FROM ANONYMITY TO NOTORIETY.

HISTORICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH OUTBREAKS

OF EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES; A CASE STUDY:
EBOLA HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER.

by

Daniel K. Sokol

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science in Social and Economic History.

University of Oxford

September 2002
 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I shared my idea of conducting a survey among Ebola specialists with a fellow
student, he predicted a final sample size of four. Thirty three surveys came back,
some with remarkably detailed answers. I wish to thank all the 33 scientists who took
the time to complete the survey. Many expressed a deep interest in this project and
continued to e-mail me with ideas and contributions throughout the year.

Special thanks to Dan Bausch, of the Centers for Disease Control, Cathy Roth and
David Heymann, of the World Health Organization, Jean-Paul Gonzalez, of the
Institut de Recherche et de Développement, Joel Breman, of the US National Institute
of Health, Sue Fisher-Hoch, of the University of Texas School of Public Health, and
Bill Close for dealing so patiently with my questions and requests.

Thanks also to Barry Hewlett, of Washington State University, for his comments on
the anthropological side of Ebola, and Jens Kuhn, for sharing his monumental
knowledge on the virus and its history.

Most of all, I express my gratitude for my genial supervisor Dr Helen Tilley, formerly
of the Wellcome Unit for the History of Medicine in Oxford, and now of Princeton
University, whose insights and suggestions were invaluable. I envy her future
students.
 3

ABSTRACT

Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever is an acute viral disease with a lethality rate ranging from
50% to 90%. Although first reported in 1976, it only emerged in the public
consciousness in the early 1990s. This work explains the reasons behind this sudden
change, and examines the modifications that arose in the transition from scientific
texts to popular articles. My analysis reveals that this newfound notoriety has had
direct and indirect effects on the control and management of Ebola epidemics.

The initial reactions of Europeans and Africans in epidemic sites are reconstructed
using oral interviews, published material, as well as surveys sent to 33 Ebola
researchers. Using this evidence, the thesis explores a variety of issues: how afflicted
communities interpreted the outbreaks, the role of Western and traditional medicine,
the various ways in which local populations resisted control measures, and the
different attitudes of Western health personnel towards the disease and each other.
The result is a deeper understanding of the considerable social impact of Ebola
epidemics, and an awareness of certain problems entirely neglected by the media.

Finally, this thesis turns its attention to the mystery surrounding the disease and to
scientists’ attempts to solve some of the unknown elements, such as the identity of the
natural reservoir. I argue that the scientific uncertainty has affected popular
perceptions of the disease, and, as a result, increased the amount of funds invested
into Ebola research. A section devoted to broader issues, such as the difficulty of
reconciling deforestation and economic growth in impoverished African countries,
and the deleterious effects of political instability, concludes the work. The thesis
argues that the publicized drama of Ebola outbreaks has obscured these fundamental
problems.
 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction 5

Background on Ebola 5
The Ebola Phenomenon 6

2. From Anonymity to Notoriety 8

The Puzzle of Ebola 11

The Spread of Ebola out of Africa 15

3. Face to Face (!) with Ebola 24

The African Response to Ebola Outbreaks 24

Western Health Workers’ Reactions to Ebola 37

4. An Epi(demi)c Mystery: In Search of Answers 44

Ebola and Scientific Uncertainty 45

Beyond the Reach of Science 51

5. Conclusion 56

Appendix 58

Bibliography 73
 5

CHAPTER 1

Introduction
‘I will show you fear in a handful of dust’

T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land (1922)

Background on Ebola

Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever (EHF) is an acute viral illness with a lethality rate that

ranges from around 50% to 90%. With the exception of Rabies and HIV/AIDS, no

other viral disease has such a high case fatality rate. The Ebola viruses are one of two

genera of the family Filoviridae.1 The symptoms of Ebola infection vary from case to

case, but generally involve fever, headache, joint or muscle pains, sore throat,

vomiting, diarrhoea, bleeding, shock and other neurological symptoms. Patients

usually die six to nine days after the appearance of the first symptoms. At the time of

writing, there exists no treatment against the disease. Transmission of the virus

occurs through contact with infected blood or body fluids. One species of the genus,

Reston Ebola Virus (REBOV), is believed to be spread by aerosol, but is

nonpathogenic to humans. Despite a number of investigations, the organism in which

the virus resides in nature - the reservoir – is not known.2

1
The other genus comprises the Marburg virus. There are four species of Ebola, named after the
country or site of their first recorded appearance: Zaire, Sudan, Reston and Côte d’Ivoire Ebola Virus.
2
Colebunders, R., and Borchert, M., ‘Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever’, Journal of Infection, 40 (2000), 16-
20.
 6

The first reported cases of EHF appeared in the Sudan and the Democratic Republic

of the Congo (DRC) in the middle of 1976, when 602 people were reported to have

contracted the disease. Since then, there have been about a dozen further outbreaks,

totalling 1638 identified cases, and 1104 deaths (67% case fatality rate). It should be

noted, however, that retrospective evidence of Ebola infections, as shown by Tignor

et al., and the non-identified or misidentified cases are likely to make this total a gross

underestimate.3 The new agent was named Ebola, after a river in northern DRC.

The Ebola Phenomenon

With 1104 documented deaths since 1976, and even if the figures are wrong by a

factor of a hundred, Ebola is a statistically trivial disease. Malaria, for example, kills

over two million people each year, and Tuberculosis makes three million victims

annually.4 Yet ‘Ebola’ is a household name. It was not always so. One purpose of

this thesis is to examine the immediate questions and observations raised by scientists

on the nature of this new disease. Chapter one explains the disease’s meteoric rise in

the early 1990s from anonymity to notoriety in the public consciousness. The

consequences of this rise to fame are also discussed.

The second chapter deals with the reactions of Africans and Westerners to Ebola

outbreaks. Using extracts from a survey conducted among 16 field epidemiologists

and 17 laboratory researchers, all of whom have worked with the virus, as well as
3
Tignor et al.’s study, based on serological evidence, claims that victims of a Yellow Fever epidemic
ravaging parts of Ethiopia in the early 1960s died not only of Yellow Fever, but also of Ebola. Some
scientists, however, question the findings, as Tignor used error-prone indirect immunofluorescence
tests to obtain the results. Tignor, G., et al., ‘The Yellow Fever Epidemic in Ethiopia, 1961-2’,
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 87 (1993), p. 162.
4
World Health Organization Fact Sheet Number 189. Available Online: http://www.who.int/inf-
fs/en/fact189.html
 7

personal communications and published material, chapter two reconstructs the actions

and reactions of victims, community members and health personnel in the field.5 The

result is a vivid tableau of what occurred during past outbreaks, and a deeper

understanding of the immediate social impact of Ebola epidemics. A detailed

summary of the survey results is included in the Appendix.

Finally, we shall turn our attention to the mystery surrounding Ebola, and the broader

issues associated with the disease. We follow the elusive search for the reservoir, the

debate on the underlying causes of the epidemics, and the effects of politics on

African governments’ responses to Ebola outbreaks. What becomes apparent is that

the scientific uncertainty complicates an already elaborate web of issues surrounding

Ebola.

Unlike firmly established diseases such as Cholera, Plague and Yellow Fever, Ebola

is a recent addition to the pantheon of dreaded afflictions. This thesis attempts to

untangle strands of the ‘Ebola web’, and to illuminate neglected aspects of the

disease’s history.

5
Between March and July 2002, two different surveys were sent to field and laboratory scientists. As
promised to the respondents, their identity is undisclosed.
Certain scientists have given me information on the condition of anonymity. Citations from these
sources will be referenced simply as ‘Personal Communication’.
 8

CHAPTER 2

From Anonymity to Notoriety

The Ebola virus has been lurking in the forests of Africa for thousands of years,

contained within a still unknown reservoir.6 Before 1976, the year the virus left its

niche to infect 602 human cases in the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the

Congo (DRC), Ebola was probably responsible for the sporadic deaths of both human

and non-human primates for centuries. A recent serological study has shown that

some Pygmy populations and farmers of the Central African Republic possess

filovirus antibodies in their blood, suggesting previous encounters with Ebola and
7
Marburg. Following the reported eruptions of Ebola in the late 1970s, a

haemorrhagic fever surveillance program was conducted in the DRC between 1981

and 1985. The program led to the identification of 21 cases of Ebola. These few

cases, which would probably have passed unnoticed in the absence of surveillance,

provide evidence that small-scale and self-limiting outbreaks of Ebola have been

occurring in the past. It is easy to imagine, in areas of very low population density, a

hunter entering the forest, contracting the disease through the bite or blood of an

infected animal, and in turn transmitting the disease to the rest of his family. The

6
Suzuki, Y., and Gojobori, T. ‘The Origin and Evolution of Ebola and Marburg Viruses’, Molecular
Biology and Evolution, 14, 8 (1997), 800-806.
7
Gonzalez, J-P., et al. ‘Ebola and Marburg Virus Antibody Prevalence in Selected Populations of the
Central African Republic’, Microbes and Infection, 2 (2000), 39-44.
 9

outbreak would stop at the hunter’s doorstep, and would not be reported to the health

authorities.

Chimpanzees and gorillas have also been victims of Ebola. As early as 1931, Charles

Elton, an Oxford zoologist, stressed the importance of studying animal epidemics.

Such studies, he argued, would allow us to trace human diseases to their reservoir in

the wild and to examine the forerunners of an epidemic. In short, they would provide

a greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying epidemics in general.8 At the

close of the 20th century, the rise in emerging infections meant a leap out of obscurity

for the disease ecology of animals. The possibility of total species extinction through

disease, long thought nonsensical in terms of population biology, is perhaps the most

notable - and alarming - finding.9 In 2002, the US Institute of Medicine published a

report on the emergence of zoonotic diseases, pointing to the avalanche of emerging

zoonotic infections of the last decade, and addressing the need for better prevention

and control strategies to combat such diseases.10

The death of non-human primates has often preceded outbreaks of human disease.

The human epidemic of Kyasanur Forest disease in India (1957), for example, was

announced by an unusually high number of monkey deaths. 11 In many African

countries, monkeys are commonly hunted for food and trade and present a risk of

infection to humans. Peeters et al. analyzed the blood of 788 monkeys captured in the
8
Elton, C., ‘The Study of Epidemic Diseases Among Wild Animals’, Journal of Hygiene, 31, 4 (1931),
436-437.
9
Daszak, P. ‘The Emergence of Infectious Diseases Among Wildlife’, International Conference on
Emerging Infectious Diseases 2002, Atlanta, USA, 25 March 2002. Daszak cites Australian gastric
brooding frogs, Hawaiian birds and Partula tree snails as examples of total species extinction through
disease.
10
Burroughs, T., Knobler, S., and Lederberg, J. (eds) The Emergence of Zoonotic Diseases
(Washington D.C., 2002).
11
Banerjee, K., ‘Emerging Viral Infections with Special Reference to India’, 103 (1996), 177-200.
 10

rainforests of Cameroon. They found that 13 of the 16 monkey species were infected

with Simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV), including four species not previously

known to harbour the virus. They conclude that ‘humans who hunt and handle

bushmeat are exposed to a plethora of genetically highly divergent viruses’. 12 Dr

William Karesh, of the Wildlife Conservation Society, estimates that humans and

great apes commonly share 150 diseases. 13 Yet there exists evidence of possible

longstanding knowledge of the dangers of primate bushmeat, or at least cases when

the consumption of such meat is forbidden. In 1933, Humphrey Gilkes, a medical

officer working in Zambia, published an article on native customs in Africa. Writing

on the tribes living near the Luangwa valley in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), he

notes that people of child-bearing age must not eat the ‘flesh of monkeys because it

will make their children be born mad’.14 Such a rooted taboo, associating monkey

meat with infant dementia, suggests that monkey pathogens were transferred to man

at some time in the population’s history.

On a number of occasions, the deaths of monkeys preceded or co-occurred with

human outbreaks of Ebola, including one instance where a 34-year-old ethologist was

directly infected after performing an autopsy on a wild chimpanzee.15 A month later,

in December 1994, the first reported outbreak of Ebola erupted in Gabon. On arrival

at the site, investigators received reports of unexplained deaths among gorillas and

great apes, although they found no carcasses. In February 1996, before the second

epidemic in Gabon, 18 people who had skinned and chopped a dead chimpanzee fell

12
Peeters et al. ‘ Risk to Human Health from a Plethora of Simian Immunodeficiency Viruses in
Primate Bushmeat’, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8, 5 (2002), p. 451.
13
Personal Communication, 16 August 2002.
14
Gilkes, H. ‘Native Customs in Africa and the Medical Officer’, Transactions of the Royal Society of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 28, 3 (1933), p. 319.
15
Formenty, P., et al., ‘Ebola Virus Outbreak Among Wild Chimpanzees Living in a Rain Forest in
Côte d’Ivoire’, The Journal of Infectious Diseases, 179 (supplement 1, 1999), S120-S126.
 11

ill with the disease.16 In the most recent outbreak in Gabon (2001/2), the Gabonese

Research Minister announced that the government had been informed of ‘the

discovery in the forest of the corpses of many great apes, gorillas, chimpanzees and so

on’.17 Veterinarians found the remains of over 30 gorillas and a dozen chimpanzees.18

In the absence of a known reservoir, these epizootics could be considered useful

forerunners of human outbreaks and incorporated into surveillance programs.

The Puzzle of Ebola

When the village elders near the affected Yambuku mission in 1976 were asked by

epidemiologists if they had ever seen a similar affliction, they unhesitatingly replied

in the negative. To these villagers, Ebola was new. And so too was it for the medical

community, although they had previously encountered cases of Marburg - another

member of the filovirus family. Yet Marburg, since its first recorded appearance in

1967, had only caused eight deaths. What, then, was the reaction of the medical

community upon discovering the virus? Dr. P. Brès writes that ‘the lack of previous

experience with such sudden outbreaks and of such magnitude inevitably meant a

good deal of improvisation’. 19 In the field, the hospital workers and doctors

experienced high levels of fear. In Yambuku hospital, following wrong diagnoses and

16
Georges, A-J et al., ‘Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever Outbreaks in Gabon, 1994-1997’, The Journal of
Infectious Diseases, 179 (supplement 1, 1999), p. S66.
17
UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 14 December 2001. Available Online:
http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200112140453.
18
Gorilla Health, Wildlife Conservation Society News, 18 July 2002. Available Online:
http://wcs.org/7411/?art=64937.
19
Brès, P. in Pattyn, S.R., Ebola Virus Haemorrhagic Fever: Proceedings of an International
Colloquium on Ebola Virus Infection and other Haemorrhagic Fevers, held in Antwerp, Belgium, 6-8
December, 1977 (Amsterdam; New York, 1978), p. 237.
 12

futile treatments, 13 of the 17 medical staff fell ill, and 11 died.20 Accounts of first

encounters with Ebola victims are often striking, and shall be examined in a later

chapter.

