TC- 12 R

CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY), DELHI NCR, INTERNAL RANKING

ROUNDS, 2025

BEFORE

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF

INDIANA

Writ Petition arising out of Article 32 of Constitution of Indiana

IN THE MATTER OF
Writ Petition ( C i v i l ) No. / 2024

NANDITA RAVAL & ORS. ...................................................................PETITIONER

versus
UNION OF INDIANA & ANR.............................................................. RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

 MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [TABLE OF CONTENTS]

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………………………………….. i

II. INDEX OF AUTHORITIE………………………………………………………………………………………… ii

III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………………………………………………………... iv

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………………………………………………... v

V. ISSUES RAISED………………………………………………………………………………………………… vii

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………………………………………………. viii

VII. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED …………………………………………………………………………………... ix

VIII. PRAYER………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. x

Internal Ranking Rounds, 2025

MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS]

I. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Corresponding Expansion

& And
¶ Paragraph
ADR Association for Democratic Reforms
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Corp. Corporation
Const. Constitution
ECI Election Commission of Indiana
Edn Edition
FIRA Foreign Regulations Act
FR Fundamental Right
ILR Indian Law Reports
NBI National Bank of Indiana
PCN(s) Political Contribution Note(s)

R.C.A. Representation of Citizen’s Act

SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Sec Section
UOI Union of Indiana
Vs. Versus

Page | i
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]

II. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASE LAWS

1. State of U.P. v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 865. ……………………………………………. 1,3,15

2. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. …………………………………………. 1,11

3. PUCL v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1440. …………………………………………….. 1,2

4. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124. ……………………………….. 1

5. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523. …………………………………. 1

6. Prabha Dutt v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 6. ………………………………………… 2

7. Union of India v. Association of Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294…………… 2,6,13

8. P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1952 SC 59. ………………………… 2

9. Modern Dental College and Research Centre & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.,
(2016) 7 SCC 353 …………………………………………………………………………... 2

10. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1. ……… 4,6,9,11,14

11. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others, 1992 SCR (1) 686. ……………………….. 5

12. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399……………. 5,11

13. Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1133. …………. 5

14. State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1361. ……………. 6

15. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 41. …………………6,10

16. R.K. Garg & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1982) 133 ITR 239 (SC). ……………….6

17. State of Bihar & Ors. v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 453. …………….8

18. Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2014 SC 2051. …………………… 9

19. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225. …………………………. 10

20. Velayudhan Achari & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 582. …………... 10

21. Ram Jethmalani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 1. ………………….. 11
pg. ii
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]

22. R.K. Garg & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 4 SCC 675. ………………………… 12,13

23. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 2299…………………………. 12

24. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 1. ……………………………… 12,13,14

25. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 597. …………………………….. 12

26. Common Cause v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 9 SCC 499. ……………………………. 13

27. Balco Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 333. …………. 13

INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW

1. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). ………………………….. 4,7,11
2. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010). ……………………………………………………….. 4
3. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). …………………………………………………….. 7
4. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). …………………….. 11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1. INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 1(a).

2. INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 2.

3. INDIA CONST. art. 109.

4. INDIA CONST. art. 110.

5. INDIA CONST. art. 324.

6. INDIA CONST. sched. VII.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. Representation of the People Act, 1951

2. Companies Act, 2013
3. Income Tax Act, 1961- Amendments under Finance Act, 2017
4. Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934
5. Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 2003

REPORTS & COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

pg. iii
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]

1. K. Santhanam Committee Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption (1964)

2. Indrajit Gupta Committee Report of the Committee on State Funding of Elections (1998)

3. Law Commission of India, 170th Report (1999)

4. Law Commission of India, 255th Report (2015)

5. Reserve Bank of India, Digital Payments Index (September 2023).

6. Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), Analysis of Sources of Funding of National and
Regional Parties: FY 2004-05 to 2017-18 (2019).

7. Council of Europe (Venice Commission), Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters:

Guidelines and Explanatory Report (2002).

8. Assam Legislative Assembly, Practice and Procedure of Parliament (7th ed., 2002).

9. Election Commission of India, Annual Report (2019)

BOOKS

1. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press,
1966) – federalism and democracy.

2. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th ed., LexisNexis, 2018).

3. V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India (14th ed., Eastern Book Company, 2020).

4. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th ed., Universal, 2019).

JOURNAL ARTICLES

1. Varottil, U. (2018) ‘Corporate Donations and Democracy in India’ Indian Journal of

Constitutional Law, 5(1), pp. 45–70.

2. Mehta, P.B. (2017) ‘India’s Electoral Funding Crisis’ Economic and Political Weekly,
52(2), pp. 10–13.

LEGAL DATABASE REFERRED

1. WWW.MANUPATRA.COM
2. WWW.SCCONLINE.COM
3. WWW.LEXIXNEXIS.COM
4. WWW.JSTOR.COM
5. WWW.HEINONLINE.COM
pg. iv
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [STATEMENT OF FACTS]

III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court of Indiana.

The Hon'ble Court has Jurisdiction to hear the instant matter under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of Indiana, 1950.

Article 32(1) guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court, for enforcement of
Fundamental Rights.1 Article 32(2) empowers this Hon’ble Court to issue directions, orders
or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo
Warranto and Certiorari for enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III in
the Constitution of Indiana.2
Right of Access to the Supreme Court under article 32 is a Fundamental Right itself.

