The Measure of Battle: A Study of Combat Effectiveness in the S. 4th Armored Division and the German Panzerlehr Division in the ETO (July 1944 to December 1944) A Professional Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies Spring 2003 By Bob E. Willis Jr. Committee Dr. Michael Pavkovic (First Reader) Dr. Russell Hart (Second Reader)We certify that we have read this professional paper and that, in our opinion, itis satisfactory in scope and quality for the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies. Committee Pall Fae First Reader Second Readeriii Abstract Historians are more frequently examining the subject of what makes military units effective in combat and are increasingly concluding that the ability of nations to create and sustain successful combat formations has played a key role in determining the course of world history from the Napoleonic era to the present. Although the discipline of combat effectiveness studies is expanding in time and diversity, the most passionately debated conflict within the field of study remains the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during World War Il. Even though the fighting that raged across Western Europe between Germany and the Allies ended nearly sixty years ago, historians are busier than ever comparing the soldiers, the armies and the different national systems for creating and sustaining effective militaries. ‘This paper seeks to add to this field of study. While not overlooking the important contributions of other Alli countries, this is a study of U.S. and German combat effectiveness. The central question addressed in this paper is how effective were the U.S. 4th Armored Division and the German Panzerlehr Division, divisions that were in the top tier of the opposing armies most reliable and successful combat units of the war, at winning on the battlefield from July 1944 to December 1944? The principal aim is to provide a unique divisional-level perspective of combat performance over an extended period of time as battlefield conditions changed. As a secondary objective, this paper also seeks to evaluate the relative persuasiveness of the opposing schools of thought in the historical debate over U.S.-German combat effectiveness in respect to this case study. The similar operational histories of the 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division from Normandy to the Ardennes provide an exceptional opportunity to analyze and compare the battlefield performance of two highly successful fighting organizations. ‘Thiscomparison illuminates the relative effectiveness of each formation and serves as a point of reference to draw conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing schools of thought concerning U.S.-German combat effectiveness. Acknowledging that combat effectiveness is described in many different paradigms and is by its very nature a subject that resists quantifiable defi ion, this survey attempts to analyze and compare, as objectively and evenly as possible, which division most frequently and successfully accomplished its assign mission taking due consideration to the bigger strategic and operational picture in the respe armies. Four main sections comprise the foundation of this paper. It begins with a summary of the historiography of U.S.-German combat effeetiveness in the ETO. It then examines the 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division from the institutional perspective focusing on their respective doctrine, tacties, organizational structure and equipment, logistics and available manpower, training and the qualities of the individual soldier. An operational account of each division is then examined focusing on the three instances where the divisions’ combat histories intersected at the same time and on the same important battlefields: Normandy (July, 1944), the Lorraine (November, 1944) and the Ardennes (December, 1944). The divisions’ performance in each of these battles is examined and compared focusing on combat performance as evaluated against the criteria of "mission accomplishment” and examined in light of the overall operational and strategic context. This "measure of battle” concludes with an overall assessment of combat effectiveness of each division and an appraisal of the opposing schools of thought concerning U.S.-German combat effectiveness in light of this study's findings. The ultimate conclusion of this study is that the 4th Armored Division evolved to become comparatively more combat effective because it was more consistently employed according to itsfundamental doctrine, learned on the battlefield and become tactically sound, was lead by capable commanders who made quick and decisive battlefield decisions, benefited from significantly better logistical and manpower reserves and, despite a lack of veteran combat experience in July 1944, was well-trained in the three years leading up to its employment. The Panzerlehr Division did possess some advantages but not enough to offset its weaknesses. The division's strengths were its veteran combat experience, high level of motivation, the superiority in quality of weapons systems, especially tanks and anti-tank systems, and an excellent organizational structure with an powerful balance of tanks and infantry. In summary, the decisive factors that made the 4th Armored Division more combat effective than the Panzerlehr Division by December 1944 were superior doctrinal and tactical employment, logistics and manpower, battle command and training (in spite of inferior weapons, deficiencies in organizational structure and a lack of combat experience). In regards to the stated objective of appraising this subject's historiography, this analysis concludes that the historians (Michael Doubler, Keith Bonn, Peter Mansoor, Russell Hart, and others) who have proposed that U.S. combat uni evolved on the battlefield to ultimately outfight the Germans have a more compelling argument than the "Cult of the Wehrmacht."vi Contents List of Ilustrations Introduction ‘Summary of the Study Methodology Available Sources Summary Historiography Evolution of the Historical Debate The Early Years: the "Marshall Effect" and the German Generals The "Cult of the Wehrmacht" A Reconsideration of the U.S. Army Summary The Opposing Divisions' Organization and Disposition Doctrine and Tactics Organizational Structure and Weaponry Battle Command Logistics and Manpower Individual Soldier Effectiveness: Training, Experience and Combat Motivation Summary Operational Comparative Analysis ‘Normandy Panzerlehr Division Attack 16 (7-11 July 1944) 4th Armored Division's Breakthrough to Avranches (28-31 July 1944) Lorraine Operations along the Sarre River (22 November - 7 December 1944) ‘The Ardennes Panzerlehr Division's Attack 10 Seize Bastogne (17-20 December 1944) 4th Armored Division's Attack to Relieve Bastogne (22-26 December 1944) ‘Summary Conclusion Summary of Doctrine and Tactics Summary of Organizational Structure and Weaponry Vii 19 23 25 26 27 33 40 41 SI 61 66 B 83 87 88 97 105 108, 121 123 135 147 152 155Vii Summary of Battle Command Summary of Logistics and Manpower Summary of Ind Appraisal of the Historical Debate Appendices A. 4th Armored Division Organizational Diagram and Organic Units B. Panzer Lehr Division Organizational Diagram and Organic Units C. 4th Armored Division Key Attachments (July 1944 to December 1944) Bibliography 159 162 165 168 71 172 1B 175Vili Iustrations Maps . Panzerlehr Division Attack (Vire-Taute Canal), 11 July 1944 . 