A good way to establish both the questions posed by and the reactions of the medical

community vis-à-vis the virus and the events in Africa, is to examine the contents of

the first international colloquium on Ebola. The colloquium was held in Antwerp

(Belgium), little more than a year following the end of the outbreaks. In the preface

to the published version of the conference, Dr. Halter, then Secretary General of the

Ministry of Public Health and Family Affairs in Brussels, asserted that the conference

provided:

a clear picture of the characteristics of the etiologic organism and its epidemic
genius and also lift[ed] a side of the veil on the other mysterious and
dangerous haemorrhagic diseases such as Lassa, Congo, Marburg or Ebola
fevers. (my emphasis)21

Dr. Halter’s preface highlights the enigmatic qualities of Ebola, and reflects an awe

towards the organism and its effects that pervades the proceedings of the conference.

Interestingly, the Ebola outbreaks acted as a catalyst to the study of other

haemorrhagic fevers, which had before enjoyed the attention of only a few scientists.

The scientists appear most astonished by the clinical manifestations of the Ebola virus.

Piot et al. qualify the evolution of Ebola infection as ‘inexorable’.22 Murphy et al.

call the cytopathic effects of Ebola on living tissue ‘striking’, and the progression

from infection to cell death ‘extreme’ in its rapidity.23 In the discussion, Dr. Francis

20
Initial diagnoses were: Malaria, Fulminating Typhoid, Yellow Fever and Lassa fever. See Close, W.
Ebola: Through the Eyes of the People (Wyoming, 2002), p. 175, and Breman, J.G. et al. ‘The
Epidemiology of Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Zaire, 1976’, in Pattyn, S.R. (see footnote 19)
21
Halter, S., ‘Preface’, in Pattyn, S.R., p. 5.
22
Piot, P. et al., ‘Clinical Aspects of Ebola Virus Infection in Yambuku Area, Zaire, 1976’, in Pattyn,
S.R., p. 20.
23
Murphy, F. et al., ‘Ebola and Marburg Virus Morphology and Taxonomy’, in Pattyn, S.R., p. 55.
 13

mentions the ‘tremendous amount of intratissular and diarrheal loss’.24 Dr. El Tahir,

upon arriving in the town of Maridi, Sudan, found ‘a really grave situation’, and

concludes that the 76 Maridi hospital workers infected with Ebola makes this ‘one of

the most tragic hospital outbreaks that ever occurred in the recent history of

medicine’.25 The first encounters with Ebola, both in the laboratory and in the field,

are marked by bewildered observations on the cellular and societal ravages of the

virus.

In short, the conference presentations addressed a number of issues. They

acknowledged the difficulty of diagnosing Ebola and the need for simple but rapid

diagnostic tools. They called for more work on the virology of Ebola in order to

develop a vaccine and improve treatment of the disease. On the epidemiological side,

they raised the question of the outbreaks’ origins and of the links between the two

outbreaks. Speakers discussed the disseminating role of the hospitals and the

consequent importance of publicizing the disease, they considered the containment

and surveillance of Ebola during outbreaks, and reflected on the failed search for the

reservoir. Finally, talks were devoted to the handling of highly infectious agents, and

to the transport and care of infected patients.

The Ebola outbreaks, adding to the fear generated by Marburg, Lassa and Rift Valley

Fever, provided a major stimulus for the establishment of high containment facilities

at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta.26 For the first time, researchers

24
Francis, D., comment in discussion, in Pattyn, S.R., p. 34.
25
El Tahir, B., ‘The Haemorrhagic Fever Outbreak in Maridi, Western Equatoria, Southern Sudan’, in
Pattyn, S.R., p. 98.
26
Peters, C.J., Personal Communication, 19 August 2002.
Lassa Fever is an acute viral disease. It was first isolated in 1969 following a hospital outbreak in
Lassa, Nigeria. The high mortality, dramatic symptoms and the possibility of aerosol spread made
 14

wore protective ‘space suits’ and passed through air-locked anterooms for

decontamination. In May 1979, the CDC opened a new Maximum Containment

Laboratory. The short delay between the end of the outbreaks and the holding of the

conference, the sheer amount of information covered in the proceedings, and the 114

participants involved, reflect the considerable interest of the scientific community in

Ebola. But this fascination did not translate into any kind of public excitement in

Europe or the Americas. Unlike the 1995 Kikwit epidemic (DRC), where there were

84 journalists present, representing 13 countries, the 1976 Yambuku outbreak (DRC)

did not benefit from any on-site coverage by foreign journalists.

In the affected Bumba zone (DRC), the after-shock of the 1976 outbreak among the

inhabitants was evident. Karl Johnson, an M.D. involved in the control of the

epidemic, described how even months after the official end of the quarantine:

[…] the commercial airlines still refused to fly, the people who ran the river
boats between Kisangani and Kinshasa still wouldn’t pull in to Bumba to take
off cargo and the people of Zaire still retained a very great sense indeed of
horror and anxiety about this whole happening.27

But horrors and tragedies abroad do not necessarily transfer into the pages of the

national newspapers of Europe and North America. When did Ebola leave the limited

realm of the scientific world to become entrenched in the psyche of the American and

European populace, and what occurred in this transition?

Lassa Fever a major concern among the medical community in the 1970s. Rift Valley Fever (RVF),
isolated in 1930, is a zoonotic disease affecting animals and humans. The discovery that RVF could
develop into a haemorrhagic fever was spurred on by the 1975 Marburg outbreak in Johannesburg,
South Africa.
27
Johnson, K. M., comment in discussion, in Pattyn, S.R., p. 127.
 15

The Spread of Ebola Out of Africa

In October 1989, a hundred monkeys (cynomolgus macaques) were sent from the

Philippines to a quarantine facility in Reston, Virginia, USA. Alarmed by an

uncommonly high death rate, scientists isolated an Ebola-like virus from the blood of

the dead primates.28 Although nonpathogenic to humans, this strain of the virus could

be transmitted by aerosol. Journalists, focusing on this new mode of transmission,

filled the newspapers with apocalyptic scenarios. In March 1992, Ebola Reston was

found in monkeys in Sienna, Italy, sent from the same monkey facility in the

Philippines. Ebola, even if nonpathogenic and originating from the Philippines, had

emerged out of the ‘dark continent’ - popularly perceived as a hotbed of disease - and

into the United States and Europe. A parallel can be drawn with Cholera in the 19th

century, which to the shock of Europe and North America had spread from filth-

ridden India to plague the great cities of ‘civilized’ countries. 29 Nations such as

France, before the arrival of the epidemic, believed their ‘civilized’ state would

protect them from such afflictions. In 1989, the United States - one of the world’s

wealthiest nations - did not anticipate the importation of this rare African disease into

a suburb of Washington DC. The outbreak led Japan Airlines, All Nippon Airways,

and Korean Airlines to stop importing certain monkey species into Japan. In addition,

the United States introduced stricter disease control measures for the handling and

importation of non-human primates.30 Ebola, out of its protective African ‘cage’ and

floating ominously in the North American air, was now newsworthy material.

28
A new subtype, Ebola Reston (REBOV), was identified.
29
Delaporte, F., Disease and Civilization (Cambridge, MA, 1986), p. 16.
30
DeMarcus, A., et al., ‘US Policy for Disease Control Among Imported Non-Human Primates’, The
Journal of Infectious Diseases, 179 (supplement 1, 1999), S281-2.
 16

In October 1992, Richard Preston wrote a piece in the New Yorker magazine entitled

‘Crisis in the Hot Zone’, dramatically describing the events of the Reston episode.31

Such was the popularity of the article that Preston was soon in talks with film

producers, and expanded his New Yorker piece into a bestselling book, The Hot Zone,
32
published in 1994. In the same year, Newsday reporter Laurie Garrett

complemented Preston with the publication of The Coming Plague.33 The following

year, in April 1995, Warner Brothers released the film Outbreak, which recounted the

infiltration of an Ebola-like virus into a small North American town. 34 Indeed,

Sheldon Ungar has argued that ‘1994 marks the “coming out” ceremony for infectious

diseases in the popular media’, explained possibly by a number of dramatic outbreaks

in the early 1990s, such as the mysterious hantavirus pulmonary syndrome in the

spring of 1993 in the United States and the Cholera epidemics in the Western

Hemisphere and Asia.35

Whereas the 1976 Ebola outbreak in Yambuku (DRC) generated fewer than 10

newspaper articles, the 1995 Kikwit outbreak (DRC) was the topic of 2793 articles in

English in the Lexis-Nexis search engine.36 Ebola had emerged out of the tropical

rainforests of deepest Africa, and leaped from the pages of specialist publications to

those of newspapers and popular books. The transformation from scientific to

popular could hardly have been more radical. The sociologist Renee Anspach has

analyzed characteristic features of the language of written medical discourse.37 The

31
Preston, R. ‘Crisis in the Hot Zone’, New Yorker, 26 October 1992, 58-81.
32
Preston, R. The Hot Zone, (London, 1994).
33
Garrett, L. The Coming Plague, (New York, 1994).
34
Outbreak [film], dir. W. Petersen, distr. Warner Bros, 1995.
35
Ungar, S., ‘Hot Crises and Media Reassurance’, British Journal of Sociology, 49, 1 (1998), p. 41.
36
Garrett, L. The Betrayal of Trust, p. 65 and p. 68.
37
Anspach, R., ‘Notes on the Sociology of Medical Discourse’, Journal of Health and Social Behavior,
29 (1988), 357-375.
 17

style of medical discourse uses a variety of linguistic features to stress objectivity.

The following examples are taken from a scientific article describing the clinical

manifestations of Ebola patients during the 1995 Kikwit epidemic.38 One way is to

make the medical procedure the agent of the sentence, thereby eliminating the human

element. In the example below, this is reinforced by the use of a verb suggesting

infallibility: ‘Auscultation revealed clear lungs in several patients with terminal

tachypnea.’ (my emphasis)39 The passive voice is frequently employed, and serves to

obscure the agent: ‘Different practices were used in the management of patients […]

and resulted in various side effects.’ (my emphasis). 40 In short, the rhetoric of

medical discourse attempts to render observations and procedures free from human

judgement or error. The person performing the auscultation or managing the patients

is absent from the sentence. Furthermore, the conveying of detailed information in

condensed form inevitably de-humanizes the object of the clinical description. This is

evident in the following passage:

Bleeding signs generally manifested as oozing from the punctured skin, the
gums, and the nose. Prolonged bleeding at intravenous puncture sites was
sometimes the first clue to the diagnosis of EHF. Overall the occurrence of
visible bleeding signs indicated a poor prognosis, except from melena and
bloody stools.41

Compare the above description with one found in Preston’s The Hot Zone. I have

underlined words and phrases which I deemed salient.

Your mouth bleeds, and you bleed around your teeth, and you may have
haemorrhages from the salivary glands – literally every opening in the body
bleeds, no matter how small. The surface of the tongue turns brilliant red and
then sloughs off, and is swallowed or spat out. It is said to be extraordinarily
painful to lose the surface of one’s tongue. […] Your heart bleeds onto itself.
[…] Ebola attacks the lining of the eyeball. You may go blind.

38
Bwaka, M. et al., ‘Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Clinical
Observations in 103 Patients’, Journal of Infectious Diseases, 179 (supplement 1, 1999), S1-S7.
39
Bwaka, M. et al., p. S4.
40
Bwaka, M. et al., p. S4.
41
Bwaka, M. et al., p. S3.
 18

The differences between the two passages are striking. First, Preston’s description,

through the constant repetition of ‘you’ and ‘your’, deeply involves the reader. He

wishes the reader to imagine himself as suffering from the disease. The repetition of

‘bleeds’ and the inclusion of many parts of the anatomy, both external (mouth, teeth,

tongue, eyes – note that these are all facial) and internal (salivary glands, heart) evoke

a total disintegration of the self, a disintegration that is above all painful, and

relentless, as alluded by the repeated use of the conjunction ‘and’. Unlike medical

discourse, Preston’s writing does not necessarily prize lexical economy. Many of his

clauses appear unnecessary, or rather serve only to emphasize information already

given or otherwise obvious. There is, for instance, little doubt that losing the surface

of one’s tongue is excruciating. Joffe and Haarhoff, in their detailed examination of

popular representations of Ebola in Britain, noted that a third of British tabloids, and

next to half of the broadsheets referred to ‘liquefying, disintegrating, combusting

bodies’. 42 The vivid portrayal of Ebola’s horrific symptoms, associated with

speculations on the pandemic potential of the virus, evoke fear in the reader.

Medical historian Paul Slack suggests that knowledge of a disease’s symptoms can

affect the social and intellectual reactions to it, and plays a part in the representation

of the disease in the public imagination. 43 In most societies, and throughout history,

blood possesses powerful symbolic values, associated with life, vital energy and spirit.

Ebola – a statistically insignificant disease – has acquired an almost mythical status

among the media and the lay population, adorned with apocalyptic and science-fiction

imagery. Inevitably, one commonly finds misinformation regarding transmissibility,

42
Joffe, H. and Haarhoff, G., ‘Representations of far-flung illnesses’, Social Science & Medicine, 54
(2002), p. 962. The tabloids analyzed were The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, and The Daily
Express. The broadsheets were The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent and The Times.
43
Ranger, T. and Slack. P. (eds), Epidemics and Ideas (Cambridge, 1992), p. 8.
 19

global threat, mortality rate and other characteristics in press articles. 44 Rebecca

Weldon has summed up perhaps the main modification that occurred in the translation

process from scientific discourse to popular discourse: the latter portrays the virus ‘as

a sentient being, stalking, invading, capable of hunting and capturing prey’.45 But

what were the consequences of Ebola’s newfound notoriety?

Such a frightening image, coupled with the distortions of the media, engendered

irrational decisions towards the afflicted communities, and occasionally, countries.