The present memorandum in the matter of Nandita Raval & Ors. Union of Indiana & Anr.,
sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.

1
INDIA CONST. art. 32, cl. 1.
2
INDIA CONST. art. 32, cl. 2.

pg. v
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [STATEMENT OF FACTS]

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. INTRODUCTION

For many years, the Republic of Indiana faced a significant challenge regarding the
funding of its political parties. A large portion of donations was made in cash, making it
difficult to trace the source of the money. This raised public concern about the role of
unaccounted or "black money" in the nation's democratic process. To address this, the
Union Government announced a new policy aimed at reforming the system.

II. The Political Contributions Scheme, 2017

1. In 2017, the Union Government introduced the Political Contributions Scheme

(hereinafter “the Scheme”) with the stated aim of curbing black money in elections.
The Scheme was enacted through the Finance Bill, 2017, which was certified as a
"Money Bill," thereby bypassing detailed scrutiny in the Upper House of Parliament.

2. The Scheme created a new instrument for political donations called "Political
Contribution Notes" (PCNs). These were bearer financial instruments that could be
purchased from the National Bank of Indiana (NBI) through formal banking channels.

3. The core feature of the Scheme was donor anonymity. While the NBI maintained a
confidential record of the purchaser's identity, this information was not made public.
The PCNs had a validity of 15 days and could be redeemed only by eligible political
parties.

4. To facilitate the Scheme, key laws were amended. The cap on corporate donations,
previously limited to 7.5% of a company's average net profits, was removed. Further,
political parties were exempted from the legal requirement to disclose the source of
donations received through PCNs.

III. The Parties to the Dispute

 The Petitioners: The case has been filed by Ms. Nandita Raval, an investigative
journalist, along with two retired civil servants and a voter rights organization named
Janmat Watch.

 The Respondents: The case is filed against the Union of Indiana, which created the

pg. vi
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [STATEMENT OF FACTS]

Scheme, and the National Bank of Indiana, which was the only bank authorized to
issue the PCNs.

IV. The Controversy

1. In October 2023, The Indiana Ledger, a news outlet, published an investigative report
based on a leaked internal document from the NBI. The report revealed that over
₹9,000 crore had been donated through PCNs in the last five years.

2. The investigation, led by journalist Nandita Raval, found that a few large
conglomerates, including foreign-owned subsidiaries, were the primary purchasers of
these notes. It was also discovered that the vast majority of these donations were
encashed by parties belonging to the ruling alliance.

3. Following these revelations, Ms. Raval submitted formal representations to the

Ministry of Legal Affairs and the Election Commission of Indiana (ECI), urging a
review of the Scheme. The Ministry dismissed her concerns, and the ECI took no
concrete action.

4. The matter was further intensified by a whistleblower from the Ministry of Corporate
Oversight, who revealed that several shell companies with no business operations had
purchased PCNs worth crores.

V. The Legal Challenge Before This Court

1. In February 2024, the Petitioners filed this writ petition before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, challenging the constitutional validity of the Political Contributions Scheme
and the related legal amendments.

2. The central constitutional challenge before the Court is whether the Scheme's core
feature of donor anonymity violates the citizens' fundamental right to information
under Article 19(1)(a), preventing voters from making fully informed decisions.

3. Alongside this, the Court must consider whether unlimited, anonymous corporate
donations undermine free and fair elections under Article 21 and encourage quid pro
quo dealings. Finally, the petition challenges the legislative changes that enabled the
Scheme, questioning if they are arbitrary, and whether the law itself was passed
properly as a ‘Money Bill’.

pg. vii
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ISSUES RAISED]

V. ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1

Whether the Political Contributions Scheme violates the right to information under
Article 19(1)(a)?
ISSUE 2

Whether anonymous political donations breach the constitutional mandate of free and
fair elections under Article 21?
ISSUE 3

Whether the passage of the Political Contributions Scheme through a Finance Bill,
bypassing scrutiny in the Rajya Sabha, violates the federal structure and bicameral
legislative procedure guaranteed under the Constitution?

ISSUE 4

Whether State policy that conceals political funding from public scrutiny can be
constitutionally sustained?
ISSUE 5

Does the PCS facilitate quid pro quo arrangements, thereby undermining the integrity of
the electoral process as protected under Article 21?

pg. viii
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. THAT THE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS SCHEME, 2017 (“PCS”) VIOLATES

THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(A).

The PCS does not infringe Article 19(1)(a), as it balances transparency in political funding
with donor privacy through regulated banking transactions and judicially supervised
disclosure, because [1.1] Article 19(1)(a) Includes the Right to Know, but Subject to
Reasonable Restrictions [1.2] Legitimate Objectives of the PCS and Their Constitutional
Validity [1.3] PCS Satisfies the Four-Stage Proportionality Standard [1.4] Safeguards:
Confidentiality with Accountability [1.5] Privacy and Associational Freedom: Constitutional
Dimensions and Proportionality under PCS.

2. THAT THE ANONYMOUS POLITICAL DONATIONS UNDER THE PCS

BREACH THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
UNDER ARTICLE 21.

Anonymous donations under the PCS do not breach the mandate of free and fair elections
under Article 21, as the scheme curbs black money, protects donor privacy, and strengthens
electoral integrity through regulated banking channels, because [2.1] The Political
Contributions Scheme Strengthens Free and Fair Elections [2.2] Legislative Competence and
Presumption of Constitutionality [2.3] Balancing Privacy and Right to Know [2.4]
Comparative Jurisprudence: Protection of Associational Rights [2.5] Accountability and
Enforcement Safeguards.

