate Change and Sustainable Development. Analysis of actor logics
and global governance issues in international relations. Chisinau, Moldova: Sciencia Scripts.
Fox, W. (1985). Geopolitics and International Relations, E. Zoppo and C. Zorgbibe. On
Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear. Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 15-44.
Friedman, T. L. (2005). The World is Flat. A Brief History of the Globalized World in the 21st Century.
London: Penguin Books.
Furfari, S. (2017). The changing world of energy and the geopolitical challenges. 2. Shifting Sands: The
Geopolitics of Energy. S.l.: CreateSpace, Amazon.
Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. New York: Free Press.
Gilpin, R. (1972). Has Modern Technology Changed International Politics? The Analysis of
International Politics, In Rosenau, J. N., Davis, V. & East, M. A. Essays in Honor of Harold
and Margaret Sprout. New York, The Free Press: 166-174.
Gray, C. S. (1977). The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Rimlands and the Technological
Revolution. New York, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc.

31
 Criekemans

Gray, C. S. (1996). A Debate on Geopolitics. The Continued Primacy of Geography, Orbis:

a quarterly journal of world affairs, 40(2): 247-259.
Gray, C. S. (2004). In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a
Hundred Years On. Comparative Strategy, 23(1): 9-25.
Gray, C. S. (2006). Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty
of Context. Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute.
Gray, C. S. (2009). National Security Dilemmas. Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, D.C.:
Potomac Books.
Gray, C. S. & Sloan, G. (Eds.) (1999). Geopolitics. Geography and Strategy. London: Frank Cass.
Grigas, A. (2017). The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London,
England: Harvard University Press.
Hafner, M., & Tagliapietra, S. (2020). The Geopolitics of Global Energy Transition. Cham:
Springer.
Hafner, M. & M. Noussan, (2020). Technologies for the Global Energy Transition. In M.
Hafner & Tagliapietra, S. (2020). The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition (Lecture Notes in
Energy 73). Cham: Springer Open: 177-202.
Heffernan, M. (1998). The Meaning of Europe. Geography and Geopolitics. London: Arnold.
Hepple, L. W. (2000). Géopolitiques de Gauche: Yves Lacoste, Hérodote and French
radical geopolitics, K. Dodds and D. Atkinson, Geopolitical Traditions. A Century of Geopolitical
Thought. London, Routledge: 268-301.
Herwig, H. H. (1999). Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum, In C. S. Gray and G.
Sloan (Eds.) Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy.. London: Frank Cass: 218-241.
Holdar, S. (1992). Political geographers of the past. The ideal state and the power of
geography. The life-work of Rudolf Kjellén. Political Geography, 11(3): 307-323.
Hugill, P. J. (1999) Global Communications since 1844. Geopolitics and Technology. Baltimore,
Maryland: The John Hopkins University.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). Why International Primacy Matters. International Security, Vol. 17,
No. 4 (Spring): 68-83.
Johnson, E. & Morehouse, H. (Eds.) (2014). After the Anthropocene: Politics and
Geographic Inquiry for a New Epoch, Progress in Human Geography, 38(1): 439-456.
Kaplan, R. D. (1994). The Coming Anarchy. How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism,
and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet, The Atlantic Monthly,

32
 Grounding World Politics Anew

February 1994, accessed via:

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/
Kaplan, R. D. (2012). The revenge of geography : what the map tells us about coming conflicts and the
battle against fate. New York: Random House.
Khanna, P. (2016). Connectography. Mapping the Future of Global Civilization. New York: Random
House.
Kjellén, R. (1924). Der Staat als Lebensform. Berlin-Grunewald: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag.
Kjellén, R. (1944 [1924]). Autarchy, In A. Dorpalen (Ed.). The World of General Haushofer.
Geopolitics in Action.. Port Washington, N. Y., Kennikat Press, Inc.: 241-248.
Klare, M. (2001). Resource Wars. The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Henry Holt
and Company.
Klare, M. (2012). The Race for What’s Left. The Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources. New
York: Picador.
Kristof, L. K. D. (1960). The origin and evolution of geopolitics, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
4(1): 15-51.
Labohm, H. H. J. (1998). Van geopolitiek naar geoeconomie: een paradigmawisseling,
Liberaal Reveil 39(2 (April)): 53-57.
Lacoste, Y., Ed. (1993). Dictionnaire de Géopolitique. Paris, Flammarion.
Lacoste, Y. (2000). Rivalries for Territory, Geopolitics, 5(2): 120-158.
Le Billon, P. (2013). Resources, in: Dodds, K., Kuus, M. & J. Sharp (Eds.), (2013). The Ashgate
Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics. Farnham, UK & Burlington, USA: Ashgate.: 281-303.
Legault, A. (1985). Geopolitics and the Conduct of Modern Warfare. In: Zoppo, C. E. &
Zorgbibe, C. On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear. Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers:
201-215.
Libicki, M. (1996). A Debate on Geopolitics. The Emerging Primacy of Information. Orbis:
a journal of world affairs, 40(2): 260-263.
Locksley, G. (1991). Information technology and capitalist development. In: Little, R., &
Smith, M. Perspectives on World Politics. London, Routledge: 339-351.
Lorot, P., Thual, F. (1997). La géopolitique. Paris, Montchrestien.
Lorot, P. (1999). Introduction à la géoéconomie. Paris, Economica.

33
 Criekemans

Mackinder, H. J. (1994 [1904]). "The Geographical Pivot of History" from Geographical

Journal (1904). The Geopolitics Reader. G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routlegde. London,
Routledge: 27-31.
Mackinder, H. J. (1919). Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the politics of Reconstruction.
London, Constable and Company, Ltd.
Mackinder, H. J. (1943). The Round World and the Winning of the Peace. Foreign Affairs,
21(4): 595-605.
Mackinder, H. J. (1994 [1904]). The Geographical Pivot of History from Geographical
Journal (1904), In: G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby & P. Routlegde. The Geopolitics Reader. London,
Routledge: 27-31.
Mahan, A. T. (1890). The United States Looking Outward. Atlantic Monthly,
LXVI(December): 816-824.
Mahan, A. T. (1897). The Interest of America in Sea-Power, Present and Future. London, Sampson,
Low and Marston.
Mahan, A. T. (1900). The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies. London,
Sampson, Loe and Marston.
Mahan, A. T. (1957 [1890]). The influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783. Boston, Little,
Brown.
Moore, S. (2020). Sustainable Energy Transformations, Power and Politics: Morocco and the
Mediterranean. Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge.
Morgenthau, H. J. (1973). Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
Nestoras, A. (2022). Analysing Geopolitical Myths: Toward a Method for Analytic
Geopolitics. In Criekemans, D. (ed.) (2022a). Geopolitics and International Relations. Grounding
World Politics Anew. Leiden & Boston: Brill Nijhoff: 194-218.
Nestoras, A. (2024 forthcoming) Belonging to the West: Geopolitical Myths and Identity in Modern
Greece. A Study of Analytical Geopolitics. Brill book series “Geopolitics and International
Relations”.
Ohmae, K. (1993). The Rise of the Region State, Foreign Affairs, (Spring): 78-87.
Ohmae, K. (1996). Het einde van de natiestaat. De opkomst van de regionale economie.
Amsterdam/Antwerpen, Uitgeverij Contact.
O’Lear, S. (2018). Environmental Geopolitics. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
Ó Tuathail, G. (1996). Critical Geopolitics. London, Routledge.

34
 Grounding World Politics Anew

Ó Tuathail, G. (1998). Political geography III: dealing with deterritorialization, In: Progress in
Human Geography. An international review of geographic work in the social sciences and humanities, 22(1):
81-93.
Ó Tuathail, G. (2001). Geopolitik - zur Entstehungsgeschichte einer Disziplin, In R.
Zeilinger, C. Rammer, E. Binder, G. Menschik & P. Oberdammer, Geopolitik. Zur
Ideologiekritik politischer Raumkonzepte. Wien, Österreich, Promedia Druck- und
Verlagsgesellschaft: 9-28.
Papic, M. (2021). Geopolitical Alpha. An Investment Framework for Predicting the Future. Hoboken,
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
Prontera, A. (2017). The New Politics of Energy Security in the European Union and Beyond. States,
Markets, Institutions. Abingdon: Routledge.
Raffestin, C., Lopreno, D. & Y. Pasteur, (1995). Géopolitique et Histoire. Lausanne, Editions
Payot.
Ratzel, F. (1896). The Territorial Growth of States, Scottish Geographical Magazine, 12: 351-
361.
Ratzel, F. (1897). Politische Geographie. München/Leipzig, Verlag von R. Oldenbourg.
Ratzel, F., Bolin, R. L. (1969 [1896]). The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States. In R. E.
Kasperson and J. V. Minghi. The Structure of Political Geography. Chicago, Aldine Publishing
Company: 17-28.
Rosecrance, R. (1986). Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World.
New York: Basic Books.
Ruggie, J. G. (1993) 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations’, In: International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Winter, 1993), pp. 139-174.
Sainteny, G. (2010). Les enjeux géopolitiques des énergies naturelles renouvelables, Questions
Internationales, n°45, septembre-octobre.
Scholte, J. A. (2000). Globalization. A Critical Introduction. London, Mac Millan Press, Ltd.
Scholten, D., Criekemans, D., & Van de Graaf, T. (2020). An energy transition amid great
power rivalry. Journal of International Affairs (New York: Columbia University), 73(1): 195-204.
Sloan, G. R. (1988). Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987. Brighton, Sussex
(U.K.), Wheatsheaf Books Ltd. (Simon & Schuster).
Strausz-Hupé, R. (1942). Geopolitics. The Struggle for Space and Power. New York, G. P.
Putnam's sons.

35
 Criekemans

Strausz-Hupé, R. (1943). It's smart to be geopolitical. The Saturday Review of Literature.

26: 4-5, 20-21.
Strausz-Hupé, R. (1945). The Balance of Tomorrow. A Reappraisal of Basic Trends in
World Politics. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania.
Sprout, H. H., Sprout, M. T. (1944 [1939]). The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918.
Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press.
Sprout, H., Sprout, M. (1957) ‘Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics’,
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1: pp. 309-328.
Sprout, H. H. (1963). Geopolitical hypotheses in technological perspective. World Politics,
XV: 187-212.
Sprout, H., Sprout, M. (1964) ‘Geography and International Politics in an Era of
Revolutionary Change’, in: Douglas Jackson, W. A. Politics and Geographic Relationships. Reading
on the Nature of Political Geography. London, Prentice-Hall International, Inc.: pp. 34-52.
Sprout, H., Sprout, M. (1968) An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of International Politics.
Princeton, Center for International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University.
Sprout, H. H., Sprout, M. T. (1971 [1965]). The Ecological Perspective on Human Relations with
Special Reference to International Politics. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers.
Spykman, N., & Nicholl, H. R. (1969 [1944]). The Geography of the Peace. s.l., Archon Books.
Spykman, N. (1942). America's Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power.
New York, Harcourt Brace.
Starr, H. (1992), ‘Joining Political and Geographic Perspectives: Geopolitics and
International Relations’, in: Ward, M. D. The New Geopolitics. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
Gordon & Breach Science Publishers: pp. 1-10.
Thermænius, E. (1938). Geopolitics and Political Geography. Baltic and Scandinavian Countries,
IV: 165-177.
Thirwell, M. P. (2010). The Return of Geo-economics: Globalisation and National Security. Lowy
Institute for International Policy, September 2010, 43 p.
Tolba, M. (1990). From Geopolitics to Ecopolitics, New Perspectives Quarterly, 7(Spring): 60-
62.
van Staden, A. (1999). Economisering van de internationale betrekkingen?, Internationale
Spectator, 53(11): 612-616.

36
 Grounding World Politics Anew

Vidal de la Blache, P. (1898). La géographie politique à propos des écrits de Mr. Frederic
Ratzel, Annales de Géographie, 7(32): 97-101.
Vidal de la Blache, P. (1926). Principles of Human Geography. New York, Henry Holt and
Company.
Wehrmann, D. (2020). Critical Geopolitics of the Polar Regions: An Inter-American Perspective
(Series ‘InterAmerican Research: Contact, Communication, Conflict). Abingdon, United Kingdom:
Routledge.
Yergin, D. (1992). The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. New York: Free Press.
Yergin, D. (2020). The New Map. Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Civilizations. New York:
Penguin Books.

37
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch2

The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries (2022)

Zoltán Oszkár Szántó 1, Petra Aczél 2, Pál Bóday 3, János Csák 4, Chris Ball5, Khadija
Farooqi6, Daniel Hogan7, Balázs Lajos Pelsőci 8

Abstract
This paper presents a new, multidisciplinary concept applicable to social entities called
“Future Potential” and introduces a methodology for measuring this concept empirically.
Notably, in addition to outlining the concept, it presents a new global index, the “Future
Potential Index” (hereinafter, FPI). Positioned at the intersection of philosophy, psychology,
sociology, political theory, economics, and geopolitics, along with other fields of social
sciences, Future Potential and its empirical metric, the index, should be of interest to both
academics and policymakers alike.
The concept of Future Potential derives from an effort to capture the key elements of a
social entity that determine its potential to continue and possibly flourish in the future. This
requires first defining what the entity is, what it means to exist and flourish, and then how
to measure it.
To address the very first step – defining a social entity – in a way that ensures consistency
and facilitates comparability across different contexts, our work on defining Future
Potentials and an FPI starts by establishing a fixed normative, analytical, and discursive
framework. The explicit definition of such a framework is, to the best of our knowledge,
unique to our work and, thus, to the FPI.
The question addressed by our work is whether there is a framework that is broad and
consistent enough to permit both the definition and the measurement of a social entity such
that we can monitor whether it is evolving over time in a direction that may be considered
“good” or intentional or both. We show how to do this and then describe the development
of the first index that actually does this using real-world data. More specifically, we present
here our results for the OECD countries using 2022 data. While the concept and

1 Dean and Professor at Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest and
Scientific and Executive Director at Future Potentials Observatory (FPO), MOME Foundation, z.o.szanto@uni-
corvinus.hu
2 Vice-rector and Professor at Moholy-Nagy University of Art and Design and Member of the Executive Committee

and Leader of the Future Potentials Project at FPO

3 Expert at FPO and Advisor to the President of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office
4 Strategic Advisor to the Management at FPO
5 Invited Research Fellow at CIAS and Director of the Central European Institute, Quinnipiac University,

christopher.ball@quinnipiac.edu
6 Intern at FPO and Senior Research Analyst, Global Economics Research Team, Quinnipiac University,

khadija.farooqi@quinnipiac.edu
7 Intern at FPO and Senior Research Analyst, Global Economics Research Team, Quinnipiac University,

daniel.hogan@quinnipiac.edu
8 Doctoral Student at Doctoral School of Business and Management, Corvinus University of Budapest and Project

Coordinator at CIAS
 Szántó et al.

measurement thereof are described in this paper, we hope the initiative will form the basis
for future research that utilizes the index and/or approach to address policy questions
regarding the development of social entities and institutions perceived as integral parts of a
broader society of value to humanity. Alternatively, it may be noted that this approach can
be modified and applied to smaller-scale entities – something we discuss briefly below.
This paper proceeds as follows. We first present the normative framework, which is centered
around the idea of "a good life in a unity of order," emphasizing a harmonious balance of
peace, security, attachment, and care (Csák, 2018). We then explain how this architecture
suggests key dimensions and metrics that can be measured as indicators of the various
aspects of Future Potential. We then discuss how these have been compiled into an index
and applied to a range of countries. We close by discussing the latest results as an example
of this approach and include thoughts about future directions for the further application of
the innovation.

Introduction
The Future Potentials Observatory (FPO) was established in 2023 to bring together
scholars from diverse fields to research and keep track of future-oriented topics,
including, but not limited to, the Future Potentials of various countries and other
social entities from nations all the way down to cities and even private organizations.
The FPO defines Future Potential as “the readiness of social entities (e.g., countries,
cities, organizations, groups) in terms of their ability to preserve a good life for their
members in a unity of order through the strategic management of future change”
(Szántó, Aczél, Csák, Ball, 2019).
What is meant by “a good life in a unity of order” and what a nation or country may
be expected to provide for its citizens in terms of a good life are questions that date
back at least to Ancient Greece (Csák, 2018). In recent years, the generally applied
approach has simply involved looking at a country’s GDP, assuming that GDP and
welfare are closely related and that more GDP implies more human welfare. Today,
that approach is being called into question from a range of intellectual perspectives,
each generating its own branch of research around its specific area of critique.
Kocsis (2020), for example, compared the FPI with eight other country-level
indices.9 As the challenges to the traditional approach have grown, so has the
volume of new measures aimed at more comprehensively capturing the notion of
“better,” “welfare,” and a “good life” (Csák, 2018). Some examples include

9 Kocsis (2020) undertook the comparison against the Better Life Index (BLI), Change Readiness Index (CRI),
Global Resilience Index (GRI), Human Development Index (HDI), Happy Planet Index (HPI), Inclusive
Development Index (IDI), Sustainable Development Goals Index (SDG), World Happiness Index (WHI) from
three different perspectives: nature, society, and economy.
40
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

happiness indices and measures incorporating environmental sustainability into

their broader assessment.
The Human Flourishing Program at Harvard’s Institute for Quantitative Social
Science is yet another and different approach that has some loose conceptual
similarities to our work (VanderWeele, 2017). This approach also recognizes the
limitations of the traditional GDP-equals-welfare perspective and the importance of
making explicit a general framework. The Human Flourishing program thus
measures human flourishing “based around five central domains: happiness and life
satisfaction, physical and mental health, meaning and purpose, character and virtue,
and close social relationships”10 (VanderWeele, 2017).
While perhaps a distant conceptual relative to our work (since the framework does
recognize the importance of virtue, for example), this initiative lacks a deeper
normative framework. Thus, the presence of the latter makes our approach unique.
Additionally, the former work merely applies a set of two questions per domain.
The questionnaire can then be downloaded and used to survey people in an
organization, for example, to determine if they are flourishing.11 In addition, this
work is static, being interested in measuring a snapshot in time, while our FPI is, by
definition, interested in potential over time rather than cross-sectional
measurements at a point in time.
Perspectives about “futuring” itself vary. Many associate futuring with future
studies, while others associate it with sustainability, and yet others with
competitiveness (Szántó, 2018; Kocsis, 2018; Monda, 2018). To clarify our usage,
we focus on two concepts that are closely linked to futuring: future orientation and
future-proofing (Aczél, 2018).
Future orientation refers to the degree to which an individual or a culture thinks
about and plans for the future, capturing attitudes toward how the future is
connected with the present and past. This concept also reflects the mindset through
which the future is conceived and can vary significantly across cultures and
disciplines. For instance, technologically oriented societies and disciplines may
emphasize performance, completion, and achievement over time, measuring the
future in terms of performance-related outcomes.
On the other hand, future-proofing is more prevalent in technological and
architectural fields, where the emphasis is on ensuring that investments, whether in

10 While VanderWeele (2017) is the basis for this work, the latest research by this program is shared on the website:
https://hfh.fas.harvard.edu/measuring-flourishing The quote here was taken from the website to ensure the use
of the latest version of their wording for the project.
11 See VanderWeele 2017 for details and further exposition about their approach.

41
 Szántó et al.

products or structures, remain viable and adaptable to future changes. This concept
involves informed strategic formulation, aiming to create flexible and open-ended
systems that can adapt to changing needs and withstand environmental or
technological challenges. Unlike future orientation, which focuses on how far and
in what manner an entity looks forward, future-proofing is concerned with the
practical measures taken to secure the longevity and relevance of investments.
Despite their differences, both concepts are integral to the broader practice of
futuring, ensuring that social entities and investments are strategically positioned to
thrive in an uncertain future.
Just as future orientation and future-proofing provide frameworks for strategic
planning, both approaches offer specific and different perspectives, offering unique
insights into overall well-being and national potential. Happiness literature attempts
to address people’s psychological well-being. Sustainability measurements focus on
environmental well-being and long-term viability. Still other indices examine aspects
of the political system, such as the rule of law, or focus on traditional economic
indicators. The FPI aims to integrate diverse normative standards and strategic
pillars to provide a holistic view of a nation's capabilities and prospects. It quantifies
the degree of Future Potential by evaluating various normative standards and
synthesizes a broad range of insights into a comprehensive framework for
assessment that is tailored to each country.
Unlike other indices that function in isolation, the FPI attempts to bring their key
insights under one roof and asks how this may be done for society as a whole. In
order to do this, one first needs to identify a common social goal against which to
measure the current position and, hence, develop a means of measuring progress
over time. As an initial step, the concept of Future Potential returns to the classical
perspective of “a good life in a unity of order” as the broad notion of welfare in a
society. The study of human development is an interdisciplinary endeavor ultimately
driven by implicit and explicit moral and metaphysical considerations. Historically,
reflections on a worthwhile life, the image of man, and the human condition have
been formulated from philosophical, religious, scientific, and artistic perspectives.
Philosophy ultimately deals with issues such as “how one ought to live [well]; what
course of life is best; [and what is] the right conduct of life,” and the nature and
proper operation of the unity of order that enables a good human life (Csák, 2018).
From the religious perspective, transcendental principles provide the fundamental
framework for comprehension and interaction and have been an integral and valued
aspect of the identity of civilizations, permeating every sphere of life throughout
history. Nevertheless, Western civilization has been an exception, as it seems to have

42
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

undermined its own religious and transcendental foundations, particularly over the
last 300 years.
The modern scientific perspective is a detached, strictly rational, methodological
approach intended to free humankind from the limitations defined by Nature and
to change the world. Modern science claims neutrality with regard to ultimate values.
Thus, when science faces ultimate choices between values, the risk of reducing
persons to physiological processes arises, with all the potential unintended
consequences. Historically, the arts have also been a unique guide for human
comprehension through endeavors that inspire man’s aesthetic sense and emotions.
Philosophical, religious, scientific, and artistic perspectives of comprehension cross-
fertilize and prevail upon each other over time, as exemplified historically by
Christianity assimilating elements of ancient Greek philosophy, the arts invigorating
worldviews during the Renaissance, and the natural sciences overtaking philosophy,
religion, and the arts altogether during modernity. Despite such ‘contests,’ we argue
that sophisticated philosophical, religious, scientific, and artistic reflection is
necessary for any entity that aspires to comprehensive self-consciousness and
identity.
“Future Potential” is a new multidisciplinary perspective that builds on the findings
of the fields mentioned above to map out the characteristics that enable entities to
preserve their way of life. Correspondingly, we assume that there exist ways of
being/living through which human persons can fulfill their material, intellectual,
spiritual, and psychological needs and, in general, flourish better than others and are
thus worth preserving and reproducing (Haldane, 2009). In this paper, we elaborate
on the constitutive qualities of this worthwhile, or, in other words, “good life” in a
unity of order as a conceptual framework or standard (Strauss, 1953), according to
which the changes in the FPI scores may be interpreted. Such analysis may help
social entities to systematically reason about alternative courses of action for shaping
their futures. Using this conception as the normative metric and basis for evaluation
is one of the aspects that makes the Future Potential approach unique.
Once the appropriate normative objective is established, the Future Potential
concept can draw with intent from a range of social science approaches to bring
together relevant insights and metrics. Finally, Future Potential determines the
appropriate means of measuring the progress of an actual social entity toward its
stated goal. Operationally, this is achieved through the new FPI.
The Future Potential concept is a refined term based on the prior notion of “Social
Futuring” presented in the Foundations of the Social Futuring Index (Szántó et al., 2020).
In that paper, Social Futuring was defined as “a measure of a social entity’s creative

43
 Szántó et al.

intent and potential to comprehend the ever-evolving world, its ability to get things
done, to preserve and reproduce its way of life, and to control its destiny in general”
(Szántó, Aczél, Csák, Ball, 2019; see also Szántó and Mueller, 2023). This provided
a holistic overview of the process of measuring a social entity’s ability to strategically
plan for and sustain itself in the future while attempting to maintain the broad goal
of sustaining a good life for constituent members.
Both concepts align, emphasizing the importance of maintaining a good life and
unity of order for members of such entities through organized and intentional
efforts. The Future Potential concept builds upon the original idea by integrating
and emphasizing the readiness to preserve a given quality of life by managing future
changes. This both reflects and enhances social futuring’s focus on a social entity's
creative intent and potential to navigate an evolving world. Moreover, both
perspectives stress the ability to take decisive action, preserve cultural and social
continuity, and exert control over one's destiny. Thus, Future Potential's emphasis
on strategic management and structure complements the criteria employed in the
earlier social futuring notion of intent, capability, and future-oriented adaptability,
creating a more comprehensive approach to evaluating social resilience and
foresight.

Defining the Concept of Future Potential

Future Potential is defined as the ability of social entities, such as countries, cities,
organizations, and groups, to strategically manage future changes to maintain a good
quality of life for their members within a harmonious order. These are the very
features of an arbitrarily chosen social entity that express its potential, ability, and
competence – namely, (1) to interpret, envisage, influence, and generate future
changes, and (2) to prepare for their strategic treatment – that is, to await challenges
that stem from any changes (be they limits/opportunities or threats) in a state of
full preparedness. One may encounter expressions like "future-proofness," "future-
orientedness," "resilience," and "adaptation" in the semantic surroundings of Future
Potential (Szántó, 2018).
The necessary conditions for a social entity’s Future Potential are that the given
entity is self-conscious and constitutes itself, permanently operates in a functional
way, and organizes actions that influence its functioning and environment in the
future. The sufficient conditions of social futuring are that a given social entity is
able to facilitate/create changes or prepare itself to manipulate, exploit, or manage
the risks of future changes.

44
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

The Methodology of the Compilation of the Future Potential Index

The FPI expresses countries' degree of Future Potential, grounding its logic and
composition on multidisciplinary conceptual foundations. Normative standards
such as Balance and Health, Care and Generativity, Attachment and Community,
and Peace and Order form the conceptual framework that defines a “good life”
within nations. These standards intersect with pillars encompassing ecological-
geopolitical, technological, socio-economic, and cultural aspects, which necessitate
strategic management to navigate future changes.
Figure 1: FPI normative standards, pillars, and dimensions

Source: Szántó, Aczél, Bóday & Harsányi (2023)

Figure 1 shows the hierarchy of normative standards. The four layers and
subsequent dimensions are those needed to achieve a good life in a unity of order
and constitutedness.
The foundational layer upon which the entire entity’s structure is built is that of
Peace and Order. An entity cannot function without a meaningful degree of peace
– free from constant threat and disruption – as well as basic order within society.
The Future Potential of an organization cannot be measured if it does not exist in
the present.
Attachment and Community are included in the second most important normative
layer for a social entity to meaningfully exist. The reasoning here is that to exist as
an entity, the entity itself must want to exist, thus necessitating attachment to
something larger than itself. Community forms a bond between individuals and

45
 Szántó et al.

ideally drives action that sustains the country, allowing it to have a measurable
future.
The third layer is formed by the concepts of Care and Generativity. These are
intended to capture the level of future-proofing of any one organization. The
previous two layers help establish and sustain the nation, but to remain sovereign
and stable for the future, the former requirements must be met.
The topmost layer, Balance and Health, serves as a measure of the quality of life. A
nation could most certainly meet all three requirements by ruling with an iron fist,
for example, but a poor quality of life does not meet the standard of a good life of
unity. Thus, this top layer serves as a way to distinguish countries that are
performing well in a holistic manner from those only performing well, say,
economically or in some other single dimension.
Dimensions emerging from this intersection encompass human, environmental, and
instrumental phenomena, explicating the capacities that operationalize these
normative standards and pillars, evaluated across 22 selected indicators. From a
theoretical framework of sixteen potential dimensions (four normative standards
multiplied by four pillars), essential aspects such as Life Prospects, Material
Advancement, Self-Reliance, Family, Belonging, Safety, Assets, and Functionality
were identified for measurement. These are later defined in more detail, as they are
a crucial part of the index.
The FPI serves as a crucial tool for quantifying and expressing the overall Future
Potential of countries and is constructed upon sound multidisciplinary conceptual
foundations to ensure its logical and comprehensive composition.
The Future Potential of countries is defined through normative standards that
define the framework for a good life, including Balance and Health, Care and
Generativity, Attachment and Community, and Peace and Order. These normative
standards intersect with Ecological-Geopolitical, Technological, Socio-Economic,
and Cultural pillars, necessitating strategic management to address future changes.
Dimensions identified from this intersection are human, environmental, and
instrumental phenomena, operationalized through 22 indicators that measure
abilities and capacities. From the theoretically possible sixteen dimensions, essential
ones such as Life Prospects, Material Advancement, Self-Reliance, Family,
Belonging, Safety, Assets, and Functionality were chosen. The FPI quantifies the
degree of a country's Future Potential, structured upon multidisciplinary conceptual
foundations.
The FPI is a composite index of sub-indexes comprising a hierarchical indicator
system based on the holistic Future Potentials conceptual framework. Simply put,

46
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

the FPI is a weighted average of carefully selected indicators that best capture the
elements of Future Potential.
The FPI comprises 22 indicators selected with the help of an expert panel. Each
indicator is transformed into a combined indicator by incorporating its latest value
and change over time. During the process, outliers are handled and all elements are
normalized on a scale of 0 to 100. The combined indicators are weighted and
aggregated according to the structure of the FPI framework.
A hierarchical structure was selected to best grasp the concept of the indicator. This
structure allows for the creation of sub-indicators at different levels to examine the
contexts of the conceptual framework. In general, such hierarchical structures are
the most suitable choice for presenting complex, multi-dimensional phenomena.
To connect the normative standards with the pillars defined in the wider framework,
definitions were prepared to describe the phenomena of each of the nine essential
paired intersections of the aspects, based on which the appropriate indicators could
later be selected.

Selection of Variables
The FPI is, in some ways, the next evolution of the original indicator set employed
by the Social Futuring Index (SFI). Eight indicators have remained unchanged, five
were slightly changed to express a different aspect of the measured phenomenon,
and nine new indicators were selected. A panel comprised of members with
expertise in various academic disciplines and statistics examined the potential
indicators of SFI and compiled the final set of indicators that best suit the written
definitions.
The indicator selection process involved the basic requirements that indicators had
to
 be measurable/available,
 have a time series,
 be accessible from official, publicly available sources,
 have at least OECD-country coverage,
 have no or limited overlap with other indicators and
 have a measurable and meaningful range.

47
 Szántó et al.

Several workshops were held to finalize and fine-tune the indicator set to avoid
overlaps and maintain a balance between the elements of the framework. In the end,
all indicators were designed to capture both the latest value of the given indicator
and its change over time. More details about the compilation of the indicators can
be found under the “Normalization” section below.
For each indicator, the most recent data that was available was used. In most cases,
this involved data from 2020 to 2022. For each indicator, the direction (positive or
negative) of the evaluation was determined based on the concept of Future
Potential. This was an essential step, primarily for the purpose of normalization.

Imputation
As with nearly all datasets, there are cases with missing values. Such missing
observations accounted for only about 2% of our total observations and, therefore,
had little bearing on the final rankings. The selection of indicators was partially based
on an attempt to obtain maximum country coverage. When observations were
missing, or there were clear anomalies – for example, radically different data to other
countries for that observation and seemingly inconsistent with reasonable
boundaries – the observations were imputed using other reliable sources or, in rare
cases, supplemented with the value of a similar country. Again, with less than 2% of
total observations either missing or clearly erroneous, none of the rankings were
sensitive to imputation in these cases.

Normalization and Compilation of Indicators

Normalization is required prior to any data aggregation, as the indicators in a data
set often have different measurement units or orders of magnitude. After filtering
outliers with an interquartile range, the min-max method was chosen because it best
met the needs of a hierarchical model. There were no negative numbers and no
problems handling 0; therefore, additivity was retained.
All indicators are designed to capture both the latest value of the given indicator and
its change over time. This results in a combined value that also captures dynamic
performance.
Change over time is measured by absolute rather than relative change. This reduces
the effect of small value changes (e.g., a change in a value from 1 to 2 is 100% more,
while from 50 to 51, it is only 2% more).

48
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

The basic data for each indicator is the latest available value (filtered of outliers and
normalized) and its absolute change (also filtered of outliers and normalized)
compared to 2010 (in general).
The 'final' normalized indicator for each indicator is calculated as the sum of these
two factors, which are then re-normalized (to a value between 0 and 100) for ease
of interpretation. The two factors are equally weighted, so the range of the
normalized values is 100 for both factors.

Establishing the Index

The study of resilience, future orientation, and future-proofing contributes new
insights into how cultures differ and which parameters affect a group’s ability to
engage with the world around it over time. The FPI aims to do the same while being
grounded on a normative framework. However, as a project, it is not merely an
intellectual endeavor. The Future Potential initiative defined the practical goal of
developing the FPI, a composite measure of countries comprising several
dimensions and indicators associated with four pillars with pre-defined normative
standards.

Pillars
Figure 2 presents the outlines of the FPI, which are summarized here. According to
this logic, the index's concept is based on four pillars: Ecological-Geopolitical,
Technological, Socio-Economic, and Cultural.
The Ecological-Geopolitical pillar captures aspects of a social entity’s assets, such as its
basic Assets (energy, water, land, etc.), without which it would not have
the resources to maintain itself. Moreover, it includes elements that aid in measuring
levels of Safety, Assets, and standards of living to capture various aspects of
Belonging to the social entity and the resources required to develop Future
Potential.
The Technological pillar includes aspects such as a social entity’s ability to connect,
innovate, and function generally. Basic functioning requires fundamental resources
like clean water, while innovation requires a legal framework for patents and
intellectual property. Finally, the ability to network and connect can be measured in
physical terms, such as roads, or digitally, such as internet access and ICT use.
The Socio-Economic pillar includes classical economic areas like capital, labor, various
forms of expenditure, and indicators of unemployment, schooling, and

49
 Szántó et al.

GDP/capita. Socially, the core unit considered appropriate for a stable, socially
cohesive society that has Future Potential is the Family, so the FPI includes
measures such as fertility, the number of single-parent households, couples with
children, work-life balance, ageing and inequality.
Finally, the Cultural pillar – in many ways, the single dimension that makes the FPI
unique since its normative basis is one of the key aspects of Future Potential,
includes measures such as religiosity and adherence to tradition.

Dimensions and Indicators

The dimensions are concepts that can be identified at the intersection of the
normative standards and pillars. From the sixteen possible dimensions (four
normative standards multiplied by four pillars), the eight that were chosen were Life
Prospects, Material Advancement, Self-Reliance, Family, Belonging, Safety, Assets,
and Functionality. These indicate the human, environmental, and instrumental
phenomena, abilities, and capacities that operationalize the meaning of the given
normative standard and pillars. The following is a list containing every dimension
and the related indicators, with their respective weight, used to quantify the
dimension within the whole index. Please refer to Chart 2 for an illustration.
Life Prospects: This is the sole dimension of the Balance and Health normative
standard. It captures the forward-looking aspects of the standard of living, gauging
how good life will be in the future. The dimension is formed at the intersection of
the Cultural and Ecological/Geopolitical pillars with the respective normative
standard. It lies at the top of the pyramid, as it exists only if all other defined
dimensions are present. Indicators: life expectancy (3.3%), alcohol use disorder
(3.3%), anti-depressant usage (3.3%).
Material Advancement: Half of the dimensions in Care and Generativity are comprised
of Material Advancement. Advances in an organization’s technological and
economic sectors are key to maintaining activity and care within the organization.
This dimension is ‘only’ crucial for any entity in relation to keeping up with societies
that are evolving and having a measurable future, but it is not a prerequisite for
existence as a society. Indicators: average wages (3.3%), labor productivity (3.3%),
Gini coefficient (3.3%).
Self-Reliance: The other half of Care and Generativity is located at the intersection
with the Socio-Economic pillar. An organization or nation’s ability to sustain itself
in sectors associated with food and energy is vital to its ability to function as a

50
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

sovereign entity. Indicators: employment rate (3.3%), old age dependency (3.3%),
and population with tertiary education (3.3%).
Family: The normative standard of Attachment and Community is partially
comprised of ‘Family,’ which is at the intersection of both this standard and the
Culture and Socio-Economic pillars. To properly plan for the future, a population
must be sustainable; steady growth measured by Family size can provide insight
here. However, Family is equally important to individual wellbeing and thus plays a
role in measuring future success. Indicators: single person households (7.5%),
fertility rate (7.5%).
Belonging: While Family is a necessity, personal attachments to groups and individuals
outside of one's own household can indicate a higher level of cooperation among
an organization and may be a measure of overall well-being. This dimension is
associated with the Culture and Socio-Economic pillars due to their significant
presence in determining how and with whom any one individual may interact.
Indicators: registered voters who actually voted (7.5%), self-reported religiousness
(7.5%).
Safety: The foundation of Peace and Order is partially based on the Safety of
individuals. Ecological conditions and geopolitics influence this dimension greatly
due to their ability to affect every individual. To ensure there is a community to
belong to, residents must feel that they are safe from local, foreign, and ecological
threats. Indicators: global peace index (4.4%), energy import dependence (4.4%),
ecological balance (4.4%)
Assets: To develop Peace and Order both ecologically and geopolitically, the
government and society must have enough Assets to address problems/threats.
From domestic production to having cash on hand, Assets are key in the
establishment of an organization capable of measuring its Future Potential.
Indicators: renewable water sources (4.4%), government debt (4.4%), investment
debt (4.4%).
Functionality: The last vital dimension that underpins the existence of a society is
Functionality. Indicators: gross national income (4.4%), global innovation index
(4.4%), internet users as a share of individuals (4.4%).

51
 Szántó et al.

Figure 2: FPI indicators

Source: Szántó, Aczél, Bóday & Harsányi (2023)

Main results
In the first iteration of the index in 2022, Iceland led the OCED nations in the FPI
with a score of 64.4 out of 100. Greece rounded out the group with a score of 36,
slightly more than half of Iceland’s score. A difference of almost thirty points is not
insignificant; there are a few areas where this difference does not occur within the
country profiles within the FPI.
Starting with the foundational normative standard of Peace and Order, Iceland
outranks Greece in every dimension. The smallest gap between these two nations
was 37 points in Safety. In the dimensions of Assets and Functionality, the scores
were 70.1 and 47.2, respectively. While the difference between the two countries’
Peace and Order scores is the largest in the index, this highlights the robustness of
the index. Greece has a near-average score for Balance and Health, which helped
narrow its score to within 30 points of Iceland, despite the 50+ point gap in the
Peace and Order score, a dimension that accounts for 40% of the total index score.

52
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

Figure 3: Overall FPI ranking of OECD countries (2022)

Source: Szántó, Aczél, Bóday & Harsányi (2023)

According to the FPI, Iceland is the country best suited to face the future (scoring
four points more than the nation with the second-highest score, Israel). Iceland
ranked highest on the dimensions of Material Advancement (68.1), Safety (82.3),
Assets (82.8), and Functionality (75.1). However, Iceland performed poorly in
Balance and Health, ranking 33rd out of all OECD countries. It is on the dimensions
of Life Prospects and Family where last-placed Greece outperforms Iceland, ranking
22nd and 28th, respectively, out of all the OECD countries.
It is important to note here that Denmark and Germany are the only two countries
in the top ten performing nations that do not place in the bottom quarter of the
rankings for any of the normative standards. This is in sharp contrast to the
countries that ranked between 11 and 19 in the index, of which five did not rank in
the bottom quarter for any normative standards. Four of those five nations ranked
in the top 10 for at least one normative standards.
These statistics highlight the significant variability across nations, making calculating
Future Potential difficult. The common trend among the top ten nations is a strong
foundation. High scores across the normative standards of Peace and Order,
attachment, and community suggest the establishment of a more stable nation,
leading to a higher score.
An example of a nation lacking such a foundation would be Japan, an aging,
indebted society that ranks 35th on the FPI. Despite ranking second in Life
Prospects with a score of 88.9 and 9th in Self-Reliance, it lacks the fundamentals of
a stable society, ranking 34th in Peace and Order and 38th in Attachment and

53
 Szántó et al.

Community. It must address its slowing economy, growing debt, and aging
population to become better positioned to address future problems. Without
addressing these issues, Japan may be caught flatfooted as it lacks Assets and Safety.

The Role of Sustainability Within the Future Potential Index

The concepts of environmental sustainability and measuring Future Potential are
difficult to distinguish at first sight, and both are clearly future-oriented (Kocsis,
2018). On a deeper level, it becomes evident that both fields paradoxically cannot
exist without one another. It is not possible to measure a society's Future Potential
if it is not functioning in a sustainable manner. However, it is equally impossible to
classify a society as sustainable if it is incapable of ensuring the basic features that
permit the measurement of its Future Potential.
Thus, any index that measures a certain degree of sustainability will also measure the
level of a society's Future Potential. Conversely, any index that measures the Future
Potential of a society will inherently capture how environmentally sustainable that
society is. The relationship between these two features helps highlight the
uniqueness of the FPI.
The United Nations maintains an index that measures each country’s progress in
achieving the sustainable development goals (SGDs). (The SDGs are a series of
goals defined by the UN as a roadmap for creating a future that address inequality,
climate change, and any other potential issue that could hinder development). The
index is comprised of 84 indicators that measure the 17 different goals and each
subsection of these goals.
Ranging from economic growth to poverty alleviation to achieving net zero carbon
emissions, the SDGs have similar goals to the FPI, making the two a good pair for
comparison in terms of how they rank OECD nations.