4th Armored Division Attack (Périers to Coutances), 28-29 July 1944 . 4th Armored Division Attack (Coutances to Avranches), 30-31 July 1944 4th Armored Division and Panzerlehr Division Operations East of the Sarre River, 18-30 November 1944 Panzerlehr Division Attack (Our River to Bastogne), 16-19 December 1944 6. 4th Armored Division Attack (Relief of Bastogne), 22-26 December 1944 Table - Operational Comparative Analysis (Key Battles) 94 99 100 113 129 142 87Introduction: Military history helps us to understand how militaries succeeded in the past so that we may have a more mature and enlightened understanding of what will work in the future. ~ Historian Jeremy Black! Summary of the Study ‘The explanation of how nations create and sustain effective fighting forces is an important question for military professionals and historians alike. For military professionals, the abi ity to create combat units capable of fighting and winning in uncertain conditions against an array of potential adversaries is an essential aspect of preserving national security. For historians, the effectiveness of fighting forces plays a key role in the "big picture:" it can determine the winners and losers in the most defining events in human history. Historians in particular are more frequently examining this subject of what makes an army effective in combat in addition to the time-honored, straightforward campaign and battle narratives conventional to military history. The subjects of this field of study are expanding in time and diversity, from the Amny of Revolutionary France to the U.S. Army in Desert Storm.” Whether approaching combat effectiveness from the perspective of historian or military professional, the most written about and hotly argued conflict in the field of study remains the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during World War Il. The campaigns waged across Western Europe between the Allied and German Armies were part of a large, high-intensity, ‘modern-industrial, ideological war. This conflict continues to provide historians an opportunity * From Dr. Jeremy Black's opening remarks during a special guest lecture at Hawaii Pa 2008. ? an example ofthe wide-ranging spectrum of combat effectiveness studies are John Lymn, The Bavonets ofthe Republic (Chicago: University of ilinois Press, 1984) and Robert Seale, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Office ofthe Chief of Sta, U.S. Army, 1993), ie University, Januarying battlefield combat to compare different national systems for creating and sustai effectiveness. This paper seeks to add to this field of study. While not overlooking the important contributions of other Allied countries, this is a study of U.S. and German combat effectiveness. ‘This paper examines U.S. and German combat effectiveness in the ETO from the divisional level perspective. It first examines key aspects of the structure and composition of the USS. Amy's 4th Armored Division and the German Army's Panzerlehr Division and then compares their combat performance from Normandy to the Battle of the Bulge, a period spanning from July 1944 to December 1944. ‘These divisions’ parallel operational histories during this period present a unique case study to compare the opposing forces’ combat performance at the tactical level.’ This work follows a comparative analysis approach and proposes that a detailed examination of these units’ organization and their fighting performance over several months will show a compelling picture of their relative combat effectiveness. This comparative method is an ideal approach for studying combat effectiveness as, according to historian Martin van Creveld, "it alone allows the facts to speak for themselves.” Additionally, this tactical level unit comparison approach presents an alternative perspective to assess the merit of the key historical arguments on the overall combat effectiveness of the U.S. Army and the German Amy, the Heer, in the ETO. 2 The tactical level is aterm used to describe one of the three levels of war (strategic, operational and tactical). ‘Tactics is described here as the "realm of close combat, where forces are in immediate contact and use direct and indirect fires to defeat or destroy enemy forces and to seize or retain ground.” The tactical level is the "employment ‘of units in combat, it includes the ordered arrangement of maneuver units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious bales and engagements.” U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (June 2001) 2-5. * A concept attributed to Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982) 177. * "Heer: Army. The regular German Army, Began formation in 1933, announced to the world in 1935, disbanded in August of 1946 by the Allies." Feldgrau, Glossary of German Military Terms and Abbreviations,A prevailing methodological approach to military history is to examine wars and their armies in political, economic, social or cultural contexts. While this approach provides a broader understanding of conflict in general, it often overlooks the fundamental explanations of how armies fight and win at the sharp end of the sword. Historian Russell Hart suecinetly summarized this point in Clash of Arms saying: "while economic, industrial and demographic strength have played major roles in determining the outcome of modern wars, militaries have still had to win on the battlefield."* The central question addressed in this paper is how effective were the 4th Armored Di ision and the Panzerlehr Division, divisions that were the top tier of the opposing armies most reliable and successful combat units of the war, at winning on the battlefield from July 1944 to December 1944? The principal aim is to provide a unique perspective in a growing field of study where, according to historian Keith Bonn, “historians and, at least in the United States, ranking soldiers, sometimes hotly debate the relative merits and proficiency of the opposing sides in the West in 1944-45."" Asa secondary objective, this paper also seeks to evaluate the relative persuasiveness of the opposing schools of thought in the historical debate over U. .