3. THAT THE PASSAGE OF THE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS SCHEME

THROUGH A FINANCE BILL VIOLATES THE SCRUTINY OF THE RAJYA
SABHA OR THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND BICAMERAL LEGISLATIVE
PROCEDURE GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.

The passage of the PCS through a Finance Bill does not violate bicameralism or the federal
structure, as it falls within the constitutional framework of Articles 109–110 and addresses
financial matters legitimately, because [3.1] Constitutionally Sanctioned Procedure [3.2] The
Scheme Has a Clear Connection with Financial Matters under Article 110 [3.3] Federalism
and Bicameralism Are Not Violated as the Constitution Limits the Rajya Sabha’s Role in
Financial Matters.

pg. ix
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]

4. THAT THE STATE POLICY THAT CONCEALS POLITICAL FUNDING FROM

PUBLIC SCRUTINY CAN BE CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSTAINED.
The State’s policy of keeping political donations confidential is constitutionally valid, as it
balances the voter’s right to know with the donor’s right to privacy, promotes systemic
transparency, and curbs black money in elections, because [4.1] Presumption of
Constitutionality and Judicial Deference to Legislative Policy [4.2] Right to Know vs. Right to
Privacy: A Constitutional Balancing Exercise [4.3] Proportionality & Systemic Transparency
under the Scheme [4.4] Free & Fair Elections is Strengthened, Not Weakened.

5. THAT THE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS SCHEME FACILITATES QUID PRO

QUO ARRANGEMENTS, THUS UNDERMINING ELECTORAL INTEGRITY.
The PCS strengthens electoral integrity, curbs black money, and maintains accountability,
because [5.1] The PCS is a constitutional reform designed to strengthen, not undermine,
electoral integrity [5.2] Quid pro quo allegations are speculative and unsubstantiated [5.3]
Statutory safeguards preserve accountability [5.4] Corporate and institutional contributions
reflect legislative policy, not arbitrariness [5.5] The PCS is consistent with constitutional
principles under Article 21 and the basic structure

pg. x
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

VII. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: THAT THE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION SCHEME, 2017 (“PCS”) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
RIGHT TO INFORMATION UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(A).

1. It is most respectfully submitted that the Political Contributions Scheme, 2017 (“PCS”) does
not amount to a violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It makes political funding
transparent while still protecting donors’ privacy and freedom to associate, using bank-based
transactions and court-supervised disclosure when needed.

[1.1] Article 19(1)(a) Includes the Right to Know, but Subject to Reasonable Restrictions
2. Article 19(1)(a)3 of the Constitution of Indiana guarantees the freedom of speech and
expression. Courts have recognised that the right to information is an integral part of freedom
of speech and expression.4

3. It is respectfully submitted that the rights under Article 19(1)(a) are not absolute. Article
19(2) expressly permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of
sovereignty and integrity of the State, security of the State, public order, decency, morality,
contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence. 5 Courts have affirmed that while
freedom of expression is fundamental, it is subject to reasonable restrictions in the public
interest.6 Restrictions must be reasonable and proportionate to their purpose.7 The PCS meets
the court’s test by tackling untraceable cash donations through regulated, bank-based
transactions, balancing transparency with donor privacy.

[1.2] Legitimate Objectives of the PCS and Their Constitutional Validity

4. It is humbly submitted that the Political Contributions Scheme (“PCS”) is designed to
advance pressing and constitutionally valid objectives.

3
INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 1(a).
4
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149.
5
INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 2.
6
PUCL v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1440.
7
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523.

Page 1 of 28
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

[1.2.1] PCS Pursues Legitimate and Weighty Public Objectives

5. The primary objective of PCS is (i) curtailing the use of unaccounted cash in political funding
and thereby reducing corruption; (ii) bringing political donations into the formal banking
system so that transactions remain auditable and taxable; and (iii) protecting donors from
political victimisation and coercion, thereby safeguarding their right to democratic
participation. The right to information is not absolute and can be limited to protect
confidentiality and other competing interests.8

6. Such objectives fall within the scope of reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).
Transparency in political finance is a legitimate constitutional goal, though it must be balanced
against competing interests.9 Similarly, in P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, AIR
(1952),10 the Court emphasised that regulatory measures directed at legitimate public interests
do not violate Part III rights.

[1.2.2] Pressing Need in the Present Context

7. The leaked NBL data shows donations exceeding ₹9,000 crore clustered around major policy
events, underscoring the need for a structured mechanism. By retaining a bank-held, judicially
record, while avoiding indiscriminate disclosure, PCS represents a constitutionally
proportionate solution. The Constitution requires a balance between transparency in elections
and legitimate accessible State interests.11 The PCS achieves exactly this balance by ensuring
accountability, while at the same time protecting citizens from unnecessary risks.

[1.3] PCS Satisfies the Four-Stage Proportionality Standard

8. It is respectfully submitted that the Political Contributions Scheme (“PCS”) is by the doctrine
of proportionality laid down in Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016). 12
Firstly, curbing black money, ensuring donations flow only through banking channels, and
protecting donors from retaliation are legitimate aims under Article 19(2). Secondly, its design
has a rational connection to those aims, with KYC-based purchases, short validity of PCNs,
and eligibility filters for political parties. Thirdly, the necessity that the restriction is the least

8
Prabha Dutt v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 6.
9
Union of India v. Association of Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294; PUCL v. Union of India, AIR 2004
SC 1440.
10
P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1952 SC 59.
11
Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294.
12
Modern Dental College and Research Centre & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 353.