Comparing the FPI Against the Sustainability Development Goals Index

(SDGI)
The FPI, as established, emphasizes the necessity of peace and community for
achieving a good life in a unity of order. Yet, this is not the only way a nation’s
success or readiness for the future may be measured. Numerous other indices, from
the Happiness Report to the Human Development Index, have attempted to do
this. However, the SDGI takes one of the most holistic approaches, as it is centered
around sustainable development, thus making it a good index to compare against

54
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

the FPI. By comparing the indexes, it is possible to highlight the uniqueness of the
FPI and how the methodology is applied. Israel and the United Kingdom are prime
examples that highlight the differences well.
In the FPI, Israel was ranked second overall among all OCED countries but in the
bottom five by the SDGI. Based on how Israel ranks over the next few years, the
importance of measuring the Peace and Order normative standard and Material
Advancement will be significant. War, while not considered in these reports, is
unsustainable, but being able to defend oneself properly in/against war and amass
strong allies is pivotal to ensuring a nation remains sovereign. While the region may
not be safe today, Israel is liable to survive and recover due to the country’s high
pre-war FPI score.
As measured by the FPI Life Prospects, the United Kingdom (UK) has some of the
worst Life Prospects in the OECD, and the nation lacks the necessary Belonging
and key Assets. While the FPI contains only twenty-two indicators, all of them are
of value. However, the SDGI has seventeen dimensions, each with its own
indicators. So, while the UK is projected to fall short of its goals in the areas of good
health and well-being, it is still ranked in the top ten of the OECD nations in terms
of the SDGs. Hedging against certain indicators always has its benefits, preventing
nations from wild swings in their index score.
The two ‘case studies’ that compare the FPI to another major index show the
dynamism of the FPI. There are enough indicators and, importantly, variations in
the type of indicators that make up the index to avoid violent swings in
measurement. Great Britain is downgraded for its permanent shortcomings with
some key elements needed to achieve a good life in an order of unity. On the other
hand, throughout the war, Israel’s situation was coherent with the FPI findings from
previous years; a well-prepared country can successfully handle a major problem due
to its future-proofing measures. These results are currently the most concrete
evidence that the FPI has established a meaningful way of measuring how future-
proofed a country is and how we can learn from the successes of other nations.
Figure 3 shows the overall FPI rankings of OECD countries. Overall, northern
European nations dominate the top 10 list, taking four of the five top spots in the
Index. This is seen with other indexes, too, as Nordic nations are typically ranked
highly. However, we start to see some deviation in the lower half of the top 10. In
other indexes, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), Turkey ranks below
the nations of France, Italy, Japan, and Greece, but in the FPI, we see Turkey ranked
well above this latter group, in seventh place from all OECD countries. The

55
 Szántó et al.

aforementioned group of nations places 23rd, 32nd, 35th, and 38th, respectively, in
the overall FPI rankings of OECD countries.
Figure 4: OECD country ranking according to Peace and Order
normative standard (2022)

Source: Szántó, Aczél, Bóday & Harsányi (2023)

Figure 5: OECD country ranking according to Attachment and Community
normative standard (2022)

Source: Szántó, Aczél, Bóday & Harsányi (2023)

According to the normative standard of Peace and Order, Iceland remains at the
top. Accounting for 40% of a nation’s total FPI score, this normative standard has

56
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

the most weight of all four normative standards. Despite the security the United
States enjoys due to its large military, the FPI ranks it in 24th place. With a
government debt of more than 100% of GDP and an increasing deficit, there is a
lack of major fiscal responsibility in the States, resulting in a lower score. Other
notable movements include Israel in 15th place (2nd overall) and Estonia in 8th for
Peace and Order (17th overall).
The normative standard of Attachment and Community captures the more personal
elements of nations, something that can be hard to quantify. The top quartile here
is dominated by Central European nations, with Slovakia in 1st (9th overall),
Slovenia in 5th (14th overall), and Czechia in 10th (18th overall) place. This
highlights one of the FPI’s strengths – countries like Iceland and Denmark (3rd
overall) fall to 17th and 16th place when scored on this normative standard. Being
able to capture these details helps enhance the robustness of the index.
Figure 6: OECD country ranking according to Care and Generativity
normative standard (2022)

Source: Szántó, Aczél, Bóday & Harsányi (2023)

With the normative standard of Care and Generativity, there are some
significant changes in the rankings of the OECD nations. Poland’s ranking increases
the most relative to the overall scores. The nation jumps from 28th overall to 7th
on this standard. However, the largest change in ranking occurs with Israel, which
drops from 2nd overall to 29th on this normative standard. Having a wide range of
standards and indicators allows the FPI to capture these massive changes in
performance while still providing a fair and holistic evaluation of each nation. Other

57
 Szántó et al.

notable changes are Japan gaining 19 spots and Ireland dropping 19 spots (in terms
of the relation of the overall FPI ranking to the ranking for Care and Generativity).
Figure 7: OECD country ranking according to Balance and Health
normative standard (2022)

Source: Szántó, Aczél, Bóday & Harsányi (2023)

The final normative standard, Balance and Health, is attributed 10% of the
combined weight of all the standards. With this measurement, there are drastically
different rankings. Japan gains 33 spots (from 35th overall to 2nd) for this normative
standard. The top spot is held by the only other eastern-Asian nation, South Korea.
The scores (ranking) for Iceland and Latvia decline the most for this normative
standard, dropping 32 and 23 places, respectively. This is the weakest score for
Iceland, but the country’s performance is well-rounded enough to ensure it the top
spot despite performing poorly on certain indicators.

Conclusions
This paper has presented the newly created FPI. The index is based on the Future
Potentials concept and the effort to operationalize the concept into a metric with
some value and potential utility to researchers and policymakers alike. The first
index was created for OECD countries using 2022 data and demonstrates the
viability of the concept and index.
The concept we have applied is unique in that it creates a substantive normative
framework that guides the determination of the architecture on which an entity, its
Future Potential, and our measures are based. We then provide details about each

58
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

layer of the architecture in the context of the framework and how they are
transformed into data-based metrics.
We show that the overall index is different from other indices and is robust
because of its multi-layered (horizontal) plus multi-pillared (vertical) approach,
creating a structure that incorporates weights for various categories, all of which
indicate Future Potential. This allows researchers to explore inter-country
differences and intra-country ones across various categories that are deemed
important for determining a nation’s Future Potential.
Policymakers in these countries can likewise use this index and sub-category
rankings to determine where the policy focus is most appropriate going forward.
Again, the FPI concept and index are different because we do not intend to help
policymakers maximize a single objective like GDP or “happiness,” however
defined today. Rather, the FPI may help policymakers focus on what they can do to
improve their nation’s outcomes today, and how they can sustain and improve the
Future Potential of their nation in terms of the aspects they value themselves.

59
 Szántó et al.

References
Aczél, P. “Social Futuring – A Discursive-conceptual Framework.” Society and
Economy 40, Issue S1, 2018:47-75. https://doi.org/10.1556/204.2018.40.s1.4
Csák, J. “Social Futuring – A Normative Framework.” Society and Economy 40, Issue
S1, 2018: 21–45. https://doi.org/10.1556/204.2018.40.s1.3
Haldane, J. “Practical Philosophy: Ethics, Society and Culture.” St. Andrews
Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Imprint Academic, 2009.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00008.x
Kocsis, T. “Finite Earth, Infinite Ambitions: Social Futuring and Sustainability as
Seen by a Social Scientist.” Society and Economy 40, Issue S1, 2018: 111–142.
https://doi.org/10.1556/ 204.2018.40.S1.6
Kocsis, T. “The Future Potential Index (FPI) in the Context of Economy, Society
and Nature: Intenscoping Nine Composite Indices Measuring Country
Performance.” 2020. (Unpublished manuscript)
Monda, E. “Social Futuring – In the Context of Futures Studies.” Society and
Economy 40, Issue S1, 2018: 77–109. https://doi.org/10.1556/204.2018.40.s1.5
Strauss, L. “Natural Right and History”. Chapter II. Natural Right and the Distinction
between Facts and Values. The University of Chicago Press. 1953
Szántó, Z.O. “Social Futuring – An Analytical Conceptual Framework.” Society
and Economy 40, Issue S1, 2018: 5–20. https://doi.org/10.1556/204.2018.40.S1.2
Szántó, Z.O., Aczél, P., Csák, J. and Ball, C. “Foundations of the Social Futuring
Index.” Információs Társadalom,19(4), 2019: 115–132.
https://dx.doi.org/10.22503/inftars.XIX.2019.4.8
Szántó, Z. O., Aczél, P., Csák, J., Szabadhegy, P., Morgado, N., Deli, E.,
Sebestyény, J. and Bóday, P. “Social Futuring Index – Concept, Methodology and Full
Report 2020.” Corvinus University of Budapest, Social Futuring Center, Budapest
2020
Szántó, Z. O. and Mueller, J.D., “Social Futuring, Modern and Ancient.” World
Futures, 79(2), 267-296. https://doi.org/10.1080/02604027.2022.2059305 2022
Szántó, Z. O., Aczél, P., Bóday, P. and Harsányi P. “Future Potential Index 2022 –
Concept, Measurements and Results” Presentation, Future Potentials Observatory,
Budapest (URL:
https://api.mome.hu/uploads/Future_Potential_Index_PPT_5ee60aa904.pdf,
date of download: 2024.06.30)

60
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

VanderWeele, T.J. “On the promotion of human flourishing.” Proceedings of the

National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A., 2017, 31:8148-8156.

Appendix 1 – Indicators associated with the Future Potential Index

1. Global Peace Index

(direction: negative, normative standard: Peace & Order, dimension: Safety)
Definition: The Global Peace Index is a composite index calculated using 23
qualitative and quantitative indicators and measures the state of peace across three
domains: a) the level of Societal Safety and Security, b) the extent of Ongoing
Domestic and International Conflict, c) the degree of Militarization.
Unit of Measure: Index (1 to 5)
Source of Data: Vision of Humanity, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/public-
release-data/
2. Energy Import Dependency
(direction: negative, normative standard: Peace & Order, dimension: Safety)
Definition: Energy import dependency is estimated as energy use minus
production, both measured in oil equivalents and divided by final energy
consumption.
Unit of Measure: Percent of energy use
Source of Data: UN, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/energystats/dataPortal/
3. Ecological Balance
(direction: positive, normative standard: Peace & Order, dimension: Safety)
Definition: The ecological balance is the difference between a population’s
ecological footprint and a country’s biocapacity. If a country's demand exceeds its
biocapacity, it has an ecological deficit. If a country's biocapacity exceeds its
ecological footprint, it has an ecological reserve.
Unit of Measure: Global hectare
Source of Data: Global Footprint Network,
http://data.footprintnetwork.org/#/exploreData
4. Renewable Water Resources

61
 Szántó et al.

(direction: positive, normative standard: Peace & Order, dimension: Assets)

Definition: "Total annual actual renewable water resources per inhabitant
[Total renewable water resources per capita] = [Total renewable water resources] *
1000000 / [Total population]".
Unit of Measure: Cubic meter/inhabitant
Source of Data: FAO, https://tableau.apps.fao.org/views/ReviewDashboard-
v1/country_dashboard?%3Aembed=y&%3AisGuestRedirectFromVizportal=y
5. Government Debt
(direction: negative, normative standard: Peace & Order, dimension: Assets)
Definition: General government debt-to-GDP ratio measures the gross debt of
the general government as a percentage of GDP.
Unit of Measure: Percent of GDP
Source of Data: IMF,
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GG_DEBT_GDP@GDD/hun
6. Investment Rate
(direction: positive, normative standard: Peace & Order, dimension: Assets)
Definition: The investment rate is defined as gross investment (gross fixed capital
formation) divided by GDP.
Unit of Measure: Percent of GDP
Source of Data: OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?lang=en#
7. Gross National Income (GNI)
(direction: positive, normative standard: Peace & Order, dimension: Functionality)
Definition: Gross National Income (GNI) is an indicator derived from GDP that
takes into account primary income received from abroad and paid abroad. Unlike
gross domestic product, it does not include the income associated with foreign
ownership generated by foreign capital operating in the country or the income of
foreign workers in a country, but it does include the income earned abroad by
investors and workers in a country and the sum of the balance of subsidies
received and taxes paid from abroad.
Unit of Measure: USD (current price and PPP)

62
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

Source of Data: OECD, https://data.oecd.org/natincome/gross-national-

income.htm

8. Global Innovation Index

(direction: positive, normative standard: Peace & Order, dimension: Functionality)
Definition: The Global Innovation Index (GII) ranks world economies according
to their innovation capabilities. Consisting of roughly 80 indicators grouped into
innovation inputs and outputs, the GII aims to capture the multi-dimensional
facet of innovation.
Unit of Measure: Score (0 to 100)
Source of Data: Global Innovation Index,
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
9. Internet Users as a Share of Individuals
(direction: positive, normative standard: Peace & Order, dimension: Functionality)
Definition: Internet users as a share of individuals measures Internet uptake by
the adult population who have used the Internet over the past three months prior
to being surveyed.
Unit of Measure: Percent of individuals aged 16-74
Source of Data: Going Digital, https://goingdigital.oecd.org/indicator/20
10. Share of Single-Person Households
(direction: negative, normative standard: Attachment & Community, dimension:
Family)
Definition: Share of single-person households among all households.
Unit of Measure: Percent of all households
Source of Data: Eurostat,
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_lvph02/default/table?lang=
en
11. Fertility Rate
(direction: positive, normative standard: Attachment & Community, dimension:
Family)

63
 Szántó et al.

Definition: The total fertility rate is defined as the total number of children that
would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing
years and give birth to children in alignment with the prevailing age-specific
fertility rates.
Unit of Measure: Number of children
Source of Data: OECD,
https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=HEALTH_DEMR&lang=en
#
12. Registered Voters Who Actually Voted
(direction: positive, normative standard: Attachment & Community, dimension:
Belonging)
Definition: The total number of votes cast (valid or invalid) divided by the
number of names on the voter register, expressed as a percentage.
Parliamentary Elections: The parliamentary elections displayed in the voter turnout
database are elections to the national legislative body of a country or territory. If
the legislative body has two chambers, only the second (lower) chamber is
included. If elections are carried out in two rounds (using the two-round system,
TRS), only the second election round is included.
Unit of Measure: Percent
Source of Data: International Idea, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/world-
view/40?st=par#rep
13. Self-reported Religiousness
(direction: positive, normative standard: Attachment & Community, dimension:
Belonging)
Definition: The share of those who reply that they are religious to the question.
“Are you (1) A religious person, (2) Not a religious person, or (3) A convinced
atheist?”
Unit of Measure: Percent
Source of Data: World Values Survey,
https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp ; https://ess-
search.nsd.no/CDW/ConceptVariables

64
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

14. Average Wages

(direction: positive, normative standard: Care & Generativity, dimension: Material
Advancement)
Definition: Average annual wages per full-time and full-year equivalent employee
in the total economy. Average annual wages per full-time equivalent dependent
employee are obtained by dividing the national-accounts-based total wage bill by
the average number of employees in the total economy, which is then multiplied
by the ratio of average usual weekly hours per full-time employee to average
usually weekly hours for all employees.
Unit of Measure: USD (constant prices 2021 and PPPs)
Source of Data: OECD,
https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=AV_AN_WAGE&lang=en#
15. Labor Productivity
(direction: positive, normative standard: Care & Generativity, dimension: Material
Advancement)
Definition: GDP per hour worked is a measure of labor productivity. This
measures how efficiently labor input is combined with other factors of production
and used in the production process. Labor input is defined as the total hours
worked by all persons engaged in production. Labor productivity only partially
reflects the productivity of labor in terms of the personal capacities of workers or
the intensity of their efforts. The ratio between the output measure and the labor
input depends to a large degree on the presence and/or use of other inputs (e.g.,
capital, intermediate inputs, technical, organizational, and efficiency change,
economies of scale). This indicator is measured in USD (constant prices 2010 and
PPPs) and indices.
Unit of Measure: USD (constant prices 2010 and PPPs)
Source of Data: OECD, https://data.oecd.org/lprdty/gdp-per-hour-
worked.htm#indicator-chart
16. Gini-coefficient (Wealth)
(direction: negative, normative standard: Care & Generativity, dimension: Material
Advancement)
Definition: The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of the wealth
distribution in a population. Higher values indicate a higher level of inequality.

65
 Szántó et al.

Unit of Measure: 0-100

Source of Data: Credit Suisse, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-
us/en/reports-research/global-wealth-report.html
17. Employment Rate
(direction: positive, normative standard: Care & Generativity, dimension: Self-
Reliance)
Definition: Employment rates measure the extent to which available labor
resources (people available to work) are being used. They are calculated as the
ratio of the employed to the working-age population.
Unit of Measure: Percent of working-age population,
Source of Data: OECD, https://data.oecd.org/emp/employment-rate.htm
18. Old Age Dependency
(direction: negative, normative standard: Care & Generativity, dimension: Self-
Reliance)
Definition: The ratio of dependents older than 64 to the working-age population
(15-64).
Unit of Measure: Percent of working-age population
Source of Data: WB, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL
19. Population with Tertiary Education
(direction: positive, normative standard: Care & Generativity, dimension: Self-
Reliance)
Definition: Population with tertiary education is defined as those having
completed the highest level of education. This includes both theoretical programs
leading to advanced research or high-skill professions such as medicine and other
vocational programs leading to the labor market. The measure is the percentage of
the same-age population. As globalization and technology continue to reshape the
needs of labor markets worldwide, the demand for individuals with a broader
knowledge base and more specialized skills continues to rise.
Unit of Measure: 25–64-year-olds, % in same age group
Source of Data: OECD, https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/adult-education-
level.htm#indicator-chart

66
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

20. Life Expectancy

(direction: positive, normative standard: Balance & Health, dimension: Life
Prospects)
Definition: Life expectancy at birth is defined as how long, on average, a
newborn can expect to live, if current death rates do not change.
Unit of Measure: Years
Source of Data: OECD, https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/life-expectancy-at-
birth.htm#indicator-chart
21. Alcohol Use Disorder
(direction: negative, normative standard: Balance & Health, dimension: Life
Prospects)
Definition: Alcohol dependence is defined by the International Classification of
Diseases as the presence of three or more indicators of dependence for at least a
month within the previous year. To allow comparisons between countries and
over time, this metric is age-standardized.
Unit of Measure: Percent
Source of Data: Our world in data, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-
with-alcohol-use-disorders?time=2019
22. Anti-depressant Usage
(direction: negative, normative standard: Balance & Health, dimension: Life
Prospects)
Definition: Antidepressant drug consumption in DDD. Defined daily dose
(DDD) is the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its
main indication in adults.
Unit of measure: Defined daily dosage (DDD) per 1,000 people per day
Source of data: OECD,
https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=HEALTH_PHMC

67
 Szántó et al.

Appendix 2 – Weighting and Aggregation

Weights were defined on the basis of the conceptual framework and considering
the importance of the normative standards. All indicators within each dimension
were equally weighted.

Weight
Weight according Weight Number of
Normative according
to Normative Dimensions according to Indicators within
Standards to
Standards Dimensions the Dimension
Indicators

Peace & Order 40 Safety 13.3 3 Indicators 4.4

Assets 13.3 3 Indicators 4.4

Functionality 13.3 3 Indicators 4.4

Attachment &
Community 30

Family 15 2 Indicators 7.5

Belonging 15 2 Indicators 7.5

Care & Material

Generativity 20 Advancement 10 3 Indicators 3.3

Self-Reliance 10 3 Indicators 3.3

Balance & Balance and

Health 10 Generativity 10 3 Indicators 3.3

Aggregation was based on weights and normalized indicator values. Based on this,
sub-indicators can also be defined (at the dimension and normative standard level).
All composite indicators should be interpreted on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.
Also, the composite indicator at any given level can be built from the sub-
indicators that comprise it. This greatly facilitates the analysis of the effect of the
indicator composition.

68
 The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

Appendix 3 – Ranking of OECD countries according to indicators

69
 Szántó et al.

70
The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

71
 Szántó et al.

72
The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

73
 Szántó et al.

74
The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

75
 Szántó et al.

76
The Future Potential Index for OECD Countries

77
 Szántó et al.

78
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch3

Methodological Concepts in Small States Research:

Introducing the Geopolitical Power Index Framework
Marta Zorko1

Abstract
In recent years, the study of small states has gained increasing attention in the field
of international relations and geopolitics. These states, often overlooked in
traditional analyses dominated by great powers, may play a significant role in shaping
global affairs of a multipolar order. However, existing methodological frameworks
for studying small states dynamics often fall short in capturing the complexities of
their geopolitical behaviour and potential in their global power dynamics. To
address this gap, this paper presents a methodological concept of the Geopolitical
Power Index which was originally developed for Routledge Small States Series book
(Car & Zorko, 2025). The main aim here is to test it across different disciplines and
methodological approaches common for research in the area of geopolitics and
International Relations. This paper debates on usage of indexation in geopolitical
analysis and purpose of such indexes for future research. Unlike traditional power
that primarily focus on military capabilities or economic strength, the GPI
Framework considers a broader range of factors relevant to small states, including
geographical positioning, diplomatic influence, digitalization readiness, and
resilience to cyber threats. The GPI framework enables comparative analysis across
different small states, allowing researchers to identify patterns and trends within
diverse group of countries.

Key Words:
Geopolitical Power Index, GPI framework, small states, Routledge Small States
Book Series

1 University of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science

 Zorko

Introduction

In the vast landscape of geopolitical theory, the spotlight has historically been
dominated by the great powers (Mackinder, 1919; Spykman, 1942; Kennedy, 1989;
Kissinger, 1994; Huntington, 1996; Brzezinski, 1997; Mearsheimer; 2001; Zakaria,
2008; Kagan, 2013; Allison, 2017). The name itself – Great Game – suggest that
only big players are allowed to participate. The Great Game often include analysis
on actions and reactions of great powers instead of focusing on balance of power
in International Relations or even minor roles that small(er) states may play in
international arena. This focus stems from the traditional view that these large,
powerful states are the primary architects of international order and the main drivers
of global political dynamics. Theories and models developed by prominent
geopolitical scholars, Mackinder’s Heartland Theory (1904; 1919) or Mahan’s Sea
Power concept (1890), predominantly emphasize the strategic maneuverers of large
states. As a result, the geopolitical discourse has often overlooked the significant
roles and capabilities of small states in shaping the global order.
The traditional neglect of small states can be attributed to several factors. Firstly,
the classical understanding of power in geopolitics is rooted in tangible assets such
as military strength, economic clout, and territorial expanse—metrics by which small
states often fall short. This has led to a pervasive underestimation of their potential
impact on international relations. Additionally, the realist school of thought, which
has heavily influenced geopolitical theory, tends to prioritize the study of power
politics among major states, reinforcing the marginalization of smaller nations.
However, this traditional perspective is increasingly at odds with contemporary
geopolitical realities. In an era marked by rapid technological advancements,
globalization, and the proliferation of digital spaces, the influence of small states
cannot be further ignored. Small states often possess unique strategic advantages,
such as agility in diplomatic maneuvers (Luša & Picula, 2025), the ability to forge
niche economic roles, and the capacity to act as mediators in international conflicts.
Furthermore, the rise of cyber capabilities and digital diplomacy provides small
states with new avenues to exert influence and alter geopolitical dynamics. For
example, Estonia's pioneering efforts in e-governance and cybersecurity have
positioned it as a global leader in digital innovation, despite its small size (Puusalu,
2025; Mikac et all, 2025). Similarly, countries like Malta (Grech & Debattista; 2025)
and Iceland (Kos-Stanišić et all, 2025) have leveraged their strategic positions and
specialized sectors to punch above their weight in international affairs. These
examples underscore the need for a revised geopolitical framework that

80
 Methodological Concepts in Small States Research

acknowledges the significant, albeit different, forms of power potential wielded by

small states.
While great powers undoubtedly play a crucial role in shaping the global order, the
capabilities and contributions of small states must not be overlooked. By expanding
the scope of geopolitical analysis to include the strategic behaviours and innovative
approaches of small states, scholars and policymakers can gain a more
comprehensive understanding of the contemporary international landscape. This
shift in perspective is essential for recognizing the multifaceted nature of power in
the 21st century and for fostering a more inclusive and accurate representation of
global geopolitical dynamics and multipolar World. Bearing in mind multiple “new”
subjects arisen, small states are also one of them, but in old traditional nation-state
centric way. In the evolving landscape of global politics, the emergence of a
multipolar world order is reshaping the dynamics of international relations both with
new subjects as well as under new processes and in new unconventional dimensions.
This paper offers insights on already developed Geopolitical Power Index (Car &
Zorko, 2025). The existing index combines different geopolitical factors and
recognized “four key categories for analysis of geopolitical power – geographical
power; social and political power; economy power; and military power. While first
factor is rather easy to present, later three should be represented by combination of
indexes and qualitative interpretation of existing data and indicators” (Car & Zorko,
2025: 4). Moreover, the fifth category in a form of cyber-power was tested as a
stand-alone factor for future research trough case-study oriented part of the book.
But, following Nuno Morgado (2023: 15) re-thinking on power, stating that “power
and potential are two different concepts” one must consider this power-divide as a
factor for itself. As further explained (ibidem) “power depends on potential; i.e.,
power is “inferior” to potential in the sense that there will always be a waste of, or
mismanagement of, resources in the process of their extraction and
operationalization. Consequently, power is the revelation of potential in a particular
space and time. It follows that if the assessment of potential is demanding, the full-
scale apprehension of power before it is revealed in its course of action is virtually
unachievable”. Power depends on potential, meaning that without the underlying
resources or capacities, power cannot be exerted. However, power is considered
“inferior” to potential because not all potential can be perfectly converted into
power. In that sense, actual power potential, rather than power itself should be a
scope for wider framework. There is also another dimension to consider in a form
of the will to act. One might have both potential and power but without will to act
there are no actual changes in power dynamics.

81
 Zorko

The role of small states in multipolar world

Traditionally overshadowed by great powers, small states are increasingly asserting
their influence and redefining their roles on the global stage. This shift is driven by
a combination of strategic adaptability, technological advancements, and the fluid
nature of modern geopolitical alliances. The end of the Cold War and the
subsequent decline of bipolarity marked the beginning of this transformation. The
power vacuum left by the diminishing dominance of the United States and the
Soviet Union created opportunities for new actors to emerge. In a multipolar world,
power is distributed among multiple states, including emerging powers like China,
India, and Brazil. This diffusion of power has inadvertently provided small states
with more room to manoeuvre and assert their influence. Technological
advancements, particularly in the realms of digitalization and cybersecurity, have
further levelled the playing field. Small states like Estonia and Singapore have
harnessed their technological prowess to become leaders in e-governance and digital
innovation, setting global standards and influencing international policies. These
states have demonstrated that size is no longer a determinant of influence; rather, it
is the ability to innovate and adapt that defines a state's role in the contemporary
world. Small states have also excelled in niche diplomacy and multilateral
engagement. Countries such as Norway and Switzerland have established
themselves as key mediators in international conflicts, leveraging their perceived
neutrality and diplomatic agility. Moreover, the strategic importance of small states
has been amplified by their geographic positions. States like Qatar and the UAE,
situated in geopolitically critical regions, have used their resources and strategic
locations to become pivotal players in regional politics. Their roles in energy markets,
financial sectors, and as hubs for international dialogue further underscore their
rising influence.
Small states are typically defined by factors such as their population size and
geographical area. However, there is no universally accepted definition, and scholars
often employ a range of criteria to classify states as “small” (Crowards, 2002; Maass,
2008; 2009). Research on small states encompasses a wide range of topics, including
their security strategies, diplomatic behavior, economic policies, and regional
dynamics (Goetschel, 1998; Ingebritsen et all., 2006; Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006;
Briguglio, 2016; Baldacchino & Wivel, 2020). Scholars examine how small states
navigate the complexities of the international system, form alliances, and pursue
their national interests in a world dominated by larger powers (O Tuathail et all,.
1998; Walton, 2007; Grey & Sloan, 2014; Dittmer & Sharp, 2014; Morgado, 2021,
Baldacchino, 2023). But often not from the perspective of small states ability to
change or influence the change in global world order but from the perspective how

82
 Methodological Concepts in Small States Research

to cope in/with existing one. For instance, there is a book “Small States in World
Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior” (2003) edited by Jeanne A.K. Hey
explores the foreign policy strategies of small states in various regions of the world
and provides theoretical frameworks for understanding their behaviour in the
international arena. Furthermore, book “Geopolitics of the Knowledge-Based
Economy” (2019) by Sami Moisio examines the geopolitical implications of the
knowledge-based economy, including the role of digital technologies in shaping
power dynamics and international relations. The book “Digital Diplomacy: Theory
and Practice” (2015) edited by Corneliu Bjola and Marcus Holmes is a book that
examines the evolving role of digital technologies in diplomacy and international
relations, including the use of social media, digital platforms, and cyber tools by
states and non-state actors but not focusing on small states in particular. Finally,
“The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience” (2009) by
Andrew F. Cooper, Timothy M. Shaw is an in-depth analysis of the various methods
used by small states to overcome their vulnerabilities in the international arena.
The concept of “small states” remains one of the most elusive and debated topics
in geopolitical discourse. Despite extensive research and numerous theoretical
frameworks, there is still no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a
small state. This lack of a clear definition presents significant challenges for scholars,
policymakers, and international organizations attempting to understand and address
the unique issues faced by these states and potential roles they could play in global
order. At the core of this definitional ambiguity is the complexity and diversity of
criteria used to categorize states as “small”. Traditionally, size has been measured in
terms of geographical area and population. However, these metrics alone fail to
capture the multifaceted nature of state power and influence. For instance, many
small states possess substantial economic clout, advanced technological capabilities,
or significant geopolitical importance due to their strategic locations. These factors
complicate simplistic size-based classifications and highlight the need for a more
nuanced understanding.
Different academic disciplines offer varied definitions, further complicating the
discourse. In international relations, small states are often defined by their limited
ability to influence global politics and their dependence on larger states for security
and economic stability. In contrast, economists might classify small states based on
economic indicators such as GDP or market size, while political scientists might
focus on institutional capacity and governance structures.
Moreover, the relative nature of smallness means that a state's classification can
change over time or depending on the context. A country considered small in one

83
 Zorko

regional context might be viewed differently in another. Moreover, the “smallness”

is interconnected to power potential as well.
The lack of a standard definition has practical implications. It affects the design and
implementation of policies tailored to small states, potentially leading to ineffective
or inappropriate measures. International organizations, such as the United Nations
or the World Bank, often have to adapt their programs and support mechanisms to
fit a broad range of state sizes and conditions, which can dilute the effectiveness of
their interventions. Without a clear understanding of what constitutes a small state,
it is challenging to form cohesive groups or alliances that can effectively lobby for
their collective interests on the global stage. This fragmentation can weaken the
position of small states in international negotiations and forums, where unified
action is often necessary to influence outcomes. This definitional ambiguity
complicates scholarly research, policy formulation, and international cooperation,
underscoring the need for a more comprehensive and flexible approach to
understanding the unique characteristics and needs of small states.

Methodology, Indexation, Power Categories, and Intent to Measure

In international relations (IR), indexation refers to the process of ranking or
measuring countries or regions based on specific criteria. It typically involves the
creation of indices that help in comparing various aspects of state behaviour,
development, and power dynamics usually reserved for geopolitics. These indices
can be focused on economic, political, military, environmental, or societal factors
and are used to facilitate analysis and policy decisions. In geopolitics, the
methodological use of indexes involves a systematic approach to quantifying and
comparing different dimensions of state power, stability, or potential influence in
relation to ability to influence or change world order. Researchers and policymakers
employ these indexes to organize complex data into measurable indicators, allowing
for the comparison of states or regions across specific variables such as military
strength, economic resilience, or governance quality. Methodologically, this process
begins by selecting relevant metrics, collecting data from reliable sources (e.g.,
international organizations or national reports), and then aggregating this
information into composite scores that reflect broader geopolitical trends. The
construction of these indexes often follows statistical techniques like normalization
or weighting to ensure that diverse variables are comparable and reflective of real-
world conditions. Analysts then use these indices to draw correlations, identify
patterns, or inform models of prediction in geopolitical behaviour, enhancing
decision-making in international arena. However, rigorous attention is paid to the

84
 Methodological Concepts in Small States Research

choice of indicators and data sources to minimize biases and ensure that the index
accurately captures the complexities of the global landscape. However the use of
multiple indexes are often needed to ensure more objective perspective.
While indexes in geopolitics offer valuable insights, they also face significant
shortcomings that can undermine their reliability and applicability. One major
limitation is the potential for bias and subjectivity in the selection and weighting of
indicators, which can skew results toward particular political or ideological
perspectives. Data availability and quality pose another challenge, as not all countries
consistently provide reliable or transparent data, leading to gaps or inaccuracies that
can misrepresent a nation’s true standing. And finally, when comparing the power
potential new subjects such as non-state actors or small states are often neglected.
Additionally, indexes often oversimplify complex geopolitical dynamics by reducing
multifaceted issues like governance, security, or economic resilience to a single score
or rank, masking important regional or contextual nuances. The comparability of
different countries or regions can also be problematic, as diverse political, social, or
economic systems may not be adequately captured by universal metrics. Moreover,
some indices rely heavily on historical data, which may not reflect current realities
or rapidly shifting geopolitical landscapes, reducing their relevance for
contemporary analysis. Consequently, while indexes provide useful frameworks,
their results must be interpreted cautiously and supplemented with deeper, more
qualitative analyses.
Indexes play a crucial role in a variety of other geopolitical methods, providing data-
driven insights that enhance the rigor and in-depth of analysis. These methods span
areas like power projection, conflict forecasting, risk assessment, and diplomatic
strategy, where indexes serve as foundational tools for evaluating state capacity,
vulnerabilities, and global influence. Moreover, indexes often serve as basis for
sophisticated trajectories such as Scenario Analysis of Future Science. The use of
indexes in scenario analysis offers framework for examining potential future
developments in international arena. By providing structured, data-driven
representations of various dimensions of state power, stability, or influence, indexes
allow analysts to build multiple plausible scenarios for how global dynamics may
evolve. These scenarios, which are narratives of possible future states, help
policymakers, businesses, and scholars anticipate risks, identify opportunities, and
develop strategies to manage uncertainty in an increasingly interconnected world.
In scenario planning, analysts typically select a set of key drivers that are most likely
to influence the future trajectory of geopolitical dynamics. These drivers are
represented by index scores, which provide a baseline for understanding current
conditions. Analysts then explore how changes in these index values might interact

85
 Zorko

to produce different outcomes. For instance, if an index shows a country's economic

capacity declining while its military expenditure index rises, this could lead to a
scenario where internal pressure grows due to economic hardship, but the
government prioritizes military strength over social welfare, increasing the risk of
conflict or authoritarianism. Scenario analysis can thus help policymakers identify
early warning signs of instability or conflict by tracking shifts in index values over
time.
One of the most useful aspects of using indexes in scenario analysis is their ability
to incorporate a wide range of factors and uncertainties. Indexes can reflect
everything from shifts in economic growth patterns to climate change vulnerability
or changing diplomatic relationships. Despite its strengths, there are challenges to
using indexes in scenario analysis. Over-reliance on quantitative data can lead to
oversimplification of complex dynamics, particularly when social or cultural factors
that are harder to quantify play critical roles. Furthermore, the accuracy and
timeliness of data used in indexes can affect the quality of scenarios. Outdated or
incomplete data may lead to scenarios that do not fully capture the evolving nature
of geopolitical risks. To mitigate this, scenario analysis should complement index
data with qualitative insights and expert judgment.
In future studies—also known as futures analysis or foresight—indexes play a
critical role in exploring potential global developments and preparing for a wide
range of future scenarios. Futures studies aim to anticipate long-term trends and
uncertainties by identifying key drivers of change, assessing emerging risks, and
generating alternative futures. The use of indexes in this field allows researchers and
policymakers to ground their analyses in data-driven insights, creating more robust
and plausible models of the future. Future studies is a constantly evolving field, and
there is growing interest in developing new indexes to better capture emerging
global trends. For instance, there is increasing recognition of the need to index the
impact of artificial intelligence on geopolitics or the role of data sovereignty in global
power structures. The development of new indexes to measure these emerging areas
would provide futurists with more accurate tools for predicting the future
geopolitical environment. Moreover, indexes are increasingly being integrated with
big data and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in future studies, offering new
ways to model complex geopolitical dynamics. Predictive algorithms, combined
with real-time data from indexes, can be used to simulate future scenarios with
higher levels of accuracy and detail.

86
 Methodological Concepts in Small States Research

The use of GPI framework

The Geopolitical Power Index (GPI) with cyber-power component added (GPI+C)
offers a comprehensive and multidimensional framework for assessing state power
potential, making it an invaluable tool for policymakers, analysts, scholars, and
businesses alike. However, it is oriented solely towards small state research since the
area for shifts in power (potential) are bigger in case of new emerging actors in IR.
Its applications and benefits extend across strategic planning, comparative analysis,
risk assessment, diplomatic and economic engagement, academic research, business
investment, and international cooperation.
Governments can utilize the GPI for strategic planning and policy formulation. By
understanding their strengths and weaknesses across the five categories of power,
states can craft informed national security strategies, economic policies, and
diplomatic initiatives. For instance, a state with robust cyber capabilities but limited
military power might prioritize cybersecurity measures and digital diplomacy to
enhance its international standing and security.
The GPI framework also enables comparative analysis between states, providing a
nuanced understanding of how different countries measure up across various
dimensions of power. This is particularly useful for identifying potential allies and
competitors. Small states can compare their cyberpower and economic power with
those of other small states or larger nations to find areas where they can collaborate
or compete effectively. Analysts can employ the GPI for risk assessment and
management, evaluating a state’s performance in each category to identify potential
threats such as economic dependency on a single resource, demographic challenges,
or cybersecurity weaknesses. This comprehensive risk assessment facilitates better-
prepared contingency plans and more resilient national strategies. The Index is
particularly valuable for small states, which often face unique challenges and
opportunities. By using it for strategic purposes, small states can identify their niche
strengths, such as advanced cyber capabilities or strategic geographical positions,
and leverage these in international forums.
Diplomatic missions and international organizations can leverage the Index to
enhance their engagement strategies. Understanding a country's geopolitical power
profile aids in crafting targeted diplomatic efforts and economic partnerships. For
example, knowing that a particular state excels in economic power but lacks cyber
capabilities might encourage investment in joint technological initiatives or
cybersecurity collaborations. International organizations and coalitions can use it to
identify areas for cooperation and capacity-building. Initiatives aimed at improving

87
 Zorko

cybersecurity in states with strong economic power but weak cyber defences can
enhance collective security and foster international collaboration.
Beyond practical applications, the Geopolitical Power Index contributes to
geopolitical theory and the measurement of power potential. It offers a holistic
approach to understanding state power, moving beyond traditional metrics focused
solely on military and economic strength. By incorporating dimensions like
cyberpower reflects the complexities of modern territoriality and envisions of the
place/space changes. This multidimensional perspective enriches theoretical
discussions and provides a more accurate tool for measuring and comparing state
power in an increasingly interconnected and digital world. This Index provides a
structured methodology for research. Scholars and students of international
relations and geopolitical studies can use it to conduct detailed case studies,
comparative research, and theoretical analyses. Academic research can also benefit
from the GPI Framework by providing a structured methodology for analysing the
complex interactions between different dimensions of state power.

Conclusion
The study of small states in the context of geopolitics and international relations
remains an essential yet complex field, underscored by the lack of a universally
accepted definition. This complexity stems from the diverse criteria and
multifaceted nature of state power and influence, which traditional metrics such as
geographical size and population fail to capture adequately. As we have explored
and presented in Routledge Small States Series book, the Geopolitical Power Index
offers a nuanced framework for understanding and measuring the power of states,
integrating categories like geographical power, social and political power, economic
power, military power, and cyberpower. This comprehensive approach allows for a
more accurate assessment of a state's capabilities and strategic importance, especially
in a world increasingly influenced by digitalization and cyber dynamics.
The GPI's inclusion of cyberpower as a distinct category highlights the increasing
importance of digital capabilities in the contemporary geopolitical landscape. As
traditional notions of power are challenged by technological advancements, the
ability to project influence in cyberspace becomes a critical component of national
power (but not exclusively military power). This shift underscores the need for small
states to invest in digital infrastructure and cybersecurity to enhance their resilience
and strategic positioning.
The evolving geopolitical landscape, characterized by rapid digitalization and
changing power dynamics, calls for innovative approaches to better understand and

88
 Methodological Concepts in Small States Research

navigate the complexities of contemporary international relations. As small states

continue to play critical roles in regional and global contexts, their study will remain
crucial for advancing geopolitical theory and practice, ultimately contributing to a
more nuanced and effective engagement with the diverse new actors shaping the
multipolar world order.

89
 Zorko

References

Allison, G. (2017) Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's
Trap? Boston-NY: Houghton Mifflin Hargcourt.
Baldacchino, Godfrey; Wivel, Anders (2020) (eds.) Handbook on the Politics of
Small States. Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Baldacchino, G. (2023) The Success of Small States in International Relations. Mice
that Roar? NY: Routledge
Bjola, C; Holmes, M. (eds.) (2015) Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. NY:
Routledge.
Briguglio, Lino (2016). (ed) Small States and the European Union Economic
Perspectives. NY: Routledge.
Brzezinski, Z. (1997) The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives. NY: Basic Books.
Car, V; Zorko, M. (eds.) (2025) Geopolitical perspective on digital environment of
European Small States: challenges, threats, and opportunities. NY: Routledge (to be
published 2025).
Cooper, A. F.; Shaw, T. M. (eds.) (2009) The Diplomacies of Small States: Between
Vulnerability and Resilience. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Crowards, T. (2002), Defining the category of ‘small’ states. Journal of International
Development. 14(2): 143-179.
Desforges, A. (2014). Representations of Cyberspace: A Geopolitical Tool.
Hérodote, 152-153(1-2) 67-81. https://doi.org/10.3917/her.152.0067
Dittmer, J. & Sharp, J. (eds.) (2014). Geopolitics. London: Routledge.
Goetschel, L. (2013), Small States Inside and Outside the European Union. New
York: Springer.
Grech, A; Debattista, M. G. (2025) “Hyperlocal media and the private-public sphere:
Malta’s complicated ecosystem”. In: Car, V; Zorko, M. (eds.) ((2025) Geopolitical
perspective on digital environment of European Small States: challenges, threats,
and opportunities. NY: Routledge (to be published 2025).
Grey, C. S. & Sloan, G. (2000). Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, London and
NY: Routledge.