-German combat effectiveness in respect to this case study. Four central parts compose the foundation of this paper. It begins with a summary of the historiography of U.S.-German combat effectiveness in the ETO during World War Il. It then examines the 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division from the institutional perspective focusing on their respective doctrine, tactics, organizational structure and equipment, training and the qualities of the individual soldier. The operational history of each division, in the key battles from Normandy through the Ardennes, is then examined and compared focusing ® Russell Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001) 2. A quote from Keith Bonn in the forward to Heinz Gunther Guderian's From Normandy to the Ruhr: With the 116th Panzer Division in World War Two (Bedford, PA: Aberjona Press, 2001) ix-.on combat performance as evaluated against the criteria of "mission accomplishment” and examined in light of the overall operational and strategic context. This "measure of battle” concludes with an evaluation of the overall level of combat effectiveness of each division and an assessment of the opposing schools of thought concerning U.S.-German combat effectiveness in light of this study's findings. Methodology ‘The 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division were very similar units in both organization and operational history. This similarity provides a base for a credible case study that compares battlefield performance and serves as a point of reference to draw conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing schools of thought concerning U.S.-German, combat effectiveness. The similarity of these two units is based upon three characteristics. First, both units were considered to be the respective armies most effective units and were regarded as two of the premier fighting divisions on either side in the theater. Second, the 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division were organizational equivalents: combined arms divisions with similar strength, weapons and equipment. Finally, both divisions fought in a number of ‘common campaigns, at times going head-to-head in battle, resulting in comparable operational histories. Between July 1944 and December 1944, both divisions fought in Normandy, Lorraine and the Ardennes.* This represents a unique situation in the ETO where comparable units fought D * For the purposes of this study, the campaigns are simplified as Normandy, the Lorraine and the Ardennes although the U.S. Army's official campaign titles identify the major operations in the ETO as differently. The U.S. Army in World War Il, European Theater of Operations series categorizes these campaigns as Breakout and Pursuit (I July to 11 September 1944), The Lorraine Campaign (1 September to 18 December 1944) and The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge (16 December 1944 to 3 January 1945).almost continuously for seven months in the same major campaigns with only minor periods of recovery and reconstitution. The method constructed for conducting this comparative analysis is explained by addressing four key questions. First, why a divisional-level case study and what can it tell us about overall combat effectiveness? The second question is why the 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Divi mn; how are they representative of the opposing armies? Third, why is this study focused on the period from July 1944 to January 1945; why not continue through to the end of the war? And finally, how is combat effectiveness evaluated; what standard is presented to assess the units’ combat performance? ‘The answers to these four questions provide the general framework for this paper's methodological approach. Why a Divisional-level Comparative Study? ‘The idea of a divisional level case study on combat effectiveness in the ETO originated from two disparate sources - the writings of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz and a regimental history from the U.S. Civil War. One of the key objectives in this comparative analysis is to "advance from the simple to the complex" - a theoretical approach on the study of war attributed to Clausewitz in On War.'° Clausewitz proposed that in the study of war, it was advantageous to "consider first the single elements of our subject, then each branch or part, and, ° This assertion is based upon two processes: (1) a detailed examination of armored divisions and Panzer Divisions’ campaign histories inthe ETO from the U.S. Army's Order of Battle (U.S. Amy, Headquarters, Office ofthe Theater Historian, ETO, Order Of Batle of The United States Army, World War Il, European Theater Of Operations- Divisions, and Shelby Stanton's Order of Batle, US. Army in World War If) and the Heer's Order of Battle (Samuel Mitcham, Hitler's Legions, The German Army Order of Bauile and Andris Kursitis, The Wehrmacht at War, 1939-1945) 0 determine what units were employed inthe theater, and (2) a systematic "by-battle” cross reference to determine which units were most frequently opposed in the major campaigns (from the U.S. Army "Greenbook Series" and other battle and campaign studies cited inthe bibliography). Another similar comparison derived from this earch was the U.S. 3rd Armored Division and the German 116th Panzer Division. "© Cari von Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin, 1968) 101last of all, the whole, in all its relations, therefore advancing from the simple to the complex." ‘The advantage of Clausewitz's approach was that "the consideration of any of the parts" helped to better understand "the nature of the whole."'? The historiography of combat effectiveness in the ETO however has taken a completely inverse approach than the method proposed by Clausewitz. A review of the historical literature on combat effectiveness in the ETO reveals a trend of “top-down,” macro-level analysis, or examining the subject in its total sum then proceeding backwards to examine more narrowly focused aspects. The first school of thought to emerge in this process approached the subject from the macro-level, or in the words of Clausewitz, it considered "the nature of the whole.” Historians such as Overy, Why the Allies Won (1977), Dupuy, A Genius for War (1977), Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (1981), van Creveld, Fighting Power (1982), Hastings, Overlord, (1984), and Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness, (1988) each presented arguments on the overall effectiveness of the U.S. and German armies in their entirety." Bach of these works addressed combat effectiveness from "the nature of the whole,” but from different angles. Van Creveld, Dupuy and Millett and Murray took the direct approach, examining the subject through comparisons of the opposing nation's armies and their respective levels of effectiveness. Overy, Weigley and Hastings took the indirect approach, ing traditional campaign and battle studies to draw conclusions on overall effectiveness. "bia Ibid. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Norton and Company, 1977); Trevor Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977); Russell Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945, (Bloomington, Indiana Indiana University Press, 1981); Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939- 1945 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982); Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Batle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Allan Millet and Williamson Murray, (Editors), Miliary Effectiveness, Vol. 3 The Second World War (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988)As the field of study evolved, the next generation of historians began to narrow the focus of combat effectiveness studies. This current school of thought on ETO combat effectiveness is noticeably represented by, although not limited to, serving or former U.S. Army Officers examining specific campaigns, Examples of this school are Bonn, When the Odds Were Even (1994), Hart, Clash of Arms (2001) and Rush, Hell in Hiirtgen Forest (2001)."* Michael Doubler's Closing with the Enemy (1994) was the forerunner of the new direction in combat effectiveness studies and went beyond specific campaigns to study key systemic aspects of combat performance such as battlefield tactical evolution and flexibility.'’ Peter Mansoor's The GI Offensive in Europe (1999) approached the subject from the perspective of particular types of units, such as the U.S. infantry divisions.'® In summary, it is evident that the combat effectiveness field of study has advanced from the complex to the simple, examining first the whole, then the many parts. '7 At present, no study has undertaken a detailed examination and comparison of the parallel operational history of two divisions over the course of the fighting in the ETO. A tactical-level comparative analysis of representative U.S. and German combined arms divisions over an extended period of operations should therefore contribute to the historical literature by identifying certain trends that support or contradict the opposing schools of thought on U.S.- Keith Bonn, When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains, October 1944-January 1945 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994); Russell Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Alles Won in Normandy. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001); Robert Rush, Hell n Harigen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001). 'S"Michael Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIS Fought the War in Europe 1944-1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994). "Peter Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions 1941-1945, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999) "Not surprisingly, these two schools of thought differed not only in their approach, but in their overall conclusions concerning combat effectiveness 2s wel (se this papers historiography).German combat effectiveness. '* This idea originated from an unlikely source- a U.S. Civil War regimental history. In A Brotherhood of Valor: The Common Soldiers of the Stonewall Brigade, CSA and the Iron Brigade, USA, historian Jeffry Wert examined the operational histories of two of the Civil War's most respected fighting units during the key battles of the conflict. Wert set out to create "more of a dual history than a comparative study" but discovered when recounted together, the separate histories "allowed for the integration of comparative analysis" and provided a unique perspective on the opposing armies' military effectiveness.'” In A Brotherhood of Valor, Wert focused on the Confederate Army's Stonewall Brigade and the U.S. Army's Iron Brigade for three reasons. Both units were recognized as the most successful fighting commands in the conflict, a wealth of available material existed to accurately recount their histories and both brigades fought in the same theater, in many of the same battles, and "on three fields, stood opposite each other in combat."*" The idea for a possible World War II divisional level comparative study began as a question sparked by interest in Wert's method. Could the same approach be applied to the ETO? Did the scenario exist in the ETO where similar type U.S. and German units fought in a number of common battles? That scenario ced in the case of the 4th Armored Dit e jon and the Panzerlehr Division and it poses an interesting divisional combat effectiveness comparative study. There are dangers involved in pursuing this method. First, there is the certainty that no ‘two units are ever exactly alike and no single unit can exemplify the effectiveness of an entire army. This study makes no claim to either assertion. However, this methodological danger "* Some works have taken a similar approach that yielded useful comparisons such as Joseph Balkoski’s Beyond the Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1989). However, Balkoski's book is limited to the performance of U.S. and German infantry in the Normandy campaign only. " Jefity Wert, Brotherhood of Valor: The Common Soldiers of the Stonewall Brigade, CSA and the Iron Brigade, USA, (New York: Touchstone, 1999) 9-11. °° Wert, d Brotherhood of Valor, 1.presents a challenge rather than an insurmountable obstacle to developing reliable conclusions concerning overall combat effectiveness from the division-level comparison.”