TNMA 12.

10/01
First edition

TNMA 12.10/01
First edition
22 November 2022

Risk education for improvised

explosive devices (IED)

Director
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
1 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
USA

E-mail: mineaction@un.org
Telephone: +1 (212) 963 0691

Website: www.mineactionstandards.org

© UNMAS 2022 – All rights reserved

 TNMA 12.10/01
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Warning

This document is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) are subject to regular review and revision, users should consult the IMAS project website
in order to verify its status at (http://www.mineactionstandards.org/, or through the UNMAS website at
http://www.mineaction.org).

Copyright notice

This UN document is an International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) and is copyright protected by the UN.
Neither this document, nor any extract from it, may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by
any means, for any other purpose without prior written permission from UNMAS, acting on behalf of the UN.

This document is not to be sold.

Director
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
1 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
USA

E-mail: mineaction@un.org
Telephone: +1 (212) 963 0691

Website: www.mineactionstandards.org

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Contents

1 Scope ......................................................................................................................................... 1
2 Normative references ............................................................................................................... 1
3 Terms and definitions .............................................................................................................. 1
4 Conflict sensitivity and “do no harm” .................................................................................... 3
5 IED under international legal obligations to provide EORE................................................. 4
6 Design of messaging and material specific to IEDs ............................................................. 5
6.1 General ....................................................................................................................................... 5
6.2 Emphasising safer behaviour ..................................................................................................... 6
6.2.1 General ....................................................................................................................................... 6
6.2.2 Emphasising indicators and signs .............................................................................................. 6
6.2.3 Identifying at-risk behaviours ...................................................................................................... 8
6.3 The implications of “improvisation” for visual presentations....................................................... 8
6.4 Alternatives to relying on pictures of items: other approaches .................................................. 9
6.5 Adapting the IED RE to actual threats........................................................................................ 9
7 Risks related to the delivery of EORE in non-permissive environments ........................... 9
7.1 General ....................................................................................................................................... 9
7.2 Risks to affected communities .................................................................................................... 9
7.3 Risks to EORE (and other agency) teams ............................................................................... 10
7.4 Managing risk to IED RE stakeholders..................................................................................... 10
7.4.1 General ..................................................................................................................................... 10
7.4.2 Modifying the marking message ............................................................................................... 10
7.4.3 Modifying the report message .................................................................................................. 10
7.4.4 Separating IED from standard EORE presentations (where applicable) ................................. 11
7.4.5 Use of alternative RE delivery methods ................................................................................... 11
7.4.6 Communication with parties to a conflict .................................................................................. 11
8 Training requirements for EORE operators ......................................................................... 11
Annex A (normative) References .................................................................................................. 13
Annex B (informative) Risk management for IED risk education .............................................. 14
B.1 General ..................................................................................................................................... 14
B.2 Analysis of the (non-)permissiveness of the context of IED RE programmes ......................... 14
B.2.1 Analysis of the conflict .............................................................................................................. 14
B.2.2 Analysis of IEDs ....................................................................................................................... 14
B.3 Risk assessment ...................................................................................................................... 15
B.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 15
Annex C (informative) Example of IED RE risk assessment flow chart .................................... 17
Annex D (informative) Example research questions for IED RE risk assessment, and threat
analysis and assessment ...................................................................................................... 20
D.1 General ..................................................................................................................................... 20
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D.2 Step one: The risk and threat assessment process ................................................................. 20
D.2.1 General IED situation ............................................................................................................... 20
D.2.2 What is the nature of the IED threat? ....................................................................................... 21
D.2.3 What is the impact of IED on the civilian population? .............................................................. 22
D.2.4 Who is the intended target of IEDs?......................................................................................... 23
D.2.5 What are the common tactics of IED use? ............................................................................... 23
D.2.6 What is the impact of IED on the humanitarian and development actors? .............................. 24
D.3 Step two: The risk evaluation process...................................................................................... 24
D.3.1 What are the risk implications of engaging in IED risk education for the EORE operator? ..... 24
D.3.2 What are the risk implications of participating in IED RE for members of the community? ..... 25
Amendment record ........................................................................................................................... 27

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Foreword

Management practices and operational procedures for mine action are constantly evolving. Improvements
are made, and changes are required, to enhance safety and productivity. Changes may come from the
introduction of new technology, in response to a new explosive ordnance (EO) threat, and from field
experience and lessons learned in other mine action projects and programmes. This experience and lessons
learned should be shared in a timely manner.

Technical Notes for Mine Action (TNMAs) provide a forum to share experience and lessons learned by
collecting, collating and publishing technical information on important, topical themes, particularly those
relating to safety and productivity. TNMAs complement the broader issues and principles addressed in
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

The preparation of TNMAs follows a rapid production and approval process. They draw on practical
experience and publicly available information. Over time, some TNMAs may be “promoted” to become full
IMAS standards, while others may be withdrawn if no longer relevant or if superseded by more up-to-date
information.

TNMAs are neither legal documents nor IMAS. There is no legal requirement to accept the advice provided
in a TNMA. They are purely advisory and are designed solely to supplement technical knowledge or to
provide further guidance on the application of IMAS. TNMAs are published on the IMAS website at
www.mineactionstandards.org.

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Introduction

While, over the past decades, the mine action community has taken major steps towards professionalizing
explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), the increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
affecting civilians poses specific challenges for EORE. The principles and guidance provided for the effective
assessment, planning, implementation, management, monitoring, and evaluation of EORE described in
IMAS 12.10 also apply to risk education for improvised explosive devices (IED RE). However, the latter may
require further considerations.

Some considerations relate to the improvised nature of IEDs, their design and the novel ways in which they
can be employed. Unlike other explosive ordnance (EO), IEDs are generally more difficult to recognize given
the variety of components, designs, emplacements, concealment and employment, and the fact that they
may look like harmless everyday objects. These characteristics may complicate the design of EORE
messages and supporting materials, and the choice of methods for EORE delivery, that will effectively and
efficiently support behaviour change in affected populations.

Other considerations refer to the extent to which the environment permits EORE interventions. Although the
question is not unique to IEDs, it is often the case that contexts with IED contamination are non-permissive
environments. In these cases, IED RE interventions can be perceived by armed groups or armed forces
employing IEDs as an undue interference or as taking sides in a conflict. The improvised nature of IEDs may
also indicate their attribution to one or more specific armed groups or forces. Delivering EORE in such
contexts can result in additional risks to intended beneficiaries, EORE operators and teams. The decision
as to whether and how IED RE can be delivered without resulting in protection risks for the beneficiaries
(that is, risk of reprisals, forced displacement, stigmatization, etc.), requires EORE teams and operators to
undertake a thorough context analysis sensitive to conflict and to diversity factors. such as age, gender and
disability, as well as the implementation of a risk management approach. This supplementary attention is
necessary to ensure that risks to the intended beneficiaries, EORE operators and teams are adequately
identified, assessed and treated.

Whereas humanitarian clearance of EO may require a cessation of the considered conflict, EORE applies
as a legal obligation to protect civilians as per international humanitarian law and international human rights
law (see IMAS 12.10, 4.2). The delivery of EORE can even ultimately facilitate the acceptance of survey and
clearance operations.

