Dao (2024) 23:687–705

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-024-09965-4

The State of the Field Report XIV: Contemporary Chinese

Studies of the Xing Zi Ming Chu (Nature Derives from Decree)

Fan He1

Accepted: 2 September 2024 / Published online: 21 September 2024

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024

Abstract
The Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 (Nature Derives from Decree) is one of the eight-
een pieces that were recorded in Guodian 郭店 bamboo slips, which were excavated
in 1993 and thought to be buried around 300 BCE. We can observe from this text
detailed discussions surrounding terms such as xing 性 (nature), qing 情 (emotion),
xin 心 (heart-mind), and yue 樂 (music), which played crucial roles in producing
early Chinese philosophical discourses, particularly in the area of moral psychol-
ogy. Since its publication in 1998, this text has gained huge interest from Chinese
scholars. This article illustrates how Chinese scholars, through their concrete stud-
ies, reveal the complicated textual nature of the Xing Zi Ming Chu and its intricate
relations to different philosophical streams which followed. This article also points
out a problematic assumption that lies in the majority of Chinese scholarship and
proposes a more sensible approach to examine this text.

Keywords Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 · Human nature · Emotion · Heart-mind ·

Music

1 Introduction

The text known as the Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 (Nature Derives from Decree;
hereafter XZMC) is one of the eighteen pieces that were recorded in Guodian 郭店
bamboo slips, which were excavated in 1993 and thought to be buried around 300
BCE. The contents of XZMC can also be found in a piece named Xingqing Lun 性
情論 (Discourse on Nature and Emotions), which belongs to Chu 楚 bamboo slips
collected by the Shanghai Museum and thought to be recorded and buried roughly
at the same time with XZMC (Z. Liu 2005: 88). Yet, in comparison with frag-
mentary Xingqing Lun, XZMC “possesses complete contents” (L. Chen 2002: 6).

* Fan He
hefan@scu.edu.cn
1
Philosophy Department, Sichuan University, Chengdu, Sichuan Province,
People’s Republic of China

Vol.:(0123456789)
688 Fan He

Furthermore, we can observe from XZMC detailed discussions surrounding terms

such as xing 性 (nature), qing 情 (emotion), xin 心 (heart-mind), and yue 樂 (music),
which played crucial roles in forming early Chinese philosophical discourses, par-
ticularly in the area of moral psychology. Hence, since its publication in 1998, Chi-
nese scholars immediately recognized the importance of XZMC in understanding
the formation of early Chinese philosophy, invested much effort, and generated fruit-
ful works over the past two decades.
Chinese scholarship on XZMC comprises two aspects, the first on the philosophi-
cal lineage and authorship for XZMC and the second on the crucial terms discussed
in this text. This article focuses on both aspects, investigating how Chinese scholar-
ship reveals the complicated nature of XZMC and its intricate relations to the differ-
ent philosophical streams which followed. This article also points out a problematic
assumption that lies in the majority of works. That is, a text can only be attributed to
a philosophical “school” (jia 家), or an “author” must exist behind a text. This article
suggests that a more sensible approach is to examine XZMC as a corpus that can
be accessible to any later thinkers. This approach could greatly improve our under-
standing of XZMC’s significance in, and the nature of, the development of early
Chinese philosophy.

2 The Philosophical Lineage and Authorship of XZMC

The philosophical lineage is an essential issue for Chinese scholars on XZMC.

There are generally three views on XZMC’s philosophical lineage. The first view,
held by the majority of scholars, attributes XZMC to the Confucian lineage, while
the second and the third focus on its connections with the Daoist and Legalist tradi-
tions, respectively.
Pang Pu 龐樸, an authority on the excavated texts, may be one of the earli-
est scholars to attribute XZMC to the Confucian tradition. In his introduction on
the nature of Guodian texts, Pang suggests that after Confucius there were two
approaches among his followers, namely, the “inner approach,” which focuses on
“clarifying the heart-mind and seeing nature” and the “outer approach,” which
“applies externally universal principles to social and individual affairs” (Pang 1998:
89). Pang points out that the excavated texts, including XZMC, belong to the inner
approach. Although Pang does not provide a detailed account of how XZMC can
be related to other Confucian texts, he suggests that the progression from heaven
(tian 天) to decree (ming 命), to nature (xing 性), to emotion (qing 情), and to Dao 道,
reveals an important feature of the inner approach of the Confucian tradition (Pang
1998: 93).
Most scholars follow Pang’s attribution of XZMC to the Confucian lineage.
Meng Peiyuan 蒙培元 further examines XZMC in relation to the Zhongyong 中庸
(Doctrine of the Mean). He argues that XZMC and the Zhongyong share a simi-
lar “structure of thought” (siwei moshi 思維模式), a structure that progresses from
“decree to nature, to Dao, and to teaching (jiao 教),” and which captures the central
thesis in Confucian tradition, namely, the “oneness between heaven and man” (tian-
ren heyi 天人合一) (Meng 2008: 37). Given the intimate relation between XZMC
The State of the Field Report XIV 689