90
 Methodological Concepts in Small States Research

Hey, J. A.K. (ed.) (2003) Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy
Behavior, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Huntington, S. (1996, 2011) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order. NY, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon&Schuster Paperbacks.
Ingebritsen, C. & Neumann, I. & Gstöhl, S. & Beyer, J. (2006). Small States in
international relations. Washington: Washington University Press.
Jakešević, R; Mikac, R. (2025) “Cybersecurity: Basic Concepts, Contemporary
Security Challenges and Digital Technology”. In: Car, V; Zorko, M. (eds.) (2025)
Geopolitical perspective on digital environment of European Small States:
challenges, threats, and opportunities. NY: Routledge (to be published 2025).
Kagan, R. (2013) The World America Made. NY: Vintage Books.
Kennedy, P. (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. NY: Vintage Books.
Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy. NY, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon&Schuster
Paperbacks.
Kos – Stanišić, L; Jakopović, H; Đula, D. (2025) “Icelandic Environmental Security
Communication Strategies”. In: Car, V; Zorko, M. (eds.) ((2025) Geopolitical
perspective on digital environment of European Small States: challenges, threats,
and opportunities. NY: Routledge (to be published 2025).
Luša, D; Picula, B. (2024) “Digital diplomacy and small states”, in: Car, V; Zorko,
M. (eds.) (2025) Geopolitical perspective on digital environment of European Small
States: challenges, threats, and opportunities. NY: Routledge (to be published 2025).
Maass, M. (2008), “Small States as ‘Small Countries and ‘Little States”. Conference
paper,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/295907113_Small_States_as_'Small_C
ountries_and_'Little_States. (15 April 2023)
Maass, M. (2009), “The elusive definition of the small state”. International Politics.
46(1): 65-83.
Mackinder, H. (1904) “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical
Journal, XXIII: 4.
Mackinder, H. (1919). The Democratic Ideals and Reality, London: Henry Holt and
Company, Inc.
Mahan, T. A. (1890) The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783. Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company.

91
 Zorko

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NY: W.W.. Norton
& Compan
Mikac, R; Cesarec, I; Sazonov, V. (2024) “Hybrid threats as challenges for the
protection of critical information infrastructure: Comparative comparison of
Croatia and Estonia”. In: Car, V; Zorko, M. (eds.) (2025) Geopolitical perspective
on digital environment of European Small States: challenges, threats, and
opportunities. NY: Routledge (to be published 2025).
Moisio, S. (2019) Geopolitics of the Knowledge-Based Economy, NY: Routledge.
Morgado, N. (ed.) (2021). Geopolitics in the Twenty-first Century: Territories,
Identities, and Foreign Policies. Nova Science Pub Inc.
Morgado, N. (2023) “Modelling neoclassical geopolitics: An alternative theoretical
tradition for geopolitical culture and literacy”, European Journal of Geography,
14(4): 13-21. https://doi.org/10.48088/ejg.n.mor.14.4.013.021
O Tuathail, G; Dalby, S; & Routledge, P. (eds.) (1998) The Geopolitics Reader, NY:
Routledge
Puusalu, J. (2024) “The smaller the state the bigger the challenge: Estonia as the
digital state”. In: Car, V; Zorko, M. (eds.) (2025) Geopolitical perspective on digital
environment of European Small States: challenges, threats, and opportunities. NY:
Routledge (to be published 2025).
Spykman, N. J. (1942) America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and
the Balance of Power. NY: Routledge.
Thorhallsson, B., & Wivel, A. (2006). Small states in the European Union: what do
we know and what would we like to know? Cambridge Review of International
Affairs 19(4) 651–668.
Voo, J; Hemani, I; Jones, S; DeSombre, W; Cassidy, D. and Schwarzenbach A. (2020)
“National Cyber Power Index 2020”. Harvard Kennedy School, The Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs,
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/national-cyber-power-index-2020. (27
March 2023)
Walton, D. (2007). Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century:
Multipolarity and the Revolution in Strategic Perspective. London: Routledge.
Zakaria, F. (2008) The Post-American World. London – NY: W. W. Norton &
Company.

92
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch4

Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving world-system

analysis:
Examining mobility across periphery-semi periphery-core structure

Ismael de la Villa Hervás1

Abstract
Even though during the last five decades world-system framework has
experienced an enormous development, as it has provided a wide range of
analytical categories for spatiotemporal processes from historical sociology
gaze, it might not have deepened enough into its empirical dimension beyond
historiographic resources. Regarding this fact, one of its main axes as three
tier structure of core-semi periphery-periphery and its features have been well
described and discussed from the beginning. However, empirical quantitative
methodology for determining reshaping and mobility along this structure has
been barely treated in comparison with the employment of qualitative and
observational techniques.
To fill this relative absence is fundamental not only to study mechanisms for
upgrade or downgrade mobility during long wave periods but also because of
the importance of providing tools for researching systemic transformations in
a controversial region such as the semi periphery. This last one is especially
important in relation with this sort of methodology because of the ambiguity
that this category sometimes have showed in different analysis as well as the
structural relevance that it has for (dis)stabilizing world-system.
In this sense, this paper seeks two main goals. Firstly, to collect all the
previously described quantitative methodologies for world-system mobility
analysis. Secondly using primary sources and data, to put them into practice
and to combine their different tools in order to boost the future outcomes
from world-system theory.
Key words:
world systems, semi periphery, mobility, methodology, comparison

1 , Complutense University of Madrid

 Hervas

Introduction
The well-known tripartite structure of the capitalist world-economy, based on
the development of the dialectic between the core and the periphery, having
as a synthetic result the historical-spatial conformation of the semi-periphery;
has been shown as a category of analytical and explanatory potential for long
processes from the sphere of historical sociology in general (Wallerstein 1974,
1976; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1977; Radice 2009; Karataşlı 2017) and in an
accessory way offering multiple tools and background for other disciplines
such as international relations, geopolitics and political economy. Within this
framework, despite initial criticism of the issue of ambiguity surrounding the
ontological delimitation of the semi periphery category (Aymard 1985),
subsequent and more recent works have been able to provide a series of
definitions (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Chase-Dunn 1988; Terlouw 1992;
Radice 2009) provide more detailed and solid basis on the role of the semi-
periphery, as well as everything related to upward and downward mobility
within this social structure. However, precisely within this epistemological
plurality, a methodological plurality has also developed when it comes to
specifying the hierarchy, antagonisms and the variables that govern them
within the world-economy. In short, proposals have been made by different
authors who, beyond the diversity in the modification of algorithms or
quantitative techniques to obtain results with good statistical quality, do not
coincide at all in the inclusion criteria of variables that simply have to do with
the differential spatial distribution of income in the world system, with the
international division of labor throughout the core and the periphery, with the
inclusion of social dimensions that characterize local labor forces and with the
capacity of national states to develop coercive power and legal-administrative
influence on a global scale to maintain or improve their position within the
tripartite structure (Babones 2005).
Taking this background into consideration, the possibility of determining to
what extent this relationship between the use of a certain methodology based
on the formulated epistemology influences the determination of a particular
configuration of the world system, appears relevant. Although the main
methodologies both at a qualitative level (Wallerstein 1974, Braudel 1992,
Frank 2011) and the previously mentioned quantitative ones are well known
and have been largely compiled (Babones 2005; Clark and Beckfield 2009;
Barbones and Chase-Dunn 2012). This compilation has not been
accompanied by a comparison that makes it possible to analyze the differential
results when reflecting changes in mobility within the structure. Considering

94
 Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving
world-system analysis

this fact, this article precisely aims to be able to concretely assess the precision
and sensitivity of the main methodologies developed under the systemic
theoretical framework. Under a total sample of 105 States, from the period
from 1972 to 2022, which makes it possible to obtain all the necessary data
and variables according to each methodology, it is proposed to apply four of
the main most used techniques at the same time through which a relationship
of the upward and downward mobilities that occurred during the last long
wave of expansion and contraction of the capitalist world-economy is
obtained. To achieve this objective, the article will be organized through the
following structure. Firstly, the main axioms and premises will be briefly
explained, both those previously tested at an empirical level and those that are
purely theoretical, about the mobility that has occurred since the rise of the
world-economy until today to understand and explain the mechanisms of
mobility in the results obtained in the analysis. After this, the next section
details the more purely methodological aspects and discussions to make
understandable the previous works that have discussed the inclusion criteria
for the variables, the different foundations of the algorithms, the limitations
when establishing the size sample, the methods to compare the mobility data
obtained, etc. Subsequently, the results obtained with each of the four
methodologies will be presented, their comparison will be made, and the
potential and limitations will be discussed based on the analyzed sample itself.
Finally, in the conclusions, it will be fully established how the main
methodologies present today within the world systems perspective make it
possible to obtain a complete scheme of the transformations in long-term
global power relations, as well as the possible developments, from this, in
future academic works.

Hypotheses and foundations of mobility within the capitalist world-

economy
Although mobility within the capitalist world-economy can largely be
conceived as the rise from the periphery to the core or vice versa, passing
through the semi-periphery, it must be taken into consideration that other
jobs that have precisely focused on production of multivariate quantitative
methodologies (Nemeth and Smith 1985; Van Rossem 1996; Mahutga and
Smith 2011; Jacinto 2023) have established new divisions within each of the
parts with different degrees of integration in each of them. In any case, these
new tones also appear to be relevant when analyzing the mobility of nation-
states. Once we have taken this clarification into account, we must go to the

95
 Hervas

basic root that explains the transformations in the core-periphery dialectic.

This means understanding the Marxist expression of capital accumulation (M-
C-M') not simply as a social relationship, but as a historical-spatial process in
which the production of mercantile equivalents corresponds to systemic
material expansion (M-C) and contraction has to do with obtaining surplus
value as profit (C-M') (Arrighi 1994). It is precisely after these cycles that the
reorganization of the role that capital and States acquire, with their agency
capacities, in the international division of labor occurs. Although the ultimate
foundation of the system, unequal exchange, is maintained and therefore
direct mobility between periphery and core in a single cycle is very
complicated, the semi-peripheries are presented as the regions with the most
upward and downward mobility for different reasons. Even despite this
general characterization, there is no consensus on the unique particularities of
semi-peripheries. Since there are no specific productive activities that
differentiate the semi-peripheries because these will always be relational to the
development of historical capitalism (Morales-Ruvalcaba 2013). However,
attempts have been made to conceptualize them through other peculiarities
such as the mix of core and periphery activities, with an intermediate
geographical position between the core and periphery and the value chains
between them (Arrighi and Drangel 1986) and with sufficient balances. in
these nodes to avoid falling towards the periphery (Radice 2009, Mahutga
2012); the difference in the ways of organizing production, the diversity of
public policies and strategies by institutions to maintain stability in contraction
cycles, the intermediate levels of intensive capital (Chase-Dunn 1988), the
strong control of the political structures of the national elites compared to
those of the peripheries, the character of the core but with an internal
periphery that is capable of exploiting (Babones 2013), etc. They do roughly
compose the characteristics of the semi-peripheries according to most of the
authors, unlike others, such as the level of income distribution or the
destabilizing or stabilizing nature between cycle transitions, which is subjected
to further questioning (Terlouw 1992).
Beyond the innovative base on which the semi-peripheries are based to
achieve upward mobility, the maintenance of their role or even the dispute
for hegemony at the core; the strategies they can follow to achieve this are
very diverse, being able to distinguish mainly three (Chase-Dunn 1988): those
of evolutionary potential, maintaining adaptation and adaptability between the
innovation of economic, political and cultural practices; that of the “advantage
of backwardness”, through which a given, although with less intensive
technologies and capital, can exceed the rate of profit of a given core activity

96
 Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving
world-system analysis

through higher rates of exploitation of the labor force combined with

organizations more effective productive structures and, finally, the strategy of
uneven and combined development, through the incorporation of new
processes and practices brought from the core, while maintaining structures
typical of peripheral underdevelopment. However, if we look at the strategy
of the semi-peripheries not with respect to their interior, but rather based on
their relationship with the core and the hegemon, we could differentiate two
possible results and, therefore, two types of semi-peripheries results. of this
mobility (Arrighi 1990; Bornschier and Trezzini 1997). On the one hand,
those that fight against exclusion, seeking their integration through the
transfer of core activities and their subordination to it; and on the other hand,
those that fight against exploitation through partial disconnection, seeking a
direct dispute of hegemony (Bradshaw and Lynn 1994). Both can result in the
opposite effect and produce downward mobility since they can either increase
dependence on the core and reduce the decision-making capacity for future
new strategies and innovations or hinder access to fixed capital and
technology to be able to compete at the same time. even with the core. These
semi-peripheral processes are usually determined in turn by the historical
dependence on the export income of raw materials, fostering interclass
conflicts that hinder upward mobility, unlike others where this social
composition does not occur and the process of substitution by import is
shorter (Bornschier and Trezzini 1997).
Regarding the most recent mobility processes, these have been characterized
by the capacity to attract medium-value manufacturing activities (Arrighi and
Drangel 1986). Although this process would have led to significant mobility
during the 1970s and 1980s through dependent development with rapid
economic growth, such as in Southeast Asia, today it would have been much
more limited ( Clark, 2010), due to the great stabilization in the unequal
exchange that the current composition of the semi-periphery would have
achieved (Mielants 2012) despite the greater capacity that exists between the
three levels to transfer capital, technology and labor force (Mahutga and Smith
2011). Other authors, on the contrary, affirm that precisely the great territorial
conflicts and wars at the end of the 20th century are examples of this
reconfiguration, of new mobility processes during the contraction cycle
(Bergesen 1992).

97
 Hervas

Methods for determining hierarchy and mobility

Babones (2005) fundamentally distinguishes three main quantitative
methodological trends when analyzing hierarchies in the world-economy:
those that establish network analysis, with multiple types of dimensions, to
determine the level of connection between the different States to from there
infer its position; those that carry out a conceptualization of the structure in a
non-compartmentalized manner in a non-discrete manner, but rather as a
continuous whole through indexing and normalization of multiple variables;
and finally, the third and one of the first to be developed (Arrighi and Drangel
1986), which establishes a discrete distribution based on the income
distribution as an indirect measure, not to infer with great precision, but to
determine changes in mobility and power. incorporate a voluminous sample
due to the ease in obtaining data. Applying each of them, we will carry out the
comparative analysis. Furthermore, we will add a fourth considering one more
element of an epistemological and methodological nature. This consists of
carrying out another analysis from the continuous perspective but without
including variables that have to do with the coercive capacity, diplomatic and
military influence of the States (Terlouw 1992; Van Rossem 1996; Kentor
2014) and without applying indexation but rather factorization. and
blockmodeling based on the position in global commodity chains.
For the first type, network analysis, after discrete analysis by income, is one
of the methods that has been most used (Nemeth and Smith 1985; Kick 1987;
Smith and White 1992; Clark and Beckfield 2009, Boyd et al 2010, Hyacinth
2023). The main foundation of these methodologies is the establishment of
connections between States based on international trade data, regarding
imports and exports. It is based on the premise that the States closest to the
core will have a greater number of connections while the more peripheral ones
will be more disconnected. Through different network analysis algorithms
that factor and simplify the matrix obtained, a range of scores between 0 and
1 is generated to determine the position. In this case, we will apply the
SVD/MINRES algorithm, based on the State-by-State import data matrix,
which has been shown to be effective in establishing these hierarchies (Boyd
et al 2010, Jacinto 2023). The statistics, in this case, have been obtained from
trade data from the International Monetary Fund.
Regarding the second method, based mainly on the proposal of Kentor
(2014), an index will be established that will serve as continuous stratification
based on three dimensions: economic power, coercive power and global
dependence. The dimension of economic power will be determined from four

98
 Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving
world-system analysis

variables: capital intensity (indirectly through GDP per capita), the size of
production based on GDP, the volume of trade through the size of exports
and finally, control over global capital through a ratio between the investment
of national capital outside the country and foreign direct investment. For the
dimension of military power, military spending, arms exports and global
military control will be included through a ratio between the volume of arms
exports and imports. Thirdly, regarding global dependence, the degree of
diversification of the type of exports will be considered, the dependence on
foreign capital through the volume of debt with respect to GDP and military
dependence as a ratio between arms imports with respect to GDP. All these
variables, obtained through the World Bank database, will be standardized
through a normal distribution to obtain Z scores that can be grouped to form
the index.
For the third case, the distribution of income in relation to the population
(Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Babones 2005), data on the total populations of
the States and their GDP per capita will also be collected. These, to facilitate
graphical distribution, will be converted into decimal logarithms so that the
set of accumulated populations will be represented as dependent variables
with respect to it. The relative positions of the concavities will group each of
the structural parts of the world-economy. To better interpret the distribution
in the histogram, the function will be transformed using the Kernel Gaussian
method, smoothing the lines. Furthermore, to determine the limits of each
region between the minimum and maximum of the concavities, the method
of Korzeniewicz and Martin (1994) will be applied. Both variables, in this
method, will also be compiled from the World Bank databases.
Lastly, for continuous clustering, the methodology proposed by Mahutga and
Smith (2011) is used. This is based on the premise of the definition of global
commodity chains within the world system (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1993;
Bunker and Ciccanetll, 2005; Fernández-Stark and Gereffi 2019), which
understands that the differential spatialization of commercial productive
nodes is fundamental to understanding how exchange is generated. unequal
based on competitive advantages and innovations, leading to the rise or fall
within the structure. Within this hypothesis, five sets of chains are taken as
representative: high-tech and heavy industry, sophisticated extraction goods,
simple extraction, low value/light industry, and animal products and
bioproducts. Based on these data, obtained from the UN COMATRADE
Database, a hierarchical clustering is developed along two extracted factors

99
 Hervas

through Principal Component Analysis (PCA) employing hierarchical

algorithm.
The total sample of 105 States in a distributed manner is applied to the period
from 1972 to 2022. This long wave period allows for finding a balance
between including a time frame that includes two economic crises to be able
to assess mobility or absence of it. Furthermore, methodologically, data from
this large sample is available within it for all the variables necessary in each of
the four methods to be applied.

Results and discussion

Firstly, in order to evaluate the compositions in the three dimensions of the
structure, we will apply to the set of distributions of each methodology, based
on their normality, the T test for the means of the three parts of the structure
established from deciles, although in the case of clustering of commercial
chains (Chart 3.1 and Chart 3.2) they are grouped into three despite obtaining
six groups as the optimal distribution (Mahutga and Smith 2011). Observing
the results, given the total statistical significance obtained in each case, the
analysis of commercial networks using the SVD/MINRES algorithm (Chart
1.1 and Chart 1.2), appears to be the most sensitive when it comes to
establishing significant changes in the total of the composition of each part,
highlighting above all the change appreciated only by this between the
periphery and the semi-periphery between 1997 and 2022 and the greater
significance that it gives to those that occurred between the semi-periphery
and the core for the same period. Next, partly unexpected, is that the
clustering method (Chart 3.1 and 3.2) and the discrete income/population
distribution (Chart 2) show practically the same sensitivity and results. The
only difference between these is in the periphery-semi periphery changes from
1972 to 1997 and the intra semi periphery mobility between 1997 and 2022.
Finally, the least sensitive, although like the latter two, is the continuous
analysis of economic and coercive power (Table 2), which does not reach the
highest level of statistical significance p <0.01 in any period and for any part
of the world economy.

100
 Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving
world-system analysis

1972-1997 1997-2022

Trade network analysis PS* H.H** SC* PS* H.H** SC**

Economic and coercive P.S. H.H* S.C. P.S. H.H* SC*

continuum

Income/population PS* H.H** SC* P.S. H.H* SC*

discrete distribution

Continuum Clustering P.S. H.H* S.C. P.S. H.H** SC*

Commodity Chains

Table 1. Statistical significance for changes in parts from Student's T test (*: p<0.05; **: p<0.01).
Source: author.

101
 Hervas

Chart 1.1. Trade network after SVD/MINRES analysis for import/export coreness in 1972.
Source: own elaboration based on IMF data

Chart 1.2. Trade network after SVD/MINRES analysis for import/export coreness in 2022.
Source: elaboration

102
 Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving
world-system analysis

1972 1997 2022

1 United States (5.71; United States (5.11; United States (5.98;

5.12; 0.88) 4.79; 0.92) 4.8; 0.07)

2 United Kingdom Japan (3.18; -0.33; China (3.15; 0.62;

(6.41; 0.27; 0.55) 1.29) 0.33)

3 France (2.26; 0.23; Germany (2.44; - Germany (2.93; -

0.24) 0.12; 0.72) 0.32; 0.48)

4 Germany (1.77; - United Kingdom United Kingdom

0.17; 0.70) (2.14; -0.08; 0.69) (2.47; -0.28; 0.25)

5 Italy (1.26; -0.46; - France (1.82; 0.10; France (2.14; -0.08;

0.22) 0.49) 0.07)

6 Japan (1.08; -0.50; Netherlands (1.62; - Japan (2.13; -0.60;

1.44) 0.67; 0.21) 0.80)

7 Belgium (1.03; - Italy (1.45; -0.44; - Netherlands (1.91; -

0.51; -0.25) 0.06) 0.76; -1.91)

8 Australia (0.99; - China (1.43; -0.05; - Italy (1.78; -0.35; -

0.59; -1.54) 0.40) 0.30)

9 Sweden (0.88; -0.61; Canada (1.11; -0.33; South Korea (1.77; -

-0.14) -0.12) 0.57; 0.63)

10 China (0.55; -0.55; - Australia (0.83; - Spain (1.59; -0.54; -

1.33) 0.65; 0.25) 0.28)

50 Suriname (-0.94; - Costa Rica (-0.78; - Thailand (0.49; -

1.11; -0.89) 0.73; 0.74) 0.75; 0.95)

51 South Korea (-0.95; Jamaica (-0.80; - Indonesia (0.47; -

-0.55; -0.22) 0.73; -1.71) 0.74; -0.72)

52 Turkiye (-0.96; - Thailand (-0.83; - South Africa (0.41; -

0.44; -1.44) 0.70; 1.56) 0.75; 0.28)

103
 Hervas

53 Malaysia (-0.97; - Botswana (-0.84; - Colombia (0.38; -

0.69; -1.12) 0.75; -2.06) 0.74; 0.46)

54 Costa Rica (-0.98; - Dominican Peru (0.38; -0.76; -

0.71; -1.88) Republic (-0.85; - 1.53)
1.05; -0.8)

55 Fiji (-0.98; -0.99; - India (-0.88; -0.60; - Vietnam (0.37; -

1.44) 1.24) 0.77; 0.71)

56 Algeria (-0.99; -0.59; Tunisia (-0.89; - Suriname (0.36; -

-1.00) 0.82; -1.24) 0.77; 1.67)

57 Colombia (-0.99; - Ecuador (-0.90; - Botswana (0.35; -

0.51; -0.88) 0.88; -0.52) 0.77; -2.21)

58 Iraq (-1.01; -0.78; - Suriname (-0.91; - Ecuador (0.33; -

2.12) 0.73; -2.25) 0.76; -1.12)

59 Tunisia (-1.02; - Morocco (-0.92; - Algeria (0.32; -0.74;

0.88; -0.81) 0.71; -0.70) -2.23)

96 Mauritania (-1.11; - Central African Malawi (0.14; -0.75;

0.62; -1.33) Republic (-1.04; - -0.85)
0.73; -0.48)

97 Senegal (-1.12; - Niger (-1.04; -0.73; - Mozambique (0.13;

0.63; -1.72) 0.55) -0.72; 2.14)

98 Solomon Islands (- Malawi (-1.04; -0.68; Gambia (0.13; -0.77;

1.17; -0.59; -1.55) -1.22) -0.80)

99 Indonesia (-1.18; - Rwanda (-1.05; - Chad (0.12; -0.69; -

0.68; 0.8) 0.68; -0.83) 1.98)

100 Niger (-1.21; -0.68; - Cambodia (-1.05; - Guinea Bissau

2.28) 0.69; -0.94) (0.12; -0.79; -1.24)

101 Chad (1.22; -0.60; - Nepal (-1.05; -0.70; Niger (0.11; -0.77; -
1.51) 1.36) 1.43)

104
 Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving
world-system analysis

102 Gambia (-1.23; - Chad (-1.06; -0.73; - Somalia (0.11; -0.81;

0.63; 0.21) 1.51) -0.83)

103 Central African Myanmar (-1.06; - Sierra Leone (0.10; -

Republic (-1.23; - 0.67; -0.95) 0.77; -1.52)
0.67; 0.51)

104 Cambodia (-1.24; - Sierra Leone (-1.07; Burundi (0.09; -

0.67; -2.1) -0.91; 0.71) 0.77; -1.66)

105 Haiti (-1.25; -0.68; - Ethiopia (-1.07; - Central African

1.99) 0.92; -0.33) Republic (0.09; -
0.79; 1.02)

Table 2. Z scores result for continuum multivariate analysis [State (economic power; military power;
global dependence)]. Source: Author

Chart 2. Income/Accumulated population distribution for 1972, 1997 and 2022. Source: own
elaboration

105
 Hervas

Chart 3.1. Continuum Clustering Plot by Commodity Chains for 1972. Source: Own elaboration

Chart 3.2. Continuum Clustering Plot by Commodity Chains Plot for 2022. Source: Own
elaboration

Secondly, to compare upward mobility and downward mobility between the

different models, a Student's T test has also been applied to compare those
States that had experienced mobility of more than 10 positions in each
corresponding period. If we look at Table 3 where these results are collected.

106
 Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving
world-system analysis

Once again, for the specific cases of States, the trade network analysis
methodology appears to be the most sensitive, especially to determine
mobility between the periphery and the semi-periphery, compared to the rest.
The other three, although highlighting different cases, show very similar
results. A problem to highlight in the distribution of accumulated
income/population is the special and oversized mobility that it gives to oil-
exporting countries. This, for example, is an advantage in the value chain
methodology, since it completely excludes all goods linked to fossil fuels,
giving a much more realistic image of the position in the international division
of labor.

1972-1997 1997-2022

Trade network analysis Brazil (U, 19) China (U, 13), Argentina (D, 15)Australia
India (U, 14), Indonesia (U, (D, 10), Brazil (U, 12), India
25) South Korea (U, 12), (U, 21), Indonesia (U, 10),
Spain (U, 13), Thailand (U, DPR Laos (U, 14), Lesotho
24) Vietnam (U , 18), (D, 20), Libya (D, 12)Nepal
Botswana (U, 11) (D, 23), Sierra Leone (D, 22),
South Africa (U, 13)South
Korea (U, 13), Thailand (U,
11), Turkey (U, 15)Venezuela
( D, 13),Vietnam (U, 20),
Zambia(D, 14)

Economic and coercive Brazil (U, 15) China (U, 10), Brazil (U, 13), India (U, 24)
continuum Vietnam (U, 19), India (U, South Africa (U, 15)
26), Indonesia (U, 24), Venezuela (D, 12), South
Malawi (U, 20) Korea (U, 13)Vietnam (U,
20), Zambia (D, 16)

Profit/population non China (U, 12), Indonesia (U, Brazil (U, 11), China (U, 17),
discrete distribution 22), Nepal (D, 20), Vietnam India (U, 21), United Arab
(U, 18), Zambia (D, 21) Emirates (U, 25), Guinea
Bissau (D, 10), Nigeria (U,
14), Sierra Leone (D, 12),
Thailand (U, 15)
Vietnam (U, 14), Qatar (U,
22)

107
 Hervas

Continuum Clustering China (U, 11), India (U, 15), Australia (D, 10), Argentina
Commodity Chains Nepal (D, 21) Spain (U, 13), (U, 12) Brazil (U, 10), China
Singapore (U, 17) Hong Kong (U, 15)Norway
(D, 10), Venezuela (D, 10)

Table 3. Statistically significant mobility between periods in the different methodologies [State (D:
Downward mobility, U: Upward mobility, No. of positions)]. Source: Author.

Conclusions
In addition to evaluating the specific cases of States that have experienced
mobility in the last long wave cycle, being able to corroborate that, although
limited in comparison to other previous cycles within the world economy,
relevant mobility continues to occur, especially within the semi-periphery; We
have been able to achieve both objectives: apply the main methodologies
developed through the same sample for a period of 50 years in which
significant changes could be observed and compare results to evaluate the
quality and sensitivity of each one. With this, in short, it could be said that the
method that presents the best prospects today is network analysis based on
trade data. After it, we find that, despite the simplicity in data collection and
analysis, the discrete distribution of income/accumulated population presents
very good sensitivity for determining the composition of the parts. Although,
in terms of mobility, it may overestimate some cases such as countries that
export raw materials with variable prices, it finds a very good balance between
time spent and results. The clustering of commercial chains, although it
requires greater data processing and analysis, is not far from the quality of
results of the latter and allows greater precision in the classification by
establishing 6 groups in the structure (one for the core, two for the semi-
periphery and three for the periphery). For its part, the continuous analysis,
although it shows greater detail in variables that, although questioned by
authors from the world systems tradition, the other analyzes do not include,
finds a worse balance between the time necessary for its application and the
less sensitivity shown.
Based on this, with a view to future methodological perspectives from a
systemic prism, it would be very interesting to explore the continuation of the
development of the network methodology applied to new variables, beyond
trade data, which would make it possible to extend the analysis periods and

108
 Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving
world-system analysis

would provide, if possible, within the quality already obtained, greater

statistical significance.

109
 Hervas

References
Akaev, Askar and Vladimir Pantin. 2018. Central Asia as the economic and
geopolitical tension nexus: Some implications for the world futures. World
Futures, 74(1), 36-46.
Arrighi, Giovanni. 1990. The developmentalist illusion: A reconceptualization
of the semiperiphery. Semiperipheral states in the world-economy, 11-42.
Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. The long twentieth century: Money, power, and the origins of
our times. Verso.
Arrighi, Giovanni and Jessica Drangel. 1986. The stratification of the world-
economy: an exploration of the semiperipheral zone. Review (Fernand Braudel
Core), 10(1), 9-74.
Aymard, Maurice. 1985. “Nation-states and Interregional Disparities of
Development.” Pp. 40–54 in Semiperipheral Development: The Politics of
Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century, edited by Giovanni Arrighi.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publication
Babones, Salvatore. 2005. The country-level income structure of the world-
economy. Journal of world-systems research, 29-55.
Babones, Salvatore. 2013. A structuralist approach to the economic
trajectories of Russia and the countries of East-Central Europe since 1900.
Geopolitics, 18(3), 514-535.
Babones, Salvatore and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 2012. Routledge handbook of
world-systems analysis. Routledge.
Bergesen, Albert. 1992. Communism's collapse: a world-system explanation.
Journal of political & military sociology, 133-151.
Bornschier, Volker and Bruno Trezzini. 1997. Social stratification and
mobility in the world system: different approaches and recent research.
International Sociology, 12(4), 429-455.
Boyd, John, William Fitzgerald, Matthew Mahutga and David Smith. 2010.
Computing continuous core/periphery structures for social relations data
with MINRES/SVD. Social Networks, 32(2), 125-137.
Bradshaw, Michael and Nicholas Lynn. 1994. After the Soviet Union: the
post-Soviet states in the world system. The Professional Geographer, 46(4), 439-
449.

110
 Multidimensional quantitative methods for improving
world-system analysis

Braudel, Fernand. 1992. Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, vol. II: The
wheels of commerce (Vol. 2). University of California Press.
Bunker, Stephen and Paul Ciccantell. 2005. Globalization and the Race for
Resources. JHU Press.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 2013. Socialist states in the capitalist world-
economy. In Sociological Worlds (pp. 98-114). Routledge.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1988. Comparing world systems: Toward a theory
of semipheral development. Comparative civilizations review, 19(19), 3.
Clark, Rob. 2010. World-system mobility and economic growth, 1980–2000.
Social Forces, 88(3), 1123-1151.
Clark, Rob and Jason Beckfield. 2009. A new trichotomous measure of world-
system position using the international trade network. International Journal of
Comparative Sociology, 50(1), 5-38.
Dezzani, Raymond. 2012. Measuring transition and hierarchy of states within
the world-systems paradigm. In Routledge Handbook of World-Systems Analysis
(pp. 129-138). Routledge.
Frank, André Günder. 2011. World accumulation. NYU Press.
Fernandez-Stark, Karina and Gary Gereffi. 2019. Global value chain analysis:
A primer. In Handbook on global value chains (pp. 54-76). Edward Elgar
Publishing.
Gereffi, Gary and Miguel Korzeniewicz (Eds.). 1993. Commodity chains and
global capitalism. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.
Hopkins, Terence and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1977. Patterns of development
of the modern world-system. Review (Fernand Braudel Core), 111-145.
Jacinto, Martín. 2023. Assessing the stability of the core/periphery structure
and mobility in the post-2008 global crisis era: A world-systems analysis of
the international trade network. Journal of World-Systems Research, 29(2), 401-
430.
Karataşlı, Şahan Savas. 2017. The capitalist world-economy in the longue
durée: Changing modes of the global distribution of wealth, 1500–2008.
Sociology of Development, 3(2), 163-196.
Kentor, Jeffrey. 2014. Capital and coercion: The economic and military processes that
have shaped the world economy, 1800-1990. Routledge

111
 Hervas

Kick, Edward. 1987. World-system structure, national development, and the

prospects for a socialist world order. America’s changing role in the world-system,
127-155.
Korzeniewicz, Roberto. y Martin, William. 1994. The global distribution of
commodity chains. Contributions In Economics And Economic History, 67-67.
Mahutga, Matthew. 2012. When do value chains go global? A theory of the
spatialization of global value chains. Global Networks, 12(1), 1-21.
Mahutga, Matthew and David Smith. 2011. Globalization, the structure of the
world economy and economic development. Social Science Research, 40(1), 257-
272.
Mielants, Eric. 2012. The great transition debate and world-systems analysis.
In Routledge Handbook of World-Systems Analysis (pp. 56-62). Routledge.
Morales Ruvalcaba, Daniel. 2013. Inside the BRIC: analysis of the
semiperipheral character of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Austral: Brazilian
Journal of Strategy & International Relations, 2(4), 141-173.
Nemeth, Roger and David Smith (1985). International trade and world-system
structure: A multiple network analysis. Review (Fernand Braudel Core), 8(4), 517-
560.
Radice, Hugo. 2009. Halfway to paradise? Making sense of the Semi-
Periphery. Globalization and the ‘New’semi-peripheries, 25-39.
Smith, David and Douglas White. 1992. Structure and dynamics of the global
economy: network analysis of international trade 1965–1980. Social forces,
70(4), 857-893.
Terlouw, Cornelis Peter. 1992. The regional geography of the world-system:
external arena, periphery, semiperiphery, core.
Van Rossem, Ronan. 1996. The world system paradigm as general theory of
development: A cross-national test. American sociological review, 508-527.
Wallerstein, I. 1974. The Modern World-System I Capitalist Agriculture and
the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1976. Semi-peripheral countries and the
contemporary world crisis. Theory and society, 3(4), 461-483.

112
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch5

Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard: New Ways of Theorizing the

International Relations of Central Asia1
Dragan Trailović2

Abstract
For a long time, Central Asia has been seen as a region divided by conflict, insecurity,
and competition, lacking comprehensive cooperation between its countries.
Writings on the region often focused on the influence of external powers,
institutions, and norms they created. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
independence of the Central Asian republics, discursive framing of the region has
repeatedly relied on the notion of the Great Game/New Great Game, a competition
between major powers for regional influence. This portrayed Central Asian nations
as passive participants in international relations, objects of international relations,
pawns on a geopolitical chessboard. Now, with the intraregional process of power
transition and the internally initiated process of strengthening regional integration
through consultative meetings of the heads of state of the Central Asian republics,
there have also been changes in the theorizing of regional international relations.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate the main emerging ways of re-
theorizing Central Asia in this field. To this end, the article will present the primary
approaches for reconceptualizing the region, with a particular emphasis on several
theoretical frameworks and concepts. These include Buranelli's perspective on
Central Asia as an "international society", Dadabaev's advocacy for the
"decolonization of Central Asian international relations," Fazendeiro's concept of
“power as togetherness”, and Dzhuraev's "3-i's model."

Keywords:
geopolitics, New Great Game, IR theories, Central Asia retheorized, "international
society", "decolonization of knowledge", "power as togetherness", "3-i's model"

1 Funding: The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project “Serbia and
challenges in international relations in 2024”, financed by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development
and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by Institute of International Politics and Economics,
Belgrade, during the year 2024.
2 , Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Serbia
 Trailović

Introduction
There is no single, universally accepted definition of Central Asia (CA). The
understanding of its boundaries has changed over time, influenced by historical-
political contexts, regional social circumstances, and the relationships between
various rulers, political units, and centres of power. This has resulted in different
names for the region, such as Transaxonia, Turkestan, and Central Asia, each
reflecting different geographical scopes and highlighting that the concept of Central
Asia is more a social and political construct than a fixed geographical area.
Nevertheless, the most common definition in the literature defines Central Asia as
the territory of the five former Soviet Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan (Artman and Diener 2022,
135-140)
Brzezinski (1998) compared Central Asia to the Balkans due to its history of
instability and potential for conflict. His analogy suggests that “Eurasian Balkans”
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Georgia, and Afghanistan), with its own complex ethnic structure,
unresolved border disputes, and history of Soviet authoritarian rule, has the
potential for similar outbreaks of violence. Additionally, the region's strategic
location and wealth of natural resources makes it an area of competition for
influence by major powers, further raising the risk of instability (Brzezinski 1998,
123-150).
Commonly, Central Asia has been viewed in this manner, as a space divided by
conflict, insecurity, instability, cleavages, and rivalry, regardless of how its borders
were understood and spatialized (Karabayeva 2021, 25-26).
However, although this view of the Central Asian region is in some aspects
grounded in empirical evidence, in relation to the practice of regional international
relations, there are completely opposite facts that significantly affect the new
dynamics of international relations in the region. This refers primarily to intra-
regional changes, especially concerning the transition of power in the Central Asian
republics and the initiation of consultative meetings among the heads of state aimed
at improving regional connectivity and strengthening regional identity. Such
processes have led to changes within the Central Asian region, particularly in the
foreign policy behaviour of individual states, thereby impacting wider intra-regional
relations.
Importantly, the aforementioned changes at the empirical level in the Central Asian
region not only confirm existing theoretical explanations of international relations
in the region, which critique the dominant view of the region as a battleground for

114
 Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard

great power competition, but also demonstrate that newer approaches to theorizing
interstate processes in Central Asia possess significant explanatory potential. The
main critiques in this body of literature highlight the overemphasis of systemic IR
theories on major global players and external influences, neglecting the agency of
Central Asian states, while also critiquing monocausal and structural explanations
that diminish regional agency, overlook local norms and institutions, marginalize
local perspectives, and perpetuate reductionist views that oversimplify foreign policy
dynamics (Buranelli 2019; Dadabaev 2022; Fazendeiro 2020; Dzhuraev 2021).
Recent literature on Central Asia indicates a departure from a purely geopolitical
paradigm and concepts such as rivalry, domination, and spheres of influence (New
Great Game). Instead, Central Asian states are increasingly recognized as active
agents shaping regional integration according to their national interests (Marat,
2021).
Building on the points mentioned above, the goal of this paper is to present several
authors and their works from a larger group who theorize international relations in
Central Asia differently than the dominant perspectives in existing literature. The
intention of this paper is not to dismiss earlier approaches, particularly those relying
on the geopolitical paradigm or the concept of the New Great Game, as lacking
explanatory potential for international relations in Central Asia. Instead, the paper
argues that these approaches are often limited and overlook other important and
influential factors.
In this context, the paper will present theoretical approaches and conceptual
frameworks from selected authors to illustrate new ways of theorizing international
relations in Central Asia in order to understand Central Asia's changing regional
dynamics. One approach uses the English School's concept of "international
society" to explain Central Asia's order and stability through norms, institutions, and
informal rules (Buranelli 2019). Another advocates decolonizing international
relations by integrating regional traditions and challenging Western and Russian-
centric perspectives, promoting local approaches to concepts like sovereignty and
modernity (Dadabaev 2022). A different perspective views power as a collective
capacity shaped by shared norms and collective action, challenging dominance-
focused narratives (Fazendeiro 2020). Finally, an approach employing analytical
eclecticism integrates ideas, interests, and institutions to capture the dynamic nature
of foreign policy decisions (Dzhuraev 2021).

115
 Trailović

Changes in the Intra-Regional Context of Central Asia

The first group of changes that took place in the region are the processes of the
transition of power in the Central Asian republics. It is important to note that in
many cases, this did not signify a change in the character of the government system,
but rather personal changes in the most important institution of the system—the
president of the republic. The transition of power has occurred in almost all Central
Asian republics, including Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
Only in Tajikistan is President Emomali Rahmon, who has been in that position
since 1994, still in power.
These transitions brought changes in certain aspects of the social, political, and
economic contexts, as well as in foreign policy approaches and cooperation with
other countries. This has resulted in improved relations between the countries of
the region and even sparked the process of resolving decades-long border and other
disputes. Uzbekistan and President Mirziyoyev stand out as the best example
(Tolipov 2022). Uzbekistan's cooperation agenda is being reshaped by domestic
policy changes that critically re-evaluate its post-independence development, leading
to economic liberalization, political reforms, and greater openness. This shift has
altered national self-perception and influenced the regional environment, changing
the political discourse from competition to cooperation (Dadabaev 2022, 80-81).
This further triggered another significant change: for the first time, there is a self-
initiated and internally driven effort to strengthen mutual regional connections and
create a stronger Central Asian identity. This effort aims to establish a regional order
based on dialogue and trust without external influence or initiatives from outside
the region (Buranelli 2021). This is exemplified by the consultative meetings of the
heads of state of all five republics. Previously, the countries of the Central Asian
region were mostly connected through forms of cooperation that were driven by
external actors such as Russia, China, the USA, and the EU. These initiatives often
did not involve all Central Asian countries together and lacked a comprehensive
regional approach.
Regional cooperation gained momentum under Uzbekistan's new president,
Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who prioritized good relations with neighbouring countries for
stability and sustainable development. In 2017, he proposed regular high-level
consultation meetings, leading to the first such meeting of all five Central Asian
presidents in 2018 in Astana, followed by subsequent meetings in Tashkent,
Ashgabat, Cholpon-Ata and Dushanbe. At the Cholpon-Ata meeting, the presidents
signed several agreements, including a roadmap for regional cooperation and a green
agenda program. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a treaty of

116
 Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard

friendship and cooperation, with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan pledging future

accession (Kassenova 2023, 16-17).
Regionalism, as an institutionalized process of integration, is exemplified by
European integration, which served as a model for regions worldwide, including
Asia. However, Central Asia did not achieve the same level of integration and
institutionalization due to the EU model requiring both economic and political
integration. Instead, regional organizations and mechanisms in Central Asia
resemble ASEAN's model, which focuses on enhancing economic cooperation
without compromising the sovereignty of nation-states with supranational elements
(Cornell and Starr 2018; Starr 2019)
Buranelli (2023) notes that Central Asia has its own ideas of informal regionalism
and order, which do not necessarily follow the integrationist dynamics seen in
Europe and other parts of the world. Consultations, consensus, and informality
remain central to Central Asian regionalism, though elements of institutionalization
are emerging. Annual summits, the creation of the Council of National Coordinators
for Consultative Meetings, and a regional diplomatic award signify a growing
commitment to stronger regional cooperation.