Page 2 of 28
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

intrusive method since donor identities are preserved with the National Bank and can be
accessed under judicial orders, thereby safeguarding investigatory needs while protecting
associational freedom. Fourthly, on balance, the limited restriction on public disclosure is
outweighed by systemic gains of clean, auditable funding, as recognized in Puttaswamy (2017)
and S.P. Gupta (1981), making the PCS a constitutionally valid.

[1.4] SAFEGUARDS: CONFIDENTIALITY WITH ACCOUNTABILITY

9.The citizen’s “right to know” is not absolute and may be restricted when stronger public
interests prevail.13 Reflecting this principle, the PCS provides that donor identity can be
disclosed only “under judicial order”, thereby ensuring that confidentiality is conditional and
not absolute. Whenever corruption, criminality, or overriding public interest is established, this
Hon’ble Court or any competent judicial authority may access the relevant bank records.
Further, the National Bank of Indiana, being a public sector bank, employs “fool-proof” and
“scientific” systems to prevent unauthorised executive access; any attempt to illegally retrieve
donor data would leave a digital trail and attract penal consequences. Together, these
safeguards ensure that transparency and accountability are preserved, while secrecy is
maintained only where necessary.

10. The PCS also incorporates deliberate structural and fiscal safeguards against misuse.
Political Contribution Notes (“PCNs”) are valid for only 15 calendar days and may be encashed
solely by political parties that secured at least 1% of votes in the previous General Election
(Annexure I, §4(2)), thereby preventing their use as deferred currency or through sham political
outfits. Moreover, although Section 7 exempts political parties from disclosing donor names in
their reports, every PCN must be purchased through account-payee banking channels
(Annexure I, §4(1)), ensuring that all transactions enter the formal financial system. These
flows remain subject to taxation and audit obligations, preserving fiscal visibility at the
systemic level while safeguarding donor privacy at the individual level. This balance between
confidentiality and accountability renders the Scheme constitutionally reasonable.

[1.5] PRIVACY AND ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOM: CONSTITUTIONAL

DIMENSIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY UNDER PCS

13
State of U.P. v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 865.

Page 3 of 28
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

11. Informational privacy is part of the right to life and liberty under Article 21.14 Political
affiliation, being among the most sensitive forms of personal data, cannot be compulsorily
disclosed without meeting the test of necessity and proportionality. Any mandatory public
naming of donors infringes the associational freedom protected by Article 19(1)(c).

12. Experience demonstrates that disclosure of donor identities has been exploited by rival
political actors to intimidate, boycott, or retaliate against contributors. Compelled disclosure,
in this context, could expose citizens to harassment and deter genuine political participation.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that compelled disclosure was unconstitutional where there
existed a reasonable probability of harassment.15 The PCS addresses these risks by shielding
donor identities from indiscriminate public exposure while maintaining accountability. The
U.S. Supreme Court has also held that disclosure must respect associational privacy, and the
UK allows some anonymous donations.16 The PCS follows this model.

13. It is, thus, most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana that
PCS does not violate Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Indiana.

ISSUE 2: THAT THE ANONYMOUS POLITICAL DONATIONS DO NOT BREACH THE

CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 21.
14. The Respondents submit that anonymous political donations under the PCS do not breach
the constitutional mandate of free and fair elections under Article 21. On the contrary,
confidentiality in contributions safeguards donor privacy, prevents political victimization, and
strengthens electoral participation through formalized, regulated channels.

[2.1] The Political Contributions Scheme Strengthens Free and Fair Elections.
15. The PCS directly addresses the problem of black money in elections by replacing opaque
cash donations with regulated banking instruments. This ensures electoral fairness, consistent
with the constitutional mandate of free and fair elections as part of the basic structure.

[2.1.1] Free and fair elections as part of the basic structure.

14
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1.
15
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
16
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010).

Page 4 of 28
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

16. The Respondents respectfully submit that the principle of free and fair elections forms part
of the basic structure of the Constitution.17 This principle was also reaffirmed in PUCL v.
Union of India.18 In these cases, the Supreme Court held that democracy thrives only when
elections are conducted on a level playing field free from undue influence. The PCS aims
precisely at this end, it replaces the opaque and unregulated flow of black money in cash with
a formal banking channel, thus preventing unaccounted wealth from distorting electoral
outcomes.

[2.1.2] Historical context of unregulated funding.

17. Electoral corruption arising from cash donations has been a long-standing concern. The
Santhanam Committee Report (1964)19 and the Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998)20 both
highlighted the pervasive role of illicit money in elections. The Supreme Court itself
acknowledged these reports and called for systemic reform. 21 Further, the Law Commission of
India, Report No. 255 on Electoral Reforms (2015),22 specifically flagged the risks posed by
unchecked corporate donations and black money, recommending curbs through statutory
mechanisms. The PCS is therefore a constitutionally sound legislative response to decades of
documented concerns, securing electoral fairness by ensuring contributions flow through
banking instruments.

