DISTRICT JUDICIARY, KURNOOL

WORKSHOP-I YEAR 2025

TOPICS FOR PAPER PRESENTATION:

LAW ON LIMITATION: a) Limitation-Suits, Appeals, Applications

b) Computation of period of limitation

PAPER PRESENTATION
BY

S LAKSHMI KARRI

ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE

(JUNIOR DIVISION) NANDYAL ,
KURNOOL DISTRICT
LAW OF LIMITATIONS, LIMITATIONS ON SUITS, APPEALS
AND APPLICATIONS, COMPUTATION OF PERIOD
1. The Code of Civil Procedure confers a right to appeal but does
not prescribe a period of limitation for filing an appeal. The
Limitation Act 1963, however, provides the period for filing
appeals. It states that appeals against a decree or order can
be filed in a high court within 90 days and in any other court
within 30 days from the date of the decree or order appealed
against.
2. It is for the general welfare that a period be put on litigation.
Further, it is a general principle of law that law is made to
protect only diligent and vigilant people. Equity aids the
vigilant and not the indolent. The law will not protect people
who are careless about their rights. Moreover, there should be
certainty in law and matters cannot be kept in suspense
indefinably. It is, therefore, provided that Courts of Law
cannot be approached beyond a fixed period. The Limitation
Act of 1963 provides the limit in civil matters.
3. The “Law of Limitation” prescribes the time limit for diMerent
suits within, which an aggrieved person can approach the
court for redress or justice. The suit, if filed after the
exploration of a time limit, is struck by the law of limitation.
It’s meant to protect the long and established user and to
indirectly punish persons who go into longer slumber over
their rights.
4. The statutory law was established in stages. The very first
Limitation Act was enacted for all the courts in India in 1859.
And finally took the form of the Limitation Act in 1963.
5. A citizen is not expected to master the various provisions
which provide for limitation in diMerent matters but certain
 basic knowledge in this regard is necessary. For instance,
Section 12 of the Limitation Act lays down certain guidelines
regarding the computation of the limitation period. It says
that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal
or application, the day from which such period is to be
reckoned, shall be excluded.
6. Further, the day on which the judgement complained of was
pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the
decree, sentence or order appealed from shall be excluded.
However, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or
order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall
not be excluded.
7. Section 14 of the Act, similarly, says that in computing the
period of limitation, for any suit, the time during for which the
plaintiM has been prosecuted in civil proceedings, whether in
a court of first instance or of appeal or revision against the
defendant shall be excluded where the proceedings relate to
the same matter in a court which is unable to entertain it on
account of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like
nature.

WHAT DOES THE LIMITATION PERIOD MEAN?

The law prescribes diMerent periods within which a person who has
a grievance should go to court. For example, if somebody has
borrowed your money and not returned it, you should approach the
court within three years from the date you lent the money. If you
don’t go to the court within that time, the courts will not be of help
to recover your money. This is called the Limitation period. After the
limitation period, you cannot enforce your rights in a court. The
Limitation Act, of 1963 prescribes diMerent limitation periods for
diMerent kinds of claims.