and the Zhongyong, which is commonly attributed to the “Zisi-Mengzi lineage” (Si-
Meng xuepai 思孟學派), Meng maintains that XZMC also “belongs to, and provides
invaluable source to further investigate, the Zisi-Mengzi lineage” (Meng 2008: 43).
In addition, Meng gives three possibilities for the written time and author of XZMC,
which he admits cannot be determined with confidence. The first possibility is that
XZMC was written before Zisi 子思, and the author would most likely be Ziyou 子
游, a disciple of Confucius. The second is that this text was written in the time of
Zisi, and the author would most likely be Zisi himself. The third possibility is that
XZMC was written after Zisi, and the author would most likely be the person whom
Mengzi admired and treated as his teacher, although he was not directly tutored by
that person. Among the three possibilities, Meng suggests that in light of XZMC’s
writing style and contents, and comparing this text with other Guodian texts, such
as “Wuxing 五行 (Five Conducts),” it is more probable that the author of XZMC
is Zisi. It should be noted that Meng admits that the original Zhongyong cannot be
recovered and to what extent the received Zhongyong reflects the thought of Zisi,
accordingly, cannot be determined (Meng 2008: 43).
Considering XZMC as a Confucian text, Ding Sixin 丁四新 gives a more detailed
analysis of possible authors for this text. One possible author is Gongsun Nizi 公孫
尼子,1 perhaps a disciple of Confucius’ disciple. This speculation is based on three
clues (S. Ding 1999: 38). First, the “discourse on the heart-mind and nature” (xinx-
inglun 心性論) in XZMC is related to that in the “Recording of Music (Yueji 樂記)”
chapter of the Liji 禮記 (Book of Rites). Second, the main contents of the “Record-
ing of Music” can be identified in the “Book of Music (Yueshu 樂書)” of the Shiji
史記 (The Grand Scribe’s Records). Third, Zhang Shoujie 張守節, a representative
scholar who glosses the Shiji, suggests that the “Book of Music” was written by
Gongsun Nizi. Can some relations between XZMC and the “Recording of Music”
lead to the conjecture that the two texts share the same author? Without any direct
evidence, can Zhang’s view be taken to determine the author of XZMC? One can
easily find these clues extremely tenuous. On the one hand, Ding carefully compares
the discourses on the heart-mind and nature from both XZMC and the “Recording
of Music,” arguing that the discourse from the “Recording of Music” is “more com-
prehensive and deeper than that in XZMC” and hence it is “inappropriate to con-
sider the two texts to be written by the same author” (S. Ding 1999: 41). On the
other, having observed that the Lunheng 論衡 (The Balanced Inquiries) mentions
that Gongsun Nizi’s discussion on xingqing 性情 (nature and emotion) emphasizes
that xing possesses both goodness and badness, which is consistent with the view
presented by XZMC, Ding cautions that “the possibility of Gongsun Nizi [being the
author] cannot be entirely excluded” (S. Ding 1999: 41).
Ding further examines the possibility of Zisi as the author of XZMC by compar-
ing XZMC and Zhongyong, a text commonly attributed by Chinese scholars to Zisi.
Ding’s comparison includes three aspects (S. Ding 2000a: 35). First, both texts have
detailed discussions on xin 心, xing, and qing, but XZMC’s discussion on relations
between the three terms is much deeper than Zisi’s. Although Zisi also discusses

1
This view is suggested by Chen Lai 陳來 (L. Chen 1998).
690 Fan He

qing, he places far less emphasis on it than XZMC. Second, in XZMC xin 信 is
emphasized and used to define other terms such as xin 心, xing, and qing, while Zisi
does not place as much emphasis on this term. Third, terms such as cheng 誠 and
zhonghe 中和, which are essential for Zisi, receive little attention in XZMC. Given
these divergencies, the attribution of XZMC to Zisi seems unconvincing. Nonethe-
less, Ding still believes that “there is a high possibility that XZMC is composed by
Zisi” (S. Ding 2000a: 35).2
In addition to Gongsun Nizi and Zisi, Ziyou is another possible author for
XZMC. This view is advocated by Liang Tao 梁濤. Liang argues that among Con-
fucius’ disciples, Ziyou focuses more on ritual and music, which are two important
topics in XZMC. Hence, Ziyou possesses intellectual capacity to compose XZMC
(Liang 2008: 27–28). Furthermore, Liang cites two chapters of the Liji to buttress
his arguments. One is the “Liyun 禮運 (Evolution of Rites)” chapter, which is con-
sidered to belong to the Ziyou lineage. In this chapter, discussions of qing and yi 義
(righteousness) can be identified and, Liang argues, are intimately related to those
in XZMC (Liang 2008: 28–29). The other chapter is “Tangong II 檀弓下),” which
records Ziyou’s description of different sounds and acts that change with emotions
(Liang 2008: 29). Based on the similarity between this description and a passage of
XZMC, Liang argues that it demonstrates that “there is a very high possibility that
XZMC is composed by Ziyou or his disciples” (Liang 2008: 29).
The majority of scholars do not just consider XZMC as a Confucian text but
delve into its possible Confucian authors. In the meantime, some scholars, though
very few, doubt this exclusive attribution of XZMC into the Confucian lineage, and
propose its connections with other philosophical streams. XZMC’s connection with
the Daoist tradition is suggested by Chen Guying 陳鼓應. Observing that XZMC
proposes that “both goodness and non-goodness belong to xing” (shan bushan, xing
ye 善不善, 性也), Chen argues that XZMC’s idea of xing is divergent from Mengzi’s
goodness of xing, and is closer to Gaozi 告子 than Mengzi (G. Chen 1999: 404).
Thus, the exclusive attribution of XZMC to the Zisi-Mengzi lineage, or more gen-
erally the Confucian tradition, is problematic. Furthermore, focusing on another
important term in XZMC, namely qing, Chen suggests that XZMC was “composed
during the time between Zhuangzi 莊子 and his followers,” and was “clearly influ-
enced by the representative works of Jixia 稷下 Daoism, namely the four chapters of
Guanzi 管子” (G. Chen 1999: 405). Chen gives three clues for this influence. First,
XZMC stresses xinshu 心術 (techniques of the mind), a term that can be considered
a most distinctive idea in Jixia Daoism. Second, XZMC advocates “rituals arising
from emotions” (li zuoyu qing 禮作於情), which is in line with the Jixia Daoist view
that rituals should “follow people’s emotions” (yin ren zhi qing 因人之情). Third,
observing that XZMC uses the expression “reasoning emotions” (li qi qing 理其情)