[2.2] Legislative Competence and Presumption of Constitutionality

18. Parliament has express competence to regulate elections and political finance, and its policy
choices enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. The PCS, being an economic reform measure,
deserves judicial deference unless it clearly violates fundamental rights.

[2.2.1] Wide legislative competence under Articles 245–246.

19. The power of Parliament to legislate on matters relating to elections flows from Entries 72
and 97 of List I, read with Article 324 of the Constitution.23 Parliament is therefore well within
its competence to regulate electoral finance. Questions of legislative policy fall squarely within

17
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others, 1992 SCR (1) 686.
18
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399.
19
K. Santhanam Committee, Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption (1964).
20
Indrajit Gupta Committee, Report of the Committee on State Funding of Elections (1998).
21
Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1133.
22
Law Commission of India, 255th Report: Reform of the Electoral Laws, (1999).
23
INDIA CONST. art. 324.

Page 5 of 28
MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

Parliament’s domain, unless they transgress fundamental rights.24 The PCS, being an economic
and electoral reform measure, is a matter of policy and thus lies within Parliament’s
prerogative.

[2.2.2] Presumption of constitutionality and judicial deference in economic reforms.

20. It is a settled principle that every law made by Parliament enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality unless clearly shown to be arbitrary or unconstitutional. 25 Furthermore, in the
Supreme Court stressed that courts must allow “play in the joints” for economic reforms and
tolerate trial-and-error methods.26 The PCS, being an innovative attempt to channel political
contributions away from black money and into formal systems, is precisely the kind of
experiment that merits judicial deference rather than intervention.

[2.3] Balancing Privacy and Right to Know

21. The scheme strikes a proportional balance: it protects donor privacy from public retaliation
while ensuring that enforcement agencies retain full access through NBI records. Thus, voters’
right to know is preserved in its proper scope without overreach.

[2.3.1] Privacy is a fundamental right, but not absolute.

22. Supreme Court has the right to privacy a facet of Article 21, 27 but clarified that it is not
absolute. Any limitation is permissible if it passes the tests of legality, necessity, and
proportionality. The PCS meets this standard: while the public does not have blanket access to
donor identities, such details remain available to the issuing bank (NBI) and can be compelled
by courts or enforcement agencies during investigation. Thus, proportionality is maintained,
anonymity protects donors from reprisals, but accountability remains through institutional
safeguards.

[2.3.2] Right to information of voters is not unlimited.

23. The scope of the voter’s right to know has been judicially recognized primarily in relation
to the disclosure of information concerning electoral candidates, such as their criminal records,
assets, liabilities, and educational qualifications. 28 The Court in this case expressly confined

24
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1361.
25
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 41.
26
R.K. Garg & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1982) 133 ITR 239 (SC).
27
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1.
28
Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 294.

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MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

disclosure to candidate-related information and left the regulation of political funding to

Parliament. Extending the doctrine to compel disclosure of every political donor would
constitute judicial overreach into policy. The PCS thus maintains a constitutionally valid
balance by insulating donors from retaliation while preserving enforcement-level transparency.

[2.4] Comparative Jurisprudence: Protection of Associational Rights

24. Global democratic practice and U.S. jurisprudence recognize that compelled disclosure can
chill political participation. The PCS follows a hybrid model, safeguarding associational rights
under Article 19(1)(c) while aligning with international norms.

[2.4.1] International precedent favors anonymity in political participation.

25. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that compelled disclosure of association members would
chill freedom of association under the First Amendment. 29 It recognized that compelled
disclosure in political funding can deter individuals from exercising their political rights. 30 By
analogy, the PCS safeguards associational freedom under Article 19(1)(c)[16] by permitting
donors to contribute without fear of reprisal or retribution.

[2.4.2] International practices show hybrid disclosure models.

26. Globally, democracies adopt varied disclosure thresholds. In the U.K., donations below
£500 are not disclosed publicly; in Canada, only contributions above CAD 200 require
disclosure.31 The PCS follows a similar “hybrid” model, where donor identities are known to
regulated banking authorities but not released into the public domain. Thus, far from being
unconstitutional, the scheme aligns India with globally accepted democratic practices.

[2.5] Accountability and Enforcement Safeguards

27. Through KYC-based purchase of bonds and NBI’s record-keeping, PCS ensures
traceability and accountability. Concerns of misuse cannot justify invalidation, as the scheme
offers a stronger safeguard than unregulated cash donations.

[2.5.1] PCS ensures traceability and accountability.

28. The Law Commission of Indiana in its 255th Report on Electoral Reforms (2015) observed

29
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
30
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
31
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, § 54 (U.K.).

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MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

that unchecked cash and corporate donations severely undermine electoral integrity, and
therefore recommended greater reliance on banking instruments and stricter disclosure norms
for political funding. Unlike the earlier system of cash donations, Electoral Bonds are
purchased only through KYC-compliant banking channels. Thus, the State Bank of Indiana
retains donor details, which can be accessed by enforcement agencies when investigating
corruption or quid pro quo arrangements. This is a significant improvement over unaccounted
cash donations, ensuring both traceability and accountability.

[2.5.2] Fear of misuse cannot invalidate legislation.

29. It is trite law that a statute cannot be struck down merely on the possibility of misuse. 32 If
there are concerns about quid pro quo between corporations and political parties, the answer
lies in better enforcement, not judicial invalidation. The PCS already provides a robust
framework for transparency within the system, while insulating donors from undue harassment.