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Risk education for improvised explosive devices (IED)

1 Scope

This Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA) is primarily concerned with the provision of risk education for IEDs
(IED RE) to the local population in affected countries.

This TNMA is intended to provide guidance on additional factors to be considered when designing, planning and
conducting IED RE. It is not intended to be a replacement for existing standards for EORE, such as IMAS 12.10.
Rather, it is considered complementary to the general principles and guidance set out in IMAS 12.10, and used
as guidance to address the particular factors that may be present in places where IEDs present a threat to
communities.

In addition to the principles and guidance outlined in IMAS 12.10, this TNMA provides guidance on the design of
the messaging and supporting materials for the development of IED RE. Building on the principles established for
risk management in IMAS 07.14, this TNMA also provides guidance on the management of specific risks to the
intended beneficiaries, EORE teams and operators.

While it is not primarily intended for the provision of safety and security training to the staff of humanitarian
organizations, some of the principles set out in this TNMA may be of use to organizations wishing to provide
appropriate advice to their own personnel.

2 Normative references

A list of normative references is given in Annex A. Normative references are important documents to which
reference is made in this technical note and which form part of the provisions of this technical note.

3 Terms and definitions

A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) series is given in IMAS 04.10.

In the IMAS series, the words “shall”, “should” and “may” are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance:

− “shall” is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform
to the standard. This term is not used in TNMAs, as their contents are purely advisory.

− “should” is used to indicate preferred requirements, methods or specifications; and

− “may” is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.

3.1
explosive ordnance risk education
EORE
activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from explosive ordnance by raising awareness of women, girls,
boys and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles and needs, and to promote behavioural
change
Note 1 to entry: Core activities include public information dissemination, education, and training.

3.2
explosive ordnance risk education operator
EORE operator
any organization, including governmental, non-governmental, civil society organizations (for example, women’s
organizations, youth organizations, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, etc.), commercial entities and military
personnel (including peace-keeping forces), or practitioner, which is responsible for implementing EORE projects
or tasks
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Note 1 to entry: The EORE operator may be a prime contractor, subcontractor, consultant or agent.

3.3
explosive ordnance risk education team
EORE team
element of an organization, however named, that conducts one or more prescribed EORE activities, such as an
EORE needs assessment, public information project, a school-based education project or a community mine
action liaison project evaluation

3.4
explosive ordnance
EO
mine action’s response to the following munitions:
− mines;
− cluster munitions;
− unexploded ordnance;
− abandoned ordnance;
− booby traps;
− other devices (as defined by CCW APII);
− improvised explosive devices
Note 1 to entry: Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) meeting the definition of mines, booby-traps or other devices fall under
the scope of mine action, when their clearance is undertaken for humanitarian purposes and in areas where active hostilities
have ceased.

3.5
improvised explosive device
IED
device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner, incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious,
incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass
Note 1 to entry: They may incorporate military stores but are normally devised from non-military components.

3.6
improvised
in the context of explosive ordnance, improvised is taken to refer to the design, construction and or emplacement
of an item of EO. Such items of explosive ordnance, or components thereof, that are made from materials
available at hand and have one or more of the following characteristics:
− not subject to quality control during manufacture;
− use components not in their original design purpose;
− employed in a manner or a purpose that was not intended in its design.

3.7
booby-trap
any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly
when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act
Note 1 to entry: For the purpose of this TNMA, only explosive booby-traps are covered.

3.8
mine
munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the
presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle

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3.9
anti-personnel mine
mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure
or kill one or more persons

3.10
other devices
manually emplaced munitions and devices, including improvised explosive devices, designed to kill, injure or
damage and which are actuated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time

3.11
firing switch
component of an improvised explosive device that initiates the explosive train

3.12
non-permissive environment
<mine action> operational area during a specified time period where there is a humanitarian need, where access
is not possible, or where consent is not provided by relevant stakeholders, preventing mine action activities to
take place according to the humanitarian principles and within the framework of international humanitarian law
Note 1 to entry: This is the opposite of a permissive environment.

3.13
permissive environment
<mine action> operational area during a specified time period where there is a humanitarian need, where access
remains possible, and where consent is provided by relevant stakeholders, allowing mine action activities to take
place according to the humanitarian principles and within the framework of international humanitarian law
Note 1 to entry: This is the opposite of non-permissive environment.

3.14
risk assessment
overall process comprising a risk analysis and a risk evaluation

3.15
risk analysis
systematic use of available information to identify hazards and to estimate the risk

3.16
risk evaluation
process based on risk analysis to determine whether the tolerable risk has been exceeded

3.17
risk treatment
risk mitigation
risk reduction
selection and implementation of options for addressing risk
Note 1 to entry: The terms ‘risk treatment’, ‘risk mitigation’ and ‘risk reduction’ are synonyms.

4 Conflict sensitivity and “do no harm”

For the purpose of this TNMA, conflict sensitivity is understood as the ability of an organization to understand the
context it operates in, the interaction between its intervention and that context, and to act accordingly in order to
minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impact on the conflict.1

1 The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity, February 2012.

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In order to assess and treat this risk, a conflict sensitive analysis of the environment is required to support a risk
management approach.

As stated in IMAS 12.10, 4.1: “Owing to the nature of the contexts that they work in, EORE operators are required
to work in a conflict-sensitive manner and to take utmost care not to put the community they work in and the
EORE staff, at risk of harm or hardship as a consequence of their interventions. EORE is delivered in line with
the core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.”

As stated in IMAS 12.10, 4.3.5: “All EORE operations should take a conflict-sensitive approach and be
implemented in line with the principles of “do no harm””, as some activities could potentially cause unintentional
harm to beneficiaries, communities or personnel.

5 IED under international legal obligations to provide EORE

As reminded in IMAS 12.10, 4.2, certain international treaties impose legal obligations on States Parties to provide
EORE. The following are particularly relevant for this TNMA: the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II (CCW APII) on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices technically.

The definition of mines, IEDs and booby-traps can overlap as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Overlapping categories of explosive ordnance

A given EO may correspond to several categories. These overlapping categories illustrate the ways in which some
IEDs will fall under the APMBC and some under the CCW, obligating the States Parties to provide IED RE.

The relevance of the international treaties to the obligation to provide risk education further depends on three
main factors:

− the nature of the explosive device, in particular the firing switch and the method of emplacements (for
example, manual emplacement of an explosive device actuated by remote control);

− the activity of the victim or its interaction with explosive ordnance (for example, performing an apparently
safe act, a daily act of living);

− the nature of the location (for example, a civilian object).

Below are some examples:

− Explosive ordnance that are actuated due to the presence, proximity or contact of a person fall under the
definition of a mine regardless of their improvised nature. Such explosive ordnance is subject to EORE
under the APMBC.