Most recently, in December 2001, the Chinese government imposed a ban on apes

imported from Gabon, and warned Gabonese citizens that they would be subject to

extra scrutiny and possible isolation.46 In November 2000, the Kenyan government

deported over 100 Ugandans who were attending a conference in Nairobi, even after

Kenyan doctors confirmed none of them carried the disease.47 In January 2001, the

Saudi Arabian government banned Ugandan Muslims from attending the annual Hajj,

despite recommendations from the WHO that such measures were unnecessary. 48

During the outbreak in Kikwit, DRC (1995), four countries stopped all incoming

flights from the DRC, and some European governments banned the importation of

primates from the African continent.49 Even the realm of sport was affected when

players of the Zimbabwean football team refused to play against the DRC for the

return leg of the African Nations’ Cup. 50 Cathy Roth, of the Global Alert and

Response Team at the WHO, asserted in an interview that such reactions arose

44
Examples of misinformation may be found in Joffe and Haarhoff (2002).
45
Weldon, R., ‘An “Urban Legend” of Global Proportion’, Journal of Health Communication, 6, 3
(2001), p. 285.
46
‘China Fears Ebola Virus, Bans Some Gabon Animals’, CARPE, 29 December 2001. Available
Online: http://carpe.umd.edu/congo_basin_news/news_article.asp?article=90.
47
Telewa, M., ‘Ugandans Deported in Ebola Scare’, BBC News Online, 24 November 2000.
48
Borzello, A., ‘Uganda “almost” Ebola Free’, BBC News Online, 24 January 2001.
49
Garrett, L., The Betrayal of Trust, p. 95.
50
Campbell, H., ‘Ebola and Biological Warfare’, 1995. Available Online:
http://syllabus.syr.edu/AAS/hgcampbe/aas312/pub.htm
 20

‘because the decisions are often made by people who are poorly informed on the

disease’.51 What determines these reactions is not so much the actual threat of Ebola,

but rather the perceived threat. As the earlier comparison between a scientific and

popular text demonstrated, the latter tends to inflate the statements of scientists during

the translation process and, as a result, contributes to the creation of a perceived threat

that eclipses the actual risk. The $900 or so million spent by the US government on

smallpox vaccine this year is evidence that it is the perceived threat that drives

decisions.52

The virus’s notoriety also affects the actions taken to combat the disease. The Kikwit

outbreak, for example, erupted in the DRC at a time when the budget for the Special

Pathogens Branch at the Centers for Disease Control was decreasing. As one survey

respondent wrote:

Kikwit was an opportunity [for the CDC] to draw the attention of the US
Congress on emerging diseases and to raise some budget. With CNN, CDC
won an unexpectedly large budget.53

The media interest was directly responsible for the increased funding of the CDC.

Dan Bausch, an epidemiologist working for the CDC, asserts that ‘short-term

financial commitments for a high-profile outbreak are relatively forthcoming’ but

points to the difficulty of obtaining the long-term support that would give researchers

a greater understanding of the disease.54 The situation appears worse in the United

Kingdom. A leading British virologist who took part in the survey deplores the lack

of government support for Ebola research:

51
Personal Communication, 8 April 2002.
52
Burke, D., Personal Communication, 8 March 2002.
53
Survey 27. Although not included in the Appendix, the author has numbered all the surveys from 1
to 33. These are available upon request.
54
Bausch, D. ‘The Ebola Virus’, United Nations Chronicle Online Edition, 38, 2 (2001). Available
Online: http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2001/issue2/0102p6.htm
 21

Since this disease is of no immediate epidemiological concern outside

endemic areas, it is not considered a high priority by Government or Granting
Authorities. It only becomes high on the political agenda when we identify an
imported Viral Haemorrhage fever case in the Northern Hemisphere.55

Bioterrorism is another fear-induced source of attention and, for this reason, of

income. Yet despite Ebola’s notoriety, and the money generated from its reputation,

most researchers lament the lack of funds. When the survey among laboratory

researchers was conducted between March and August 2002, 29% of the respondents

believed enough money was injected into Ebola research, as opposed to 71% calling

for additional funding. Considering the direct involvement of the respondents in

Ebola research, these results are unsurprising. Whether such an investment is a good

use of limited resources is a question whose scope lies outside this thesis.

Extending the metaphor of Ebola as a stealthy assassin, the media exposes field

epidemiologists as fearless ‘hunters’. In fact, some epidemiologists have embraced

this term, as indicated by the title of their books. It is interesting to note that the three

scientists who chose to include the phrase ‘virus hunter’ or ‘virus hunters’ in their

book title all worked with Ebola.56 This popular portrayal highlights certain aspects

of the epidemiologists’ role, such as the search for cases and the inherent danger of

infection, but obscures others, in particular the unsightly side of work in the field.

The egos and rivalries among field workers, for instance, are not mentioned in the

popular press. Scientists, after all, are eager to enhance their image to further their

career and obtain funding. Unsurprisingly, press articles also fail to mention the

negative effects of media presence on outbreak sites.

55
Survey 31.
56
The authors are McCormick, J. and Fisher-Hoch, S. who co-authored Virus Hunters of the CDC
(Atlanta, 1996), and Peters, C.J. who wrote Virus Hunter (New York, 1997).
 22

Feeding on the popularity of the disease, press journalists have regularly been sent to

investigate outbreaks on-site. The presence en masse of the media is a double-edged

sword. As we have seen, media coverage of an outbreak can affect the distribution of

funds to Ebola research. It can also accelerate the importation of much-needed

equipment for control and management procedures. But in Kikwit, the dozens of

rapacious journalists cared little for the privacy or safety of the scientists and afflicted

populations. They attempted to infiltrate patient wards, filmed private funerals and

the list of names of the dead or dying, and bribed airport officials to fly them to the

quarantined town of Kikwit. In outrage, Pierre Rollin, a French scientist then working

for the CDC, vowed never to give a press interview again. Cathy Roth called the

Kikwit episode a ‘circus’.57 Reiter et al. end their article on the reservoir search in

Kikwit with an appeal for unperturbed research:

heavy media coverage […] has become a significant element in such field
investigations and needs to be addressed if it is not to distort scientific
research.58

With the flood of press journalists and camera crews, hotel rooms and

accommodation soon became difficult to find for the newly arriving foreign scientists.

As a consequence of the events in Kikwit, and the pleas of scientists such as Reiter, a

closely regulated Press Centre was set up in the 2000/2001 Uganda outbreak, with

specific times attributed to interviews and filming sessions.

Finally, it seems that media interest in Ebola is subsiding, despite the intense scrutiny

it enjoyed after the terrorist attacks in September 2001 and the occasional brief

mentions in articles on bioterrorism. The Ugandan outbreak attracted less press

57
Personal Communication, 8 April 2002.
58
Reiter, P., et al., ‘Field Investigations of an Outbreak of Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever, Kikwit, DRC,
1995: Arthropod Studies’, The Journal of Infectious Diseases, 179 (supplement 1, 1999), p. S153.
 23

attention than the outbreak in Kikwit, and the recent epidemics in Gabon and the DRC

have gone largely unnoticed in the North American and European newspapers.

Perhaps more than any other disease, Ebola outbreaks reveal how popular

representations of an affliction can have direct repercussions on the control and

management of an epidemic. Print and media journalists, authors and film directors

do not merely recount events or stories, they actively participate in the creation of an

image. The case of Ebola demonstrates the far-reaching impact of this image.
 24

CHAPTER 3

Face to Face (!) With Ebola

In the preceding chapter, we attempted to understand the initial reactions of the

medical community and the construction of the disease in the public imagination. The

effects of Ebola’s notoriety on the actions taken to combat the disease were also

discussed. This chapter will move away from the representations of Ebola in Western

societies to focus on Africa, and the responses of medical staff and afflicted

populations in what Preston terms the ‘hot zone’.

The African Response to Ebola Outbreaks

The experience of frightening epidemics is not new to Africa. Perhaps the best

documented cases of epidemics in Africa date from the colonial period, when colonial

powers often controlled, prevented, and in some cases unwittingly started epidemics.

The native inhabitants of early 20th century Belgian Congo (now DRC) were part of a

complex disease environment, living amidst malaria, leprosy, river blindness,

filariasis and a plethora of other infections. Sleeping sickness, which was to become a

devastating epidemic upon the arrival and ensuing ecological disruption of the

colonizers, was kept under check through a variety of preventive indigenous

mechanisms. Faced with an outbreak of Ebola, villagers also possessed means to

contain the disease. In 1976, when it dawned on the village chiefs that many were
 25

dying of an unknown, highly lethal disease, they ordered the isolation of the village,

arguably recalling the smallpox procedures learnt around the time of the WHO

smallpox eradication programme in the late 1960s. A member of the international

team involved in the Zaire epidemic wrote:

When we arrived several villages had established road blocks to assure that no
sick persons came to their village, to prevent sick ones from escaping and to
find out what people and things were moving through their fiefdoms.59

Likewise, afflicted communities abandoned or modified certain local customs. As the

epidemic progressed, people avoided the traditional physical contact with the corpse

during a burial. But the social impact of Ebola went beyond the private sphere of

funerals to the everyday, and paranoia escalated into stigma. In the town of Mbarara,

during the Ugandan outbreak (2000/2001), inhabitants refused to shake hands or

handle bills and coins, and wore latex gloves as a preventive measure.60 In the same

town, staff members of the local hospital, which cared for four Ebola cases, were

victims of a stigma common to all the major Ebola outbreaks:

Some members of staff were made to feel unwelcome in town and in some
instances were refused entry to some establishments. A local radio station
even advised the listeners to ‘run away’ from all staff members of MUTH
[Mbarara University Teaching Hospital]. Following an occasion when the
burial team was threatened with stones as they approached the burial ground
with one of the bodies, subsequent visits were accompanied by armed military
escort.61

Of the survivors of the 1995 Kikwit epidemic, 35% attempted to escape from their

family or neighbourhood during their illness.62 Alphonse Kuomissel, a survivor of the

1995-1997 Ebola outbreaks in Gabon, recounts his experience:

59
Survey 8.
60
Locsin, R., and Matua, A., ‘The Lived Experience of Waiting-to-know’, Journal of Advanced
Nursing, 37, 2 (2002), p. 174.
61
Bitekyerezo, M. et al. ‘The Outbreak and Control of Ebola Viral Haemorrhagic Fever in a Ugandan
Medical School’, Tropical Doctor, 32 (2002) p.13.
62
De Roo, A. et al. ‘Survey Among Survivors of the 1995 Ebola Epidemic in Kikwit, Democratic
Republic of Congo: Their Feelings and Experiences’, Tropical Medicine and International Health, 3,
11 (1998), p. 885.
 26

People would walk backward away from you, to make sure you wouldn’t
touch them. Taxis were afraid to stop. Even the police at the roadblocks just
waved you through because they didn’t want to touch your identity card. 63

Although no substantial articles have yet been written on the recent outbreaks in

Gabon and the DRC, Dr. Bernard Morinière, an epidemiologist who visited the

affected sites in February 2002, told me that survivors returning to their villages were

also heavily stigmatized.64

One aspect that has received virtually no attention is the role of traditional medicine

during Ebola outbreaks. More than mere anthropological curiosity, knowledge of

traditional healing practices during severe epidemics could prevent unnecessary

spread of the virus. Medical historians have shown that ignoring these belief systems

often leads to conflict. Maryinez Lyons has described how the colonizers neglected

African customs during the sleeping sickness epidemic that ravaged the Belgian

Congo in the early 20th century, and the hazardous effects of this cultural disdain.65

From the perspective of the afflicted Africans, the invasive colonizers prevented their

movement, touched and inspected their bodies in unfamiliar ways, forced them to take

certain drugs whose efficacy they doubted, and sent their loved ones to lazarettos

from which they would seldom return. As a result, many villagers hid during the

much-feared doctors’ visits, patients in the lazarettos regularly fled, and in two cases,

revolts occurred.

63
Salopek, P., ‘An Ill Wind in Gabon Blows a Warning to the World’, The Seattle Times, 21 January
2000. Available Online: http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-
world/html98/afri_20000121.html
64
Personal Communication, 11 March 2002.
65
Lyons, M., The Colonial Disease (Cambridge, 1992).
 27

Similar acts of resistance have occurred during Ebola outbreaks. David Simpson, on

site during the Yambuku outbreak in 1976, spoke of the difficulty of tracing sick

patients. The international team would ask children for information on the

whereabouts of the afflicted, as adults were not always reliable.66 In D.H. Smith’s

article on the clinical manifestations of Ebola in the Sudan outbreak (1976), one reads

the following, isolated statement: ‘Patients both resisted and resented physical

examination’. 67 Nothing more is said. In the recent outbreak in Gabon (2001/2),

where local hostility towards medical teams has been particularly fierce, some

villagers hid contacts and suspects from the surveillance teams, refused to send cases

to isolation wards, and did not adhere to the instructions given by the health workers

for burials.68 In Kikwit, the epidemic was rekindled when the corpse of a woman was

forcibly snatched away from the Red Cross burial team by family members. She was

then buried according to local customs. 69 In that outbreak, volunteers of the Red

Cross - composed almost entirely of trained Africans - temporarily went on strike,

tired of the poor pay and intense stigma. In January 2002, the international team of

experts was forced to flee the village of Mekambo, Gabon, when hostile villagers

threatened them with violence. One survey respondent was not surprised by such

reactions, and highlighted the social implications of many of the restrictions:

Locals are asked not to give nursing care to diseased family members but to
hand them over to strangers in space-suits […] Locals are asked not to prepare
bodies for eternal rest, and not to perform burial rites that allow social life to
continue normally after the death of a beloved one. In the recent outbreaks in
Gabon/Congo, some experts even advised the locals not to hunt – that of
course must be unacceptable in a gatherer/hunter society – people there live on
bushmeat.70

66
Simpson, D. in Virus, BBC Radio 4, 9 March 1999.
67
D.H. Smith et al. ‘African Haemorrhagic Fever in the Southern Sudan, 1976: The Clinical
Manifestations’, in Pattyn S. R., p. 28.
68
Survey 7.
69
Guimard, Y., et al., ‘Organization of Patient Care During the Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever Epidemic in
Kikwit, DRC, 1995.’, Journal of Infectious Diseases, 179 (supplement 1, 1999), p. S272.
70
Survey 16.
 28

The significance of traditional healing practices varies from outbreak to outbreak.