Rethinking Central Asia: Buranelli's English School Approach

Filippo Costa Buranelli (2019, 237-239) in his chapter titled "The Heartland of IR
Theory? Central Asia as an ‘International Society’ Between Realism and Liberalism"
uses the English School's (ES) concept of "international society" to explain the
region's order, stability, and coexistence as a balance between competition and
cooperation in Central Asia. He argues that Central Asia cannot be viewed solely
through the lens of realism and competition; instead, norms, institutions, and
informal rules play significant roles in regulating relations between states. He argues
that such an approach can shed better light on intra-regional dynamics that are often
neglected by other theoretical approaches. Buranelli (2019, 240) contends that world
politics is not a ‘black and white’ realm, where states either compete or cooperate
mechanically pushed by structural forces as it is the case with neorealism and
neoliberalism.
According to him, Central Asia is best theorized as an international society in which
order, stability, and coexistence are viae mediae between competition and
cooperation, far from being a Hobbesian state of nature marked by continuous
conflict or a peaceful, Kantian world made up of liberal democracies (239).

117
 Trailović

The ES, like neorealists and neoliberalists, maintains that states exist in an anarchic
environment, without an overarching authority. Buranelli (2019, 251) adds that
states are still capable of maintaining order, coexistence, and achieving a minimal
degree of cooperation by abiding by very few norms, rules, and institutions in what
is known as an ‘international society’. In Central Asia "relations are aimed at
ensuring coexistence and limited to ad hoc cooperation on given matters (transit of
goods, water-sharing, border definition, limited trade, diplomatic resolution of
skirmishes, and intercultural programs), and not at full-fledged integration" (ibid.).
Challenging the dominant (neo)realist framework, Buranelli's (2019, 253) research
highlights norms and institutions that establish a degree of order in Central Asia.
These include references to sovereignty, diplomacy, non-intervention principles,
and international law, along with informal practices like president-to-president
dialogues, problem-solving phone calls, and seniority-based relations among elites.
These elements indicate a web of normative dynamics that sustain the region.
Buranelli (2019, 256; 243-250) further contends that the institutions of Central Asian
international society—sovereignty, international law, diplomacy, authoritarianism,
and great power management—hold different meanings in this region. Sovereignty
is more rigid and less flexible, diplomacy depends more on strong inter-presidential
contacts than on multilateralism, and authoritarianism is not only accepted but has
become an institution in itself.
Buranelly (2019, 254; 256) argues for a methodological approach to International
Relations (IR) research in Central Asia that moves away from the traditional
analytical, or "mind-world dualism," where concepts from the global level are
imposed on the region without considering its unique characteristics and its unique
social relations. Instead, he advocates for an interpretivist approach that focuses on
understanding how institutions and practices are conceptualized and implemented
by local actors creating a basis for a sociology of IR that reflects socio-behavioural
differences on a regional level.
Buranelly (2019, 257) suggests differentiating regions based on the formality or
informality of their practices and institutions. He proposes Central Asia as a case
study to explore this approach further and to identify "regional international
societies" where global norms are either weakly internalized or replaced by local
customs and informal practices.

118
 Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard

Dadabaev's Challenge to the Coloniality of Knowledge in Central Asian IR

In his book "Decolonizing Central Asian International Relations: Beyond Empires",
Dadabaev (2022, 150) argues that existing theoretical frameworks in International
Relations (IR) applied to Central Asia either heavily rely on positivist and rationalist
approaches (commonly found among realists, neo-realists, liberalists, neo-liberalists)
which emphasize rivalry, domination, spheres of influence, and 'divide and conquer'
rhetoric, or they attempt to transcend these rationalist perspectives by focusing on
local interpretations of various concepts and terms.
Dadabaev (2022, 15) suggests that the region of Central Asia has been turned into
a 'knowledge consumer' rather than a 'generator.' By prioritizing a dogmatic
inheritance of 'knowledge' and 'meaning' over knowledge creation, the discipline of
international relations in the CA region falls into a 'coloniality of knowledge.' This
is partly due to the Soviet past, where Marxist-Leninist ideas were imposed as 'faith'
rather than operationalizable political platforms. In the post-Soviet setting, Marxist-
Leninist interpretations were replaced by Western interpretations, treating the CA
region as a mere consumer of Western knowledge.
The book underscores the necessity of decolonizing international relations in the
Central Asian region to achieve a fair representation of regional states in global
affairs. According to Dadabaev (2022, 1-12), this involves exposing the concepts
and stereotypes imposed on the region by dominant assumptions in contemporary
international relations. By offering empirical grounding for alternative perspectives,
the author challenges Western international relations' tendency to replicate the
errors of Russian Marxists in attributing a narrative of modernity to the region. He
highlight the need to integrate Central Asia into the broader International Relations
(IR) discipline by valuing knowledge production rooted in regional traditions and
approaches. This approach does not dismiss Western IR advancements but calls for
recognizing and incorporating regional perspectives to give Central Asian actors a
voice and agency. Currently, non-regional actors like the EU, the US, Russia, and
China dominate the narrative on CA politics. To address this imbalance, CA voices
should be central in discussions about the region, allowing their unique perspectives
to enrich IR discourse and promote a more inclusive and representative body of
knowledge.
Contemporary approaches to Central Asia suggest that the end of the Soviet Union
did not terminate colonization but merely shifted the narrative of 'modernity' from
a Russian perspective to a Western one. These societies are continually framed
within a dualistic system: 'modern vs. traditional,' 'agricultural vs. industrial,' and
'democratic vs. authoritarian.' Their non-European (non-Russian, non-Western)

119
 Trailović

traditions and approaches are often relegated to the past, with the future portrayed
as aligned with 'global' and 'universal' values and norms (Dadabaev 2022, 15-16).
Dadabaev (2022, 152) argues that attempts should be made to counter the tendency
to accept the 'meanings' of concepts from other regions and apply those 'meanings'
to the Central Asian regional context. He argues that the Marxist-driven theoretical
platform, prevalent among Central Asian scholars in the late Soviet and immediate
post-Soviet context, was a double-colonial construct. It was initially framed around
European experiences, applied to Russia, and then reintroduced in the Central Asia
realm, shaping new layers of colonial ideas. The unconditional acceptance of the
Western version of the state and progress, coupled with the rejection of the Central
Asian past as immature and transitional, leads to the rejection of the CA 'self' and
the possibility of alternative visions of progress, sovereignty, cooperation, and
engagement.
Both Western and Russian perspectives disregard the region's unique model of
modernity and progress, which doesn't necessarily align with the modern nation-
state, ethnicity, and state-building. Central Asian behaviour is often guided by
notions of neighbourhood, brotherhood, informal community of states, and
regional norms, rarely acknowledged in mainstream IR theories (Dadabaev 2022).
Dadabaevs (2022, 5) study emphasizes the need to move beyond state-centric
notions of sovereignty, power politics, domination, democratization, and
modernity, or their complete rejection. Instead, it advocates for a 'reconciliation of
diverse perspectives' aiming 'to achieve mutual learning'. There is a need to use
Central Asian cases to advance Western theoretical assumptions about state
behaviour. The major problem is not the reflection of Western and European
experiences on Central Asian cases, but the claim of their global and universal
applicability. This book joins the call for a need to pursue global IR with disciplinary
inquiries that focus on pluralistic universality and respect for diversity and agency
while negating exceptionalism (Dadabaev 2022, 16).
According to Dadabaev (2022), Central Asian states should be seen as active agents
capable of shaping their foreign policies and generating knowledge, on par with
global powers like Russia, China, the US, and the EU. Related to this problem are
the concepts proposed as paradigms defining the nature of relations in Central Asia.
The most enduring one is the narrative of the Great Game. However, there is a
growing understanding that this image is no longer empirically valid. According to
Dadabaev (2022, 20), narratives of various schemes in the Central Asia require
successful interlocutors between rationalism and critical post-positivist approaches.
While these interlocutors have Western intellectual roots, they need to be equipped

120
 Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard

to account for the social construction of relations, identity, norms, and the changing
nature of the state.
In this process of constructing norms and identities, the notions of 'practicality' and
'functionality' are key for understanding the construction of relations among Central
Asian states (Dadabaev 2022, 20). Dadabaev (2022, 22) emphasizes the importance
of neighbourhood as a psychological and identity-rooted notion defining the Central
Asia 'selves' as parts of a regional identity. Informal structures of neighbourhood,
informal consultations, and the institution of political elders are based on shared
norms of enduring, collective decision making, brotherhood (fraternity). These
norms shape the Central Asian identity and define how Central Asian states
construct their interactions with others. Central Asian states have demonstrated
agency in constructing their regional order, albeit within the constraints imposed by
historical, geopolitical, and economic factors.
The concept of neighbourhood is central „long-term platform for interactions,
which is neither formalized nor operationalized in terms of structure (Dadabaev
2022, 23).“ It extends beyond geographical proximity to encompass shared history,
culture, and social interactions. This notion of neighbourhood has facilitated the
development of informal mechanisms of cooperation, such as regular summits of
heads of state and subnational diplomacy among regional governors (Dadabaev
2022, 25).

Fazendeiro's Challenge to the Dominance Paradigm in Central Asia: “power

as togetherness”
Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro (2020, 1) in his article "Domination and Togetherness:
Conceptions of Power in Central Asia’s International Politics" begins by
highlighting that in the academic literature on Central Asian international relations,
the "struggle for dominance" is the most commonly represented conception of
power. As he notes, "the struggle for dominance remains one of the more systematic
ways to depict Central Asian international relations (ibid.)." This concept, which
gained prominence in the 1990s under the "New Great Game" label, equates the
regional dynamics to a contest involving great powers (the United States, Russia,
and China) and other influential states (India, Pakistan, and Iran) competing for
material wealth, particularly natural resources. While still a prevalent analogy, it is
increasingly criticized for exaggerating the influence of external powers and
overlooking regional agency (Fazendeiro 2020). Additionally, Fazendeiro (2020, 1-
2) notes that it perpetuates misleading geopolitics, benefiting local incumbents who
invoke external threats to maintain their positions.

121
 Trailović

According to this author, different conceptions of power significantly influence the

understanding of international relations. He contends that these different
conceptions of power offer distinct interpretive frameworks for analysing
international politics, particularly in regions like Central Asia, where both forms of
power are evident. The author builds on two classical manifestations of power:
potestas (power as domination) and potentia (power as togetherness). Potestas
focuses on individual or group dominance through coercion and strategic
positioning, emphasizing a logic of instrumentality. Conversely, potentia highlights
the capacity for collective action based on shared norms and values, emphasizing a
logic of performance and logic of appropriateness (Fazendeiro 2020). Fazendeiro
(2020, 1-3) draws on Hannah Arendt’s ideas, suggesting that political actions are
influenced by collective norms and the moral principles of the community. Words,
ideas, and symbols play a crucial role in constituting meaning and guiding actions.
This conception of power as togetherness highlights how communities are built on
shared ideas and practices, reaching beyond the elite's preoccupation with retaining
power.
According to him, while several scholarly depictions have moved away from certain
aspects of the New Great Game, they still adhere to its underlying spirit of
domination. Fazendeiro (2020, 3-6) uses Roy Allison’s concept of “virtual
regionalism” to show how Central Asian leaders prioritize regime security and
reinforce dominance through regional organizations, Kathleen Collins to highlight
how local elites use patrimonial networks for survival and enrichment through
corruption and nepotism, and Alexander Cooley’s “Great Games, Local Rules” to
demonstrate how local actors manipulate great powers for their advantage, all
emphasizing the spirit of domination in Central Asian politics.
The author argues that there's another way to see this: power can also be about
cooperation and a sense of belonging to a common region. Countries work together
on things like border control, establishing regional organizations, and managing
natural resources. This cooperation helps create a sense of shared identity and
strengthens the states involved. State actions are not solely driven by material
interests or coercion but also by the desire to establish a sense of belonging. This
broader perspective challenges the simplistic view of Central Asian politics as
dominated by the pursuit of dominance and highlights the importance of collective
ideas and practices in shaping regional dynamics (Fazendeiro 2020).
To support his argument, Fazendeiro (2020, 6-7) highlights several contributions to
the literature that demonstrate how emphasizing togetherness can mitigate the
pervasive spirit of political domination typically invoked. As Fazendeiro explains,
Nick Megoran argues in "Nationalism in Central Asia" that the tensions between

122
 Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard

Central Asian states stem primarily from their distinct nationalist visions
(nationalistic ideology), rather than solely from hegemonic ambitions or patrimonial
politics. While acknowledging the role of patrimonial politics, Megoran asserts that
focusing solely on patronage networks overlooks deeper ideological factors at play
in regional interactions. He emphasizes that beyond economic or security interests,
nationalist ideologies significantly shape the positions of state actors and often
hinder bilateral cooperation between countries in Central Asia.
Fazendeiro also examines the perspectives of other authors. According to his
analysis, John Heathershaw and Edward Schatz (Paradox of Power: The Logics of
State Weakness in Eurasia) argue that states in Central Asia should not be viewed
merely as entities with a monopoly on violence. Instead, they contend that states
also perform roles to satisfy audiences, and these performances can maintain order
and legitimacy even without formal benchmarks of power. Heathershaw further
argues that performances of the state in the international arena are significant and
impact how local and international actors perceive and interact with the state
(Fazendeiro 2020, 7).
According to Fazendeiro (2020, 7-8), Alessandra Russo's work "Regions in
Transition in the Former Soviet Area: Ideas and Institutions in the Making"
introduces a framework that reinterprets Central Asia's international politics by
challenging the notion that former Soviet regional organizations are merely tools of
domination. Russo argues that these organizations and states mutually shape each
other in what she terms co-constitution. This means that regional organizations, like
the Commonwealth of Independent States, not only help states secure political
networks but also contribute to defining the region by fostering a sense of
belonging. As Fazendeiro (2020, 7-8) noted, Russo concludes that while power
struggles are part of the regional dynamic, cooperation at various levels contributes
significantly to Central Asia's cohesion as a region beyond mere domination
dynamics.

Overcoming Monocausality: Dzhuraev's 3-i's Model for Central Asia

Shairbek Dzhuraev (2021, 232-234) in his chapter "Domestic Sources of Foreign
Policy in Central Asia" begins by grouping the literature on international relations
in the Central Asian region into three categories based on different disciplines:
international relations, foreign policy analysis, and comparative politics. Actually, he
identifies two main groups of literature on international relations in Central Asia:
one that predominantly relies on systemic theories of international relations, and

123
 Trailović

another that relies on foreign policy analysis (FP) of using domestic sources of
international relations.
Dzhuraev (2021, 232;241) continues with his criticism of both sets of literature and
academic works, pointing out that both lack broader explanatory potential, or that
their explanatory power is at least limited. According to him, both groups are
characterized by monocausality and structural explanations of foreign policy and are
limited by the domestic-external dichotomy.
The first group, which relies on systemic theories of international relations,
especially neorealism, views international relations in Central Asia through the lens
of either the relations between major geopolitical players or the relations of Central
Asian states with those actors. This approach typically views the agency of the
Central Asian republics in international relations as limited, seeing them as objects
of international relations due to their status as "small" and "weak" states. If Central
Asian states are considered small and weak, their foreign policy agendas are primarily
focused on international alignment with greater players (Dzhuraev 2021, 233-234).
When it comes to the second strand of literature, Dzhuraev (2021, 232) argues that
it originated from dissatisfaction with the theoretical limitations of geopolitics-
focused arguments but seldom escaped its own restrictive framework of political
ruling regimes. According to Dzhuraev (2021), the focus on ruling regimes in
Central Asian political studies is well-founded, given that these states have not
experienced peaceful transitions of power through elections in the thirty years since
their independence. However, Dzhuraev (2021, 239-240) argues that an exclusive
focus on regime interests can limit the understanding of Central Asian foreign
policies in several ways.
Firstly, viewing regimes as unitary and rational actors merely replaces one presumed
unitary actor (the state) with another (the regime), without justifying the assumption
of their rational and predictable behaviour. This perspective risks simplifying the
complexity of who actually constitutes the ruling regime at any given time. Secondly,
while the shift from IR-centric views to domestic ruling regimes aims to incorporate
domestic politics into the analysis, it often neglects the intricacies of domestic
political dynamics, assuming that external threats are the primary concern for these
regimes. Finally, the focus on regime interests tends to promote monocausal
explanations, limiting the scope of foreign policy analysis to a single variable and
ignoring the multifaceted nature of foreign policy actions.
He proposes using analytical eclecticism as an alternative and the 3-i's model to
provide complex understanding of the factors at play. This approach would
integrate ideas, interests, and institutions into a comprehensive analytical

124
 Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard

framework, offering a better understanding of foreign policy actors and actions. By

considering the interaction of these three elements, researchers can better capture
the complex nature of foreign policy decisions in Central Asia. This framework
allows for a deeper exploration of how individual leaders' ideas and identities
influence foreign policy, how regime changes impact decision-making processes,
and how personal motivations and interpretations of political environments shape
foreign policy actions. Analytical eclecticism, therefore, provides a more holistic
approach to studying Central Asian foreign policies, moving beyond the constraints
of monocausal explanations (Dzhuraev 2021, 239-241).

Conclusion
The long-standing lack of clear indicators of more serious regional integration in
terms of institutionalization in Central Asia, coupled with its strategic geographical
position, wealth of resources, and proximity to major regional powers, has
contributed to the perception of the Central Asian region as historically unstable,
fragmented, and strongly influenced by external forces competing for dominance.
Central Asia has long been seen as a "pathologically" non-cooperative region
(Karabayeva 2021, 25-26).
The prevailing narrative of Central Asia as a volatile region prone to instability and
conflict, often framed within the "Eurasian Balkans" or "New Great Game"
paradigms (great power rivalry), while rooted in historical realities, has increasingly
become an oversimplification.
The analysis presented here underscores the significance of intra-regional
developments in reshaping Central Asia's trajectory. The transition of power in
several republics, coupled with Uzbekistan's pivot towards regional cooperation, has
fostered a new era of intra-state relations characterized by increased dialogue, trust-
building, and a nascent sense of regional identity. This shift is evident in the
establishment of consultative meetings among the heads of state and the growing
emphasis on regional cooperation initiatives in many areas.
Likewise, other approaches and explanations have begun to appear in the literature,
offering different theoretical and methodological starting points for a more
thorough understanding of interstate (international) relations in this region.
In this paper, we first highlight the basic shortcomings in the so far dominant views
and analyses of regional international relations in Central Asia, based on the works
of several selected authors who critically examine the weaknesses and limitations of
traditional understandings of the region. According to them, the geopolitical

125
 Trailović

paradigm, systemic theories of international relations (neorealism and

neoliberalism), as well as previous works in the field of foreign policy analysis (which
rely on domestic factors of foreign policy behaviour and relations), have limited
explanatory potential regarding Central Asian IR. There are several dominant points
of criticism of the previous literature and approaches to IR in Central Asia, which
we noticed in the new group of authors analysed in the paper. First, they criticize
earlier literature for overemphasizing only one factor (variable) as influential,
whether it is the influence of great powers and their hegemony, internal factors such
as the struggle for influence, dominance and rivalry between the Central Asian states
themselves, or the overemphasis of domestic factors such as the role of regime-
centric or elite-driven factors (patrimonial regimes, security concerns, and
personality cults) as determinants of the foreign policy behaviour of CA states and,
consequently, international relations in the region (Buranelli 2019; Dadabaev 2022;
Fazendeiro 2020; Dzhuraev 2021).
These authors further argue that the CA region cannot be viewed only through the
lens of realism, characterized solely by competition and conflict, and that the
propositions of systemic IR theories are monocausal and dominantly focused only
on structural factors that mechanically and deterministically influence the states of
the region. According to these authors, previous approaches to the region are
dominantly based on rationalist points of view, while ideational and normative ones
are left out. They dominantly emphasize dynamics of dominance, "power as
dominance", and "logic of instrumentality" (Fazendeiro 2020). According to them,
such approaches significantly lead to the uncritical imposition of top-down external
concepts onto the region in explanations of regional dynamics in CA without taking
into account its unique characteristics and distinct social relations, where the region
becomes a recipient of knowledge rather than its generator (Dadabaev 2022). The
consequence of such approaches is the practical denial of any agency of CA
republics in their own region, viewing them as objects of international relations due
to their status as "small" and "weak" states (Dzhuraev 2021).
To address the shortcomings of the aforementioned approaches, the authors
analysed in this paper propose different theoretical-methodological approaches,
concepts, and explanations that, according to them, have greater explanatory power.
They suggest moving towards an "inside-out" approach to the region, emphasizing
the need to recognize the agency of Central Asian states in shaping their foreign
policies. This involves moving beyond the limitations of established theoretical
frameworks by adapting them to the unique context of the region.
While traditional approaches to the Central Asian region have merit, the region is
also characterized by cooperation, the absence of major interstate conflicts, and the

126
 Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard

existence of local regional informal rules and norms that maintain stability. The
foreign policy behaviour of Central Asian states is often guided by notions of
neighbourhood, brotherhood, and regional norms, which are rarely acknowledged
in mainstream IR theories (Dadabaev 2022). Therefore, the authors we analysed
argue that it is necessary to understand and explain international relations in Central
Asia through theoretical and methodological approaches that include analytical
eclecticism, interpretivism, multicausalism, and pluralistic universality while
respecting diversity and negating exceptionalism (region (Buranelli 2019; Dadabaev
2022; Fazendeiro 2020; Dzhuraev 2021).
The concepts that these authors believe have greater explanatory power include
"international society", "power as togetherness", and the "logic of appropriateness",
according to which ideas, norms, interests, and formal and informal institutions are
integrated into a comprehensive analytical framework (Buranelli 2019, Fazendeiro
2020). These authors advocate for an approach that focuses on how institutions and
practices are conceptualized and implemented by local actors in Central Asia. In
Central Asia, institutions hold different meanings, and global norms are often
weakly internalized or replaced by local customs and informal practices. This
perspective values knowledge production rooted in regional traditions and
approaches, and it does not dismiss Western or any other IR explanations. Instead,
it calls for recognizing and incorporating regional perspectives to give Central Asian
actors a voice and agency (Buranelli 2019; Dadabaev 2022; Fazendeiro 2020;
Dzhuraev 2021).

127
 Trailović

References
Artman, Vincent, and Alexander C. Diener. 2022. “Boundaries, Borders and
Identities“. In: Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Central Asia, edited by Rico
Isaacs and Erica Marat, 135-153. Oxon: Routledge
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1998. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its
Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books.
Buranelli, Filippo Costa. 2019. “The Heartland of IR Theory? Central Asia as an
‘International Society’ Between Realism and Liberalism“. In: Theorizing Central
Asian Politics The State, Ideology and Power, edited by Rico Isaacs and Alessandro
Frigerio, 237-262. Cham:Palgrave Macmillan.
Buranelli, Filippo Costa. 2021. “Central Asian Regionalism or Central Asian Order?
Some Reflections“. Central Asian Affairs 8 (2021): 1–26.
Buranelli, Filippo Costa. 2023. “Central Asian Regionalism After the 5th Leaders’
Meeting“. The Diplomat. 19 September 2023.
https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/central-asian-regionalism-after-the-5th-
leaders-meeting/
Cornell, E. Svante, and S. Frederick Starr. 2018. Modernization and Regional
Cooperation in Central Asia: A New Spring?. Washington, Stockholm-Nacka:
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program.
Dadabaev, Timur. 2022. Decolonizing Central Asian International Relations:
Beyond Empires. Oxon:Routledge.
Dzhuraev, Shairbek. 2022. “Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy“. In: Theorizing
Central Asian Politics The State, Ideology and Power, edited by Rico Isaacs and
Alessandro Frigerio, 232-247. Cham:Palgrave Macmillan.
Fazendeiro, Bernardo Teles. 2020. “Domination and Togetherness: Conceptions of
Power in Central Asia’s International Politics“. Problems of Post-Communism
68(2), 1-9.
Karabayeva, Assylzat. 2021. “Leaders, ideas, and norm diffusion in Central Asia and
beyond“. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 6 (1): 25–44.
Kassenova, Nargis. 2023. “Strategic Autonomy for Central Asia: Drawing
Inspiration and Support From the European Union“. Davis Center. Accessed 26
June 2024.
https://2706.capsunlock.org/files/Strategic_autonomy_for_Central_Asia_booklet

128
 Beyond the Geopolitical Chessboard

.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0NHvAUbrv4BOXiXFPaAfvu0-
641VuRboguUcVnK95_GLmrGQtS_7cdQhM
Marat, Erica. 2021. “Introduction: 30 years of Central Asian studies – the best is yet
to come“. Central Asian Survey 40 (4): 477-482.
Starr, Frederick. 2019. “Is This Central Asia’s ASEAN Moment? “. The Diplomat,
5 December 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/is-this-central-asias-asean-
moment/
Tolipov, Farkhod. 2022. “Uzbekistan-2.0: Continuity and Change in Foreign
Policy“. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Joint Center.
Accessed 28 June 2024. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/feature-
articles/item/13740-uzbekistan-20-continuity-and-change-in-foreign-policy.html

129
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch6

STRATEGIC SIMULATIONS IN GEOPOLITICS:

RESEARCHING, MODELING, TEACHING1
Vladimir Ajzenhamer2, Mihajlo Kopanja3, Petar Stanojević4

Abstract
In the field of geopolitics, it is difficult to aptly study the complex processes on how space
impacts international politics. There are three main reasons for that. Firstly, as in most social
sciences, it is impossible to conduct experiments and empirically test one’s own ideas.
Secondly, being that geopolitics tends to observe the longue durée processes, it takes years,
decades, or even centuries to see whether certain ideas will prove to be a sufficient
explanation. Thirdly, we cannot simply wage a war, to put it to extremes, in order to see
whether we are right or not. We could even add a fourth issue related to teaching – given
previous issues, it becomes difficult for professors to adequately pass on knowledge to
students in courses that last mere few months. However, trends in software development
are allowing us to overcome these issues in the virtual realm, by developing specific software
dedicated to simulating the international arena. Although wargames have always existed
within military planning and education it was never as prominent in academia. In recent
years, many top university and research institutions have begun establishing specific
departments that solely focus on conducting strategic wargames. The goal of this paper is to
show how strategic simulations can be implemented in the field of geopolitics in order to
provide a better foot ground for researching, modeling and even teaching geopolitics.
Although utilization of software simulations will be highlighted, the paper will also deal with
the merits of relying on existing practices of in vivo wargames. To do so, this paper is
organized into three parts. Firstly, we will provide an overview of wargames and simulations
in the broader fields of international relations, security and strategic studies. Secondly, we
will point out the main differences between software and in vivo simulation from the
perspective of their utility for different scenarios. Finally, we will highlight the main benefits
utilization of strategic simulations have for researching, modeling and teaching geopolitics.

Key words:
Geopolitics, strategy, simulations, strategic simulations, wargames

1 This paper was written as part of the Science Fund of the Republic of Serbia project “Ideas” - NEWSIMR&D,
#7749151
2 Associate professor, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, ajzenhamer@fb.bg.ac.rs
3 Assistant professor, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, mihajlo.kopanja@fb.bg.ac.rs
4 Full professor, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, petar.stanojevic@fb.bg.ac.rs
 Strategic Simulations in Geopolitics

Introduction
In the field of geopolitics, it is difficult to aptly study the complex processes on how
space impacts international politics. This is not just an issue for geopolitical studies.
In general, social sciences are burdened with major complexities in experimenting
and empirically testing one’s own ideas. There are two major issues present –
nowhere as evident as in the case of trying to test different hypotheses on what
causes war. In such an experiment, researchers would take several states and
manipulate their behavior in ways that it causes war. The first issue is how would
we even do that? For the corps of variables that are structural in nature, researchers
would essentially have to remake the world order. But even if they were to focus on
second image variables, they would have to not only get acceptance by the
overwhelming majority of people, but also manipulate the behavior of everybody –
something that seems virtually impossible. Second, and more pertinent issue is –
would that even be moral? We believe that every reader of this paper is acquainted
with many problematic psychological experiments conducted in the 1950s and
1960s, which caused irreparable damage to volunteering participants. Now just
imagine the case of experimenting with the causes of war. How many tens or
hundreds of thousands of people would have to die just so that we can gain some
knowledge. The amorality and even cruelty behind such endeavors render
experimenting, especially in international security, virtually impossible.
But besides these issues, there are additional ones – more specific to geopolitical
studies. On the one hand, being that geopolitics tends to observe the longue durée
processes, it takes years, decades, or even centuries to see whether certain ideas will
prove to be a sufficient explanation. Take Mackinder`s Geographical Pivot of
History, Ratzel`s Laws of State Growth, or, from the more recent repertoire, Jared
Diamond`s Gun, Germs and Steel which represent cases of research where long-
term trends have been detected (Mackinder, 1904; Ratzel, 1969; Diamond, 1997).
The specificity of geopolitics, when compared to many international relations
approaches, is that it avoids what John Agnew calls the Territorial Trap, in that it
recognizes that spatial structure of the world is never the same (Agnew, 1994). Being
that we are talking in terms of decades and centuries, as well as the fact that each
epoch is virtually unique, longitudinal experiments become impossible to conduct.
Finally, there is even the issue of teaching. Given everything previously stated, it
becomes difficult for professors to adequately pass on knowledge to students in
courses that last a mere few months. Since students are never given the chance to
test abstract ideas, only the few with exceptional qualities can see through theory
into the real world.
We believe that the previous passages came as no surprise to readers of this paper.
All of us are aware of these issues in our everyday work. We do our best to overcome
these obstacles in our quest for knowledge. However, trends in software

132
 Ajzenhamer, Kopanja, Stanojević

development are allowing us to overcome these issues in the virtual realm, by

developing specific software dedicated to simulating the international arena.
Although wargames have long existed within military planning and education it was
never as prominent in academia. In recent years, many top university and research
institutions have begun establishing specific departments that solely focus on
conducting strategic wargames. The goal of this paper is to show how strategic
simulations can be implemented in the field of geopolitics in order to provide a
better foot ground for researching, modeling and even teaching geopolitics.
Although utilization of software simulations will be highlighted, the paper will also
deal with the merits of relying on existing practices of in vivo wargames.
To do so, this paper is organized into three parts. Firstly, we will provide a short
overview of wargames and simulations in the broader fields of international
relations, security and strategic studies. In doing so, we highlight how wargames and
strategic simulations have long been an integral part of the broader geopolitical
problematique (albeit indirectly). Secondly, we will point out the main differences
between software and in vivo simulation from the perspective of their utility for
different scenarios. While there is an implicit notion that computer software
simulations provide a more adequate reflection of reality, we show how there are
cases where in vivo simulations are a more adequate tool. Finally, we will highlight
the main benefits utilization of strategic simulations have for researching, modeling
and teaching geopolitics. Given the aforementioned issues plaguing empirical testing
in geopolitical studies, as well as passing on knowledge, strategic simulations can be
the way to vastly improve the state of the discipline.

Wargames and Strategic Simulation

Wargaming and strategic simulations came long before the information age. While
we have repeatedly mentioned terms like software and simulation, thus implying the
usage of computers. However, in principle, this is not needed. Nor has it been
needed. Since humans started living in organized groups, one can argue that
wargaming was present. There is evidence from more than millennia and a half ago
from Ancient China (McCreight, 2013, 21). One can argue that chess and go are
nothing more than one of the oldest wargames (Caffrey Jr. 2000, 34). The amount
of chess metaphors in contemporary geopolitics, IR and strategic studies just serve
to highlight this connection (eg. see Brzezinski, 1997). In fact, as George P. Baird
et al. imaginatively showcase, even bonfire gatherings where elders speak of their
war achievements can be thought of as wargaming (Baird et al, 2009, 146). Why?
Well, there are at least two reasons. Firstly, if conflict existed so did attempts to be
prepared for them. Secondly even bonfire gatherings hit the core of what
wargaming, and strategic simulations are. Why we clump these terms together in

133
 Strategic Simulations in Geopolitics

this paper, and use them almost interchangeably, is that they share the same basic
idea of recreating the complex and violent nature of geopolitical phenomena
in a controlled and non-destructive environment. This point is pertinent to both
long established wargaming practice and the strategic simulations in the virtual
domain and in vivo simulations that we focus mostly on in this paper.
The practice of wargaming, that has led to strategic simulations, as we know it today
is a German, or better yet a Prussian product. Even the term wargame came from a
translation of the German word kriegspiel. In the aftermath of Napoleonic Wars,
study of warfare rose prominently and gave us some of the most prominent authors
of war and strategy like Klausewitz and Jomini. It was in the same era that
wargaming was born. This connection is clearly evident from Jomini`s definition of
strategy as “the art of making war upon the map [emphasis added], the art of
embracing the whole of a theatre of war” (Žomini, 1952, 90). By emphasizing
warmaking upon the map, there is a clear connection with prior preparations where
generals have essentially been simulating possible courses of action in order to
achieve the objective of war. Caffrey Jr. provides a concise history of the evolution
of wargaming by highlighting its beginnings in 19th century Prussia, from 1825 to
1871, followed by wargaming becoming global between 1872 and 1913, steady
decline between 1913 and 1945, return during the Cold War, and, interestingly, its
biggest rise during the Unipolar Moment in the 1990s (Caffrey Jr, 2000).
To write on the complete evolution of wargames and strategic simulations is a book
project in its own right. However, it is important to highlight that wargaming and
strategic simulations are not the same concepts inasmuch as war and conflict are not
the same. Akin to the field of strategic studies – thinking on strategy in war led to
thinking on strategy in international politics – wargames are narrower form in terms
of problematique they focus on. However, for full conceptual clarity, the distinction
between wargames, models and simulations must be understood. As Mattew Caffrey
Jr. writes, modeling and simulation are different from what wargaming is since
“models are simply proportional representations of reality…[while]…simulations
are proportional representations of reality through time” (Caffrey Jr. 2000, 34).
According to this author, wargames use both modeling and simulation aspects and
direct it towards a singular agenda – understanding how best to act in an armed
conflict under both your constraints and constraints and behavior of your opponent.
Therefore, while the label might be misleading, strategic simulations are not just
simulations, but wargames on a bigger scale.
Understanding the differences between these terms does not change an important
fact – they are virtually interchangeable terms (McCreight, 2013). International
Politics without warfare is just as nothing as warfare without international politics.
One can never have strategic simulation without some form of wargame, just as no
wargame can exist outside the context of international politics. Circling back several

134
 Ajzenhamer, Kopanja, Stanojević

paragraphs ago, it remains the fact that both share the idea of recreating the complex
and violent nature of geopolitical phenomena in a controlled and non-destructive
environment. As McCreight stresses “this [wargame or strategic simulation] is done
to replicate reality and force participants to make decisions, extract new information,
verify or clarify ambiguities or discern new insights that would be required in order
to develop different courses of action in the midst of battle” (McCreight, 2013, 22).
Much has been said here on battles, namely because wargames and strategic
simulations began for those purposes. But this is not a paper in military science or
the tactical level. Likewise, wargames and strategic simulations are not solely
applicable to these matters. In fact, we argue that true benefits of strategic
simulations are even more evident in the geopolitical domain. There are several
reasons for that. Firstly, in order for an analysis to be geopolitical you need spatial
factors influencing international politics, that are very complex and plentiful.
Secondly, geopolitics does not solely revolve around the usage of military power.
Contrary to what authors like Guzzini believe, geopolitics study a broader scope of
interactions between states (Guzzini, 2014). This only increases the complexity of
reality that needs to be modeled and simulated, and therefore requires a more careful
and thorough approach in researching, modeling, and teaching. Thirdly, geopolitical
problematique is, as we mentioned, longue durée in nature. This means that in order
to fully grasp the complexity of it, you must find a way to “accelerate time”. At this
point even the traditional wargames fail. Therefore, strategic simulations help us to
envision how such long lasting processes will manifest themselves, allowing us to
better understand and be better prepared. However, as we said, this is something
that even the more traditional wargames and simulations that rely on in vivo
interactions fail – whereas software ones do not.

In Vivo vs. Software Simulations

For most of our history, wargames and strategic simulations were solely possible in
vivo. Given their long history it is understandable why – we did not have the
technology needed. It is important to understand that we have had computers in
our daily life for around four decades, with some specialized institutions having
them for around three quarters of a century. This, however, did not mean that in
vivo simulations of the past were inadequate. On the contrary. They gave us the
blueprint on how to conduct complex strategic simulations that did produce great
results – as evident from the quality of Prussian officer schools. Yet, with the
introduction of computers and computer programs that were able to model and
simulate natural and social phenomena, our abilities increased greatly. As we stated
to a certain degree in the previous chapter, software that is developed for strategic
simulations are not only able to encompass a wider array of phenomena but are also

135
 Strategic Simulations in Geopolitics

able to do so for a significantly longer period of time. This is because while in vivo
simulations are “slaves” to the natural flow of time, computer software can be
modified so that time passes much quicker. Although this can also be done in in
vivo simulations through time jumps, this method still relies on human decision
making which does not need to account for the actual behavior in the simulated
reality.
An additional obstacle that plagues in vivo simulations is the interpersonal relations
of participants. More often than not, in vivo simulations are conducted within a
closely knit group of people who know one another. Having such relationships in
mind, actions within in vivo simulations may be governed even more by the
previous knowledge or others` perceptions, personality, and character which can
lead to behavior tailored not to the simulated situation but the adversary on the
other side. Simply put, it is difficult to factor out interpersonal relationships out of
the equation, and therefore end up with a strategic simulation that does not
adequately reflect reality. Even when different participants are held strictly
separated, you still require middlemen in order to make an in vivo simulation which
also corrupts the simulation.
In contrast, software simulations are not plagued with such issues. Software
simulations of geopolitical phenomena rose in prominence in recent years. To a
certain degree they do owe their rise to the popularity of grand strategy computer
games that virtually do the same thing, albeit for different purposes. Among those
strategic simulations that have gained most attention in the academic community
are the products of Statecraft Simulation Inc (StatecraftSim). In recent years, there
has been a plethora of published papers that focus on both the good and the bad
sides of Statecraft Sim (eg. see: Raymond, 2014; Saiya, 2015; Cox, 2021; Smith and
Michalsen, 2021). In essence it was developed primarily as a teaching tool for
students to understand the complex theoretical concepts in IR and geopolitics. This
is why the application of Statecraft Sim is mostly used in classrooms and is therefore
plagued with some of the same issues as in vivo simulations – namely that
interpersonal relationships do factor in. However, this does not necessarily need to
be the case. Given that it is run completely online, you could hypothetically run a
strategic simulation without these issues. From the geopolitical perspective, one of
the most interesting – and we would argue important – aspects of Statecraft Sim is
that it simulates international politics unfolding in a reality with different geography
to our planet. This means physical geography of Statecraft Sim`s world is completely
different. This helps students understand how space impacts state behavior because
they are not burdened with assumptions and implicit knowledge they gained over
the years.
Leaving aside Statecraft Sim (primarily because of its teaching focus), software
strategic simulations could further improve the whole wargaming and strategic

136
 Ajzenhamer, Kopanja, Stanojević

simulations domain because it can hypothetically simulate the behavior of the other
side. Computer software is nothing more than algorithms, akin to how independent-
dependent variables work in our theoretical approaches. Therefore, our theoretical
knowledge not only can, but must be factored into the software in order to make
the simulation viable. While most humans do implicit decision-making by factoring
many variables, computer software does that explicitly. This means two things:
firstly, that we can replicate a vast array of independent variables in order to see how
their joint values impact the dependent variable we desire; and secondly, assuming
we have information both precise and vast enough, we can simulate the behavior of
the other side without the need of other people making decisions behind the scenes.
And what is more important, we can track the process, manipulate the variables,
and produce different outcomes without any moral burdens. This allows for
reaching scientific conclusions without the concern of researchers’ biases.
However, this does not mean that traditional in vivo strategic simulations should be
forgone all together, and they still retain value. It is difficult to aptly simulate many
cognitive aspects of individuals leading their countries. Practical geopolitical
reasoning, and the geopolitical codes that stem from them, concepts like place and
civilizations – basically most concepts from the corps of critical geopolitics, as well
as some types of state interactions like negotiations cannot be so aptly simulated by
software. While recent strides in machine learning and artificial intelligence are
getting us closer to that, we still have a very long way to go in order to do so.
Therefore, both in vivo and software strategic simulations do have their merit and
should be applied according to the research, model or lecture thought.

Benefits of Strategic Simulations: Researching, Modeling and Teaching

Geopolitics
Previous chapters have given us some glimpses to the benefits of strategic
simulations in the domains of researching, modeling, and teaching geopolitics.
However, a more systematic review of the main benefits was absent. This is because
they were more related to the histories and concepts of wargaming and strategic
simulations as well as the differences between in vivo and software simulations. This
helped us ascertain them rather than connect them more fully to geopolitics in
general. As stated in the introduction, geopolitics is the spatial analysis of
international politics. This means that geopolitics is a) an approach to analysis; that
b) relies on spatial phenomena; to understand c) international politics. Therefore, if
analyses do not rest on spatial phenomena as an independent variable, we cannot
truly say that such an analysis is geopolitical. The problem lies in the fact that spatial
phenomena that geopolitics relies on are complex and long-lasting (Cohen, 2015,
1).