2
Ding’s discussion of possible authors of XZMC can also be found in S. Ding 2000b: 201–209. Liu
Lexian 劉樂賢 compares the “Miucheng Xun 繆稱訓 (On Erroneous Designations)” chapter (which Yang
Shuda 楊樹達 suggests has several sentences similar with those assumed to belong to the lost text Zisizi子
思子) of the Huainanzi 淮南子 with XZMC, arguing that it is very probable for XZMC’s discussion of
qing to come from the lost Zisizi (L.-X. Liu 2000). Liu’s argument implies that Zisi may be the author of
XZMC.
The State of the Field Report XIV 691

to juxtapose reason with emotion, Chen contends that “the juxtaposition of reason
with emotion cannot be identified in any other pre-Qin 秦 works other than the four
chapters of Guanzi” (G. Chen 1999: 405–406).
XZMC’s connection with the Legalist tradition is noted by Han Dongyu 韓東育,
who argues that “there is high consistency between the Legalist and XZMC’s ‘dis-
courses on human essence’ (renqing lun 人情論)” (Han 2002: 11). Such consistency
can be observed from four aspects (Han 2002: 12). First, the Legalist discourse on
renqing is based on the negation of goodness or badness of human nature. XZMC
emphasizes the expression “the heart-mind possesses no fixed will” (xin wu dianzhi
心無奠志), which also reveals that it does not take humans’ goodness or badness as
the starting point for its discussion. Second, Legalists stress that people like profits
and dislike harms, which is echoed by the view of XZMC, namely “liking and dis-
liking belong to human nature; the objects of that liking or disliking are external
things” (Cook 2012: 700).3 Third, Legalists oppose xinxue 心學 (learning of heart-
mind), which is the focus in Mengzi’s and Xunzi’s 荀子 self-cultivation. XZMC also
avoids discussing the heart-mind, saying that “the most difficult thing in learning
is the search for the heart-mind. If one follows the lead of what is to be performed,
one will be close to attaining it” (Cook 2012: 728). Thus, XZMC proposes focus-
ing on external studies such as practices in regulating the internal activities of the
heart-mind. Lastly, Dao in XZMC does not possess any ontological sense as in the
Laozi 老子; it is only used to refer to practical principles that guide human activities,
for example, “only the human way (Dao) is worthy of being taken” (Cook 2012:
711). Such use of Dao is similar with that of the Legalists. In addition, Han explores
XZMC’s intricate relations with Huang-Lao 黃老 Daoism. He further suggests that
XZMC should not be simply considered as a Confucian text, but should be, more
accurately, attributed to the “category of the eclectic texts” (zajia lei 雜家類), which
result from combining sources of different philosophical lineages (Han 2002: 14).
Having examined the above-mentioned studies, one can easily find textual evi-
dence to support or oppose the attribution of XZMC to Confucianism, or Daoism, or
Legalism.4 Thus, is it appropriate to view XZMC from a perspective of a particular
philosophical lineage? Is it meaningful to analyze and speculate possible authors of
XZMC? And how do we consider the textual nature of XZMC? These questions boil
down to how we understand “school” (jia 家), authorship, and the nature of texts in
early China. An increasing number of scholars argue against the idea that there were
different “schools” of thought competing against each other in the Warring States
and Han 漢 periods (Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan 2003; Smith 2003). Some schol-
ars go even further to claim that there is never one organized and unified Kong jia
孔家 or “school of Confucianism” in the Warring States period (Harbsmeier 2013:

3
In the rest of this review article, I adopt Scott Cook’s translation of XZMC, if Chinese scholars’ under-
standings of the sentences from this text are the same as Cook’s (Cook 2012). If they have different
understandings, I translate them myself in accordance with the understandings of the scholar being
reviewed.
4
For example, Guo Zhenxiang 郭振香 uses some evidence to demonstrate XZMC’s relations to Confu-
cianism and to reject its relations to Daoism and Legalism (Z. Guo 2005a).
692 Fan He

18).5 The issue of authorship has also drawn special attention from both traditional
and modern scholars, who deny the concept of authorship for early texts (Yu 2007:
200–210, 213–215; L. Li 2004: 197–198).6 Their negation of the concept of author-
ship is based on the observation that the structures and contents that we see from the
received early texts had not been fixed in early China; it is through long processes
of compilation of the preexisting materials and newly composed materials that the
structures and contents become stable (L. Li 2004: 197–198; Boltz 2005: 70).
I do not suggest that this scholarship has completely overthrown traditional
understandings of “school,” authorship, and the nature of early texts; they do remind
us that we should not take for granted that there was a Si-Meng xuepai or an author
behind a text, or that a text can be exclusively attributed to a philosophical stream.
Hence, any exclusive attributions of XZMC to the Confucian or Daoist or Legalist
tradition, or to the Si-Meng xuepai, or even to a person such as Ziyou, Zisi, or Gong-
sun Nizi, are based on doubtful understandings of “school,” authorship, and the
nature of early texts, and are conjectures at best. Although it is impossible to reach
consensus on possible philosophical lineages and authors for XZMC,7 the above dis-
cussions reveal to us the complicated nature of this text and its intricate relations
with different early philosophical texts.

3 
Xing

Xing is the central term in XZMC, and consists of many aspects, to which almost all
later texts’ discussions of xing can be related. Seven aspects of xing are identified by
Ding Weixiang 丁為祥 from XZMC (W. Ding 2001: 29–31).
The first aspect of xing is related to ren 人 (people). On the one hand, XZMC sug-
gests that “all people possess [human] nature” (Cook 2012: 700), and “Within the
four seas, all [people, too] share the same nature” (Cook 2012: 705). On the other,
according to “(people’s heart-minds) depend upon [external] things to arise, depend
upon gratification to take action, and depend upon practices to become fixed” (Cook
2012: 700), xing refers to potentials that people could realize. In other words, the
same nature that all people possess is merely potential that requires realization.
The second aspect is related to tian 天 (Heaven). Since XZMC says “[Human]
nature comes via mandate, and [this] mandate is sent down from Heaven” (Cook
2012: 700), tian provides ontological justifications and principles to men to develop
and complete their xing.
The third aspect is related to qi 氣. While tian plays an ontological basis for xing,
qi can be considered as the media through which xing is manifested. However,