! Special consideration has therefore been taken to avoid unfounded assumptions. In the words of Martin van Creveld, this comparative analysis intends to "allow the facts to speak for themselves."”” To achieve this objective, the ultimate assessment of combat effectiveness must be objective and impartial and therefore based upon reliable information from trustworthy primary and secondary sources. This approach, by neces: jons for the sake of , limits the scope to two practicality and feasibility. Additionally, both units are the most like comparison possible. A perfect comparative study is impossible: no two U.S. units were exactly alike let alone two opposing divisions. However, the differences should not be exaggerated and many relevant, similarities existed as will be illustrated. Furthermore, as long as armed conflict exists, itis extremely important to examine the nature of how forces fight and win on the battlefield. Comparative studies are a sensible approach to achieve that purpose. As explained by van Creveld, "a comparison between dissimilar forces is the only one possible; for what is to be gained by comparing two identical spheres?" ‘The Selection of the Units The second part of the current study's method that must be addressed is why the 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division; to what degree are they representative of the opposing armies? ‘The answer is based upon two qualifications defined for the framework of the 7" Russell Hart also cautions that comparing the Heer and its opponents at any fixed point is "inherently misleading” {due to the timelines of rearmament and that a more balanced method is to compare armies "atthe peak of their efficiency and accomplishments." Hart, Clash of Arms, 5. 2 Van Creveld, Fighting Power, 177. » Ibid10 study: each division had to be an organic combined arms unit and each division had to be involved in the key battles and campaigns throughout the duration of the fighting in the ETO. The decision to focus on combined arms divisions was based on a desire to achieve a broad perspective of combat effectiveness that included the major combat arms and weapons systems. ‘This combined arms qualification narrowed the scope of the type of divisions to U.S. armored divisions and German panzer divisions. These units were the primary types that organically combined the combat arms of infantry, armor and artillery at the division level.” The second discriminating factor was the emphasis on examining units with the most combat experience exclusive to the ETO. Of the sixteen U.S. armored divisions formed during World War Il, there were only five that served in the ETO from July 1944 to the end of the war earning campaign streamers in the five major campaigns (Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes, Rhineland, and Central Europe); these were the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, Sth and 6th Armored Divisions.”* On the German side, in the summer of 1944 there were twenty-three panzer divisions in the Heer and an additional seven in the Waffen SS.° Among these thirty divisions, eleven were committed to the German Army in the West, the Westheer, for the majority of 2" The USS. Army's 1940 “triangular infantry division” did not possess organic tank units. Independent tank battalions assigned at army or corps level (known as General Headquarters or GHQ units) were normally task ‘organized with infantry divisions depending on the situation. This method of employment frequently confined GHQ tank battalions to infantry support as opposed to exploitation. Michael Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 302; U.S. ‘Amy, Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1941). In the Heer, Panzergrenadier Divisions were not considered because oftheir irregular ‘organization and equipment authorizations for their single panzer battalions. In any case, only the 17 SS Panzergrenadier Division was employed in the ETO during the period considered in this study; Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944, German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Ejectiveness, (Winnipeg: JJ Fedorowicz, 2000) 363-369; Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 41-48. 2 U.S, Amy, Order Of Battle of The United States Army, World War It, European Theater Of Operations- Divisions 2 A full account ofthe number and employment of Germany's panzer division is provided in Germany's Panzer ‘Arm. R.L. DiNarclo, Germany's Panzer Arm (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1997) 103. "Waffen SS: Armed ‘Schuizstaffel. Units ofthe political organization of the SS, the German Schutsstafel. The Waffen-SS is often ‘mistaken for the SS itself, and although a part of the larger structure ofthe political SS, the Waffen-SS was a frontline fighting organization that would grow to well over 500,000 members by the end of WWI," from Feldgraw, Glossary of German Military Terms and Abbreviations.u operations in the ETO between June 1944 and the end of the war; these were the 2nd, 9th, 11th, 2ist, 116th, and the 130th Panzerlehr Divisions along with the Ist, 2nd, 9th, 10th, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions.” Using this order of battle method to narrow the field of possible units down to a select few divisions, the remaining criteria to develop the case study are based on the three imperatives as described by Wert: successful units, available sources and similar operational histories. The 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division best met these conditions for a useful comparative analysis. In summary, each division was considered to be in the top tier of the most capable commands in the conflict, a wealth of available material is available to accurately recount their histories, and both units consistently fought on the same battlefields, engaging each other in close battle on a number of occasions. The degree to which each unit fulfills the first of these three conditions requires a brief explanation." ‘The 4th Armored Division was perhaps the most renowned fighting division in the entire ETO. Without entering into an unproductive and pointless argument on the best division in the theater, the 4th Armored Division was certainly evaluated as among the best by the Allied senior leadership. Shortly after the war ended, General of the Army George C. Marshall instructed Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower to prepare recommendations for those divisions deserving of recognition for outstanding service in the ETO. Eisenhower instructed Colonel S.L.A. Marshall, the ETO Chief Historian, to evaluate the combat records of the divisions that fought in the ETO to determine those units whose "performance has been ” Kursietis, The Wehrmacht at War. ™ The assessment of the sources available for this study is found in the Notes on Sources section, the Historiography and the Bibliography. See note 9 for a description ofthe "order of battle method" for determining the most frequent aivis See also the Historical and Evaluation Research Organization's (HERO) Quantified Judgment Method (QJM) Data Base on engagements in the ETO. Trevor Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War (Fairfax, VA: HERO Books, 1985) 233-237.12 consistently strong and meritorious and in particular operations has been outstanding."”” Eventually, Eisenhower recommended only three of the sixteen armored divisions in the ETO to the War Department for commendation: the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions.”