137
 Strategic Simulations in Geopolitics

While some factors like geographical location or natural resources – that are crucial
for more classical analyses, are relatively simple, they never exist in a vacuum.
Furthermore, you cannot change the physical geography of a state (Grygel, Sicker).
Of course, it is not absolutely static, but nevertheless changes at such a slow pace
that we can think of it as static. Therefore, manipulating the individual geopolitical
variables of a state becomes almost impossible. However, in its own right, this is
not an issue. Because of the complexity and long-lasting processes of geopolitics
even the most static variables can lead to different dependent values in correlation
with others and over time. Open western borders of Russia, which are virtually a
static fact, are either a problem or a blessing, depending on relations between Russia
and the European countries. If good, open borders ease communication and help.
If bad, it is a source of insecurity. When you factor in dozens of factors that are key
for the conduct of geopolitical study, one tends to get overwhelmed. Knowing that
in theory can help us to develop software strategic simulations that can more
explicitly and thoroughly account for the interrelationship between these variables.
That is why strategic simulations can be a very useful tool in researching geopolitics.
By modifying certain variables of the greater conceptual tool-kit of geopolitics in a
given case, we can simulate the “new reality” in order to research and predict the
problematique in question. In a sense, software strategic simulations are akin to
three different methodological approaches: process tracing, scenario building and
counterfactual analyses. The way in which software algorithms are coded and how
they function is eerily similar to how process tracing is conducted. The major
difference is that software simulations can cover more variables and even more
relations between them, when compared to human implemented process tracing. It
can show us how relations between different variables account for the geopolitical
reality we see. On the other hand, it is also similar to scenario building inasmuch as
it does create a “reality” in its own right. Although, the similarity to scenario building
is more evident in modeling. Finally, it is perhaps the most akin to counterfactual
analysis when talking from the perspective of research. Since counterfactual analyses
rest upon manipulating as few variables as possible in order to see how differently
the case would unfold, software simulations can help to deprive this process of
researcher`s biases. What is more, strategic simulations can show us the world we
created by implementing those changes and not rely only on narrative explanations.
Of course, the problem of quantification of geopolitical phenomena does remain
here, however overcoming them does not lead to further obstacles. In doing so,
software strategic simulations can point us to the merits of individual geopolitical
factors, the importance of their mutual interactions as well as overcoming researcher
biases.
This directly correlates to the secondary point of modeling. While we have said that
models are a proportional representation of reality, the usage here is more related

138
 Ajzenhamer, Kopanja, Stanojević

to the “holy grail” of any scientific field – prediction. Just as strategic simulations
can be used as a tool for researching through conducting complex analyses of how
different factors of the conceptual tool-kit of geopolitics interact and produce
international political outcomes, they can also be used as tools for predicting certain
outcomes. However, this point is even more so contingent on having full and right
information about the values different factors have, to do so. In order to predict
with any degree of certainty, you need to have correct values of geopolitical factors.
Contrary to utilizing strategic simulations for research purposes, you do not know
the end result – that is the international political outcome. In all honesty, we as
authors are somewhat skeptical on the ability of strategic simulations to ever
produce statistically significant predictions. There is too much hidden variables in
geopolitical research to ever produce correct predictions. This is why we insisted on
referring to it as modeling rather than predicting. If we conceptually stretch out a
bit the concept of a model, it is possible to consider the usage of strategic
simulations as a tool for modeling rough estimates of potential outcomes courses
of action will create. While it might not be as appealing as providing accurate
predictions, it can still help strategists and decision-makers in their pursuit of
optimal courses of action.
Finally, all those who teach geopolitics or IR can agree that making students truly
understand the complex concepts in these fields is a daunting task. As it turns out,
utilizing strategic simulations in the classroom arguably has the biggest and most
immediate benefit in the field of geopolitics. We say immediate because even with
existing strategic simulations this is possible. Programs like Statecraft Sim are used
precisely for those purposes. On the other hand, we say the biggest impact because
it allows for a better grasp of complex geopolitical concepts and ideas. It is one thing
when we teach abstract theoretical concepts, another when we showcase them on
case studies. But nothing can compare to putting students in the “driver`s seat” of
a country and show them what they did right and what they did wrong. Like in any
activity, trial and error tends to be the best teacher, and in the field of geopolitical
studies this is the only viable option for such a thing. However, teaching need not
be reduced to universities and student classrooms alone. A similar approach can be
used in training professionals in the military and statecraft domain. Somewhat
comparable to students, military and statecraft professionals do not have the luxury
of a trial-and-error approach to learning as their mistakes cost money, lives and lost
years and decades not just for them, but for millions of their fellow citizens.
Implementing strategic simulations as a part of not only university curriculum but
also continued education of military and statecraft professionals can lead to better
governance and a more secure world.

139
 Strategic Simulations in Geopolitics

Conclusion
Theorizing is great. It helps us give sense and order to the chaotic geopolitical reality
that we live in. However, it can only take us so much. Reality is overly complex for
singular humas to envision all possibilities and scenarios. Utilizing computer
software strategic simulations can help us overcome this. Of course, no simulation
can exist without theory, as it provides the direction. However, leaving things “as
they always were” – an academic conservatism if you will, can rob us of endless
possibilities that exist in the information age. Strategic simulations, namely those
that are made using computer software can help us in our research – by allowing us
to better comprehend the intricate interrelationship between different geopolitical
variables, their manipulation and how different outcomes came to be; modeling –
by allowing us to envision the potential outcome certain courses of action can lead
to, how they faire, and what is more effective; and teaching – by allowing us to pass
on knowledge better, include something akin to a trial-and-error approach, and give
actual training.
Although mostly confined to military circles, traditional wargaming has been
developed and implemented in parallel to theoretical advancements in more
mainstream academia. However, advances in technology have the potential to help
us further expand the way we approach researching, modeling and teaching
geopolitics. And this is not something we should either pass because of academic
conservatism or wait until other disciplines already implement it and just jump the
bandwagon. Still, no matter how these things make it seem like traditional research
will become obsolete, logical and theoretical reasoning will still remain – if nothing
else then do inform, expand, and elaborate strategic simulations to come.

140
 Ajzenhamer, Kopanja, Stanojević

References
Agnew, John. (1994). “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of
International Relations Theory”, International Political Economy, 1 (1), pp. 53-80.
Baird, George P., Wolff, Jason, Watkins, Dale and Perkins, Charles. (2009). “A
Brief History of Wargames”, Air Force Journal of Logistics, 33 (2), pp. 144-148.
Brzezinski,Zbigniew. (1997). The Grand Chessboard. New York: Basic Books.
Caffrey Jr., Mattew. (2000). “Toward a History-Based Doctrine for Wargaming”,
Aerospace Power Journal, 14 (3), pp. 33-56.
Cohen, Saul B. (2015). Geopolitics: the Geography of International Relations. 3rd Edition.
New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Cox, Eric. (2021). “Does Statecraft Improve Student Learning Outcomes? A
Controlled Comparison”, Journal of Political Science Education, 17 (3), pp. 406-417.
Diamond, Jared. (1997). Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New
York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Grygel, Jakub J. (2006). Great Powers and Geopolitical Change. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Guzzini, Stefano. (2012). “Which Geopolitics?”, In: S. Guzzini (ed). The Return of
Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises (pp. 18-44).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mackinder, Halford J. (1904). “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The
Geographical Journal, 23 (4), pp. 421-437.
McCreight, Robert. (2013). “Scenario development: using geopolitical wargames
and strategic simulations”, Environment Systems and Decisions, 33, pp. 21-32.
Ratzel, Friedrich. 1969. “Laws of the Spatial Growth of States”. In: E. Kasperson
and J. V. Minghi (eds). The Structure of Political Geography (pp. 17–28). Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company.
Raymond, Chad. (2014). “Can`t Get No (Dis)Satisfaction: The Statecraft
Simulation`s Effect on Student Decision Making”, Journal of Political Science
Education, 10 (3), pp. 302-314.
Saiya, Nilay. (2015). “How Dangerous Are Virtual Worlds Really? A Research
Note on the Statecraft Simulation Debate”, Social Science Computer Review, 35 (2), pp.
1-10.

141
 Strategic Simulations in Geopolitics

Sicker, Martin. (2010). Geography and Politics among Nations. New York: iUniverse,
Inc.
Smith, Hayden J. and Michalsen, Niall. (2021). “Assessing Bias in the Statecraft IR
Simulation”, Journal of Political Science Education, 17 (3), pp. 458-471.
Žomini, Antoan Anri (1952). Pregled ratne veštine. Beograd: Vojno delo.

142
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch7

Reinventing the "Two State" Solution as a Consequence of the

"Swords of Iron" War
An Adoption of the 'Nordic Balance System' as a Security Regime
in the Middle East
Arie L. Geronik1

Abstract
Believing that two decades of experience in Vietnam would ensure victory,
American generals requested that Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara would authorize additional troops for the campaign. However,
McNamara countered that, far from accumulating twenty years of
experience, the US had repeated one year's worth of mistakes over a period
of twenty years. Likewise, those who look with equal parts of optimism and
frustration at nearly fifty years of failed peace initiatives between Israel and
the Palestinians ignore the fact that each "new" plan has been nothing more
than a repetition of past unsuccessful efforts.
The prospect of renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a two-state
solution might seem highly distant. Yet the trauma of October 7, 2023, and
the pain engendered by the ongoing crisis may create the kind of willingness
on both sides lacking in the past decades. Good faith negotiations would
require new leadership in Jerusalem and Ramallah, which enjoy broad
public support. That might be possible in Israel even with the current
parliamentary makeup (provided Prime Minister Netanyahu steps down
and a new coalition is formed). In Palestine, where elections for the
Palestinian Authority have not taken place since 2006 and are unlikely to
take place anytime soon, the legitimacy would need to be achieved through
internal organizational reforms as well as through major economic
reconstruction and assistance by way of a Marshall-like Plan, namely,
external support. Meanwhile, the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and the
consolidation of a Palestinian polity would suggest the removal of one of
the main obstacles to such negotiations since Hamas took over Gaza in
2007. An external model, such as the Scandinavian Model, may be of
assistance.

1
Open University of Israel
 Geronik

****
For a suggested solution to the Palestinian situation to be viable, it must
meet the security needs of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians concurrently.
To achieve this, we must alter our point of view and widen our perspective
so that the entire Middle East will be included.
The "Nordic Balance" model is a way of thinking that contributed to the
security of Northern Europe throughout the Cold War and can be
reproduced in the M.E. In the North European framework, the USSR was
on one side, NATO-member Scandinavian countries were on the other,
and neutral Finland and Sweden were in the middle, serving as buffer states.
Thus, they became a regional power that served as a stabilizing factor in the
subsystem.
For reasons made evident in this paper, in the Middle East, Israel can
technically assume the role that the USSR held in Northern Europe on the
one hand, while Iraq and Iran can play the part of Denmark and Norway
on the other. Jordan and Palestine can serve as buffer states, assuming the
role similar to that of Sweden and Finland, thus becoming the hearth of the
model.
Sweden and Finland constituted a kind of international strategic vacuum in
the grey zone between the two blocks. This state of affairs turned these two
states into mutually dependent "Siamese twins," where any change in the
political status of one would immediately result in a change in the
geopolitical situation of the other. The interdependence arising from such
a situation, the fact that each country safeguards the neutrality of the other,
warrants stability.

Keywords:
International Relations, Regional Stability, Balance of Power, Middle East,
War, Scandinavia

144
 Reinventing the "Two State" Solution

Background
The past decades have seen the greatest geopolitical change in the Middle
East in an entire century. Iraq, Yemen, and Syria are no longer territorially
coherent functioning states, with the civil war in the latter being a stain on
humanity. Egypt underwent a revolution, democracy, theocracy, and a
coup. At the same time, the West's nearly 40-year-long cold war with Iran
has begun to thaw somewhat, just as the whole region is engulfed in a
quadrupole proxy war of Sunni, Shi'ite Saudi, and Iranian actors.
Yet the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—the hinge on which the rest of the
region used to swing—has been strangely sluggish until recently. Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu leads a coalition with no genuine
interest in pursuing a two-state solution. At the same time, President
Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority oversees a fractured and
corrupt construction with no natural or practical ability to deliver a deal.
Just as history is being written and rewritten all around them, Israelis and
Palestinians remained submerged in a decades-long status quo of creeping
settlement growth and sporadic violence.
Nevertheless, it is essential to understand that of all the strategic and other
problems facing Israel and the Arab and Muslim world, the most critical is
the Palestinian problem. While it is unclear whether a lasting solution can
be found, the absence of one will make attempts to solve other strategic
issues more complex for the parties involved.
Israel's constant goals of preventing future violence, maintaining her special
relationship with the United States even post the Biden era, and – according
to the Arab initiative of 2002 –even concluding peace agreements with the
entire Muslim world all depend on finding a viable solution to the
Palestinian problem. From the regional point of view, if a solution is not
found, sooner or later, the Arabs might unite to fight Israel again; the peace
process will thus be destroyed, but the Palestinian problem will live on. All
parties involved in the peace process must, therefore, accord top priority to
finding a lasting solution to the Palestinian problem; otherwise, having paid
dearly in blood, they may find themselves in the same continuous situation.
Looking, we notice that all the possibilities and options advanced in recent
years for a solution to the Palestinian problem have been deficient; no
available formula is acceptable to all sides and, hence, could be
implemented. For a suggested solution to the Palestinian problem to be
viable, it must meet the objective as well as the subjective individual security

145
 Geronik

needs of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians simultaneously. To achieve this,

we must alter our point of view and widen our perspective to include the
entire Middle East. The solution will have to rest on a model of balance of
power, where the countries involved (including Palestine) will be members
of dynamic coalitions that balance out one another, thus preventing one
nation from monopolizing others and, in so doing, laying the groundwork
for future attacks.
The term balance of power refers to the general concept of one or more
states' power being used to balance that of another state or group of states.
According to this way of thinking, in the anarchy of the international
system, the most reliable brake on the power of one state, is the power of
the other states. Balance of power can refer to any ratio of power
capabilities between states or alliances, or it can mean only a relatively equal
ratio. Alternatively, balance of power can refer to the process by which
counterbalancing coalitions have repeatedly formed in history to prevent
one state from conquering an entire region. (Goldstein& Prevehouse; 2010)
The theory of balance of power argues that such counterbalancing occurs
regularly and maintains the stability of the international system. The system
is stable in that it rules and principles stay the same: state sovereignty does
not collapse into a universal empire. It is important to emphasize however,
that this stability does not imply peace. It is rather a stability maintained by
means of recurring wars that adjust power relations.
When thinking about Scandinavia, or the Middle East, as this paper does,
one should in addition to keep in mind also the lessons of history regarding
small states. History teaches that small states cannot take their survival for
granted. For example Athens decreed that Melos should be wiped out,
despite the islands efforts to stay out of the Peloponnesian War. Other
small states, in more recent history, such as Estonia, Czechoslovakia and
Kuwait suffered at the hands of large, threatening neighbors, sometimes to
the point of loss of territory or independence or even destruction (Feldman;
2023).
The small state will try, in these circumstances, to encourage its rivals to
adopt international norms, rules and laws, join institutions and embed
patterns of democratic values in its rival's society and regime to advance
mutual dependence. In other words, the small state will ascribe a central
role to soft power in its security strategy and rely less on military strength
and will try in this manner to moderate the aggressiveness of its neighbor

146
 Reinventing the "Two State" Solution

peacefully (Koehane & Nye, 1977; Miller, 2010; Neumann & Gstohl, 2006;
Nye, 2002; Rosenrance, 1986; Russel,2020).

A New Perspective
The "Nordic Balance model" could be an apposite model for
implementation in the Middle east. It contributed to the security of
Northern Europe throughout the Cold War, and it can be reproduced in
the Middle East. In this framework the Soviet Union was on one side, the
NATO-member Scandinavian countries were on the other and neutral
Finland and Sweden were in the middle, serving as buffer states, thus
becoming regional powers, who serve as a stabilizing factor in the sub-
system. In the Middle East, for reasons that will be made clear in the course
of this paper, Israel can assume the role of the Soviet Union on the one
pole, Iraq and Iran can play the part of Denmark and Norway on the other,
and Jordan and Palestine can serve as buffer states, assuming a role similar
to that of Finland and Sweden. They will become the model's core as
neutral states between the belligerent countries.
Finland and Sweden together constituted a kind of international strategic
vacuum in the grey zone between the two blocs, and, as in nature, so too in
international politics; a vacuum is a condition that tends to be filled. This
state of affairs turned Finland and Sweden into mutually dependent political
"Siamese twins," where any change in the geopolitical status of one would
immediately result in a change in the geopolitical situation of the other.
Possible scenarios could have been, for example, a Soviet invasion of
Finland resulting from Sweden's increasing ties with NATO or Sweden
joining NATO in reaction to Finland coming closer to the Eastern bloc, or
one of the two becoming an isolated buffer state, an impossible situation
on the long run. The mutual dependence arising from such a situation,
the fact that each country safeguards the neutrality of the other, ensures
stability.
In the Middle East, as in Scandinavia, one can find a geostrategic reality that
prefers a situation in which two neighboring states are linked as neutral
states between two blocs. In both cases, one can identify the factor that
makes this bonding possible: the shared historical experience and the
virtually identical worldview and cultural-social structure of both countries.
Each condition is necessary; both together are sufficient in this case.

147
 Geronik

Israel, with its military and technological might, is, in fact, the regional
power in the Middle East. On the other hand, the Fertile Crescent
constitutes the opposing pole to Israel's power within the subsystem. This
system includes, first and foremost, Iraq, as we knew her before 2003, and
Iran. Between these two Middle Eastern blocs, we find Jordan fulfilling,
almost traditionally, her national function of a buffer state. Since the
establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan, Jordan has, in its various
metamorphoses, served as a buffer state. At one time, she stood between
the Saudi Wahabis and the French in Syria; today, she separates between
Israel and the Arab world and between the radical north and the more
conservative south. In her role as a buffer state, Jordan helps to preserve
stability in the region, as was seen in the Gulf War (1990-91), when she
stood between Iraq and Israel. This takes place utilizing a complex game of
deterring each side through tactical reconciliation with the other side. In
return, Jordan received support from countries concerned with maintaining
regional stability, such as the United States and Europe. This consideration
results in the Israeli government's traditional support of Jordan's continuing
existence as a buffer state.
Israel is suited to play a role similar to that of the Soviet Union in the Middle
East for several reasons: First, as in the case of the Soviet Union at one
time, Israel (for the time being) is the only country in the region considered
(though not confirmed) to be a nuclear power. Second, in both cases, we
see the need for, and even the willingness of other subsystem members, to
recognize the special security interests of both countries. This has been
reflective of the attitude of the Arab states toward Israel since the mid-
seventies. The Arab initiative of 2002 is yet another example of that. One
may add a cultural parallel to this strategic-political consideration: both the
Soviet Union in northern Europe and Israel in the Middle East are culturally
foreign to the subsystem of which they are a significant part.
Today, Iraq and especially Iran, can suitably fulfill the role of Denmark and
Norway in the proposed equation since, as in Scandinavia, we are referring
in the Middle East as a pair of nations which, though powerful, are not yet
nuclear powers in the accepted sense of the term. In the Nordic case, the
power stemmed from membership in a pact and, in the Middle East, from
a strong army equipped with non-conventional weapons (and in the case of
Iran – with nuclear aspirations). In both cases, these are pairs of nations
with similar socio-economic, political, and religious outlooks, their different
emphases notwithstanding.

148
 Reinventing the "Two State" Solution

If the intention is to adopt the Nordic Balance model, the significant

political change that must take place in the Middle East will be characterized
by the turning of Jordan and the future Palestinian state into neutral status.
Neutrality is perceived as an attractive policy for small nations, which,
because of their strategic location or symbolic political value, stand or may
stand in the focus of a struggle for influence or control by regional or global
rivals. The neutral state is a country whose political independence and
territorial integrity enjoy the permanent recognition of the superpowers,
provided that the neutral country does not use weapons against another
country except for self-defense and does not enter into contractual
obligations with any party that might endanger its status.
The object of neutrality is to preserve international order, to reduce
tensions in the system, and to bring international disputes to a solution
based on agreed norms and institutions. From the neutral state's point of
view, neutrality's objective is to defend its military security and preserve its
political and territorial integrity. From the standpoint of the nations
bordering the neutral state, the object of neutrality is to preserve the balance
of power.
In this case, a distinction that is particularly apposite is the division of
neutrality into positive and negative aspects. The positive aspect of the
policy of neutrality denotes the complexity of the policy of neutrality. It
denotes the complex attempts by neutral states to make their neutrality as
attractive as possible to the contesting sides. This aspect incorporates a
series of political measures carried out simultaneously on two levels: the
first is measures intended to reduce fears of the contending sides regarding
possible damage that might be caused to them by the neutrality of the small
country; the second is steps intended to strengthen their interest in
continuing to preserve neutrality.
The negative aspect of the neutralist policy refers to deterring the
contending sides from violating neutrality by convincing them that the price
they would have to pay for such a step will be high. Such deterrence is based
on military power (Karsh, 1988).
Since this division is hypothetical, it would be more correct to distinguish
between "negative-positive" neutrality, which puts the emphasis first on
military deterrence and only then on political reliability, and "positive-
negative" neutrality, which first underlines reliability and deterrence. This is
precisely the distinction between the neutrality of Sweden and Finland,

149
 Geronik

respectively. The same distinction would apply to Jordan and Palestine, also
respectively.
Contrary to Scandinavia, where neutrality can be defined as "traditional
neutrality," an attribute of which is the freedom of choice, the more
appropriate term for the neutrality applicable to the Middle East would be
neutralization, in the context of which neutrality would be imposed on the
state engaging international agreements. The outstanding characteristic of
such a nation is that it is not neutral out of choice and, accordingly, cannot
change its status according to its wishes. Though filled with suspicions, this
would somehow contribute to stability in the Middle East.
It should be noted that the question of Israel's (or Jordan's) preferences
regarding the future of the Palestinian Authority as a sovereign state or as
something less within the context of a federation or confederation with
Jordan is irrelevant. An examination of recent processes in the international
context, especially in Europe in the post-cold war era, shows that the
question of "nationalism" or "supra-nationalism" is a function of political
development. In the modern era, the future seems to lie in the system of
blocs, provided that these are freely entered (otherwise, we're talking about
colonialism). To achieve political unity of either kind, as in Western Europe,
for example, or as the Palestinian-Jordanian confederation proposes, a
relatively homogeneous group of sovereign states with many years of
sovereignty is required. Assets, including sovereignty, cannot be
relinquished unless they exist. Thus, the movement toward Palestinian
independence does not contradict the unifying tendencies within the Arab
world; instead, it constitutes a continuity: initially, Palestinian sovereignty in
the framework of an independent state and later, relinquishing some of the
rights of statehood to be integrated into a confederation with Jordan. The
cases of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia show what can be
expected when an attempt is made to curtail these developmental processes
by skipping the initial stage of sovereignty. Introducing such a Trojan horse
into our backyard would be unwise, primarily due to the unstable factor
that the "Arab Spring" had contributed to the region, as mentioned. In
other words – any idea for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that
is not based on the "Two States" solution is not realistic.
Speculation about a neutral Palestinian state is not new. Still, it seems that
contrary to conventional thinking, which denies this possibility, because
Palestine will be a purely Arab nation (neutrality does not necessarily mean
ideological neutrality), in this case, the problem lies in the fact that it would

150
 Reinventing the "Two State" Solution

be an isolated buffer state, a situation which history has proved to be

untenable in the long run. The solution proposed here corrects this
deficiency as not all of Palestine's borders would be belligerent since not all
of Palestine's borders would be confrontational borders, as they would be
encircled by two buffer states (along with Jordan). This is what combines
them as a regionally stabilizing power. The buffer state thus becomes
an edge country, with all the latter's advantages to a small and neutral
country. One can apply this lesson from the "Nordic Balance Model."
Let's examine previous proposals for solving the Palestinian problem. We
see that what is expected demand of Jordan and Palestine is, in fact,
neutrality, even if it is not explicitly designated. For example, Jordan is
called upon not to take part in any military alliance, not to allow foreign
troops to be stationed on its soil, nor to enable such forces to use Jordanian
territory as a corridor. Regarding Palestine, emphasis should be placed on
limitations concerning membership in military or political pacts. The fact
that all these are characteristics of neutrality cannot be ignored.
As mentioned before, in connection with the different shades of neutrality,
the Nordic case can also serve as a model for what can be implemented in
the Middle East. In addition, the Soviet-Finnish border corrections and
restrictions regarding the size and quality of the Finnish army determined
in bilateral Soviet-Finnish agreements can serve as precedents.
Palestine, initially under Jordanian rule (until 1967) and later under Israeli
rule, resembles Finland in this inconsistency. Until its independence,
Finland was under Swedish rule (until 1809) and later under the rule of
Imperial Russia (until 1917). It thus seems that the slogan of Finnish
nationalists in the early 20th century, "Swedes we are not, we'll not be
Russians, so let us be Finns," can be applied to the Palestinians, Mutatis
Mutandis.

Advantages
This proposal seems to be advantageous to all parties involved: Israel will
gain peace safeguard its security interests in the east and enhance its regional
and international recognition. Palestine will gain independence anchored in
international agreements. Jordan will achieve international standing and a
national role similar to Sweden during the Cold War; she will become an
edge country instead of just a buffer state while protecting her interests in
the face of Palestinian irredentism. The entire region will gain stability, even

151
 Geronik

without a straightforward solution to the Israeli-Iranian tension. (Thus also

enabling a successful American withdrawal from Iraq and Syria within a
broader regional settlement) This will be achieved thanks to a subsystem
composed of nations which balance one another, with a dyad of two neutral
countries in between, serving together as a regional buffer power; "Peace
by balance," to quote Raymond Aaron.
This proposal constitutes a conceptual framework for a lasting solution to
the Palestinian problem. Many substantial issues, such as the final borders,
the question of Jerusalem, the question of Jewish settlers on the one hand
and Palestinian refugees on the other, the allocation of water, the
involvement of the international community, and others, are omitted. The
parties involved could discuss these issues after establishing the framework
recommended here.
One of the known obstacles preventing a successful transition from
hostility to peace is the necessity of replacing negative attitudes,
beliefs, and values concerning the opposite side. Paradoxically, the
best way to achieve this goal is to practice living in peace, but this
will not be achieved without stability first. Later, the parties can turn
to attitude changes through "Truth and reconciliation committees."
In addition, the framework suggested here offers two significant
contributions to furthering the peace process which is not included in the
existing peace proposals: The first – to quote President Reagan, when
talking to the Soviet leader Gorbachev at their meeting in Reykjavik in 1986,
“We are armed because we don’t trust each other, and we don’t trust each
other because we are armed,” it seems that the element of trust is the critical
element necessary for breaking this vicious circle which is related to the
"Security Dilemma." The framework suggested here solves this dilemma
because establishing a Palestinian State will become a source of stability in
the area rather than a source of instability as is feared.
The second –Author Amos Oz claimed, in his book, Actually There Are
Two Wars Here (Hebrew), that Israel is going through two wars
simultaneously: the first is against the Palestinians, for which there is a
broad consensus even within Israel that the solution has to be based on the
principle of “two states for two peoples.” The second and more essential
war is the war against Islamic fundamentalism. My claim is that the fear of
the second war prevents a successful solution to the first war!

152
 Reinventing the "Two State" Solution

We are now facing a situation where Israel – for the first time in its history
– is fighting a full-scale war against Islamic fundamentalism. Should the
"Swords of Iron" war in Gaza, which falls into that category, end by
repulsing Hamas out of the Gaza Strip, leaving it demilitarized and
repulsing the Hezbollah north of the Litany River in Lebanon (in
accordance with the 2006 UNSC resolution 1701), it might bring an
unprecedented opportunity: The vacuum that will be created in the
place where Islamic fundamentalist organizations once stood, the
detachment of these organizations from the immediate vicinity of
Israel's borders might make place to a successful effort to bring the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a more stable solution. That means a
solution to the first war through effective management of the second war.
There is no easy fast-forward track, but the urgency for regional and global
diplomacy cannot be overstated. Failure to create an off-ramp from this
war would mean not simply more of the same but a precipitous fall into the
abyss.
Finally, this framework is missing in the successive implementation of the
well-known Clinton parameters, the "Road Map" or the "Obama plan" for
the broader Middle East. In other words, integrating these principles into
the various peace proposals for the Middle East will ease the way for
decision-makers on both sides to adopt and implement these ideas, both
externally and internally. An implementation that, as mentioned, will sooner
or later become imperative.

153
 Geronik

References:
Feldman, D. (2023). From Soft Power to Hard Power: Finland's Security
Strategy vis-à-vis Russia ( 1992 – 2022). Strategic Assessment, INSS
Goldstein, J.S., Prevehouse (2013). International Relations. Pearson. Essex
Karsh, E. (1988), Neutrality and Small States, London, Routledge
Keohane, R. & J.S. Nye, (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Power in
Transition, Little Brown & co.
Miller, B. (2010), Democracy Promotion: Offensive Liberalism versus the
rest (of IR Theory). Journal of International Studies, 38(3), pp. 561 – 591
Neumann, I.B. & S. Gstohl (2006), Lilliputians in Gulliver's world? In
Ingebritsen, C. I. Neumann,. S. Stohl,. & J. Beyer (eds.), Small States in
International Relations, University of Washington
Nye, J.S. jr. (2002). The paradox of American Power: Why the world's only
superpower can't go it alone. Oxford University Press
Rosencrance, R. (1986). The rise of the trading state: Commerce and conquest in the
modern world. Basic Books
Russel, N. (2020). Democracy promotion by small states: The case of
Estonia's "niche diplomacy" approach in Ukraine. IFAIR – Young Initiative
on foreign Affairs and International Relations

154
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch8

Embracing Political Ethnography:

The Impact of Identity Constructs in Response to Ukraine
Laura Welty1

Abstract
This paper explores the impact of geopolitical conflict on identity construction by
analyzing the evolution of discourse surrounding Ukrainian identity in the wake of
the 2022 Russian invasion and situating it within broader discussions surrounding
refugees. Critical discourse analysis of Ukrainian and Russian media reveals how
conflicting identities are framed, reflecting divergent national, political, and
sociological worldviews (Ushchyna, 2022). Drawing on identity theory, this paper
analyzes the construction and reconstruction of who qualifies as 'European'. It will
explain the conceptualization as a response to geopolitical conflict and its resulting
impact on the behavior of political actors. It will show how imperative it is to have
a nuanced understanding of race, ethnicity, culture, and identity to provide essential
context for a holistic understanding of the shifting nature of responses to
geopolitical events.
Furthermore, this paper discusses the value of incorporating a bottom-up and 'from
within' approach across various dimensions of geopolitics. Specifically, it highlights
the significance of incorporating an ethnographic understanding of identity and
advocating for a more reflexive approach that acknowledges diverse perspectives
and knowledge systems. Additionally, it examines the potential for reshaping
methodological approaches to capture the complexities of contemporary
geopolitical landscapes better, emphasizing the need for interdisciplinary
collaboration and innovative research methodologies.

Keywords
Geopolitics; Ethnography; Identity; Discourse; Media; Ukraine; Refugees

1
Lecturer in Political Science, Australian National University
ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9631-6303
 Welty

Introduction
Identity serves as a catalyst and a consequence of conflict, which is evident in the
relationship between geopolitical conflict and identity construction in the Russia-
Ukraine war. This paper demonstrates the impact of identity construction on
geopolitics by focusing on the evolution of discourse surrounding Ukrainian identity
following the Russian invasion in 2022. This analysis is situated within broader
discussions on refugees, drawing on identity theories to examine how definitions of
'European' are reconstructed in response to geopolitical turmoil. A nuanced
understanding of race, ethnicity, culture, and identity is necessary for
comprehending the shifting nature of geopolitical responses.
The paper advocates for a bottom-up approach in political geography and
geopolitics, highlighting the significance of incorporating local narratives and
diverse perspectives to gain a holistic understanding of geopolitical phenomena.
This perspective challenges traditional top-down analyses, emphasizing the value of
ethnography in capturing the complexities of contemporary geopolitical landscapes.
Ethnography's strength lies in its ability to provide in-depth insights into the
everyday experiences and cultural contexts that shape geopolitical events, moving
beyond elite discourses to include multiple voices and perspectives.
Two case studies are analyzed: the Russo-Ukrainian war narratives and the discourse
surrounding Ukrainian refugees. The first case study examines how media discourse
constructs and perpetuates conflicting national identities, reflecting deeper
ideological divides. The second case study analyzes the differing responses to
Ukrainian refugees, exploring how narratives of compassion and othering shape
refugee policies. Media statements reveal how conflicting identities are framed,
reflecting divergent national and political worldviews.

Conceptual Overview
Identity is a construct shaped by mental and material practices that create a
distinction between the 'self' and the 'other.' The construction of the 'other' is a core
component of identity creation. Carl Schmitt (1932) posits that all politics is based
on the friend-enemy distinction; it is inherently public and involves groups finding
themselves in situations of mutual enmity. Any distinction can serve as a marker of
collective identity and does not inherently hold any intrinsic significance; simply, the
distinction is important because a group relies on it to define its own collective
identity and believes it is worth defending. Humanity is hidden, and this
concealment "requires both individual personality and particular cultures to close
onto themselves and requires all individuals and groups to differentiate others as

156
 Embracing Political Ethnography

others" (Plessner et al. 2018; Delitz and Seyfert 2018, vii). This mirrors hegemony
theory, which states that the definition of culture also always includes differentiation
from a constitutive outside (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Delitz and Seyfert 2018).
Research and theorizing on social identity are complemented by psychology's
historical emphasis on personal identity (Erikson 1968). This can be seen in the
interplay between conceptions of self and group identity. Identity is not neutral; it
is embedded within power dynamics, working as a classification system for
individuals and groups while imposing societal norms and perceived truths
(Burlachuck, 2023).
Awareness of the 'constitutive outside' can be explained by social identity, which
refers to an individual's sense of belonging to a particular social group and
significantly influences their behaviors, cognitions, and emotions. Rooted in Social
Identity Theory, it emphasizes the collective self over the individual self, where
identification with a group involves cognitive awareness, value connotation, and
emotional attachment to the group (Guan and So, 2022). It relies on self-
categorisation of group memberships (the "we"), while personal identity refers to
the unique ways that people define themselves as individuals (the "I"). Tajfel and
Turner (1986) argue that the perceived differences between groups with which one
self-identifies can lead to increased occurrences of otherization. The fear of an
outside 'other' mobilizes individuals, communities, countries, and global regions into
social and political action.
Situational identity refers to how individuals express different identities in different
contexts or situations. It is the idea that one's sense of self and identity can vary
depending on a particular situation's social, cultural, and environmental factors. This
can include identifying situations based on images and negotiating identity in
different cultural settings, especially when incorporating online spaces (Qin and
Lowe 2021). The notion of situational identity highlights the dynamic nature of
identity and how it can be influenced and shaped by various situational factors.
Social and situational identities are interrelated as the interplay between individual
self-conception and the surrounding social environment shapes both. They are
mutually reinforcing, each shaping and being shaped by the other in a dynamic,
context-dependent process.
Identities are not static structures; they are discursive constructions constantly in
flux that only gain stability and meaning within specific contexts and situations
(Benwell and Stokoe 2006; Törrönen 2013). Narratives fuel the fluidity of identities.
They become "subjective meaning-making tools for shaping people's thoughts and
beliefs, which provide a framework for explaining and justifying social and political
events, thereby constructing the boundaries between 'we' and 'others'" (Demirel,

157
 Welty

2023, p.1). Social identity influences information consumption, fueled by narratives,

where individuals tend to favor information that enhances their in-group's status
while discrediting out-groups. This phenomenon can lead to misinformation
(Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg 2020).
Othering naturalizes exclusion, justifies discrimination, and fuels xenophobia
(Holohan, 2019). The reaction to refugees is often characterized by fear, suspicion,
and antipathy. It perpetuates a neocolonial discourse of otherness, further
embedding refugees within a narrative that diminishes their humanity and rights.
This is compounded by the exclusion of refugees from knowledge production and
historical narratives, which not only marginalizes their experiences but also
reinforces the epistemic injustice that silences their voices and contributions (Reed
and Schenck, 2023). The process of empathizing with and understanding the
experiences of refugees, particularly those from different cultures, challenges
Western norms and structures.
The way that states craft refugee policies built on othering narratives and an 'us'
versus 'them' mentality can be explained by defensive nationalism. Rabinowitz’s
(2023) defensive nationalism is a form of national populism that combines anti-
liberalism and anti-globalization sentiment with economic nationalism. Nationalism
is concerned with ensuring that the rights of 'true citizens' are safeguarded against
the encroachment of 'outsiders' and necessitates the creation of an 'us' versus 'them'
dichotomy with clearly defined in and out-groups. Defensive nationalism emerges
when states face global economic pressures and demographic changes
simultaneously and stems from the need to protect the 'nation' against global forces
under the assumption that these forces are inherently hostile. Four dimensions
necessary for defensive nationalism include a precise construction of who
constitutes the 'national people,' construction of the global enemy, organizing
principles, and clear policy objectives (Rabinowitz, 2023).
The implementation of discriminatory refugee policy is justified by constructing the
identity of the national people while othering the external enemy. Creating narratives
that clearly define 'us' establishes a logic to delineate which refugees deserve
assistance and protection under the law due to the constructed proximity of the
refugees' identity to that of the national people. The more similar the refugees'
identity is perceived to be to that of the host country, the more positively they will
be received due to a reduction in the othering of that identity compared to the
national people. Media narratives on refugees exemplify how elements of
intersecting identities can be employed to humanize or other both the refugee and
the conflict, leading to varying levels of acceptance from countries expected to
receive refugees. How identity narratives are constructed, interweaving elements

158
 Embracing Political Ethnography

that evoke feelings of compassion and shared plight or the unlikelihood of shared
suffering and experience, directly impact the attitudes and policies concerning
refugees.
When explaining why there are differing responses to refugees, we can call on
Nussbaum's position of compassion to analyze how narratives are constructed. If
observing suffering leads to compassion, which motivates action to spur an
individual, or in this case, any political actor, one must frame the plight of the
refugee in a way that facilitates the emotion of compassion. If inaction is the desired
outcome, then issue framing should impede compassion. Highlighting the suffering
of a refugee group should be done in a way that emphasizes the severity of their
experience, shows the suffering was not due to the observers' direct action, and
emphasizes how the observer may meet a similar fate to motivate the observer into
action (Nussbaum, 1992; Schriefer, 2011). Alternatively, if inaction is the goal, then
the severity of suffering should be trivialized or normalized, the culpability of the
observer should be emphasized, and the observer should be framed as different
from the refugee to underscore the unlikelihood of the observer experiencing similar
suffering. Inaction typically occurs through the construction of normative discourse,
which otherizes the experience and identity of the refugee and leads to a lack of
compassion and action.

Why Ethnography as Methodology?

It is vital to have a holistic and contextual understanding of the intricate interplay
between power, space, and human agency. To achieve this, researchers incorporate
ethnography and analyze politics as a process that demands the inherent inclusion
of all processual elements. This approach to the analysis of politics incorporates "the
study of the processes involved in determining and implementing public goals and
in the differential achievement and use of power by the members of the group
concerned with those goals" (Swartz et al. 1966, 3). To understand how political
actors behave within the political process, it is necessary "to know how the political
"units" think, feel, and will in relation to their understanding of the issues that they
generate or confront" (Swartz et al. 1966, 18). The 'Processual Paradigm' is primarily
concerned with rejecting government structures as the primary unit of analysis and
provides room for local perspectives and multiple levels of analysis (Swartz et al.,
1966). This approach allows for an analysis that prioritizes how various political
actors engage with conceptions of the 'self,' ‘other,' and 'the nation' and their direct
impact on creating or reacting to geopolitical events and resulting policies. The
Processual Paradigm aligns with Holland's (2020, 2) assertations that "critical

159
 Welty

constructivist perspectives conceive ethnic, racial, and nationalist identities as social

processes that are historically contingent, plastic, and varying in degree of social and
political importance across time and place."
Political ethnography is research based on immersion in the subject, including
reasoning originating from social practice that leads to contextual knowledge claims
(Bellah et al. 2007; Snow and Benford 1988). The approach emphasizes analysis and
knowledge 'from below' and 'from within.' It requires investigating situational actors'
practices, concepts, and processes to generate holistic understanding. Political
sociology and political science traditionally look at formal politics as the object of
analysis, including the clear distinction between civil society and state actors. The
referent object is not static. Ethnography focuses on "the nature of the political
bond, such as how it is organized and whether people invest their sense of
sovereignty in other citizens and organizations or in state institutions." (Benzecry
and Baiocchi 2017, 234).
Complimentary to the Processual Paradigm, a political ethnographic approach
justifies the inclusion of local perspectives and accounts of personal experience and
opinion in understanding political action and the multi-level analysis and
decentralization of the state. Benzecry and Baiocchi (2017, 230) explain that
"political ethnographies get to the lived experiences of the political. Where previous
studies of politics used broad strokes to paint a picture of political life, political
ethnography allows the researcher to bring up the mundane details that can affect
politics, providing a 'thick description' where one was missing". Tilly (2006, 410)
furthers this with the statement that "political ethnography provides privileged
access to [the] processes, causes, and effects" of political processes.
Overall, as a research method, ethnography is "well equipped to capture a messy
and complex picture at the local level by privileging the informants' point of view
or the emic perspective" and provides an "opportunity to study politics from the
insider's viewpoint, relating it with other domains of life" (Kumar, 2014, 237).
Examining the construction of identity as a 'from-within' process allows for a more
nuanced conceptualization of identity and its relation to geopolitics and resulting
policy. Reflexivity and the centering of local voices give nuanced insight into how
individuals create the ‘self’ and how that ‘self’ informs all other intersecting forms
of identity from the bottom up. Understanding how individuals create and interact
with the ‘self’ provides a pathway for changing thoughts and behaviors based on
identity. This impacts everything from how an individual may view another person
to how states craft foreign policy.

