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L-32432

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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,

vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members
thereof, respondents.

G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No.
6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. GONZALES,
petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.

Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.

Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., and
Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and Guillermo C. Nakar for
respondents.

Lorenzo Tañada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici curiae.

MAKASIAR, J.:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by
petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running
as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132,
claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. After the Solicitor General had
filed answers in behalf the respondents, hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely
Senator Lorenzo Tañada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued
orally.

It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose
constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the
same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in
accordance with the Revised Election Code.

After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically
restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.

On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the
aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates
apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants:
Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same
qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives,"1 "and that any other details relating
to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the
provisions of this Resolution."2

On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.3

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in
Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec.
8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

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The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether elective or
appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of
corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of
and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial
of due process or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A.
No. 6132 was upheld.4

II

Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the enactment of
R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as
a Constituent Assembly, because —

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and
plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-
fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling
for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional
convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number,
apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for
the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other
implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the
above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which
are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to
Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of
Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not
expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they
are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing
details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the
necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res
No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no argument
against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not
irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent
Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details.

III

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with
proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing
any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides.

Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such
apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress,
sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for
each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present
Constitution wanted the apportionment of delegates to the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in
each representative district, they would have done so in so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment
of the representative districts.5

The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent expressed
therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in
Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the existing
representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two
delegates for a representative district. The presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available official
population census, for such apportionment was presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for
the necessary computation to effect the desired proportional representation.

The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No. 6132,
submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment of the delegates on the 1970
official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census and Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976;
and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable apportionment of delegates. The Director of the
Bureau of Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis
of the preliminary count of the population, we have computed the distribution of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention based on Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of
distributing the delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon
your request at the session of the Senate-House Conference Committee meeting last night, we are submitting
herewith the results of the computation on the basis of the above-stated method."

Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis for such apportionment.6
The fact that the lone and small congressional district of Batanes, may be over-represented, because it is allotted
two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a population very much less than several other
congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only two delegates, and therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis
Batanes alone, does not vitiate the apportionment as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional
apportionment is not required and is not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the population
census cannot be accurate nor complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by
the constant movement of population, as well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis employed is
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reasonable and the resulting apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a minimum of two
delegates for a congressional district.

While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment considering the evidence submitted to Congress
by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not prepared to rule that the computation formula adopted by,
Congress for proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4 is unreasonable and that the apportionment
provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially proportional representation.

In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which was nullified as unconstitutional,
granted more representatives to a province with less population than the provinces with more inhabitants. Such is
not the case here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is allotted only two delegates, which number is
equal to the number of delegates accorded other provinces with more population. The present petitions therefore do
not present facts which fit the mould of the doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec, supra.

The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs that
the apportionment of congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to
their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const.,
emphasis supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants"
emphasizes the fact that the human mind can only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an
absolutely proportional representation with mathematical precision or exactitude.

IV

Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law
and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any
public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the government
government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."

That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic under our constitutional
system. The State through its Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and define the qualifications and
disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions on a public officer. Consequently, only those with
qualifications and who do not fall under any constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected or appointed
to a public office. The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting
influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing
solely in the interest of the nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the land,
which may endure for generations and which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the
disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for concessions
in the form of an elective or appointive office as long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing
authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own proposals. Not love for self, but love for country
must always motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise the several provisions of the new Constitution may only
satisfy individual or special interests, subversive of the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the
disqualification is not permanent but only temporary only to continue until the final adjournment of the convention
which may not extend beyond one year. The convention that framed the present Constitution finished its task in
approximately seven months — from July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935.

As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the constitutional provision prohibiting a member
of Congress, during the time for which he was elected, from being appointed to any civil office which may have been
created or the emolument whereof shall have been increased while he was a member of the Congress. (Sec. 16,
Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.)

As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the challenged disqualification,
temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time
to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in the
convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise
"designed to prevent popular political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the
appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control the
convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.)

Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public
office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. ᇈWᑭHIL

The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is
based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and
applies to all members of the same class.7 The function of a delegate is more far-reaching and its effect more
enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the
land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties
of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in
one or two years. No other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they
themselves, propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the
community.

As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the proposed
amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the enhancement of selfishness,
greed, corruption, or injustice.

Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be elected on the second Tuesday
of November, 1970.

Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the constitutional guarantees
of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of
association.

This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free
expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the
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pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important
public interests.8

In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and present danger test to determine whether a
statute which trenches upon the aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a legitimate exercise of police power.9

Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:

1. any candidate for delegate to the convention

(a) from representing, or

(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other
organization; and

2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations or
organized group of whatever nature from

(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or

(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his
campaign for election.

The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is
confined to party or organization support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or otherwise. The very
Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the members of his family within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not more than one for every ten
precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of his freedom of expression and his right to peaceful assembly,
because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section
may or will be violated. The right of a member of any political party or association to support him or oppose his
opponent is preserved as long as such member acts individually. The very party or organization to which he may
belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause or program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate
information about, or to arouse public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or
constitutional proposals for amendments.

It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights
themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid
constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.

In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously sustained the validity of the limitation
on the period for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:

The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is not too formidable in
character. According to the act: "It shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee, or political
group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty
days immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days
immediately preceding an election.