® Ultimately, on June 14, 1945, at Landshut, Germany, the 4th Armored Division became the only armored division and only the second entire division of any type in U.S. Army history to receive the Distinguished Unit Citation.*" On the German side, the Panzerlehr Division was considered an elite division for two reasons: its unique organization in regard to its quality of personnel and equipment levels and its distinguished combat performance. The Panzerlehr Division was created especially for the defense of the West.” In January 1944, the division was formed from the cadre of the Heer's Panzerlehrtruppen (armor demonstration troops) from the Bergen Training Area and transferred to France. The core Lehr unit's cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers were mostly experienced combat veterans and were selected for their positions based on their combat elite skills and demonstrated battlefield heroism.”® Additionally, the Panzerlehr was the best- ‘equipped division in the Heer.’ General Fritz Bayerlein, the division's commander, s ® From the Headquarters, U.S. Forces, ETO "Distinguished Unit Citations for Divisions" as cited by Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 264-265, 315 nA. > Additionally, only seven ofthe forty-three infantry divisions and the 101st Airborne Di Mansoor, The G! Offensive in Europe, 264-265. >! The citation was awarded for the division's actions between 22 December 1944 and 27 March 1945, a period ‘encompassing its achievements in the relief of Bastogne during the Battle ofthe Bulge. This citation was largely considered at the time as an inclusive award for its outstanding performance and accomplishments in battle since landing in Normandy in July 1944 (U.S. Army, 4th Armored Division, "Presidential Unit Citation,” typescript, 1945, available at hitp:/'www-fourtharmored.com and U.S. Army, The Army Almanae: A Book of Facts Concerning the Army of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, pp. 510-592). The only other entre U.S. Ibid » According to the report "Panzerlehr Division” status report "Zustandbericht und Kriegsgliederung, Stand: 1.6.1944," NARA T-18, 623. Hart, Clash of Arms, 307, 331 n17. See Appendix B for the Panzerlehr Division's ‘organizational diagram and organic units jon were recommended,The Panzerlehr Division was the best-equipped division Germany ever had. It was one hundred percent armored, even the infantry was completely mechanized. All this was because of our unique mission of throwing the invading Allies back into the sea -- it was planned to make this the greatest panzer division that ever existed. In spite of heavy losses suffered between operations in Normandy in June and July 1944 and operations in the Ardennes five months later, the Panzerlehr Division was one of the few German divisions that maintained a consistent level of offensive capability. Within the German Army High Command, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (abbreviated OKW), in June 1944, there was serious concern over the readiness of the panzer divisions assigned to Panzergruppe West: "only the Panzerlehr Division, 12th SS Panzer Division, 2nd Panzer Division, and the 21st Panzer Division possessed sufficient serviceable panzers and wheeled transport to enable them to be committed as a complete division."** Over the next five months, the Panzerlehr Division was consistently evaluated as one of few fully combat effective units on the Western Front. The division sustained it superior level of combat power in relationship to the rest of the German Army over the course of the fighting between Normandy and the Ardennes. As an example of its the relative sustained combat power fh Panzer Army commander General Hasso von Manteuffel personally rated only four of his armored formations as "good attack formations” (the 116th Panzer, 2nd Panzer, and Panzerlehr Divisions, and the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade) in preparation for the Ardennes offensive in December 1944.7 ° Ms # ETHINT-66, Fritz Bayerlein, "Panzerlehr Division Mission (Jan -28 June 1944)" 3-4. % OKs assessment ofthe panzer divisions in the west is from Victory at Mortain. Mark Reardon, Victory at Mortain: Stopping Hitler's Panzer Counteroffensive (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002) 2-3. Panzergruppe Wes, intially commanded by General Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, was a special armored staff created in 1944 to supervise the training and operational employment ofall armored forces inthe west and was responsible forthe planning of the armored counterattack after the Allied landings. Hitler, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt (Commander, Oberbefelshaber (OB) West), Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (Commander, Heeresgruppe 8B) and von Sweppenburg argued over the readiness and tactical disposition of the panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions in the west. DiNardo, Germany's Panzer Arm, 61. *" Hugh Cole, The Ardennes: The Baitle ofthe Bulge (Washington: GPO, 1965), 176.14 The Time Period ‘The third aspect of this paper's method relates to the time period selected for the study. ‘The parameters for this analysis are July 1944 to December 1944, although the inclusive dates for the entire land campaign in the ETO are 6 Tune 1944 to 8 May 1945, or D-Day to Germany's capitulation. The start point for the study focuses on operations in Normandy in July 1944. On the western flank of the Normandy beachhead line in July 1944, between St. L6 and the Atlantic coast of the Contentin Peninsula, the combat histories for both divisions intersected on the same battlefield for the first time.* Although both divisions fought until the end of the war in Central Germany, the period from January 1945 to the end of the war is not germane to this project.” ‘The Ardennes offensive marked the beginning of the end for German forces in the field. "The costs incurred by the Germans in manpower, equipment, supplies, and morale during the Ardennes-Alsace battles were instrumental in bringing about a more rapid end to the war in Europe."