− Explosive ordnance that are deliberately placed to cause direct victims when an apparently harmless object
is disturbed, or a normally safe act is performed fall under the definition of a booby-trap under CCW APII.
They also fall under the definition of an anti-personnel landmine under the APMBC. Such explosive
ordnance is subject to EORE.
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− IEDs that are manually emplaced, designed to kill, injure or damage, and which are actuated manually, by
remote control or automatically after a lapse of time fall under the definition of other devices as per CCW
APII. If such explosive devices are directed against civilians or have the potential to result in incidental harm
to civilians, such IEDs may be subject to EORE according to CCW APII. For example, an IED emplaced in
a vehicle that is driven to detonate against civilians can fall under this category.

To determine if IEDs fall under relevant international treaties in a given context, it is essential to conduct an
analysis of the threat to civilians. In most cases, the analysis is based on past incidents. Accessing data directly
indicating the type of explosive ordnance, especially, the type of firing switch is not always possible or consistent.
In addition to information regarding the technical nature of the IED, collecting data on the circumstances of the
incidents – for example, what was the activity of the victim at that moment, were they on foot or on a vehicle –
can help to determine whether the explosive ordnance falls under one of the above categories. In addition, in the
case of “other devices”, the technical nature of a firing switch, for example a command wire or a timer, is not
sufficient to determine whether it falls under the obligation to deliver EORE. Data should demonstrate that civilians
are targeted or are at risk of incidental damage.

Beyond the obligations of State Parties under the above-mentioned treaties, during armed conflicts regulated by
the international humanitarian law, civilians and civilian objects are protected under the principle of distinction. It
is the right of civilians to be protected from EO that cause them harm. If civilians are victims of EO, be it due to
lack or absence of discrimination, or deliberate targeting, they have a right to receive specific risk education.

The national mine action authority (NMAA), or the organization acting on its behalf, should facilitate the access to
such data. In particular, the NMAA should facilitate the exchange of information between organizations conducting
clearance and disposal of IEDs and EORE operators. It is not the role of EORE operators and teams to collect
and analyse physical technical data. In no case should they try to do so.

6 Design of messaging and material specific to IEDs

6.1 General

National authorities and EORE operators should base their projects on an EORE needs assessment. The purpose
of an EORE needs assessment is to:

− identify, analyse and prioritize the local EO risks;

− assess the capacities and vulnerabilities of the women, girls, boys and men in the affected communities
and other stakeholders; and

− determine the options for conducting EORE (see IMAS 12.10, Clause 5).

National authorities and EORE operators should gather sufficient information to:

− gain as accurate as possible an understanding of the extent of the EO threat and its impact;

− understand the prevalence/scale of unsafe behaviour; and

− understand the reasons for risk taking (see IMAS 12.10, 4.3.3).

This information should help to determine the location of hazardous areas and the impact and threats posed by
EO on the civilian population. This is essential to raise awareness of the risk and to promote safer behaviour. As
with any EO and in line with IMAS 12.10, IED RE operators and teams should design their messaging around
promoting safe behaviours and addressing barriers to adopting these behaviours. It should take into account
gender, age, disability, socio-economic status and other relevant diversity factors identified during the needs
assessment.

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In IMAS 07.14 Risk Management in Mine Action2 , Annex C tools to support the macro analysis and to assess the
local threat are presented.

Where several operators deliver EORE, including IED RE, in the same context, they should ensure a common
analysis. The NMAA or its Mine Action Center (or the organization acting on its behalf) should facilitate the access
to data and information supporting this analysis. The NMAA should facilitate the exchange of information between
EORE operators and organizations clearing IEDs.

Subclause 6.2 provides further guidance to raise awareness and to promote safer behaviour in contexts where
IEDs affect communities.

6.2 Emphasising safer3 behaviour

6.2.1 General

The key is to promote safer behaviour based on the local characteristic of the threat and on the knowledge and
behaviours of the different groups within the communities.

The risk from EO to persons results from the combination of three associated factors (see TNMA 07.14/01:2020,
Figure 5). An explosive hazard must be present at a certain time and at a location where an activity capable of
interacting with the hazard is taking place or will take place. This activity is related to demographic characteristics
such as socio-economic profile, age, gender, etc.

This can be applied to IEDs as illustrated in Figure 2. The development of IED RE messaging should be based
on the analysis of these factors as developed in 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. The understanding of these three factors in a
given context is essential to the development of IED RE messaging.

Figure 2 – Three factors essential to the development of IED RE messaging

6.2.2 Emphasizing indicators and signs

IED RE should focus on all the indicators and signs suggesting the presence of IEDs in a particular context. Based
on the analysis of trends and patterns of use of IEDs in the targeted area, context and period of time, IED RE
messaging should focus on providing information that emphasizes safer behaviour rather than focusing on
technical components of IEDs that detract the audience from the main messaging requirement. Whereas it may

2IMAS 07.14, Edition 1, Risk Management in Mine Action, Annex C, Threat Analysis and Threat Assessment in
Environments Affected by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
3 Safe or safer? Communities at risk are likely to already have developed coping mechanisms to mitigate the existing risks but
may need additional support to adopt safer behaviour. In addition, in some contexts, risk education contributes to reducing the
risks but is not sufficient to guarantee the absence of risks.

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be relevant to train peacekeepers or other security providers on functioning, design and components of IEDs, it
is suggested that this is not the appropriate way to approach IED RE.

Messages should be clear (no use of technical jargon), simple (no information that does not contribute to the
development of safer behaviour), realistic (it is based on the capacities of the beneficiaries) and practical (clear
advice is proposed to the beneficiaries). EORE operators and teams should avoid overburdening the target
audience with unnecessary technical information.

Figure 3 – Different types of explosive ordnance

Only technical information supporting safer behaviour should be part of IED RE. In Figure 3, the mines on the left
side can each be considered as one device for EORE messaging. The mine of an improvised nature on the right
side has four potentially visible elements that can be explained in IED RE: a container, wires, a wrapped battery
and a wrapped pressure plate. These elements are potentially emplaced in the very same place, or not. In some
instances, one or several elements are partially or completely visible. Note that this picture is not an example of
visual presentation for EORE. On that topic, refer to 6.3.

EORE operators should describe signs and clues indicating the potential presence of an IED in a given
environment (see GICHD’s 2021 IED indicators and ground sign awareness handbook, for more details and
examples of signs and clues). The identification of such clues and signs should be facilitated by the NMAA (or the
organization acting on its behalf) and any humanitarian coordination system. Other actors, such as mine action
organizations conducting land release operations and EOD spot tasks, may contribute to this analysis.

The analysis of events helps to determine which types of terrain features are more prone to the emplacement of
IEDs. Specific points of the terrain where it is particularly advantageous to emplace an IED are also known as
vulnerable points. Such analysis supports the identification by IED RE beneficiaries of terrain features that indicate
the possibility of the presence of one or several IEDs.

The analysis of the design of IEDs and the methods of emplacement support the identification of signs left on the
ground by the perpetrators, for example, disturbed soil or aiming marker. In addition, the components used for
the design of IEDs are sometimes visible and constitute a sign such as a wire or a battery.