Small, isolated villages are more likely to depend on traditional healers than large

towns, such as Kikwit, which has approximately 400 000 inhabitants and where

biomedicine is firmly established. In countries such as Uganda, the high cost of

healthcare means that villagers turn to more affordable traditional healers for

treatment.71 Joel Breman noted the scarifications found on the bodies of eight cases

in the Yambuku outbreak (1976), and described a potentially hazardous purgative

practice among women:

[…] it was done with a thin bamboo reet put into the rectum and then the
others would blow material through this reet. The same reet was used for all
women. Of course this could have incised the intestinal mucosa and certainly
implicated blood products or stool as a vector. 72

Traditional healers in another village also regularly cut patients’ skin with unsterilized

knives. During the 1996/7 Ebola outbreak in Gabon, a traditional healer and his

assistant got infected with the virus after treating a patient suffering from the

disease. 73 No study has yet focused on the role of traditional medicine in Ebola

outbreaks. In light of the evidence above, the tendency of outbreaks to affect isolated

populations, and the increasing frequency of epidemics, such a study is urgently

needed.

The irony lies in that, historically, a person has a higher risk of Ebola infection by

going to a hospital than to a traditional healer. The public health infrastructure of

Ebola-endemic countries is, at best, inadequate, and, at worst, nonexistent. A report

on the DRC, published by Médecins Sans Frontières in 1999, revealed that only two

71
Leggett, I., Uganda (Oxford, 2001), p. 63.
72
Breman, J., comment in discussion, in Pattyn, S.R., p. 115.
73
Kunii, O et al., ‘Epidemics and Related Cultural Factors for Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever in Gabon’,
Nippon Koshu Eisei Zasshi, 48, 10 (2001), 853-859.
 29

of the 11 provincial health inspectors possessed vehicles, that health personnel risked

kidnapping by soldiers and rebels, and that medical equipment, buildings and supplies

were deteriorating. The report concluded that ‘the [Ministry of Health’s] budget is

inadequate and really only exists on paper’. 74 In sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, with

the possible exception of South Africa, access to healthcare in rural areas is limited.75

Indeed, in many outbreaks, Ebola only became epidemic through nosocomial spread

in grossly underresourced hospitals. The lack of medical equipment and protective

gear favoured person-person transmission of the virus.

Throughout Ebola’s recorded history, the hospital has played an important role as an

amplifier of epidemics. In Yambuku (1976), the mission hospital, which admitted

between 6000 and 12 000 outpatients a month, used five needles and syringes a day.

Eleven of the 17 hospital staff contracted the disease and died. The report of the

International Commission affirms that the closure of the Yambuku hospital was ‘the

single event of greatest importance in the eventual termination of the outbreak’.76 In

the teaching hospital of Maridi, Sudan (1976), a third of all hospital staff fell ill with

the disease (76 cases out of 230 employees). In the 1979 outbreak in Nzara, Sudan,

the outbreak started when an infected person was admitted to Nzara hospital, and

started a chain of infection. In Kikwit, 25% of the Ebola cases were healthcare

workers. In addition to working in a facility lacking electricity, running water or a

waste disposal system, many staff members had not been paid for months. 77 In

October 1996, a Gabonese doctor contracted the disease and later died following an

74
Survival in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Médecins Sans Frontières Research Centre, Brussels,
December 1999. Available Online: http://www.aerzte-ohne-grenzen.de/.
75
Sanne, I., ‘Conference Report: Developing an HIV/AIDS Therapeutic Agenda for Resource-Limited
Countries’, Medscape HIV/AIDS ejournal, 7, 6 (2001). Available Online:
http://www.medscape.com/viewpublication/124_index.
76
‘Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Zaire, 1976’, Bulletin of the WHO, 56, 2 (1978), p. 280.
77
Guimard, Y. et al., p. S272.
 30

endoscopy on an Ebola-infected patient. The South African nurse who cared for him

in Johannesburg, where he was admitted for treatment, also died. In the Ugandan

outbreak (2000/1), 14 of 22 health staff in the Gulu district were infected after nursing

patients. With this in mind, it is understandable that hospital personnel and afflicted

persons have reacted strongly to working or staying in the hospital. Like the sleeping

sickness lazarettos of early 20th century DRC, hospitals became associated with death

for many of the inhabitants.

Flight or avoidance from the hospital, by both patients and hospital staff, is recurrent

in Ebola outbreaks. Attendance at Yambuku hospital dwindled as the epidemic

progressed and medical staff died, until it closed completely on the 3rd October 1976.

In the town of Maridi, Sudan, most nurses fled from the hospital, and some patients

refused to be sent to the isolation wards at the hospital.78 When P. Lolik, sent by the

Regional Ministry of Health in Juba, arrived in Maridi hospital on the 23rd October, he

found only three nurses working in an establishment entirely lacking in hospital

supplies, and discovered that two suspected cases had earlier escaped.79 A similar, if

more extreme, scenario occurred in Kikwit General Hospital (1995). There the vast

majority of patients and health workers deserted the premises, and only moribund

patients and voluntary workers remained. Tom Ksiazek, of the CDC’s Special

Pathogens Branch, visited the abandoned hospital and found 30 expiring patients, left

to care for themselves amid rotting corpses, sometimes in the same bed.80 Even in

one of Uganda’s major hospitals, Mbarara Teaching Hospital, the patient’s experience

during the Ugandan outbreak was traumatic. Bitekyerezo et al. write:

78
‘Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Sudan, 1976’, Bulletin of the WHO, 56, 2 (1978), p. 250.
79
Lolik, P., ‘Containment and Surveillance of the Ebola Virus Epidemic in Southern Sudan’, in Pattyn,
S. R., p. 128.
80
Virus, BBC Radio 4, 9 March 1999.
 31

Our patients all died in isolation without contact with family or friends, cared
for by people wearing masks and goggles. The psychological and spiritual
needs of such patients should not be overlooked.81

But the staff were also experiencing distress. Eleven of the 18 staff members caring

for the patients developed Ebola-like symptoms and suffered from such extreme

anxiety that they required counselling.82 In 1976, the four doctors looking after an

Ebola patient at the Coppetts Wood Hospital in London developed similar so-called

‘phantom’ symptoms. They experienced a ‘flu-like’ illness with stomach pains,

which disappeared several days later. Antibody studies revealed no infection.83

In St. Mary’s Hospital, another leading hospital in northern Uganda, the 400 health-

care workers mutinied and assembled in protest, calling for the closure of the hospital.

Dr. Matthew Lukwiya, the hospital’s medical superintendent and later victim of the

disease, persuaded them to stay.84 Yet he too was aware of the perils of working in

such an environment, and his hospital colleague, junior doctor Yoti Zabulon, recalled

a proleptic conversation with Dr. Lukwiya: ‘One time he told me “my God, Dr. Yoti,

we’re going to die on duty one of these days!”’. He pursued his narrative with a

recollection of the conditions in the isolation ward of the hospital:

[…] so you can imagine 69 people, seriously sick, some running up and down,
bleeding, vomiting, having diarrhoea with high fever, crying with aches, and
you are two doctors on duty, with less than ten nurses. It was so dramatic!85

In such chaotic and exhausting conditions, precautions are sometimes overlooked by

medical personnel. Dr. Lukwiya’s death is believed to have occurred through an

81
Bitekyerezo, M. et al., p. 14.
82
Bitekyerezo, M. et al., p. 13.
83
Emond, R., p. 33.
84
For a detailed and fascinating account of what occurred in St. Mary’s Hospital, and in particular Dr.
Lukwiya’s involvement in the outbreak, see Harden, B., ‘Dr. Matthew’s Passion’, The New York Times
Magazine, 18 February 2001.
85
Zabulon, Y., in On the Ebola Frontline, BBC Radio 4, 26 May 2002.
 32

uncharacteristic lapse: on the night of November 20, he wore no protective goggles

when caring for a heavily bleeding patient. The role of the African doctors is often

overlooked in Western press articles, who prefer to focus on the life-saving acts of the

international medical teams, but one scientist wrote in a personal communication:

During any of the Ebola/Marburg manifestations the job of the African

physicians has been tremendous, courageous, unique sometimes at the early
stage of the epidemics before anyone from the civilized occident intervened
and took the floor.86

The most comprehensive study to date on indigenous responses to an Ebola outbreak

was conducted by Barry Hewlett, a cultural anthropologist from Washington State

University. 87 Hewlett spent 16 days among the hard-hit Acholi tribe during the

Ugandan outbreak. His findings enlighten us on native treatments and interpretations

of fulminating epidemic diseases, but also lay out the positive and negative health

effects of both the international team and the local community. The study clearly

reveals the importance of cultural understanding to avoid conflict. In colonial times,

the medical staff involved in the control of epidemics would have been based in situ

and, as a result of longer stays, arguably more aware of indigenous beliefs and

practices. Today, such medical bases are fewer, and help generally comes from

abroad. Scientists from the CDC, for instance, are often sent on assignment at very

short notice, and with no knowledge of the cultural context of the epidemics.88 The

closure of the training bases has also affected the number of suitably trained scientists.

There is at present - in the words of Dan Bausch - a ‘vacuum of young researchers

truly versed in the study of tropical pathogens’.89

86
Personal Communication.
87
Hewlett, B., ‘The Cultural Contexts of Ebola in Northern Uganda; A Preliminary Report’, 15 March
2001. Available Online: http://www.vancouver.wsu.edu/fac/hewlett/ebola.html
88
Personal Communication.
89
Bausch, D., ‘The Ebola Virus’, United Nations Chronicle, 38, 2 (2001), p. 4.
 33

The Acholi initially considered Ebola a regular illness and, accordingly, treated the

disease with a mixture of indigenous (herbs and consultations with traditional healers)

and biomedical (chloroquine and antibiotics) remedies. Following a string of deaths,

some families hired traditional healers to perform animal sacrifices and remove the

disease-causing ‘yat’, or poisons, from their household. The financial cost of such a

procedure was debilitating to many families.90 In the stricken village of Mekambo,

Gabon (2001/2), the prohibitions on hunting and selling bushmeat also took a heavy

financial toll on the inhabitants, causing general discontent towards the control

measures. When deaths continued to occur among the Acholi, the disease changed

classification from ‘yat’ to the more severe ‘gemo’ and triggered a protocol to prevent

and contain the outbreak. The explanation for ‘gemo’ is unclear. Hewlett writes:

Gemo is said to be rather mysterious in that it just comes on its own, but
several people indicated that it comes because of lack of respect and honor for
jok [‘spirits’ or ‘gods’]. People talk about gemo catching you, so if someone
is close to a person with gemo it is easier for gemo to catch you.91

The exact mechanisms of the ‘gemo’ protocol are too numerous to describe in detail

but they emphasized the isolation of the patient and the restriction of the community’s

movements. The ban on eating rotten or smoked meat, the prohibition of sexual

intercourse, the caring for patients by survivors, and the quarantine requirements

would all have contributed to the termination of the outbreak. The lessons of past

epidemics are reflected in some of the methods, such as the prohibition of sex and the

refusal of food offered by outsiders, no doubt reflecting experiences with previously

encountered sexually-transmitted or food-borne diseases.

90
Families paid 150 000 Ugandan shillings (roughly $88), 4 or 5 goats or sheep, and one chicken.
Hewlett, B. p. 4.
91
Hewlett, B., p. 5.
 34

Hewlett’s classification of Acholi belief systems regarding disease into a neat bi-

partite explanatory model is, although informative, rather simplistic. It fails to

acknowledge the plurality and diversity of interpretations within the community.

Indeed, upon discovering the futility of traditional treatments, some Acholi looked

elsewhere for alternative therapies. One such example was the use of the powerful

bleach ‘Jik’. Believing that Jik could kill Ebola inside as well as outside the body,

people literally imbibed or bathed in the disinfectant. A member of the Ugandan

parliament had to openly discourage these practices.92

Survivors and their relatives, as discussed earlier in the chapter, were commonly

stigmatized. Hewlett affirms that along with rejection at the village market or water

hole, some were not allowed back in their homes, their clothes were burned and some

spouses abandoned their partners. Survivors were often unable to find work. One

man, whose wife had died of Ebola, committed suicide. To counter this, teams of

volunteers, trained by the Ugandan Red Cross, visited villages to dispel any myths

and persuade the communities to accept the return of survivors. A recent letter

published in the journal Tropical Doctor, which refers to the continuing

stigmatization of survivors as a ‘second epidemic’, suggests that these efforts have not

been entirely successful.93 The only beneficiaries of this intense stigmatization were

the 40 prisoners held by the Lord’s Resistance Army, a brutal anti-government rebel

group, who were released when the Army leaders feared they might contract the

disease.94

92
Buwembo, J. ‘With Our Burning Blankets, We Shall Save Africa’, The East African, 12 November
2001.
93
Jeppson, A., ‘Defend the Human Rights of Ebola Victims!’, Tropical Doctor, 32 (2002), p.182.
94
Maurice, J., ‘The Ugandan Ebola Outbreak – Not All Negative’, Bulletin of the WHO, 78, 12 (2000),
p. 1477.
 35

The ‘gemo’ protocol was largely effective in controlling the disease, but certain

practices served as amplifiers. Fifty-seven percent of survey respondents found that

locals prevented or slowed down the implementation of control procedures. Hewlett’s

study provides several examples of this. As in many Ebola outbreaks, funeral

practices played a considerable role in the early dissemination of the virus. The

washing, dressing and regular contact with the body, as well as the ritual washing of

hands in a bowl, presented opportunities for disease transmission among the

attendants. The transportation of the sick or deceased by bicycle or cart, and the

ensuing proximity between the ill and the healthy, was another possible amplifier.

Finally, although the practice was in decline after the experience with HIV/AIDS,

certain traditional healers inserted medicines through cuts on the body, encouraging

the interchange of contaminated blood.

Members of the international community, although in many ways helpful in

controlling the outbreak, contributed to the social havoc in the villages. The WHO

produced an educational video which they sent to hospitals in Uganda, describing the

principal characteristics of Ebola and the management procedures to be followed.

Although it alleviated certain fears, some individuals developed an obsessive attention

to hygiene which drove them to burn the beds, clothes and houses of survivors.