BAR OF LIMITATION
• Subject to provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act,
every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made
after the “prescribed period” shall be dismissed, although
limitation has not been set up as a defence.[section 3(1)].
• ‘Period of Limitation’ means the period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the schedule
to the Act and ‘prescribed period’ means the period of
limitation computed as per provisions of the Act. [section
2(j)].
• PERIOD AS PRESCRIBED IN SCHEDULE TO THE ACT- The
period has been prescribed in schedule to the Act. Generally,
it is as follows:
(a) 3 years for a suit relating to accounts, contracts,
declarations, decrees, suits relating to movable property,
recovery of law suit under a contract etc.
(b) 12 years for suits relating to possession of immovable
property and 30 years for mortgaged property.
(c) One year for suits relating to torts.
(d) 30 to 90 days in case of appeals under the Civil Procedure
Code and Criminal Procedure Code.- The period of filing an
appeal and application can be extended if proper cause is
shown[section 5].
• If the court is closed on the last day, the suit can be filed on
the next day when the court reopens. [section 4].
 • CONTINUOUS RUNNING OF TIME - When once period of
limitation starts running, it continues even if there is any
subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an
application.[section 9].— However, at the time when a person
is entitled to file a suit or make an application, if a person is
disabled, the period of limitation will start after the disability
is removed.[section 6(1)].
• A misjoinder of parties or of the cause of action shall be
deemed to be a cause of a like nature mentioned above.
Under section 15 of the act, the time during which an
injunction or restraining order issued by a court remains in
force is to be excluded when computing the period of
limitation for any suit or application for the execution of a
degree. In cases, where previous consent or sanction of the
government or any other authority is required under the law,
the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall
be excluded. When a defendant has been absent from India,
the time during which he has been absent can be excluded
from the period of limitation.
• In case, the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or
application expires when the court is closed, the suit, appeal
or application may be instituted on the day when the court
reopens, as provided under section 4 of the act. This is based
on the principle “actus curial neminem gravabit”, which
means that an act of court shall not prejudice anyone. The
court can condone the delay if satisfied that it causes were
beyond the control of the plaintiM too.

CONDONATION OF DELAY RULE 3-A:

• Condonance may be made when an accuser has previously
forgiven or condoned the act about which they are
complaining. In some legal jurisdictions, and for certain
behaviours, it may prevent the accuser from prevailing.
• Rule 3-A has been inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976. It
provides that when an appeal has been presented after the
expiry of the period of limitation specified therefore, it shall
be accompanied by an application that the applicant has
suMicient cause for not preferring the appeal within the time.
• Prior to the insertion of rule 3-A, the practice was to admit
such an appeal subject to the opinion regarding limitation.
This practice was disapproved by the privy—council, and it
stressed the expediency of adopting a procedure for securing
the final determination of the question as to limitation before
admission of appeal. This rule is added to give eMect to the
recommendation of the privy council.
• As observed by the Supreme Court in the state of M.P v.
Prandeep Kumar, the object of the provision is two-fold:
firstly, to inform the appellant that the delayed appeal will not
be entertained unless it is accompanied by an application
accompanying the delay, and second, to communicate to the
respondent that it may not be necessary for him to get ready
on merits as the court has to first deal with an application for
condonation of delay as a condition precedent. The provision
in the Howe directory is not mandatory. If the memorandum
of appeal is filed without an accompanying application for
condonation of delay, the consequence is not necessarily
fatal. The defect is curable.
JUDICIAL ACTIONS:
Raj Bahadur Singh & Another v. D.J. & Others: According to the
learned judge the application 4-GA(format of an application used
under order 9, rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) had been
rejected on two grounds firstly being barred by limitation and
secondly being without any valid ground. Thus, the appeal filed by
the respondents was fully maintainable. He further submitted that
the learned District Judge vide order dated 11.2.2002 had admitted
the appeal while overruling the preliminary objections, and the writ
petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable. In the present
case the question is as to whether an appeal lies against an order
passed by the trial Court wherein it had by a common order
rejected both the applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act
and order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. on the ground that the application is
barred by Limitation and no ground for condonation of delay has
been made out, or a revision lies. If it is held that no appeal lies then
the order admitting the appeal is wholly without jurisdiction and in
such a circumstance a writ petition is maintainable.