The analysis of trends and patterns can also support the identification of other changes to the environment that
call attention to the possible presence of an IED (sometimes summarized as “presence of abnormal, absence of

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normal”). It can be an object that is out of context such as a seemingly abandoned bag, container or an unknown
vehicle.

The dates and times of incidents should also be analysed. Within a particular context, the likelihood of
encountering IED can change during specific periods, moments or occasions. For example, this likelihood can be
higher during specific hours, days, seasons or events, such as security operations.

6.2.3 Identifying at-risk behaviours

In conjunction with the above, it is essential to identify the specific vulnerabilities of the different groups within the
affected communities.

Needs assessments for IED RE should also be based on reporting and analysis of incidents and information on
direct victims of EO, also denoted as casualties, and with the participation of at-risk-communities. It aims to identify
the most at-risk areas and periods, the most at-risk groups and the most at-risk behaviours and activities.

If feasible, setting up an ongoing injury surveillance system that includes IED-related direct victims will support
this analysis. At a minimum, the collection of data should focus on direct victims. The NMAA, any organization
acting on its behalf, or the humanitarian coordination system, should facilitate the collation and exchange of such
information. Since patterns can evolve quickly through time and space, it is essential to monitor and analyse local
trends, their incidence on the population and to review the needs assessments accordingly.

In addition to the analysis of direct victim data, EORE needs assessments should also seek to understand
prevalent behaviours in the area of operations for different target groups in a manner sensitive to factors such as
age, gender, disability and diversity, as well as displacement and conflict dynamics. This enables EORE operators
to identify the risk of interaction between civilians and IEDs as well as with other EO. It will help to identify activities,
behaviours and their drivers4 which increase this risk. In addition to the minimum data requirements,5 the NMAA
and the EORE operators should focus on the circumstances leading to the events: why the victims were at the
accident site, what they were doing and what were the reasons for doing this.

EORE operators may further look into specific dynamics inducing accrued risks to people. This can be the case
of displacements and return dynamics.

6.3 The implications of “improvisation” for visual presentations

One of the most common methods for transmitting information in EORE is visual presentation, particularly through
the use of images of EO as an aid for the recognition of dangerous objects. However, improvisation based on the
builder’s imagination being a key attribute of IEDs, many items normally used on a daily basis, especially for
domestic purposes, can be utilized to design IEDs, to disguise their true nature and/or to conceal them: clocks,
batteries, wires, plastic containers, pressure cookers, bags, suitcase, cellphones, toys, etc. Whereas
manufactured EO are most often clearly recognizable due to their shape, colour and size, this is often not the
case for IEDs. Because they are often composed of objects present in daily life, there is also a risk of confusion.

Whereas images of IEDs are still needed to raise awareness, these are not sufficient to help identify an IED.
Furthermore, such an approach could be counter-productive in either encouraging large numbers of false alarms,
or damaging the credibility of the IED RE materials.

Nevertheless, when and where analysis shows that, within a particular context, many IEDs are of the same type
or used in the same manner, it may make sense to depict the IEDs using pictures, drawings or videos focusing
on the “abnormal”, for example, wires coming out of a jerrycan.

EORE operators should monitor the images they use against the evolution of the threat of IED. The images should
reflect the local nature of IEDs. EORE operators should use images reflecting the local nature of IEDs. EORE
operators should update the images to reflect the present nature of IEDs.

4 For more details and examples, you can read the Behavioural Drivers Models, V. Petit, UNICEF.2019:
https://www.unicef.org/mena/reports/behavioural-drivers-model
5 IMAS 05.10 Information management, Annex B Minimum Data requirements

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EORE operators may use images of IEDs to raise awareness but should not articulate the development of safer
behaviour around images of EO only. There are alternatives to relying on pictures of items.

After gaining a thorough understanding of the circumstances under which IEDs are employed and of the local
behaviours developed in 6.1, EORE operators may present images of these circumstances (similar to
presentation of “mine indicators/clues”) and then provide visuals of actions to avoid such circumstances (that is,
“safer behaviour” advice).

6.4 Alternatives to relying on pictures of items: other approaches

Small media (like posters and leaflets) encourage the use of pictures of items due to their size and layout.
Therefore, in IED RE it is suggested to promote safer behaviour through alternative media, such as oral
storytelling, songs or theatre. Storytelling can easily be combined with pictures of safer behaviour, for example.
The use of radio or, at least, borrowing from radio techniques, is another variation of oral storytelling. Writers for
radio inevitably have to rely on mental images in a medium which does not use pictures.

6.5 Adapting the IED RE to actual threats

Patterns of IED use are often fluid. They can be both highly localized and change rapidly in areas of concern.
Messages and supporting materials can be relevant to a place and moment but less relevant in another place and
through time. In order to adapt IED RE to actual risks in a given area, the NMAA and EORE operators should
constantly monitor trends and review threat analysis, threat assessments and needs assessments, including
ongoing injury surveillance. The NMAA, or any organization acting on its behalf, or the humanitarian coordination
system, and EORE operators should constantly review these documents. They may liaise with other organizations
dealing with IED to facilitate the monitoring of the threat. They should maintain the engagement with affected
communities to monitor the behaviours.

Regarding supporting materials, digital and radio campaigns, where applicable, offer advantages as they allow
for quick adaptation. If printed materials are used, then EORE operators should avoid printing too much surplus
stock.

7 Risks related to the delivery of EORE in non-permissive environments

7.1 General

The NMAA, or organization acting on its behalf, and the EORE operators should pay special attention to
messaging and risk management in the context of ongoing and protracted conflicts, whether or not they are of
international nature.

In addition to the risks posed to themselves, the NMAA and the EORE operators should assess the risks of
unintended adverse impact posed to the potential beneficiaries in order to carefully select the options to treat
these risks.

7.2 Risks to affected communities

Three common elements of EORE messaging are:

1) IED awareness and recognition. How to recognize the threat and the dangerous areas (see Clause 6).

2) Promoting safer behaviour (see Clause 6 also). This is generally articulated around the following main
messages:

a) “Stay away from hazardous areas and suspicious objects”;

b) “Do not touch, do not approach suspicious objects”;

c) “Emplace warning signs to indicate the presence of suspicious objects” is sometimes included.

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3) Reporting.

Including a “marking” and a “reporting” element to RE can lead to risks for intended beneficiaries in environments
that are not fully permissive. One key aspect of a “do no harm” approach to IED RE should include consideration
of the implications to the security of local populations if they are being exhorted to mark and report EO currently
in use by parties to the conflict. In particular, the NMAA and the EORE operators should assess the risk of reprisal
if IED and other EO are marked or reported to authorities.

7.3 Risks to EORE (and other agency) teams

There are similar risks to the EORE operators and teams who are attempting to deliver EORE interventions,
especially but not only where the “report” message is included. In such circumstances, and regardless of the type
of EO, the EORE personnel (and potentially, by extension, other personnel working with this EORE operator) may
also be at risk from reprisals, as it may be felt that they are taking sides with one party to the conflict.

The EORE operators and teams should carefully assess these risks. If the EORE operators consider a
collaboration with local partners to relay EORE, then the EORE operators should involve these local partners in
the risk assessment to inform the decision.