160
 Embracing Political Ethnography

Geopolitics, Identity Construction, and Ethnography

Identity and conflict are mutually constituted and reinforcing; therefore, it is vital to
incorporate an ethnographic understanding of identity when analyzing geopolitics.
This paper advocates for a methodological framework grounded in political
ethnography to address critical lacunae in contemporary geopolitics research.
Traditional approaches often prioritize top-down analyses, overlooking the nuanced
dynamics and voices embedded within socio-political landscapes. By advocating for
a bottom-up perspective that privileges local narratives, experiences, and
perceptions, this paper argues for a paradigm shift in how scholars conceptualize
and investigate key themes within political geography and geopolitics. By centering
the experiences of individuals and communities, researchers can gain a more
nuanced understanding of the socio-political processes that shape our world. This
approach enriches theoretical understandings of geopolitics and fosters more
inclusive and equitable analyses.
Using ethnography is crucial for understanding geopolitics because it provides a
nuanced and in-depth perspective that traditional methods often overlook.
Ethnography allows researchers to capture the everyday experiences and cultural
contexts that shape geopolitical phenomena, moving beyond elite discourses to
include multiple voices and perspectives (Firat 2022; Käihkö 2022). Furthermore,
ethnographic approaches also challenge the assumptions of traditional political
studies by offering real-time, long-term observations that reveal the micro aspects
of politics and the discrepancies between what people say and do (Neumann, 2022).
Ethnography's focus on the everyday and emic perspective challenges the
dominance of elite discourses in critical geopolitics, advocating for a more inclusive
and comprehensive analysis (Sturm 2008). By integrating diverse insights,
ethnography enriches theoretical conceptualizations. It provides practical tools for
analyzing and intervening in geopolitical events, making it an indispensable method
for contemporary political geography and international relations (Hagene, 2018;
Petsinis, 2019).
An interdisciplinary approach to anthropology and geopolitics can recalibrate
geopolitics as an ethnographic object, enriching the field with more diverse
perspectives and methodologies (Firat, 2022). Ethnography significantly enhances
the understanding of geopolitics by providing a nuanced, ground-level perspective
that challenges traditional, often elite-focused analyses. It captures the micro aspects
of politics, revealing the intentions and meanings behind actions that broad-based
models might overlook (Kumar, 2014). This method allows for the exploration of

161
 Welty

the 'cultures of geopolitical expertise,' offering insights into how geopolitical

knowledge is produced and enacted in various contexts (Firat 2022).
Ethnography's strength lies in its ability to restore ambiguity to polarized
understandings of war and strategy, emphasizing the human face of conflict and the
ethical responsibility of researchers (Käihkö 2022). It also provides a unique lens to
scrutinize institutional habits and bureaucratic norms, highlighting the tension
between individual ambitions and institutional dictates (Brigg and Bleiker 2008;
Jackson 2008). Incorporating ethnography and its 'from within' approach to
defining identity helps provide a more holistic and nuanced understanding of
geopolitics. This approach demonstrates how everyday phenomena and local
contexts shape and are shaped by geopolitical forces. It allows for observing
discrepancies between what people say versus what they do, which can provide a
more accurate account of political dynamics (Kumar 2014).
The study of identity through ethnographic narrative reveals how dominant and
alternative political discourses inform personal experiences and identities (Price
2018). The approach aids in adding to the cultural competence of analyses, which is
required for accurate understanding and interpreting of the social forms of politics
and policy processes (Neumann 2022). However, the concept of identity has been
muddled in disciplinary practice, with ethnicity, culture, and identity being
analytically distinct notions (Chun 2016). Identity is not solely tied to the existence
of groups but also to evolving social and political forces (Kearns et al. 2018).
Therefore, examining identity as fluid, situational, and contextual is essential when
analyzing its impact on geopolitics.
Geopolitical conflict and identity construction are intricately related, with identity
often serving as both a catalyst and a consequence of conflict. In protracted
conflicts, identity building becomes multigenerational, reinforcing negative
perceptions of the 'self' and 'other,' thus perpetuating the conflict (Ricarte 2023).
Beyond the individual, geopolitical practices play a role in forming national and
cultural identities (Nestoras 2021).
Three issues are central to the ethnographic study of political life: trajectories of
individuation, mediation, and categorical division. When evaluating trajectories of
individualization, "instead of thinking of the individual as a finalized and punctuated
self, clearly delimited, we want to observe in which relational ways individuals
inscribe themselves in groups and activities they qualify as political" (Benzecry and
Baiocchi, 2017, 238). This often occurs within larger holistic and hierarchical ideas
of identity. Thus, it is crucial to identify how someone individualizes themselves.

162
 Embracing Political Ethnography

These individual constructions of identity are essential when evaluating how

identities are hierarchically categorized based on their importance to the 'self.'
In addition to self-individualization, it is integral to understand how individuals
choose their affiliations and how this self-inclusion and exclusion form a political
self, based on pre-existing understandings of political roles and establish bonds they
understand as political (Benzecry and Baiocchi, 2017). Processes of inclusion and
exclusion bring into question the imagining of political bonds and resulting
categorical separations. These perceived bonds result in "categories through which
participants self-define their experiences and how they imagine what counts as
political and what does not, as well as how these categories may be generative of
forms of institutionalized inclusion and exclusion" (Benzecry and Baiocchi 2017,
238). This is in alignment with Foucault's (2001) definition of culture as "a
hierarchical organization of values, accessible to everybody, but at the same time the
occasion of a mechanism of selection and exclusion" (p. 173).
The concept of ethnogeopolitics, which merges ethnopolitics, the politicization of
ethnicity, and geopolitics, underscores the importance of defining and
understanding the political, ethnic, and geopolitical dimensions to grasp the
complexities of global interactions (Holland, 2020; Rezvani, 2018). By integrating
these approaches, researchers can challenge traditional assumptions and contribute
to a more comprehensive understanding of geopolitical phenomena (Petsinis, 2019).
This holistic approach ultimately fosters a deeper engagement with social
transformation and the politics of identity, ethnicity, and race (Ramirez and Chan,
2021).

Case-study: Russo-Ukrainian War Narratives

Ethnography restores ambiguity to polarized understandings of war, helping to
humanize the conflict and reveal the complex strategies and ethical responsibilities
involved (Yao, 2022). The Russo-Ukrainian war highlights how media discourses
construct and perpetuate conflicting national identities, reflecting deeper ideological
divides (Ushchyna, 2022). Crump (1975) and Meertens (1975) stress the necessity
of studies with a representative regional focus and account for geography, national
history, and ideology (Hutson, 1976). Therefore, studies of the war must be
culturally contextual and situational, accounting for unique regional characteristics,
which can be done through ethnography.
The geopolitical conflict between Russia and Ukraine is deeply intertwined with the
construction of national identities, as evidenced by the contrasting historical
narratives and cultural affiliations that shape each nation's self-perception. Russia's

163
 Welty

imperial narrative, which emphasizes state power and control, clashes with Ukraine's
pursuit of sovereignty and alignment with European values, creating an intractable
identity conflict.
The conflict is deeply rooted in the contrasting national identities constructed
through various discourses and media representations. Critical discourse analysis of
the Ukrainian and Russian press reveals how conflicting identities are framed,
reflecting divergent national, political, and sociological worldviews (Ushchyna,
2022). In 2012, Putin stated Russia is a "type of state civilization where there are no
ethnicities, but where 'belonging' is determined by a common culture and shared
values," which is reliant upon "preserving the dominance of Russian culture" against
"hostile forces." Former Putin aide Vladislav Surkov denied the existence of Ukraine
but admitted to "Ukrainianism," which he claimed was a "specific mental disorder…
There is borscht, Bandera, bandura. But there is no nation" (Chesnakov 2020).
Russian economist and political pundit Mikhail Khazin supports a "complete ban
on Ukrainian fonts, Ukrainian texts, programs on [the] Ukrainian language, on
teaching Ukrainian – i.e., completely" (Melamed 2016). This discourse demonstrated
the Russian framing and re-conceptualizing of Ukrainian identity to fit their political
goals.
The conflict is also framed as a struggle between the Ukrainian world, aligned with
European values, and the Russian world, driven by imperial ambitions (Laplan et al.
2022). In 2022 Telegram posts, Ramzan Kadyrov said, "Sooner or later everything
returns to its native freedom. So it was with the Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk did
not take root either. I think this is not the limit" (Apt, 2024). In a Youtube video,
Mikhail Khazin stated, "New Russia should be joined to the Russian regions, with
full denazification, deukrainization" (Melamed 2016). Khazon refers to Kharkov,
Odesa, Zaporozhe, and Dnepropetrovsk. Redefining Ukrainian identity to
delegitimize their sovereign land claims, justifies the Russian invasion in the name
of their ‘nation’, and unification of territory based on conceptions of their own
identity.
The war has also reinforced Ukraine's European identity, diminishing alternative
identities like Eurasian and Slavic supranationalism, thus aligning more closely with
European values and distancing from Russian influence (Minesashvili, 2022). This
has caused pushback from Russian officials. On May 1, 2023, Dmitry Mendev
posted on Telegram, "Our main task is … to inflict a devastating defeat on all
enemies – the Ukronazis, the United States, their minions in NATO, including vile
Poland, and other Western nits. We must finally return our lands" (Apt, 2024). On
June 16, 202,3, he said, "We do not need Ukraine in NATO. In any case, as long as
at least a stump of this state is preserved in its current form. Consequently, for Nazi

164
 Embracing Political Ethnography

Ukraine, the conflict will be permanent. And the new political regime in Kyiv (if it
exists at all) will definitely not be asked for in NATO" (Apt, 2024). This
demonstrates the position of Russia on their perceived interference of the West.
The integration of ethnography and a 'from within' analysis would lead to a more
holistic and nuanced understanding of how these conceptions of identity came into
being. By examining the Russian 'self' and Ukrainian 'self' and how each perceives
the constitutive outside, scholars can understand how they position themselves
within the world. Including an ethnographic narrative would show how dominant
and alternative political discourses inform identities and how that affects policy and
geopolitical conflict more broadly. It would also provide insight into defensive
nationalist policies by explaining more intricately how each side constructs the
'national people', and how and why the global enemy is defined (Rabinowitz, 2023).

Case-study: Narrative on Ukrainian Refugees

When examining the discourse surrounding Ukrainian refugees, it is easy to see how
the 'us' versus 'them' worldview is crafted. The narrative simultaneously brings
Ukrainian refugees into Nussbaum's position of compassion while otherizing them
in juxtaposition to a more mainstream conceptualization of European identity.
CBS News senior foreign correspondent Charlie D'Agata received immediate
backlash for stating that Ukraine "isn't a place, with all due respect, like Iraq or
Afghanistan, that has seen conflict raging for decades. This is a relatively civilized,
relatively European …city, one where you wouldn't expect that, or hope that it's
going to happen" (Bayoumi, 2022). This statement encapsulates the duality of
constructed narratives. It immediately degrades places like Iraq or Afghanistan as
locations somehow deserving or expected to have this type of conflict and places
Ukrainian refugees above those from areas that are perceived to be more 'war-torn.'
Simultaneously, it otherizes Ukrainians as somehow different from the rest of
Europe or the broader Western world. Ukraine is 'relatively civilized' and 'relatively
European,' meaning that they are not equal, they are not civilized, nor entirely
European, and that distinction is important because it paves the way for a policy
response that's, while better than the treatment given to refugees from the Middle
East, still allows for inaction, normalization of suffering, and differentiation to the
host population. Furthermore, it trivializes the situation in Ukraine, which has been
ongoing since 2014, and the annexation of Crimea.
Immediately after the Russian invasion, the narrative surrounding Ukrainian
refugees frequently tried to include them in the observer's conception of self.
Observers perceived Ukraine and the resulting refugees similarly to their own

165
 Welty

personal, group, and geographic sense of belonging. Journalist Phillipe Corbé stated:
"We're not talking here about Syrians fleeing the bombing of the Syrian regime
backed by Putin. We're talking about Europeans leaving in cars that look like ours
to save their lives" (Bayoumi, 2022) When the BBC (2022) hosted Ukraine's deputy
chief prosecutor, David Sakvarelidze, he stated "It's very emotional for me because
I see European people with blonde hair and blue eyes being killed every day with
Putin's missiles and his helicopters and his rockets", the implication, being that if
they were non-Europeans with different phenotypical presentations then somehow
these attacks would or should garner less of an emotional reaction. It also presents
Europeans as only being blonde-haired and blue-eyed. While the statement was
likely made in an attempt to highlight the plight of Ukrainians and humanize them
to Western Europeans and the wider world, it plays into Eurocentrism. Also, it does
not acknowledge other people fleeing Ukraine who do not fit this description. It is
well documented that non-white Ukrainian refugees have faced significantly more
barriers while fleeing and increased racism (Ferris-Rotman 2022; Ray 2022).
Similarly, Al Jazeera (2022) English presenter Peter Dobbie described Ukrainians
fleeing the war as "prosperous, middle-class people so obviously refugees trying to
get away from areas in the Middle East that are still in a big state of war; these are
not people trying to get away from areas in North Africa, they look like any
European family that you would live next door to." An ITV journalist in Poland,
Lucy Watson, said: "Now the unthinkable has happened to them. And this is not a
developing, third-world nation. This is Europe!" (White, 2022). In The Telegraph,
Daniel Hannan (2022) wrote, "They seem so like us. That is what makes it so
shocking. Ukraine is a European country. Its people watch Netflix and have
Instagram accounts, vote in free elections and read uncensored newspapers. War is
no longer something visited upon impoverished and remote populations. It can
happen to anyone". This reflects Nussbaum's model, highlighting how the observer
may meet a similar fate. However, despite this narrative creation of the similarity in
European Ness of Ukrainian refugees, you still see policy enacted that is based on
otherizing language.
These media statements highlight how identity is a construct shaped by mental and
material practices, creating a clear distinction between the idea of the 'self' and
'other.' Including Ukrainians in the 'self' automatically imposes societal norms and
perceived truths upon them. Echoing Carl Scmitt's (1932) friend-enemy distinction
and Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) hegemony theory, Ukrainians have been brought
into the 'in-group.' The conceptualization of the 'constitutive outside' Is no longer
divisions within the European Community such as Eastern versus Western Europe,
Northern versus Southern Europe, or Slavs versus non-Slavs, but instead a new
conception of Ukraine as European 'enough' to be included within the identity and

166
 Embracing Political Ethnography

community. This is then juxtaposed against the external 'other,' Russia. These
narratives also highlight the value connotation and emotional attachment to the
collective self, which now has been rewritten to include Ukraine by individuals
through humanizing narratives. Situational identity explains how this new
conception of community, self, and the other has altered due to the social and
cultural impacts of the war. It demonstrates how ideas are not static structures as
previously when discussing who or what is 'European' Ukraine, and often other
Eastern European countries, are either excluded from the narrative or not the
primary focus of defining the identity.
This clearly defined 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy with clear in and out-groups
provides a foundation for defensive nationalist policies built on othering narratives.
Ukrainian refugees have been included in European conceptions of self enough to
allow for wide sweeping acceptance of refugees, with more lenient domestic policies
than shown to refugees from areas such as Syria or Afghanistan. However, the
narrative still others Ukrainians and makes subtle distinctions of difference, which
allows for discriminatory refugee policy to be implemented to protect the original
'nation' or 'self' from external forces that are perceived as inherently hostile or
detrimental. This reflects Rabinowitz's (2023) requirements of an explicit
construction of who constitutes the 'national people' (the population of the host
state), the construction of the global enemy (Russia), organizing principles (citizens
versus refugees), and clear policy objectives.

Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the profound impact of identity construction on
geopolitical conflicts, using the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the
narratives surrounding Ukrainian refugees as a case study. Through the lens of social
identity theory, situational identity theory, and critical race theory, the analysis
revealed how discourses surrounding Ukrainian identity have evolved, highlighting
the fluid nature of concepts such as 'European.' These identity reconstructions
underscore the necessity of understanding race, ethnicity, culture, and identity to
grasp the shifting responses to geopolitical events, which is best done from
ethnography's 'from within' and 'bottom-up' approaches.
Including bottom-up approaches in geopolitics allows for including local narratives
and diverse perspectives. This methodology challenges traditional top-down
analyses and demonstrates the value of ethnography in capturing the complexities
of contemporary geopolitical landscapes. Ethnography's strength in providing in-
depth insights into everyday experiences and cultural contexts enriches our

167
 Welty

understanding of geopolitical phenomena by moving beyond elite discourses to

include multiple voices and perspectives.
The case studies on the Russo-Ukrainian war narratives and the discourse
surrounding Ukrainian refugees illustrate the intricate relationship between
geopolitical conflict and identity construction. These studies show how identity
serves as both a catalyst and a consequence of conflict, influencing media
representations and policy responses. The analysis of Ukrainian refugees, in
particular, highlights how narratives of compassion and othering shape public
perceptions and state policies, reflecting broader trends in defensive nationalism.
This paper argues for a holistic and inclusive approach to studying political
geography and geopolitics. This approach embraces the complexities of human
experiences and challenges traditional hierarchies of knowledge production. By
centering the voices of those directly impacted by geopolitical processes, scholars
can contribute to more robust theoretical frameworks and foster a more socially just
world.

168
 Embracing Political Ethnography

References
Aljazeera. 2022 ‘“Double standards”: Western coverage of Ukraine war criticised’,
27 February, available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/western-
media-coverage-ukraine-russia-invasion-criticism
Apt, C. 2024. “Russia’s Eliminationist Rhetoric Against Ukraine: A Collection” Just
Security. April 18, 2024 https://www.justsecurity.org/81789/russias-eliminationist-
rhetoric-against-ukraine-a-collection/
Bayoumi, M. 2022. “They are ‘civilised’ and ‘look like us’: the racist coverage of
Ukraine” The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/02/civilised-european-
look-like-us-racist-coverage-ukraine
BBC. 2022. ‘David Sakvarelidze speaking on BBC News’,
available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QFQ392yepF0
Bellah, R., R Madsen, W. Sullivan, A. Swidler, and S. Tipton. 2007. Habits of the Heart:
Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Benwell, B, and Stokoe, E, 2006. Discourse and Identity. Edinburgh University
Press: Edinburgh.
Benzecry, C, and Baiocchi, G. 2017. “What Is Political About Political
Ethnography? On the Context of Discovery and the Normalization of an Emergent
Subfield.” Theory and society 46(3): 229–247.
Brigg,M, and Bleiker, R. 2008. Expanding Ethnographic Insights into Global
Politics. International Political Sociology, 2(1):89-90. doi: 10.1111/J.1749-
5687.2007.00035_4.X
Burlachuk, V. 2023. “Identity construction and mechanisms of aggression” Sociology:
Theory, Methods, Marketing, (2:)65–82.
Chesnakov, A. 2020. “Surkov: I'm interested in acting against reality” Actual
Comments. February 26, 2020 https://actualcomment.ru/surkov-mne-interesno-deystvovat-
protiv-realnosti-2002260855.html
Chun, C. 2016. "Exploring neoliberal language, discourses and identities." In The
Routledge handbook of language and identity, pp. 558-571. Routledge.
Crump, T. 1975. “The context of European anthropology: the lesson from Italy” In
Beyond the Community: Social Process in Europe by Jeremy Boissevain and John Friedl
(eds). The Hague: University of Amsterdam Press.

169
 Welty

Demirel, C. 2023. “Exploring inclusive victimhood narratives: the case of Bosnia-

Herzegovina”, Third World Quarterly, 44:8, 1770-1789, DOI:
10.1080/01436597.2023.2205579
Erikson, E.H., 1968. Identity youth and crisis (No. 7). WW Norton & Company.
Ferris-Rotman, A. 2022. “They Called Ukraine Home. But They Faced Violence
and Racism When They Tried to Flee” Time Magazine. March 1, 2022.
https://time.com/6153276/ukraine-refugees-racism/
Firat, B. 2022. “Geopolitics as an Ethnographic Object and Agenda”. Geography
Compass, 16(7) doi: 10.1111/gec3.12649
Firth, R. 1957. “Introduction to Factions in Indian and Overseas Indian Societies”.
British Journal of Sociology, 8:291- 295.
Foucault, M. 2001. L’hermeneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France, 1981-1982. Paris:
Gallimard Seuil.
Guan, Mengfei & So, Jiyeon. 2022. Social Identity Theory. The International
Encyclopedia of Health Communication, 1-5. doi:
10.1002/9781119678816.iehc0667
Hagene, T. (2017). The Power of Ethnography: A Useful Approach to Researching
Politics. Forum for Development Studies, 45(2), 305–325.
https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2017.1366360
Hannan, D. 2022. “Vladimir Putin’s monstrous invasion is an attack on civilisation
itself”. The Telegraph
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/02/civilised-european-
look-like-us-racist-coverage-ukraine
Holland, C. 2020. Ethnopolitics. 10.1002/9781405165518.wbeos1647.
Holohan, S. 2019. “Some Human’s Rights: Neocolonial Discourses of Otherness in
the Mediterranean Refugee Crisis.” Open Library of Humanities 5 (1).
https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.423.
Hutson, J. 1976. “Jeremy Boissevain and John Friedl (eds): In Beyond the
Community: Social Process in Europe” Man, New Series, 11(2): 297–298.
Jackson, P. (2008). “Can Ethnographic Techniques Tell Us Distinctive Things
About World Politics?”. International Political Sociology, 2(1):91-93. doi:
10.1111/J.1749-5687.2007.00035_5.X

170
 Embracing Political Ethnography

Käihkö, I. 2022. “The utility of ethnography for understanding the Russo-Ukrainian

war” Journal of Ethnographic Theory. 12(3):677-685.
https://doi.org/10.1086/723015
Kearns, E. M., Asal, V., Walsh, J. I., Federico, C., & Lemieux, A. F. 2018. Political
Action as a Function of Grievances, Risk, and Social Identity: An Experimental
Approach. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 43(11): 941–958.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1507790
Klandermans, B., & Stekelenburg, J. 2020. Social Identity in Decisions to Protest.
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Retrieved 22 May 2024, from
https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/
acrefore-9780190228637-e-1029.
Kumar, Satendra. 2014. “The Promise of Ethnography for the Study of
Politics”. Studies in Indian Politics 2(2): 237–242.
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
Radical Democratic Politics London: Verso.
Meertens, D. 1975. “South from Madrid: regional ethics and resistance” In Beyond
the Community: Social Process in Europe by Jeremy Boissevain and John Friedl (eds). The
Hague: University of Amsterdam Press.
Melamed, S. 2016. “They need to be partially eliminated” – Mikhail Khazin speaks
about Ukraine and Ukrainians.” Youtube. December 30, 2016.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vq5Fzkr9Tec
Minesashvili, S. 2022. Before and after 2014: Russo-Ukrainian conflict and its
impact on European identity discourses in Ukraine. Southeast European and Black
Sea Studies. 23. 1-27. 10.1080/14683857.2022.2121251.
Nestoras, A. 2021. "Chapter 5 Analysing Geopolitical Myths: Towards a Method
for Analytic Geopolitics". In Geopolitics and International Relations. Leiden, The
Netherlands: Brill. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004432086_007
Neumann, I. 2022 “Ethnography” in Routledge Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis
Methods by Partick Mello and Falk Ostermann. Routledge: London.
Petsinis, V. 2019. Geopolitics, Ethnopolitics and the EU: The Cases of Serbia and
Latvia. Ethnopolitics. 19: 1-18. 10.1080/17449057.2019.1630943.
Price, C. (2018). “An Ethnographic Life Narrative Strategy for Studying Race,
Identity, and Acts of Political Significance: Black Racial Identity Theory and the
Rastafari of Jamaica”. In Political Sentiments and Social Movements: Culture, Mind,

171
 Welty

and Society by : Strauss, C., Friedman, J. (eds).. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72341-9_9
Putin, V. 2012. “Russia: The Ethnicity Issue” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. January 23, 2012.
http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/17831/
Qin, Y., and Lowe, J. 2021. “Situational selves of online identity and rationality in
choosing – More examples of the college students’ online identity in China”. Culture
and Psychology, 27(4): 612-631. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X20976514
Ray, R. 2022. “The Russian invasion of Ukraine shows racism has no boundries”
Brookings Institute. March 3, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-
russian-invasion-of-ukraine-shows-racism-has-no-boundaries/
Reed, K, and Schenck, M. 2023. “A Right to Research?” International Migration 61 (3):
390–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13145.
Ricarte, J. 2023. The Construction of Identities in Protracted Conflicts. In: The
Impact of Protracted Peace Processes on Identities in Conflict: Rethinking Peace and Conflict
Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16567-2_2
Schmitt, C. 1932. The Concept of The Political. Newark, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press.
Snow, D. A., & R.D. Benford, R. D. 1988. “Ideology. Frame Resonance, and
Participant Mobilization”, International Social Movement Research, 1: 197–217.
Sturm, T. (2008) ‘Critical Methodological Geopolitics: Discourse
Analysis/Ethnography: François Debrix (2008), Tabloid Terror: War, Culture, and
Geopolitics, New York: Routledge, x +193 pages. ISBN 978-0-415-77291-4 (Pbk.
$41.95). Mark L. Gillem (2007), America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, xx + 350 pages. ISBN 0-8166-4953-2
(Pbk. $24.95).’, Geopolitics, 13(3), pp. 600–609. doi: 10.1080/14650040802203927.
Swartz, M, Turner, V, and Tuden, A. 1966. "Introduction". In Political Anthropology
by Swartz, Mark, Victor Turner, and Arthur Tuden (eds). New York: Routledge: 1-
39.
Tajfel, Henri and John Turner. 1986. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup
Behaviour”. in Psychology of Intergroup Relations by S. Worchel and W. Austin (eds).
Hall Publishers, Chicago.
Törrönen, J. 2014. “Situational, Cultural and Societal Identities: Analysing Subject
Positions as Classifications, Participant Roles, Viewpoints and Interactive

172
 Embracing Political Ethnography

Positions.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 44 (1): 80–98.

https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12029.
Ushchyna, V. 2022. “From Conflict of Discourses to Military Conflict:
Multimodality of Identity Construction in Russo-Ukrainian War Discourse”. East
European Journal of Psycholinguistics, 9(2) doi: 10.29038/eejpl.2022.9.2.ush
White, N. 2022. ‘The racial bias in western media’s Ukraine coverage is
shameful’, The Independent, 28 February,
available: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/ukraine-refugees-racial-bias-
western-media-b2024864.html

173
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch9

Is Geopolitics still relevant?

Halford Mackinder and the war in Ukraine1
Krzysztof Sliwinski2

Abstract
This paper starts with an assumption that Geopolitics, understood as one of the
great schools of International Relations, is not only still relevant but, indeed, should
be one of the essential items in the toolkit of any student or policymaker who
peruses the challenging and ever eluding realm of international security.
It draws chiefly on the Heartland theory of Halford Mackinder to explain the
dynamics of contemporary European Security in general and the ongoing war in
Ukraine in particular.
The analysis, which relies on historical examination of the geopolitical realities of
Central and Eastern Europe, leads the author to a pair of conclusions: firstly, that
the conflict in Ukraine is unlikely to end anytime soon and, perhaps more
importantly, that the outcome of the conflict will only be one of many steps leading
to the emergence of the new, possibly a multipolar, international system and
consequently, and more obviously, a new security system in Europe, which will be
strongly influenced by Germany rather than by the United States as before.

Keywords:
Geopolitics, Heartland, Europe, Security, Ukraine

1 This is an abbreviated version of the same paper published by the author at: Śliwiński K. (2023). Is Geopolitics
Still Relevant? Halford Mackinder and the War in Ukraine. Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs,
4/2023, 7-25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.33067/SE.4.2023.1
2 Hong Kong Baptist University

ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7316-3714

E-mail: chris@hkbu.edu.h
 Sliwinski

Introduction
On Thursday, February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation commenced its invasion
of Ukraine, officially referred to by Moscow as a ‘special military operation’ against
Ukraine (Osborn, 2022). The offensive caught many by surprise, especially the
severity of Russian military actions, such as targeting civilians and civilian
infrastructure. During the first weeks of the war, the Ukrainian army and society
impressed the world with their bravery and commitment to preserving territorial
integrity and sovereignty.
Members of the European Union agreed on an extensive package of sanctions
against various Russian entities and individuals connected to Vladimir Putin, the
president of Russia. Until the attack against Ukraine, the EU had been "muddling
through" with numerous countries pursuing their national interests, shaping their
individual foreign and security policies, notably vis-à-vis Russia. The attack
reinvigorated calls of E.U. bureaucrats for more unity and an actual common
defence. EU's chief diplomat Joseph Borrel, during an extraordinary plenary session
of the European Parliament on March 1, 2022, urged the European Parliament’s
MPs to "think about the instruments of coercion, retaliation, and counterattack in
the face of reckless adversaries. […] This is a moment in which geopolitical Europe
is being born", he stressed (Brzozowski, 2022).

Heartland theory – Geopolitics 101

Geopolitics is one of the grand theories of international relations (Sloan, 2017).
Fundamentally, rather than treating states as separate, alienated geographical
organisms, geopolitics allows us to look at a broader picture, including regions or
even the whole globe, thus making it possible to account for interactions between
many states functioning in particular systems defined by geographical criteria.
According to Grygiel, geopolitics exists outside the state; it is the environment
within which, and in response to which, the state must act (Grygiel, 2006).
Furthermore, two key variables shape this environment: the location of resources
(distribution of power) and the lines of communication linking them (Grygiel, 2006).
Today's war in Ukraine occurs in a vital region for the European continent – Central
and Eastern Europe. One of the founders of Geopolitics, a scientific discipline –
Halford Mackinder (British geographer, Oxford professor, founder and director of
the London School of Economics) proposed an enduring model in his seminal
publication at the beginning of the 20th century - The Geographical Pivot of History.

176
 Is Geopolitics still relevant?

Mackinder starts with the basics – he looks at the physical map. He concludes,
looking at Eurasia, that Russia occupied half the continent, juxtaposed by many
small European powers to the West. The East is generally flat and low, whereas the
West has many complications, such as mountains, valleys, islands, peninsulas, and
rivers. Geographical conditions account for the historical developments that could
be summarised as a great push of various Asiatic peoples from the East to the West,
culminating in the complicated political puzzle on the European continent
(Mackinder, 1904, p. 425).
Consequently, drawing on the general term used by geographers – 'continental' he
posits that the regions of Arctic and Continental drainage measure nearly half of
Asia and a quarter of Europe and therefore form a grand 'continuous patch in the
north and the centre of the continent' (Mackinder, 1919). It is the famous
'Heartland', which, according to his inventor, is the key geographical area for anyone
pursuing their dominant position in Euroasia. "[…] whoever rules the Heartland
will rule the World Island, and whoever rules the World Island will rule the world"
(Kapo, 2021). Notably, the key to controlling the Heartland area lies in Central and
Eastern Europe, as it is an area that borders the Heartland to the West. Heartland
itself is protected by mountain ranges from the South and the Sea from the North.
The developments of WWII slightly altered this approach. By 1943 Mackinder
rightly foresaw the potential of the Soviet Union as a land power if it were to emerge
victorious from the war (Mackinder, 1943, p. 600).

Historical context of contemporary European geopolitics

Germany paid extra attention to Central and Eastern Europe after its unification in
1871 under Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Its policy was the one of
remorseless Kulturkampf (culture war) through which Germans hoped not only to
gain an advantage over the Catholic Church in Europe and Papacy but, in the
context of the region, to Germanize its people, which was, after all, a form of
imperialism and colonialism (Bideleux, Jeffries, 2007).
WWII started with an attack on Poland in September 1939 and ended (at least in
Europe) with Red Army soldiers sizing Berlin by the end of April 1945.
Consequently, Germany was divided into four different occupation zones, out of
which two independent German states were formed by 1947. Most nations shared
the same fate in Central and Eastern Europe, which had been pre-approved by the
"Big Three" conference in Yalta in 1945. In a nutshell, the region was sacrificed to
the USSR and its territorial ambitions in Europe.

177
 Sliwinski

Under the Administration of President John F. Kennedy, the United States moved
from massive retaliation (response or deterrence) strategy, which posited that in case
of a USSR attack against the U.S. or its allies, Washington committed itself to
retaliating with much greater power, including nuclear weapons (Wells, 1981).
Proposed by Secretary of Defence Robert MacNamara, the Strategy of flexible
response, adopted as early as 1961, introduced an 'appropriate' response to potential
aggression by the Warsaw Pact (military alliance led by the USSR) (Pepper, 1990,
p.292). Whereas nuclear weapons were primarily located in the U.S., conventional
weapons were spread around European land. Washington assumed that the attack
with conventional forces would occur in Europe, once again stressing the
importance of Central and Eastern Europe. It was considered vital as one of the
three options for NATO in case of an actual military operation. The so-called
'forward defence' concentrated conventional defence efforts at or around the central
European front (Pepper, 1988, p. 165).
On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact developed in its early years a tendency toward
conferring privileged status on the northern members of the Pact. This has taken
the form of referring in public media to the northern quartet - Poland, the German
Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union - as the 'first strategic
echelon of the Pact’ (Wolfe, 1966). The territory of the three East European
members of the Northern Quartet lay directly in line with what, in wartime, would
be the main axis of a central European campaign. Consequently, Central and
Eastern Europe had to be controlled again should the USSR seriously consider
protecting its core. As Patricia Haigh rightly reminds us: "The Warsaw Pact meant
that the countries of Eastern Europe could be bound to the strategic policies of the
Soviet Union, and the concept of buffer States against a resurgent Germany
realized." (Haigh, 1968, p.170). This is precisely how historians read the events of
1968 and the application of 'The Brezhnev doctrine’, exemplified by the
intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia the same year.

Twenty-First century geopolitics (Dugin vs Mearsheimer)

One of the most popular and arguably influential thinkers and writers in Kremlin is
Aleksandr Gel'evich Dugin. His 600-hundred pages book, Foundations of
Geopolitics 2, published in 1997, has allegedly had an enormous influence on the
Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites (Dunlop, 1997). In his book,
Dugin, drawing on the founder of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer, posits that Russia is
uniquely positioned to dominate the Eurasian landmass and that, more importantly,
'Erasianism' will ultimately hold an upper hand in an ongoing conflict with the

178
 Is Geopolitics still relevant?

representatives of 'Atlantism' (the U.S. and the U.K.). Crucially, Dugin does not
focus primarily on military means as a way of achieving Russian dominance over
Eurasia; instead, he advocates a relatively sophisticated program of subversion,
destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services,
supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia's gas, oil, and natural resource
riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia's will (Dunlop,
1997).

The Moscow-Berlin Axis

According to Dugin, the postulated New Empire (Eurasian) has a robust
geopolitical foothold: Central Europe. "Central Europe is a natural geopolitical
entity, united strategically, culturally and partly politically. Ethnically, this space
includes the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, Prussia
and part of the Polish and Western Ukrainian territories. Germany has traditionally
been a consolidating force in Central Europe, uniting this geopolitical conglomerate
under its control" (Dugin, 1997). Consequently, while the impulse of the creation
of the New Empire needs to come from Moscow, Germany needs to be the centre
of its western part. Furthermore "only Russia and the Russians will be able to
provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarchy.
Therefore, the European Empire should be formed around Berlin, which is on a
straight and vital axis with Moscow." (Dugin, 1997, 127).
Regarding the role of Anglo-Saxons in Central and Eastern Europe, Dugin offers a
very straightforward analysis: "The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis as the
western supporting structure of the Eurasian Empire presupposes several serious
steps towards the countries of Eastern Europe lying between Russia and Germany.
The traditional Atlanticist policy in this region was based on Mackinder's thesis
about the need to create a "cordon sanitaire" here, which would serve as a conflict
buffer zone preventing the possibility of a Russian-German alliance, which is vitally
dangerous for the entire Atlanticist bloc. To this end, England and France strove to
destabilize the Eastern European peoples in every possible way, to instil in them the
idea of the need for "independence" and liberation from German and Russian
influences". It follows logically that "Ukraine as an independent state with certain
territorial ambitions, represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without
resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is, in general, senseless to speak about
continental politics" (Dugin, 1997). "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine
(especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'.
Importantly, as this can inform us to an extent about the future settlement of the

179
 Sliwinski

conflict: "The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is
the total and unlimited control of Moscow along its entire length from Ukrainian to
Abkhazian territories".

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

In the preface to the update of his seminal book "The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics" (2013 edition), John Mearsheimer acknowledges that his analysis had to be
updated with regards to the so-called "peaceful rise" of the People's Republic of
China as a significant challenger to the role and position of United States in the
international system. Consequently, he envisaged that the process would produce a
highly sensitive, if not prone to local conflicts environment (Mearsheimer, 2013,
10). Following the logic of power balancing, he claimed that firstly, China had to
build formidable military forces and, secondly, dominate Asia similarly to how the
United States dominated Western Hemisphere. Correspondingly, China would
strive to become a regional hegemon to maximise its survival prospect. This would
make China's neighbours feel insecure and prompt counterbalancing by, as one
might surmise, strengthening the existing bilateral and multilateral alliances and
building new ones (AUKUS being a perfect example). Logically speaking, therefore,
if you follow Mearsheimer's argumentation, Russia and India, Japan and Australia,
and the Philippines and Indonesia should build a solid coalition to counter the
ascent of China. Such developments would be in the interests of the United States,
and Washington would naturally play a crucial role under such circumstances.
Notably, the rise of China was not likely to be peaceful and produce "big trouble"
for international trade as well as peace and security.
This was approximately what the Trump administration had in mind when preparing
the national security strategy in 2017. The Strategy mentions Russia 25 times,
frequently in connection with China, as major challengers to the U.S.: "China and
Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode
American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free
and fair, grow their militaries, and control information and data to repress their
societies and expand their influence" (National Security of the United States of
America, 2017). Yet, after even a short analysis of the document, one identifies the
difference between the two in terms of how the U.S. perceives the challenge that
each represents. Regarding Russia, Washington concludes that Kremilin's main aim
is to: "seek to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near
its borders". China seems to be more ambitious in the eyes of the Capitol. As
evidenced by such statements as: "Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S.

180
 Is Geopolitics still relevant?

intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars", "China seeks to

displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-
driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour. China's infrastructure
investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to
build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free trade flow,
threaten other nations' sovereignty, and undermine regional stability."(National
Security of the United States of America, 2017).
Given this perception, it is no wonder that under Trump, Washington embarked on
a new mission that questioned the processes of globalization for the first time in
many decades. Under Trump, the U.S.A. introduced numerous economic sanctions
against China, which sparked a revolution called 'decoupling'. Johnson and Gramer,
writing for foreignpolicy.com in 2020, questioned this policy: "The threat of a great
decoupling is a potentially historical break, an interruption perhaps only comparable
to the sudden sundering of the first massive wave of globalization in 1914, when
deeply intertwined economies such as the Great Britain and Germany, and later the
United States, threw themselves into a barrage of self-destruction and economic
nationalism that didn't stop for 30 years. This time, though, decoupling is driven not
by war but peacetime populist urges, exacerbated by a global coronavirus pandemic
that has shaken decades of faith in the wisdom of international supply chains and
the virtues of a global economy." (Johnson, Gramer, 2020).
With the comfort of looking at hindsight, we should conclude that perhaps luckily
for the Far East and international political economy, Mearsheimer was wrong, at
least for the time being. Firstly, no military conflicts exist in the Far East or the
Pacific. The most potentially dangerous issue remains one of the cross-straight
relations, i.e. P.R.C. vs Taiwan (Chinese Taipei). Whether Xi Jinping will risk another
diplomatic backlash by an open invasion remains to be seen. The jury is out, and
one might claim that with the world being focused on the war in Ukraine, China
could get away with an invasion of Taiwan. Then, on the other hand, perhaps there
is no need for the P.R.C. to unite all territories of China in the imminent future
forcefully.
At the same time, as it appears at least mid-2023, contrary to Mearsheimer's
predictions, Russia and China seem to be getting closer regarding geopolitics and
geoeconomics. On February 4th Russian President Vladimir Putin met face-to-face
with Chinese President Xi. The leaders convened in Beijing at the start of the Winter
Olympics — and issued a lengthy statement detailing the two nations' shared

181
 Sliwinski

positions on a range of global issues.3 The meeting happened shortly before the
Russian invasion, and one could surmise that it was supposed to soften the possible
adverse reaction from Beijing to the already prepared military operation by the
Kremlin since Putin told Xi that Russia had designed a new deal to supply China
with an additional 10 billion cubic metres of natural gas. Consequently, China
abstained from a U.N. Security Council vote condemning the Russian invasion
(Gerson, 2022).
Conversely, one cannot but notice that most of the energy transferred to the West
before the war in Ukraine has been redirected to the East, mainly China (Soldatkin,
Aizhu, 2022). At the same time, Russia also shifted its imports of high-tech. Instead
of the U.S. or Germany/France, it now has developed cooperation with … again
China (Taplin, 2023).

Andrew Krepinevich's Protracted Great-Power War

Andrew Krepinevich's “Protracted Great-Power War - A Preliminary Assessment
work” published by the Centre for a New American Security, informs us about the
American posture. Accordingly, "Now, however, with the rise of revisionist China
and Russia, the United States is confronted with a strategic choice: conducting
contingency planning for a protracted great-power conflict and how to wage it
successfully (or, better still, prevent it from occurring), or ignoring the possibility
and hoping for the best." (Krepinevich, 2020)
Among many valuable lessons that history can offer, one should remember that no
country can wage a systemic war on its own on two fronts hoping to be successful.
Suppose both China and Russia are seen as strategic challengers to the American
position in the international system. In that case, it follows logically that the U.S.
needs to make one of them at least neutral (appease them) when in conflict with
another. Given China's technological, economic, military, or population challenges,
the most optimal choice would be to make Russia indifferent to American 'elbowing'
in Central Asia or the Middle East vis-à-vis China. The price for such indifference
also seems logical, and it is the dominance of the Russo-German tandem in Central
and Eastern Europe and German dominance in the E.U. This would explain at least
some developments in Europe regarding energy security, particularly President
Biden's administration position on Nord Stream 2 and the not-so-much enthusiastic
help to Ukraine from Germany.

3Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations
Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. Available at:
http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770#sel=1:21:S5F,1:37:3jE (Access 18.10.2023)

182
 Is Geopolitics still relevant?

However, recent developments seem to contrast such logical argumentation.