Burial teams occasionally buried bodies before the verification of the corpse by

family members. As a consequence, families hid their sick, refused to send them to

hospital, and rumours of Europeans selling body parts for profit proliferated. The

lack of feedback between researchers and families, in particular when blood samples

were collected, led to some distrust of health care workers.95 In Kikwit (1995), the

95
Hewlett, B., p. 11.
 36

association between the hospital and Ebola deaths generated a popular rumour:

doctors were suspected of murdering workers who had smuggled diamonds out from

the mines. The workers ingested the diamonds to avoid the strip-search, and visited

surgeons to retrieve them from their gut.96 These rumours are reminiscent of the 1832

Cholera epidemic in Paris, when the working class victims accused the ruling class of

poisoning their food and water.97

Such rumours are not to be dismissed as meaningless superstition. The historian

Luise White argues that rumours are products of an African ‘voice’, and as such can

provide insights into African interpretations of Western practices. 98 Professor

N’sanga Kibari, of the University of Bandundu (DRC), claims that most of the

Catholic inhabitants of Kikwit did not attribute the 1995 Ebola epidemic to a virus,

but to God’s punishment. Others blamed an American missionary doctor who was

rumoured to transform himself into a hippopotamus and cast evil spells as he swam

down the river.99 This apparently bizarre explanation might be partly explained by

the hippopotamus’ reputation. Hippopotamuses, although prized for their meat,

destroy agricultural crops, overturn boats and are generally feared by native Africans

for their aggressive behaviour. 100 These examples show that the Africans and

Europeans differed in their interpretation of the outbreaks, and that the former did not

unanimously accept the aetiological explanations of biomedicine. With the inability

of biomedicine to treat the disease, and the flight of medical personnel from the

96
Garrett, L. The Betrayal of Trust (New York, 2002), p. 68.
97
Delaporte, F., Disease and Civilization (Cambridge, MA, 1986), 48-50.
98
White, L. ‘They Could Make Their Victims Dull’, The American Historical Review, 100, 5 (1995),
1379-1402.
99
Quoted in Garrett, L. The Betrayal of Trust, 106-107.
100
Shefferly, N., ‘Hippopotamus Amphibius’, Animal Diversity Web (May 2000). Available Online:
http://animaldiversity.ummz.umich.edu/
 37

hospitals, the afflicted Africans adopted alternative theories of causation based on

indigenous beliefs.

In answer to the survey question ‘did you sense that the locals were suspicious of you

and the international teams?’, 38% of respondents replied ‘yes’, 38% ‘no’, and 19%

circled ‘depends’ as their answer.

So far, we have attempted to reconstruct the African responses to Ebola outbreaks

from the perspective of both the medical staff and the affected communities.

Although there are common behavioural responses from outbreak to outbreak, such as

local resistance, fear, flight, and stigmatization, it would be wrong to establish an

unchanging anatomy of Ebola outbreaks. The all-encompassing terms above provide

little more than a skeletal sketch of Ebola epidemics; the rest is particular to

individual outbreaks. Local resistance, for example, was encountered in every major

outbreak, yet there is considerable variation in the degree and extent of resistance,

from a single person to entire villages, from verbal discontent to physical violence.

With this caveat in mind, we now turn our attention to the initial reactions of members

of the international teams.

Western Health Workers’ Reaction to Ebola

The difficulty in diagnosing Ebola, combined with poor health infrastructure,

defective communication systems, and occasionally governmental reluctance, explain

the significant delay between the appearance of the index case and the arrival of

foreign assistance. In Yambuku (DRC, 1976), the International Commission was

 38

formed at least seven weeks after the start of the epidemic. In Maridi (Sudan, 1976),

the WHO team arrived four months after the first identifiable case was admitted to

hospital. In Kikwit (DRC, 1995), it was three months before the district health officer

even notified the national health authorities. As a consequence, international teams

usually arrived at the middle or tail end of the epidemics, and immediately witnessed

the impact of the outbreak on the communities involved.

The report of the WHO International Commission on the Yambuku asserts that ‘no

more dramatic or potentially explosive epidemic of a new acute viral disease has

occurred in the world in the past 30 years’.101 Sixteen days before the formation of

the International Commission, two Western doctors, Jean-François Ruppol (from the

Fonds Médical Tropical) and Gilbert Raffier (from the Mission Médicale Française)

were sent from the capital Kinshasa to investigate the situation in Yambuku. Dr.

Ruppol recounted to me: ‘We went there with almost no support, we only knew the

language, their customs and history. We had some operating coats and a little bit of

good sense’.102 A few years after the end of the epidemic, Dr. Raffier gave an oral

account of the visit to his friend, Dr. Dutertre, at the time chief epidemiologist of the

French Army Health Service. Dr. Dutertre in turn transcribed it as a narrative.

Extracts of the text are worth quoting, for they provide a unique insight into the fear

and helplessness felt by all involved.

All those who could flee had already gone, foreign doctors (let’s not dwell on
this), first-aid workers, nurses. The sheer scale of the disaster, the obvious
futility of all treatment, the horrible, unfading contagiousness of this fever had
caused everyone to flee, except the Belgian colleague Van Wollenbeck [a
pseudonym referring to Dr. Ruppol] and myself.

101
‘Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Zaire, 1976’, Bulletin of the WHO, 56, 2 (1978), p. 288.
102
Personal Communication, 1 March 2002.
 39

In the face of such desolation, the two doctors dug up a pit and dumped the blood-

drenched corpses into it. The makeshift grave was set alight.

It’s at this very moment – I don’t know who initiated it, nor why, as it served
no purpose – that we undressed, threw everything in the fire, shirt, trousers,
sandals, everything, and we stood there, in front of this purifying fire, naked
and pitiful […]103

Clearly, the dramatic symptoms of Ebola contribute significantly to medical workers’

reaction to the disease, however experienced they might me. Dan Bausch, who has

worked with many viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHFs), said in a telephone interview:

For a scientist or clinician, seeing Ebola is a very impressive thing. As a

clinician, I’ve never seen another disease that will kill so reliably and rapidly.
Marburg is not pretty either, but even other VHFs (Lassa, Rift Valley) are not
as impressive in their brusqueness. Unfortunately, the victims suffer. They
suffer a lot.104

David Simpson, a microbiologist from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical

Medicine, was sent to handle the outbreak in Sudan (1976). In the radio program

Virus, he recalled that the situation when he arrived was ‘very worrying indeed’. The

postmortems, performed on grossly disfigured corpses and on the ground, were

‘horrific’, the heat was unbearable and aggravated by clouds of buzzing flies. ‘I

bloody nearly collapsed afterwards because it was so hot!’ he added.105

The scientists involved in the 1976 epidemics were faced with the difficult task of

handling a disease about which virtually nothing was known. As these were the first

outbreaks of an unknown disease, epidemiological and clinical features had to be

established from scratch. How did epidemiologists deal with a disease with so many

unknown variables? In an address given to the University of Southern California’s

103
Dutertre, J., Une Fièvre en Brousse, Available Online: http://perso.wanadoo.fr/jdtr/Fievre.htm.
Translated from the original French by the author.
104
Personal Communication, 8 March 2002.
105
Simpson, D. in Virus, BBC Radio 4, 9 March 1999.
 40

medical students on 28 May 1995, Joel Breman remembered the CDC’s briefing on

the situation in the DRC:

I was told only the following: first, an outbreak of a severe unknown disease
was spreading rapidly into all of the villages in a remote area of northern Zaire.
Second, all of the people in the epidemic area had died. This information was
frightening, but it really didn’t make sense. At that time I knew of only one
disease that caused such high mortality, Rabies, and this didn’t sound like
Rabies.

For the physicians on-site, the indefinite means of transmission of the virus was the

most worrying question mark. Bill Close, head of logistics for the international team,

commented in an interview:

If you have a bad disease, and you don’t know how it’s spread, that means that
every time a fly lands on you, or every time you eat something, or every time
there’s a puff of dust that comes from the road, you wonder whether it’s
carrying whatever’s causing these deaths!106

The African heat, coupled with multiple layers of protective gear, made any

prolonged activity uncomfortable, and unsafe. Dan Bausch remembers the anxieties

experienced by the fully-suited medical personnel in Uganda: ‘we wondered if it was

just particularly hot that day or maybe we were especially tired, or was this the first

day of a fever?’.107 One scientist of the international team in Kikwit (1995) found the

stress of dealing with Ebola patients and the interminable working hours so

unbearable that he collapsed with a nervous breakdown six days after his arrival.108

Similarly, two team members resigned from the assignment after reading the first

official report of the situation in Yambuku (1976).109 Some accounts stress the surreal

aspect of the situation, such as David Heymann’s recollections of his visit to Kikwit

General Hospital, in 1995. Heymann had witnessed the Yambuku epidemic in 1976,

106
Interview with William T. Close, Ebola, Wyoming Public Radio Network,17 April 2002.
107
Bausch, D. ‘The Ebola Virus, United Nations Chronicle Online Edition, 38, 2 (2001).
108
Garrett, L. The Betrayal of Trust, p. 76.
109
Garrett, L. The Coming Plague, p. 130.
 41

and possessed extensive experience working as a medical epidemiologist for the CDC

in sub-Saharan Africa. He commented:

There was blood everywhere. Blood on the mattresses, on the floors, on the
walls. Vomit, diarrhoea…When we got here it was really awful. Apocalyptic.
There were people dying everywhere. And the women were wailing. It was
surreal.110

Heymann’s account, although brief, is deeply evocative. Strangely, it is the blood, not

the patients, that he notices first. He shifts from the general (‘blood everywhere’) to

the particular: beds, floors, walls. To this purely visual scene of red, he adds another

image and, with it, another sense: the stench of the vomit and faeces. Amid this

malodorous squalor, he finally reveals human elements, and the sound of the wailing

women joins the visual and the olfactory to heighten the poignancy of the narrative.

Western medical workers have arrived at the site of outbreaks in media res, and

immediately faced the full horror of the epidemic. First-hand accounts, such as David

Heymann’s, reveal astonishment of the awful conditions in hospitals, their mass

desertion by patients and hospital staff, the lack of even basic equipment, the

spectacular nature of the disease, and of course the physicians’ fear of contracting the

disease themselves, sometimes translated into ‘phantom’ symptoms. Answers to the

survey, in particular to the question regarding the uniqueness of Ebola epidemics,

support these observations. One respondent comments on the ‘great fear of infection

by many team members’, another on the difficulty of ‘protecting myself and other

workers from Ebola and other diseases endemic in the same area’, and yet another on

‘the stress of entire families and hospital wards being wiped-out’.111

110
Garrett, L. The Betrayal of Trust, p. 69.
111
Surveys 4, 8 and 7, respectively.
 42

One type of reaction by Western medical workers on ground zero has been totally

ignored in media articles, and barely touched upon in more scholarly publications:

rivalry. One reference to the problem, however, appeared in the 2002 Institute of

Medicine Report on emerging zoonoses. Alluding to recent zoonotic outbreaks,

Frederick Murphy wrote that ‘scientists became competitive and insular, seeming to

worry more about their publications than about the public’s health’. 112 One scientist I

interviewed cautiously said of the Ugandan episode (2000/1): ‘a few groups and

individuals for short periods may not have worked for the overall good!’.113 Two

respondents of the ‘field’ survey mentioned poor cooperation among scientists in the

field. One scientist involved in the 1976 outbreak in the DRC affirmed that locals

were not suspicious of the medical personnel but that ‘the only suspicions may have

been from other international scientists with a similar agenda’.114 The other scientist,

who formed part of the international team in the Ugandan outbreak, stated that ‘even

among the professional, there was a lot of competition and mistrust, which sometimes

affected the control interventions’.115 The competition for limited funds and status-

enhancing publications has led to rivalry among scientists in the field, but also

laboratories dealing with biosafety-level 4 pathogens. The refusal of some

laboratories to share reagents, specimens and other necessities inevitably slows down

the pace of research. But scientists are conscious of the financial importance of a

positive image, and this unsightly aspect of scientific research remains strictly within

the recondite sphere of the epidemiologists and virologists involved.

112
The Emergence of Zoonotic Diseases, Institute of Medicine Report, 2002, p. 7.
113
Personal Communication.
114
Survey 8.
115
Survey 9.
 43

The media hype and sensationalism surrounding Ebola in Western countries has made

the disease a household name, but by constantly associating the virus with science-

fiction elements (e.g. space suits, liquefying bodies, ‘apocalypse’ bugs), it has also

erected a conceptual barrier that distances the layperson from the reality of the

disease. 116 The layperson experiences a fear similar to that which he might

experience in front of a frightening movie. It vanishes as soon as the movie ends,

when rational thought once again prevails over fantasy. This last chapter attempted to

reconstruct and interpret the experiences of the afflicted communities and the

mobilized medical personnel, both African and Western. During all Ebola outbreaks,

public health specialists underwent their own reconstruction, seeking to assemble

pieces of what remains an epidemiological puzzle.

116
See Joffe, H. and Haarhoff, G.
 44

CHAPTER 4

An Epi(demi)c Mystery: In Search of

Answers.

In the last 30 years, newly emerging infectious diseases have been reported with

increasing frequency. The complacent optimism of the second half of the 20th century,

supported by the quasi-eradication in industrialized countries of polio, typhoid,

tetanus and many childhood diseases, is no longer justified. HIV/AIDS alone has

killed over 19 million people worldwide, making it the second largest epidemic of the

20th century after the 1918/1919 influenza pandemic.117 The unanticipated emergence

of diseases such as Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome, new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease, H5N1 avian influenza, and Nipah virus continue to cause great concern in the

public health community. As Professor Richard Levins, of the Harvard School of

Public Health, asserted in a lecture: ‘Public Health as a whole was caught by

surprise’.118 The Ebola outbreaks of 1976 signalled the start of a new epidemiological

era, when novel diseases gave rise to a heightened appreciation of epidemic and

environmental complexity.

117
Bartlett, J., ‘Global Impact of the HIV Pandemic’, Lecture Presented at the 4th Annual Brazil-Johns
Hopkins Conference on HIV/AIDS, October 2000.
118
Levins, Richard, ‘The Challenge of New Diseases’, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
740 (1994), p. xvii.
 45

Ebola and Scientific Uncertainty

An epidemiological investigation, by its very nature, always possesses some

unknowns. In the face of these, epidemiologists use prior knowledge of a disease as a

starting point. So, for instance, an outbreak of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever

(CCHF) would immediately suggest the presence of Hyalomma ticks and human

contact with infected livestock. Application of pesticides to control the tick vector,

the use of protective clothing and insect repellent, or simply the avoidance of tick-

infested areas would constitute an effective arsenal against further spread of the

disease. Many elements in the epidemiological equation are already known variables,

and these greatly facilitate the choice of control measures. A very recent example of a

thorny epidemiological problem is the epidemic of the previously unknown Nipah

virus in Malaysia in 1998. The case of Nipah clearly illustrates the sheer complexity

of disease emergence, and the difficult task epidemiologists face in deciphering it.