7.4 Managing risk to IED RE stakeholders

7.4.1 General

The circumstances that may apply in any one country, or even in any one community are very variable. Thus, it
is impossible to lay down any immutable advice on the best way to apply the principle of “do no harm” and continue
to provide IED RE that is effective in modifying behaviour, hence reducing the number of victims. A more detailed
risk assessment process is set out in Annexes C and D. There are however a few alternatives that can be
considered.

7.4.2 Modifying the marking message

Affected communities sometimes improvise markers and signs to warn the community of the presence of an EO
or of a hazardous area (see IMAS 08.40 on informal marking systems). In some cases, indicating the position of
IED with markers and signs can put the community at risk of reprisals. It is still vital that the information concerning
the presence of IED is passed among the at-risk communities in an inclusive manner. The at-risk communities
may be better placed to elaborate their own warning mechanisms with the support of EORE operators which have
the technical understanding of the design of IEDs.

As part of the needs assessment and monitoring of IED RE, EORE operators should engage with at-risk
communities on the issue of marking. The NMAA and EORE operators, in close coordination with at-risk
communities, should assess the risk associated with improvised marking of EO and elaborate mechanisms to
warn and exclude the population from hazardous areas. Such mechanisms should take into account marginalized
groups to be inclusive. Security institutions and parties to the conflict may be included in the elaboration of these
mechanisms.

If the contamination in the area contains EO other than IED, the NMAA and EORE operators should agree on the
overall marking messaging.

7.4.3 Modifying the report message

In some circumstances the use of a confidential or anonymous reporting system might be sufficient to help with
safe reporting. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to suggest that they report any such items to their own
community leaders, who may be better placed to identify alternative solutions, rather than advising beneficiaries
to report suspected IEDs to the security forces. Instead of formal reporting, communities may be encouraged to
warn their family members, trusted neighbours and community members on the known or suspected presence of
IEDs.

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As part of the needs assessment and monitoring of EORE, EORE operators should engage with at-risk
communities on the issue of reporting. The NMAA (or organization acting on its behalf) and EORE operators
should elaborate reporting mechanisms in close coordination with at-risk communities. These reporting
mechanisms should take into account marginalized groups to be inclusive. Security institutions and parties to the
conflict may be included in the elaboration of reporting mechanisms.

7.4.4 Separating IED from standard EORE presentations (where applicable)

It may be appropriate to separate IED RE from other EORE messaging in conflictual contexts where IEDs are
being used.

Such a decision should be informed by the analysis of the conflict. This analysis should indicate if any party to the
conflict, especially parties using IEDs, would consider IED RE as contravening their objectives, being illegitimate
or even directed against them. For example, in some cases, the analysis could indicate that civilians are
deliberately targeted by IEDs.

As a result of such analysis, the NMAA (or organization acting on its behalf) and EORE operators may not include
IED RE messaging in EORE. Alternatively, they may conduct separate IED RE messaging.

When doing so, EORE operators and teams should maintain their neutrality and not stigmatize specific sides of
the conflict only, nor refer to combatants. Breaching neutrality of the messaging increases risks to the communities
and to the EORE operators and teams.

In addition, EORE operators may consider not including their own names or logos in IED RE messaging. They
should also confirm if donors and partnering organizations want to be visible or not. It also may be appropriate for
the relevant national authority to “own” the messaging.

The analysis of the nature of IED incidents could indicate that some IEDs, such as vehicle-borne or person-borne
IEDs, are used similarly to other forms of explosive weapons attacks, such as aerial bombardment or shelling.
The NMAA (or organization acting on its behalf) and EORE operators may consider including specific messaging
in larger programmes designed to improve preparedness, build resilience and enhance protection of civilians
against explosive weapons. Such programmes would require a thorough conflict-sensitivity analysis as described
in 4 and may include diverse safety measures such as basic first aid or fire safety.

7.4.5 Use of alternative RE delivery methods

When the environment does not permit the EORE operator to directly access beneficiaries, the use of mass media
campaigns and/or digital technologies may be considered. EORE operators may also consider the implementation
through local partners provided that a joint risk assessment has been conducted, and that risk treatment measures
are identified and accepted. Equally, such partnership should be conflict-sensitive. All these approaches have
advantages and disadvantages.

In case of implementation through local partners, the NMAA (or the organization acting on its behalf) and EORE
operators should ensure the transfer of competence through training.

7.4.6 Communication with parties to a conflict

In particular contexts and where appropriate, the NMAA, or the organization acting on its behalf, and/or the EORE
operators may seek to communicate with parties to a conflict to gain acceptance of IED RE.

When conducting IED RE, the NMAA and EORE operators should develop clear security protocols, including
guidelines on what to do if a party to the conflict questions the EORE operators and EORE teams about the
activities being conducted.

8 Training requirements for EORE operators

It can be seen from these issues that there are additional training requirements for engaging in safe and effective
IED RE. This additional knowledge does not replace but completes the competences needed to deliver EORE
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and to operate as safely as possible. Whereas the following additional training requirements are suggested as a
minimum, specific circumstances may require more training. As for any EORE, there is no need to provide
exhaustive and detailed technical training on IED components and construction for strict IED RE purposes. As a
prerequisite, EORE teams should be thoroughly trained in the humanitarian nature of their job and the associated
humanitarian principles to follow. Suggested minimum additional knowledge requirements are as follows.

1) Circumstances of use

− Define IEDs.

− Know how IEDs tend to be used in the affected country and in the targeted area.

2) IED indicators/ground sign and situational awareness

− Explaining where IEDs are likely to be encountered.

− Explaining signs suggesting the presence of IEDs.

− Explaining circumstances under which IEDs are likely to be encountered.

3) Introduction of different types of IEDs

− Recognize and name typical components of IEDs.

− Break down by types of firing switch: time/victim/command.

− Know IED acronyms (VOIED, VBIED, PBIED, etc.).

− Describe level of technical details relevant to IED RE.

4) Notion of permissive/non-permissive environments

− Explain the notions of permissive/non-permissive environment and their implications for IED RE.

− Explain the importance of the core humanitarian principles.

− Explain the importance of conflict-sensitivity and “do no harm”.

− Point out similarities and differences with other forms of EORE, if relevant.

− Explain which messages are acceptable and which are not.

− Explain the reporting issues where these are relevant.

5) Risk assessment

− Fully involve EORE teams in the risk assessment process as part of their training, so that they are
comfortable with the conclusions.

− Explain the need to be aware of their own safety and that this is a core part of the approach being
taken.

− Explain how to introduce the subject to local communities and leaders and seek local approval of the
training before it is provided, especially during active hostilities.

− Assess whether it is appropriate to implement IED RE together with other EORE interventions. See
Annexes B, C and D.

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Annex A
(normative)

References

The following normative documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions
of this TNMA. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or revisions of, any of these publications do not
apply. However, parties to agreements based on this TNMA are encouraged to investigate the possibility of
applying the most recent editions of the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest
edition of the normative document referred to applies.