5
Paul Goldin also doubts the use of “school,” suggesting only two of the postulated schools, namely
Confucians and Mohists, can be said to have established any institutions (Goldin 2020: 1–2).
6
It should be noted that Yu Jiaxi 余嘉錫 discussed the concept of authorship in detail over eighty years
ago. Li Ling 李零 systematically developed Yu’s arguments.
7
These problematic understandings remain deep-rooted in Chinese scholars. For example, He Yixin 何
益鑫 even goes so far as to take Ziyou as the author of XZMC as the starting point to draw on this text to
construct Ziyou’s philosophy (He 2020).
The State of the Field Report XIV 693

qi does not refer more generally to that from which all things in the universe are
formed, but represents substances that are connected with particular emotions
such as joy, anger, sorrow, and grief. For example, XZMC says “the vital energies
(namely qi) of joy, anger, grief, and sorrow are [human] nature; once they manifest
externally, things take hold of them” (Cook 2012: 700). Thus, xing can be consid-
ered as qi that stimulates emotions to be displayed outside. Hence, xing is the foun-
dation for, and in connection with, emotions.
The fourth aspect is related to the heart-mind. Ding points out that XZMC may
be the earliest text to use the heart-mind to discuss xing. According to XZMC,
“[although humans] have their nature, their nature does not emerge unless their
heart-minds seek it” ([ren] sui youxing, xin fuqu buchu [人]雖有性, 心弗取不出). That
is, xing is internal and cannot initially be manifested outside. Its external manifesta-
tion and realization depend on whether it is sought by the heart-mind, or more spe-
cifically, the will of heart-mind. Only when the will of heart-mind “becomes fixed”
(dianzhi 奠志) can it be manifested outside in an appropriate way.
The fifth aspect is related to emotions. XZMC says “likes and dislikes belong to
nature” (haowu, xing ye 好惡, 性也), suggesting that emotions (including likes and
dislikes) are rooted in xing. XZMC also says “sorrow and joy express the common-
ality of people’s nature” (aile, qi xing xiangjin ye 哀樂, 其性相近也). In other words,
xing can be manifested through “genuine emotions” (zhiqing 至情).
The sixth aspect is related to “practices” (xi 習). XZMC says “practices are what
nurture human nature” (Cook 2012: 707). Practices include education and culti-
vating affections. For teaching, XZMC says “that they (people) each employ their
minds uniquely, [however], is due to the direction of their education” (Cook 2012:
705). The objective of education is to “internalize virtues in the innate nature”
(sheng de yu zhong 生德於中). For cultivating affections, XZMC says “true affec-
tions in a person are something to delight in. If one does something with true affec-
tions, though he may transgress, this is not to be deplored” (Cook 2012: 737). It
means that affections arise from xing and are manifested outside, and it is through
cultivation that affections become true and can be appropriately expressed. As a
result of practices, virtues and true affections become the internal and external reali-
zations of xing, respectively.
The last aspect is related to goodness and badness. In one place, XZMC suggests
that “goodness and nongoodness belong to nature” (shan bushan xing ye 善不善性
也). However, in another place, XZMC suggests that “people can constantly behave
appropriately without any teaching, because they possess the goodness of nature”
(weijiao er minheng, xingshan zhe ye 未教而民恆, 性善者也). Since XZMC presents
multifaceted accounts of xing from particular perspectives of ren, tian, xin, and so
on, Ding argues that the sentences “goodness and non-goodness belong to nature”
and “peoples possess the goodness of nature” are also said from particular perspec-
tives, and hence, are not accounts of the “common nature of all people” (ren de
pubian benzhi 人的普遍本質). Nonetheless, the central focus of XZMC is on “explor-
ing the innate goodness of people.”
Having presented the seven aspects of xing, Ding further suggests inconsist-
ency among them. On the one hand, the sentence “Within the four seas, all [people,
too] share the same nature” describes the common nature of people, which can be
694 Fan He

ultimately related to heaven. On the other hand, the sentence “people can constantly
behave appropriately without any teaching” reveals the innate goodness of nature,
which, however, just applies to some rather than all people. That is, the common
nature of people is related to heaven but cannot be clearly viewed as good; the innate
goodness of nature can apply to some individuals but not universally to all people.
Chen Lai also identifies seven aspects of xing (L. Chen 2005: 1–7). He discusses
xing in relation to heaven, qi (of joy and anger), the mind, practices, emotions, like
and dislike, and things (wu 物). The differences between Chen and Ding’s discus-
sions are thus: (1) Chen does not discuss xing in relation to goodness and badness;
(2) the aspect of like and dislike can be contained in Ding’s discussion of emotions;
and (3) the aspect of things emphasizes the influences of external things on people,
and hence can be contained in Ding’s discussion of people. Both Chen’s and Ding’s
discussions reveal the complexity and nuance of xing in XZMC. The complexity
of xing in XZMC, as Chen argues, demonstrates that both Mengzi’s goodness of
human nature and Xunzi’s badness of human nature are “a bit unique and not popu-
lar” in the early development of Confucianism; but XZMC’s use of qi to discuss
xing is consistent with the majority of Confucians’ discourses on human nature in
the pre-Qin period and the Han dynasty (L. Chen 2005: 1).
XZMC presents multifaceted aspects of xing. Most scholars, however, examine
them in the Confucian lineage, and focus mainly on how Mengzi and Xunzi’s theories
of xing are related to XZMC (Q. Guo 1999; T. Li 2002a; Y. Guo 2005; Liang 2002,
2004, 2008; C. Li 2009; Song 2021). Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇 may be the first scholar to
attempt to combine different aspects of xing to produce a coherent understanding,
and meanwhile explores relations between XZMC and Mengzi. According to Guo,
XZMC suggests that “the innate qualities of people come from the decree issued by
heaven; the innately emotional partialities such as like and dislike make human to be
human; these emotional qualities are embodied by qi, and it is only when stimulated
by external things can they be manifested outside” (Q. Guo 1999: 25). Intrinsic emo-
tions arise from interactions with external environments, yet it is the morally innate
nature (which originates from the heavenly decree) that guides the issuing of emo-
tions. Although there is difference between renxing 人性 (human nature) and qingqi
情氣 (qi of emotions), the former is always expressed through the latter. Guo further
stresses that “qingqi refers not only to natural desires but also to moral emotions.”
These moral emotions belong to renxing, which fundamentally comes from heaven.
“It is these innately moral emotions that Mengzi focuses on” to develop his theory of
“moral rationalism” (daode lixing 道德理性) (Q. Guo 1999: 25).
Li Tianhong 李天虹 compares Mengzi’s “goodness of nature” (xingshan 性善)
with XZMC’s discussion of xing. Li argues that Mengzi’s xingshan comprises two
main points. First, renxing innately possesses the potential of goodness, and peo-
ple can be good, just because they follow and develop their innate nature. Second,
the reason that people may not be good is that they cannot realize or even lose the
potential of goodness. According to Li, XZMC also suggests that “renxing possesses
the tendency to become good; yet the moral goodness is not innately possessed by
people, and only through learning and cultivation, can it be accomplished.” Hence,
Li contends that “XZMC’s discussion of xing is not a theory of xingshan,” yet
The State of the Field Report XIV 695