President Biden's administration, as well as the leadership of the U.S. Armed Forces,
seem to be committed to continuing the financial, technical and logistical support
to Ukrainian President Zelensky's government for "as long as it takes" (the term
frequently used in official speeches by Antony Blinken – The Secretary of State).
According to the U.S. Department of Defence information (as of Feb 21, 2023), the
U.S. committed security assistance to Ukraine in the form of 160 Howitzers, 31
Abrams tanks, 111 million rounds of small arms ammunition and four satellite
communication antennas, among others. On top of that, Washington committed
more than 30.4 billion U.S. dollars (only since the beginning of the Biden
Administration) (U. S. Department of Defence, 2023). The U.S. is the leader of the
coalition of many nations (54 to be exact) in efforts to counter the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. This situation puts Washington in a predicament as, at least in the
mediasphere, experts and former policymakers such as the former C.I.A. Director
and U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta do not shy away from identifying the
existing state of affairs as a "proxy war" between the United States and the Russian
Federation (Macmillan, 2022).4
But is "Uncle Sam" still in a position to effectively challenge either Russia or China
on their own? In 2001, French historian, sociologist and political scientist
Emmanuel Todd claimed that as of the beginning of the 21st century, the United
States was no longer a solution to global problems; instead, it became one of the
problems (Todd, 2003). The U.S. guaranteed political and economic freedoms for
half a century. In contrast, today, they seem to be more and more an agent of
international disorder, causing wherever they can uncertainty and conflicts. They
demand the international community support their foreign policy goals and join in
their actions regardless of cost and benefit analysis. Given the geopolitical changes
after 1989, the U.S. took for granted its position in the international system and
decided to extend its interests across the globe. Surprisingly, perhaps for
Washington, even traditional U.S. lies started to demand more independence (see
the case of Germany and its role in southern Europe.) (Macron's idea of 'strategic
autonomy')5. According to Todd, given the actual balance of power globally, the
U.S. would have to fulfil two conditions to maintain its hegemonic position. Firstly
it had to continue controlling its protectorates in Europe and Japan. Secondly, it had
to finally eliminate Russia from the elite group of 'big powers', which would mean

4 Importantly, Kremlin has been playing the “proxy war” card for some time in building its narrative regarding the
ongoing “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine.
5 “Emmanuel Macron's comments about Taiwan and his call for European "strategic autonomy" sparked

controversy as he advocated for the EU not to become followers of the US and China”. This parallels with
President de Gaulle earlier calls for European strategic independence from American influence over European
security (Lory, 2023).
183
 Sliwinski

the disintegration of the post-Soviet sphere and the elimination of the nuclear
balance of terror. None of these conditions have been met. Not being able to
challenge Europe or Japan economically, the U.S. has also been unable to challenge
the Russian nuclear position. Consequently, it switched to attacking medium powers
such as Iran or Iraq economically, politically, and militarily engaging in 'theatrical
militarism'. (Todd, 2003).
In contrast to the French historian, American political scientist Joseph Nye claims
"The United States will remain the world's leading military power in the decades to
come, and military force will remain an important component of power in global
politics." (Ney, 2019, p.70). He goes on to question whether the rise of China is
going to spell the end of the American era: "[…] but, contrary to current
conventional wisdom, China is not about to replace the United States as the world's
largest economy. Measured in 'purchasing power parity' (P.P.P.), the Chinese
economy became larger than the U.S. economy in 2014, but P.P.P. is an economists'
measure for comparing welfare estimates, not calculating relative power. For
example, oil and jet engines are imported at current exchange rates, and by that
measure, China has a US$12 trillion economy compared to a US$20 trillion U.S.
economy." […] “Power—the ability to affect others to get what you want—has
three aspects: coercion, payment and attraction. Economic might is just part of the
geopolitical equation, and even in economic power, while China may surpass
America in total size, it will still lag behind in per capita income (a measure of the
sophistication of an economy).” (Ney, 2019, p.70).
And yet, as of 2023, America's economic components of her might seem to be very
quickly eroding. After the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis and the consequent Covid-
19 induced economic crisis, there are several woes on the horizon: Inflation has
been rampant (that is one of the effects of federal stimulus after Covid-19), which
makes the Federal Reserve continue to increase interest rates, making loans more
and more expensive (Goldman, 2022). The stock market has been in the "sell-
everything mode", which means the investors are losing a lot of money, so their
trust in the economy is decreasing. Thirdly, this time around, the investors are not
switching to bonds, which seems to confirm the previous point. Fourthly and finally,
"none of this is happening in a vacuum. Russia continues its deadly invasion of
Ukraine, which has choked off supply chains and sent energy prices through the
roof." China, on the other hand, remains in semi-locked mode when it comes to
some of its biggest cities due to after Covid-19 vulnerability.
On top of that, a labour shortage has sent salaries surging and hindered the normal
flow of goods worldwide (Goldman, 2022). Worse still, according to the Bureau of
Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, some of the key

184
 Is Geopolitics still relevant?

performance indicators regarding international trade are primarily negative (Bureau

of Economic Analysis, 2023). As of July 2022, experts debated whether the country
was in a technical recession, whereas by now (mid-2023), the actual national debt
surpassed 31.46 trillion U.S. dollars (FiscalData.Treasury.gov, 2023), with states
such as California officially defaulting on its debts towards the Federal Government
(Gillmore, 2023). Finally, one cannot but notice the latest initiatives of the BRICS
nations to drop using the U.S. dollar as a means of international payments (Aizhu,
2023). Some economists predict the Ukraine crisis will lead to the end of the
dominance of the dollar-euro system, the backbone of Western military power. With
nearly 4 billion people, Asia will develop a parallel financial system and lessen its
dependence on the West (Krikke, 2022).
One could also argue that the fact that the war in Ukraine happened in the first place
and is continuing proves that the position of the United States and the Pax Americana
are being effectively challenged.

The German-French engine of the European federalization?

The economic and political decrease of the U.S. and the parallel increase of China
with Russia holding its position or even reclaiming its influence vis-à-vis NATO
countries causes significant challenges to European powers and offers some
ground-breaking opportunities. In terms of challenges, especially economically,
Germany and France, as mentioned before, find themselves in a predicament. Their,
especially Germany's, idea was to continue the role of an economic powerhouse,
based chiefly on the export of manufactured goods worldwide, thanks to energy
security provided by the Russian Federation. The war in Ukraine has changed these
dynamics completely due to the pressure of the U. S. to support Ukraine and
economic sanctions against The Russian Federation. Similarly, France, is not very
happy with the economic sanctions against Russia and has continually tried to play
down the possibility of an all-out EU vs Russia conflict. Listening to the speeches
of Macron and Scholz, one cannot but hypothesise that Paris and Berlin would be
happy with the end of the war as soon as possible at any cost, to be born by Ukraine,
only to be able to come back to “business as usual”. Apparently, in an attempt to
"escape forward", both European powers are proposing further steps to generate
even more federal dynamics. To be more exact, they suggest that concerning
Foreign and Security Policy, the still observed voting pattern based on unanimity,
one of the last strongholds of sovereignty, should be abolished, and the decisions
should follow qualified majority voting. Notably, such arguments are made,
invoking the potential gains for the EU as a geopolitical actor. In other words,

185
 Sliwinski

countries such as Poland and Hungary would no longer be able to block Paris and
Berlin from imposing their interests on the rest of the EU by presenting them as
European. According to this vision, Hungary would no longer be able to
‘sympathize’ with Russia, and Poland would no longer be the ‘Trojan Horse’ of the
U.S. interests in Europe in their game with Russia. And so, the war in Ukraine
presents a perfect circumstance to call for a European federation. Germany has
recently publicized such a vision. On August 24, 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz
presented a speech at Charles University in Prague regarding his vision of the future
of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop
of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Experts, policymakers, and media pundits
widely commented on the speech. It starts with an assertion that Russia is the biggest
threat to the security of Europe. That fact produces two breakthrough
consequences: firstly, Berlin has to pivot from Russia to its European Partners both
economically and politically. Secondly, the European Confederation of equal states
should morph into a European Federation (The Federal Government, 2022).
Scholz’s vision includes four major ‘thoughts’. Firstly, given the further enlargement
of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition should be made to majority
voting in common foreign or tax policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty,
“we grow more autonomous in all fields; that we assume greater responsibility for
our own security; that we work more closely together and stand yet more united in
defence of our values and interests around the world.”. In practical terms, Scholz
singles out the need for one command and control structure of European defence
efforts (European army equipped chiefly by French and German Companies?).
Thirdly, the EU should take more responsibility (at the expense of national
governments) regarding migration and fiscal policy against the backdrop of the
economic crisis induced by Covid-19 pandemic. This, in practical terms, means,
according to Scholz, one set of European debt rules to attain a higher level of
economic integration. Finally, some disciplining. “We, therefore, cannot stand by
when the principles of the rule of law is violated, and democratic oversight is
dismantled. Just to make this absolutely clear, there must be no tolerance in Europe
for racism and antisemitism. That’s why we are supporting the Commission in its
work for the rule of law. The European Parliament is also following the subject with
close attention. For that I am very grateful […] We should not shy away from using
all the means at our disposal to correct failings. […] It also seems sensible to
consistently tie payments to the maintenance of the rule of law standards – as we
have done with the 2021-2027 Financial Framework and the Recovery Fund in the
COVID crisis“.

186
 Is Geopolitics still relevant?

Conclusion
The war in Ukraine is arguably proof of the region's role in the security and stability
of Europe and its economy. Food supplies, mostly various harvests and energy,
mainly gas, are a case in point. On top of that, the region has a lot of raw materials.
Ukraine has large deposits of 21 of 30 such materials critical in European green
transformation (Ukrinform, 2023). Before the war in Ukraine began, in July 2021,
the EU and Ukraine signed non less than a strategic partnership on raw materials.
The partnership includes three areas from the approximation of policy and
regulatory mining frameworks, through a partnership that will engage the European
Raw Materials Alliance and the European Battery Alliance to closer collaboration in
research and innovation along both raw materials and battery value chains using
Horizon Europe (European Commission, Press Release 2021).
As for security, in a traditional sense, the U.S. is involved with Ukraine regarding
nuclear weapons. In the letter from March 17, 2023, the director of the Energy
Department’s Office of Nonproliferation Policy, Andrea Ferkile, tells Rosatom’s
director general that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Enerhodar “contains
US-origin nuclear technical data that is export-controlled by the United States
Government” (Bertrand, Lister, 2023).6 Worse still, The Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, Victoria J. Nuland, admitted in her testimony on Ukraine in the
US Congress that, indeed, “Ukraine has biological research facilities, which we are
now quite concerned Russian troops, Russian Forces, may be seeking to gain control
of, so we are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent any of those
research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces should they
approach” (C-Span, 2022).
As Scott and Alcenat claim, the analysis of the competitive policies of each great
power confirms the Heartland concept's importance. They project the utility of
Mackinder’s analysis to Central Asia, asserting that: “it is valid in today’s foreign
policy and policy analyses. Each power strives for control of or access to the region’s
resources. For China, the primary goal is to maintain regional stability as a means
for border security and assurance of stable economic relations. For the European
Union, the main goal is to gain economic access while simultaneously promoting
the democratization of those countries that are politically unstable.” (Scott, Alcenat,
2008).7

6See more at: https://www.state.gov/energy-security-support-to-ukraine/ (Access 18.10.2023)

7Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (retired) - a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua
University and a China Forum expert, a former director of the Centre for Security Cooperation of the Office for
International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of National Defence of China offered a similar evaluation: “the
competition between the two giants (U.S.A. and China) will not occur in the Global South, where the US has already
187
 Sliwinski

References

Aizhu, Ch. (2023) “Analysis-Vast China-Russia resources trade shifts to yuan from
dollars in Ukraine fallout”, Reuters, 10.05. Available at:
https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/articles/2023-05-10/analysis-vast-
china-russia-resources-trade-shifts-to-yuan-from-dollars-in-ukraine-fallout (Access
18.10.2023)
Bertrand, N. and Lister, T. (2023) “US warns Russia not to touch American nuclear
technology at Ukrainian nuclear plant”, CNN Politics, 19.04. Available at:
https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/18/politics/us-warns-russia-zaporizhzhia-
nuclear-plant/index.html (Access 18.10.2023)
Bideleux, R. and Jeffries, I. (2007) A History of Eastern Europe. Crisis and Change 2nd
Edition. Oxon: Routledge.
Brzozowski, A. (2022) “Ukraine war is 'birth of geopolitical Europe', E.U. top
diplomat says.” Euroactiv, 1.03. Available at:
https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/ukraine-war-is-birth-of-
geopolitical-europe-eu-top-diplomat-says/ (Access 18.10.2023)
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce (2023) U.S.
Economy at the Glance. Available at: https://www.bea.gov/news/glance (Access
18.10.2023)
Bo, Zh. (2023) “The true battleground in the US-China cold war will be in Europe”,
South China Morning Post, 2.05. Available at: The true battleground in the US-China
cold war will be in Europe | South China Morning Post (scmp.com) (Access
18.10.2023)
C-Span (2022) US biolabs confirmed in Ukraine. Available at: https://www.c-
span.org/video/?c5005055/user-clip-biolabs-confirmed-ukraine (Access
18.10.2023)
Dunlop, J. B. (1997) “Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics.” Stanford.
The Europe Centre. Freeman Spogli Institute and Stanford Global Studies.
Available at: https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-
geopolitics (Access 18.10.2023)

lost out to China. At the same time, in the Indo-Pacific, few nations want to take sides. Instead, it will be in Europe,
where the U.S. has most of its allies, and China is the largest trading partner” (Bo, 2023).

188
 Is Geopolitics still relevant?

U. S. Department of Defence (2023) Support for Ukraine. Available at:

https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Support-for-Ukraine/ (Access 18.10.2023)
European Commission, Press Release (2021). “EU and Ukraine kick-start strategic
partnership on raw materials” 13 July 2021, Available at: https://single-market-
economy.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-ukraine-kick-start-strategic-partnership-raw-
materials-2021-07-13_en (Access 18.10.2023)
FiscalData.Treasury.gov (2023) “What is the national debt?” Available at:
https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/national-debt/ (Access
18.10.2023)
Gerson, J. and Klare, M. (2022) “Is ‘Taiwan Next’ No Sign of Sino-Russian
Coordination over Ukraine or Preparations an Invasion of Taiwan". Available at: Is
"Taiwan Next"? No Sign of Sino-Russian Coordination over Ukraine or
Preparations for an Invasion of Taiwan — Committee for a SANE U.S.-China
Policy (saneuschinapolicy.org) (Access 18.10.2023)
Gillmore, T. (2023) “California Defaults on $18.6 Billion Dept, Now Businesses
Have to Pay.”, May 9, 2023. Available at:
https://www.theepochtimes.com/california-defaults-on-18-6-billion-debt-now-
businesses-have-to-
pay_5246637.html?utm_source=partner&utm_campaign=ZeroHedge&src_src=p
artner&src_cmp=ZeroHedge (Access 18.10.2023)
Goldman, D. (2022) “4 reasons the economy looks like it's crumbling — and what
to do about it”. May 14, 2022 Available at:
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/14/economy/recession-signs/index.html
(Access 18.10.2023)
Grygiel, J. J. (2006) Great Powers and Geopolitical Change. Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press.
Haigh, P. (1968) “Reflections on the Warsaw Pact” The World Today Vol. 24(4), pp.
166 – 172.
Johnson, K and Gramer, R. (2020) “The Great Decoupling” foreignpolicy.com,
Available at: http://acdc2007.free.fr/greatdecoupling620.pdf (Access 18.10.2023)
Kapo, A. (2021). “Mackinder: Who rules Eastern Europe rules the World.” Institute
for Geopolitics, Economy and Security, February 8, 2021. Available at:
https://iges.ba/en/geopolitics/mackinder-who-rules-eastern-europe-rules-the-
world/ (Access 18.10.2023)

189
 Sliwinski

Krepinevich, A. Jr. (2020) “Protracted Great-Power War. A Preliminary

Assessment”. Available at:
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/protracted-great-power-war (Access
18.10.2023)
Krikke, J. (2022) “Ukraine and the battle for Eurasia From the Heartland Theory,
to the Cold War, to the Belt and Road, to the new Iron Curtain”. AsiaTimes, April
26, 2022. Available at: Ukraine and the battle for Eurasia – Asia Times (Access
18.10.2023)
Lory, G. (2023) “Is Macron's idea of 'strategic autonomy' the path to follow for E.U.
relations with the U.S.?” Euronews, April 13, 2023. Available at:
https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/04/13/is-macrons-idea-of-
strategic-autonomy-the-path-to-follow-for-eu-relations-with-the-us (Access
18.10.2023)
Mackinder, H. (1904) “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal
XXIII, no. 4 (April), pp. 421-437.
Mackinder, H. (1919) Democratic Ideals and Reality. A study in the politics of reconstruction.
London: Constable and Company L.T.D.

Mackinder, H. (1943) “The round world and the winning of the peace”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol 21(2), (July), p. 600.
Macmillan, J. (2022) “With NATO and the U.S. in a 'proxy war' with Russia, ex-CIA
boss Leon Panetta says Joe Biden's next move is crucial". A.B.C. News, 25.03.
Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-25/nato-us-in-proxy-war-
with-russia-biden-next-move-crucial/100937196 (Access 18.10.2023)
Mearsheimer, J. (2013) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norhon
& Company 2nd Edition.
National Security of the United States of America (2017) The White House:
Washington. Available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf (Access 18.10.2023)
Ney, J. S. Jr. (2019) “The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to
Trump.” International Affairs Vol 95(1), pp. 63-80
Osborn, A. (2022) “Russia's Putin authorises 'special military operation' against
Ukraine.” Reuters, 24.02. Available at:

190
 Is Geopolitics still relevant?

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-
operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/ (Access 18.10.2023)
Pepper, D. M. (1988) “Geographical Dimensions of NATO's Evolving Military
Strategies.” Progress in Human Geography Vol 12(2), (June), pp. 157-178.
Pepper, D. M. (1990) “Geographical Dimensions of Flexible Response Strategy in
the European Theatre.” Area Vol. 22(3), (Sep), pp. 284 – 295.
Scott, M and Alcenat, W. (2008) “Revisiting the Pivot: The Influence of Heartland
Theory in Great Power Politics.” Macalester College, 09.05. Available at:
https://www.creighton.edu/fileadmin/user/CCAS/departments/PoliticalScience
/MVJ/docs/The_Pivot_-_Alcenat_and_Scott.pdf (Access 18.10.2023)
Sloan, G. (2017) Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History. London: Routledge.
Soldatkin, V. and Aizhu, Ch. (2022) “Putin hails $117.5 bln of China deals as Russia
squares off with West.” Reuters, 04.02. Available at:
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-tells-xi-new-deal-that-could-sell-more-
russian-gas-china-2022-02-04/ (Access 18.10.2023)
Taplin, N. (2023) “How Russia Supplies Its War Machine. Following the trail of
chips and other tech gear from China, Turkey, Hong Kong and elsewhere to
Ukraine's battlefields". The Wall Street Journal, 10.03. Available at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-ukraine-tech-chips-exports-china-f28b60ca
(Access 18.10.2023)
The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles
University In Prague On Monday, 29 August 2022. Available at:
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-
university-2080752 (Access 18.10.2023)
Todd, E. (2003) Schyłek imperium. Rozważania o rozkładzie systemu amerykańskiego.
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog.
Ukrinform (2023) Ukraine has deposits of 21 raw materials critical to EU Available at:
https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3280369-maasikas-ukraine-has-
deposits-of-21-raw-materials-critical-to-eu.html (Access 18.10.2023)
Wells, S. F. Jr. (1981) “The Origins of Massive Retaliation.” Political Science Quarterly
Vol. 96 (1), (Spring), pp. 31 – 52.
Wolfe, T. W. (1966) “The Warsaw Pact in Evolution.” The World Today Vol. 22 (5),
pp. 191 – 198.

191
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch10

Neighborhood Effect Revised:

Spatial Statistical Analysis in Electoral Geography

Igor Okunev1

Abstract

The differentiation of space based on the electoral preferences of residents is what forms
the electoral space – a special layer of the earth’s surface that is the object of study of the
discipline we call electoral geography. Geography of voting identifies the factors and
patterns that underlie long-standing territorial differences in the political activity of voters
and their voting habits by administrative and territorial unit, constituency and district, as
well as the geographic favouritism and disproportionality of electoral systems – that is,
the proclivity of electoral procedures to the territorial differentiation of election results.
The key task of electoral research is thus to assess the degree to which voter intention is
deformed by a system of interrelated filters including the effects of electoral geography.

Keywords:

electoral geography, geography of voting, spatial effects, neighborhood effect, spatial

analysis, spatial statistics.

1 Director, Center for Spatial Analysis in International Relations, Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University
iokunev@mgimo.ru
 Okunev

A number of factors influence the electoral behaviour of voters, some of which have a
pronounced geographical nature. These are called the spatial effects of voting, which we
will discuss in greater detail. Scalar spatial effects of voting include those in which
electoral behaviour is determined by the properties of a given place (say, the fact that an
election campaign was successful in one region, but unsuccessful in others). Vector spatial
effects of voting are those where electoral behaviour is determined by the location of a
given place (for example, the fact that the region is located close to the area where a given
candidate can traditionally rely on support). We can thus say that scalar voting effects are
based on the principle of vertical conditionality in geography, where the properties of an
object are determined by the properties of the place in which it is located, and vector
effects are based on the principle of horizontal conditionality in geography, where the
properties of an object are determined by its location relative to other objects – that is,
they arise as a result of its relations with the positions of other objects in space (Table 1).

Effect type Geographic principle Explanatory factor Examples of effects

Scalar Vertical conditioning Properties of the Friends-and-neighbours effect,

place campaign effect, issue voting
effect

Vector Horizontal Location of the Neighbourhood effect

conditioning place
Table 1. The scalar and vector spatial effects of voting

The most obvious scalar geographic factor in electoral behaviour is the friends-and-
neighbours effect (sometimes called the localism effect), which describes the propensity of
voters to vote for people from the same region. There are, in fact, dependencies of two
different scales here.

At the local level, the friends-and-neighbours effect can be seen in a narrow sense: the
closer voters live to the hometown (district, street, home) of a candidate, the more likely
they are to vote for them.

At the regional level, the friends-and-neighbours effect is evident in the broad sense:
when voting for a candidate to represent them in the authorities, the electorate is more
inclined to support someone local, that is, a candidate who was born in or spent a
significant part of his life in the same region (district, city, country) as his or her voters.
Accordingly, candidates get more support in territories they have a personal connection
with.

194
 Neighborhood Effect Revisited

There are two key explanations for this dependency. First, candidates are traditionally
more recognizable in their native regions and it thus is easier for them to rally support
there, because proximity to the candidate (geographical, but also social) equals trust, since
it is far more likely that interactions with this candidate will take place in the future than
with a candidate who is not from the region. Second, voters will naturally expect a
“hometown” boy or girl to pay more attention to local interests, which means that it is
easier for these candidates to convince doubters or get indifferent voters to be more
politically engaged. The first explanation is more typical of situations where a narrow
understanding of the friends-and-neighbours effect is evident, while the second is truer of
situations where the broader understanding reigns. Moreover, opening up the scale of the
analysis makes the first explanation irrelevant – that is, isolated local cases aside, voters
tend to cast their vote for local candidates, even when they know just as much about them
as they do about their rivals.

The effect was first described by Valdimer Key Jr, in his 1949 book Southern Politics in State
and Nation, but in a negative connotation: it turned out that the localist factor was more
important than the political platform of the candidate. Next came the methods proposed
by Raymond Tatalovich in 1975 and John Van Wingen and Joseph Parker in 1979 that
estimate the friends-and-neighbours effect by calculating the correlation between the level
of support for a candidate and the distance between voting districts and that candidate’s
hometown. These approaches differ in that the first describes the dependence as linear,
while the second describes it as logarithmic.

Tatalovich friends-and-neighbours effect ,

Van Wingen–Parker friends-and-neighbours effect ,

where is the percentage of support for the candidate, is the distance to the
candidate’s voting district, is the level of support in the candidate’s voting district, and
is the strength of the friends-and-neighbours effect. Another obvious scalar spatial
effect of voting is the campaign effect, according to which a voter is more likely to support a
candidate in areas where they have campaigned more actively.

During an election campaign, candidates and parties are forced to choose constituencies
and regions into which more resources will be channeled in order to secure victory. This
is done based on two main factors. First, attention is paid to areas where the electoral
strategy will be most effective, that is, areas with the highest numbers of undecided voters
who are more likely to lean towards the chosen candidate. Second, this electoral strategy

195
 Okunev

tries to adjust the inherent geographic favoritism of the electoral system in order to
prevent wasted votes. For example, in single-member plurality systems, large parties try to
avoid receiving excess votes, as they would prefer a more even distribution of voters
across the country to hypertrophied support in certain regions. At the same time, small
parties are interested in consolidating their supporters in individual districts, since equal
distribution across the territory necessarily leads to a large number of lost votes and,
subsequently, seats. These considerations, among others, affect the decision whether a
candidate should visit a region on his or her campaign trail for rallies and meet-and-greets
with voters, or whether a media campaign will suffice.

Researchers are effectively left guessing as to the size of the resources that candidates
direct to various regions during their election campaigns. Indicators they look to typically
include the distribution of regional shares in the overall campaign budget, or the volume
of campaign materials, although gaining access to such data is far from easy. This is why
the main indicator for evaluating the campaign effect is the number of times a candidate
visits individual districts, and for how long, as well as the number of pre-election events
held there – we could just as well call it the pre-election visit effect. In our opinion, these
metrics could be supplemented by an assessment of the nature of the spatial distribution
of these visits (in terms of turnout and regularity).

Eric Mintz is considered a pioneer in the analysis of the geography of election campaign
tours following his 1985 study into the impact of candidate visits on the 1984 Canadian
federal election. One of his followers, Thomas Holbrook, used regression analysis to
prove that each of Harry S. Truman’s campaign visits during the 1948 U.S. presidential
election brought him an average of 0.248% support. Major election campaigns have
effectively turned into a race to see how many regions across the country candidates can
visit, because the more meet-and-greets and events the candidate holds in different
regions, the greater the spatial effect of his or her campaign will be. For example, during
the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign, during the final three weeks before voting, Donald
Trump visited 48 cities in 15 states, while Joe Biden visited 23 cities in 10 states. That is,
both candidates managed to visit at least two cities per day.

The final scalar effect of voting is the issue voting effect, which states that voters tend to
support candidates more in areas they pay greater attention to during their election
campaigns. For example, a party that is against tearing down residential buildings to make
way for new ones in Moscow will find more support in those districts of the capital
where this is happening and public opinion is rather negative towards it.

196
 Neighborhood Effect Revisited

While a scalar is a value that remains the same when the spatial coordinate system
changes, the value of the vector depends on its location relative to other elements of
space. Suppose we are studying the relationship between the share of workers and
support for the left party in two cities, and , located in places ,
respectively. The left party received 60% of the votes in City , where 40% of the
residents are working class, and 40% of the votes in City , where 20% of the residents
are working class. This territorial differentiation reflects the geography of ideological and
political cleavages in society. Imagine we can change the coordinates of these cities, but
the dependence remains the same: 20% of the residents of City are working class, and
the left party will receive 40% of votes; while 40% of the residents of City are
working class, and the left will receive 60% of the votes. What this means is that the
results depend solely on the properties of the pace itself, and that we are dealing with a
scalar effect in electoral geography. But what if dependence is determined not by the
properties of a given place, but rather by that place’s location in space (for example, it
belongs to a belt of cities that traditionally supports the left? Suppose that, now, the left
receives 30% of the votes in City , where 20% of the population is working class, and
just 50% of the votes in City , where 40% of the population is working class. What we
have here is an example of the vector voting effect, also known as the neighbourhood effect.
In this example, the neighbourhood effect will be 10% in both cities (see Table 2). This
effect belongs to a large family of contextual voting effects in political science that
describe how external factors influence the nature of electoral choice.

Initial situation No neighbourhood effect Neighbourhood effect

Table 2. The neighbourhood effect

So, let us get this straight: if you change the location of an object and its properties do not change as
a result, then we are dealing with non-spatial (scalar) dependence that is determined by the properties of
the object itself. If the properties of the object do change when placed in a different location, then we have
spatial (vector) dependence.

197
 Okunev

The neighbourhood effect means that support for a candidate (or party) is greater in
districts that are adjacent to regions where support for this candidate (or party) is higher
than the national average. Accordingly, the inverse neighbourhood effect is when support
for a candidate (party) is lower in districts that are adjacent to regions where support for
this candidate (or party) is lower than the national average. A more formal expression of
the neighbourhood effect is that the share of people who vote for a candidate (party)
tends to show a positive correlation with the share of those who vote for the candidate
(party) in neighbouring districts. In other words, the neighbourhood effect is observed
when there is significant spatial autocorrelation in the level of support for a candidate
(party) and, as a result, stable spatial differentiation of the electoral landscape.

The neighbourhood effect was conceptualized in 1969 by David Reynolds in the article
“A Spatial Model for Analyzing Voting Behavior”, and then further explained that same
year by Kevin Cox in his paper “The Voting Decision in a Spatial Context”. Cox based
his explanation of this principle on Torsten Hägerstrand’s theory of the spatial diffusion
of innovations. According to Cox, the regular spatial clustering of specific candidates and
parties is somewhat similar to the way in which rumours or diseases spread. The voter’s
behaviour is determined by the influence of the information that dominates in the area
where he or she lives. Each person acts as a node in the network of information flows,
acting simultaneously as the addressee, transformer and sender of signals. The
effectiveness of connections between nodes, and thus of the dissemination of
information in the network, depends on the number of addressees, the distance between
them and quality of the political culture. The neighbourhood effect is thus explained by
the density and quality of the connections between voters: higher density and quality
means that voters tend to repeat the voting decisions of their neighbours. William Miller
described the essence of the neighbourhood effect using the simple formula “those who
speak together vote together”, and this conjecture about the nature of the effect of the
communication network on electoral behaviour was confirmed by Robert Huckfeldt and
John Sprague’s 1995 study on how people in Indianapolis and St. Louis voted in the
presidential elections.

An important addition to our understanding of the neighbourhood effect was provided

by the models of environmental effects identified by Miller based on his observations of
the UK electoral landscape in 1977. Describing the neighbourhood effect, Miller pointed
out that the dependence can manifest itself differently for different parts of society (class,
strata, ethnic groups, etc.), which partly explains situations when the effect is minimal
(Fig. 1). Miller identified the following environmental (neighbourhood) effect models:

198
 Neighborhood Effect Revisited

1) consensual environmental effect – the classic neighbourhood effect, where

communication between people strengthens the position of the dominant
political force in the region;

2) no environmental effect – the absence of the classic effect, when communication

between people does not affect their electoral behaviour;

3) reactive environmental effect – the opposite of the classical type, when

communication between people increases their mutual annoyance, anxiety and
hostility, and, as a result, this weakens the position of the dominant political
force in the region;

4) Przeworski environmental effect – when the neighbourhood effect acts differently on

individual parts of society: say, one segment of society is influenced by the
majority, while another is indifferent to it, and a third votes differently in
defiance.

Fig. 1. Miller’s environmental (neighbourhood) effect

Source: Miller W.L., Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918 (London: Macmillan, 1977), 266.

199
 Okunev

As we see, the neighbourhood effect is not equivalent to the geography of ideological and
political splits in society, including those that are based on territoriality. It can be said that
the geography of voting (the electoral and geographic differentiation of society) is a
reflection of the geography of ideological and political divisions anchored in space by the
neighbourhood effect. The geography of cleavages would create smooth territorial
transitions in the spatial continuum of the state, but the neighbourhood effect polarizes
society in space by, among other things, creating a territorial dimension for non-territorial
(social, ideological and other) splits.

To assess the degree of clustering of the electoral space, either simple indicators of
geographic concentration and spatial relationships or spatial statistical analysis methods
can be used.

The localization coefficient measures the relative distribution (or relative concentration) of
supporters of a given party in a specific region in relation to the country as a whole.

where is the number of supporters of the party in region , is the total number
of supporters of that party in the country, is the total number of voters in region ,
and is the total number of voters in the country. If the localization coefficient is
greater than 1, this means that the party is relatively more concentrated in the region
being observed.

While the localization coefficient estimates the relative distribution in space of supporters
of one party among all voters, the geographic disparity index compares the proportional
distribution in space of supporters of two different parties.

where and are the number of supporters of parties and in region , is

the sum of supporters of these parties in the country as a whole. The index ranges from
0 to 100, where 0 means absolutely equal spatial distribution of the two parties across the
country, and 100 means completely opposite spatial distribution.

200
 Neighborhood Effect Revisited

The geographic segmentation index is similar to the geographic disparity index. The difference
is that it compares the performance of one party relative to voters in the country as a
whole, rather than the performance of two parties. It is also measured on a scale of 0 to
100 and has the same threshold interpretations.

In order to assess the neighbourhood effect, it is important to both determine the level
of space clustering, and to identify the strength of the geographical interaction between
objects – i.e., how connected and interdependent they are. This is done using the
gravitational model, borrowed from Isaac Newton’s equation of universal gravitation.

where is the force of gravity (spatial interaction) as it is directed from Place to Place
, is a constant, is the distance between and with distance exponent , and
and are the number (or share) of Party ’s supporters in regions (electoral districts)
and . Points and are mapped as centroids or administrative centres of regions or
electoral districts. For most investigations in absolute two-dimensional space, it is
reasonable to use and .

201
 Okunev

References

Cox K.R. The Voting Decision in a Spatial Context // Progress in Geography. — 1969. —
Vol. 1. No. 1. — P. 81–117.

Holbrook T.M. Did the Whistle-Stop Campaign Matter? // Political Science & Politics. —
2002. — Vol. 35. No. 1. — P. 59–66.

Huckfeldt R., Sprague J. Citizens, Politics and Social Communication: Information and
Influence in an Election Campaign. — Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. —
305 p.

Johnston R.J. The Neighbourhood Effect Revisited: Spatial Science or Political

Regionalism? // Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. — 1986. — Vol. 4. No. 1. —
P. 41–55.

Key V.O. Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation. — NY: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1949.
— 675 p.

Miller W.L. Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918. — London: Macmillan, 1977. —
242 p.

Mintz E. Election Campaign Tours in Canada // Political Geography Quarterly. — 1985.

— Vol. 4. Iss. 1. — P. 47–54.

Reynolds D.R. A Spatial Model for Analyzing Voting Behavior // Acta Sociologica. —
1969. — Vol. 12. Iss. 3. — P. 122–131.

Tatalovich R. «Friends and Neighbors» Voting: Mississippi, 1943-73 // The Journal of

Politics. — 1975. — Vol. 37. No. 3. — P. 807–814.

Van Wingen J.R., Parker J.B. Measuring Friends-and-Neighbors Voting // American Politics
Quarterly. — 1979. — No. 7 (3). — P. 367–383.

202
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch11

Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness:

Dynamics of Geopolitical Processes in Eurasia
Arseniy N. Fartyshev1 and Sergei V. Pisarenko2

Abstract
The official list of the "unfriendly countries" has appeared in the Russian political discourse
since 2022, though dividing countries into friends and foes has deep roots, that come from
traditional American geopolitical discourse. The authors view friendliness and unfriendliness
of the geopolitical actors and their mutual distance as key characteristics of the geopolitical
space. The study presents a renewed scale of friendliness and unfriendliness based on
“Discord and collaboration” by A. Wolfers. Analyzing both qualitative and quantitative data,
the empirical research includes using this multistep scale to evaluate countries friendliness
and unfriendliness towards Russia in 2016 and 2024. Next, the method of multiscale distances
is used to measure and graphically represents the connectedness and degree of geographical
influence of the geopolitical subjects varying in friendliness and unfriendliness on Russia,
Siberia (as a general geographic region) and the Siberian federal district. The research
considers in mesolevel that is measured through economical distances (understood as the
length of the existing transport lines) between nearest cities as actors of economical space.
The research proves that due to its remoteness Siberia has a more beneficial location in
comparison with Russia as a whole, because only friendly economic centers can be found
within 2500 km from Siberia, unfriendly geopolitical actors moved even farther from it,
whereas the friendliest actors (primarily Eurasian states) remained as close as in 2016 and
became even friendlier towards Russia. The view of the geographical map through the prism
of dynamic characteristic of graduating friendliness-unfriendliness and the multiscale analysis
of remoteness of geopolitical subjects help us to understand geographical and geopolitical
advantages and disadvantages of the Eurasian integration and the concept of the Greater
Eurasia, its problems and threats. In case of Siberia the main characteristic of the current
geopolitical position is the drifting of Mongolia and Kazakhstan as the most geographically
close subjects from friendliness to the opposite, whereas other subjects in Central Asia rise
to more friendly status as detected on the scale. Overall, the presented view on the
geopolitical dimensions presents a new geographical picture of position Russia and Siberia in
Eurasia.
Keywords: quantitative geopolitics, Russia, Siberia, economical distances, Wolfers,
unfriendliness, Eurasia, sanction policy, economic distance

1 Head of Laboratory of Natural Resources and Political Geography, V. B. Sochava Institute of Geography SB RAS,
Irkutsk. Russian Federation. Associate Professor, Irkutsk State University, Irkutsk. Russian Federation.
2 Research Fellow, Laboratory of Natural Resources and Political Geography, V. B. Sochava Institute of Geography

SB RAS, Irkutsk. Russian Federation. Associate Professor, Pushkin Leningrad State University, Pushkin, Russian
Federation.
 Fartyshev and Pisarenko

Introduction
Traditionally, geopolitics is concerned primarily with the global and the national level
(Okunev 2021), and the role of subnational units - regions - is somewhat reduced
due to their smaller role in foreign policy. The methodology of regional geopolitics
is most fully presented in the works of P.Ya. Baklanov on the territory of the Far
East (Pacific Russia) (Baklanov, Shvedov, and Romanov 2023). Probably, the interest
in this topic specifically in the Far East is associated with the significant vulnerability
of this territory and constant geopolitical shifts in the external environment. Siberia,
despite its remoteness from most world powers in modern times, is also an important
part of Russia, the geopolitical position of which has significant dynamics. This is
manifested in the changing positioning of neighboring Mongolia on the world stage,
the foreign policy drift of Kazakhstan and, of course, in the Ukrainian crisis, which
pushed Russia to accelerate its “turn to the east.” In view of these transformations,
the importance of geopolitical research is increasing.
Another factor that has influenced the revision of geopolitical studies is the creation
of "lists", "axes" and "registers" of unfriendly countries. Such lists are rarely based
on clear and objective criteria, but some efforts to formulate them can be noted (for
example, Safranchuk, Nesmashnyi, and Chernov 2023 is noteworthy in this regard).
One way or another, subjects of varying degrees of unfriendliness have different
geographical influence on Russia. Siberia also occupies a special place, being, like the
Far East, the most remote territory from the theater of Russian-Western
confrontation, but the question arises how significant this fact is. The purpose of
this work is to identify the geographical characteristics of subjects of varying degrees
of unfriendliness that affect Russia and Siberia in particular.

Review
Attempts to create a scale of friendliness and hostility have been made in the
academic literature for quite a long time, but researchers have used different terms
and variables for this topic. Back in 1941, a study by F. Klingberg was published, in
which tension was considered as a “psychological distance” separating two states,
the value of which can be measured within the framework of the “friendliness -
hostility” scale (Klingberg 1941).
In 1955, a model for measuring interstate tension as a dynamic state located in a
multidimensional space between the poles of stability and conflict was presented
(Wright 1955). Earlier, in thinking about whether tension could be assessed or
measured, Wright started from the use of this term in the physical sciences and its
reflections in sociological and psychological research. An approach to measuring

204
 Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness

tensions, based on the assumption that in formulating foreign policy it is important

to understand the perceptions of reality, images, stereotypes and definitions of the
situation by decision makers, rather than the objective conditions existing in the
world, was later proposed by K. J. Holsti 1963. The greatest attention when turning
to the analysis of tension, as a rule, was attracted by the problem of identifying the
main causes and factors causing it (Leifer 1974). These included perceptual variables
such as threat perceptions, assessments of abilities, intentions, attitudes and overt
behavior (O. R. Holsti 1962). As a result of all these efforts, the concept of tension
gradually began to acquire greater definition and substantive rigor. In accordance
with the classical interpretation of K. Holsti, it has come to be understood as a set
of attitudes and tendencies, such as distrust and suspicion, that the public and
politicians experience towards others (K. J. Holsti 1963).
In mathematical models used in political science, the political attitude is represented
as a certain constant that is specified by the researcher. In the model of L.F.
Richardson, known as the arms race model, identifies “the magnitude of past
grievances” as such a variable (Richardson 1960). This variable can be either a
positive or a negative number, but one way or another it was perceived as a constant.
Richardson's followers were engaged in a detailed description of the exact definition
of this parameter.
The most well-known scale in the positive direction (that is, the scale of friendliness)
is probably the concept of B. Balassa about the stages of integration processes
(Balassa 1961). Complex integration processes have a branched structure, but it has
been revealed that economic integration has certain stages: a preferential trade zone,
a free trade zone, a customs union, a common market, an economic union. At the
same time, currency unions remain somewhat on the sidelines, since they are created
for various reasons (this can occur both from integration processes and due to
currency protectorate or post-colonial ties) (Okunev 2021). A similar gradation can
be seen in the military-political sphere: a non-aggression treaty, an agreement on
cooperation in the military-technical sphere, joint military exercises, a joint defense
agreement, a unified military command. In the context of the friendliness of states,
these processes overlap each other, forming different levels of friendliness of states.
To summarize, we derive the parameter of “political attitude” as a measure of the
positivity or negativity of connections between geopolitical subjects, which is similar
to Richardson’s “magnitude of past grievances”, since it generally reflects the
assessment of one subject by another on the “friendliness-hostility” scale. It is this
factor that introduces a geopolitical aspect into political-geographical analytics. At
the state level, A. Wolfers, in his essay “Discord and collaboration”, presented certain

205
 Fartyshev and Pisarenko

and clear criteria for political subjects, divided into categories, ranked on a “hostility-
friendliness” scale. He identified the following categories:
• Irreconcilable hostility (state of war)
• Showing hostility
• Termination of friendly relations
• Minimum relationships
• Cool or non-aligned relations
• Active internal cooperation
• External cooperation
• Extreme expression of friendship (Wolfers 1962)
The Wolfers scale emphasized military power, but in subsequent decades there was
a tendency to reevaluate the importance of military and economic factors in shaping
foreign policy in favor of the latter. In our earlier works, the Wolfers scale was
modernized and the exact criteria for the onset of one or another stage of
manifestation of friendliness or hostility were identified (Fartyshev 2018). It is the
basis for this work.

Data and Methodology

Within the framework of the task, two successive stages are distinguished:
distribution of geopolitical subjects according to the degree of friendliness-hostility
and assessment of the remoteness of subjects of varying degrees of distance from
Russia (Fartyshev 2017). The sample includes Asian countries (excluding Southeast
Asia and the Arabian Peninsula), the most significant and close countries of Europe
and the USA. In earlier works, a typology of political attitude was proposed based
on a linear scale of “friendliness-hostility”, which presents clear criteria for stages of
the parameter PA (political attitude), starting from PA = 0, as minimal relations, both
in the direction of friendliness and in the direction of hostility, and being divided
into 9 stages (Fartyshev 2018). The assignment of one or another degree of gradation
is based on the criteria reflected in Table 1. In case of duality of assessment, the
prevalent criterion is considered to be the one that is more up-to-date (for example,
the expulsion of diplomats as the latest fact of a change in the type of political
relationship), or stronger (for example, the fact of regularly held military exercises
between Russia and Mongolia is more significant than the negative factor of the
negative connotation of news about Russia in the Mongolian media).

