Armed humanitarian intervention was not a legitimate practice during the cold war
because states placed more value on sovereignty and order than on the enforcement of
human rights. But there was a significant shift of attitudes during the 1990s, the ‘golden
age’ of humanitarian intervention (because of a dramatic increase in the number of
humanitarian interventions), among liberal democratic states, to intervene on the basis of
humanitarian reasons because: 1). the post-Cold War period was closely linked to the idea of
a ‘new world order’; 2). liberal democratic states led the way in pressing new humanitarian
claims within international society on the basis of the notion that human beings matter
more than sovereignty during the 1990s; 3). With the end of Cold War, and the emergence
of USA as the world’s sole superpower, it was easier to build consensus amongst major
powers favouring intervention. Also, politicians and policy-makers were more willing to
accept the doctrine of human rights as the basis for a ‘right to intervene’.
During the 1990s, states began to intervene to protect imperilled strangers in distant lands.
This was symbolized by NATO’s intervention to halt Serb atrocities in Kosovo and the
Australian-led intervention to end mass killing in East Timor. Kofi Annan declared that
there was a ‘developing international norm’ to forcibly protect civilians who were at risk
from genocide and mass killing.
Humanitarian intervention poses a hard test for an international society built on principles of
sovereignty, non-intervention, and the non-use of force. UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan
tried to reconcile the tension between sovereignty and human rights by arguing that, the state
should be viewed as ‘the servant of its people, and not vice versa’. Such thinking led to the
idea of ‘responsible sovereignty’. a state’s right to sovereignty is dependent on fulfilling its
duty to protect its citizens. In this view, the state is merely the custodian of a sovereignty
that is ultimately located in the people.
The most thorough and considered attempt to establish principles for military intervention
can be found in the report The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), produced by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), set up by the
Canadian government in 2000.
The legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention remains hotly contested but a norm
of intervention authorized by the Security Council emerged in the 1990s. The ‘counter-
restrictionist’ case for a legal right of individual and collective humanitarian intervention
rests on two claims: first, the UN Charter’s preamble and Articles 1(3), 55, and 56 commits
states to protecting fundamental human rights, and second, there is a right of humanitarian
intervention in customary international law.
A legal exception or humanitarian exception to the ban on the use of force in Article 2(4)
of the Charter should be created as humanitarian intervention does not violate the ‘political
independence’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of states.
Counter-restrictionists admit that there is no legal basis for unilateral humanitarian
intervention in the UN Charter, but argue that it is permitted by customary international law.
International lawyers describe this as opinio juris. Instances include the creation of safe
havens for the Kurdish people by US, British, French and Dutch military in the
aftermath of 1991 Gulf War, and Kofi Annan’s support for unilateral intervention to
halt the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
The motives for humanitarian intervention were always mixed and complex. For example,
US intervention in Haiti was partly motivated to stem the flow of Haitian refugees to the
USA. Similarly, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was partly motivated to:
avoid a refugee crisis,
prevent regional instability and
fear of ‘Srebrenica syndrome’ -- replication of the Bosnian genocide.
Domestic public opinion can pressurize policy makers to intervene because of the CNN-
effect e.g., creation of safe havens for the Kurdish people by US, British, French and Dutch
military in the aftermath of 1991 Gulf War, and US military intervention in Somalia.
Humanitarian interventions have strictly limited objectives of restoring peace and order and
allowing humanitarian relief to be deployed
Humanitarian interventions have partly been determined by national interests. So,
calculations behind humanitarian interventions include:
prioritization of vital national interest and
casualty-free intervention because of body bag effect.
That is why States always apply principles of humanitarian intervention selectively, e.g.,
NATO intervened in Kosovo but did not intervene in Darfur.
The Weinburger-Powell Doctrine guides the US administration’s decisions on the use of
force. This doctrine outlined six requirements to be considered before committing US troops
to an operation including the conditions that vital national interests should be at stake and that
overwhelming force should be employed to ensure victory.
Humanitarian interventions have undergone a radical change after 9/11 and the war on terror.
The purpose now is ‘to prevent future 9/11s, rather than future Rwandas’.
The goals of intervention now are regime change and democracy promotion,
Interventions are means of consolidating US’s global hegemony and securing oil
supplies from the Middle East.
As a result, mobilization of support for humanitarian intervention since 2001 has become far
more difficult because of:
lack of domestic public support in the US,
opposition by China and Russia,
UN’s lack of resources and political will.
This has resulted in non-interventions in Zimbabwe and Myanmar.
Humanitarian intervention requires humanitarian intent, not humanitarian motive. This is
a significant revision of the traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention that permitted
intervention only by the commission of particular crimes (genocide, mass killing) and not by
the ‘character’ of the regime. But removal of tyranny and democracy imposition are now
legitimate humanitarian intents.
The doctrine of simple moral necessity and the logic of appropriateness (the logic of doing
the right thing) in the 1990s have been replaced by assertive multilateralism of Clinton
presidency, which was then replaced by the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes of Bush
presidency.