LIMITATION OF SUITS, APPEALS and APPLICATIONS

(sections 3 to 11): a
SECTION 3
• Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, every
suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after
the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation
has not been set up as a defence.
• For this Act- a suit is instituted- in an ordinary course when
the plaint is presented to the proper oMicer,
a) in the case of a pauper, when the application for leave to
sue as a pauper is made; and • in the case of a claim
against a company which is being wound by the court,
when the claimant first sends in his claim to the oMicial
liquidator, • any claim by way of set-oM or counterclaim,
shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to
have been instituted- -•in the case of set-oM, on the same
date as the suit in which the set oM is pleaded
b) in case of counter-claim, on the date on which the counter
claim is made in the court. Section 3 of the Limitation Act
enjoins a court to dismiss any suit instituted, appeal
preferred and application made after the period of
limitation prescribed therefore by the Schedule
irrespective of the fact whether the opponent had set up
the plea of limitation or not. It is the duty of the court not to
proceed with the appliance if it is made beyond the period
of limitation prescribed.
c) The court had no choice and if in construing the necessary
provision of the Limitation Act or in determining which of
the limitation act applies, the subordinate court comes to
an erroneous decision, it is open to the court in revision to
interfere with that conclusion as that conclusion led the
court to assume or not to assume the jurisdiction to
proceed with the determination of that matter. Decree not
a nullity- Even if it is true that it is the duty of the court to
take note of the provisions of S.3 of the limitation Act and
to dismiss a suit when it is found that it is barred by
limitation, if the court without taking note of the said
provisions decides a suit on merits, the decree is not a
nullity. It is merely an error of law which can be rectified in
 the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. The
decree or order cannot be held to be a nullity (Ittyavira
Mathai v.VarkeyVarkey, AIR 1964 SC 907) Section 3 limits
the time after which a suit or other proceeding would be
barred. The right to sue and the commencement of the
running of time for the purpose of the limitation depend on
the date when the cause of action arose. A cause of action
is a fact or combination of facts that gives a person the
right to seek judicial redress or relief against another.
Section 3 bars only the institution of suits, applications
and appeals, and the period within which the same has to
be filed. But so far the defence is concerned there is no
such limitation. There can be no period of limitation for
acts which the courts are bound to perform. Section 2(j)
Prescribed Period- “period of limitation” means the period
of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by the schedule, and “prescribed period” means the
period of limitation computed following the provisions of
this Act.

• ShrimantSham Rao Suryavanshi v.Pralhadbhairoba

suryavanshi, 2002, 3 SCC 676- It is, therefore, manifest that
the limitation act doesn’t extinguish a defence but only bars
the remedy. Since the period of limitation bars a suit for
specific performance of a contract, if brought after the period
of limitation, it is open to a defendant in a suit for recovery of
possession brought by a transferor to take a plea in defence
of part-performance of the contract to protect his
possession, though he may not be able to enforce that right
through a suit or action.
 • SECTION 4: Expiry of the prescribed period when the court
is closed-Where the prescribed period for any suit , appeal or
application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit
appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on
the day when the court reopens.
• Explanation: A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day
within the meaning of this section if, during any part of its
normal working hours, it remains closed on that day. Section
4 has nothing to do with the period of limitation. It does not
add to the period of limitation. It only extends the concession
that is not-withstanding that the period of limitation expires
on a day when the court is closed suit appeal or application
may be filed on the day on which the court reopens.

• SECTION 5: Section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963 allows for

the condonation of delay in filing appeals or applications
after the prescribed period of limitation, provided the
appellant /applicant demonstrates a “suMicient cause” for
the delay.This means that the court can accept a late filing if
the applicant explains why they couldn’t file within the time
limit. The concept of “suMicient cause” is interpreted liberally
by courts to ensure justice is served, even if there is a slight
delay.

SUFFICIENT CAUSE:
• SuMicient cause means there should be adequate reasons or
reasonable grounds for the court to believe the applicant was
 prevented from proceeding with the application in a court of
law.
• Section 5 allows the extension of the prescribed period in
certain cases on suMicient cause being shown for the delay
• In the state of West Bengal vs Administrator(1972):
a) The Supreme Court held that the extension of time is a
matter of concession and cannot be claimed by the party
as a matter of right.
b) It is diMicult and undesirable to precisely define the
meaning of suMicient cause. It must be determined by the
facts and circumstances of each case. However, a
suMicient cause should fulfil the following essentials:
i) It must be a cause which was beyond the control of
the party invoking it
ii) He must not be guilty of negligence.
iii) His diligence and care must be shown.
iv) His intention must be bonafide.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR

CONDONATION OF DELAY:
i) The applicant was misled by any order, practice or
judgement of the court in ascertaining or computing the
prescribed period.
ii) Serious illness of the applicant.
iii) Significant changes in the law.
iv) Applicant is disqualified under any law for the time being
in force.
v) Delay in procuring copies from the oMicials.
LATEST JUDGMENT:
Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.R.s. and Ors. Vs. The Special
Deputy Collector(2024):
• The Supreme Court held that, in case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be justified
grounds to condone the delay.