“Mengzi’s xingshan can be traced to XZMC’s emphasis on the good aspect of xing”
(T. Li 2002a: 81).
Liang Tao 梁濤 adopts a distinctive perspective, namely the structure of XZMC,
to argue that XZMC is closer to Mengzi than to Xunzi. According to Liang, its
structure can be divided into two parts. The first part focuses mainly on emotions
such as joy, anger, grief, sorrow, like, and dislike, and can be considered as “natu-
ral theory of human nature” (ziran renxinglun自然人性論). In this part, xin 心 refers
to a cognitive and rational faculty, which plays an essential role in nourishing and
developing nature. In the process of cultivation, rituals and music are particularly
proposed to cultivate and transform xingqing性情 (human nature and emotions). The
second part focuses on emotions that are related to virtues such as benevolent love,
loyalty, and trust, and hence, can be considered as “moral theory of human nature”
(daode renxinglun 道德人性論). In accordance with this theory, xin is associated with
morality, and qing plays an important role in moral practices. According to Liang,
“the discussion of the first part is followed and refined by Xunzi, while the second
part is further developed by Mengzi.” Liang also points out that regarding human
nature, there is a development from the first part to the second part, which means
that the emphasis of the whole XZMC is on the second part, namely, “moral theory
of human nature.” Hence, “the central thesis of XZMC is not followed by Xunzi but
by Mengzi” (Liang 2008: 155). It is worth mentioning that Wang Zhongjiang 王
中江 disagrees with Liang’s division of XZMC’s discussion into two parts. Wang
argues that, given the high consistency between the writing styles of the two parts,
it is possible for the author of XZMC to keep consistent his discussion and “it is
highly impossible to change it dramatically, unless this author lacks logical thinking
or rationality” (Wang 2011: 186).
In contrast to Liang, Guo Yi 郭沂 emphasizes the intimate relation of XZMC
with Xunzi.8 Guo argues that XZMC’s renxinglun 人性論 (theory of human nature)
is not based on moral principles (yili 義理), but solely on “temperaments” (qizhi 氣
質) and “emotions and desires” (qingyu 情慾). Guo also suggests that according to
the sentence of XZMC, “the vital energies (namely qi) of joy, anger, grief, and sor-
row are [human] nature” (Cook 2012: 700), and xing represents “an internal state”
(neizai zhuangtai 內在狀態) (Y. Guo 2005: 53). Thus, whether people’s xing appears
good or bad depends on “teaching” (jiao 教). As a result of teaching, virtues can
arise in zhong 中 (the internal), the word which, Guo argues, is the same as that in
the sentence “that joy, anger, grief, and happiness are not issued is called zhong”
(xi nu ai le zhi weifa weizhi zhong 喜怒哀樂之未發謂之中) of the Zhongyong and
can be explained as xing. Guo’s explanation of zhong as xing is novel yet highly
problematic, because zhong in the Zhongyong is often accounted for as “middle”
or “balance,” which he does not give persuasive evidence to refute. Based on this
novel explanation, Guo further suggests that XZMC considers virtues external to
human’s innate qualities, namely xing, but through teaching, they can be integrated

8
Yan Binggang 顏炳罡 also emphasizes XZMC’s relation with Xunzi (Yan 2009).
696 Fan He

into xing.9 In this sense, XZMC is divergent from Mengzi but “opens the way for
Xunzi’s theory of nature” (Y. Guo 2005: 56).
In addition, Li Tianhong argues that, regarding xing, Gaozi is closer to XZMC
than any others. Li argues that although XZMC does not develop a coherent theory
of xing, its understanding can be roughly attributed to the view of “human nature
is neither good nor bad” (xing wushan wubushan 性無善無不善) (T. Li 2002a: 79),
which is also held by Gaozi. This view believes that good and bad characters are
innately possessed by all people, yet they are not invariable but rather changeable to
external factors. For example, people in a peaceful and harmonious time are more
inclined to become good, but in a chaotic and turbulent time to become bad. “Peo-
ple’s goodness or badness of xing is in association with, and even determined by,
social environments” (T. Li 2002a: 81). Even though Li advocates XZMC’s inti-
macy with Gaozi, she admits that from him XZMC’s emphasis on goodness cannot
be observed, and the belief that human nature can be cultivated and transformed
by teaching, as revealed in XZMC, has become the common ground for Confucian
thinkers’ discussions on xing (T. Li 2002a: 81).
The multifaced aspects of xing have been carefully examined by Chinese schol-
ars. Most of their attempts are to demonstrate that XZMC is closer to a particular
thinker, such as Mengzi, or Xunzi, or Gaozi. On the one hand, I believe that any
consensus would hardly be reached through these attempts. Evidence for XZMC’s
intimacy with Mengzi, or with Xunzi, or with Gaozi, can equally be found from this
text, and hence, it is impossible to determine who has a closer relation to it. On the
other, it is through these scholars’ attempts that the composite nature of XZMC is
again exhibited. XZMC should not be attributed to a particularly philosophical line-
age or a thinker; it should be considered as a corpus that can be accessible to all the
later thinkers, be they Confucians, or Mohists, or Daoists. Considering that almost
all of these studies place XZMC’s discourse on xing in the Confucian lineage, how
other philosophical streams, such as the Zhuangzi, are connected with, or respond
to, the view of xing presented in XZMC, has received little attention and calls for
detailed investigation.