30. It is thus, most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana that
the PCS does not violate free and fair elections or voters’ right to know. Instead, it
strengthens the electoral process by curbing black money, balancing transparency with
privacy, aligning with international practice, and ensuring accountability through
banking channels.

ISSUE 3: THAT THE PASSAGE OF THE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION SCHEME THROUGH A FINANCE BILL
DOES NOT BYPASS SCRUTINY IN THE RAJYA SABHA AND DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FEDERAL
STRUCTURE AND BICAMERAL LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.

31. It is respectfully submitted to this Hon’ble Court that the Political Contributions Scheme
(PCS), 2017, passed through a Finance Bill certified as a Money Bill under Article 110, does
not violate bicameralism or the federal structure. 33 Rather, it is a legitimate and constitutionally
valid exercise of the legislative process.

[3.1] Constitutionally Sanctioned Procedure

32. The Speaker’s Certification is Ordinarily Final and Subject to Only Limited Judicial
Review Article 110(1) covers taxation, appropriation, and matters incidental thereto. The
Scheme amends the Income Tax Act (tax exemptions), the RBI Act (banking oversight), and

32
State of Bihar & Ors. v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 453.
33
INDIA CONST. art. 110.

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MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

the Companies Act (corporate donations), all financial. Article 110(3) of the Constitution of
Indiana explicitly provides that “the decision of the Speaker of the House of the People on
whether a Bill is a Money Bill shall be final.” The Speaker’s certification attracts absolute
constitutional deference, and courts cannot interfere absent a clear constitutional violation. 34

33. Article 122 bars judicial inquiry into “any alleged irregularity of procedure” in Parliament.
The certification of a Bill as a Money Bill is an internal proceeding of Parliament and thus
protected, absent a manifest violation of the constitutional text. The majority in Puttaswamy
judgement35 reaffirmed that the Aadhaar Act was a valid Money Bill, adopting the “substantial
nexus/dominant thrust” test.

3.2 The Scheme has a clear connection with financial matters under Article 110
34. The Political Contributions Scheme, in its pith and substance, falls within the ambit of
Article 110 as it primarily regulates fiscal and banking mechanisms of political contributions.
There is Substantial nexus with taxation, borrowing, and practice of parliament. The Scheme
regulates issuance of contribution instruments through a bank, changes rules of company
donations, and impacts taxation and disclosure. These subjects directly fall under Article
110(1)(c)(g), like “taxation” and “borrowing of money. Parliamentary practice shows that if
the main purpose of a Bill is financial, then adding some incidental provisions does not take
away its Money Bill character.36 No binding precedent renders the Finance Bill route
unconstitutional.

3.3 Federalism and bicameralism are not violated because the Constitution itself limits
the Rajya Sabha’s role in financial matters
35. Bicameralism and federalism are respected, not violated, by the Finance-Bill route; the
Constitution itself narrows the Council of States’ role in Money Bills, and the subject is within
Union competence.

3.3.1 Bicameralism is qualified in fiscal matters, and no impact on States’ powers

36. Article 109 deliberately restricts the Rajya Sabha’s powers with respect to Money Bills.
Giving it only recommendatory powers. Bicameralism, therefore, is not an absolute feature in

34
Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2014 SC 2051.
35
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1.
36
Assam Legislative Assembly, Practice and Procedure of Parliament, 7th ed., Assam Assembly, 2002.

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MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

fiscal legislation, but a constitutionally qualified mechanism, not absolute. 37 The Constitution
itself defines the basic structure, and here, the framers deliberately circumscribed the Upper
House’s role in fiscal legislation.38 The Scheme deals with corporate donations, banks, and
Union taxation, all of which are in the Union List.39 Hence, there is no violation of Federalsim.

3.3.2 Policy purpose supports constitutionality

37. The aim of the (PCS) Scheme was to reduce black money in elections and promote banking-
channel contributions. This supports transparency and cleaner elections. Reports by the Law
Commission and the Election Commission have suggested reforms in political funding. 40 Even
the RBI’s Digital Payments Index shows India’s shift towards cashless systems.41 These policy
purposes underline the Scheme’s constitutional legitimacy.

Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the passage of the Political Contributions

Scheme through a Finance Bill does not bypass the scrutiny of the Rajya Sabha
unconstitutionally, and does not violate the principles of federalism or bicameralism.
Instead, it falls squarely within the constitutional framework of Articles 109- 110, is
supported by legislative practice, and furthers legitimate public policy objectives.

ISSUE 4: THAT THE STATE POLICY THAT CONCEALS POLITICAL FUNDING FROM PUBLIC SCRUTINY
CAN BE CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSTAINED.
38. It is respectfully submitted that the State’s policy of keeping political donations confidential
is constitutionally valid, as it is presumed to be lawful, balances the voter’s right to know with
the donor’s right to privacy, and is a fair measure to tackle the problem of black money in
elections.
[4.1] Presumption of Constitutionality and Judicial Deference to Legislative Policy
39. It is a well-established principle that every law passed by the legislature is presumed to be
constitutional. These economic and regulatory policies must be examined with restraint unless
they are arbitrary or violate explicit constitutional provisions.42 When a law is made to deal
with deep-rooted social or economic problems, it should be given more freedom and respect. 43

37
INDIA CONST. art. 109.
38
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
39
INDIA CONST. sched. VII.
40
Law Commission of India, 255th Report: Reform of the Electoral Laws, (1999).
41
Reserve Bank of India, Digital Payments Index, September 2023.
42
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 41.
43
Velayudhan Achari & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 582.