[1] IMAS 04.10, Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations

[2] IMAS 05.10, Information management for mine action

[3] IMAS 07.14, Risk management in mine action

[4] IMAS 08.40, Marking of explosive ordnance hazards

[5] IMAS 12.10, Explosive ordnance risk education

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Annex B
(informative)

Risk management for IED risk education

B.1 General

When considering the delivery of IED RE, this annex highlights specific considerations to be incorporated in risk
management processes and tools described in IMAS 07.14 Risk Management in Mine Action.

This annex establishes additional guidance to assess if delivering IED RE would possibly result in accrued threats
and opportunities for EORE operators and intended beneficiaries. This guidance applies to processes and tools
described in IMAS 07.14, especially its Annex C Threat Analysis and a Threat Assessment in Environments
Affected by IED.

It is important to conduct and review risk assessments:

— at different levels to include the national level and the micro-level (IED RE project level);

— periodically and at moments when there is a major change to the context.

B.2 Analysis of the (non-)permissiveness of the context of IED RE programmes

B.2.1 Analysis of the conflict

Like for any EORE intervention in a conflictual context, it is essential to identify and analyse:

− the sources of tensions, the causes and deep roots of the conflict;

− the stage of the conflict (for example, escalating or de-escalating);

− the actors of the conflict (for example, who they are, which are their main interests, goals or positions).

If the area affected by the presence of IED is no longer subjected to an ongoing conflict, then including IED in RE
possibly represents no additional risk for the beneficiaries, EORE teams and operators.

If the area is subjected to an ongoing conflict, it is possible that the inclusion of IED RE within EORE, results in
additional risks to the implementing EORE operator, EORE teams and beneficiaries. These risks include
retaliation from parties to the conflict.

For a given country, it is possible that the status of the conflict differs from an area to another, that is, active in
one area and finished in another area. It is also possible that the status of a conflict changes over time. Thus, the
status of a conflict should be determined.

B.2.2 Analysis of IEDs

It is essential to identify and analyse the impact of IED on civilians in conjunction with:

− their technical nature;

− the wider context of the conflict; and

− its actors.

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It is important to determine how and why the civilian population is impacted by IEDs. For example, it is important
to determine if some actors of the conflict deliberately target civilians.

Additional steps also need to be undertaken in the form of a risk assessment taking into account intended
beneficiaries, EORE teams and operators. These additional steps are as follows.

B.3 Risk assessment

The above should support the assessment of risks related to the delivery of IED RE under current and local
circumstances. It includes risks to:

− EORE operators and teams;

− intended beneficiaries;

− partners and other stakeholders;

− EORE programming.

These risks include:

− security risks to EORE staff, equipment and premises;

− similar risks to partners and other stakeholders;

− confidence of communities towards EORE operators and teams;

− access for/to EORE.

For each risk, it is necessary to assess:

− the likelihood, proximity and impact;

− if these risks are tolerable;

− appropriate risk treatment options (see Clause 6);

− the residual risk and its tolerability for any risk treatment option.

B.4 Methodology

The above analysis should involve a combination of different methods to include the following:

− data analysis;

− desk research;

− consultations with communities;

− workshops with EORE stakeholders and other relevant actors, such as IED clearance operators.

Additional methods may be employed, for example, surveys or expert interviews.

The NMAA (or the organization acting on its behalf) should involve EORE operators in the identification
information requirements (see IMAS 05.10, 7.2).

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Examples of detailed questions to support the risk assessment are presented in Annex D. It is recommended that
the questions in Annex D be used as part of the risk assessment (and subsequent risk reviews), and the answers
gained from the questionnaire then used in turn to help navigate the flow chart in Annex C.

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Annex C
(informative)

Example of IED RE risk assessment flow chart

IMAS 07.14, Annexes B and C, provide detailed guidance on risk management tools, threat analysis and threat
assessment in environments affected by IEDs. This annex proposes an application of these tools for the purpose
of IED RE programming.

It is essential that products of these tools and processes are collated in a risk register, closely monitored and
reviewed in a dynamic and responsive manner, especially in highly complex and fast developing environments.

It is also essential to establish clear criteria concerning the tolerability of risks for the intended beneficiaries, the
EORE teams and operators.

At the level of EORE operators, these criteria may generally be well established and understood. With regard to
the “do-no-harm” principle, it is essential to involve intended beneficiaries in the risk management process.

Desktop reviews of available information as well as community liaison support this process.

The first step aims to understand the context, assess the need for IED RE and determine if the environment is
permissive or non-permissive.

The second step aims to determine the risks to the intended beneficiaries, EORE teams and operators if IED RE
is delivered.

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* Risk treatment options include:

– avoiding the risk: for example, not undertaking EORE;
– removing the risk source: for example, through access negotiations or indirect RE methodologies;
– changing the likelihood: for example, separating IED from standard EORE;
– changing the consequences: for example, modifying or removing the report message;
– sharing the risk: for example, using local partners;
– accepting the risk.

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Annex D
(informative)

Example research questions for IED RE risk assessment, and threat

analysis and assessment

D.1 General

When considering the delivery of RE for IED, this annex proposes questions to be incorporated in risk
management processes and tools described in IMAS 07.14, especially in its Annex C. Concerning needed data,
IMAS 05.10, Annex B, provides guidance on minimum requirement, and IMAS 05.10, 7.2, provides guidance on
the specification of information requirements.

D.2 Step one: The risk and threat assessment process

D.2.1 General IED situation

The following questions are intended to complement a general security/mine action briefing on the IED situation
in the country.

The risk implications of engaging in IED data-collection or risk education are significant in a context where the
IEDs are actively employed by parties to the conflict. Therefore, it is essential to carefully analyse available data
to assess whether the IEDs are currently employed or a result of past conflict. This analysis shall be carried out
at a national but also more local level as the context requires.

Question examples Explanation How can the question be answered?

1.1 How does the Compile evidence on the relative Analysis of IMSMA data, injury
incidence and importance of IEDs. This may help to surveillance systems and other data
prevalence of IED use ultimately balance the decision as to collection mechanisms (for example,
compare to that of whether to deliver IED RE or not. M&E Mechanism for the UN Mine
other weapons? Action Strategy; Monitoring and
Reporting Mechanism on grave
violations affecting children)
1.2 Which are the parties It is important to identify the different Mapping of different parties to the
to the conflict known parties to the conflict or armed forces conflict; people with knowledge (PwK)
to use IEDs? that use IEDs, because they will not all interviews; secondary data research
be using them in the same way. The
subsequent analysis should be carried
out keeping in mind the different parties
to the conflict and how that impacts the
other research questions.
1.3 Why are parties to the IEDs can be used for different reasons, PwK interviews; secondary data
conflict using IED? for example, to create terror among the research
local population, to challenge state
control of certain areas, in cases where
parties to the conflict do not have access
to other weapons, as a substitute of
small arms, as command-detonated
devices to secure security forces
positions
1.4 Who is currently It is important to identify who is already Mapping of different state, commercial,
involved in efforts working to reduce the risks of IEDs. security providers, UN and NGO actors
against IEDs? involved in IED risk reduction.
1.5 What is the scope of The agency should aim to supplement
their activities? not duplicate activities of other actors,
depending on the need.