4 
Qing

The term qing 情 appears not frequently in texts that are earlier than Guodian bam-
boo slips, and in these earlier texts, qing is almost never used to refer to emotions. In
contrast, qing appears 27 times in Guodian texts, and particularly, 20 times can be
identified in XZMC, which implies that XZMC’s emphasis on qing is remarkable
(T. Li 2001; S. Ding 2003; H. Li 2016). There are two views on XZMC’s accounts
of qing: the first view, which is held by the majority of scholars, understands it as

9
The adoption of external approaches, such as learning and rituals, to transform humans’ innate quali-
ties can be captured by the term xi. For focusing on xi and xin to examine the relation between XZMC
and Xunzi, see L. Liu 2021 and Zhang 2000, respectively.
The State of the Field Report XIV 697

qinggan情感 (emotion or affection) (T. Li 2001; Wang 2011; H. Li 2016), while the
second as qingshi 情實 (essence or genuineness) (S. Ding 2003).
The first view suggests that we can observe three features of qinggan from
XZMC. First, according to XZMC, “fidelity (/trustworthiness) is the orientation of
[genuine] affections, and the affections arise from human nature” (Cook 2012: 730),
qinggan, which is issued from inner activities, must be expressed in a genuine way
in external acts. Hence, genuineness is a main feature of qinggan. Second, because
of its genuineness, qinggan is often considered “beautiful” (mei 美) and “delight”
(yue 悅). As XZMC says, “The noble man regards the affections as beautiful” and
“In general, true affections in a person are something to delight in” (Cook 2012:
715, 737). Hence, XZMC has positive attitudes toward qinggan. Third, XZMC
focuses mainly on grief and joy to discuss qinggan. It says “grief (/mourning) and
happiness (/music) are those which make most extreme use of the affections” (Cook
2012: 732), implying that grief and joy are two essential forms of qinggan (H. Li
2016: 31). For the origin of qinggan, XZMC states that “[Human] nature comes vis
mandate, and [this] mandate is sent down from Heaven. The Way begins with the
affections, and the affections are born of [human] nature” (Cook 2012: 700). Qing-
gan belongs to people’s innate attributes that are given by Heaven. That is to say,
it should not be eliminated or constrained, but guided in accordance with human
nature and issued in appropriate ways (H. Li 2016: 35).
Given that qing in early texts is more often used in the sense of qingshi than in
the sense of qinggan (T. Li 2001: 63), scholars who understand qing as qinggan,
however, do not give a detailed account of why qing should be understood as qing-
gan rather than qingshi.10 Since both emotions and essence can be used to explain
qing, between the two meanings perhaps exists an intimate association and they may
be combined in one account of XZMC’s qing. These possibilities have also not been
considered by those scholars.
Ding Sixin holds the second view, understanding qing in XZMC as qingshi, and
tries to unify different senses of qing to give a coherent account (S. Ding 2003: 61).
Ding examines qing in relation to xing. The difference between xing and qing in
XZMC is that xing refers to innate characters that are “not issued outside” (weifa 未
發), while qing belongs to things that are “issued outside” (yifa 已發) from xing (S.
Ding 2003: 63). Ding also makes two observations to distinguish qing (namely qing-
shi) from emotions (qinggan). First, “particular emotions (namely qinggan) such as
joy, anger, sorrow, and happiness are manifestations of their corresponding qi that,
as a result of xin’s responses to external things, is issued from xing.” Second, “qing
(namely qingshi) is issued from xing, and hence, essential and genuine. Hence, qing
is the ‘internal regulation’ (neizai guiding 內在規定) that things innately possess and
should possess, rather than a result of human intentions or psychological responses
to external things (namely emotions).” Despite the difference between qinggan and
qingshi, Ding points out that “the foundation of qinggan and the sources of its stim-
ulating power are ultimately related to qingshi” (S. Ding 2003: 67).

10
Some scholars, such as Wang Zhongjiang, argue against qingshi. I believe their arguments are uncon-
vincing. I shall discuss Wang’s arguments later in this section.
698 Fan He

To further analyze the relation between qinggan and qingshi, Ding examines dif-
ferent uses of qing in XZMC, suggesting that qing’s meanings vary in contexts. In
some contexts, qing is used to describe a genuinely psychological state, which is
close to the meaning of cheng 誠 (genuineness). For example, “one who is trusted
before he even speaks is one who possesses magnificent qing” (Cook 2012: 741).
In another example, qing means zhenshi 真實 (reality or fact), which is used to
describe the existence of external objects. This meaning can be read from the phrase
“order the reality of things” (liqiqing 理其情). In addition, in some places, an inti-
mate association between qing and emotions can also be observed. For example,
“extreme [expressions of] music (/happiness) must [end in] sorrow, and crying (/
grief) also [ends in] sorrow—this is because they bring out the utmost of their affec-
tions (namely qing)” (Cook 2012: 722). The former two meanings belong to qing-
shi, while the third to qinggan. Ding’s account of the unification of the three mean-
ings, to me, is obscure (S. Ding 2003: 65). I try to make sense of his account thus.
Qing (namely, zhenshi) represents the reality of things that are issued from humans’
innate characters (namely, xing). In humans’ constant responses to the external
environments, qing should be expressed in a genuine or spontaneous way (namely,
cheng). This process necessarily involves psychological responses and accordingly,
their specific manifestations, namely emotions (which are fundamentally related to
human innate character, namely xing). Consequently, the three meanings of qing can
be related with each other by xing.
However, Wang Zhongjiang refutes Ding’s consideration of qingshi as the pri-
mary meaning of qing, which, he suggests, still should be qinggan (Wang 2011:
187–188). Wang’s refutation contains three points. First, qing possesses the mean-
ing of shi 實 (reality or genuineness), but it cannot lead to the conclusion that shi
is the only meaning of qing. Second, qing is a pictophonetic graph (xingshengzi形
聲字), and etymologically speaking, its “original meaning” (benyi 本意) is not shi,
which is just one of its derivative meanings. Third, if shi is the original meaning
of qing, emotions such as anger and joy cannot be the derivative meanings of qing
(Wang 2011: 187).
For me, Wang’s three points are implausible. In the first point, Wang mispresents
Ding’s argument. Ding emphasizes shi as the primary meanings of qing, but he nei-
ther asserts that shi is the only meaning of qing nor denies that emotions are related
to qing. Second, Wang’s adoption of the etymological perspective to claim that the
original meaning of qing should not be shi is also arbitrary. We cannot identify the
graph qing from any oracle bones or bronze inscriptions (P. Li 2003: 945). To deter-
mine the original meaning of qing is impossible. Likewise, whether shi is the origi-
nal meaning of qing cannot be determined. In the third point, Wang appears to deny
the relation between shi and emotions, but he does not give a detailed explanation of
why emotions cannot be derived from shi.
Among different accounts of qing in XZMC, I still believe Ding’s account is
more coherent and convincing. Although Ding notes qing’s relation to emotions and
understands emotions from the perspective of human innate characters, he does not
clearly articulate how emotions are related to shi. I guess that the consideration of
emotions as qing is not directly owing to their relations to human innate characters;
only when psychological activities are manifested (namely emotions) in genuine
The State of the Field Report XIV 699