The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they may
nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their
scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their
freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its validity. We do so
unanimously. 10

In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the conduct of an election campaign
or partisan political activity may be limited without offending the aforementioned constitutional guarantees as the
same is designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral
process." 11

Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other group of
persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar
assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any
candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign either directly or
indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six
members of this Court, which could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a
serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence,
and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the reality of
the situation." 12 ;

Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, failed to muster
the required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the limitation on the period for (a) making speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public
office; (b) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; and (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars.
(c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 13

The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is one of the major compelling
interests that moved Congress into prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, to
justify such ban. In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave "due recognition to the legislative concern
to cleanse, and if possible, render spotless, the electoral process," 14 impressed as it was by the explanation made
by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo Tañada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a
clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship,
dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has marred election campaigns and partisan political
activities in this country. He did invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies

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for an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should
the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded." 15

But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process, as conceded by Senator
Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the
Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the candidates equal
protection of the laws by according them equality of chances. 16 The primary purpose of the prohibition then is also
to avert the clear and present danger of another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The
candidates must depend on their individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations.
Senator Tolentino and Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even
chance as against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them, because such a conclusion,
predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent political history and experience. Both Senators
stressed that the independent candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the major political parties, is
a rare phenomenon in this country and the victory of an independent candidate mainly rests on his ability to match
the resources, financial and otherwise, of the political parties or organizations supporting his opponent. This position
is further strengthened by the principle that the guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution,
includes the guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr.
Justice Tuazon in the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17

While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that Congress in the
exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the
exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is a
valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated.

Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all organization support."
18

The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test. 19

In the apt words of the Solicitor General:

It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful endeavor
to find a solution to the grave economic, social and political problems besetting the country. Instead of ℒαwρhi৷

directly proposing the amendments Congress has chosen to call a Constitutional Convention which shall have
the task of fashioning a document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals of the people. Because what
is to be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is indispensable that the Constitutional Convention be
composed of delegates truly representative of the people's will. Public welfare demands that the delegates
should speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not those of a particular segment of the citizenry, or of
a particular class or group of people, be they religious, political, civic or professional in character. Senator
Pelaez, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes and Constitutional Amendments, eloquently stated that
"the function of a constitution is not to represent anyone in interest or set of interests, not to favor one group
at the expense or disadvantage of the candidates — but to encompass all the interests that exist within our
society and to blend them into one harmonious and balanced whole. For the constitutional system means, not
the predominance of interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof."

So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not be deflated or frustrated, it is necessary
that the delegatee thereto be independent, beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election of delegates who, because they have
been chosen with the aid and resources of organizations, cannot be expected to be sufficiently representative
of the people. Such delegates could very well be the spokesmen of narrow political, religious or economic
interest and not of the great majority of the people. 20

We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in par. I of
Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue
favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to all organizations, whether
political parties or social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the
law, which are to avert the debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among
individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their machinery and other
facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any organization support, does not have. The fact that the
ℒαwρhi৷

other civic of religious organizations cannot have a campaign machinery as efficient as that of a political party, does
not vary the situation; because it still has that much built-in advantage as against the individual candidate without
similar support. Moreover, these civic religious and professional organization may band together to support common
candidates, who advocates the reforms that these organizations champion and believe are imperative. This is
admitted by petitioner Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17, 1970 attached to his petition as
Annex "D", wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa" group had agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to
support petitioner Gonzales and two others as their candidates for the convention, which organized support is
nullified by the questioned ban, Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and working in joint
collective effort" they cannot "exercise effective control and supervision over our leaders — the Women's League,
the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they "could have presented a solid front with very
bright chances of capturing all seats."

The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that they should be exempted from the
ban; because then by such exemption they would be free to utilize the facilities of the campaign machineries which
they are denying to the political parties. Whenever all organization engages in a political activity, as in this campaign
for election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, to that extent it partakes of the nature of a political
organization. This, despite the fact that the Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or professional
associations usually prohibit the association from engaging in partisan political activity or supporting any candidate
for an elective office. Hence, they must likewise respect the ban.

The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any existing
organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political party or any
other association for support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from
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any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and
Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility
of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected.

Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Tañada for the invalidation of par. 1 of
Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once again his deep concern for the preservation of our civil liberties
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to entertain the belief that the challenged ban transcends the
limits of constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities.

WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a),
paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1
Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4.
2
Sec. 3, Res. No. 4.
3
Sec. 22, R.A. No. 6132.
4
Abelardo Subido vs. Comelec, in re validity of Sec. 4 and Sec. 8(a) par. 2, R.A. 6132, G.R. No. L-32436, and
In the matter of the petition for declaratory relief re validity and constitutionality of Sec. 4, R.A. 6132, Hon.
Guardson Lood, Judge, CFI, Pasig, Rizal et al., petitioners, G.R. No. L-32439, Sept. 9, 1970.
5
Sec. 5, Art. VI, Constitution.
6
Macias et al. vs. Comelec, G. R. No. L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961..
7
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People vs. Solon, G.R. No. L-14864, Nov. 23, 1960.
8
See Gonzales vs. Comelec, L-27833, April 18, 1969; Vol. 27, SCRA, p. 835, 858 et seq.; Justice Douglas in
Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 US 11, 18-19, 1966.
9
27 SCRA, pp. 860-861.
10
27 SCRA, p. 865.
11
27 SCRA, p. 869.
12
27 SCRA, pp. 864-865, 868.
13
27 SCRA, pp. 869-870.
14
27 SCRA, p. 873.
15
27 SCRA, p. 872.
16
See his sponsorship speech of July 20, 1970.
17
84 Phil. 847, 852.
18
See his sponsorship speech on July 20, 1970.
19
See Justice Castro's separate opinion in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, 27 SCRA, pp. 898-899 citing
American Communications Association vs. Douds, 339 U.S. 383, 94 L. Ed., 925, 9437.
20
Pp. 4-5, 12, Answer in L-32432.

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