SECTION 6:
• Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an
application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from
which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor
insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the
application within the same period after the disability has
ceases, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time
specified therefore in the third column of the Schedule.
• Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed
period is to be reckoned, aMected by two such disabilities, or
where, before his disability has ceased, he is aMected by
another disability, he may institute the suit or make the
application within the same period after both disabilities
have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the
time so specified.
• Where the disability continues up to the death of that person,
his legal representative may institute the suit or make an
application within the same period after the death, as would
otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.
 • Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section(3)
is, at the date of the death of the person whom he represents,
aMected by any such disability, the rules contained in
subsections (1) and (2) shall apply.
• Where a person under disability dies after the disability
ceases but within the period allowed to him under this
section, his legal representative may institute the suit or
make the application within the same period after the death,
as would otherwise have been available to the person had he
not died.
i) Explanation: For this section ‘minor’ includes a child
in the womb. This section will not grant indulgence to
a minor entitled to prefer an appeal; it provides only
for suits or applications for execution of the decree.

Section 7:
• Disability of one of several persons—-Where one of several
persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an
application for execution of a decree is under any such
disability, and a discharge can be given without the
concurrence of such person, time will run against them all;
but when no such discharge can be given, time will not run as
against any of them until one of them becomes capable of
giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others
or until the disability has ceased.
• • Explanation 1: This section applies to a discharge from every
kind of liability including a liability in respect of any
immovable property.
• Explanation 2: For the purpose of this section the manager of
a Hindu undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law
 shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge, without
the concurrence of the other members of the family only if he
is in management of the Joint family property.
• Narayan v. Babasaheb, 2016(2) JBCJ 415(SC): (2016)6 SCC
725 Facts: A Hindu man who was the original owner of the
ancestral property died leaving his two sons, one being minor,
along with 4 daughters and his widow. A sale deed was
executed by the widow (D2) in favour of one D1 on 20.1.1982
and on 28.11.1988 for the same property. In 1989, suit is filed
by the sons and daughters for recovery of possession and
setting aside the sale deed executed by their mother who has
been arrayed D2 and the purchaser made party as D1. The
first appellate court concluded that Article 60 of the limitation
act, is not applicable to the case as D2 is not the guardian
appointed by the court. Question whether the suit was barred
by limitation, being hit by: Article 60 which prescribes a
limitation of 3 years after the ward attains majority to set
aside the transfer of property made by guardian of ward OR
Article 109 which prescribes a limitation of 12 years when the
suit is by a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law to set aside
alienation made by father of his ancestral property

SECTION 8:
• Special exceptions—Nothing in section 6 or 7 applies to suits
to enforce rights of pre-emotion, or shall be deemed to
extend, for more than 3 years from the cessation of disability
or the death of the person aMected thereby, the period of
limitation for any suit or application. The combined eMect of
s.6, and s.8, read with the third column of the appropriate
 article of the Limitation Act would be that a person under
disability may sue within the same period as would otherwise
be allowed from the time specified therefore in the third
column of the schedule but the special limitation as an
exception has been provided in s.8, laying down that the
extended period after cessation of disability would not be
beyond 3 years of the cessation of the disability or the death
of the disabled person.
• Kolandavel Goukder v.Chinnapan, AIR 1965 Mad 541 Facts:
Some joint family property was sold by the father acting for
himself and on behalf of his minor sons in 1940 and the
purchaser made further sale in 1942. Possession passed
from father to the alienee on 17.8.1942. In this suit filed on
9.1.1958 by the sons it was contended that the period of
limitation I.e, 12 years should be counted from the date of the
youngest son attaining majority or in the alternative, when the
first son becomes the manager of the property after the death
of his father in April, 1948 so that he became capable of giving
discharge on behalf of his brothers also. In the light of this,
the period will start running against them all only from
April,1948.