*” In short, the course of the war was no longer in doubt after the Battle of the Bulge; "the carefully husbanded enemy reserves that the Allies expected to meet in their final offensive into ® The Panzerlehr Division was employed a month earlier than the 4th Armored Division and obviously showed the effects in July ofthe previous months bitter fighting. ‘The Panzerlehr Division was first employed against the British 7th Armored Division, British XXX Corps, along the Bayeaux-Tillysur-Seulles-Villers-Bocage line in the first days after the initial D-Day landings. The Panzerlehr Division suffered serious losses in the chaotic German response to the Allied landing » The Pancerler Division surrendered to U.S. Army forces in the Ruhr Pocket in April 1945 (Kursiets, The Wehrmacht at War, 139) while the U.S. 4th Armored Division fought through Germany pursuing enemy unit all the way to the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, where the division performed occupation duties unt its return tothe US. in April 1946 (U.S. Army, Order Of Bauile of The United States Army, World War I, European Theater Of Qperations- Division) USS. Army Center of Military History, Ardennes-Alsace: The US. Army Campaigns of World War IT (Washington, D.C.: CMH Historical Division) 5115 iveness in the Germany had been destroyed in December and January."*' German combat effe field was dwindling at an increasing rate after January 1945. The same is true for the Panzerlehr Division itself. Germany's greatest division was built for Normandy, was smashed by the end of July 1944, essentially rebuilt for the Ardennes offensive, and smashed again, On 19 January 1945, Helmut Ritgen described the Panzerlehr Division as mere "remnants." In describing the Ardennes Offensive's effects on the German Army, historians Wil ymson Murray and Allan Millett noted: "the German's had nothing left except enemies."* Based on the Heer's situation in the West in final months of the war, the usefulness of a comparative combat effectiveness study ends after the defeat of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 to. January 1945, ‘The Measure of Combat Effectiveness The final aspect of the methodology that must be addressed is the question of evaluating. combat effectiveness. To say that combat performance is the ultimate standard to judge armed forces may seem simplistic or overly obvious. However, the concept of combat effectiveness has only recently been considered an important dynamic, possibly even the decisive factor, in determining the outcome of war. A dominant, or at least widely accepted definition or standard to assess a units! combat performance in historical terms has yet to emerge. Peter Mansoor offers a simple but powerful argument against quantifying combat effectiveness: "since war involves the vagaries of human behavior under extreme stress, accurate quantification of combat “bid. ® Ritgen, The Western Front 1944, 292. © Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, A War fo Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000), 47116 effectiveness is not possible, but itis possible to examine successful military organizations to determine what makes them work, for in the end, success in war is the only standard by which to judge military organizations."“* foundation of this paper is a belief that war, and by extension An important philosophic: combat effectiveness, is more “art” than "science." Therefore, empirical models such as the Quantified Judgment Method (QJM) developed by Colonel Trevor Dupuy are of lesser value than the evaluation of a unit's capabilities based upon sound historical analysis as suggested by Doubler, Mansoor, Hart and others.*> When evaluating the 4th Armored Division and this paper, three important concepts are applied. ‘The first is a relatively straightforward and objective measure of combat effectiveness: borrowed from Mansoor and defined as the “ability of a military organization to achieve its assigned missions with the least expenditure of resources (both material and human) in the shortest amount of time." Using mission accomplishment as a "measuring stick" for combat effectiveness is however imperfect and certainly has its own hazards. It is entirely possible for great units to perform remarkably well and yet ultimately fail to accomplish their mission, especially if the mission is unrealistic for logistical reasons or the broader operational picture makes the task ible to carry out in the beginning, This is perhaps the greatest weakness in the ive combat effectiveness studies: the failure to adequately assess the "big picture” and to draw conclusions about its impact on the studied units performance. “ Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 2-3 “ This Quantified Judgment Method (QJM) concept is based upon the comparison of factors such as Combat Effectiveness Variables (CEV), pioneered by Trevor Dupuy, (Numbers, Predictions and War,) and used as an analytical mode! in various modified forms in historical literature such as John Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, and modern war gaming as explained by Charles Hawkins, Combat Effectiveness: A Brief Survey, United States Marine Corps War Gaming and Simulation Center (Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia, August 1990). * Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 3.7 The second concept therefore adds a greater degree of subjectivity but also adds the important contextual variable: the missions themselves must be realistically achievable and the units" performance must be evaluated in the broader operational and strategic context. In an effort to achieve this contextual framework, the current study examines how well the 4" Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division actually fared in combat (or the objective mission accomplishment standard) examined in light of the characteristies of operations (or the "big picture” such as the strategic and operational situation, weather, terrain, air superiority, etc.). By overlaying the broader external situation on the measure of mi jon accomplishment, the degree of the objective evaluation is tempered by including the intangibles. This process hopefully provides a more sophisticated view of the mission, the inherent capability of the respective unit and ultimately, the overall level of combat effectiveness in each division. Lastly, a broad framework of intrinsic variables impact upon a unit’ ability to accomplish the mission” and these are considered throughout the work, When considering the totality of forces that impact the ability of a military force to accomplish its assigned task, each factor can be categorized as either internal or external. Unfortunately, mi ry historians tend to illuminate the later while ignoring the importance of the former. One of the principle arguments of this study is that the internal combat effectiveness factors in