Between September 1998 and April 1999, an outbreak of a mysterious disease caused

the death of 105 persons and the preventive destruction of 1.1 million pigs in the

Malay Peninsula. Most of the victims were pig farmers. The new virus was named

Nipah, after the pig-farming village of Sungei Nipah. In an example of the way

similarities between diseases can provide epidemiological information, the genetic

link between Nipah virus and the bat-transmitted Hendra virus enabled researchers to

identify the fruit bat as the reservoir. A number of events combined to drive the

emergence and the dissemination of Nipah virus: the human encroachment into fruit

bat habitat, the slight decrease in forested cover, the establishment of high-density pig

farms, the dramatic drop in oil palm production caused by the climatic disturbances of
 46

El Niño, the ensuing lack of fruiting trees for the bats, and finally the mass transport

of pigs for commerce.

As the epidemiology of Nipah virus and most other newly emerging infections -

including Ebola - demonstrates, the human/animal divide has become increasingly

blurred in the eyes of the public health community. This realization culminated in the

2002 Institute of Medicine report on the ‘Emergence of Zoonotic Diseases’, which

made clear that a better understanding of emerging diseases in wildlife could aid

investigators in understanding those in humans. 119 The recent calls for inter-

disciplinary cooperation to solve complex epidemiological puzzles also bear witness

to the new facets of the problem. The parasitologist Dr Peter Dazsak, in the 2002

International Conference on Emerging Infections in Atlanta, spoke of the need to

‘look far beyond the standard outbreak investigation’.120 Today, the epidemiologist

can no longer deal with epidemics on his own, but requires a team which would

ideally involve veterinarians, entomologists, ecologists, social and behavioural

scientists, physicians and public health officials.

The 1977 Ebola conference in Belgium lifted - in the words of Dr. Halter - ‘a side of

the veil’ on Ebola and other haemorrhagic fevers.121 Yet despite some insights, there

remained a deep sense of scientific uncertainty. Where did Ebola come from? Why

did it arise? How did it kill its victims? How was it transmitted? How could it be

treated? These questions gave rise to broader concerns among the public health

community in industrialized countries: how can we prevent Ebola epidemics? How

could we stop international dissemination of the virus? How would we handle

119
Burroughs, T., et al. (eds), The Emergence of Zoonotic Diseases (Washington DC, 2002).
120
Daszak, P. See footnote 9.
121
Halter, S., Preface, in Pattyn, S.R., p.5.
 47

imported cases of Ebola? Could Ebola be used as a biological weapon by nations in

conflict or by bioterrorist groups? Could we cope with such an attack? The micro-

level questions, related to on-the-ground epidemiological issues (reservoir, spread,

vaccine, treatment) gave rise to macro-level questions, concerned with more general

matters (public health infrastructure, socio-political situations, introduction of virus in

Western country, use of Ebola as biological weapon). Finally, there were questions

stemming from an even broader perspective, that of global public health. These

pertained to the justification of Ebola research and surveillance in the face of

statistically larger burdens of health. The three-tiered distinction - micro, macro, and

global - is convenient for illustrative purposes, but in order to get a sense of the

interconnectedness of the layers, we shall treat the issues collectively.

As one survey respondent stated, Ebola is a ‘real challenge for field epidemiology’

and the only virus whose natural history is unknown 30 years after the discovery of

the disease’s etiology.122 Yet the hunt for the reservoir began as early as November

1976, when a survey team from the International Commission searched the environs

of Yambuku. The team caught mosquitoes in glass tubes, collected bedbugs from

beds and soil, trapped bats in nets, got hunters to shoot monkeys, villagers to capture

rodents, and finally extracted the organs of two cows and the blood of ten pigs for

testing. No trace of the Ebola virus was found. The low mosquito activity during the

outbreak, and the rarity of A. aegypti suggested that arthropod transmission was

unlikely. The high mortality of monkeys infected with Marburg relegated non-human

primates low in the list of potential suspects.

122
Survey 27.
 48

A reservoir search was also performed in Nzara, Sudan, but eight months after the

initial outbreak, between January and February 1977. By that time, the seasonal

fluctuations, cyclical life patterns and short life-span of many organisms had

inevitably altered the forest environment. The authors of this early study dwell on

bats as possible reservoirs, although serological evidence for this suspicion was not

yet available. They noted:

[…] the known range of Tadarida (Mops) trevori […] closely paralleled the
distribution in Sudan and Zaire, the area of the epidemic. This bat species was
collected from a large roof colony in the cotton factory directly over the
storeroom where the primary cases worked and which was laden with faeces
and urine. Several bats were collected in the room on the desk of the
unfortunate primary case. Although conjecture only, it is interesting.123

The authors also devote a paragraph on the effect of anthropogenic ecological

disturbances on human health. This was to become a topos in the discourse on

emerging infectious diseases.124

In 1989, a new strain of Ebola was imported in the United States via infected primates

from the Philippines. Prior to this event, Ebola was believed to be confined to Africa,

so the question was: how did Ebola get there? There were two distinct hypotheses:

some unknown migratory host could have transported the virus from Africa to Asia.

A recent example of this trans-oceanic expansion of disease range is the epidemic of

West Nile Virus in New York City in the fall of 1999. This was the first recorded

appearance of the disease in North America. Infected birds, along with mosquitoes

and humans, are suspected culprits. Alternatively, the Ebola virus could have been

introduced artificially, possibly through the illegal importation of live African

monkeys. The discovery of Ebola Reston (REBOV) in the Philippines, one of the
123
Arata, A., and Johnson, B., ‘Approaches Towards Studies on Potential Reservoirs of Viral
Haemorrhagic Fever in Southern Sudan (1977)’, in Pattyn, S.R., p. 137.
124
Arata, A. and Johnson, B., p. 138.
 49

world’s primary suppliers of monkeys for biomedical research, is a cause for concern.

Although REBOV is considered nonpathogenic to humans, the direct infection of

Ebola Côte d’Ivoire (CIEBOV) from a dead monkey to a Swiss researcher in 1994

bears testimony to the perils of the illegal - and indeed legal - monkey trade.

Furthermore, the feasibility of manipulating Ebola to enhance, or trigger, lethality

makes even a nonpathogenic strain a potential danger to humans.

In June 1995, another survey team attempted to solve the ‘reservoir’ mystery. The

team painstakingly reconstructed the activities of the index case and collected

specimens in accordance with his previous whereabouts. By the end of the five week

investigation, the team had gathered 34 985 arthropods, including more than 15 000

mosquitoes, and over 12 000 ticks and bedbugs.125 Again, no virus was found. The

authors adopted what Arata and Johnson, the two biologists who first hunted the

reservoir in 1977, called the ‘catch all and analyze all’ philosophy.126 Although not

directly related to the topic at hand, two comments from the article are worth quoting.

At the outset of the article, the authors remind the reader that past studies have

revealed no evidence of arthropod transmission. They continue

However, since many of the diseases that the public associate with the tropics
are vector borne, there was strong pressure to include arthropods in the work
of the international teams. (my emphasis)

At the end of the article, the authors express their regret on the poor timing of the

study, but confess that ‘the urgency of making a visible response to the widely

publicized human tragedy was an important factor in the decision-making process’. 127

These comments reflect the lasting association of the tropics with vector-borne

diseases, and reveal the practical consequences of such preconceptions. Scientists

125
Reiter, P., et al., p. S151.
126
Arata, A., and Johnson, B., p. 138.
127
Reiter, P., et al., p. S148 and p. S153.
 50

must respond to the expectations of the public, and Reiter’s remark on the need for an

immediate ‘visible response’ confirms this.

Also in June 1995, the WHO and CDC sponsored another survey to elucidate the

identity of the reservoir. On this occasion, researchers only tested vertebrates but the

results were no different: no trace of Ebola. Unlike the other reports however, the

review highlights in some detail the logistical difficulties encountered in the field,

namely the

[…] transport and power supply problems, the cold-chain maintenance of

biologic materials, lack of up-to-date maps of the area to help select sample
collection sites, recruitment of specialist staff members, and biosafety
concerns.128

These comments are reminders that investigations, even ecological studies, did not

occur in a vacuum, but within social contexts that at times hindered research efforts.

This will be discussed later.

The quest for the reservoir, in spite of the extensive surveys, remains unfulfilled.

Most survey respondents agree that finding the reservoir would substantially affect

control efforts, allowing more focused control measures, preventing initial infection

of the index case and dispelling deleterious rumours and myths on the disease.129 On

the other hand, some doubt the impact of unmasking the reservoir on disease

prevention. Professor Susan Fisher-Hoch, formerly of the CDC and now based at the

University of Texas, explained in an e-mail:

Normally it is essential not just to know but to understand the reservoir.

However, with Ebola, things are different. Primary infections with Ebola are
extraordinarily rare. Sure, it would be useful to be able to predict or prevent

128
Leirs, H., et al., ‘Search for the Ebola Virus Reservoir in Kikwit, DRC’, The Journal of Infectious
Diseases, 179 (supplement 1, 1999), p. S159.
129
56% of respondents believed that identifying the reservoir would have an ‘important effect’, while
38% deemed the finding of ‘modest’ importance.
 51

them, but given that they probably occur in very remote locations under
conditions we cannot hope to control without destroying all tropical rainforests,
we have to live with the fact that occasionally primary infections will occur,
unpredictably. 130

However useful the identification of the reservoir turns out to be, the mysterious

origins of Ebola, coupled with the lack of treatment and prophylaxis, have contributed

to the disease’s notoriety. The disease’s enigmatic provenance has fuelled the

metaphors representing the virus as an indiscernible ‘stalker’, and field

epidemiologists as intrepid ‘hunters’.

Beyond the Reach of Science

On a more general level, the emergence of Ebola and other new infectious diseases

out of the African rainforests caused some disquiet in the public health community.

Ebola became an oft-cited example of the dangers of anthropogenic environmental

disturbances on human health. Yet the articles in the media usually construed

deforestation and other man-induced disturbances as invariably nefarious. They

failed to acknowledge the paradox inherent to the problem. It is economically

nonsensical to stop roadbuilding and logging in many African countries since these

are essential for their financial development. As Wilkie et al. write of the Congo

Basin:

The development of roads and road networks is strongly correlated with

economic growth and national wealth and linked to the scale of ecological
disturbance and natural resource degradation.131

130
Personal Communication, 28 March 2002.
131
Wilkie, D., et al., ‘Roads, Development, and Conservation in the Congo Basin’, Conservation
Biology, 14, 6 (2000), 1614-15.
 52

The construction of roads, by reducing or destroying habitats, leads to the loss of

species and very occasionally unleashes pathogens that affect humans. But roads also

lower expensive transport costs, reduce insect damage common to floating timber logs,

and provide more bushmeat to local hunters. Press articles rarely mention the

economic necessity of deforestation to impoverished countries such as the DRC. The

issue is not whether deforestation should be practiced, but, as Wilkie et al. assert, how

to ‘maximize[s] the social and economic benefits [of deforestation] and minimize[s]

environmental damage’.132 In short, media and, in some cases, scientific articles have

presented an oversimplified and one-sided exposition of the problem, focusing on

ecology but ignoring economy, both of which have an impact on human health.

Economic, and thus political, considerations cannot be divorced from discussions on

environmental change.

Ebola epidemics have erupted in countries with adverse political conditions. In

Gabon, Uganda and the DRC, central governments have struggled to stave off rebel

groups, and experienced corruption among their ranks. Political issues have

repeatedly affected the control and management procedures of Ebola epidemics. In

the most recent outbreak in Gabon (2001/2002), the rebels occupying the eastern half

of the country were asked to allow the free movement of doctors and sufferers.

Rebels apart, ongoing elections also affected the deployment of assistance. In a

telephone interview, Bernard Morinière said:

The government was right in the middle of an election period so there was a
delay in providing assistance. The Prime Minister also resigned which didn’t
help things. In fact, the region had the legislative elections postponed due to
the outbreak and the two competing candidates claimed the government used
Ebola to ruin their chances. So it was all very complicated.133

132
Wilkie, D., et al., p. 1620.
133
Personal Communication, 11 March 2002.
 53

In Uganda (2000/1), epidemiologists faced the threat of violent rebel groups. Dan

Bausch, Acting Chief of the Special Pathogens Branch of the CDC, recounted: ‘one

problem […] was the Resistance Army. There were no incidents but we needed

military escorts to go from one place to the other’.134 This threat prevented the tracing

of suspected cases living in rural areas, increasing the risk of virus spread.

Faced with myriad domestic problems and fearful of Ebola’s impact on trade and

tourism, governments have at times reacted half-heartedly to Ebola alerts. Anecdotal

but pertinent is the story of Bonzali Katanga, district health officer of Watsa-Durba in

the DRC. In late 1998, Dr. Bonzali witnessed a string of unusual deaths among gold

miners and, suspecting Ebola or Marburg, alerted his superiors by radio. Despite

repeated pleas for urgent assistance, it was six months before any help arrived. Once

on site, the investigators found Dr. Bonzali dead, and a sample of his blood carefully

preserved in the refrigerator so that the disease could be identified. 135 Scientists

isolated Marburg virus from the sample. Cathy Roth asserts that such attempts to

alert the outside world were also made in Kikwit (1995), DRC. This is confirmed by

one of the survey respondents, who claims that ‘information was not reported to the

central government quickly and precisely’ and that the ‘government was reluctant to

accept the fact [the existence of an Ebola outbreak], […] wanted to hide its epidemic,

and delayed its alarm’.136 Referring to the 1994 and 1996 Ebola outbreaks in Gabon,

and based on internal documents from non-governmental organizations, Borchert et al.

reveal that ‘the central level has occasionally played down the seriousness of the

134
Personal Communication, 8 March 2002.
135
Roth, C., Personal Communication, 8 April 2002. Also, Vick, K., ‘Where Disease and War
Intersect’, washingtonpost.com, 17 October 2000. Available Online:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A19573-
2000Oct16
136
Survey 10.
 54

situation or discouraged the disclosure of outbreak information to the international

community’.137 When asked if such reactions were common, Cathy Roth replied:

It depends on the country. In some cases, it might be beneficial to call for help
as it would give international attention to their desperate situation. In others,
the governments are worried about trade, tourism, and the reaction of other
countries.138

The Ebola outbreak in Uganda, for example, considerably affected the country’s

tourism industry, even though the epidemic was geographically limited. 139 An

outbreak of, say, Measles would not have produced such an effect. The reluctance of

governments to openly acknowledge Ebola outbreaks is thus linked to the popular

perception of the disease. An Ebola epidemic, through the ink and lens of hundreds

of foreign journalists and reporters, reflects negatively on the afflicted country. With

no coverage, however, an epidemic is harmless to the international reputation of a

nation.