SECTION 9:
• Continuous running of time-Where once time has begun to
run no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or
make an application stops it. Provided that where letters of
administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted
to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit
to recover the debt shall be suspended while the
 administration continues. Limitation cannot run unless the
cause of action has arisen. A cause of action normally
accrues when there is in existence a person who can sue and
another can be sued, and when all the facts happened which
are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiM to succeed.
Where time has begun to run owing to the right to sue having
accrued to a person not labouring under any legal disability,
the subsequent disability of himself or his son or other
representative is not a ground of exemption from the
operation of the ordinary rule.

SECTION 10:
• Suits against trustees and their representatives-
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing
provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom
property has become vested of trust for any specific purpose,
or against his legal representatives or assigns, to follow in his
or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof or for an
account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any
length of time.
• Explanation: For this section, any property comprised in a
Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable
endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for
a specific purpose, and the manager of the property shall be
deemed to be the trusted thereof.

SECTION 11:
Suits on contracts entered into outside the territories to which the
Act extends:
(1). Suits instituted in the territories to which this Act extends on
contracts entered into the state of Jammu and Kashmir or in a
foreign country shall be rules of limitation contained in this Act.
(2). No rule of limitation in force in the state of Jammu and Kashmir
or in a foreign country shall be a defence to a suit instituted in the
said territories on a contract entered into in the state or in a foreign
country unless a. The rule has extinguished the contract; and b.
The parties were domiciled in that state or in a foreign country
during the period prescribed.

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION

• Section 12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.
• Section 13. Exclusion of time in cases where leave to sue or
appeal as a pauper is applied for.
• Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceedings bonafide in court
without jurisdiction.
• Section 15. Exclusion of time in certain other cases.
• Section 16. EMect of death on or before the accrual of the right to
sue.
• Section 17. EMect of fraud or mistake.
• Section 18. EMect of acknowledgement in writing.
• Section 19. EMect of payment on account of debt or interest of
legacy.
• Section 20. EMect of acknowledgement or payment by other
person.
• Section 21. EMect of substituting or adding new plaintiM or
defendant.
• Section 22. Continuing breaches and torts.
• Section 23. Suits for compensation for acts not actionable
without special damage.
• Section 24. Computation of time mentioned in the instruments.

SECTION 12: EXCLUSION OF TIME IN LEGAL

PROCEEDINGS:
• In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or
application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall
be excluded.
• In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or application
for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgement, the
day on which the judgement complained was pronounced and the
time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order
appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be
excluded.
• Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised
or reviewed or where an application is made for leave to appeal
from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the
judgment.
• In computing the period of limitation for an application to set
aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the
awards shall be excluded.
Case laws:(1). State of Maharashtra vs v.M.R. Apte AIR 1988 SC
1305:
Principle: Time taken to obtain a certified copy must be excluded,
even if the application for the copy was made a few days delay.
• Kailash v. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 1: Explained section 12(2) in
detail and emphasised that time taken for preparing the certified
copy is to be excluded whether or not it is due to appellants delay.
• Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (2005) 12 SCC 1: Explained
section 12(2) in detail and emphasised that time taken for
preparing the certified copy is to be excluded whether or not it is
due to appellants delay.