the case of the 4th Armored and Panzerlehr Divisions were equally as important as the external factors in determining how each formation performed. In simple terms, internal factors are those activities and processes, be they intellectual or physical in nature, which a particular unit has a moderate to high degree of control over. Conversely, external factors influence how a particular military force performs in battle but are normally beyond the span of control or influence of the unit. Using this example, doctrine and training are intrin18 while national armaments production air supremacy are external to, or beyond the control of, an armored ground formation, Of course doctrine is written by armies not field divisions, however, divisions have a large degree of latitude of how closely they implement doctrine at the tactical level. ‘The same can be said of training, though circumstances and army policy may dictate how much and what type of training can or should be conducted, divisions to a large degree determine how aggressively and efficiently training is executed. At the other end of the spectrum, line divisions normally have no influence over armament strategy or how strategic and tactical air power is allocated, Current U.S. Army doctrine calls these internal variables the elements of combat power.*” Historians who have examined these factors have used different terminology to describe essentially the same framework: Michael Doubler in Closing with the Enemy uses the definition "combat power", John Lynn's "Model for Combat Effectiveness" in Bayonets of the Republic uses the terms "motivational and military systems,” Trevor Dupuy developed an elaborate model called "Combat Effectiveness Variables" and Peter Mansoor categorizes the elements into human, organizational and technical groups."* For the purposes of this project, these variables are addressed as the units’ organization and disposition and include five key areas doctrine and tactics; organizational structure and weaponry; battle command; logistics and manpower; and the training, combat experience and motivation of the individual soldiers. In summary, the overall measure of combat effectiveness is a composite assessment based on the objective standard of efficient and expedient mission accomplishment, a “US. Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations. * Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 8; Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 22; Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War, 185-232; Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 2-419 consideration of the broader operational and strategic context, and finally, the totality of the units' organization and disposition.” Available Resources ‘The types of references used in this study fall into one of three categories: first, studies that specifically focused on the subject of combat effectiveness, secondly, traditional campaign and battle stu s that provide general information on the 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division and finally, and lastly, unit histories, documents and other sources that, provide specific information on the 4th Armored Division and the Panzerlehr Division. Since the early 1980s, a number of studies have emerged on the subject of combat effectiveness in the ETO. Two definitive schools of thoughts have developed and the often-heated debate continues. ‘The opposing schools of thought are largely divided between advocates of the superiority of the Wehrmacht, even in defeat, and those who advocate the notion that the U.S. Army evolved to become the most effective army in the theater. The debate over U.S.-German combat effectiveness is important to this paper's overall conclusion, therefore the available sources specific to this endeavor are briefly summarized here and more fully addressed in the historiography in the following section. In the almost sixty years since the end of World War Il, perhaps no other conflict in the field of military history has been the subject of more campaign and battle studies than the ETO. Keith Bonn asks in his introduction to When the Odds Were Even: "what facets of the fighting in © Organizational structure includes: doctrine and tactics, organization and weaponry, battle command, logistics and ‘manpower, training and motivation of the individual soldier (explained in Section lil). Battlefield effects describes those variables outside the direct control or influence of a particular unit but nevertheless shapes the outcome ofits battles, they may be natural variables such as Weather and terrain or man-made such as air superiority.20 the ETO have not been studied, dissected, examined, and reexamined by countless authors in ‘every manner from comic books to major works of scholarly research?"” Having too many historical studies is certainly better than too few and this work would not be possible without the vast amount of research on the campaigns and battles in the ETO. The United States Army in World War If Series, more commonly known as the "Green Books," is perhaps the single best modem official history of any conflict. The ETO sub-series in the Green Books primarily cover the land operations on the European continent from the U.S. perspective and focuses on the strategic to tactical levels and includes the units, commanders, planning, and logis Fortunately for undertaking, the Green Books’ contributing authors consistently emphasized a particular theme: "the end purpose of all activity in the theater was- as always in war- to close with the enemy and destroy him, a majority of the volumes deal with tactical operations."*' The ETO sub-series consists of ten volumes divided along the key operations or distinct phases of the war. Four volumes from the ETO sub-series are used extensively through this work: Cross- Channel Attack, Breakout and Pursuit, The Lorraine Campaign, and The Ardennes. In addition to the ETO Green Books, there is a truly extensive number of scholarly campaign and battle studies important to the examination of combat effectiveness in the ETO.* Some examples of these excellent campaign and battle studies are: Hart, Clash of Arms (2001), Hastings, Overlord (1984), D'Este, Decision in Normandy (1983), Rickard, Patton at Bay (1999), MacDonald, 4 Time for Trumpets (1985), Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (1981), ® Keith Bonn, When the Odds Were Bven, 1 * United States Army in World War I! Reader's Guide, (CMH Publication 11-9 Center of Military History, United ‘States Army, Washington, D.C., 1992) 70. * Some of these works are also discussed in detail as key works in the combat effectiveness historiography.