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1.6 Are the IEDs currently If parties to the conflict using IEDs Write up the analysis of PwK interviews
used by parties to the consider it to be a legitimate means, they and secondary research.
conflict? may want to oppose IED RE or to restrict Claims by perpetrators of IED use.
IED RE.
1.7 Is there any current If there is a current target for IEDs, then Open and non-open-sourced data,
target for the IEDs? they are considered an element of an PwK interviews
ongoing conflict.
1.8 Are there differences Even in the case of an ongoing conflict, it Conflict and IED maps
between geographic is possible to consider IED RE activities
locations in-country in in the areas where active hostilities have
terms of whether the ceased or remote IED RE where active
IEDs can be hostilities are ongoing
considered as being
currently employed or
remnants?

D.2.2 What is the nature of the IED threat?

Using the working definitions described previously, an analysis should be carried out to determine whether the
bulk of the problem is with booby-traps or other improvised mines, or with specific types of command detonated
IED (VBIED, PBIED, road-side bomb, time bomb, etc.).

Question examples Explanation How can the question be answered?

2.1 What is the overall This should include data for all types of If available, the data should be provided
number of incidents IED to give the scale of the problem for IED use over time. Ideally it should
involving IEDs in- overall. be disaggregated by year to show
country? whether IED use is increasing or
decreasing.
Sources of information include: open
source database, specialized agencies
to include humanitarian ones, IMSMA
data, national injury surveillance
systems, internal incident mapping, etc.
2.3 What are the categories Comparing these pieces of information Provide analysis and charts of any
of switches employed with information on the direct victims recent data to demonstrate the
(victim-operated, will help to establish the relationship percentage of different types of devices
command-operated, between the nature of IEDs and their being used.
time, combination)? impact on civilians. IED maps; open-source database,
What are their relative These pieces of information will also specialised agencies to include
numbers and support the elaboration of awareness humanitarian ones; IMSMA data.
percentages? and messaging tailored according to Sources of information include open-
2.4 Are victim-operated specific risks. source database, specialized agencies
IEDs designed to be to include humanitarian ones, IMSMA
antipersonnel or anti- data, UN verified data from the
vehicle or both? Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
on Grave Violations against Children in
2.5 What are the methods to Situations of Armed Conflict, other M&E
deliver IEDs (emplaced mechanisms internal incident mapping,
or carried to the target)? etc.
2.6 What is the If IEDs are used by parties to the If no good quality data is available on
geographical and time conflict in one location, but IED the nature of IED use, this should be
distribution for each of remnants pose a threat in another noted in the analysis.
these categories? location no longer under conflict, it may
be necessary to consider different
types of IED RE.
The geographical and time distribution
of IED can also be used to promote
safer behaviours.

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D.2.3 What is the impact of IED on the civilian population?

Question examples Explanation How can the question be

answered?
3.1 What is the overall percentage of This helps to provide evidence for the Sources of information
civilians among direct victims of extent to which the civilian population include: open-source
IEDs? is at risk from IEDs. database, specialized
agencies to include
3.2 How does the number of civilian This will provide evidence of whether humanitarian ones, IMSMA
victims from IEDs compare to that IEDs or other weapons have greater data, national injury
of those from other weapons? humanitarian impact. surveillance systems, internal
3.3 For each category of IED defined in This will support the decision incident mapping, etc.
Clause 3, what is the percentage concerning the delivery and the Gender and diversity analysis.
and the number of civilian direct content of IED RE.
victims?
3.4 What is the geographical and time The risks possibly vary from an area
distribution for these direct victims? to another and through time. This
information will support the design
and the delivery of IED RE tailored
according to specific risks.
3.5 Are specific groups (age, gender, This will support the design and the
disability, ethnicity, political belief delivery of IED RE tailored according
and practices, language, socio- to specific risks.
economic occupation, etc.) Even when they are not the primary
particularly impacted? target of IED, civilians often represent
the highest number of direct victims
from being in the wrong place at the
wrong time (“collateral damage”). The
EORE operator might be able to
provide IED RE in these
circumstances, but additional steps
also need to be undertaken to
complete the risk analysis.
3.6 Are there evidence or reasonable This will help to determine or to Sources of information
indications of civilians being assess whether parties to the conflict include: open-source
deliberately targeted with IEDs (that using IED would oppose or restrict the database, specialized
is, claims)? Are specific groups delivery of IED RE. agencies to include
(age, gender, disability, ethnicity, humanitarian ones, IMSMA
political belief and practices, data, national injury
language, socio-economic surveillance systems, internal
occupation, etc.) particularly incident mapping, etc.
targeted? Public claims by parties to the
conflict using IED, analysis of
the conflict.
3.7 Why would the civilian population or It is necessary to understand the logic Analysis of the conflict.
specific groups of the civilian or the motivation behind why one
population be targeted with IEDs? group or another is targeted.
3.8 What are the common scenarios in This helps to understand which is the Provide analysis of any recent
which civilians are killed or injured primary target; data to demonstrate the
during IED incidents? − bystanders who are killed in the percentage of attacks against
initial blast; different targets.
− being caught in gunfire following Sources of data include open-
an explosion; source database, specialized
agencies to include
− being caught in a secondary blast, humanitarian ones, IMSMA,
etc. Injury surveillance systems,
3.9 Are there any specific places where In some countries where civilians are database, etc.
the local population are most at risk the direct targets, they will typically be
from IED attacks? Why? most at risk in places such as
markets, moto parks, restaurants,
mosques, churches, etc. It is

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necessary to understand what these

places are in the country context.
3.10 How do IED impact on people’s It is important to understand what
daily lives? coping strategies (if any) are already
adopted
3.11 What are the common behaviours In some instances, the behaviour of
of the local population if in the the local population in the immediate
proximity of an IED attack? aftermath of an attack can increase
their exposure to risk. For example,
often people run to assist victims of
an initial blast and are then caught up
in a secondary blast.
3.12 What can be done to reduce the It is important to take into Engagement with at-risk
vulnerability of the civilian consideration do-no-harm principles, communities.
population to the IED threat? gather information and ideas on how
this vulnerability can be reduced. It is
also important to gauge interest in
IED RE sessions.

D.2.4 Who is the intended target of IEDs?

It is important to identify and provide evidence on the primary target of IEDs as it impacts on the course of action
that the EORE operator should take.

Question examples Explanation How can the question be

answered?
4.1 Why would government It is necessary to understand the logic or the Analysis of the conflict
agencies be targeted motivation behind why one group or another is
with IEDs? targeted.
4.2 Which government In complex security environments, this Sources of data include open-
agencies are most likely information supports the assessment of the risks source databases, specialised
to be attacked? to EORE operators and beneficiaries. agencies, media reports,
claims.

D.2.5 What are the common tactics of IED use?