206
 Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness

Table 1: Typology of political relations between geopolitical subjects

Type Sub-type Attribute

3.3 Unity Common governmental structures

Union
3.2 Trust No border control, common currency
(PA=+3)

3.1 Cohesion Military alliance, joint defense treaty

2.3 Friendship Customs union

Cooperation
2.2 Mutual benefit Special conditions for trade agreements
(PA=+2)

2.1 Partnership Joint military training

1.3 Consent Support in voting on UN resolutions

Warm
neutrality
1.2 Sympathy Positive connotations of news about the country in the media
(PA=+1)
1.1 Communication Existence of trade relations without special conditions

Minimal relations (PA=0) Small volumes of trade, political and cultural connections

-1.1 Caution Strengthened visa regime, tougher customs duties

Cold neutrality
-1.2 Rejection Negative connotations of news about the country in the media
(PA=-1)

-1.3 Disagreement Protest voting on UN resolutions

-2.1 Rivalry Territorial disputes are in the active stage of discussion

Competition
(PA=-2) -2.2. Opposition Embargo/sectoral sanctions

-2.3 Disgust Diplomatic wars (cases of expulsion of diplomats)

-3.1 Remission A war in a frozen state

Hostility
-3.2 Escalation Local war
(PA=-3)

-3.3 Destruction Total war

To assign one or another degree of friendliness, current data on UN voting on

resolutions, data on military exercises, data on international treaties on the degree of

207
 Fartyshev and Pisarenko

economic integration, data on the political coloring of messages in the leading media
of the relevant countries (the sample included 100 publications in each country), data
on cases of expulsion of diplomats and other relevant data were analyzed.
Geographical analysis is based, first of all, on measuring the distance of certain
entities from each other. In classical geopolitical studies, the principle of
neighborhood order is used (Baklanov, Shvedov, and Romanov 2023), however, we
believe that this approach is incorrect due to the underestimation of the extent of
space, therefore the influence of subjects is evaluated through the economic distance
between the nearest demographic and economic centers, reflecting the possibilities
of direct cooperation between countries.
Economic distance (in other terminology “relative distance”) refers to the distance
along existing communication routes (roads, railways, sea routes) (Bezrukov 2023).
It can be measured in length, time or prices. This is important from the point of view
of the immediate possibility of contact between two geopolitical entities for the
exchange of goods. The comparison of economic distances was carried out on the
basis of border checkpoints operating on highways as of March 1, 2024. In a number
of cases, sea distances are taken through currently existing sea connections (for
example, transport connections with Syria are actually carried out along the
Novorossiysk-Latakia sea line, and connections with India are through the ports of
Calcutta-Vladivostok and Nhava Sheva-Novorossiysk, and not by land transport).
For comparative analysis, two dates were taken: 2016 as the year preceding the period
of global turbulence and pandemic transport restrictions, and the current year 2024.
Besides, the perception of the borders of Siberia should be clarified. During the
period under review, the Siberian Federal District was reshaped after the
resubordination of the Republic of Buryatia and the Zabaikalsky krai to the Far
Eastern Federal District, however, following the academic traditions of V. B.
Sochava Institute of Geography SB RAS, the territorial framework of Siberia in the
general geographical sense should include the Tyumen region with its districts and
the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia (Korytny 2021). From the point of view of modern
approaches in regional studies, the region does not have clearly defined boundaries
at all, since the level of regional cohesion (regional consolidation) is of greatest
importance (Hettne 2005).

208
 Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness

Results

The origin of the concept of unfriendly countries

In itself, the division into friendly and unfriendly countries is fundamental for
political theory, since the theory of the emergence of statehood according to K.
Schmitt is built around the dichotomy of friend or foe. The proclamation and
institutionalization of “other” communities or subjects allows us to see more clearly
what “we” are, where the border between “them” and “us” lies, and what exactly
serves as this border (Kharkevich 2009). In the period of antiquity, states on the
political map of the world, according to this demarcation, were divided into the
“civilized world” and “barbarians”, during the Middle Ages - into Christian states
and infidels, in modern times and especially aggravated during the Cold War -
“democratic” and “authoritarian” states. In 1959, US President D. Eisenhower
signed a joint declaration with Congress recognizing the “Captive Nations Week”
and issued a proclamation, which subsequent US presidents reissued every year. In
the same year, Public Law No. 86-90 (07/17/1959) was adopted, under which it was
impossible to peacefully exist with a communist society, and Russian communism
(in fact, the USSR) was declared a serious threat to the national security of the United
States and the whole world. The law designates the countries (Poland, Hungary,
Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Belarus, East
Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Albania, Idel-
Ural, Tibet, Kozakia, Turkestan, etc.) in need of support of their desire for freedom
and independence from the USSR.
The report of the US National Security Council No. NSK 5811/1 dated May 24,
1958 provides an overview of the geopolitical relationship of Romania, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria to the United States, and formulates short-,
medium- and long-term goals reflecting the declared principles of the proclamation.
At the same time, guidelines were drawn up for the introduction of US foreign policy
towards Eastern Europe and the following measures were prescribed (some are
classified to this day): nurturing nationalist pride and aspirations among people and
within the leadership of the regime, publishing evidence of violations of the human
rights of citizens of the republics by the USSR, etc. This document provides specific
guidance on policy towards the Baltic countries. It seems that such proclamations
should be considered an official designation of the geography of US geostrategic
interests, which have not changed since the end of the Cold War.
In the late 1980s – early 1990s, the term “rogue states” arose in the discourse,
characteristic of US international policy, as a similar manifestation of the “alien” in

209
 Fartyshev and Pisarenko

foreign policy to replace the collapsed USSR (Kharkevich 2009). US President

George W. Bush, speaking before Congress on January 29, 2002, introduced the term
“axis of evil” into international circulation, referring to countries that allegedly
support terrorism and develop weapons of mass destruction. The first list included
Iraq, Iran and North Korea; in 2005, Condoleezza Rice and her deputy John Bolton
included Libya, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Zimbabwe and Myanmar in the “axis of evil”.
In 2022 the Government of the Russian Federation published the “List of Unfriendly
Countries and Territories” (Order of the Government of the Russian Federation
dated March 5, 2022 No. 430-r), thus institutionalizing one of the main components
of the geopolitical position - the political relationship between countries, expressed
on the scale of "friendliness-hostility". The list as of March 1, 2024 includes:
Australia, Albania, Andorra, Great Britain, including Jersey, Anguilla, Bahamas,
British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, member states of the European Union, Iceland,
Canada, Liechtenstein, Micronesia, Monaco, New Zealand , Norway, Republic of
Korea, San Marino, North Macedonia, Singapore, USA, Taiwan (China), Ukraine,
Montenegro, Switzerland, Japan, as well as dependent territories of Great Britain.
This list was originally created from the point of view of the so-called “sanctions
policy” (Timofeev 2023), but in reality it has had an impact on many more areas than
just economic measures. When referring to this list, the following important aspects
should be emphasized:
- The selection of “aliens” was done quite clearly (although the above-
mentioned decree is constantly being supplemented), whereas the selection of
entities that are friendly is a more debatable topic. Although a number of legislative
acts (for example, Federal Law No. 630-FZ dated December 25, 2023 “On
Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation “On Customs Tariffs” and the
Federal Law “On the Fundamentals of State Regulation of Foreign Trade Activities”)
introduce such a definition, there is no list of friendly countries.
- The register of states itself is discrete and does not imply gradation, which
is a significant simplification of current reality. In terms of research, it is more
accurate to talk about levels or degrees of gradation, which will be discussed in more
detail below.
- The list contains polities that do not take direct unfriendly actions towards
Russia, for example, the British dependent territories, such as the Pitcairn Islands,
were included in the list in order to comply with the sanctions regime on all territories
that have any form of dependence from the metropolis, but, at the same time,
unincorporated dependent territories of the Netherlands, such as the island of Aruba
and Curacao, on the contrary, were not included. Such an approach is inconsistent
and gives rise to misinterpretations of the list.

210
 Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness

Thus, lists of unfriendly countries are a traditional form of fencing, hanging a “label”
or a “black mark” and highlighting the “alien” in a multidimensional political space,
but from a research point of view it seems more relevant to speak about various
levels of political relations of geopolitical subjects.

Assessment of the level of political attitude

During the period under study, significant changes occurred in the political attitudes
of countries. In 2016 the vast majority of European countries were subject to
Russia’s economic and political sanctions. After the announcement of a “special
military operation” in 2022, hostility intensified with the expulsion of diplomats
(which in the previous period happened only in the case of Great Britain, Sweden,
Poland and the Ukraine), which means a transition from the stage of “opposition”
to “disgust”. The most radical geopolitical subject in attitude towards Russia is the
Ukraine, the degree of hostility with which in 2024 can be assessed as “escalation”
(although in the political discourse of both Russia and Ukraine in a number of cases
the “destruction of statehood” is mentioned). Relations with China have not
developed, and Russia and the PRC have not advanced along the path of integration,
although every year the parties conduct joint Maritime Cooperation exercises in the
Sea of Japan, which allows one to evaluate relations as “partnership” with the
prospect of moving to higher degrees of friendliness (Lukin 2021).
Relations between Russia and the DPRK over the past period remain uncertain.
North Korea is one of the few countries that recognized the annexation of new
regions by Russia. In September 2023 the leader of the DPRK visited Russia and
negotiations were held at the highest level, in July the Russian Minister of Defense
visited the DPRK, where the issue of joint military trainings was discussed among
other things. However, the political attitude is not symmetrical, since Russia holds
strict sanctions against the DPRK, introduced by the UN.
Russia's warmest relations are observed in Central Asia, where the CSTO military
alliance prevails as the highest stage of friendship, with high stability, assessed as
“cohesion” Relations with the countries of South Asia are characterized primarily by
joint military exercises, which are held regularly. In the case of India, these have been
carried out since 2005, with Pakistan - since 2014, and with Iran - since 2019. Since
2023, Iran has entered into a free trade zone with the EAEU, which further increases
its degree of friendliness. Relations with Nepal and Bhutan can be characterized as
minimal relationship.
The remaining assessments of countries according to the scale are more specific. The
final distribution of countries by degree of political attitude is presented in Fig. 1.

211
 Fartyshev and Pisarenko

Figure 1: Political attitude of the countries of the world towards Russia.

The following trends are visible from the presented maps:

- Over the past period, there has been an increase in unfriendliness both on
the eastern and the western “flank” of Russia that were already unfriendly in the
previous period (from the degree of competition to hostility). For Siberia, these
subjects have a more distant position, but they are of more critical importance for
Russia as a whole.
- The friendliness of countries within the Eurasian space to the south of
Russia has increased, it is strengthening slowly and gradually, from neutrality towards
cooperation. For Siberia, these are the closest subjects, which increases the
geopolitical significance of this macro-region.

212
 Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness

- The presented maps show the inconsistency of the judgment about the
political isolation of Russia and, taking into account a number of assumptions, clearly
shows the implementation of the concept of the so-called “Greater Eurasia”,
implying the political consolidation of the intra-Eurasian space (Bezrukov 2018;
Fartyshev 2021).

Analysis of the degree of remoteness of geopolitical subjects

The results provide grounds for a geopolitical assessment of the proximity and
distance of countries with various political attitudes and depending on the level of
their significance in world politics. The classification of power levels is taken from
the another study (Nesmashnyi, Zhornist, and Safranchuk 2022). Distance diagrams
are presented for this assessment (Fig. 2).
An analysis of the remoteness of political entities showed the main trend that
occurred during the period under review: unfriendly entities moved away from the
territory of Russia due to the closure of the border between Russia and the Ukraine,
and the closure of all checkpoints on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. The greatest
increase in distance is observed with Moldova, which, despite the fact that
geographically it is a second-order neighbor, now has land connection with Russia
only through three countries - Ukraine, Poland, Belarus. The closure of most border
points in Finland has led to an increase in the economic distance by land between
the nearest economic centers; whereas the maritime connectivity of the states
remains. As for the macroscale, there have been no fundamental changes, but when
considering the distances between political centers along aviation routes, taking into
account the emergence of no-fly zones and closed airspaces, the greatest changes
have affected almost all European countries, where the connection with Russia is
only possible through third countries (for example, through Turkey).
These processes have less impact on Siberia and the Siberian Federal District, since
they are located at a considerable distance and, according to the law of diminishing
returns, the increase in high mileage is less significant. In the 2500-km distance zone,
Siberia has exclusively friendly entities, which makes its geopolitical position
extremely advantageous, while they remained at the same distance as they were in
2016, since during the period under review there was no increase in connectivity as
border points (the only new border checkpoint was opened on the Russian-Chinese
border in the area of the village of Nizhneleninskoye, Jewish Autonomous Region),
np new direct transport routes connecting economic centers, no transfers of political
centers occurred, and the closest entities that were previously unfriendly (among
them) did not become friendly. Only Turkey can be noted, and the growing

213
 Fartyshev and Pisarenko

friendliness of Pakistan and India is offset by the excessive remoteness of these

countries.
The overland remoteness of Siberia is, of course, an economic problem for itself,
since transport costs by land are significantly higher than by sea (Bezrukov 2008),
however, from a geopolitical point of view, Siberia seems to be the most favorable
territory for future internal economic and internal political development. But, of
course, this is only one of the factors.

Discussion
Today we can observe a significant civilizational movement, when Russia is
increasingly moving away from the “Western countries”; against this background, a
new interest in Eurasianist ideas has arisen (Druzhinin 2021), as well as the ideas of
the “Siberianization” of the country (Karaganov 2024). As the results of our analysis
show, Siberia has an advantageous geopolitical position due to its proximity to
friendly countries, therefore Siberia becomes a platform for ensuring the internal
economic stability of a country under siege by the Western thalassocratic bloc. The
failure to finish creating the third industrial base with the center in East Siberia lead
to the lack of industrial development of the vast territories beyond the Yenisei, the
focus not on creating full-cycle production chains, but on the export of resources
without a high degree of processing, the problems of developing transport and
logistics capacities along the transit type along the Asia-Europe route. This negative
feature of spatial development in the post-Soviet stage is clear now, when the military
and strategically important industry of the country is primarily situated in the
European part of Russia, in the proximity of the theater of military operations.
At the same time, it is important to understand that political attitudes are extremely
dynamic and depend mainly on government decisions and internal political events,
which is why the presented structure is flexible. For example, the change of power
in Argentina in 2023 turned the state’s policy almost 180 degrees from the desire to
join BRICS towards increased foreign policy dependence on the United States and
the “dollarization” of the country. The same processes could be observed during the
periods of “color revolutions” of the 1990s-2010s. There are still countries in close
proximity to both Russia and Siberia that have the potential for a sharp change in
foreign policy course through a revolutionary path, for example, in Kazakhstan, or
an evolutionary path, for example, in Mongolia. These two neighboring countries are
located at the very core of the continent, and the dynamics of consolidation in the
Eurasian space depend on the policies of these countries. In many ways, the project
of Greater Eurasia will depend on Russia’s policy towards these two countries,

214
 Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness

which, translated into the language of geopolitical analysis, implies increased

friendliness on the scale we presented above.
On the other hand, geographical images and stereotypes are incredibly inertial
(Kolosov 2003), which is embedded in the political culture and behavioral patterns
of both the population and the elites of a particular country. The construction of the
image of “enemy” or “friend”, “significant other”, “center” and “periphery”, etc.
occurs through human communication, mass propaganda, art, etc. These images,
based on collective identity, remain unchanged for a long time, which depends on
the speed of information dissemination, the degree of ingrained ideas, consistency
with the picture of the world, which reflects the process of diffusion of innovations.
How to influence this image of one’s country in the event of a transition of one or
another state to a hostile state is a question of the design of social behavior. For the
studied time period 2016-2024 there was no overall critical change in the political
attitude of these countries towards Russia, although for the purposes of national
interests, the increase in friendliness of continental states should be at least
symmetrical to the deterioration of sentiment in the countries of the Western bloc.
At the moment, such a symmetrical process is not happening.
In order to increase the relative proximity of states, it is necessary to develop
intracontinental highways. For example, India, being a generally friendly state
towards Russia, remains an extremely distant country, since communication with it
is carried out not by land routes, but almost exclusively through seaports. But the
main limiting factor of meridional distribution is the belt of political instability on
the border of South Asia with East and Central Asia (Bezrukov 2008).

Conclusion
The division into unfriendly and friendly countries has a long historical tradition.
The modern “list of unfriendly countries” published by the Russian Foreign Ministry
is, from the economic side, a manifestation of the “policy of sanctions”, but from
the political side it is the successor to the American geopolitical tradition of
identifying “rogue countries” or “captive nations".
Analysis using the grading of geopolitical subjects on a scale of “friendliness-
hostility” shows the exact characteristics of the political attitude of countries. The
following changes were recorded for 2016-2024: increased hostility of European
countries, increased friendliness of the countries of Central and South Asia, static
relations with China, North Korea and Mongolia, and increased friendliness with
Turkey. The geopolitical situation requires constant monitoring due to the dynamism
recorded in this work.

215
 Fartyshev and Pisarenko

The trends in geographic remoteness, which are only briefly reflected in this article,
indicate many side effects of political decisions to change the status of border
crossings or airspace. At the same time, economic distances shows the real difference
in the distance of countries much more accurately than dividing countries according
to an ordinal principle and should be used as a basis for geopolitical analysis. A
tendency has been revealed that Siberia, in its general geographical understanding,
has an advantageous geopolitical position due to its remoteness of more than 2500
km from hostile entities, however, economically this is a disadvantage due to the long
transport distance and high transport costs.

Acknowledgements
Research funded by Russian Science Foundation № 23-77-10048,
https://rscf.ru/project/23-77-10048/

216
 Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness

References
Baklanov, P. Ya., V. G. Shvedov, and M. T. Romanov. 2023. “Pacific Vector
in the Spatial Development of Russia and USA: Main Frontiers and Stages.”
Proceedings of the Russian Geographical Society 153 (3): 3–16.
doi:10.31857/S0869607121030022.
Balassa, Bela. 1961. The Theory of Economic Integration. London: Allen & Unwin
Ltd.
Bezrukov, L. A. 2018. “The Geographical Implications of the Creation of
‘Greater Eurasia.’” Geography and Natural Resources 39 (4): 287–95.
doi:10.1134/S1875372818040017/METRICS.
Bezrukov, L. A. 2023. “Continental–Oceanic Dynamics of Russia at the
Beginning of the 21st Century.” Geography and Natural Resources 44 (2): 91–98.
doi:10.1134/S1875372823020038.
Bezrukov, L.A. 2008. Continental-Oceanic Dichotomy in International and Regional
Development. Edited by Ishmuratov B.M. Novosibirsk: Geo.
Druzhinin, A. G. 2021. Ideas of Classical Eurasianism and Modern: Human-
Geographical Analysis. Rostov-on-Don: South Federal University.
Fartyshev, A. N. 2017. “Geopolitical and Geoeconomical Position of Siberia:
Modelling and Estimation.” Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Earth Sciences 62
(3): 300–310. doi:10.21638/11701/spbu07.2017.306.
Fartyshev, A. N. 2021. “Siberia in Conception of Greater Eurasia.” The Bulletin
of Irkutsk State University. Series Political Science and Religion Studies 37: 40–49.
doi:10.26516/2073-3380.2021.37.40.
Fartyshev, A.N. 2018. “Assessment of Political Relations of Geopolitical
Subjects in the Modern World Using A.Wolfers’ ‘Friend-Foe’ Scale.” World
Politics 4 (4): 21–33. doi:10.25136/2409-8671.2018.4.26652.
Hettne, Björn. 2005. “Beyond the ‘new’ Regionalism.” New Political Economy 10
(4): 543–71.
doi:10.1080/13563460500344484/ASSET//CMS/ASSET/AB1611AE-
334C-496F-B2F3-08B2E0E8CAF7/13563460500344484.FP.PNG.
Holsti, K. J. 1963. “The Use of Objective Criteria for the Measurement of
International Tension Levels.” Background 7 (2): 77–95. doi:10.2307/3013638.
Holsti, Ole R. 1962. “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 (3): 244–52.

217
 Fartyshev and Pisarenko

doi:10.1177/002200276200600306/ASSET/002200276200600306.FP.PNG_
V03.
Karaganov, Sergei A. 2024. “An Age of Wars? Article Two. What Is to Be
Done.” Russia in Global Affairs 22 (2): 96–111. doi:10.31278/1810-6374-2024-
22-2-96-111.
Kharkevich, M.V. 2009. “Rogue-States as Images of the ‘Other’ in World
Politics.” Polis. Political Studies 4: 99–110.
Klingberg, Frank L. 1941. “Studies in Measurement of the Relations among
Sovereign States.” Psychometrika 6 (6): 335–52.
doi:10.1007/BF02288590/METRICS.
Kolosov, V. A., ed. 2003. The World by Eyes of Russians: Myths and Foreign Policy.
Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation.
Korytny, L. M. 2021. “Northeast Asia: Delimitation Preconditions,
Composition, Boundaries.” Izvestiya Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk. Seriya
Geograficheskaya 85 (1): 14–23. doi:10.31857/S258755662101009X.
Leifer, Michael. 1974. The Foreign Relations of the New States. Longman Australia.
Lukin, Artyom. 2021. “The Russia–China Entente and Its Future.” International
Politics 58 (3): 363–80. doi:10.1057/S41311-020-00251-7/METRICS.
Nesmashnyi, A. D., V. M. Zhornist, and I. A. Safranchuk. 2022. “International
Hierarchy and Functional Differentiation of States: Results of an Expert
Survey.” MGIMO Review of International Relations 15 (3): 7–38.
doi:10.24833/2071-8160-2022-OLF2.
Okunev, Igor. 2021. Political Geography. Bruxelles: Peter Lang B.
doi:10.3726/b17747.
Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes
And Origins of War. Pittsburgh: Boxwood.
Safranchuk, Ivan A., Alexander D. Nesmashnyi, and Daniil N. Chernov. 2023.
“Africa and the Ukraine Crisis: Exploring Attitudes.” Russia in Global Affairs 21
(3). Foreign Policy Research Foundation: 159–80. doi:10.31278/1810-6374-
2023-21-3-159-180.
Timofeev, I. N. 2023. “Policy of Sanctions in a Changing World: Theoretical
Reflection.” Polis. Political Studies 2 (2): 103–19. doi:10.17976/JPPS/2023.02.08.
Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

218
 Measuring Unfriendliness and Remoteness

Wright, Quincy. 1955. “The Peaceful Adjustment of International Relations:

Problems and Research Approaches.” Journal of Social Issues 11 (1): 3–12.
doi:10.1111/J.1540-4560.1955.TB00300.X.

219
Figure 2: Diagram of the distance between subjects of varying degrees of friendliness and hostility towards Russia, Siberia and the Siberian Federal District
 https://doi.org/10.18485/ipsa_41_15.2024.7.ch12

Stochastic Count Processes and Hypergraph Databases in the Dynamic

Network Analysis of International Visits

Aleksey Domanov1 and Oleg Semenov2

Abstract

The given study applied dynamic topological network analysis with regime shifts to
international visits. Using this quantitative method, we demonstrated, how the degree of
connectivity between various countries has been affected by abrupt changes on the
international arena — like coronavirus pandemics. High-level officials’ visit hypergraphs
were compared between the first and the second quarter of 2020. Hypergraph database
allowed for modeling multilateral meetings sampled from the GDELT project materials.
Transforming them into simplicial and cell complexes allowed for applying a well-
established spatial computing method (one of the techniques employed by topological
data analysts) to international relations. Topological tools revealed key structural features
of pre- and early-Covid networks. Parallel interpersonal channels of communication
decreased in number after the pandemic start, and this regime shift was reflected in the
number of topological features. A “hole” discovered between France, Turkey and Nigeria
suggests emergence of considerable obstacles to communications between their leaders.
According to GDELT database, not only did they interrupt direct personal contacts, but
also no intermediary head of state personally visited all the three countries, hosted their
leaders or met them on a “neutral” territory.

Keywords:

connectivity, Topological Data Analysis, 2-simplex, cell complex, random hypergraph,

persistent homology, coronavirus restrictions, clustering, multilateral summits,
communication.

1 Junior Researcher, Sochava Institute of Geography Siberian, Branch Russian Academy of Sciences;
Research Fellow, Department of European Integration Research, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences
domanov.aleksey@gmail.com
2 Junior Researcher, Sochava Institute of Geography Siberian, Branch Russian Academy of Sciences
wetkidereva@gmail.com
 Domanov and Semenov

Introduction

Fragmenting world politics increases the necessity to provide solid quantitative basis for
analyzing the density of interactions between international actors. Being a trigger of
major readjustment in global connections, Covid-19 pandemics provided researchers with
rich material to understand, what changes in international connectivity resulted from
restrictions related to this virus. We suggest approaching this phenomenon using
topological network analysis.

Hypothesis 1: global connectivity decreased after the beginning of Covid-19 pandemics.

More specifically, we would like to focus on the subnetwork of connections

between 3 following countries.

Hypothesis 2: the connectivity between France, Turkey and Nigeria decreased after the
beginning of Covid-19 pandemics.

The following sections describe our approach to network analysis and a sample selected
from checked GDELT dataset. Furthermore, we compare two networks by a single global
characteristic (representing increased sparsity in international connections around the
world after Covid-19 pandemics start). Besides, connections between 3 specific countries
and other states are characterized using the same networks with transformed edges.

Stochasticity in visits network dynamics

Connectivity between two states could be reflected in the frequency of friendly actions
undertaken by the political elite of one country towards their counterparts abroad - e.g.
visits. Two countries could be regarded as connected, if their leaders met (not only on
their territories, but also in a neutral location). Therefore via these meetings a network of
visits is created, which could have dense connectivity or high sparsity.

Sparse networks could be analyzed within the tradition advanced by Hungarian

mathematician Paul Erdös: as a random graph, where edges between vertices appear with
a certain probability. In the case of international relations these edges could depict
interpersonal ties established or reinforced by politicians – from geographical point of
view, they become contiguous in relative space (moreover, they constitute a space in
mathematical sense without geodesic coordinates).

222
 Stochastic Count Processes and Hypergraph Databases

Randomness in this graph is not only observed spatially, but also temporally. Politicians’
external actions could be generalized as a process including probabilistic events, which
contribute to network density. Therefore the neighborhood of every node and the whole
graph stochastically evolves – edges are added at variable rate in various periods. If the
number of meetings is aggregated by timeslots, it is described as a count process.

This temporal model of contacts between actors theoretically allows for a simultaneous
drop in this frequency of negotiations. At the level of the whole network it could result
in decreased overall connectivity. This effect could have a long-lasting nature: some inertia
from the event, which caused that major reconfiguration, often remains tangible several
months or years after this date. Sometimes observers could register that the system
transitioned to a new mode of operation – underwent a regime shift. It is worth noticing
that not only some values of network nodes could endure changes (e.g., a decrease in the
GDP level due to a crisis), but also edge attributes or weights could be altered, and the
whole network could be rewired

In practice this dynamics of meeting probability could be witnessed at the start of Covid-
19 pandemics, which could accelerate decoupling between key international players. This
divergence could arise from inability to eliminate misunderstandings during personal,
offline contact (which became more difficult to organize because of health restrictions).
Information flow in the network could be hampered, because of disappeared direct
connections: although indirect duplicating circuits of interpersonal communication (visits
of intermediaries) and low-level meetings could remain, actors could withhold sensitive
information for several more months than usual – until it becomes possible to discuss
these issues personally in private.

As for quantitative characteristic of the “regime shift” in focus, meetings network could
become more sparse. Its density could decrease (following the number of edges) and
more messages could be delivered along bridges – intermediaries instead of direct
meetings. The pandemics start could have the disconnection effect depicted on Fig. 1: the
solid, black circuit between 3 partners could be replaced by indirect communications
(dotted contour).

Long-lasting consequences of Covid-19 restrictions make reasons to attempt modeling

this dynamic as a “regime shift”: substantial change of system parameters from one
period to another. This temporal approach resembles difference in differences research
design, widely used for spatial analysis – inside geographic regression discontinuity
algorithms.

223
 Domanov and Semenov

For that purpose the stochastic processes related to political actors were sampled in order
to conduct dynamic comparison between pre-Covid and early-Covid periods. It is worth
noticing, that this “shift” has not been sudden (after 11 March 2020, when the World
Health Organization declared Covid-19 a pandemic, some countries didn’t introduce full
restrictions, and their presidents continued meeting each other). Therefore our network
was divided at the end of March 2020 – into two windows by 3 months (equal periods in
order to avoid unbalanced sampling) for the first quarter 2020 and the second quarter
2020.

Fig. 1. Personal communication channels in parallel to disappeared (dotted) connections between French, Turkish
and Nigerian leaders.

Hypergraph database, simplicial and cell complexes

A dataset, which could be divided into pre- and early-Covid-19 periods, has been
collected by filtering and checking information from the Global Database of Events,
Language and Tone (GDELT project) with the help of our colleagues I. Ivlev, V. Lazereg
and V. Botvinkin. This is a catalog of media materials, which underwent speech
recognition and natural language processing procedures [The GDELT Project].

Our database consisted of individual meetings sampled according to some requirements.

In particular, we were interested only in contacts between heads of state, which occurred
in person (phone calls have also been registered, but not analyzed below).

Information about multiplicity of participants in some summits (multilateral conferences)

should have been accurately reflected in our dataset: otherwise we could lose interesting
patterns related to cumulative qualities of communities and its members – e.g. 3 leaders’
readiness to adjust their schedules for a trilateral meeting rather than having 3 separate
discussions. In order to preserve this multilateral data, it was stored in hypergraph format.

224
 Stochastic Count Processes and Hypergraph Databases

Fig. 2. Fragments of overlapping hyperedges corresponding to summer 2020 multilateral conferences.

Hypergraphs improve upon graph structures in the following way: they allow for
modeling connections between more than two vertices (in our case, multilateral
conferences including more than two state leaders). As hyperedges are not limited to
relations between two vertices (Fig. 2), hypergraphs could demonstrate that, for example,
strong connectivity could exist between NATO governments, judging by their decision to
conduct a roundtable discussion even if Turkish and Greek presidents would prefer not
meeting (bilaterally) some year because of their military tensions.

One could also represent the same multilateral meetings as generalized clique complexes -
simplicial and cell complexes. These are topological structures which could have groups
of vertices belonging to the same hyperedges – n-ary polyhedra. For instance, 2-simplices
for trilateral meetings, other types of cells – for summits with more than 3 participants.

Fig. 3. A network with cell complex.

225
 Domanov and Semenov

This simplicial representation is used (Aktas, Akbas, Fatmaoui, 2019) to focus on

topological invariants of a network. A topological characteristic could be given to the
whole configuration of edges, in particular one could compute the number of holes
between the international links. This procedure is based on the following theoretical
ground.

The topological data analysis (TDA)

This database was analyzed with an emphasis on its topology. One of the methods
suitable for this task is the topological data analysis (TDA). It is reputed for adopting a
holistic perspective on samples: this is made possible by approaching the space
constituted by individual elements.

The TDA regards space as a set of objects with connections between them, and
connections could be defined in abstract terms: any item could be considered close to
another according to the researcher’s choice (following the “axiom of choice” in set
theory), even if they are located 1000 km from each other. These relaxed assumptions
about neighborhood allow for clarifying, how individual units (organized in triplets,
polyhedra and other simplices) structure this space. The TDA formalizes this global
relationship structure, and due to this operationalization a new information about it could
be extracted from particular datasets.

It is worth noticing, that the TDA is a multifunctional tool: it is applied to cases with
established metric distances, or when contiguity between countries is not expressed in
km. Topological perspective presupposes abstracting the network structure – analyzing it
regardless of the vector space, in which it is embedded (e.g. constituted by geophysical
locations of nodes). The TDA attempts at revealing fundamental properties inherent in a
dataset’s shape, looks for phenomena, which are present at different measurement scales.

The existence of these fundamental properties provides a solid methodological ground

for comparison between different spaces. For instance, in the realm of world economy
researchers could be interested in finding similarities between foreign direct investment
network and regional trade blocs: whether the latter tends to structure the former ties.
Topology formalizes resemblance between these graphs by describing similar ways, in
which nodes are wired together in both cases. The TDA also ensures drawing analogies

226
 Stochastic Count Processes and Hypergraph Databases

between large-scale and small networks, because sets with uneven number of objects are
approached in the same manner during the computation process.

Due to its focus on the dataset shape, the TDA is particularly instrumental for dynamic
comparisons. Indeed, various configurations of the same network at different time could
be inspected for major structural changes resulting from external influences or internal
tensions, while disregarding minor distinctions: e.g. related to a change in distances
between objects, if their relative locations remained the same – their order has been
preserved. Therefore the TDA appears to be useful to study the consequences of the
Covid-19 pandemics (regarded as an operator, which reshaped international networks),
and properties of a new early- or post-Covid configurations could be compared against
the parameters of the same system before this major shift.

Moreover, deformation research motivated topologists to specify the properties in

question and focus on phenomena remaining stable under special types of operations –
homeomorphisms. The network features, which are robust against space deformations
are called topological invariants (because they proved to be permutation-invariant). Most
parameters, suggested by mathematicians since Leonhard Euler in 18th century, were
aimed at quantifying the shape of continuous, infinite spaces, especially 3-dimensional
spheres. Numerous invariants were defined for vector spaces as corollaries of theorems
proved on manifolds, where most points did not represent individual isolated objects.
Nevertheless, some of theoretical topological studies are considered applicable not only
to smooth surfaces, but also to relations between discrete entities (for instance, systems
visualized as graphs). Besides, some achievements in the field of continuous spaces could
be transposed to discrete or combinatorial geometry, and further applied to data science
and statistics.

In particular, many topological studies of continuous and discrete spaces share the same
topic: connectivity between points or individual objects. Expanding on observations
made by colleagues studying connection density and graph sparsity, topologists
emphasize, that connectivity or ruptures could be deformation-invariant: some places
could remain unaccessible after network configuration had changed due to a
mathematical operation or an event. Consequently, specific evaluation procedures were
elaborated in order to quantify and compare spaces by their interrelatedness.

Reformulating a problem in topological terms and representing a dataset as a simplicial or

cell complex or a hypergraph makes it possible to discover “handles” and “holes” besides
them. Having defined connections of higher order (e.g. hyperedges “ECOWAS” and “G5
Sahel” are linked with 3 common points), we could go beyond traditional graph measures

227
 Domanov and Semenov

like the minimum cut coefficient. Namely, the TDA is used to find points of
multidimensional (and therefore intensive) communication between nodes – along
handles –, and locate parts of a network lacking important links – where they are replaced
by holes. The number of holes in a dataset could give an idea about the extent, to which
the real network resembles an ideal fully-connected, dense graph. Researchers of
dynamics could also count holes in order to evaluate, how many of these features
disappeared after transformation (e.g. after network reshaping by the Covid pandemics):
planes equivalent to “filled holes” taken into account in one of the earliest coefficients
developed in topology – Euler characteristic/number.

Two TDA approaches to visits network dynamics

This quantitative method consists in looking for connected components including all the
possible combinations of vertices (e.g. 2-simplices – trilateral meetings). Failure to find
high-rank simplices could presuppose the existence of other topological features – holes.
A hole between several meetings – (hyper-)edges of a network – could visualize parallel
channels of communication. International configurations having these duplicating liaison
circuits could have relatively high connectivity, whereas without this intermediaries
(intermediate vertices) governments could have limited ways to exchange opinions). E.g.
German government could get information about Latvian approach to the pandemic by
using two channels:

- indirect (during the bilateral meeting with Kersti Kaljulaid, Estonian president
on 30 June 2020 about the results of Kaljulaid's recent visit to Latvia of 25 June 2020);

- and direct (during personal meting with Krišjānis Kariņš, Latvian prime
minister on 18 July 2020) - to check the information gathered from Estonia.

Having compared the pre-Covid and early-Covid datasets, one could register a loss in the
number of holes-circuits. Only 181 holes remained after the pandemics started, which
could reflect a decrease in connectivity, i.e. confirm hypothesis 1. In particular, there is no
evidence of any personal connection between leaders of any South-East Asian state with
the rest of the world (whereas prior to Covid-19 these countries were fully integrated into
global communications).

Topological data analysis could also be useful to confirm the emergence of

communication barriers between particular actors. For this task the data should be
transformed: these target nodes are separated from the rest, because researchers are

228
 Stochastic Count Processes and Hypergraph Databases

interested in the absence or presence of contacts with these special nodes. Nevertheless,
binary arrays (one for every source node) are inspected for the same topological feature –
hole. In this case its existence could mean that some obstacles prevents all the countries
from reaching all these target states.

As France, Turkey and Nigeria had been selected as target nodes, the dataset was
recalculated into evidence about combinations of target countries, which had been
contacted by other governments during the studied periods. An edge was drawn on Fig. 1,
if, for example, US president contacted only two countries out of the given triple,
hyperedge or 2-simplex – if he met leaders of all the three target states (not necessarily at
a quadrilateral meeting – not only simultaneously between France, Turkey, Nigeria and the
US at the same table).

We were mostly interested in the following configurations: if authorities from this

country had met only one pair of those leaders (so an edge appeared on Fig. 1, for
example between Turkey and Nigeria), but had not reached the remaining third country
(in this case, France). E.g. during the summer of 2020 Lybian government contacted
France and Turkey, but not Nigeria. This fact could suggest some obstacle preventing
Lybians from reaching Nigeria, although Libya is located on the same continent, unlike
France and Turkey.

Unlike the above-mentioned processing of unchanged database, this technique would

demonstrate the existence of a single hole after considering all the countries, which could
theoretically contact France, Turkey and Nigeria. Another calculation method is used: all
the countries’ “French-Turkish”, “Turkish-Nigerian” and “French-Nigerian” edges, as
well as “French-Turkish-Nigerian” hyperedges or 1-simplices are pooled together on the
same triangle (Fig. 1) and the computer finds out, whether this triangle remains empty or
this hole is filled. Theoretically, one could fail to construct this triangle: one or several
edges along its boundary could be absent if no president visited or hosted, e.g. French and
Turkish leader during this period.

This approach has been established a decade ago to deal with accessibility problems - to
check if actors are able to reach some objects (Ghrist et al., 2012; general principles of
this approach were later applied to spatial computing: Derenick, Speranzon, Ghrist,
2013). To our knowledge, this approach has not been used in political geography yet.

Technically, this method presupposes computing persistent homology, which are often
visualized using persistence diagrams. These homological structures appear (are “born”)
during automatic step-by-step reconstruction of the cell complex – at recorded stages of
the layout process. Many features are cancelled out after further steps (e.g. a hole could be

229
 Domanov and Semenov

covered because a “French-Turkish-Nigerian” simplex has been found – like the middle
point on Fig. 4), but some remain for infinite time (“persist” till the upper line on the
diagram).

Therefore our hypothesis 2 would be confirmed, if the topological hole between France,
Turkey and Nigeria remained till the end of our Covid computation, but eventually
disappear (i.e. filled) in pre-Covid case. Fig. 4 and 5 demonstrate that this structure
appeared during processing of both pre-Covid and Covid networks, but remained intact
only for the 2nd quarter of 2020: the diagram for the beginning of 2020 shows, that this
hole was filled (see the “short-lived” middle point) and at the same time a new topological
feature appeared – the simplex which covered that hole (see the highest point).

Fig. 4 and 5. Persistence diagrams visualizing

homology, simplices and holes in two cell complexes around France, Turkey and Nigeria.

This difference between networks means hampered communication between France,

Turkey and Nigeria: not only did their leaders cease direct personal contacts till end
summer of 2020, but also no intermediary head of state personally visited all the three
countries, hosted their leaders or met them on a “neutral” territory. This failure to
maintain trustful connections could prevent governments from exchanging sensitive
information required for globalization and interregional cooperation.

230
 Stochastic Count Processes and Hypergraph Databases

Discussion

In the given study hypergraphs of international high-level visits in the 1st and the 2nd
quarter of 2020 have been compared using topological data analysis. This quantitative
method has been applied to evaluate connections density prior to and after Covid-19
pandemics start.

Hypergraph databases and cell complexes have been used in order to model connections
between more than two states at the same time (e.g. at a multilateral conference). These
topological structures demonstrated, how simplices and holes could give a single dynamic
characteristic to the whole international network and take into account disconnection
(topological “holes”) between 3 or more entities.

Our conclusions about connectivity decrease (both globally and between France, Turkey
and Nigeria) have been derived by interpreting the same algebraic structures (“holes”) in
two opposite ways. For the first task of characterizing the whole network, holes
represented duplicating circuits of communication (so a loss of these intermediated
channels could mean fewer opportunities for sensitive data exchange). As for persistent
homology analysis after database transformation (computation, whether any country
leader established personal connections with all these 3 countries), the same topological
feature represented communication barriers between particular 3 actors.

Acknowledgement:

The research was funded by the Russian Science Foundation (grant №23-77-
10048, https://rscf.ru/en/project/23-77-10048/)

231
 Domanov and Semenov

References

Aktas M., Akbas E., Fatmaoui A., 2019. “Persistence Homology of Networks: Methods
and Applications”. Applied Network Science 4 (61). doi: 10.1007/s41109-019-0179-3.

Derenick J., Speranzon A., Ghrist R., 2013. "Homological Sensing for Mobile Robot
Localization". IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation. IEEE: Karlsruhe,
pp. 572-579, doi: 10.1109/ICRA.2013.6630631, ISSN: 1050-4729.

Ghrist R. et al., 2012. “Topological Landmark-Based Navigation and Mapping”, preprint

https://www2.math.upenn.edu/~ghrist/preprints/landmarkvisibility.pdf. Accessed 25
June 2024.

The GDELT Project. https://www.gdeltproject.org/. Accessed 25 June 2024.

232
CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

327::911.3(083)
911.3:32(082)

INTERNATIONAL workshop on geopolitics and political geography

"Geography, identity, and politics: concepts, theories, and cases in
geopolitical analysis" (2024 ; Budapest)
Proceedings from the 7th International workshop on geopolitics and
political geography "Geography, identity, and politics: concepts, theories,
and cases in geopolitical analysis", Budapest, 11th to 13th of October,
2024 / Nuno Morgado and Mihajlo Kopanja (eds.). - Belgrade : Faculty
of Security Studies, University, 2024 (Belgrade : Čigoja štampa). - V, 232
str. : ilustr. ; 24 cm

Tiraž 100. - Str. I-IV: Introduction / Nuno Morgado. - Napomene i

bibliografske reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija uz svaki rad.

ISBN 978-86-80144-67-2 (FB)

а) Геополитика -- Зборници
б) Политичка географија -- Зборници