ways can these emotions be considered as qing, namely, the genuine (shi 實) man-
ifestations of psychological activities. In other words, all uses of qing may share
a basic semantic scope, which can be conveyed by words such as “reality,” “fact,”
“genuineness,” “essence,” and “sincerity.” These points are beyond the scope of this
article but deserve further inquiry.
In addition, regarding qing, some scholars point out relation between XZMC and
other texts. Guo Zhenxiang 郭振香 says that “XZMC’s qing contains three basic
senses, namely ‘reality,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘sincerity’,” and “these senses are developed,
respectively, in cheng 誠 (sincerity) of the Zhongyong and in zhen 真 (genuineness)
of the ‘Yufu 漁父’ chapter of the Zhuangzi” (Z. Guo 2005b: 51). Ding Sixin suggests
that Xunzi’s understanding of qing diverges from those revealed in XZMC. Ding
says that “Xunzi considers likes and dislikes, joy and anger, grief and joy as qing,
and focuses on sensual desires to account for qing, asserting that people’s qing is
highly undesirable” (S. Ding 2003: 67). Guo and Ding’s intriguing points are just
briefly mentioned and call for detailed investigations.

5 
Xin and Yue

In addition to xing and qing, xin and yue are other two important terms in XZMC,
but in contrast to the former two, they have received little attention from Chinese
scholars. Given scarce studies on xin (Zhang 2000, Zhao 2017) and yue (T. Li
2002b, Peng 2004), and given that yue is in close association with xin, I discuss xin
and yue in one section.
Zhao Fasheng 趙法生 conducts a detailed investigation of xin in XZMC, which he
argues comprises five aspects (Zhao 2017: 34–35). The first aspect of xin is related
to moral knowing. According to XZMC, “Those who ‘know’ (zhi 知) the affections
can bring it forth, while those who ‘know’ propriety an instill it” (Cook 2012: 700).
Zhi in this sentence reveals that xin possesses the moral capacity to know ritual and
righteousness, right and wrong. Zhao argues that this morally knowing xin, however,
does not possess any ontological senses as in the Mengzi’s benxin 本心 (the morally
innate heart-mind),11 but it is the basis for nourishing virtues. The second aspect can
be read from descriptions such as “The noble man, when directing his inclinations,
must have a heart-mind that is magnanimous,” “a heart-mind that is straightfor-
ward,” and “a heart-mind of lasting contentment” (Cook 2012: 750, 734, 734). These
descriptions show that xin is not the ontological cause to, but the result of, moral
knowing and practices. The third aspect is related to zhi 智 (intelligence). XZMC
says “yearning is that which makes most restless use of the heart-mind; worry is
that which makes most anxious use of zhi” (Cook 2012: 732). The main function
of zhi is to weigh up the pros and cons. The fourth is related to sensual desires.
XZMC says “The eyes’ fondness for beauty and the ears’ delight in sounds [result
in] qi of pent-up elation” (Cook 2012: 732). Zhao argues that XZMC associates the

11
Zhang Maoze 張茂澤 points out that regarding xin, XZMC is different from both the Zhongyong and
the Mengzi (Zhang 2000: 112, 114).
700 Fan He

heart-mind’s delight in beauty and sounds with qi, which shows the role of sensual
desires in the heart-mind. The last aspect of xin concerns the accepting and issuing
of emotions. For example, “Happiness (/music) and grief (/mourning) are similar in
nature, and thus their [effects upon the] heart-mind are not far apart” (Cook 2012:
722). Zhao contends that this aspect that the heart-mind is in an intimate association
with emotions receives the most discussions in XZMC. Thus, we can divide the five
aspects of xin into two categories according to how they are related to moral “teach-
ing and transformation” (jiaohua 教化). The first category (the first aspects) exists
before jiaohua and the second category (the rest of four aspects) is closely related to
jiaohua.
Zhao further suggests that xinshu 心術 (the pathway of the heart-mind) plays a
crucial role in jiaohua. XZMC says, “For all ways, the pathways of the heart-mind
are primary” (Cook 2012: 711). Among several features of xinshu presented in
XZMC, three features deserve our attention (Zhao 2017: 36–37). First, xinshu exists
in the issuing of natural emotions, which are manifested in sounds, languages, and
acts: “Joy leads to elation; elation leads to excitement; excitement leads to song;
song leads to swaying; and swaying leads to dance” (Cook 2012: 726). Second, xin-
shu can “transform natural emotions to moral emotions” (Zhao 2017: 37). Zhao sug-
gests that poetry, ritual, and music can be used to foster this transformation. Third,
the ultimate goal of xinshu is to realize yi 義 (righteousness): “[The Way’s] begin-
nings are close to the affections, while its finalities are close to propriety” (Cook
2012: 700).
In addition, Zhao points out that “xinshu is not an exclusive Confucian term; it is
commonly adopted by other philosophical streams” (Zhao 2017: 38). In contrast to
XZMC, the pathway of the heart-mind in the Zhuangzi, for example, “is to negate
senses, thoughts, and especially, emotions, and necessarily, deny the significance of
ritual and moral transformation” (Zhao 2017: 40). The pathway of the heart-mind in
the Guanzi, on the one hand, “adopts Confucian ritual and music to address issues
that arise from emotions and desires,” and on the other, proposes “eliminating intel-
ligence and fixation,” and thereby, “the heart-mind returns to empty and tranquility”
(Zhao 2017: 41).
We can learn from Zhao’s investigation the complexity of xin and the differences
between XZMC and other philosophical texts’ understandings of xinshu. Yet Zhao
does not elaborate how these different aspects of xin are related with each other, nor
gives his opinion of whether these aspects can be unified to form a coherent theory
of xin. For me, the complexity of xin again reflects the composite nature of XZMC, a
text to which later thinkers’ understandings of xin can be traced back. Regarding the
discourse on xin, how later texts can be related to XZMC calls for more discussion.
Li Tianhong examines the nature of yue from three aspects (T. Li 2002b: 67–69).
For the origin of yue, according to XZMC, “whenever [expressive] voices/sounds
derive from affections genuinely, their entry into and inciting of the heart-mind
is profound” (Cook 2012: 718), Li suggests that “voices origin from psychologi-
cal activities, and their ultimate origin belongs to the innately human nature” (T. Li
2002b: 67). For the process of yue, yue is in intimate relation with emotions. That is,
“When the voice (/sound) changes, so too does the heart-mind; when the heart-mind
changes, so too does the voice (/sound)” (Cook 2012: 724). More specifically, when
The State of the Field Report XIV 701