Question examples Explanation How can the question be

answered?
5.1 What are the most It is necessary to understand the most common Provide analysis of any
common tactics used for tactics for IED use, for example, as part of a complex recent data to demonstrate
IED attacks? attack; VBIED parked in a crowded market; RCIED at the percentage of attacks
the roadside detonated as a military vehicle passes, against different targets.
etc. Sources of data include
5.2 Are there any This information will support the design of risk open-source database,
differences in tactic, awareness and messaging. specialized agencies to
depending on whom the include humanitarian ones,
target is? IMSMA database, etc.

5.3 Are there any particular It is necessary to understand if there are any specific
places that are most places where people are most at risk of being killed or
commonly targeted? injured during IED attacks.
5.4 What are the common This information will support the design of risk
indicators of IEDs? awareness and messaging.
5.5 What are the common We need to know if there are any context-specific
indicators of an imminent signs that an attack is about to take place. In some
IED attack? cases, these are quite distinct (for example, an empty
market on market day), but in other cases they are
not.

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D.2.6 What is the impact of IED on the humanitarian and development actors?

Question examples Explanation How can the question be

answered?
6.1 What percentage of overall IED This helps to provide evidence for
victims are humanitarian and the extent to which the
development actors? humanitarian community is at risk
from IEDs.
6.2 What are the common scenarios in This helps to understand whether Provide analysis of any recent
which humanitarian and they are: data to demonstrate the
development actors are most at − bystanders who are killed in percentage of attacks against
risk of IED attacks? the initial blast; different targets.
− caught in gunfire following an Sources of data include open-
explosion; source database, specialized
agencies to include humanitarian
− caught in a secondary blast, ones, IMSMA database, etc.
etc.
6.3 Are there any specific places In some countries where civilians
where humanitarian and are the direct targets, they will
development actors are most at typically be most at risk in places
risk of IED attacks? such as restaurants, mosques,
churches etc. It is necessary to
understand what these places are
in the country context.
6.4 How does the IED threat impact on There are many possible effects,
the delivery of humanitarian and such as increased security costs,
development assistance? fear of attacks at distribution
points. etc. It is necessary to
understand from the perspective of
assistance providers what those
effects are.
6.6 To what extent is the staff of What safety training has been
humanitarian and development given? How relevant or accurate is
organizations equipped with the it?
knowledge and skills to work in
contexts where IEDs are a
significant threat?
6.7 What can be done to reduce the It is important to gather information
vulnerability of humanitarian and and ideas on how this vulnerability
development organizations and can be reduced. It is also
their staff to the IED threat? important to gauge interest in risk
education for humanitarian
workers.

D.3 Step two: The risk evaluation process

NOTE: the conclusions drawn from this risk evaluation process will be very dependent on the EORE operator’s willingness to
accept risk. These notes are for guidance only.

D.3.1 What are the risk implications of engaging in IED risk education for the EORE operator?

Question examples Explanation How can the question

be answered?
7.1 Who is currently involved in It is necessary to know if other agencies Mapping of stakeholders
counter-IED efforts in-country involved in counter-IED have become targets
and what are the challenges that for parties to the conflict because of the work
they have faced? that they are carrying out. If they have then
the risk-implication for the EORE operator as
an organization is high.

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7.2 In general, how will the provision Any involvement in counter-IED could be Conflict analysis
of IED RE affect the EORE perceived as taking sides in the conflict.
operator status as neutral and
impartial? What could be the
result of that?
7.3 How will the government In many countries, counter-IED efforts are Provide analysis of any
perceive the involvement of the typically dealt with by state entities. Any recent data to
EORE operator in the provision effort by the EORE operator to engage in demonstrate the
of IED RE? IED RE may therefore not be well received percentage of attacks
and could result in negative consequences against different targets.
7.4 How will security providers for the organization.
perceive the involvement of an Sources of data include:
international organization/NGO open-source database,
in the provision of IED RE? specialized agencies to
include humanitarian
7.5 How will parties to the conflict The perception that humanitarian ones, IMSMA database,
perceive the involvement of an organizations are affiliated with the state etc.
international NGO in provision of entities counter-IED efforts would call into
IED RE question the neutrality and impartiality of the
humanitarian organization involved and
could result in the organization and its staff
being considered as legitimate targets for
attack by parties to the conflict.
7.6 Is the provision of IED risk Again, this could result in the organization Conflict analysis and risk
education going to highlight the and its staff being considered as legitimate assessment exercise.
EORE operator as a provider of targets for attack by parties to the conflict.
advice that is intended to
counter the aims of parties to
the conflict?
7.7 What are the implications for the Again, this could result in the organization
work of the other and its staff being considered as legitimate
projects/programmes by the targets for attack by parties to the conflict.
EORE operator?
7.8 What are the risk implications National staff usually live and work in
for the national staff of the affected communities. Out of duty of care, it
EORE operator? is necessary to be sure that provision of IED
RE is not going to expose them to risk of
− retribution from parties to the conflict; or
− detention by state actors.
7.9 How can the risks for national It is important to identify any precautions the
staff be mitigated? EORE operator can take to avoid causing
harm to national staff.
7.10 In cases where the EORE In some working contexts, the EORE
operator is already considered a operator may already be considered a target.
target, will provision of IED RE It is necessary to assess whether provision
incur significant additional risk? of IED RE will increase the likelihood of
being attacked.

D.3.2 What are the risk implications of participating in IED RE for members of the community?

Question Explanation How can the question be

answered?
8.1 How will community At the community level, anyone who is Engagement with local
members participating in IED RE known or suspected to have community leaders
sessions be viewed by the participated in an IED RE session could
government and security be viewed as a member of a party to
providers? the conflict by government and security
providers so could be at risk of
detention.
8.2 How can we mitigate these risks? It is important to identify any
precautions the EORE operator can

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take to avoid causing harm to the local

population at the hands of security
providers.
8.3 How will community members Who is known or suspected to have
participating in IED RE sessions be benefited from an IED RE session could
viewed by parties to the conflict? be viewed as an informant by the
parties to the conflict, so would be at
risk of retaliation.
8.4 How can we mitigate these risks? It is important to identify any
precautions the EORE operator can
take to avoid causing harm to the local
population at the hands of parties to the
conflict and militias.
8.5 How would asking people to report In some countries, there may be
suspected IED be perceived by widespread agreement among some
parties to the conflict? communities with those placing the IED.
In others, there may be a fear that
8.6 How would asking people to mark retaliation will be taken against people
suspected IED be perceived by reporting and/or marking IED.
parties to the conflict?

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Amendment record

Management of TNMA amendments

The IMAS series of standards are subject to formal review on a three-yearly basis. However, this does not
preclude amendments being made within these three-year periods for reasons of operational safety and efficiency
or for editorial purposes.

As amendments are made to this TNMA they are given a number. The date and general details of the amendment
shown in the table below. The amendment is also shown on the cover page of the IMAS by the inclusion under
the edition date of the phrase “incorporating amendment #.”

As the formal reviews of each TNMA are completed, new editions may be issued. In this case, amendments up
to the date of the new edition are incorporated into the new edition and the amendment record table cleared.
Recording of amendments then starts again until a further review is carried out.

The most recently amended IMAS are posted on the IMAS website at www.mineactionstandards.org.

Number Date Amendment details

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