SECTION 13: EXCLUSION OF TIME IN CASES

WHERE LEAVE TO SUE OR APPEAL AS A PAUPER IS
APPLIED FOR:
• If a person applies for permission to sue or appeal as a pauper
and the application is rejected or allowed but the suit or appeal is
eventually filed, then the time spent during the pendency of that
application is excluded from the limitation period for filing the suit
or appeal.
• The application to sue or appeal as a pauper must be bona fide.
• The time for filing the paper application to the decision on it is
excluded.
• Applies only when the suit or appeal is filed afterwards, either
with court fees or without.
• Case laws:
 (1). Ganesh Prasad v. Lakshmi Narayan AIR 1985 MP 191: When
an application to appeal as a pauper is rejected and the appeal is
then filed with court fees, the time taken in pauper proceedings
must be excluded under section 13. It ensures that litigants are not
penalised for seeking pauper status in good faith.
(2). Jugal Kishore v. Dhanno Devi AIR 1973 All 158: If the application
to sue as a pauper is accepted, the suit is deemed to be filed on
the date of pauper application. No limitation issue arises.
(3). Chandrika Prasad v. Beni Prasad AIR 1952 All 716: Reinforced
that the benefit of section 13 is available even if the application is
ultimately rejected, provided the actual suit/appeal is filed
promptly after.

SECTION 14: EXCLUSION OF TIME OF PROCEEDINGS

BONAFIDE IN COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION:
• If a litigant prosecuted civil proceedings in good faith in a court
that lacked jurisdiction then the time spent in that proceeding is
excluded from the limitation period for filing a fresh case in a
competent court.
• Previous proceedings must have been diligently and in good faith
prosecuted.
• It must relate to the same matter in issue.
• The earlier court must have been unable to entertain the case due
to a defect of jurisdiction or similar cause.
• The current case must be filed in a competent court.
• Case laws:
(1). Roshanlal v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi AIR 1960 SC 940: Even if
the earlier case was withdrawn or dismissed due to lack of
jurisdiction, the time spent is excluded if the litigant acted in good
faith and with due diligence.
(2). Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills (2004) 2 SCC 747:
Section 14 applies even when the earlier proceedings were before
a wrong forum, provided that the party was acting in good faith.
(3). Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank v. Sharma Construction Co. (2004)
2 SCC 385: Explained good faith under section 14. A litigant must
genuinely believe the court had jurisdiction and must have
prosecuted the matter diligently.

SECTION 15: EXCLUDES OF TIME IN CERTAIN

OTHER CASES:
• Allows for exclusion of time from the limitation period when legal
proceedings are stayed by an injunction or order, the institution or
execution of a suit or application is legally restricted, A notice or
sanction is required before the institution.
• Section 15(1): If a suit or execution proceeding is stayed by
injunction or order the period during which the stay was in eMect is
excluded from limitation.
• Section 15(2): If a law requires notice before suing, the notice
period is excluded.
• Section 15(3) to Section 15(5): Cover situations like; Leave to sue
a minor’s estate, Trusts or charitable endowments, and
Proceedings requiring previous consent/ sanction of government.
• Case laws:
(1). M/s. Lakshmiratan Engineering Works v. Asst.
commissioner(Sales tax) AIR 1968 SC 488: When a stay order
prevents a party from initiating proceedings, the time during which
the stay was operative is excluded from limitation under section
15(1).
(2). India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani (2003) 9 SCC 393: The court
held that pendency of a restraint order or injunction will suspend
the limitation, even if it turns out the party could have acted
despite it if they acted bona fide.
(3). Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta and Bros AIR 1971 SC 1558:
Section 15(2) applies where mandatory notice is required, e.g.,
Section 80 CPC. The period of notice is not counted in a limitation.

SECTION 16: EFFECT OF DEATH ON OR BEFORE

THE ACCRUAL OF THE RIGHT TO SUE:
• Section 16 deals with how death aMects the start of the limitation
period when
(1). The person who has the right to sue dies before the right
accrues, or
(2). The person against whom the right lies dies before the right
accrues.
• Section 16(1): If a person who would have had the right to sue dies
before the right accrues, the limitation period begins when there is
a legal representative capable of suing.
• Section 16(2): If a person against whom the right to sue exists dies
before the right accrues, limitation begins when there is the legal
representative of the deceased who could be sued.
• Section 16(3): This section does not apply to suits to enforce
rights of pre-emption, or for possession of immovable property.
• Case laws:
(1). Shiv Dayal v. Sant Ram AIR 1951 All 791: If the plaintiM dies
before the right to sue accrues, limitation starts only when a legal
representative becomes capable of suing.
(2). T. Kaliamurthi v. Five Gori ThaikalWakf (2008) 9 SCC 306:
Section 16(3) was discussed—it bars the application of section 16
to suits for possession of immovable property, reaMirming that
limitation still runs even if death occurs.