Despite the best efforts of scientists to solve Ebola’s many puzzles, economic and

political factors in epidemic countries leave the complete resolution of problems

beyond the reach of science alone. Much like Russian dolls, the immediate problems

are embedded within larger ones, but the publicized drama of Ebola outbreaks often

obscure the fundamental issues to be addressed. Both the media and the scientific

literature fail to mention the larger biosocial contexts in which epidemics occur.

Even after 30 years, the epidemiological puzzle of Ebola epidemics remains

unresolved, but the underlying causes of the epidemics are far from inscrutable: civil

137
Borchert, M., et al. ‘Viewpoint: Filovirus Haemorrhagic Fever Outbreaks’, Tropical Medicine and
International Health, 5, 5 (2000), p. 321, and Personal Communication, 12 May 2002.
138
Personal Communication, 8 April 2002.
139
Busharizi, P., ‘Ebola Hits Uganda’s Tourism Revival Effort’, Reuters News Service, 27 December
2000.
 55

conflict, rash environmental disturbances, poor public health infrastructures and

irresponsible governments both cause and exacerbate epidemics.

 56

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

With the regular identification of newly emerging infections, the close study of

Ebola’s turbulent history becomes increasingly important. For although statistically

minor, the lessons learnt from Ebola might well prove useful in the handling of other

fulminating diseases. This short thesis examined what can be termed the ‘Ebola

phenomenon’, the sudden rise of a hitherto trivial disease to a ‘Hollywood’ virus, and

analyzed the many changes that accompanied this transformation. More than the fact

itself, the consequences of this notoriety reveal the extent to which the social

construction of a disease influences its control and management.

The far-reaching tentacles of the media impeded control measures by their

invasiveness, and exasperated scientists in the field. The terrifying image of the virus

projected by the media proliferated outwards to distant countries and continents, and

unwittingly stigmatized Ebola-struck nations. The metaphorical mutation of the virus

into a disfiguring and, above all, mobile killer engendered irrational fears of pandemic

spread. These fears, made worse by the threat of bioterrorism, spurred governments

to inject additional funds into Ebola research, and sparked off a competitive struggle

for attention among the relevant laboratories and scientists.

 57

Away from the hypothetical, the very real social impact of Ebola outbreaks was

obscured by the sobriety of scientific articles and the sensationalism of the mass

media. The behaviour of affected African communities, especially before the arrival

of the international teams, was largely overlooked by the literature. Although

common to many outbreaks, foreign scientists did not anticipate local resistance to the

control measures. They acted in ignorance of the belief systems underlying the

actions of the indigenous populations. The many rumours that circulated during

epidemics show that indigenous theories of disease causation are plentiful, and some

quite dissimilar to biomedical aetiology. A historical glance at past Ebola outbreaks

makes clear the importance of cultural sensitivity in limiting confrontations.

Neither did the scientists imagine the horror and panic they would find on arrival at

the epidemic sites. The fear they experienced was heightened by the nature of the

virus itself, in particular the untreatability of the disease, the unknown reservoir, and

the near certainty of its clinical course. This work has shown to what extent Ebola

outbreaks turn affected communities topsy-turvy, and examined the roles of the

various actors - African and Western - in this drama.

Finally, the observations of the scientists in the field exposed broader issues, such as

the effects of political instability, and the barely existing public health infrastructures.

These problems, intrinsically associated with epidemics of Ebola and other diseases,

are simply beyond the reach of science. What emerges from the thesis is an idea of

the intricate web of events and issues that surround what is essentially a core of sub-

microscopic virions. The complexity of the pathogen itself is, as it were, translated

into a broader conceptual density.

 58

APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF SURVEYS SENT TO 16 FIELD SCIENTISTS

• Question 1: ‘Do you think we are better able to deal with Ebola epidemics
today than in 1976?’

a) yes, definitely
b) yes, but not much
c) no

Results: 140

a b c TOTAL
Number of replies 9 6 1 16
Percentage of total (%) 56 38 6 100

Comments:

▪ Better understanding of epidemiology, although reservoir unknown.

▪ Better knowledge of clinical course of disease, although no treatment or
vaccine.
▪ Higher on index of suspicion.
▪ Better knowledge of transmission.
▪ More international partners to control epidemics.
▪ Standards for surveillance and clinical care established.
▪ Prevention is, however, difficult. Human behaviour and environmental
change not easy to modify. Need to enhance acceptability of control measures.
▪ Problem is getting simple equipment for barrier nursing to isolated,
impoverished communities. Also, early recognition and notification of
outbreaks is vital.

• Question 2: ‘Ebola has appeared with increasing frequency in the last few
years. Can you see this trend continuing? Any reasons?

140
Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. Consequently, the total may not equal 100.
 59

Yes No Don’t know TOTAL

Number of replies 15 0 1 16
Percentage of total (%) 94 0 6 100

Comments:

▪ Better awareness and detection.

▪ Better communication to signal outbreak.
▪ Unknown reservoir host makes spillage from reservoir to human population
difficult to prevent.
▪ Ill-defined epidemiological belt.
▪ Increase in trade, population movement, and civil unrest, facilitating
dissemination of virus.
▪ Environmental degradation.
▪ Poor infrastructure and hospitals.
▪ Increased population densities, more movement into forest, and closer contact
with monkeys.

• Question 3: ‘Past outbreaks of Ebola have shown that there is often a

considerable delay between the appearance of the index case and the triggering
of the alarm. What kind of things, from your experience, cause this delay? And
what do you think can realistically be done to reduce them.’

Comments:

Causes:

▪ Poor accessibility to health care, due to weak public health system caused by
economic breakdown, war or negligence.
▪ Consultation of traditional healers, delaying response.
▪ Lack of concern at community, regional and central levels until health workers
affected. Low transmission levels until amplification event.
▪ Non-specific clinical symptoms. Lack of familiarity with disease, so late
physician recognition.
▪ Lack of trained staff, and diagnostic capability.
▪ Poor international collaboration and coordination of laboratory, epidemiologic
and public health support.
▪ Desire of some researchers to control all specimens and data. Reluctance of
central government to acknowledge problem.

Solutions:

▪ Better surveillance and response systems.

▪ Heightened awareness of disease in risk areas.
▪ Reduce isolation of most communities, which means dealing with political and
military impasses causing poverty and isolation.
▪ More political commitment of governments to improve public health.
 60

▪ Promotion of training and sensitization of health professionals to disease.

▪ Focus on hospitals (health workers at highest risk), then peripheral health units.
▪ Improving mechanism for collection and shipment of samples from suspected
cases to appropriate lab for confirmation.
▪ Wide availability of simple diagnostic tests.

• Question 4: ‘Ebola, like the Sabia virus, still has an unknown reservoir, to
what extent do you think this unknown element affects the control and
management of the disease.’

Important effect Modest effect Hard to tell TOTAL

Number of replies 9 6 1 16
Percentage of total (%) 56 38 6 100

Comments:

Important effect:

▪ Greatly affects detection, hence control.

▪ Fear of unknown, fuels rumours and irrational attitudes.
▪ More focused prevention (especially in high-risk areas) and control once
natural cycle elucidated.
▪ Ability to cut transmission cycle, preventing occurrence of index case.

Modest effect:

▪ Depends on outbreak. In Gabon (2001/2002), important effect, as multiple

introductions probably involved. In most cases, usually single person infected
and then person-person transmission.
▪ Reservoir probably bat – ecological niche known and can already advise
people not to handle dead animals.
▪ Contact between reservoir and humans is rare, so knowledge of exact species
unlikely to reduce frequency of contact. We also know areas where primary
cases are likely to arise. Main problem is poor hospital conditions.
▪ Better understanding of ecological circumstances leading to Ebola outbreaks
may help to make predictions.

Hard to tell:

▪ Hard to tell until reservoir and chain of transmission are known.

• Question 5: ‘Did you sense that the locals were suspicious of you and the
international teams?’
 61

Yes No Depends No answer TOTAL

Number of replies 6 6 3 1 16
Percentage of total (%) 38 38 19 6 101

Comments:

Yes:

▪ In latest Gabonese and DRC outbreak: no support from local and national
authorities due to elections.
▪ In some areas where disease is new, refusal or denial of disease by people.
▪ Little understanding among some populations of transmissible infectious
agents – belief that ‘white man’ is responsible for introducing the virus.
Information for local population vital. But resistance understandable, as
sometimes enormous adaptations are asked of locals, such as breaking burial
traditions and telling hunter/gatherer societies to cease hunting.
▪ In Uganda: little help at national level/ managerial level, especially when
figures not tallying and discrepancies arose. Competition and mistrust among
internationals occasionally affected control interventions. Some locals refused
to go into isolation.

No:

▪ Affected local communities cooperative in Uganda (with one exception when

population refused to offer a burial ground and to have an isolation unit
created in a district hospital for fear of spread). In most outbreaks, local
people very involved and cooperative.
▪ In 1976 Zaire outbreak, people leading control efforts had thorough
knowledge of country, language and customs. Great deal of time spent with
village chiefs to educate and facilitate cooperation.

• Question 6: ‘Did the locals do anything, willingly or unwillingly, that prevented

or slowed down the implementation of control procedures? If so, can you list
some?’

Yes No No answer TOTAL

Number of replies 9 5 2 16
Percentage of total (%) 57 31 13 101

Comments:

▪ Hiding cases and not providing names and whereabouts of contacts.

▪ Refusing contacts to be seen or ill family members to enter isolation units.
▪ Continuing burial rites despite recommendations not to do so.
▪ Stigmatization of cases, contacts and survivors.
▪ Overt acts of hostility (road blocks, threatening gestures with weapons)
 62

▪ Continuing to eat chimpanzee meat and consulting traditional healers.

▪ Not keeping distance to other family members and not using barrier nursing
during care giving.
▪ Spreading vicious rumours about experts bringing disease.
▪ Good cooperation early in outbreak, but not in middle of control effort
because of perceived danger. Return to previous practices once emergency
over.
▪ Zaire, 1976: good cooperation because of time spent with villagers explaining
and enlisting help. Local custom to isolate village when threatened from
outside.

• Question 7: ‘Did you find local health authorities cooperative?’

Yes No Reasonably Varies No answer TOTAL

Replies 8 1 2 4 1 16
% 50 5 13 25 6 99

Comments:

▪ Yambuku outbreak: Local health workers helped as best they could,

especially as many locals and internationals refused to because of fear. Local
health workers did fear working on isolation ward.
▪ Uganda outbreak: strong national support to control disease. Heads of
hospitals and district health officers dealt almost uniquely with Ebola for four
months.
▪ Varies with country. Sometimes very cooperative, other times only when
pressured.
▪ Gabon (2001/2): cooperative locally, less so at central level.
▪ Depends on local health authority. Degree of politics always involved, some
attempt to make political capital from outbreak, attempt to impress. Unhappy
when negative statements about epidemic announced (‘the same thing would
happen in the USA.’)

• Question 8: ‘Had international teams not arrived at all, do you think the
evolution of the epidemic would have been radically different?’

Yes No Depends on Don’t No answer TOTAL

outbreak know
Replies 10 3 1 1 1 16
% 63 19 6 6 6 100

Comments:

Yes:
 63

▪ Uganda: more experience with disease, extra resources for outbreak control in
terms of manpower, mobilization of required resources and logistics, CDC lab
for on-site case confirmation. Getting people into isolation. Estimate: in
Uganda outbreak, instead of approximately 400 cases, probably 700 or 800.
More intense human-human transmission and nosocomial transmission.
▪ As local capacity increases, evolution might be less affected by arrival of
international teams.

No:

▪ Yambuku, arrival of team as epidemic was waning so negligible impact on

evolution (but led to documentation of the disease!).
▪ Most epidemics more or less over by the time team arrives. Local people
isolate spontaneously, flee hospitals (epicenters of disease) and impose simple
form of quarantine. Allusion to 1976, when local chiefs put up own cordons
sanitaires (remembering smallpox procedures).

• Question 9: ‘“Research in filoviruses is an investment into an uncertain future:

nobody knows how useful it will be in the end.” (Borchert et al., 2000)141 Do you
consider money spent on the development of an Ebola vaccine or other Ebola-
related projects (surveillance, reservoir seeking) a good use of limited
resources?’

Yes No No opinion No answer given TOTAL

Replies 10 4 0 2 16
% 63 25 0 13 101

Comments:

Yes:

▪ Value of possessing antiviral drug and vaccine for healthcare workers,

laboratory workers, and selected communities during outbreaks.
▪ Importance of antiviral drug for ‘nasty eventualities’. Problem is that affected
countries are not spending their limited resources.
▪ Ebola and related disease ‘turn endemic areas, countries, WHO and the world
topsy turvy when outbreaks occur’.
▪ Important to know reservoir to predict future outbreaks.
▪ Strengthening surveillance and outbreak preparedness on national and
international level is the most important approach.

No:

▪ Definite overemphasis. Money better spent on ‘well managed, transparent

development programs, and AIDS’.

141
Borchert, M. et al. ‘Viewpoint: Filovirus Haemorrhagic Fever Outbreaks: Much Ado About
Nothing?', Tropical Medicine and International Health, 5, 5 (2000), p. 322.
 64

▪ Other infectious diseases need more urgent work in terms of vaccine

development. Vaccine not really needed at present time.
▪ Ebola surveillance, on its own, would not be a good investment. Frequency
and scale of epidemics, combined with limited resources, do not justify
spending.
▪ ‘Not cost-effective at a spectacular level’. Some funds, however, needed for
reservoir seeking, surveillance, and training of health personnel.

• Question 10: ‘From your experience on the field with Ebola and other diseases,
what problems did you encounter with Ebola that were not found when dealing
with other microbes?’

Comments:

▪ Yambuku: Starting from scratch in defining clinical and epidemiological

features.
▪ Obtaining volunteers to help in the field due to high infection and fatality rate.
▪ Protecting oneself and others from Ebola and other endemic diseases.
▪ Limited information on disease.
▪ Risk of nosocomial spread.
▪ Spectacular nature of disease.
▪ More institutions/organizations involved.
▪ Strong competition among implementers of control strategies. Use of
outbreaks for personal growth among researchers.
▪ Potential for contact infection during field and clinical investigations.
▪ Fear of infection by many team members because of lack of vaccine and
treatment.
▪ Need to achieve very high standard of hospital hygiene to avoid nosocomial
transmission.
▪ Stigmatization of survivors by community. Their possessions and homes were
burned in Uganda.
▪ Stress of seeing entire families and hospital wards wiped out by the disease.
▪ International fear for local disease: negative impact of media coverage
(comparison of Ugandan outbreak with simultaneous yellow fever outbreak in
Guinea with very little international aid).
▪ Sensitiveness of central government on the issue.
▪ Hype and importance of dealing with media.