emotions (which arise from the heart-mind) start to change, yue accordingly varies;
when yue becomes different, different emotions are aroused and further influence
the heart-mind. Last, the significance of yue is revealed in the phrase “樂者, 樂也 yue
zhe, le ye” (“music is used to express joy” or “music is used to enjoy people”) of the
“Yueji” chapter of the Liji. Li draws on this phrase to suggest that music is used to
express joy, a state that is the most essential among people’s various emotions (T. Li
2002b: 68–69).
Peng Lin 彭林 examines how XZMC can be related to the “Yueji” with regard
to yue. The commonalities between the two texts can be observed from three per-
spectives. The first perspective is on yue’s relation with xin. XZMC says “whenever
[expressive] voices/sounds derive from affections genuinely, their entry into and
inciting of the heart-mind is profound” (Cook 2012: 718). Such a relation between
voices and the heart-mind, Peng argues, is also echoed by the view that has been
repeatedly stressed in the “Yueji,” namely “music is the voices of the heart-mind”
(yue wei xin sheng 樂為心聲) (Peng 2004: 37). Second, both texts emphasize the
power of music’s teaching and transformation. For example, the “Yueji” says “music
can rectify people’s heart-mind, move them profoundly, and transform customs” and
XZMC states that “[voices’] inciting of the heart-mind is profound” (Peng 2004:
40). The third perspective is on the relation between ritual and music. Peng under-
stands the sentence of XZMC “yue, li zhi shenze ye 樂, 禮之深澤也” as “music is the
fountainhead of ritual,” which, Peng contends, is consistent with the expressions of
the “Yueji,” namely “Virtue shining in the internal” (de huidong yu nei 德煇動於内)
and “ritual manifested outside” (li fa zhu wai 禮發諸外). In other words, both texts
suggest that music is the origin of ritual, and ritual is the manifestation of music
(Peng 2004: 45).
Li’s and Peng’s studies reveal to us the richness of philosophical significance of
yue in XZMC and XZMC’s complicated relations with other texts. Given that yue
is intimately related to xin, however, we still have not had detailed investigations of
how yue nourishes moral cultivation, particularly the process of “searching for the
[authentic] heart-mind” (Cook 2012: 728). Nor can we find any inquiries of how
XMZC influences later texts, such as the “Yuelun 樂論 (Discourse on Music)” chap-
ter of the Xunzi and the “Yueji.”12

6 Conclusion

Having examined Chinese works on XZMC, we can observe that they are mainly
conducted in the first decade since XZMC’s publication (1998–2008). As this arti-
cle shows, the greatest merit of these works is their emphasis on textual evidence
to reveal XZMC’s significance in the formation of early Chinese philosophy. We
have achieved from multiple sources of evidence better understandings of the com-
plicated textual nature of XZMC, its possible relations with particular philosophical

12
More meticulous investigations on yue have been done in English scholarship. For a study on yue’s
relation to xin, see Brindley 2006. For XZMC’s influence on the “Yuelun” and “Yueji,” see Perkins 2017.
702 Fan He

lineages, and early developments of some crucial terms in Chinese philosophy such
as xing, qing, and xin.
A majority of these studies are, however, based on a problematic assumption on
XZMC, namely, XZMC should be attributed to a particular philosophical linage, be
it Confucianism, or Daoism, or others. Hence, most studies attempt to demonstrate
XZMC to be a Confucian text, which especially belongs to the Zisi-Mengzi line-
age, or even to be composed by a particular thinker such as Ziyou, Zisi, or Gongsun
Nizi.13 Such an assumption is largely due to the fact that most Chinese scholars do
not engage with, or even completely overlook, the contemporary achievements of
English scholarship on early Chinese texts and thoughts. An increasing number of
English scholarship essentially challenges that, in pre-Qin China, there are philo-
sophical lineages called “schools” or an “author” behind a text. Granted, the con-
cepts of “schools” and “author” are not completely overthrown by English schol-
arship, but a more cautious approach to early philosophical texts such as XZMC
should not focus on these doubtful concepts, but rather on investigations of how a
theory in one text is related to, or developed by, its counterparts in others.14 Since
most of XZMC’s key terms such as xing, xin, and qing concern moral psychology,
a study with psychological depth and contemporary philosophical relevance should
consult as many recent advances in cognitive sciences as possible, which Chinese
scholars have largely overlooked.15
Despite some doubt about the research assumption and the limitation of these
works, we all should appreciate Chinese scholars’ concrete and meticulous studies
on XZMC. Their contributions reveal to us the complicated developments of cru-
cial terms and philosophical streams. We can expect that, based on these nuanced
accounts, future works on XZMC and other excavated manuscripts will provide
more profound insights into the developments of early Chinese philosophy.

Declaration The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

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