SECTION 17: EFFECT OF FRAUD OR MISTAKE:

• When a suit or application is based on fraud or mistake the
limitation period doesn’t begin until the fraud is discovered or the
mistake is known or could have been discovered with reasonable
diligence.
• The fraud/ mistake must directly relate to the cause of action.
• PlaintiM must prove they were kept from knowledge despite
reasonable diligence.
• Once discovered, the limitation starts running.
• Case laws:
(1). P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (1975) 1 SCC 152:
Limitation does not automatically extend merely because a person
alleges fraud there must be a clear proof of it and that it prevented
earlier action.
(2). Ramesh B Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta (2006) 5 SCC 638:
Section 17 is applicable only when the plaintiM could not have
discovered the fraud/ mistake despite reasonable diligence.
(3). Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition OMicer
AIR 1961 SC 1500: Limitation start when the party first becomes
aware of the cause of action—-used as a guiding principle even
before Section 17 was codified.

SECTION 18: EFFECT OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IN

WRITING:
• If, before the expiration of the prescribed limitation period, a
person acknowledges liability in writing and signs it, a fresh limit
period begins from the date of acknowledgement.
• Acknowledgement must be in writing.
• It must be signed by the party against whom the right is claimed.
• It must be made before the original limitation period expires.
• It need not contain a promise to pay but must admit the existence
of a legal relationship.
• It must relate to an existing liability.
• Case laws:
(1). Shapoor Freedom Mazda v. Durga Prasad ChamariaAIR
1961 SC 1236: Acknowledgement under section 18 must be
conscious and voluntary and should show a clear admission of
liability.
(2). Sampuran Singh v. Niranjan Kaur (1999) 2 SCC 679: A mere
reference to a past debt is not enough. There must be a clear
admission of the subsisting liability.
(3). Food Corporation of India v. Assam State Coop. Marketing
(2004) 12 SCC 360: An acknowledgement in a balance sheet or a
statement of account can extend limitation if it meets the
conditions under Section 18.

SECTION 19: EFFECT OF PAYMENT ON ACCOUNT

OF DEBT OR ON INTEREST OF LEGACY:
• If any part payment of a debt or interest on a legacy is made
before the expiration of the limitation period and it is
acknowledged in writing by the debt, a fresh limitation period starts
from the date of that payment.
• Payment must be paid within the original limitation period.
• It must be a part payment of a debt or interest of legacy.
• The payment must be acknowledged in writing.
• The acknowledgement must be signed by the person making the
payment or their agent.
• Case laws:
(1). Seth Talakchand v. Moolchand AIR 1925 Nag 218: Part
payment restarts limitation only when accompanied by a written
acknowledgement, not just oral payment.
(2). Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad AIR 1951 SC 477:
Payment by a third party can extend limitation only if authorised by
the debtor.
During the COVID-19 period (specifically between March 15, 2020,
and February 28, 2022), the limitation period for legal actions was
extended. Regardless of the original limitation period, all persons
were given a new 90-day period from March 1, 2022, to file their
cases. The Indian government extended the limitation period for
various legal actions to address the challenges caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic. The extension applied to the period between
March 15, 2020, and February 28, 2022, according to the Supreme
Court of India ruling.

CONCLUSION:
The computation of the Limitation period under the
Limitation Act of 1963 is guided by the combination of
general principles and specific exceptions provided across
Sections 12 to 24. These provisions aim to balance the
interests of both parties— ensuring timely assertion of
rights while also protecting those who may have been
prevented from acting due to valid reasons such as fraud,
mistake or legal restrictions.

Sri R.V.V.S. Murali Krishna V Additional District and

sessions Judge, Allagadda
Smt.B.Radha Rani Principal Civil Judge,
Senior division, Nandyal
Smt.S.Lakshmi Karri, Additional Civil Judge,
Junior Division, Nandyal