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MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

Such laws cannot be struck down just because they are not perfect, and courts should not
interfere by replacing the choices made by the legislature in complex financial matters.
The Political Contributions Scheme, 2017, is considered a legislative choice to address the
problem of unaccounted money in elections. The Scheme builds in clear rules, KYC-based
purchase through designated banks, 15-day validity, restriction to parties with at least 1% vote
share, and mandatory audited accounts (Annexure I)- showing careful legislative reasoning.
This represents a “hierarchy of evils” approach, preferring a regulated, confidential banking
system over an opaque cash-based regime. Within this carefully structured framework, the
Scheme deserves judicial restraint and constitutional endorsement.

[4.2] Right to Know vs. Right to Privacy: A Constitutional Balancing Exercise

40. The right to information is not absolute; it is backed by reasonable restrictions.44 The voter’s
right to know extends to the background, educational qualifications, and assets of candidates,
not the donors.45 Further, under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, personal information of third
parties need not be disclosed. Thus, a balance must be struck between the voter’s right to know
and the donor’s right to privacy. 46
The Scheme ensures “confidentiality, not absolute anonymity.” Donor details are recorded with
the National Bank of Indiana through full KYC norms, as mentioned in Annexure I, sections
4- 5. These records are available to competent authorities, the Election Commission, or Courts
in appropriate proceedings (Annexure I, Sec. 4(3)). It keeps donor identities private while still
making sure the system as a whole can be checked and held accountable. 47

[4.3] Proportionality & Systemic Transparency under the Scheme

41. Applying the proportionality test from Puttaswamy and Modern Dental College v. State of
M.P. (2016) 7 SCC 353, the Scheme passes, Legitimate Aim- Curtailing black money in
elections is a compelling constitutional objective.48 Rational Nexus- Mandatory KYC,
restricted validity, and encashment only through registered party accounts ensure traceability.
Necessity- Compared to an unregulated cash regime, the Scheme is a less intrusive, more
effective measure. Balancing- Voter information rights are preserved where relevant (candidate
data), while donor privacy is safeguarded within a verifiable, auditable structure. As Annexure

44
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 149.
45
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 399.
46
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1.
47
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334.
48
Ram Jethmalani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 1.

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MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

I provides, Bonds are valid for only 15 days to prevent misuse as currency (section 7). KYC-
based purchase (section 5). Convert only by eligible parties with at least 1% vote share (section
6). The mere possibility of misuse cannot be a ground to strike an entire policy. The correct
remedy lies in stricter enforcement. 49

[4.4] Free & Fair Elections is Strengthened, Not Weakened

42. It is respectfully submitted that free and fair elections form part of the basic structure of the
Constitution.50 Ensuring meaningful participation in democracy requires elections free from
the undue influence of money power.51 Citizens should be able to take part in elections that are
fair and free from unfair influence. 52 Pre-2018, nearly 69% of political funding came from
unknown sources, creating opacity and undermining fairness. 53 The Scheme, being less
intrusive, follows both constitutional and international standards Vienna Convention, FATF.
The Scheme strengthens free and fair elections by cutting down black money while still
protecting people’s legal rights.
43. Therefore, it is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana
that the State policy regulating political funding through confidentiality measures is
constitutionally sustained.

ISSUE 5: THAT THE STATE POLICY THAT CONCEALS POLITICAL FUNDING FROM PUBLIC SCRUTINY
CAN BE CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSTAINED

44. It is respectfully submitted that the Political Contributions Scheme (PCS) was enacted as a
structural reform to curb black money in electoral finance and to promote clean political
funding. Far from facilitating quid pro quo arrangements, the scheme introduces regulatory
safeguards that strengthen electoral integrity under the Constitution.

[5.1] The PCS is a constitutional reform designed to strengthen, not undermine, electoral
integrity
45. The PCS was introduced as a systemic electoral reform aimed at reducing corruption and

49
R.K. Garg & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 4 SCC 675.
50
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 2299
51
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 1.
52
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 597.
53
Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), Analysis of Sources of Funding of National and Regional Parties:
FY 2004-05 to 2017-18, (2019).

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MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

enhancing accountability. The scheme fits within the constitutional framework of Articles 14,
19, and 21, and addresses the menace of unregulated cash donations.

[5.1.1] Electoral integrity is a constitutional mandate but legislative wisdom governs

policy design
46. The Respondent submits that the right to free and fair elections flows not only from Article
21, but also from Articles 14 and 19.54 While electoral integrity is part of the basic structure,
this Court has consistently held that the legislature enjoys wide discretion in economic and
electoral reforms, subject only to a high threshold of manifest arbitrariness. 55

[5.1.2] The scheme curbs unaccounted “black money” in political finance.

47. Prior to the PCS, nearly 95% of political donations were in unregulated cash. 56 These
opaque channels enabled quid pro quo arrangements. By routing donations through banking
channels with mandatory KYC compliance, the PCS strengthens traceability and curbs
corruption.

5.2 Quid pro quo allegations are speculative and unsubstantiated

48. The allegations of quid pro quo are based on conjecture and lack evidentiary backing. This
part elaborates how judicial review requires concrete proof of corruption, why confidentiality
under PCS cannot automatically be equated with corruption, and why policy reforms cannot
be struck down merely on suspicion.