• Question 11: ‘Some experts have suggested downgrading EHF to a BSL-3

status. What is your stance on this?’

Agree Disagree Depends No No TOTAL

opinion answer
Number of replies 2 7 1 5 1 16
Percentage of 13 44 6 31 6 100
total (%)
 65

Comments:

Agree:

▪ No BSL grade when dealing with patients.

▪ Would accelerate research.

Disagree:

▪ Ebola fits the criteria established for p4 agents. No antiviral, no vaccine.

▪Politically, hard to justify lab accident if reduced to p3. Estimate: if lowered
to p3, death of lab worker every 1 or 2 years.

Depends:

▪ PCR after sterilisation with GIT-buffer should not require BSL-4 facilities.
Isolating/cultivating virus should. PCR could therefore play role of early
diagnostic technique while virus isolation/cultivation should remain limited to
BSL-4 labs.

• Question 12: ‘Moren contrasts the $7.5 million dollars spent on the 1995
Kikwit outbreak with the measles epidemics in Niger in 1991 and 1995, which led
to 100 000 cases with a CFR of 10% but little national or international attention.
Why do you think Ebola enjoys such attention?’142

Comments:

▪ Rare. Exotic. Novel. Frightening.

▪ Dramatic clinical course and high fatality rate.
▪ Lack of vaccine or drugs.
▪ Weapon weaponized by Soviets so direct interest by US military.
▪ Affects all age groups and otherwise healthy people.
▪ Publicity. Media interest for stories of gruesome diseases, fuelled by
mysterious nature of disease (e.g. unknown reservoir). Focus of writers on
Ebola (articles, books, films and, in Zaire, songs).

142
Moren, A., ‘Co-ordination of International Responses to Epidemics’, in Greenwood, B., and De
Cock, K., New and Resurgent Infections: Prediction, Detection and Management of Tomorrow’s
Epidemics (Chichester, 1998), p. 149.
 66

SUMMARY OF SURVEYS SENT TO 17 LABORATORY SCIENTISTS

• Question 1: ‘Since 1976, our knowledge of the virology of Ebola has increased
quite considerably, yet do you think we are better able to deal with Ebola
epidemics today than in 1976?’

a) yes, definitely
b) yes, but not much
c) no

Results:

a b C TOTAL
Number of replies 8 8 1 17
Percentage of total (%) 47 47 6 100

Comments:

Positive:

▪ Improved diagnostics and faster identification.

▪ Precautions to be taken for management of patient clearly defined, as well as
organisation of isolation unit in rural setting.
▪ Possession of specific immunoglobulins for emergency preventive
maintenance. Knowledge of the efficiency of plasmopheresis, coagulation
therapy, etc.

▪ Depends on how rapidly the disease is detected. Political sensitivities with

various countries also involved in quality and usefulness of response.

Negative:

▪ ‘On the surface, the 2000-2001 outbreak in Uganda with 400+ cases doesn’t
look much different to the outbreaks in the late 1970s.’
▪ Lack of knowledge and interest of Ebola natural history and human population
at risk (habits, behaviour), as demonstrated by hostile attitude of local
population in the current epidemic in Gabon.
▪ Response too late after appearance of index case (generally 3+ months).
▪ Reservoir unknown.
▪ Barrier nursing still key to controlling outbreak. ‘Science has not yet kicked
in’, simply adherence to good hygiene.
▪ Still much to understand on pathogenesis of virus.
 67

• Question 2: ‘Some experts have suggested downgrading Ebola to BSL-3 status.

What is your stance on this? Do you think it would accelerate research?’

Agree Disagree No opinion TOTAL

Number of replies 3 14 0 17
Percentage of total 18 82 0 100
(%)

Comments:

Agree:

▪ Highly virulent but infection easily prevented by barrier nursing.

▪ Controllable. No aerosol. Only contaminated blood is infected – ‘most
common thing in virology’.

Disagree:

▪ No possible prophylaxis. Too many unknowns. Excessive risk involved for

laboratory personnel.
▪ If downgraded, laboratory acquired infections and unnecessary deaths likely.
Knock-on effects for research in case of infections (huge clamp-down,
recriminations, etc.).
▪ Biosecurity issues to consider. Research ‘moving forward pretty well now’.

• Question 3: ‘Do you believe enough money is injected into Ebola laboratory
research?’

Yes No TOTAL
Number of replies 5 12 17
Percentage of total (%) 29 71 100

Comments:

Yes:

▪ Ebola doesn’t represent public health issue; main issue is bioterrorism and
enough money is injected in research for that purpose.
▪ Relative to the public health need and the risk, enough money is attributed to
Ebola research.
▪ Enough money, but improper distribution of funds. More money given for
very visible projects than real science (e.g. long term studies or surveys).

No:

▪ Adhere to highest safety standards and maintenance of facilities naturally

expensive. Staff have to retain their scientific skills at this level.
 68

▪ Ebola is of no immediate epidemiological concern outside endemic areas, so

Government and Granting Authorities only generous when imported case of
Viral Haemorrhagic Fever case is identified in Northern Hemisphere.
▪ No long term international or national strategies in place to address the
research or skill acquisition deficiencies. Those that exist are disjointed.
▪ In UK, very little spent on exotic pathogens. Globally, situation more
satisfactory.
▪ Potential of bioterrorism justifies more research on antivirals and perhaps a
vaccine.
▪ Recent plus in bioterrorism dollars, but key is getting the funds to the
researchers actually working on Ebola.

• Question 4: ‘Is there enough cooperation between laboratories and researchers

working on Ebola? If not, why is this and what consequences does this have?’

Yes No Depends No opinion TOTAL

Number of Replies 8 6 2 1 17
Percentage % 47 35 12 6 100

Comments:

Yes:

▪ Majority of labs work collaborate.

▪ USAMRIID mentioned twice: try very hard to help but overwhelmed.
▪ Lack of collaboration more likely to stem from funding deficiencies.
▪ More collaboration possible.

No:

▪ All labs and researchers following own scientific and political agendas; they
ensure any advances made feed their own research funding requirements.
▪ Few labs work on Ebola, so lack of international cooperation means all labs
try to cover wide range of interests (anti-virals, diagnostic and reagent
development, molecular epidemiology, understanding pathogenesis). This
approach is not cost-effective way of using scarce resources. Ideally, facilities
should support 1) exchange of scientists 2) receive visiting scientists 3) non
infectious programmes.
▪ Research scientists competitive by nature. Some get along, others don’t. Ego
and lack of trust (founded or unfounded) are main reasons for poor
cooperation.
▪ Laboratories that have access to critical material, such as primary human
materials from outbreaks, tend to be very protective of those materials and are
extremely reluctant to share with others in the field.
▪ Small trust of politicians towards scientists, which restricts cooperation
between labs. Note: security issues can pose logistical barriers between
international labs and researchers who might otherwise wish to cooperate.
 69

▪ CDC mentioned twice as possessive of BSL-4 agents and uncooperative.

Consequence: slower pace of research.

Other:

▪ How is cooperation defined? Two labs working together, not just one side
providing means and support. Lab wishing to get into field must ‘bring
something to the table’ and not simply provide whatever is requested.

• Question 5: ‘Do you think Ebola research should be directly relevant to what is
occurring on the field?’

Yes No No answer TOTAL

Number of Replies 6 7 4 17
Percentage % 35 41 24 100

Comments:

Yes:

▪ Vital need for constant surveillance systems in proven endemic areas. Need to
transfer diagnostic technologies and reagents to local areas, and educate local
population on these and other infections. This requires providing supportive
infrastructure. (WHO attempts at outbreak response support is dependent on
countries allowing and supporting the redeployment of experienced staff to
affected areas. This can be very slow and bureaucratic.)

No:

▪ Need for basic research, as well as goal-oriented work. Contributions in an

unrelated area can have unforeseen benefits later.
▪ Research should cover significant spectrum of fundamental problems.
▪ ‘Research should be unfettered’
▪ Ebola research should focus on understanding fundamental mechanisms of
disease pathogenesis – this is vital for the development of candidate vaccines
and identify targets for chemotherapeutic interventions. Volchkov’s reverse
genetics system ‘should be instrumental in studying key regulatory elements in
the viral life cycle, and will likely result in the development of new vaccines,
e.g. replication-deficient viruses’.

• Question 6: ‘The literature has often criticized the sensitivity of certain

diagnostic tests, leading to false alarms and, likewise, missed cases. Do you
consider this a major problem?’
 70

Yes No TOTAL
Number of replies 4 13 17
Percentage (%) 24 76 100

Comments:

Yes:

▪ Some groups don’t question their results.

▪ RT-PCR inherently prone to cross-contamination. The more widespread use
of this technique may cause new filoviruses to go unnoticed, ‘would RT-PCR
pick up a new Ebola virus?’.
▪ No substitute for viral isolation and/or direct visualization of virions, but
logistical issues concerning utilization of these techniques in affected
countries.

No:

▪ Several tests can be combined for diagnosis of acute cases.

▪ Most important thing until diagnosis is revealed is isolation of patient.
▪ One problem is occasional overreaction of popular press.
▪ False positive doesn’t lead to missed cases.
▪ Ebola diagnosis is easy to do, but labs don’t want to give the appropriate
inactivated antigen to ones that don’t have p4 facilities.
▪ Population-based serosurveys problematic in past, but newer tests should
provide more reliable results. Many ‘cross-reactive’ tests were serological,
but contemporary ones are molecular based.

• Question 7: ‘A new, faster diagnostic test has very recently been developed. Do
you think this will have a significant impact on case identification?’

a) yes, definitely
b) yes, but not much
c) no
d) no answer selected

a B c D TOTAL
Number of Replies 2 8 2 5 17
Percentage % 12 47 12 29 101

Comments:

Yes, definitely:

▪ Allows diagnosis at early phase of disease and requires minimum safety

precautions to be performed.
 71

Yes, but not much & No:

▪ Not much of an impact now, but should in 5-10 years time.

▪ Test needs to be available in remote places in Africa.
▪ Test essentially a new sample preparation procedure, based on existing RT-
PCR methods, so probably not a big impact.
▪ Possible impact of case identification, but not detection of epidemics,
especially sporadic cases.
▪ Key to detection is clinical observations by clinicians, without that even the
best diagnostic assays are not useful.

Other:

▪ Test yet to be validated with clinical cases and outbreak situations.

▪ System should be validated by all laboratories working on Ebola to establish
reliable quality assurance and control system.
▪ Too early to say. Most important thing is availability of test to physician in
endemic/enzootic areas.

• Question 8: ‘From your experience with Ebola and with other microbes, in
what way would you consider Ebola unique or unusual?’

Comments:

▪ Very high mortality rate and no treatment.

▪ Spectacular symptoms, dramatic course of disease.
▪ More frightening.
▪ Inability to determine natural history after knowing infective agent for 25
years.
▪ Easy spread in family and hospital setting if isolation and necessary
precautions not implemented.
▪ Scientific questions based on virus evolution and understanding of pathogenic
processes during disease stages (transmission, infection, disease, death and
recovery) that are intriguing areas requiring answers.
▪ Ability to completely shut down normal anti-viral mechanisms.
▪ Extent of spread of virus throughout body.
▪ Celebrity status. Voraciousness of popular press.
▪ Social hysteria engendered by outbreak.
▪ Significant threat of bioterrorism.
▪ ‘Do not consider Ebola more unique or unusual than other agents’.
▪ ‘It is not very unique – the mortality rate in the case of Rabies is much higher.’

• Question 9: ‘Moren contrasts the $7.5 million dollars spent on the 1995 Kikwit
outbreak with the measles epidemics in Niger in 1991 and 1995, which led to 100
000 cases with a case fatality rate of 10% but little national or international
attention. Why do you think Ebola enjoys such attention?’
 72

Comments:

▪ Mediatisation of virus by movies, press, etc.

▪ Fear of spread of disease out of endemic countries.
▪ Fear of bioterrorism.
▪ Exoticism of Ebola.
▪ Mysterious nature of Ebola.
▪ Explosive and unpredictable outbreaks with high mortality.
▪ Lack of understanding of natural history.
▪ No proven anti-virals available.
▪ Bleeding more mediatic than encephalitis.
▪ One mention of Kikwit outbreak providing the CDC with opportunity to draw
the attention of the US Congress on emerging diseases and to boost a hitherto
decreasing Special Pathogens Branch budget.
▪ Vaccine available for Measles (although coverage level is low in developing
countries).
▪ Measles is ‘common place’ – people in developed countries don’t understand
fatality of Measles outbreaks in poorly nourished countries. ‘Measles, not
Ebola, is an embarrassing failure of science, medicine, and politics. Ebola is
simply a scientific curiosity.’

• Question 10: ‘Do you consider the fear of Ebola being used as a biological
weapon unfounded or exaggerated?’

Yes No No Answer TOTAL

Number of replies 6 10 1 17
Percentage (%) 35 59 6 100

Comments:

Yes:

▪ Real threat but exaggerated.

▪ Difficult to use as biological weapon, but might be good weapon of
bioterrorism.

No:

▪ High fatality rate, no treatment, no vaccine, easy spread.

▪ Synthesizing Ebola ‘WILL happen sooner or later’. Synthesizing the virus
will get easier with time.
▪ Probability nevertheless quite low; disease unlikely to spread widely. Impact
would still be significant due to notoriety of Ebola. Mass hysteria even in the
absence of a large-scale epidemic.
▪ References to September 11th, anthrax incidents, Tokyo cult.
 73

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Arata, A., and Johnson, B., ‘Approaches Towards Studies on Potential Reservoirs of
Viral Haemorrhagic Fever in Southern Sudan (1977)’, in Pattyn, S.R. (ed.), Ebola
Virus Haemorrhagic Fever: Proceedings of an International Colloquium on Ebola
Virus Infection and other Haemorrhagic Fevers, held in Antwerp, Belgium, 6-8
December, 1977 (Amsterdam; New York, 1978), 134-139.

Bausch, D., ‘The Ebola Virus…And the Challenges to Health Research in Africa’,
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