49. In the context of coal block allocations, that corruption requires proof of a nexus between
benefit and consideration; suspicion cannot substitute for evidence. 57 Petitioners have failed to
show any specific instance where a donation under PCS resulted in governmental favour. The
policy measures cannot be invalidated on speculative grounds. 58 Similarly, the Court upheld
electoral reforms as legislative prerogative.59 Allegations that PCS “may” enable quid pro quo
are insufficient to strike it down.

54
Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 294.
55
R.K. Garg & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1981) 4 SCC 675.
56
Law Commission of India, 255th Report: Reform of the Electoral Laws, (1999).
57
Common Cause v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 9 SCC 499.
58
Balco Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 333.
59
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 1.

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MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

5.2.1 Donor confidentiality is a safeguard, not a corruption mechanism.

50. The confidentiality clause under PCS protects donors’ political affiliations, which fall
within the right to privacy.60 Just as the principle of secret ballot shields voters from
retribution,61 confidentiality protects contributors from victimization. Confidentiality fosters
participation, not corruption.

5.3 Statutory safeguards preserve accountability

51. The PCS incorporates several in-built checks that preserve systemic transparency, even
while protecting donor anonymity. This section shows how eligibility conditions, KYC
compliance, limited validity, and carefully drafted exemptions balance accountability with
donor privacy.

52. Under Section 4 of the PCS, only political parties registered under Representation of
Citizens Act, and having secured at least 1% votes in the preceding election, are eligible. This
excludes non-serious entities and enhances accountability. (Annexure 1, § 4(2))
Section 4(3) requires full KYC compliance for purchasers. Thus, while donor identity remains
confidential from the public, it is accessible to banking and enforcement authorities (Annexure
1, § 4(3)). This balances privacy with oversight, as recommended by the Election
Commission’s 2014 Consultation Paper on Electoral Reforms.

[5.3.1] Exemptions are a conscious legislative choice.

53. Sections 7 and 9 of the PCS expressly exempt political parties and companies from
disclosure obligations otherwise applicable under electoral and corporate law. This is not
opacity by default but a deliberate legislative mechanism to prioritize donor confidentiality and
incentivize legitimate, banking-channel donations. Electoral reforms lie primarily within the
legislature’s domain, and judicial review is limited to cases of manifest arbitrariness. Hence,
the disclosure relaxations under the PCS remain constitutionally valid. 62

[5.3.2]Limited validity of bonds prevents misuse.

54. The 15-day validity of electoral bonds prevents hoarding or circulation as parallel currency,
thereby eliminating the risk of them becoming instruments of political black money.

60
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1.
61
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 1.
62
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 1.

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[5.4] Corporate and institutional contributions reflect legislative policy, not arbitrariness
55. The removal of the 7.5% cap under Section 182 of the Corporate Operations Act was a
deliberate legislative decision, aligning India with global approaches that prioritize flexibility
in corporate donations. While critics such as ADR and the Election Commission have voiced
concerns, policy trade-offs in electoral finance are for Parliament to decide.

[5.4.1] Comparative and international support.

56. The electoral funding reforms must strike a balance between transparency and donor
rights.63 PCS embodies this balance, ensuring donor confidentiality while mandating systemic
accountability.

5.5 The PCS is consistent with constitutional principles under Article 21 and the basic
structure
57. PCS preserves electoral fairness by channeling funds through formal systems.
Unlike unregulated cash donations, PCS creates verifiable trails and enforces accountability.
Far from undermining electoral integrity, it strengthens the democratic process. Larger parties
naturally attract more contributions, but Article 21 does not mandate equal financial footing.
The right to know exists only to facilitate informed voting, not to equalize political resources. 64
Similarly, PUCL required transparency for voter choice, not parity of funding.
Before PCS, over 90% of donations were in cash, with no accountability. 65 Now, regulated
banking channels, KYC norms, and statutory audits create traceable records. Thus, PCS
reduces quid pro quo risks and enhances electoral integrity.

58. The Respondent respectfully submits that the PCS does not facilitate quid pro quo
but instead reduces corruption by mandating banking channels, KYC norms, and
statutory audits. Allegations of misuse are speculative and cannot override legislative
wisdom. The scheme upholds, rather than undermines, electoral integrity under Articles
14, 19, and 21.

63
Council of Europe (Venice Commission), Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters: Guidelines and
Explanatory Report, (2002).
64
State of U.P. v. Raj Narain & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 865.
65
Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), Analysis of Sources of Funding of National and Regional
Parties: FY 2004-05 to 2017-18, (2019).

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MEMORIAL on behalf of RESPONDENTS [PRAYER]

VIII. PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, it is most
humbly and respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be graciously pleased to:

1. Adjudge and declare that the Political Contributions Scheme, 2017, is a valid and
constitutional exercise of legislative and executive power.

2. Adjudge and declare that the amendments to the Corporate Operations Act, the
Representation of Citizens Act, and the Foreign Influence Regulation Act are
constitutionally valid.

3. Dismiss the Writ Petition as being without any merit and being unsustainable in
law.

AND / OTHERWISE
PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR GRANT ANY OTHER RELIEF THAT
THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, EQUITY,
AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE RESPONDENTS AS IN DUTY BOUND,

SHALL FOREVER PRAY.

ALL WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

___________________________________________________________________________

Sd/-

COUNSELS FOR RESPONDENTS

pg. xi